1 Tuesday, 12 October 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, we resume this morning to continue with

6 the presentation of the Defence case.

7 MR. KAY: Yes, Your Honour. Before we start, there is a

8 preliminary -- [German spoken on English channel]

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: There seems to be a problem with the -- is it the

10 interpretation? Start again, Mr. Kay.

11 MR. KAY: There's a preliminary matter -- [German spoken on

12 English channel]

13 THE INTERPRETER: Into which language, Your Honour?

14 JUDGE KWON: We have an interference on the English channel.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would the registrar advise us, how long that will

16 take to be resolved?

17 MR. KAY: I'll do it in English and not French.

18 There is a preliminary issue of a witness to be called this

19 morning, who is Mr. Hutsch. Mr. Hutsch is a journalist and war

20 correspondent who has worked in many parts of the world which would be

21 called areas such as trouble spots. He proposes to give evidence in court

22 today largely concerning matters that occurred in Kosovo between 1998 and

23 1999 when he was acting as a war correspondent for German newspapers and,

24 in relation to his tasks, information was provided to him by sources that

25 he wishes to keep confidential. There are probably only a few matters

1 concerning his testimony, but it is important to him, as a journalist,

2 that he be able to give his evidence, and in relation to certain matters,

3 keep confidentiality as to the sources that supplied him with information.

4 I discussed this matter with Mr. Hutsch in a meeting, and it is

5 clear that an option such as having closed session or private session

6 testimony would not fulfil any requirements of confidentiality that he

7 needs. The people that he speaks to, the people that he interviews in his

8 role as an investigative journalist have to rely upon him that he will

9 keep certain confidences absolute. He is a working journalist, this is

10 his living and trade, and in many respects people like him perform an

11 important function in the roles of tribunals such as this and other courts

12 because of the work they do, the information they provide, where they

13 happen to be at the times of conflict, and he requires that his

14 confidences be respected.

15 There is a conjoined issue to this and that concerns his attorney

16 from Germany. He is a German national who has arrived at court today, and

17 he has asked permission that his attorney be present whilst he gives

18 evidence, obviously to protect his interests, if necessary.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that in relation to the confidentiality issue

20 or his evidence as a whole?

21 MR. KAY: Confidentiality issue. It's solely that. And he has

22 taken legal opinion in Germany --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Presumably, Mr. Kay, the confidentiality issue

24 will not arise in your examination-in-chief.

25 MR. KAY: It wouldn't arise in examination-in-chief. It is a

1 matter that would probably or could arise in cross-examination. Sometimes

2 the parties, recognising this, achieve their own balance, and when they're

3 down to the last point don't seek to go any further. I don't know what

4 the Prosecution attitude would be on that.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us wait until it arises, if indeed it does

6 arise, and then we'll address it at that time.

7 MR. KAY: The issue for the journalist witness, though, is if the

8 Court then sought to compel him to disclose sources, he is then in an

9 individual position of conflict where he would not want to be in conflict

10 with this Court. And I can foresee --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: What does this mean, then? If the matter were

12 determined now prior to his testimony and the decision was that there is

13 no confidentiality, what effect would that have on his evidence?

14 MR. KAY: I think Mr. Hutsch would have to consider his position,

15 because his job and profession rely upon him providing for the integrity

16 of his position as a -- as a journalist. I know he's at court at the

17 moment, very close to the courtroom, and I wonder if the Trial Chamber

18 would think it appropriate if he was admitted at this stage whilst the

19 discussion was taking place.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'll consult with my colleagues.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will deal with the issue, if it does arise, in

23 cross-examination.

24 Mr. Nice, on the issue of the presence of the lawyer for that

25 purpose, do you have anything to say?

1 MR. NICE: I don't see any particular need for the lawyer to be

2 present in court. I know the Court has allowed lawyers to be present on a

3 limited number of occasions and I believe there are one or two occasions

4 when it has excluded lawyers in the course of the Prosecution case,

5 notwithstanding requests. I don't see the particular need for the lawyer

6 to be present here within court on this occasion.

7 May I, while addressing you on this point in general terms, say

8 only this: I was given notice by Ms. Higgins half an hour ago that the

9 issue might arise but with very little, almost no detail of how it would

10 arise. If it's going to be suggested that this witness can say, "I was

11 told by X the following, but I'm not prepared to reveal who X is," why,

12 then, we will challenge that evidence as wholly inadmissible because of

13 course it would have absolutely no truth value that the court could attach

14 to it, not knowing who X is, and I not being in any sense or way allowed

15 to cross-examine as to who X is.

16 If it is intended that the witness produce documents of one kind

17 or another where he says, "Here's the document but I'm not going to say

18 who provided it to me," then different considerations may arise if we are

19 able independently to check on and to express an opinion about the

20 document.

21 I can see these problems arising -- and there may be others, but I

22 can see these problems arising in the course of the evidence in chief and

23 not just in cross-examination.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Kay?

25 MR. KAY: Yes. First of all, the exhibits have been disclosed to

1 the Prosecutor that the witness would be relying upon. That's two

2 photographs. The information concerns matters that may arise in

3 cross-examination.

4 The witness, who is extremely concerned about this matter, should

5 have this matter discussed with him by me and his attorney so that he

6 knows the position of the Trial Chamber, and that is something that the

7 witness would want canvassed with him, and I feel it my duty to put it

8 that way, having spoken to him myself and knowing the importance to him of

9 this evidence.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you saying you want to have an adjournment to

11 speak to the witness?

12 MR. KAY: Yes, please, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: For how long?

14 MR. KAY: The matter would probably only take ten minutes.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, we'll allow the lawyer to be present in

17 court when the issue arises, but as I indicated, we are of the view that

18 the issue cannot be dealt with in vacu. It should be dealt with when an

19 objection is raised or when the issue arises in cross-examination.

20 We're also of the view that the witness should be called into

21 court now and the matter could then be explained to him. Following that

22 explanation, if you still wish an adjournment, then we'll consider it.

23 MR. KAY: I have no objection to that -- sorry. I have no

24 objection to that course of action.

25 I believe that the attorney is outside in this part of the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and

13 French transcripts correspond

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 building. I think. We have no clout to produce people in the building,

2 and I've relied on others to try and bring him to an area where he may be

3 admitted access into court.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: So for the purpose of this, I'll ask the

5 registrar to have the witness brought in and also to assist in getting the

6 lawyer --

7 MR. KAY: Yes.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- into court.

9 MR. KAY: Thank you.

10 [The witness entered court]

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I declare that I will say nothing

13 but the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

15 WITNESS: FRANZ-JOSEF HUTSCH

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Hutsch -- I'll try my best with the

17 pronunciation.

18 THE WITNESS: No problem at all.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see you speak some English.

20 THE WITNESS: Just some.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: At the beginning I should say that I have been

22 advised by the interpretation section that interpretation from and into

23 German will be provided, and since there are not enough interpretation

24 booths for five languages, the witness will receive what is called the

25 whispering mode interpretation from English into German from an

1 interpreter sitting next to him in the courtroom. In order to provide

2 good quality interpretation, therefore, all the participants will have to

3 be even more mindful of the usual concerns affecting interpretation, that

4 is speed and overlapping.

5 Now, Mr. Hutsch, there is an issue that has been raised by Mr. Kay

6 on your behalf. It relates to the confidentiality of your sources as a

7 journalist. Mr. Kay wanted to have that issue resolved by the Chamber

8 prior to your testimony. However, the Chamber is of the view that it is

9 not an issue that should be determined in vacu. It is an issue that

10 should be determined if and when it does arise, which more than likely

11 would be during cross-examination by the Prosecutor. That is the way the

12 Chamber will proceed.

13 So we will hear your testimony. Mr. Kay will conduct the

14 examination-in-chief. It does not seem likely that the issue will arise

15 in examination-in-chief. But if and when it does arise during

16 cross-examination, then the Chamber will make a decision on it, and for

17 that purpose the Chamber has agreed that your lawyer may be present in

18 court.

19 JUDGE KWON: He is already present.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: He's here now?

21 MR. KAY: Yes. Mr. Louschneider, Your Honour, has come into court

22 and is sitting on the far side of the room. I thought it might be more

23 appropriate if he was over on this side and then he could communicate

24 perhaps more easily to me if there was a problem or wanting to raise

25 anything.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, he should then leave during the

2 examination-in-chief, and if the issue arises in cross-examination, he may

3 return.

4 MR. KAY: Yes. That's perfectly all right. Thank you, Your

5 Honour.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please proceed.

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 Examined by Mr. Kay:

9 Q. Could you give the Court your full name, please.

10 A. Franz Josef Hutsch.

11 Q. You're a German national; is that right?

12 A. [No interpretation].

13 Q. And could you give the Court --

14 JUDGE KWON: I don't think we get the English translation of what

15 the witness is saying. Go ahead. Let's try.

16 MR. KAY:

17 Q. Could you give the Court a brief outline of your working history,

18 starting with your service in the German military.

19 A. I started a career as a professional officer, and after 14 years

20 and three months my service came to an end and I became a war

21 correspondent.

22 Q. If you could tell the Court when it was that you started working

23 as a journalist.

24 A. I started in May 1995 working as a journalist, and on the 3rd of

25 May, 1995, I came into contact for the first time with the war in Bosnia,

1 and I was sent to Sarajevo to work.

2 Q. And the medium in which you worked, was that the written media or

3 television or radio?

4 A. I started working for the print media, for daily newspapers, and

5 in the meantime I worked for radio, television, and the print media.

6 Q. When you left the German military, what was your -- your rank that

7 you left at?

8 A. I left the military as major, and I'm now a -- in reserve.

9 Q. Your first engagement as a journalist was in the territories of

10 the former Yugoslavia, and you spent a period of time reporting on the war

11 that was taking place in Bosnia; is that right?

12 A. That is correct. From May 1995 to March 1996, I was in Bosnia

13 permanently, uninterrupted.

14 Q. I'd like, actually, to move to a later phase of your career, which

15 is when you went to Kosovo in 1998 to report on events there. When did

16 you go to Kosovo in 1998?

17 A. I went in September 1998 to Kosovo, and I left Kosovo in December

18 1999.

19 Q. September 1998, can you tell us which was the first location in

20 Kosovo that you went to.

21 A. Of course I went to Pristina, and then I started establishing

22 contacts, the kind of contacts I need for a potential war area, to enable

23 me to work in this potential war area.

24 MR. KAY: For the purpose of the witness's testimony from now,

25 Your Honours, it would be useful to have the Kosovo road atlas, Exhibit

1 83, which we notified the Court to have to hand. And if a copy of that

2 could be put before the witness. I have a spare, if anyone requires it.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'd like to find out the witness's age.

