1 Wednesday, 8 September 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, you are to continue your

6 cross-examination.

7 WITNESS: SMILJA AVRAMOV [Resumed]

8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you allow me, Mr. Nice, I owe you

10 an explanation from yesterday. I've read this article that you gave me

11 that you said was my article. I stand by the content of it, but this is

12 not an article, Mr. Nice. It's a speech which I gave quite a long time

13 ago on the occasion of the publication of the book that is being mentioned

14 there.

15 I repeat, I stand by what is written there. These are my

16 thoughts. But probably when this was recorded and edited, I didn't quite

17 -- and the title actually was probably given by the person who recorded

18 it. So there's no doubt.

19 If you allow me a question. It is not clear. I've written

20 several articles about the Tribunal, so it is not clear to me what that

21 has to do with testifying in the case against Mr. Milosevic.

22 Well, may I give this back to you? I didn't see it from the time

23 that I actually gave this speech, so it was ten or 15 days ago. Please

24 could you take this.

25 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

1 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I just correct a couple of matters

2 from yesterday, one indeed to deal with the points of authorship of this

3 witness. She didn't single-handedly write a book called Genocide Against

4 the Serbs but she did contribute an essay to a book of that name, and my

5 understanding is that she wrote a forward to An Atlas of the Ustasi

6 Genocide of the Serbs, 1941 to 1945.

7 Q. Is that correct, Professor?

8 A. I don't know which one you are thinking of. I have a lot of

9 forwards that I wrote for at least ten books.

10 Q. Very well. Let's move on.

11 A. The --

12 Q. You must understand, Professor, we are limited as to time and the

13 longer your answers, either the longer I will detain you or the less will

14 I be able to explore your evidence to the assistance of the Chamber.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honour, one correction: The mine I was referring

16 to yesterday when I was dealing with the Kosovo miners' strike was Stari

17 Trg in Trepca. And two other questions of this witness on very general

18 matters.

19 Q. It's right, isn't it, Professor Avramov, that you were an advisor

20 both to the RSK and to the Republika Srpska and that you subsequently

21 indeed became a senator in Republika Srpska in February of 1997, having

22 earlier held the position of a member on the Education Council of the

23 Republika Srpska Krajina in March 1995?

24 A. No, that is wrong. You have the incorrect information. I was

25 never anyone's advisor. I was a member of the Educational Advisory

1 Council in Republika Srpska because there was a university there where we

2 taught, professors from the Faculty of Law, the faculty of philosophy, and

3 some other faculties from the University of Belgrade.

4 I was not an advisor. I was a member of the Educational Advisory

5 Council. And I did go to Knin to give lectures at the university there.

6 I also gave lectures in Pristina.

7 Q. I have a number of short points to cover from the evidence you

8 gave yesterday.

9 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I have a transcript that has page numbers

10 1 to whatever it is. I don't -- if the Chamber has a transcript, I don't

11 know if it's similarly paginated.

12 Q. You made a reference --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you go on, Mr. Nice, can we clarify the

14 answer to the question whether the witness was a senator in Republika

15 Srpska, which was part of the question.

16 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.

17 Q. Can you answer His Honour that question, please.

18 A. No, I wasn't a delegate or a member. I was a member of the Senate

19 of Republika Srpska for a short period if that Senate was actually

20 operating at all.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

22 MR. NICE:

23 Q. A few points arising from yesterday. In my transcript page 11,

24 speaking of the period after 1945, you spoke of the Croats organising

25 illegal groups which turned into terrorist organisations. Professor

1 Avramov, I just alert you to the fact that as far as I know, this may be

2 the first time --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- you've heard of this. A very simple question. Please answer

5 it, if you can, shortly. The terrorist groups to which you are referring,

6 did they in any way relate to or turn into the bodies with which we're

7 concerned now as we explore the falling apart of the former Yugoslavia or

8 are they entirely independent of that?

9 A. There were links. I wrote about that. I will give you my book.

10 I wrote in detail about it in my book Genocide In Yugoslavia in the Light

11 of International Law. These groups were organised, the illegal groups,

12 and later they linked up with groups in the country.

13 I don't know if you recall or if you have information about this

14 attempt at an uprising in Bosnia when these groups infiltrated the

15 country. I cannot remember exactly when this was. I think it was in 1969

16 or 1970. I don't remember the exact date.

17 Q. Very well.

18 A. They infiltrated Bosnia in order to organise an uprising and to

19 link up with the groups that were in the country.

20 Q. By what names or initials, if any, were these groups known?

21 A. These groups joined together and a united movement was created

22 called the Croatian Liberation Movement or HOP. The illegal organisation,

23 and I provided proof about that, was formed in Zagreb in 1965, and then

24 all of these groups joined together.

25 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... of the transcript, you told

1 us that the suggestion that at the Karadjordjevo meeting Milosevic and

2 Tudjman had drawn borders. You said that was a lie, a notorious lie. You

3 then explained that your working group actually dealt with borders.

4 You've written about various things, but you've never covered, I

5 think, the Karadjordjevo meeting in -- you may never have covered it in

6 your books.

7 You, in your account to this Court, don't know what passed between

8 the two presidents at that meeting, do you?

9 A. Two things. You misunderstood me. And secondly, it's not true

10 that I did not write about it in my book. The Post Heroic War of the West

11 Against Yugoslavia, which was published, I think, in 1997 or 1998, I dealt

12 with that problem on two pages. I think that is one problem. I stressed

13 that I did not attend the Karadjordjevo meeting and that I don't know the

14 content of the talks between them, but the group that I talked about and

15 which I was a part of, I assume was formed based on the agreement from

16 Karadjordjevo. I was a member of that group. And I said I wasn't talking

17 about borders at Karadjordjevo, but I talked about how we discussed

18 borders in principle, whether they can be drawn based on the revolutionary

19 division of Yugoslavia or based on international treaties. I was in

20 favour of the concept that only international treaties can be the basis

21 for future borders.