4 MR. KAY:

5 Q. Your age, Mr. Hutsch?

6 A. I am 41.

7 THE INTERPRETER: The witness needs to approach the microphone

8 when he's speaking. He's barely audible to the interpreters.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Hutsch, you need to come closer to the

10 microphone when you're speaking.

11 THE WITNESS: Okay.

12 MR. KAY: Pristina is at age 7 of the atlas. And just so that

13 we've got a fix on that.

14 Q. You arrived at Pristina. What sort of situation did you find

15 there when you arrived in September 1998 that would be of interest to this

16 trial?

17 A. Pristina itself was a city which was very tense but not

18 excessively violent in any way. At that point was it unpeaceful, there

19 were a lot of police on the streets at that time. But first of all, one

20 couldn't see that there were any fights or conflicts on the streets as,

21 for example, was the case in Sarajevo in 1995. So to this extent, first

22 of all it was a very tense atmosphere, but there was no resort to

23 violence.

24 Q. After taking stock of things in Pristina, you then moved to

25 another area to look at the situation on the ground; is that right?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and

13 French transcripts correspond

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And did you move to Prizren?

3 A. Yes. I also went to Prizren, but first to Malisevo where I had

4 contacts to the UCK, which seemed to me to be very promising and where I

5 received an offer to accompany the KLA more intensively, and this is

6 something that I considered to be very promising from a journalist's point

7 of view to continue my work in Kosovo. From Malisevo I then came towards

8 Prizren.

9 MR. KAY: Malisevo can be found at page 10 of the atlas, the

10 right-hand side, just above the letter -- the number 19, M-19.

11 Q. Malisevo: Can you describe what you found there at that time,

12 which was still in the -- September of 1998, wasn't it?

13 A. It was -- at that time in Malisevo, this was the headquarters of a

14 defence zone organised by the KLA, commanded by Ekrem Rexha and Komandant

15 Drini, a highly professional man who spoke several languages fluently and

16 was certainly an intellectual who worked in -- was a -- an officer in the

17 Yugoslav army, the VJ, had a great deal of experience, and in Central

18 Kosovo, he was entrusted with the organisation of the KLA in Kosovo.

19 Q. The purpose of that -- the purpose of that trip being to

20 familiarise yourself with the KLA at an initial level, you told us that

21 you then moved down to Prizren, which we see at page 10 of the atlas

22 again. And if you could tell the Court what the situation was that you

23 found there at this time.

24 A. Prizren itself, like Pristina, was quiet but tense, and my first

25 lasting impression was that after the Milosevic agreement, the Serbian

1 security forces had more or less returned to their barracks or withdrawn

2 to their respective areas, and the KLA started very quickly to fill this

3 power vacuum and to re-establish their own positions and to establish

4 themselves there.

5 Q. This would have been in October of 1998 that you moved down there.

6 When you describe the KLA occupying positions, what sort of positions did

7 they occupy? And perhaps looking at page 10 of our map there showing the

8 Prizren area, if you could identify what areas you were able to observe

9 them occupying.

10 Perhaps the atlas could be put on the ELMO. That's the overhead

11 projector.

12 MR. KAY: Usher, if you could assist the witness so that others

13 may see as well.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think to answer this question it's

15 important, first of all, to say that the area of Prizren, from a purely

16 military point of view, was controlled by what is known as the Dulje

17 pass. That's here.

18 MR. KAY:

19 Q. You're looking at page 11 of the atlas there, aren't you?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Just before Suva Reka?

22 A. This is the Dulje pass, certainly a strategic significance which

23 had been used by the VJ from 19 -- the turn of the year 1998 to 1999 and

24 during the rest of the war. And from Dulje pass, the Macedonian border

25 can be reached with artillery systems. This position was occupied by the

1 KLA in October and November, but in the course of the erupting violence in

2 January and February, the position could no longer be held.

3 Q. Going back to Prizren on page 10 -- just move it slightly to the

4 other way, actually, and up a bit. Other way, please.

5 That region that we see on the atlas there with Prizren down in

6 the bottom right-hand corner, were you able to observe anything about the

7 relative position of the parties of the KLA, VJ in that location?

8 A. Prizren was such that Ekrem Rexha was being excluded from the UCK

9 position. It's an old city, but Ekrem Rexha was a man who focused on

10 achieving some sort of cohabitation after the war. This was one of the

11 reasons why he was later murdered by the KLA.

12 Prizren itself was characterised by the fact that many MUP and VJ

13 people went back to the -- their barracks after the agreement. There were

14 long columns withdrawing back into Prizren. The KLA had a commander south

15 of Prizren and fired at patrols in this area, but as far as I could

16 observe, there were no major losses on the part of the Serbian armed

17 forces, and they focused mainly in the area between -- in this triangle,

18 and they tried to set up small commando troops which would then later be

19 in a position to attack Serbian patrols and Serbian security forces. But

20 one must say that during the set-up of the KVM, which took some time,

21 there were local agreements which had been negotiated by the KVM which

22 meant that Serbian patrols could go through areas which were occupied by

23 the KLA. The KLA withdrew to the edges of these areas and to let the

24 patrols pass. Then once they had passed, the KLA occupied these areas

25 once again.

1 And in some villages, Prizren to Velika Krusa, there was a

2 corridor of about five kilometres, and this was certainly a conventional

3 means of avoiding escalation, but I did not know whether this agreement

4 was also in force outside this defence zone Pastrik. I cannot say that.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, just take the witness back to the first

6 part of that answer. He referred to a man who focused on achieving some

7 sort of cohabitation, but we didn't get -- or I didn't get the name of the

8 man.

9 MR. KAY:

10 Q. You referred to a KLA commander, I believe, whom you described as

11 having had service in the VJ, and the Court is interested to know his

12 name. Perhaps you could spell it, which would help everybody.

13 A. Ekrem, E-k-r-e-m, Rexha is R-e-x-h-a, and he was known as Drini,

14 D-r-i-n-i.

15 Q. You referred to the local agreements that you were able to observe

16 in some areas where there would be a mutual assertion over the territory

17 at different times. Could you perhaps point out on the ELMO precisely, so

18 far as you know, the area that you're talking about.

19 A. Well, I was mostly in Malisevo as my base, and from there I went

20 out several times with some of the troops of the KLA. The triangle is

21 Karlovac, Suva Reka, Prizren. And I could observe that this also worked

22 in Oblaca, but 15 to 20 kilometres north of Suva Reka where I was able to

23 observe that this similar process was repeated several times.

24 Q. And the areas you indicated there were the right-hand side of map

25 10, around Malisevo, and then over on the left-hand side to Suva Reka on

1 map 11?

2 A. Yes. This was the 122 Brigade of the KLA, and the 2nd Battalion

3 of the 121 KLA brigade, the 123 Brigade in Malisevo, and the 125 Brigade

4 north of Prizren --

5 Q. You indicated --

6 A. -- were in these areas.

7 Q. You indicated the 121 Brigade as being in that area to the west of

8 Stimlje.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. During this period - I'm going to take now from October until the

11 Christmas so that we cover a scope of three months - did you see any

12 violations of the cease-fire agreement which had come into force in the

13 October?

14 A. There were several infringements of the cease-fire agreements to

15 the extent that it was tactics of the KLA to have hit-and-run attacks on

16 the Serbian patrols, to watch out for them, to try to force them into a

17 trap and to try to provoke the excessive reactions of the troops. So they

18 tried to attack the troops or the patrols from behind, to attack the

19 police officers. And we knew that there were certain to be unreasonable

20 reactions of the Serbian security forces here.

21 So this time was characterised by the fact that the KLA tried to

22 fill the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Serbian forces and

23 strategically important positions, for example, the Dulje Pass, where the

24 object was to control the pass, which I thought in military terms this is

25 rather strange, because as a commander I could not accept that

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and

13 French transcripts correspond

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 particularly in the course of such an agreement to leave an area over to

2 the enemy. A classical example of classic peacekeeping would have been to

3 occupy these areas with blue helmet UN troops.

4 Q. You described what was happening, and I think we can take it from

5 the description of your area you were travelling in that broad area that

6 you've outlined between pages 10 and 11 of the atlas; is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And during this period, were you attaching yourself to any of the

9 particular parties in the conflict? Did you spend your time with the KLA

10 or did you spend your time with the VJ, or was it a mixture?

11 A. My -- I mainly spent time with the KLA, but as a journalist, I

12 reject this procedure, but you could regard me as an embedded journalist

13 of the KLA, which meant that during the NATO air raids, I remained in

14 Kosovo and I was with the KLA.

15 Q. Still dealing with this period before the Christmas, the KLA that

16 you were involved with, could you give a description of their general

17 level of armament, military capability?

18 A. The KLA, from summer 1998 until spring 1999, tried to reorganise

19 themselves in military terms. And the loose impression that I had, I saw

20 that they formed effective brigades which were organised in hierarchies.

21 They had brought these together to defence areas, the commanders were then

22 taking charge, and it was quite clear that the KLA was receiving

23 reinforcements, not only ammunition and weapons which were becoming more

24 and more modern, but they were also reinforced in terms of staff. From

25 Western Europe Kosovo Albanian young men came flooding back.

1 They had a very brief military training, which I personally

2 considered to be insufficient, but this was done in Albania and in various

3 training camps in Kosovo, and they were then put into companies,

4 battalions, and brigades. The forces became established, and they

5 systematically started occupying areas.

6 Militarily speaking, I would regard this phase as a reorganisation

7 of armed forces and the establishment of a cohesive fighting force and

8 fighting command.

9 Q. As a person of reasonably long military service, you were

10 obviously familiar with hearing the results of gunshots or firing of

11 weapons. Are you able to distinguish between particular sounds of firing

12 of weapons?

13 A. Yes, of course, because I was also trained as a military observer

14 for the United Nations, and this was part of our daily business, precisely

15 to do these things.

16 Q. Just for the record, where was your UN duty as a military

17 observer?

18 A. In Georgia.

19 Q. The arm equipment, the weapons that the KLA had, are you able to

20 give a summary of that, what you saw at this period before the Christmas?

21 A. Yes. The emphasis was on the infantry, and each soldier had a

22 Kalashnikov, different types of Kalashnikovs from different countries, to

23 the basic equipment. They also had the RPG-7, which is a very effective

24 weapon and one of the best anti-tank devices of its kind. There were also

25 Spiders and Spenglers, which were very modern. They have a range of up to

1 three and a half to four kilometres. There were also artillery systems

2 and mortars of various calibres, but also small field howitzers. There

3 were also pick-ups and four-wheel vehicles to pick up troops very quickly.