22 Q. Very well. Then we'll move on to the next point. At page 23, you

23 suggested that the order to send reinforcements to Slovenia was issued by

24 Mr. Markovic as Prime Minister. Now, you know that is simply not true.

25 Constitutionally as Prime Minister, he had no power to do so.

1 A. Sir, Markovic and Mesic were the top leadership at that time in

2 Yugoslavia. According to our press, it says that this decision was made

3 by Markovic. I don't know whether our press conveyed this correctly.

4 Perhaps it wasn't Mr. Markovic, but who else could it have been other than

5 Mr. Markovic and Mr. Mesic? They were the federal bodies, the highest

6 ranking federal officials.

7 There is another thing. Please. The country was under threat.

8 Does that country have the right to defend itself? Of course it does.

9 That is the natural basic right of every country. This wasn't you know --

10 Q. The Commander-in-Chief was the Supreme Command or Supreme Defence

11 Council, as it was later known, but -- and of that body at the time Mesic

12 was to be the president. Jovic was also a member of it; correct?

13 A. Yes. Yes.

14 Q. And if the evidence shows that Jovic exercised power to send the

15 army to Slovenia in the absence of Mesic to stop him doing so, you can't

16 say that that's wrong, can you?

17 A. I don't have any information about that. I wasn't nearby, and I

18 had nothing to do with these top leadership organs in our country. I

19 didn't have any political functions, sir, so I cannot really answer that

20 question.

21 JUDGE KWON: Before moving on, Mr. Nice, I don't think the witness

22 answered your previous question properly.

23 Professor, the previous question was whether Mr. Markovic, Prime

24 Minister, had power to do so, to make a decision to send the troops. As a

25 legal expert, can you answer this question.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Quite certainly he did not, but our

2 press published this information, and it was the general conviction that

3 this was so. This was never denied. So -- under the constitution, there

4 were many deviations from it. The constitution was pushed aside as such

5 and anti-constitutional, unconstitutional decisions or things were carried

6 out, scores of such things at the time. We would need to go through each

7 one individually. But he was not authorised to do that; it's clear that

8 he was not.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. You've been prepared to give this evidence effectively about him.

12 Just help us -- against him. You've told us what you learnt at the time

13 from reading newspapers. Did you also learn of the same Mr. Markovic

14 voluntarily going to Ljubljana when the JNA was about to send airstrike in

15 order that he could be there to be a victim along with others should that

16 airstrike happen? Do you remember reading about that?

17 A. No, I don't remember that at all.

18 Q. Very well.

19 A. I don't remember that detail.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice is confusing the witness,

23 because Mr. Nice knows very well that I presented here the stenogram from

24 an extended Presidency meeting and the presidents of the republics where

25 you can see what the president of Slovenia at the time, Milan Kucan, said,

1 who confirmed that Markovic created that whole incident in Slovenia which

2 they described as war but which was actually a crime against the soldiers

3 and where all of this is stated. Therefore, what he's claiming is

4 actually an attempt to confuse the witness so that the witness would

5 justify something that is broadly known.

6 At this meeting, which was attended by President Mesic, president

7 of Yugoslavia at the time, Ante Markovic, Mr. Kucan who was the president

8 of Slovenia at the time. So this is not quite correct.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I hear the comments that you have

10 made. No doubt Mr. Nice has also heard them.

11 What I'd like to say is that you have an opportunity, by virtue of

12 the order which we made, to ask questions, and it would have been

13 perfectly proper for you to put that by way of re-examination of this

14 witness.

15 Mr. Nice.

16 MR. NICE: Thank you.

17 Q. Page 27 of the transcript of yesterday deals with the passage I've

18 already spoken of whereby the witness described the accused not being the

19 only person to make decisions, in case that helps you.

20 But if we go to page 30 in the transcript, we are reminded, madam,

21 that you told the Judges yesterday, when speaking of the meeting at

22 Brioni, that everyone was invited from the republics with the exception of

23 Serbia, and you said that Serbia wasn't represented. Now, that wasn't

24 true, was it? Serbia was invited.

25 A. No. Serbia was not represented at that meeting. And at the last

1 moment, according to the minutes from the Brioni meeting, at the last

2 minute they noted, well, we don't have a representative from Serbia, and

3 then Mr. Jovic, who represented the federation and was there on behalf of

4 the federation, was asked to be a representative of Serbia at the same

5 time. Now, that is correct.

6 Q. And --

7 A. I cited sources about that in my book.

8 Q. -- not only was Jovic there, well able to represent Serbia, given

9 his position and his relationship with this accused, but Kadijevic was

10 there as well, wasn't he?

11 A. Kadijevic was representing the army and not the Republic of

12 Serbia.

13 Q. If we go on, please, to page 34. You made an observation

14 yesterday, as translated, that I'd like your help with, when you were

15 talking about the rights to self-determination and secession, and you

16 spoke about what you described as not a territorial principle, a

17 subjective principle of a people, going on to say, "So the Serbs as a

18 core, c-o-r-e as it's been translated, as a core, as a constituent nation,

19 had the right to self -- it's not clear what the next word is. Did you in

20 some way regard the Serbs as being a core of Yugoslavia?

21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note it was corps, c-o-r-p-s.

22 MR. NICE: In which case, what did you -- I'm very grateful,

23 interpreters. I should have checked with you earlier this morning but I

24 didn't find the time.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Or corpus, c-o-r-p-u-s, in the original.

1 MR. NICE: In which case, I think that probably means --

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir, there is a difference between a

3 corps and between a constitutive people. These are two different terms.

4 I was speaking about constitutive peoples. One of the constitutive

5 peoples is, of course, the Serb -- are, of course, the Serb people. Not

6 only constitutive but also they were the foundation of Yugoslavia because

7 only the Kingdom of Serbia which participated in World War I had the legal

8 right to discuss the problem of a future state during the Versailles

9 negotiations. The other parts were under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So

10 this is what I had said, a constitutive people, yes.

11 Q. And does that -- just so we can understand it, although I expect

12 we all generally follow it, this puts, for example, in your mind the Serbs

13 above people such as who; Kosovo Albanians, Croats, Muslim?

14 A. Nobody ever said that, least of all myself, sir. What I said, I

15 said -- well, maybe I didn't tell you before, but I'm saying it now.