4 There were also an increase of trained officers, officers who are capable

5 of controlling air attacks from the ground, to identify targets, and to

6 make areas safe for the air force.

7 What was not available unless they were captured, this was armed

8 vehicles and such which were normally not available to the KLA.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay. Mr. Hutsch, you speak of the KLA being

10 organised in brigades. Do you have in mind the classical notion of a

11 brigade? What was the size? What was the complement?

12 THE WITNESS: In the brigade, it's -- it didn't have an

13 established size as we know it. Normally we're talking about 7.000

14 soldiers if you apply NATO standards, but it was very different. A

15 brigade could be a small brigade. Later, in the south-east of Kosovo, we

16 could have something like 700 soldiers in a brigade. But it could be

17 larger. For example, Brigade 121, as far as I can estimate in October,

18 November, December, had a staff of 1.800 soldiers. But you couldn't say

19 that you have a system of one brigade which could be transposed to another

20 brigade in terms of size.

21 But the structures were the same. We had a structure with three

22 infantry battalions, a structure with a fire support system, an artillery

23 system with mortars. We had reconnaissance departments in each brigade,

24 and also, as the time progressed from 1999, for each defence zone there

25 were special units, special operation forces.

1 MR. KAY:

2 Q. Again at this period before Christmas -- I'm going to take this in

3 two stages. This period before Christmas, were you able to identify any

4 other nationalities amongst the KLA forces other than Kosovo Albanians?

5 A. Yes. In particular, there were officers of Arab origin. These

6 officers were -- I wrote about later in a report. The forward air control

7 officers, they were from -- I think the term -- there was an American from

8 the MPRI who recruited these officers from the Mujahedin brigades of the

9 Bosnian army as mercenaries, and they offered them a great deal of money.

10 These officers were then trained in Turkey, and from spring 1998,

11 from February in particular, they were sent to the KLA in Kosovo as

12 forward air control officers to plan and carry out --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Hutsch --

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- anti-air raids.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- I gather from what you say, then, that those

16 who were from other origin were officers. They were not foot soldiers?

17 Are you distinguishing between officers and ordinary soldiers?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely. They were officers who

19 had been recruited. They had a very good training in English, and they

20 were trained to organise air operations, air raids. And in terms of

21 quantity, each brigade had one of these officers who was particularly

22 well-protected. And during the war, these officers, the more became --

23 there were more available and so they were able to delegate further down

24 the hierarchy of the battalion.

25 And there's one particular example that I have published in the

1 Netherlands: There is an asylum procedure where one of these men -- his

2 name is Almedin, his family name is Almic. At the moment he is in the --

3 going through an asylum-seeking process in Amsterdam, and he is applying

4 for asylum in the Netherlands.

5 This man, in 1998, he deserted, and he then came through a

6 circuitous route to the Netherlands. He has documents with him which

7 clearly prove that he was trained in Turkey. These documents all are

8 signed by Clark Campbell.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Since the foreigners were confined to the officer

10 rank, does that mean, then, that there were few in number?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, quite clearly. I would say the

12 total number, at least my impression is that it's between 80 and 120.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay.

14 MR. KAY:

15 Q. Again a general question in terms of uniforms of the KLA that you

16 were able to see at this period. How were they dressed? How were they

17 turned out? Were they in an official military uniform, or was there a

18 variety of clothing?

19 A. Well, there were very many different types of clothing. Some

20 soldiers had a German uniform with a Swiss army jacket. Some soldiers

21 were in jeans with a black parka. The only thing that the KLA had in

22 terms of uniform, and then increasingly so after December, was that these

23 signs that we all know, the KLA sign which characterises a KLA fighter as

24 a KLA soldier by his insignia.

25 Q. That's a sort of reddy-orange badge?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and

13 French transcripts correspond

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 A. Yes, this red badge with the yellow writing and with the Albanian

2 eagle.

3 Q. In terms of the activities of the KLA, we've been addressing

4 issues of a military nature. Were there any other activities other than

5 of a military nature that you were able to observe from those units you

6 met and spent time with?

7 A. It was clear that there was an interchange of organised

8 criminality on the one hand and operational command on the other, and it

9 was certainly the case that with an ammunition transport at the same time

10 this was combined with transport of smuggled goods to bring these goods

11 out of Kosovo. In the south of Kosovo, this was a transit area for women

12 who were forced to become prostitutes in Europe. It was clear that with

13 the ammunition transports that drugs were also transported in the other

14 direction, so that Kosovo, so to speak, was a transit route for traffic of

15 every description. And the KLA was, therefore, able to spend a great deal

16 of money to equip themselves to a very high standard of technology.

17 Q. And the levels of command that you met, you obviously met the foot

18 soldiers. How high up in the command structure did you meet the KLA

19 officers?

20 A. Well, Harading Thaci, Hasim Ceku, for example, were people of a

21 certain command level that I met.

22 Q. And again, how was it structured? Were you able to observe how

23 they were made up, how the command structure of the KLA was working?

24 A. After my subsequent research and what I observed from the outside,

25 in 1997, 1998, the hierarchy was rather on a level where people sort of

1 reacted more or less spontaneously, and it had the sort of characteristic

2 of individual terror attacks.

3 And then in summer, in particular after Holbrooke and Junik

4 visited the KLA, there was a restructuring of the KLA with the rather

5 mysterious and sudden appearance of Hasim Ceku on the KLA stage. And from

6 then the intellectual and also the practical implementation of the

7 structure of an army could be recognised, and this developed on a daily

8 basis.

9 Q. I want to turn now to the Christmas period, which is before an

10 incident that occurred at Racak. Was there a change in the scale of the

11 conflict around the Christmastime?

12 A. For me, the Christmas offensive, which is not absolutely the right

13 term because this was a term which described the military operations in

14 the area of Podujevo, to put an emotional aspect on it, the Christmas

15 offensive, so to speak, was so that the Serbian officers first lost their

16 patience.

17 If you look at the map --

18 Q. Is it page 10?

19 A. Well, I would suggest we look at page 7. It's difficult to see

20 here, but Podujevo and then Pristina. What you can see clearly, on the

21 one hand you have this road between Podujevo and Pristina. On the other

22 hand you have the railway line. The situation in December was such that

23 on the one hand the area between Mitrovica and Pristina, there was heavy

24 fighting going on after the KLA succeeded in cutting off the transit road

25 between Mitrovica and Pristina. If you look at the military situation in

1 Kosovo, these are the two main supply routes which the Serbian security

2 forces used to supply their troops. There were other possibilities via

3 Vitina and Gnjilane to enter Kosovo, but for various reasons this route is

4 not to be considered.

5 In this area between Banido [phoen] and Libano [phoen], the KLA

6 succeeded in interrupting not only the road but also the railway line.

7 And from the heights and the woods on the eastern part of this street,

8 they were able to control this area with artillery and anti-tank

9 equipment.

10 So the security force, in particular the VJ, had to open up this

11 street again in a counter-offensive. And from -- as far as I can see in

12 military terms, this made sense in order not to cut off supplies.

13 I heard rumours that this operation was supported by a tank

14 company which then came from Serbia to Kosovo, but I have -- haven't been

15 able to find any evidence of this, especially in the analysis of the

16 foreign office and the German Defence Ministry to which I had access as a

17 journalist.

18 Q. You directed our attention to page 7, which shows one of those

19 supply routes, one railway line. If we turn over to the page 6 as well,

20 we see the other railway line, which is east of Pristina going from Kosovo

21 Polje, up to Mitrovica, through Vucitrn.

22 A. That is the second one, and then -- this was the second supply

23 line which was interrupted up to spring 1999. It was attacked again and

24 again by the KLA to interrupt the supplies of the Serbian security forces.

25 And in the area of Obilic, there are still a large number of minefields

1 which they have started to clear, and the VJ was compelled, therefore, to

2 lay these minefields on both sides of the railway line to prevent the

3 advance of the KLA to these two very important supply routes.

4 Q. Those supply routes which we've looked at on pages 6 and 7 of the

5 railway lines that you've identified, was it just the railway lines that

6 was involved or were the roads involved as well?

7 A. Yes. Both areas were affected, not only the rail connections but

8 also the road. But the mobile commands on the part of the Serbian

9 security forces into -- in this area was made very difficult because of

10 the terrain. The terrain made it very difficult for the highly mobile

11 command. And this is my interpretation of the decision, therefore, to

12 open up the street from Podujevo to Pristina.

13 Q. The traffic, then, down this route, Mitrovica to Kosovo Polje and

14 Pristina, the traffic down that route was what? What was carried? You

15 said it was the major supply lines into Kosovo. Was it commercial

16 traffic, military traffic?

17 A. Both. Of course for every military supply line you have a

18 civilian supply line, but commercial goods, foodstuffs were brought into

19 Kosovo from Serbia. On the other hand, it was also the route where fuel,

20 petrol, diesel, oil, was brought for the Serbian security forces. And

21 there was also the exchange of soldiers along the route or ammunition was

22 supplied. So all kinds of goods, supply goods, were sent along this

23 route.

24 Q. So that would include materials for the population's daily living,

25 would it?

1 A. Yes, if you would interpret it like this.

2 Q. You've described now to the Court that period up to Christmas and

3 what you were able to observe from that period when you were largely

4 embedded with the KLA. Is there anything else you wish to add to that

5 picture in the period before Christmas?

6 A. Well, for me there was one thing: There was a clear difference to

7 the experience I had in Bosnia, where my experience of the war was over

8 six, seven months until the Dayton Agreement. My impression was more and

9 more that things were being staged. The KLA seemed to be advised by a

10 very good PR agent. There were situations where refugees were kept in the

11 woods until Western journalists visited the refugee camps.

12 There were situations where the civil population were kept in the

13 villages which were being attacked by the Serbian security forces, and the

14 civilians were prevented from leaving the villages.

15 So it was more of a staged war rather than the war I experienced

16 in Bosnia. So this was an incredible difference if you compare the two

17 situations.

18 Q. Those activities that you've described, were they in any

19 particular area that you were working in or --

20 A. Well, we're talking about the Drenica region where this was a

21 daily occurrence. We are talking about the Central Kosovo region, Stimlje

22 or Urosevac, later in the area west of Kacanik, where, in particular, in

23 what is known as the "elephant foot."