16 Perhaps I expressed it in a different way perhaps.

17 Q. I'm asking you -- I'm asking you -- is your --

18 A. Please go ahead.

19 Q. Is your judgement that the Serbs as a corpus of people, and you've

20 given the historical context by which you view them, rank above Kosovo

21 Albanians, Bosnians, or even Croats in their rights, or are they equal?

22 A. I never said that, and I always believed that the peoples were

23 equal, but I would also like to remind you, sir, that under the Resolution

24 of the General Assembly, and I will tell you exactly which number

25 Resolution it is, it is 1514 from 1960, it is clearly stated that

1 secession or the desire to secede cannot be done based on

2 self-determination, that self-determination cannot be the reason to

3 destroy a state.

4 This is stated in 1514/60, that Resolution. Also, it states that

5 self-determination cannot be carried out by force, and in particular it is

6 stressed that minorities in a country cannot use self-determination in

7 order to achieve or carry out a secession.

8 Q. I'm just going to ask you part of my last question again. I'm not

9 going to try and trap you or trick you because I'm going to come back to

10 this at a later stage when we look at the treatment of different parts of

11 the Yugoslavia in the plans that were laid.

12 Do you regard the Serbs as equal to the Kosovo Albanians?

13 A. Today in Kosovo they are subjugated, oppressed, expelled, and

14 there has been an attempt to effect a genocide over part of the Serb

15 people living in Kosovo. I should also like to remind you --

16 Q. I'm sorry, madam --

17 A. No, they are not equal in Kosovo.

18 Q. So in some way, and we'll look at this perhaps later, the thinking

19 of the intellectuals, including yourself, was that the Kosovo Albanians

20 were lesser in their status and lesser in their rights than the Serbs;

21 correct?

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: That -- sorry.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: I just wonder whether that's fair to the witness.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: The witness is addressing the factual situation

2 today.

3 MR. NICE: She was now but my question is directed -- I'm so sorry

4 if I misled her, of course.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. My concern, Professor Avramov, is this; to know whether in your

8 judgement --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: As a matter of principle.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. -- as a matter of principle and at the material time, they were

12 equal to the Serbs or they had for some reason less status and less rights

13 than the Serbs. What was your judgement at the time?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: You mean as a matter of law.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, sir, you did attempt

16 to trap me, because you don't differentiate the status of an individual

17 and the status of a minority from the concept of autonomy. If we view the

18 concept of autonomy in relation to the state, then autonomy has less

19 rights than does the state, according to international law.

20 Now, as far as human rights are concerned and the position of

21 minorities, they were not only equal with the Serbs but they had the

22 highest status that a minority enjoyed in Europe. You couldn't conceive

23 of any greater status. They received their own Albanian university. They

24 had their schools in their own language. They had absolutely all rights

25 accorded them and were absolutely equal to the Serbs. And in relationship

1 to the constitution of 1974, the Serbs had a lower status than did the

2 Albanians in Kosovo because the Albanians could voice their veto to any

3 amendments to the Serbian constitution whereas Belgrade couldn't do the

4 same vis-a-vis Pristina.

5 MR. NICE:

6 Q. Thank you. I'll come back to that a little later.

7 On page 57 of the transcript, you told us this yesterday when

8 asked by His Honour pressing on an earlier question that had been asked by

9 Mr. Kay, and you said of the Croats that not a -- not a single Croat was

10 harmed. This was in Serbia. "Not a hair on their head was harmed in

11 Serbia. They're still living there today."

12 A. Yes, yes. That is what I said, and that is what I claim. Now,

13 it's another matter if laws are violated or if people are brought before a

14 court of law for any illegal acts that they might have committed. I don't

15 exclude that. But in principle, that is it, and I have Croats living in

16 my own neighbourhood.

17 Q. Professor Avramov, we've heard evidence from witnesses, C-47,

18 C-48, about Subotica, about Hrtkovci, in which there were not just forced

19 movements but also killings, about the involvement of Seselj in that

20 Vojvodina region forcing people to move.

21 A. Sir, you're asking me questions about things that I did not take

22 part in, where I was not present. So I can only tell you indirectly what

23 I heard, what I read, and on the basis of what the press wrote, what I'm

24 able to conclude.

25 Yes, I do know about these Hrtkovci. I do know that there were

1 collective exchanges of houses in villages for certain villages in

2 Krajina, that these exchanges were made, and they live there to the

3 present day. They exchanged their houses. Now, some people wished to go

4 back to their own homes because some of their houses that they gave in

5 Dalmatia in some villages are much larger and better than the ones that

6 they exchanged their houses for. But as I say, I only know that from the

7 press so don't involve me in questions where I did not take part myself.

8 I am a witness here, I'm testifying here with respect to the acts of

9 Mr. Milosevic, and in Hrtkovci that has nothing to do with Mr. Milosevic.

10 Q. Professor Avramov, it was you who volunteered the answer that not

11 a single hair had been injured. I must suggest to you that Hrtkovci was

12 extremely well known --

13 A. Yes, and I claim that today, too.

14 Q. And indeed although I'm anxious not to trouble the Tribunal with

15 too much paper, but indeed there have been reports from the autonomous

16 province of Vojvodina in 2003 setting out ethnic cleansing that happened

17 there in that period. Do you accept that?

18 A. No, I do not accept that, certainly not. You have one opinion; I

19 have another opinion. You have your own documents; I have my own

20 documents because I have delved in research work and I have written three

21 books on the subject. And of course, certainly you can bring in different

22 witnesses from the same place, they were in a different position, and so

23 on and so forth and had different feelings and sentiments towards one

24 issue or another, so they would express that.

25 Q. Coming to my second-to-last topic arising from yesterday's

1 evidence, you dealt at pages 75, then later at 87, with something about

2 the autonomy of Vojvodina, which you explained had an absolute majority,

3 explaining at 88 that the point of the proposed amendments to the

4 constitution of Serbia was to deprive the provinces of the right to veto

5 through which they were influencing the policy of Serb

6 -- Serbia.

7 That was the reason why Vojvodina's autonomy was reduced or

8 eliminated along with Kosovo's, wasn't it; in order that Serbia would not

9 having to be seeking consensus or agreement in relation to things like

10 constitutional change.

11 A. Consensus is one matter, sir; veto is another.

12 Q. Vojvodina had a majority of Serbs. It wasn't vulnerable?

13 A. Yes, and it still does and they always were in the majority.

14 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... centralisation, which I will

15 suggest it was, of Serbia, by the reduction or elimination of the two

16 autonomies or near autonomies was going to serve the purpose of this

17 accused and his extension of control, wasn't it? That's why it was done.

18 A. No, sir. You can't personalise an extremely difficult situation

19 the state was facing in which that same state had the right to

20 self-defence and defence and to preserve itself and boil it all down and

21 bring it all down into one personality. The state was faced with an

22 existential difficulty. All pacts on human rights, all international

23 covenants and conventions speak about the exceptional rights enjoyed by

24 the state when it is faced with external attack, internal unrest, and so

25 on. So why should Serbia not have the right to resort to extraordinary

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1 measures under given circumstances and in certain conditions? Now,

2 whether this was done by Mr. Milosevic alone or with the agreement of the

3 government, as far as I know and as far as I was included into this

4 process, he did always ask for support from parliament. I did not attend

5 government meetings myself so I can't speak about that, but I assume he

6 did ask for support from the government.

7 And now another question I'd like to emphasise is this --

8 Q. I'm not sure --

9 A. -- Mr. Milosevic --

10 Q. -- it's appropriate for you to launch into topics of your own.

11 You have, I fear, to be responsive to questions.

12 MR. NICE: Your Honours, at page 91 --

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I answered your question.

14 MR. NICE: At page 91 of the transcript, I see I misspoke when

15 identifying the number of identifiable groups living in 200 identifiable

16 countries or thereabouts, and I think the number of identifiable groups is

17 2.000 rather than the 5.000 which I misspoke yesterday.

18 Q. Let's go back to a few matters of chronology, Professor.

19 You as an intellectual and closely -- having closely researched

20 this particular conflict, as you would say, know that paramilitaries have

21 a particular effect on society, don't they? They are destabilising

22 because they interfere with the proper monopoly of violence exercised

23 through the army and the police.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Can you explain, because -- I'm going to stay with 1991 and the

1 beginning of 1992, the period of which you've spoken of having intimate

2 knowledge. Can you explain, then, how it came about that the man called

3 Dragan was first involved in preparing for paramilitary operations in

4 April of 1991? Do you anything about Dragan?

5 A. No. I've never met the man myself. I know from the press that

6 there was a man called Dragan. I don't know him personally, I never had

7 any contact with him.

8 Q. Then let's move on just one month, because you were intimate or

9 became intimate, to a degree, with the accused. What conceivable purpose

10 was there in the accused's establishing the Red Berets in May of 1991, a

11 paramilitary force which would have the effect of destabilisation?

12 A. I'm not certain --

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He is deluding the witness once

16 again. The special units or, rather, the special unit called the Red

17 Berets was established in the Ministry of Interior of Serbia, the security

18 service, in 1996, and I think we had a tape here from 1997 and their

19 establishment. So it's 1996, not 1991. He is leading the witness into a

20 total -- into total confusion, and he hasn't got the right to state facts

21 that are incorrect in his question to the witness. So the witness is

22 unable to understand the question, like the one about the constituent

23 nation, because everyone will tell you that the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes,

24 Macedonians, and so on and so forth are constituent peoples. So this term

25 "the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia" applies to all the peoples and

1 nations. And the Muslims in 1970 also gained the status of a constituent

2 nation.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... with our

4 leave, you will be able to put to the witness through re-examination.

5 Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: Yes.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just as a matter of fact, the Red

10 Berets was established when?

11 MR. NICE: This comes when the film comes -- according to Frenki

12 Simatovic, not a witness, of course, but we've heard him speak on the

13 topic, 4th of May, 1991 the unit was established.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Any questions that relate to that issue may be

15 raised by the Court-assigned counsel.

16 MR. NICE:

17 Q. Following the accused's interjection, the Judges - I'm sure you

18 will understand this, Professor - will have to decide in due course the

19 nature of the unit, if any, Mr. Simatovic says was created in the 4th of

20 May of 1991.

21 You as an intellectual, help us, please: Was there any

22 conceivable legitimate ground for this accused to take such destabilising

23 action, if he took it, at that stage of this conflict?

24 A. I cannot give you a precise answer because I was not involved in

25 that segment of internal policy. My knowledge, my expertise, the area I

1 am versed in was international law and foreign political relations. I

2 can, as a human being, as an individual and as a legal person who knows

3 about this - of course I delved in quite different areas, not internal

4 affairs fares, other witnesses will be better placed to tell you about

5 that - but all I can tell you is this: That according to international

6 law, a state does enjoy the right to take maximum steps in order to

7 protect its integrity in case of being jeopardised, and that right

8 emanates from the right to self-defence. That is one point.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor. Professor, I'm addressing you.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I see. Go ahead.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you therefore identifying that right as -- as

12 a basis for the establishment of the Red Berets?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It could be the case under certain

14 circumstances. For example, the Americans have their marines in the form

15 of special units which they attach to embassies, for example, which is a

16 little absurd, but they consider that under situations where terrorism has

17 become a global danger, that that is a part and parcel component part of

18 their right to self-defence. But according to classical international

19 law, that actually, strictly speaking, is not acceptable.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

21 MR. NICE:

22 Q. Sorry. Two points just to follow up on this before we move on:

23 But at the time that we are dealing with, was Serbia an international

24 subject or was Yugoslavia an international subject?

25 A. Yugoslavia at all events.

1 Q. And within Yugoslavia, was Serbia being threatened by its

2 neighbours? Was Croatia threatening to invade Serbia? Was Slovenia

3 threatening to invade Serbia? Was it?

4 A. No. The only internationally recognised and protected subject was

5 Yugoslavia, and that's what I mean. First of all, there was a rebellion,

6 and then that rebellion grew to be a civil war and then an international

7 war against the sole recognised international subject, which was

8 Yugoslavia.

9 Q. So Serbia, as a constituent part of the legally recognised

10 Yugoslavia, had no grounds for acting in purported self-defence at that

11 time, did it?