24 Q. That's -- Kacanik can be found down on page 12 of the atlas.

25 Turning now to the period after Christmas, and the Court has heard

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and

13 French transcripts correspond

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 evidence about an incident in Racak. Did you attend Racak on the occasion

2 of the visit of Ambassador Walker?

3 A. On the 16th of January, a Saturday, I went -- I drove to Racak

4 with Walker. It was an unusual situation because, for most journalists,

5 the main area of fighting was in the area between Mitrovica and Pristina

6 where heavy fighting was going on. And there were systematic attacks on

7 villages. So hardly any journalists concentrated on the fighting around

8 Racak. And we were informed that there had been a massacre in Racak.

9 Q. Racak -- Racak we can find on page 11 of the atlas, just to the

10 south-east of Stimlje.

11 Were you in Prizren in the morning of the 16th of January?

12 A. I was in Pristina, because I spent Christmas with German

13 colleagues in Pristina. And also in the first week of January I had left

14 Kosovo simply to get some fresh air. I went to Macedonia and on -- was

15 back in Kosovo on the 10th of January.

16 Q. And were you with other journalists and other monitors from the

17 OSCE that morning when a convoy set off to Racak?

18 A. I was there with several colleagues. We had breakfast together.

19 When we were informed -- I was informed by my interpreter that the OSCE

20 organises too much, but they wanted to bring some journalists to Racak

21 because there had been signs of a massacre. And I think we were 40 to 50

22 journalists. We drove to Racak together with several OSCE teams and with

23 Walker.

24 It wasn't organised to the extent that we have to meet at

25 such-and-such place and all of us will leave together, but it just

1 happened like this. We drove after Walker. We formed a convoy which then

2 arrived in Racak.

3 Q. Had you been to Racak before when you were in the area around

4 Stimlje?

5 A. No, not at all. Racak, for the operation command of defence zone

6 2 had no value. This was the 2nd Battalion of the 122nd Brigade. The

7 important area was Stimlje, where the commander concentrated. But for me

8 this was of subordinate interest, so I had never been to Racak before.

9 Q. Just so that we've got a scale of the convoy that you described,

10 about how many people and how many vehicles arrived in Racak with

11 Ambassador Walker?

12 A. I guess about 20 vehicles, maybe 25 vehicles, and about 60 people

13 who arrived with Walker. But at this particular time, there were KVM

14 teams on site and also other journalists were there when we arrived. We

15 arrived about midday.

16 Q. The scene, then, in Racak when you arrived was what? Can you

17 describe where you arrived in Racak and what you saw when you arrived?

18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- road which you can see indicated

20 in red. We came from Stimlje along this red route to Racak. We entered

21 from the north, and at the entrance to the town or among the -- we stopped

22 the cars at the first houses.

23 The situation was that the KLA were on the slopes, to be seen on

24 the slopes around the town, in the north-west. And at -- in the east, in

25 the town itself, I saw ten KLA fighters myself. Some of them wore

1 uniform, different items of clothing from military supplies, but there

2 were two PU fighters, that is police fighters of the KLA were dressed in

3 black with white armbands with the insignia PU.

4 I didn't go into the town myself. The group of journalists split

5 up. Some went -- had already gone into the town with KLA fighters because

6 it was said that bodies had been found.

7 I went to the southern part of the town with Walker where we went

8 up a slope, along the bed of an old stream, and on both sides there were

9 bushes growing, and there we met -- we came across a group, a pile of

10 bodies.

11 Q. You have seen many photographs of -- of the scene at Racak, I take

12 it; is that right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. A word has been used, ravine, to describe like a gully where the

15 main group of bodies was found. Is that the area you're indicating?

16 A. Yes. It was about the height of a man up to about shoulder level.

17 It was a dried-out riverbed. That is precisely what we had. There were

18 several forks in different areas, and the bodies were lying in different

19 parts.

20 MR. KAY: The Court has seen photographs of this in Exhibit 156,

21 and I don't propose to go through those at this stage, but just for

22 reference if it assists the Judges.

23 Q. You described the KLA near the town, in the town, ten of them.

24 Did you recognise any from your periods that you'd spent working with the

25 KLA?

1 A. There were mostly young fighters, and among the older ones I

2 didn't really know any of them. One or two of them I had seen as part of

3 the 121st Brigade when I visited this brigade, but it would be too much to

4 say that I knew their names.

5 For example, there was a commander I had seen because he had set

6 up a supply base in the town. His nom de guerre was Roca [phoen], and he

7 had been known in some areas as a Foreign Legionnaire.

8 Q. You described a group of KLA being on the outside of the town, up

9 in the hills there. Are you able to tell us how many and what their

10 position was?

11 A. Well, the task of these units was clearly to secure the area

12 around Racak, to provide some sort of defence ring around the town. I

13 think there were about a hundred of them, but it's difficult to estimate.

14 There may have been 30 fewer or even more in this rather difficult

15 terrain. But I think you could talk about a company which had the task of

16 securing this area.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, we're coming up to the time for the

18 break.

19 MR. KAY: We can stop there for the moment, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Hutsch, we're going to take an adjournment.

21 It will be for 20 minutes, 20 minutes.

22 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

23 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Kay.

25 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. Before the break, Mr. Hutsch, we were dealing with Racak, your

2 arrival there. You told us about a number, maybe up to a hundred, KLA on

3 the surrounding hilltops. Were you able to tell if they were from a

4 particular brigade or any other information about them?

5 A. The soldiers said, as I was also told afterwards, they were

6 clearly part of the 2nd Battalion of 121 Brigade. It wouldn't make any

7 sense anyway in such an extremely complex situation such as the one around

8 Racak at the time. That would not have made sense to change troops, move

9 them around and use another brigade or another battalion instead. That

10 would not make any military sense and could also hardly be organised,

11 certainly not within one night.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay. You say that they were clearly part of

13 the 2nd Battalion of the 121 Brigade. How many soldiers would have been

14 in that brigade? You have told us the numbers vary in each brigade.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This brigade, as I intimated, had a

16 strength of about 1.800 soldiers, 121 Brigade at that time had a classical

17 structure of three battalions through the brigade. The battalion in

18 question, the 2nd Battalion, had about 600 soldiers.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay.

20 MR. KAY:

21 Q. In terms of uniform, was this a KLA brigade that had a consistent

22 uniform or was there a variety of clothing that was worn?

23 A. In principle, the set-up was such that the UCK, with the exception

24 of the special forces, special operation forces and the military police,

25 so-called PU, had no uniform which was the same everywhere, and the same

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and

13 French transcripts correspond

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 applied to 121 Brigade.

2 Q. So those soldiers of the KLA you saw in Racak that day had on a

3 variety of uniforms?

4 A. Different parts of a uniform, sometimes civilian clothes, but they

5 were already equipped with a badge which marked them as members of the

6 KLA.

7 Q. And did they have weapons?

8 A. Yes. They were equipped with Kalashnikov rifles. I've seen now

9 and then some state-of-the-art sniping rifles of different types. There

10 was the Russian Draganov rifle, there were some Italian sniping rifles,

11 down to American models. These were all in use. I'm not entirely sure

12 because it wasn't always clearly visible, when you entered this town and

13 looked up to the hill on your right, I think I saw a Spigot rocket, but

14 perhaps it could have been something else, a Spengler, for example.

15 Q. As part of the situation on the ground that day, you've described

16 the OSCE as being present. What sort of force of numbers did they have in

17 Racak?

18 A. Altogether there were about 10 OSCE verifiers who I observed

19 myself. I think there must have been far more than that. Another thing

20 remarkable for a place where allegedly such serious fighting had taken

21 place was that there were actually amazingly little traces of such

22 fighting to be seen. For example, there were very few spent cartridge

23 cases lying around anywhere.

24 Q. We've heard evidence about OSCE monitors being on the hills above

25 Racak, looking down into it. Were you aware of them?

1 A. I have seen individual orange-coloured jeeps with the KLA

2 fighters. They had contact there, they monitored these forces.

3 Q. The first place, then, that you saw dead bodies in Racak was at

4 the ravine. Could you describe the scene, then, and the group, telling us

5 how many were in your group, what the sort of make-up of people was -

6 we've seen film of this during the course of the trial - and what happened

7 when that group came across the bodies in the ravine.

8 A. First of all, it started with individual bodies which were spaced

9 something like 10, 15 metres away from each other. Then there was a

10 larger group of bodies. These bodies were partly dreadfully mutilated

11 almost through different shot wounds. Some of them were head-shots, some

12 of these were people who had been hit from the front. I can remember

13 seeing the corpse of one old man who still wore the Albanian traditional

14 hat, and his left -- the left half of his face was completely shot away,

15 and the back of his head had exploded.

16 There were also, among these bodies, the corpses of many older

17 men. And without having checked in every case, I would guess they were

18 between sort of late 40s, early 50s. Approximately two-thirds of these

19 men would have been more than 50 years of age, and for me this meant it

20 was very clear that they were not the potential recruited by the KLA.

21 What was also surprising here was the fact that there were very

22 few cartridge cases, particularly looking at the injuries shown by these

23 corpses. I was struck by that.

24 Something else which I noticed was that we could move freely

25 between these bodies, and some of my colleagues actually rearranged these

1 bodies so as to photograph them better, and Ambassador Walker did not try

2 to prevent this from happening when it happened. So from a forensic point

3 of view, and obviously I'm not a forensic specialist or a police reporter

4 or anything of that kind, but I thought that was a highly strange way of

5 dealing with a crime scene, changing the bodies. And also, Mr. Walker had

6 directed us to an area where, from a forensic point of view, we were

7 actually destroying evidence.

8 Q. Coming upon the scene of the bodies, where were you in relation to

9 Ambassador Walker? Where was he in relation to the group that was

10 proceeding to the ravine?

11 A. Together with a colleague, we were partly members of the group,

12 but we also walked outside again because I wanted to look from outside at

13 the scene, particularly as we went further in. And it is my habit, when

14 such a place is entered, I go back to my old sort of life as a soldier,

15 and I want to get a special impression and be able to judge that from a

16 military point of view. That is, after all, my job.

17 So I think there was a range of 30, 40 metres around the group,

18 the Walker group. That was the usual area where they used to be. But

19 when exactly from leaving the town to when we found the bodies, where I've

20 been exactly at each time, every metre of ground, I couldn't tell you now.

21 Q. This group coming across the bodies at the ravine at this stage,

22 how many -- how many were in it?

23 A. That was a group of between 25 and 40 people. Mr. Walker, his

24 Albanian interpreter who some people say was also his political advisor,

25 there were other people from the OSCE and journalists.