12 A. Yes, it did have the right, because a part of Yugoslavia had

13 seceded contrary to the law, contrary to international law. Secession is

14 not something that is recognised. The United Nations didn't recognise it

15 with respect to Cyprus or 22 secessionist movements. They are registered

16 with the United Nations. The United Nations took a negative stance

17 towards them, and this is best borne out, I don't want to remind you of

18 Biafra, for example, where the international forces arrived in order to

19 prevent secession, not to mention Cyprus, which was only recognised by

20 Turkey and not a single other country. They all refused.

21 The only case in which secession was recognised is the case of

22 Yugoslavia. It was contrary to the law, it was illegal, and it will be

23 the subject of a long-term examination and is indeed being examined now by

24 the international legal public.

25 Q. I'm not sure that answer is responsive, but I'm going to move on.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: I can tell that you it doesn't answer the question

2 as far as I can tell.

3 MR. NICE: But I have only so much time, Your Honour.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, please go ahead. Let me answer

5 your question this way. Perhaps you didn't understand my answer: In a

6 situation in which part of that sovereign state of Yugoslavia seceded

7 contrary to the law and took armed action against that state, the state of

8 Yugoslavia, then Serbia as a part, as a constituent part of Yugoslavia, as

9 a reduced part of that country, did have the right to defend itself.

10 Certainly it did.

11 MR. NICE:

12 Q. The trouble with that is that May 1991 precedes secession,

13 Professor Avramov.

14 Can we move on to September 1991. You know of Vocin, which is on

15 the borders of Western Slovenia, and I'm asking you these factual

16 questions because you have volunteered to the Judges things like, for

17 example, not a hair on the head of a non-Serb was injured in Serbia. You

18 volunteered factual knowledge.

19 Vocin in Western Slavonia was attacked by a paramilitary group led

20 by a man called Bokan. Are you aware of that man and his paramilitary

21 activities; and if so, how could they be justified?

22 A. I don't know the man. I never had any contacts with him. I don't

23 know him at all, so I can't tell you about the man.

24 Now, as far as the volunteers are concerned, yes, when the army

25 was withdrawn to barracks, went back to barracks and when the Serb people

1 were left to fend for themselves, deserted by its former -- how --

2 brethren, if I can put it that way, which the Serbs and Croats used to

3 refer themselves to as, they were open to attack and then there was a

4 revolt in Serbia and there were a lot of people who volunteered. I know

5 that many people volunteered, came forward as volunteers. Some volunteers

6 reported to the army and placed themselves under the protection and

7 disposal of the army although the army did not send its men, its

8 volunteers, but I also know that certain units were established outside

9 Serbia as assistance to the Serb people in those parts. So I know about

10 those units in principle, but I don't know the personages that you're

11 asking me about.

12 Q. Before we move to the Carrington Plan, which is what I'm going to

13 take you to, a similar question about Arkan's Tigers or the Seseljevci and

14 their activities about which this Court has heard in Knin, Borovo Selo,

15 places like that in the early part of this conflict, did you know about

16 those things, madam?

17 A. I can only give you an indirect answer, but asking me those

18 questions is quite unsuitable because I'm not somebody who took part in

19 any of that so that I can give you an eyewitness account.

20 Q. Very well. When we come to the Carrington Plan, however, certain

21 events have become quite notorious in the press and on television and so

22 on, and you must have been aware, by the time you were assisting in the

23 negotiations here in The Hague, of what had started in Dubrovnik, indeed

24 what had started in Vukovar. Dubrovnik, an entirely Croatian city,

25 majority --

1 A. No. No, not entirely. Mostly.

2 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... and Vukovar a place in which

3 the Serbs had not only no majority but there was a majority, as it were,

4 against them. Can you help us, please, from your perspective in 1991 of

5 what --

6 A. You're not correct on that score.

7 Q. Very well. Correct me. What about Vukovar? They had a majority

8 in Vukovar, did they?

9 A. At one point in time, the balance was 50/50 in Vukovar.

10 Q. What point in time?

11 A. During the old Yugoslavia.

12 Q. Yes. What about -- what about the 1990s, madam? Who had the

13 majority then?

14 A. I think there was a slight majority on the Croatian side. It

15 tipped the balance slightly.

16 Q. You've told us about, yesterday, the interests of those places

17 where Serbs were in a majority, and you've told us about how things that

18 were done were done in fear of a repetition of the Second World War

19 genocide against the Serbs.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Can you offer any explanation, any justification for the attacks,

22 well known and started before the Carrington Plan, at either Dubrovnik or

23 Vukovar?

24 A. At that time, we offered Carrington, and of course the European

25 Community, a vast number of material, of documents, about armed conflicts

1 on the soil of Yugoslavia. And in those documents we provided instances

2 of attacks by both sides. I'm sure that Dubrovnik was a case in point,

3 was mentioned, and I know that at that time, according to the reports that

4 were coming in to us, they said that the centre of Dubrovnik had not been

5 attacked and that the old city centre had not been destroyed but that

6 there was fighting in the environs of Dubrovnik.

7 Q. Just help me, please, because you know the territory. You will no

8 doubt have been to Dubrovnik probably many times. Is it --

9 A. Yes, of course I have.

10 Q. It may be that the Judges will know it and everybody knows its

11 topography. Are you really suggesting that you would take seriously the

12 proposition that people were fighting out of Dubrovnik on its little coast

13 land - I don't know how we call it - plateau there against the surrounding

14 forces? Is that really your suggestion? Or do you accept that Dubrovnik

15 was attacked, pure and simple?

16 A. Perhaps. Or, rather, according to the information that we

17 received at the time, according to which there was fighting around

18 Dubrovnik but not in the city centre itself. And the second point that we

19 provided documents about was that although Dubrovnik was a demilitarised

20 town, Croatian forces did enter Dubrovnik. We offered material to that

21 effect, which of course did not exclude the possibility and --

22 Q. Why -- it may be a demilitarised town, but you -- the Serbs had

23 absolutely no entitlement to Dubrovnik. What on earth matter was it for

24 them? We still want to know, you see, in this Court, maybe, if there's

25 any justification for the attack on Dubrovnik, and I just wondered if you

1 could help us because you were there negotiating for the accused and --

2 helping the accused in his negotiations at the same time.

3 A. Sir, we're not talking about Dubrovnik; we're talking about

4 Yugoslavia, the state of Yugoslavia. As to Dubrovnik, that is a component

5 part, or was a component part of Yugoslavia, not of Serbia.

6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, now we can move to the Carrington plan.

7 We do have a number of documents which, I think, may be helpful, coming

8 from The Hague conference, recently relieved of the restriction that had

9 been on them. The witness is a witness who can deal with them, and I

10 propose to put them through her as exhibits, taking the documents

11 individually quite quickly. They're authoritative documents, I think, and

12 they will then be part of the record. I hope that's not going to be too

13 consuming of time.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. Bear in mind the witness's travel

15 plans.

16 MR. NICE: I certainly do, and I also bear in mind that I think,

17 if I'm right, the Badinter Commission documents, which, of course, arise

18 out of all of this, are already before the Chamber because the Chamber

19 sought them and they were provided.

20 Can we have first, please -- I'll deal with them in chronological

21 order, and I'll leave my file out so you can see where we go next.

22 Q. First --

23 A. You see, I can't read all of that now. This is a vast amount of

24 material that you've given me, so --

25 Q. I'm not asking you -- I'm not asking you to read it. These all

1 come from the authorities so as to make provenance indisputable.

2 If you look just at this document, which we see is dated the 5th

3 of September, and if you go to the end of it, madam, you'll see it's the

4 representations from Milan Babic.

5 A. The 9th of September? The 9th of September?

6 Q. It comes from -- it comes from --

7 A. Oh, yes, I'm sorry. Yes, yes, I can see it now. Yes, the

8 reception was on the 9th. What page are you referring to now?

9 Q. Just the first page and the first paragraph, please. It comes

10 from Milan Babic, you will see, and it says that on the session of the 5th

11 of September the government of Krajina considered the declaration on

12 Yugoslavia brought at the ministerial meeting of European political

13 corporation in Brussels, the cease-fire treaty and the memorandum on

14 monitoring mission, and in that respect the government of the SAP Krajina

15 is presenting its standpoints.

16 And if you'd then be good enough to go over two pages, please, to

17 the third page - could you turn to the third page, please - where we see

18 paragraph number 3, which reads: "Problems discussed in the declaration

19 as expected for Serbian people in future constitution of Yugoslavia have

20 ceased being problems for Serbian people, namely Serbian people of Krajina

21 has decided through its referendum to live together with the rest of Serbs

22 on the territory of Yugoslavia. It is another problem that such decisions

23 are denied through armed aggression of Croatian neo-fascist authorities."

24 And then if you'll turn over one, two, three, four, five pages, we

25 come to the conclusion, where Milan Babic signs, enclosing some items, and

1 at number 3, he says -- he encloses the platform -- sorry, number 2: The

2 report on the referendum on Krajina's joining Serbia and its staying in

3 Yugoslavia; and 3, the platform of the government of Serbian autonomous

4 province of Krajina about possible solutions.

5 Now, just in short, this shows, this -- this document submitted by

6 Krajina and by Milan Babic shows a line of thinking entirely in accordance

7 with that of the accused in this case, doesn't it?

8 A. Your question became a leading one at the very end. What I would

9 say is that this simply corroborates what I had said. The people of

10 Krajina were resolute in their wish to remain within Yugoslavia, that

11 areas populated by the Serb people for centuries never came under the

12 sovereignty of Croatia because in Yugoslavia there was this

13 decentralisation status, as you know, and secondly, on the basis of the

14 decision, the referendum that they carried out, they stated that they

15 wished to remain within Yugoslavia.

16 As I said to you yesterday -- please allow me to finish.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, I think you have answered that

18 question.

19 MR. NICE: May that become exhibit --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: What number would that be?

21 THE REGISTRAR: The number will be 774.

22 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

23 Q. The next exhibit is a speech made at the conference by Franjo

24 Tudjman, and I'm only providing it as the counterbalance to what follows,

25 which is a speech by the accused, but just very briefly to remind you:

1 This is the speech of Franjo Tudjman at the conference. And if we just

2 look at the first paragraphs to remind you of how things developed, you'll

3 see that he spoke of a dirty, undeclared war, set out the number of

4 Croatian victims, set out the number of refugees, and asserted that

5 cultural monuments and edifices were being bombed, and so on.

6 So he set out, and I don't desire to go into it and I'm not

7 relying on it for the truth of its content or anything like that, but he

8 set out the Croatian side; correct?

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

10 A. [In English] Undeclared war against the Republic of Croatia.

11 [Interpretation] It was not an undeclared war against Croatia. It was a

12 rebellion. It was a war against Yugoslavia, the only internationally

13 recognised legal subject. So there is a difference in qualification.

14 MR. NICE: Exhibit number, please.

15 THE REGISTRAR: The exhibit number is 775.

16 MR. NICE:

17 Q. Then there's the statement that --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

19 MR. NICE: Statement that was made by the accused here on the 7th

20 of September. If that can be distributed, please. And there are just two

21 or three short passages to look at here.

22 Q. He gives a contrary diagnosis. If we look at the first page in

23 the first paragraph, we see --

24 A. Yes, I remember that.

25 Q. -- he speaks of the crisis being the result of unilateral

1 secessionist policy. At the end of that first paragraph speaks of

2 bloodshed. If we go to the second page --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- the second paragraph, it makes it clear that the Serbs in the

5 Serbian autonomous province of Krajina and the Serbian autonomous province

6 of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem deemed -- it's deemed the accused

7 should be present in the procedure initiated. It says that they're

8 actually indispensable. So he wanted them there at the -- here at the

9 conference.

10 Then if you go on two further pages to what is at page 5 at the

11 top, we can see his platform. The first new paragraph. He says:

12 "Boundaries are to be altered --"

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "-- only in the case of secession from Yugoslavia. This does not

15 apply to the nations and republics which remain in Yugoslavia."