1 Q. Were you present when Ambassador Walker came across the bodies?

2 A. Yes. I saw myself how he walked among the bodies and was very,

3 very close to these corpses.

4 Q. And what was his reaction?

5 A. He kept saying that this was unthinkable and this was one of the

6 greatest crimes against humanity, and he used the word "massacre" time and

7 again.

8 Q. Did anyone take -- take care of the area where the bodies lay, of

9 the crime scene?

10 A. There were monitors. They were on the margins, standing there,

11 but nobody really cordoned off the crime scene, as I would have expected,

12 which was done at a later stage when mass graves were discovered in Kosovo

13 and Bosnia. I have seen that there, too, that you have special tape

14 cordoning off a crime scene. There was none of this here. Nor did I see

15 anybody securing the site in the sense of making sure that traces weren't

16 destroyed, photographs would be taken, drawings made. I saw nothing of

17 that kind taking place.

18 Q. You described interference with the bodies. Any other

19 interference in the site that you were able to notice?

20 A. Some colleagues put some cartridge cases into their pockets, more

21 or less as a souvenir. Some colleagues, as I said, touched the bodies,

22 moved them into different positions. And initially, for me it was quite

23 clear that the bodies were all sort of lying downhill. So afterwards,

24 there was a great mess in the position of bodies.

25 Q. Just so we've got a position on this, what time were you at the

1 ravine looking at the bodies when this was happening?

2 A. That was about lunch-time plus/minus half an hour. Around 12.00.

3 Q. On the 16th of January.

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. Did you notice Ambassador Walker doing anything else other than

6 making those comments? Did he take any other steps or anything that you

7 were able to notice?

8 A. He frequently made phone calls. Who he was speaking to, I don't

9 know. Whenever he made a phone call, he moved away from the group a

10 little. However, he did make very frequent calls, and among us

11 journalists this led to some discussion, because we thought with this kind

12 of crisis management, it was surprising to see him with this press trip,

13 if you can call it that, not being handed to his deputy. One would have

14 expected him not -- he should have been doing the crisis management, but

15 he was marketing what happened, and that did lead to some excited debate

16 among us journalists.

17 Q. The deputy, for the record, was whom?

18 A. Well, I could have imagined that General Drewienkiewicz could have

19 done this. At least, for most of us journalists it would have seemed a

20 preferable solution, particularly because it was so clear all the time.

21 Military questions were asked which Mr. Walker could not answer because

22 the event was a military event.

23 Q. Having considered the scene at the ravine, where else did you go

24 after that? If you'd take us further on your route through Racak from

25 that moment.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and

13 French transcripts correspond

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 A. It was about 2.00, 2.00, 1400 hours, that I left the scene of the

2 crime, went down to the town and left for Pristina. Basically this was

3 because I was given a different assignment by my own paper, but the other

4 reason was I wanted to finish my report. I was then also working

5 freelance, and I wanted to launch this into a different media. I had seen

6 enough to be able to assess the situation.

7 I had talked to individual KLA members in the town itself and

8 returned to Pristina to be able to send off my report in time.

9 Q. Other than the scene at the ravine, did you go to any other of the

10 places where bodies were found?

11 A. No. I was not at the bodies which were found within the town

12 itself. There was a direct line going east from that dried up riverbed.

13 I did not go there. I have heard from colleagues who did go, but

14 something which was said from all sides and which later on the Finnish

15 forensic commission led by Dr. Ranta confirmed was the fact that not one

16 of these bodies had been raped in any way. There were some German

17 newspapers where journalists were not within this group who had not gone

18 to Racak with us saying that some of these corpses had also been mutilated

19 and obviously as journalists in Kosovo that made it difficult for us,

20 particularly when we had to pass a Serb forces checkpoint. It meant that

21 they really checked us carefully. Sometimes we had to kneel next to our

22 vehicles or lie down on the ground, so there was no longer any freedom of

23 movement. As German journalists, that was something which was done for

24 10, 14 days or so afterwards.

25 Q. Moving on from Racak, then, did you continue to base yourself in

1 the region you've been describing today or did you move to another area?

2 A. The way I assessed the situation for myself was that, given the

3 conditions, particularly the repressions I suffered under as a journalist

4 meant I could not move about freely in Kosovo. Even my press

5 accreditation could not help me any more. So I decided to join the KLA

6 completely in the Malisevo area, and in early January I first left Kosovo

7 to go to Macedonia, on the one hand to relax a bit but on the other hand

8 also to obtain some more material and also get some more reliable

9 information about what was supposed to take place in Rambouillet. And it

10 was mid-February when I returned to Kosovo through the so-called elephant

11 foot.

12 Q. Just taking that period, then, after Racak when you move out, you

13 go to Macedonia, and before you come back in, what did you find in

14 Macedonia in relation to the KLA that you had attached yourself to? First

15 of all, tell us which region in Macedonia you went to.

16 A. There were, in principle, two ways of leaving Kosovo and going to

17 Macedonia. One was using -- it was using the two main supply routes of

18 the KLA into Kosovo. I'd like to show you these routes so as to

19 illustrate the situation. Let's use this map here.

20 Q. Is that -- is that page 12?

21 A. Yes. Oh, it's this one. This is the area called Kacanik. It is

22 the so-called elephant foot here, the way it continues at the bottom. It

23 does resemble the shape of an elephant's foot. And here we have one of

24 the main supply routes -- by the way, it is still being used by the KLA,

25 or what we now call successor organisations.

1 Here are the Radusa mines. Radusa is on the Macedonian side. And

2 there is a way of going underground in Kosovo, entering the old mines, and

3 leaving on the Macedonian side. What you need to imagine is frequently

4 people use donkeys for transporting goods, and they are sent through these

5 mines to the other end respectively. So you can always permanently, as it

6 were, cross the border underground.

7 There is a second way of leaving Kosovo. That was in the area of

8 Vitina, specifically Panovcervci [phoen], which in 2001 in the Macedonian

9 crisis played a crucial role.

10 So these were the two routes, and I used them for leaving, i.e.,

11 returning to Kosovo. But these were also the main supply routes for the

12 KLA, because the Serb security forces had very largely sealed, apart from

13 the Dragas area, and defended the border elsewhere, because it made clear

14 that there was a great interest there.

15 What many people saw in Macedonia -- I spent a lot of time in the

16 Western Macedonia, in the Tetovo area, and we saw there there was a lot of

17 re-supply, particularly of freshly trained young soldiers, but also a

18 fresh supply of modern handguns in particular. Some of them American M16s

19 for special forces or recon groups or units.

20 Q. When you left -- when you left Kosovo and went into Macedonia, you

21 spent time with the KLA supply chain, if you like. And are you able to

22 describe to the Court how well the system worked for the supply chain at

23 this time?

24 A. The system was perfectly planned. It also meant that from March

25 onwards in the area between Kacanik, Vitina, Gnjilane, this whole area,

1 there were virtually no fighting. Even in Strpce, Urosevac, Kacanik, that

2 was defence zone 6, the number of brigades could be reduced to one. So

3 there was only 126 Brigade used to hold the area around Kacanik in the

4 area between Vitina and Gnjilane and later on there were only three

5 brigades with an overall strength of about 800 fighters.

6 The objective was very clearly that the Serb security forces were

7 not to be provoked any more. The idea was to keep the situation calm

8 enough to get supplies into the country and then to distribute them

9 throughout Kosovo, focusing on Prizren, Pec, and the Drenica region.

10 Q. The level of equipment that was coming into Kosovo at this time

11 from Macedonia was -- was how much? Are you able to quantify it in any

12 way?

13 A. I once saw a document with the KLA saying they had a daily need of

14 supply goods of all kinds amounting to 2.5 to 3 tonnes, and that is indeed

15 what they were able to use.

16 Q. You've described supplies. What about people? Were any new

17 forces being added to the KLA after this period in terms of people?

18 A. On the one hand, there was a training system within Kosovo. For

19 example, perhaps you would allow me to show you very briefly. On page 16.

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. There was a large training camp between Kotlina and Pustanik

22 owned by the KLA and even in 2001 this was still an active training camp

23 when the KLA became active in Macedonia as well. There was a huge

24 training camp with about 200 recruits passing through that camp. In the

25 Zelino village, for example, near Tetovo, there was also a training camp,

1 and this was a collection point for recruits which were then brought

2 through the elephant foot into Kosovo, using this route here I'm showing

3 you: East from Jegunovce, past here, the elephant foot, and into Kosovo.

4 There are several interviews. There is even footage, colleagues have

5 published this already, and there are many interviews with recruits who

6 went into Kosovo. The number of these recruits, also based on what my

7 colleagues told me, I would guess of at the least 3.000 in April and May.

8 Q. For reference purposes, looking at map 16, just to the north-east

9 there of Skopje is the elephant foot, as we can see it, with the yellow

10 borderline marked; is that right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Was there any offensive by the KLA from this position around the

13 springtime of 1999?

14 A. In early February, the KLA prepared an offensive of 161, 162

15 Brigades in the area west of Kacanik. This offensive was clear because

16 the brigades received more manpower and more equipment, and then there was

17 a very well-devised hit-and-run tactics employed to send these brigades to

18 an area west of the highway from Kacanik, Deutz, towards Pristina. And

19 they attacked patrols in that area, thus provoking the counter-attacks by

20 Serb security forces I indicated earlier.

21 Q. So moving up from map 16 into map 12, moving south of Kacanik up

22 into -- towards Urosevac; is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. We described the level of military support before Christmas. I

25 want to look at the military support now in this period, which takes us

1 from, say, Racak mid-January to the time of the NATO bombing. Were you

2 able to notice anything about the equipment supply levels for the KLA at

3 this time?

4 A. Yes. Supplies had been intensified noticeably. By spring 1999,

5 that also included modern night vision equipment, partly even thermal

6 imaging equipment. That means night vision equipment of the second and

7 third generation. It also comprised, in particular, anti-tank weapons but

8 also ground-air missiles of the type Stinger and Strelovac, a Russian

9 model. It also comprised medical equipment ranging from analgesics to

10 dressings.

11 Q. You mentioned Rambouillet earlier. That's the period from

12 February and March 1999. Was there any large offensive? You've described

13 the incursions; was there any large offensives up from the south towards

14 Urosevac?

15 A. The defence zone 6 in this area was tasked by the General Staff of

16 the KLA to initiate an offensive towards Urosevac. Offensive, in KLA

17 terms, was an increased number of ambushes being laid, ambush attacks,

18 down to massive attacks against individual villages, particularly in the

19 Strpce region, where at least until March of that year there was a Serb

20 majority population. These offensives were prepared and then commenced on

21 28 February with an attack against the Kacanik police chief, who died in

22 this attack. The clear objective was to tie down Serb forces, to provoke

23 the Serb forces, and to accompany the Rambouillet negotiations with the

24 images which became very well known. In other words, images where Serb

25 forces were shooting at Kosovo Albanian villages.

1 Q. The -- the sense of that military strategy by the KLA going up

2 from the south through Kacanik, could you comment about that as your -- A,

3 from your investigations, the time you spent there in this period, as well

4 as your knowledge of military matters.

5 A. It was clearly a situation that these tactics can be compared to

6 throwing a pebble into water, and then you create this -- a slight wave,

7 and you would react to that with force out of proportion. That was the

8 tactic employed. When we're looking at Gajre, the fighting around Gajre,

9 which is south of Kacanik, I could only follow acoustically what was

10 happening from Kotlina, but what was very clear was that after the attack

11 strong Serb security forces, I would estimate about 200 strong, attacked

12 Gajre after the attack and destroyed Gajre. It was very clear that at

13 that time the KLA had a very great deal of interest in calling on people

14 to flee their villages. So they actually purposefully created fear by

15 telling people that the villages would in the future be attacked here,

16 Straza, Ivaja, and Picevac up in the north. There the people living in

17 the villages were asked to leave the villages, go into the woodland areas

18 and were actually prevented from returning to their villages again.

19 As I observed it, the normal pattern of behaviour when Serb

20 security forces had attacked a village and left again, the people tended

21 to return to their villages and came to sort of arrangements again with

22 conditions of life, which were hard enough for the civilian people

23 already. But here the people were kept in these forests in order to

24 initiate a refugee crisis.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Hutsch, could you just elaborate on the

1 description, the metaphor that you used describing the KLA tactics as

2 comparable to throwing a pebble into water, creating a slight wave and

3 then reacting out of proportion.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The reaction was such that it was

5 enough to attack a Serbian patrol. Usually these were MUP patrols. And

6 once the attack had taken place and there were indications on the Serbian

7 side where this attack was coming from, then the place was attacked.

8 The attacks can be considered like this: That early in the

9 morning large forces occupied the area. They formed two rings, an outer

10 ring and an inner ring. The inner ring, as far as I could see, was always

11 provided by MUP, and the outer ring was organised by the VJ.

12 The population was told by loudspeaker to leave the villages, to

13 go to certain checkpoints. The population was given a certain amount of

14 time, a varying amount of time, to reach the checkpoints, from half an

15 hour to one hour.

16 I didn't have the impression that there was a uniform procedure

17 applied, and there was the threat to attack the village if the KLA didn't

18 vacate the position. And mobile loudspeakers were used to inform the

19 population and the KLA fighters to go to certain checkpoints, and after an

20 hour they started attacking the villages. And the attack was done to a

21 degree of hardness and a degree of escalation that consisted of mortar

22 fire, artillery fire. Sometimes heavy weapons were used for hours. Now

23 -- anti-aircraft rockets.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. What I didn't understand is, in your

25 metaphor, who threw the pebble into the water? Was it the KLA?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The pebble into the water was thrown

2 by the KLA, because they attacked the patrol. And the recurrent wave,

3 this strong wave, was on the part of the Serbian security forces. So they

4 provoked, on the one hand, and then there was a reaction to this

5 provocation on the other.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay.

7 MR. KAY:

8 Q. You described the movement of villagers under the direction of the

9 KLA, which had been a change in what you had seen before; is that right?

10 A. No. The provocation was continuous since I was there in September

11 in Kosovo, but it wasn't so perfidious. This -- the degree of perfidy

12 changed. Today in German we would say that they had updated it, it had

13 been refined.

14 Q. Yes. I think something got lost in translation there. I was

15 actually talking about the movement of people you described.

16 A. Okay. The behaviour to the village population was such that this

17 intensified in autumn. I had evidence of people being prevented going

18 back to their villages, or they were called upon to leave their villages.

19 In spring 1999, at least you can see there was a certain systematic

20 approach to this.

21 Q. And the population having been prevented by the KLA from going

22 back went where having moved from their villages? In what you saw.

23 A. Well, they finally went into the woods. At the Kacanik offensive,

24 the KLA, there was a larger refugee camp in this forest south-east of

25 Kacanik, in this area. There was a refugee camp to the south of Kotlina

1 towards Pustanik. About 800 to 1.000 civilians were there from the entire

2 region. There was a refugee camp in the border area at Straza where

3 people were kept.

4 Q. This period from February down to March and the NATO bombing, was

5 your concern largely, if not exclusively, that area south of Urosevac down

6 to Kacanik and the elephant foot? Is that where you were?

7 A. As I said, until mid-March, I was in this area. About the 10th,

8 11th of March, again I went to Malisevo along this road to Kacanik,

9 Urosevac, through the woods to Stimlje Racak, to this street the Dulje

10 pass, it was Malisevo, and what I saw in the two and a half weeks in this

11 region was precisely that.

12 Q. The population, then, that was being told to leave the villages

13 and go into the woods or elsewhere, what sort of numbers are you able to

14 tell us were concerned with this?

15 A. Well, I'd rather talk about what I saw in the refugee camps,

16 because there you have rough numbers. In this southern area of Kacanik

17 and west of Kacanik, I would talk about, say, 5.000, and this would have

18 to be multiplied by the number throughout Kosovo in its entirety. This is

19 an estimate. It is simply my own opinion, but I think you're talking

20 about a six-figure number.

21 Q. So what did you see building up here in terms of these -- these

22 people?

23 A. The aggression potential on both sides was clearly higher, and it

24 was quite clear. And I derived this from various conversations with the

25 KLA, that they were simply waiting to free Kosovo. These were their

1 original words. In many talks, I think this was representative of the

2 atmosphere within the KLA.

3 At that time, from mid-March, I know on the 16th of March because

4 this was part of the mandate of the 162nd Brigade, that there was -- there

5 were British soldiers in uniform, a reconnaissance party was there, and

6 they observed the Dulje pass and observed the positions of the 15th

7 Serbian Brigade.

8 Q. This is the time of Rambouillet. That was continuing, as we've

9 said, from February into March. Those KLA officers that you were dealing

10 with, how did they view Rambouillet and its effect on the process that was

11 taking place concerning Kosovo? What was their attitude?

12 MR. NICE: On this topic, Your Honour, before we move on --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

14 MR. NICE: -- it might be helpful to know whether these are names

15 that the witness is prepared to divulge or not. It's becoming very

16 generalised but the topic is becoming of some importance, arguably.

17 MR. KAY: I'll ask the witness.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

19 MR. KAY:

20 Q. Are you able to identify the KLA commanders that you would have

21 had discussions with over Rambouillet?

22 A. Yes, of course, but I think they are also known to you in the

23 documents that I have seen. These names are already known. We're talking

24 about Cabucala [phoen], we're talking about Ramush Haradinaj, we're

25 talking about Ali Ahmeti.

1 Q. I'm just slowing you down because they are important names and

2 people have to record them and they're known well to you, but we would

3 like to make sure that we get the identities right so that all the parties

4 have the information.

5 The first name you gave, perhaps --

6 A. Saban Sala, one of -- who still plays a major role in the KPC.

7 We're talking about Ali Ahmeti. In 2001 he used this area in terms of

8 logistics. Ramush Haradinaj -- I see the names are spelled wrongly.

9 Saban Sala is correct. Ali Ahmeti is A-l-i and then A-h-m-e-t-i. Ramush

10 is written R-a-m-u-s-h, Haradinaj, H-a-r-a -- yes, just like that.

11 So we're also talking about Gezim Ostreni, we're talking --

12 Q. Spell. Sorry, Mr. Hutsch, but so we get it right on the record.

13 A. G-e-z-i-m O-s-t-r-e-n-i. Another name in this context is Tahir

14 Sinani; T-a-h-i-r, the second name S-i-n-a-n-i.

15 Q. Any other names you would care to add, again in this context,

16 because it's obviously important?

17 A. There are so many, but as I said before, they are also in the

18 documents which have already been submitted to you. These are only the

19 topics from the first row. We would then have to go into further detail.

20 Q. That's enough detail for everyone to work on. And then perhaps

21 you could tell us about their attitude toward the Rambouillet peace

22 process.

23 A. It was clear that the KLA had planned or were expecting a major

24 offensive or the NATO attacks. They made use of this time to prepare

25 themselves for this war in terms of logistics, to distribute troops, to

1 occupy positions, to occupy strategic positions, to define key targets,

2 and simply to use this time to organise, reorganise, and to structure.

3 Q. Foreign military support, were you able to observe at this period

4 before the NATO bombing if there was any assistance being given to the

5 KLA?

6 A. Well, apart from the permanent assistance in the training camps of

7 the KLA, which was done by MPRI and other mercenary companies, with the

8 exception of the British troop at the Dulje pass, I saw no other

9 recognisable assistance on the ground, and I didn't see that there was any

10 inclusion of other NATO liaison officers who were active in Kosovo.

11 Q. Any addition to the KLA military, to their troops? Any fresh

12 recruits, if you like, and if so, where were they from?

13 A. Yeah. The flow of recruits was immense from three sides coming

14 into Kosovo; through the two Macedonian routes I described before, and

15 then also the way across the Albanian border, so that there was an immense

16 influx of young, freshly trained soldiers for the KLA precisely at this

17 time, who then were distributed among the various battalions to let them

18 fight in this area.

19 Q. Before we turn to the 24th of March and the commencement of the

20 NATO bombing, was there any other matter that you could see occurring that

21 you were aware of that would be of significance in this context?

22 A. Preparations before the air raids, no. It was simply an

23 atmosphere of waiting, to try to prepare for what was going to happen.

24 Q. The NATO bombing commenced on the 24th of March, 1999.

25 Whereabouts were you at that time so that we can get a fix on this?

1 A. During the course of the 24th, I was with a reconnaissance troop

2 of the KLA going towards Prizren and wanted to go to the Prizren area to

3 see the reaction on the part of the Serbian security forces who had a very

4 strong contingent in Prizren, and it was important for me to see how they

5 would react.

6 Q. Did you have any information in advance that the NATO bombing was

7 going to occurring on the 24th of March?

8 A. The information about the beginning of the NATO attacks reached

9 the main headquarters and the defence zone area 2 on the 24th at about

10 2.00 in the afternoon.

11 Q. And then what did you experience that particular day, on the 24th

12 of March?