16 And then at the bottom of the page we see him saying this: "I

17 take this opportunity to inform you that at a recent meeting in Belgrade

18 of top level representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and

19 Montenegro, the initiative has been launched on the grounds of the above

20 principle for a peaceful and democratic solution of the Yugoslavia crisis

21 and the adoption of a new constitution of Yugoslavia as a common state of

22 equal republics, nations, and citizens."

23 So that what it comes to is this: He wants to apply -- well, he

24 says in this last page that the boundaries are to be altered in the case

25 of secession from Yugoslavia, but this doesn't apply to nations and

1 republics which remain in Yugoslavia. Is that an understandable single

2 standard to you?

3 A. Quite understandably so. As I said to you, there are

4 international treaties that define borders. Those who secede yet have to

5 have their borders established at an international conference, not through

6 unilateral enactments.

7 However, this is a question of principle, why there are

8 differences and why there is a lack of understanding between you and me.

9 You treat the territory of Yugoslavia, of the state of Yugoslavia as terra

10 nullius. Whoever first comes and lays a stake, that's his land. No, sir.

11 It is not the way it was. It was a sovereign state with internationally

12 recognised borders guaranteed by the great powers, by the Paris

13 declaration, et cetera. So when we give a legal qualification, we have to

14 proceed from the state of Yugoslavia, not from what Tudjman thinks or

15 about his independent state.

16 Q. We understand your position. And we see at the foot of the page

17 the passage I mentioned that the concept of the -- or, rather, the

18 Belgrade initiative, which was to keep everything within the state of

19 Yugoslavia that could be kept within, has already taken root, hasn't it?

20 He was referring here to the Belgrade initiative.

21 A. Of course.

22 Q. The next --

23 A. No, not root. What we were told was that this was the wish of the

24 people. And why do those people have less rights than those who wish to

25 secede?

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13 French transcripts correspond

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1 MR. NICE: Exhibit number, please.

2 THE REGISTRAR: The next exhibit number is 776.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. The next exhibit is simply, for completeness, a report on what had

5 happened so far that the Chamber may find helpful. We'll just look at one

6 passage of it. It's this one. It's an official report. You may not have

7 seen this but it's an official report from those organising the

8 conference.

9 If you go to the second page at paragraph 2, you'll see the

10 position of the various delegates set out. At paragraph 2, Serbia and

11 Montenegro, both republics stress that the current situation was due to

12 unilateral acts by seceding republics. From their point of view, the

13 conference should decide on the right of self-determination and the right

14 of secession of all peoples. They want a new Yugoslavia of equal nations

15 and republics in which the federation would have control over economy,

16 standard of living, foreign policy, and national defence. Both republics

17 oppose union a la carte. They believe there has to be an equality in

18 sacrifices and that one or the other republic cannot just pick up those

19 areas of cooperation which are advantageous.

20 So that -- have those running the conference fairly reported the

21 views being expressed by Serbia and Montenegro? Yes? Have they fairly

22 reported the views being expressed by Serbia and Montenegro?

23 A. I don't think they did. That's my impression. As far as I can

24 remember, we intervened a great deal during the proceedings themselves.

25 There is one thing that is inconceivable when I see this report of theirs,

1 that there weren't any minutes taken at the conference at all, which is an

2 unprecedented case. Such an important conference where there are no

3 minutes and the minutes are not verified. I raised that issue.

4 Mr. Milosevic will remember that. Quite simply, I did this

5 professionally. What kind of a conference is this if no minutes are

6 taken? Then everybody can have his own report and his own opinion and

7 present them any way they wish, but they did not have minutes that were

8 signed.

9 MR. NICE: The proposal is dealt with on the 18th of October and

10 we can go to that -- sorry, the last exhibit, I imagine, will become

11 Exhibit 777?

12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Exhibit 777.

13 MR. NICE:

14 Q. We go to the next document, which is a further report, now dated

15 the 18th of October which brings us to the heart of the issue.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Nice, could you please give the number of

17 documents for the sake of interpreters.

18 MR. NICE: Sorry. By number, and we'll improve the exhibit

19 presentation system when I've worked out how best to do it for the Defence

20 case, but it's R0414605 at the top right-hand corner, and I'm sorry not to

21 have done that before.

22 Q. On the second page of this report of the 18th of October, and

23 under the plenary session in the middle of the page, Lord Carrington

24 invited the parties to give their agreement on chapter 1 of the agreements

25 for a general settlement previously circulated and elaboration on the

1 results of the meetings between ministers on the 4th of October, ministers

2 and Milosevic and Tudjman.

3 President Milosevic made a formal reserve on the first chapter of

4 the proposed text of the chair since the paper started from the premise

5 that an internationally recognised state should be abolished. Such a

6 change could only come about by a just and legal procedure. The

7 arbitration commission, Badinter, set up by the conference, should be

8 asked to pronounce on issues like the right of self-determination of

9 peoples as opposed to the right of self-determination of federal units.

10 He indicated that a final decision on future arrangements between the

11 Yugoslav components could only be taken by the peoples on the basis of a

12 referendum.

13 Then if we go over the page -- I should just observe that

14 Lord Carrington's position is expressed just at the foot of that same

15 paragraph, where he says that Mr. Milosevic's views were principally in

16 the approach taken, the paper starting from the concept that joint

17 interest should be built up from the bottom rather than imposed at a

18 federal level which is no longer credible.

19 Over the page. Again the summary is that in his second

20 intervention Mr. Milosevic modified his presentation, saying that the

21 Serbs of Croatia had been the subject of violent attacks and therefore

22 their rights had to be internationally guaranteed.

23 Paragraph 2.5 contains good points and then there is a valid basis

24 for a solution but the Serb areas of Croatia would have to be

25 demilitarised and the people of the regions have to decide their own

1 destiny.

2 Does that seem to you reasonably to record events that happened at

3 about that time, Professor Avramov?