13 A. In the headquarters of defence zone 2, they started making

14 operational plans for the coming days. Key targets were formulated, which

15 were to be attacked first; among others, the Dulje pass with this control

16 post for the artillery. And it was also obvious that an evacuation plan

17 was in preparation with which systematically Albanian villages could be

18 evacuated in order to protect them from attacks from the Serbian security

19 forces.

20 Q. So were you able to observe an increase, then, in the numbers of

21 people who were outside of their homes or villages or towns who were

22 collecting together?

23 A. The KLA commanders and in the brigades were called upon to set up

24 a list of priorities for the evacuations of the towns and villages. To

25 indicate the villages, to pass on this information, a messenger service of

1 the KLA command was set up. They had contact with satellite telephones

2 with safe links to Albania. These officers had identification papers with

3 them whereby they were able to take over the command of certain areas if

4 necessary.

5 There was a communications system which was supported

6 electronically, on the one hand, but it was also screened, and there was

7 direct communication with these selected officers on the one hand and the

8 individual regional commanders on the other. And they could give direct

9 orders as to which villages should be evacuated where.

10 So the population was then asked, for example, to leave the

11 village in the direction of Albania or Macedonia.

12 Q. Again so that we can get a picture of this, are you able to

13 identify on the atlas the regions you're talking about where you were able

14 to observe this happening? And if you could do that slowly so that the

15 Court is able to identify for the record.

16 A. For example, the location of the village of Malusha, close to

17 Malisevo, were one of the first to be asked to leave the village in the

18 direction of Macedonia. The population of Gajre, here, was also asked to

19 leave the village. The military objective was to have an area around

20 Malisevo which could be used by their own operations command, and there

21 were very hard and bloody battles in this town, so that the civil -- the

22 civilian population were taken out of the combat area, but also this

23 provided a possibility of using these towns and villages for the purposes

24 of the KLA.

25 Q. And we're looking at map page 10. Again, any other areas where

1 you were able to see this happening after the NATO bombing started on the

2 24th of March?

3 A. Yes. The same happened with the KLA between Orahovac and Suva

4 Reka. This is on page 11, in this area. These were on the list of

5 priorities of the villages which were to be evacuated, where the

6 population was asked to leave.

7 Q. Again, proceeding through the nearly a hundred days of the NATO

8 bombing, where else were you able to observe this -- this pattern

9 occurring of the KLA asking people to -- to move out?

10 A. I think what I could see on the part of the KLA, it took place in

11 this particular area, but in parallel, there were also villages attacked

12 by Serbian security forces. So this also resulted in the evacuation of

13 the civilian population. So there's a very clear mix. Both sides then

14 caused the movements of the civilian population, that is after the 23rd of

15 March.

16 Q. During the period of the NATO bombing campaign, did you remain in

17 Kosovo or did you move out into Macedonia or Albania? Where were you?

18 A. At this time, I went to Macedonia several times, via the routes I

19 already mentioned, for various reasons. So I believe I was about

20 two-thirds of the war in Kosovo and one-third in Macedonia, and here

21 mainly in the Tetovo region.

22 Q. And in that period did you witness any fighting, any military

23 operations?

24 A. I saw how paramilitary forces of the Serbs attacked the town of

25 Velika Krusa.

1 Q. That's on map page 10. To assist the Court, perhaps if you could

2 again indicate. Just south of Orahovac, on the railway line that you'd

3 indicated before.

4 A. Yes. During this attack, I -- I was in the forest to the east of

5 Velika Krusa. The attack started, as far as I recall, with the

6 preparation on the 25th, early in the morning, towards 7.00, where snipers

7 and advance observers attacked a water tower between Bata Krusa and Velika

8 Krusa. They occupied this water tower and they had a very good view to

9 Velika Krusa. They had -- they were supported by artillery. And in the

10 afternoon, in the open fields in this area, there was a mortar position

11 set up. And the next situation was that about -- about midday, many

12 women, old people, and children left the village, towards the forest.

13 There were clearly a few younger men, because Velika Krusa at that time

14 was not defended by any means by the KLA. There were no armed KLA

15 fighters in the village, and the attack started towards 3.00, 3.30 in the

16 afternoon.

17 Q. The firing that took place, were you able, from your military

18 experience, to judge what type of firing it was?

19 A. I think, and also after my research, it was a paramilitary group,

20 infantry group with very little in the way of mortar preparation or

21 artillery preparation. I couldn't swear to it, but between three and four

22 rounds were fired and the paramilitaries then entered the town. I heard

23 single shots, and afterwards, I heard systematic rounds being fired within

24 the town that I could hear from outside the town.

25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Hutsch, if you could describe the paramilitaries

1 more in detail; how they looked like or what they wore.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The uniforms were -- they looked

3 like normal American wood -- forest -- camouflage uniforms; brown, beige,

4 black, green. The paramilitaries were usually masked. They were about

5 100 strong - more or less the company - and they wore these bush hats.

6 Later research showed that these units were identified as so-called Frenki

7 Boys, a unit commanded by Frenki Simatovic.

8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

9 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. In dealing with -- with the conflict, there's been evidence and

11 it's been mentioned about Operation Horseshoe. Is that a phrase with

12 which you're familiar?

13 A. This term Horseshoe Plan I heard for the first time in the

14 publications of the international press after a press conference of the

15 German minister of defence, Rudolf Scharping, on the 7th of April. And

16 first of all, I thought the entire thing was implausible, because the

17 movements of the Serbian security forces that I could see didn't follow a

18 system or military plan. Later, research from October 1999 to March 2000

19 showed that this operation plan described by Minister Scharping on the 7th

20 of April and presented by him didn't arise from Belgrade but was

21 originated in the German Ministry of Defence.

22 MR. NICE: Your Honour, again I think we are arguably moving

23 outside material that this witness should be speaking about in speaking of

24 research from October 1999 to March 2000. He's speaking of something that

25 I think is likely to be covered by other witnesses on the accused's

1 witness list and is the subject of some controversy within Germany. But

2 unless he's done the research himself, I'm not sure it's going to help us

3 very much to have it second-hand from this witness.

4 MR. KAY: I think wait for it, because that was going to be the

5 next series of questions and why I raised the subject in the first place.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

7 MR. KAY:

8 Q. Did you speak to anyone in the German Ministry of Defence

9 concerning this plan that was outlined by the Minister Scharping? And if

10 so, can you identify who you spoke to and what their role was in relation

11 to the Horseshoe Plan.

12 A. The Horseshoe Plan, and this was crucial for me, that was also my

13 story, the one I published which is probably available to you, was that a

14 head of department Colonel von Kajdacsy, head of department --

15 Q. Spelling.

16 A. U, that's -- he's written S-U umlaut -- Cap S, Roman numeral II,

17 and then number 3. And in March 2000, I spoke to Colonel von Kajdacsy.

18 However, before that, several people of the German Defence Ministry had

19 said he had invented the name Horseshoe Plan and were even told he had

20 created it. What this means is that apparently on instructions of the

21 minister himself, he did what he did. And by the way, the German

22 intelligence service, BND, on 5 April 2000 -- sorry, I have to correct

23 myself; 1999, actually warned against using this plan.

24 Q. Did you speak to any individual who claimed credit for the -- for

25 the plan as it was used by Minister Scharping?

1 A. I spoke with Kajdacsy, and he indirectly confirmed in this talk

2 with him that what I said was true, and I also published that in my

3 articles. When I asked him whether he was the originator of said

4 operation, Kajdacsy told me he did not speak Serbian nor did he speak

5 Croat. You know that the question is, "Is the name for this Operation

6 Potkova," Serbian, or "Potkovica," Croat. And I then said to him again,

7 Mr. Kajdacsy, did you write this plan? Are you, as it were, the forger of

8 Mr. Scharping's plan? And he said again he spoke neither Serb nor Croat.

9 And I said, then I will write what my sources have confirmed, namely that

10 you came up with this. And then he said with a sigh, "Well, then you need

11 to do what your conscience tells you."

12 Q. You mentioned two spellings of horseshoe there, one in Croat. If

13 you could just, for the record, spell that, and then the Serbian word for

14 "horseshoe," if you could just spell that.

15 A. The name was published at the press conference and used throughout

16 by Minister Scharping as "potkova." "Potkova" is a Croat name for a

17 horseshoe whereas the Serbian name would be "potkovica."

18 Q. Any other direct information that you are able to give concerning

19 this -- this matter of Operation Horseshoe? You told us about Kajdacsy.

20 Anyone else that you spoke to about it concerning the validity of it as a

21 plan?

22 A. I spoke with General Naumann about this. I quoted him in one of

23 my articles, too, and he said unequivocally that NATO had not taken this

24 material when Minister Scharping had offered it, because A, no second NATO

25 partner was willing to confirm its validity; and B, because I quote

1 General Naumann, it was more analytical material, in inverted commas. I

2 also had a telephone interview with Ms. Del Ponte's predecessor in office,

3 Louise Arbour, also gave material to Minister Scharping and I published a

4 quote where Louise Arbour told me that she would have taken this had it

5 been a proper operation with a cover page and a stamp and a signature.

6 That would have been a smoking gun for her. But as it was, it was nothing

7 but a nice bedtime story.

8 Q. We're dealing here with conversations that you've had, and I want

9 to go back to another issue. And actually I'll finish Kosovo first before

10 I go to that.

11 You've described what you were doing in Kosovo at this period.

12 Did you interview refugees at all in the camps while you were in

13 Macedonia?

14 A. In my visit in Macedonia, and also later, I discussed the matter

15 with several refugees, and I simply had a very different impression there.

16 The people have seen unthinkable things. They had to go through

17 unspeakable suffering. But there was one major difference to Bosnia,

18 namely young women sort of came and offered up the stories of their rape,

19 and some of them actually sold their stories for money to journalists.

20 That was a major difference to what I saw in Bosnia. In Bosnia the women

21 were far more reticent with telling the story of their rape. Many of them

22 did not mention it at all. I can remember spending a good two weeks

23 meeting regularly with one woman, also to get her to tell me just what had

24 happened to her so I could then write a portrait about this young woman.

25 In Kosovo, this was different everywhere. There were one or two

1 women where my impression was very like what I saw in Bosnia, but that was

2 definitely not the case all over the place. In Bosnia it was very

3 different.

4 Q. Another feature of the times that I'd like you to tell us, if you

5 know anything about it, and that concerns any leaflets dropped by

6 aeroplanes during the period of the NATO bombing campaign or even before

7 that, if you came across any such instances.

8 A. What I saw was several leaflets being dropped depending on target

9 groups. Serb security forces were informed about the situation, about

10 what was happening. There were also within the German parliament

11 statements made by the defence committee of the German parliament

12 reflecting serious discussions intended to ask the media no longer to

13 broadcast anything from Serb television but substitute such images by

14 material provided by the German Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the

15 Interior, images which would have been taken by drones. This went even

16 down to debates as to whether it might make sense to have electronic means

17 of interfering with Serb broadcasting.

18 I have these documents available, so I could see there were

19 debates, there were plans doing just that.

20 Q. Did you read any leaflets about -- or written by any figures

21 within the KLA?

22 A. No. I did not see any leaflets being dropped with Hashim Thaci's

23 signature or Mr. Ceku's signature or that of anyone else from the

24 directorate of the KLA or from the General Staff.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Another five minutes.

1 MR. KAY:

2 Q. This period, then, during the NATO bombing, you've told us about

3 the time you spent between the two places, Macedonia, Kosovo. Were you

4 filing regular reports to your newspaper?

5 A. I did file regularly, and my reports were printed. I primarily

6 talked about what happened in Velika Krusa. Many reports on that. But I

7 also provided reports on life within Kosovo in this black box where nobody

8 really wanted to know anything about it or nobody knew what life in there

9 was really like.

10 Q. At the conclusion of the bombing campaign, 10th of June, 1999,

11 what did you do after that? Did you remain in the region?

12 A. I stayed in the region, and I finished and concluded my Kosovo

13 stay with a seven-part series published in December 1999, in which I

14 attempted to study the question of within six months what had changed in

15 Kosovo, and above all, what were the opportunities for the people in

16 Kosovo to live together again.

17 Q. Moving on now to that other subject I was going to deal with.

18 MR. KAY: Your Honour, it's probably better to start it as a

19 fresh topic, and I don't want to pad out too much.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay. We shall take an adjournment now.

21 20 minutes.

22 --- Recess taken at 12.12 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Kay.

25 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. Mr. Hutsch, I'll only be a short period of time, and your lawyer

2 Mr. Louschneider has joined us for the cross-examination stage.

3 Moving on from Kosovo, you initially told us about your period

4 that you spent in Bosnia. And I want to ask you about a particular

5 conversation that you had with General Mladic. Is it correct that you

6 interviewed General Mladic concerning Srebrenica?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Can you give the Court the date of that interview?

9 A. That was in March 1996.

10 Q. Whereabouts were you when you interviewed him?

11 A. In Sarajevo, where he is today.

12 Q. And did you question him about what happened at Srebrenica?

13 A. I asked him what had happened in Srebrenica, and the way he

14 answered the question to me was that the East Bosnian enclaves had to fall

15 in order to enable the peace plan for Bosnia.

16 Q. Did you discuss with him at all the planning of the attack on

17 Srebrenica?

18 A. I discussed the attack plan with him. In particular, I tried to

19 discuss with him to what extent he had received or might have received

20 instructions from Belgrade. In that context, Mr. Mladic stated

21 unequivocally that he had not received any orders from Milosevic; his

22 contact was Radovan Karadzic.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Why did you ask him that question?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because together with several

25 colleagues, I had attempted back then to try and look behind what had

1 happened in Srebrenica. We had tried to find out whether there had been a

2 link between Belgrade and Pale at the time.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay.

4 MR. KAY:

5 Q. Did he express how he viewed his relationship with Mr. Milosevic?

6 A. In this interview, he did not go further than state what I said

7 before. He would not -- he said he would not accept any orders from

8 Belgrade. We talked about theoretical scenarios. The interview ended up

9 in a yes, no, yes, no game which no longer provided any information, so

10 that we could only use that one statement of his, that he would not accept

11 any orders.

12 Q. And just for the record, did you publish that interview, the --

13 A. That interview was published, indeed, yes. It's also available on

14 the web.

15 Q. Was that the only interview you had with General Mladic or did you

16 have any others?

17 A. No. That was the only interview I did with him.

18 Q. And for the record as well, is it right that you interviewed

19 Mr. Milosevic on one occasion?

20 A. Yes. That was in 1998. We had a 20-minute interview, discussing

21 the situation in Serbia. But only in Serbia. We left out all other areas

22 and specifically discussed the situation in Serbia.

23 Q. So the conflicts that we're concerned with here were not the

24 subject of that interview?

25 A. That is correct.

1 MR. KAY: I have no further questions. Thank you.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay.

3 Mr. Milosevic, any questions?

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone, please.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have this other microphone.

6 Perhaps the other one is working. The other one seems to be working.

7 I listened with great care to the examination-in-chief, and this

8 kind of examination is just one further argument to you, Mr. Robinson,

9 that you ought to give me back my right to examine the witness myself.

10 This witness knows a great deal. For instance, he knows about the fact

11 that --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if you have questions of the

13 witness to add to, to complement, to supplement the examination-in-chief,

14 this is your opportunity. I don't want a speech. I don't want a

15 regurgitation of arguments that we have already heard. There is no need

16 to go over ground that we have already covered. The question of the

17 assignment of counsel is in another forum.

18 Do you have any questions?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, all I want to do is to

20 present arguments which speak to what I have been claiming. For example,

21 this witness knows full well that --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Then ask the questions. Ask the questions of

23 him.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I don't wish to use

25 scraps of right that you're giving to me as compensation for taking away

1 that right in the first place.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: I take it you have no questions to ask.

3 Mr. Nice.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When you give me back my right, then

7 I shall ask that you recall this witness for me to examine him.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

10 Q. Mr. Hutsch, quite a lot of territory to cover, and as you will

11 appreciate, we didn't know the detail of what you were going to say in

12 advance. We've been able to find some of your material on the net, but I

13 fear not all of it. I don't know if you have copies of your published

14 materials with you.

15 A. There are at least three boxes which I couldn't move here because

16 I've just returned from Afghanistan.

17 Q. You haven't brought any samples or any of the particularly

18 significant filings with you?

19 A. I had submitted some of my articles to the Defence, but obviously

20 not a whole range of everything, because I do not see myself as an

21 instrument of one of the two sides here. I am merely a neutral observer

22 stating the things I did observe, and I want to make clear that I do not

23 belong to one side. I am not a tool of one or the other side.

24 Q. It may be that I think you'll have to come back tomorrow because

25 we won't finish today, but it may be that I would ask you to make

1 available such articles that you brought with you simply because we

2 haven't been able to find them on the Internet.

3 And let's come straight away to your last bit of evidence about

4 speaking to General Mladic. You say that's published on the web. Under

5 what title? How do we find that on the web, because we haven't found it

6 yet.

7 A. It should be -- if you enter sort of Mladic into Google that

8 should be available, because the interview was translated into English and

9 published in the English language.

10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... facility indeed to even

11 search in German as well, so we'll find it, but did you make handwritten

12 notes of that interview?

13 A. Yes, I did.

14 Q. Do you have those with you today?

15 A. No. As I said, I did not bring any documentation with me with the

16 exception of some notes I made over the past eight days for myself.

17 Q. Subject to what we may see when we look at the published

18 interview, he said to you these two things: That he would not accept

19 orders from Belgrade.

20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. But that the Eastern Bosnia enclaves had to fall for there to be a

22 peace plan.

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Did you pursue that point, the fact that they had to fall, to

25 discover what he meant by that?

1 A. That was exactly the point I tried to question him to get more

2 precise answers, more details, but he did not go into detail what exactly

3 this was supposed to mean. He simply said in a more general remarks -- a

4 more general remark that one didn't need a patchwork in order to arrange

5 peace for Bosnia.

6 Q. I'll probably come back to this when I've read the interview

7 rather than to waste time and then -- and then do something twice, but

8 your recollection, please: To you was he saying one way or another that

9 he had contact with Milosevic at the relevant time, or was he denying

10 having contact with him?

11 A. No. He simply said he would not accept any orders. He did not

12 mention anything about contacts with Mr. Milosevic.

13 Q. We'll come back to that, then, when I've found the interview, if I

14 succeed in doing so overnight.

15 I'll ask you matters arising from your evidence pretty much in

16 sequence and then deal with some topics comprehensively, I hope.

17 You've been giving your account of things that KLA leaders said to

18 you, and you've been using the word "impression." In order to give

19 evidence, have you refreshed your memory from any of your notes or from

20 your articles or not?

21 A. I did have short discussions with Mr. Kay, and there were

22 questions arising from that which I tried to look up again, but I think

23 we've spent about six hours with each other, and basically what I've been

24 saying is from my recollection of events. So I did not re-examine my

25 archives. I didn't go back to the photographs I took, for example, in

1 Velika Krusa or in Kosovo in general. I did not do that.

2 Q. When you've attributed effectively to particular KLA leaders

3 particular stated positions, you haven't had the chance to go and look at

4 a note, you're still just relying on memory?

5 A. That is true. I have really intensively dealt with these people

6 for four or five years.

7 Q. For four or five years. The KLA you mean?

8 A. Yes. That is an issue which still keeps us busy and I'm sure will

9 keep us even more busy in the next years.

10 Q. Starting at the time of this conflict when you went there in 1998,

11 you've been in contact with the KLA since then, have you?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And maybe if we're better at searching the Internet, may we find

14 more articles that you've written about the KLA in recent years?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. We'll see what we can do. But under your name?

17 A. Under my name, too, but -- oh, no. That's going to be next

18 Saturday. A radio broadcast will be made on NDR, German northern

19 television/radio, where I'm going to give an eight-minute contribution on

20 the situation in Kosovo. I kept reporting on the KLA, on Kosovo, and on

21 what is happening within the KLA.

22 Q. And your seven-part series, who was that for, because we haven't

23 tracked that down either.

24 A. That was Hamburger Abendblatt.

25 Q. Matters of detail, you spoke of some of the KLA soldiers being

1 trained in Turkey. Are you able to help us? Was this trained officially

2 by the Turkish government or by the army, or just trained as a matter of

3 fact in Turkish territory?

4 A. They were trained on Turkish territory but by MPRI. I have,

5 concerning the time period, there was Almedin Alic from 16 December 1997

6 to 19 March 1998, he was trained in Turkey. Then there was --

7 Q. When you say "trained in Turkey," there is nobody in a Turkish

8 official position to help us with this?

9 A. No, nobody from the Turkish official side.

10 Q. That's fine. Now, you've estimated 80 to 120 foreign officers.

11 What nationalities?

12 A. For -- starting with Bosnian Muslims to Algerians. Primarily,

13 actually, Algerians, but there were also Saudis, Egyptians, Moroccans, the

14 people who served in the Mujahedin brigades.

15 Q. And where do you make this estimate from? Is it that