4 A. No. You see, the problem is in the following: Lord Carrington

5 and the entire team that chaired the conference made a proposal that was

6 unprecedented in the history of international law, and that is the

7 self-destruction of a state by way of consensus of its top leaders. That

8 is unheard-of that a state be destroyed in such a way. President

9 Milosevic proposed that a referendum be carried out in order to see what

10 the feelings of the people were and what the wishes of the people were.

11 So that was the basic divergence between the two positions.

12 The self-destruction of a state occurred -- well, yes, in the

13 Soviet Union when three statesmen proclaimed that that state no longer

14 existed. We thought - we the delegation and I also supported that

15 position of Mr. Milosevic - that the problems of Yugoslavia state that was

16 a protected state, a state that was one of the victors from the Second

17 World War, because do not forget the border treaties are multi-lateral

18 treaties that do not regulate only the question of borders. The status of

19 the victorious powers is regulated too. So a far broader basis was laid.

20 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... this may be an elaboration of

21 your position, but I'm simply asking you --

22 A. That was our position.

23 Q. And the impasse that developed because of the position advanced by

24 the accused was why the Carrington Plan never took effect, wasn't it?

25 A. Yes, yes.

1 Q. Yes. And confederacy was on offer, which would have kept all of

2 Yugoslavia together had Serbia and Montenegro agreed.

3 A. It was not a confederacy. Read Carrington's original paper.

4 Carrington's paper said the following: Independent states within the

5 borders of the existing federal units that may submit a request to the

6 European Community to be recognised, and once they are recognised, they

7 will start negotiations in order to see what kind of relations will be

8 established.

9 We could not accept that. But you are personalising matters. You

10 are reducing it all to Milosevic. Milosevic had the support of the

11 parliament in this respect.

12 Q. We'll come to all this, if we have time, in a few minutes, but the

13 position is that the other constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia were

14 prepared to embrace a form of confederacy. The Badinter Commission had

15 recommended, and I think Carrington was prepared to allow, extraordinary

16 autonomy and rights to areas where Serbs were in a majority in Croatia,

17 and it was only Serbia and Montenegro that stood in the way of this being

18 the result, this being the settlement.

19 A. No. Please. The point is that individuals cannot decide, those

20 who were in The Hague at that moment. This decision had to be verified

21 through an internationally verified process, and that is a referendum, on

22 the ground, that is.

23 Q. Now, my colleagues are reminding me that Serbia only stood in the

24 way, but I said what I said quite deliberately because I want us to just

25 now follow through the course of events.

1 What was on offer was initially accepted by everyone except

2 Serbia; correct? Because Mr. Bulatovic from Montenegro said yes, didn't

3 he?

4 A. Well, you see, all of a sudden we were confronted with something.

5 We were shocked by the Carrington paper. We were unprepared, because it

6 did not go through a procedure and --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you because that question is

8 amenable to a very simple answer; yes or no. Did Mr. Bulatovic from

9 Montenegro say yes to the plan?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, he did, in a very confused

11 situation that he did not understand at that moment.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Nice.

13 MR. NICE:

14 Q. He didn't say yes in a particularly confused situation, did he?

15 He said yes having had agreements with De Michelis from Italy that

16 Montenegro would receive substantial benefits; he said yes, well

17 understanding the nature of the proposals that were going to be made; and

18 he said yes on behalf of Montenegro. He then flew back to Podgorica,

19 didn't he?

20 A. Sir, that is your interpretation. My position is exactly the

21 opposite, and it is Mr. Bulatovic who can most probably give the most

22 authentic position that he took himself.

23 Q. He's a listed witness. He's written about it. Do you agree with

24 his view that he still holds that this was the solution, the time for a

25 solution, the best solution for the problems of the former Yugoslavia? Do

1 you agree with him on that?

2 A. It was that moment, yes, but not in the way in which it was

3 proposed. Absolutely that was the right moment, and we insisted on it

4 too.

5 Q. And let's just be clear about this Ms. Avramov -- Professor

6 Avramov: Had Serbia, the sole party not to agree, had Serbia agreed, then

7 on the 18th of October and had the parties moved to some form of

8 confederacy with special rights for Serbs in Croatia, had they moved

9 forward, all these people who died since the 18th of October, 1991,

10 thousands of them, and all those who were forced from their homes in the

11 same period of time would not have suffered, would they?

12 A. Sir, I repeat: The Carrington paper was one thing, and relations

13 were supposed to be regulated only pro futuro. This was composed to be

14 resolved in a comprehensive manner, bearing in mind the wishes of the

15 people.

16 Q. And just staying close in time to this conference, although the

17 attack on Vukovar had started, the massacre hadn't taken place, those

18 people would have survived, and of course, years later, so would the

19 people of Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Brcko. They would all have survived,

20 wouldn't they, Professor Avramov, if the decision had been taken then to

21 move forward with the confederal approach to which every other part of the

22 former Yugoslavia, except Serbia, initially agreed.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice --

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those are your --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't answer the question yet. Mr. Nice, the

1 fairness of that question is in question. It involves making some very

2 big leaps on the basis of certain hypotheses.

3 MR. NICE: It makes the leap -- it only makes this leap; that if

4 peace had been established by that confederacy at that time and there

5 hadn't been a further break-out of violence for other reasons, then these

6 people would have been saved, that's all.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: But it really doesn't help us, Mr. Nice, on the

8 question of criminal responsibility, does it, and that's really the issue

9 that we're addressing.

10 MR. NICE: It will do, but I accept entirely that at the moment

11 we're looking at a different type of responsibility and I have that in

12 mind and I'm going to come to the question of criminal responsibility in

13 later questions.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that you would have to

16 intervene when there is such abuse like the one just carried out by

17 Mr. Nice, and this is not the first time he does it. His hypothesis from

18 which he proceeds into this question, I am guilty because I did not agree

19 to have Yugoslavia abolished as an internationally recognised state by the

20 stroke of a pen rather than those who caused violent secession and who

21 walked over the corpses of their hitherto countrymen in order to establish

22 some ethnically pure states. If absurdity has any meaning at all, it is

23 clearly reflected now. He takes this as a point departure as if the

24 witness were a half-wit.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... proceed with

1 the next question, Mr. Nice.

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. You see, Mrs. Avramov -- Professor Avramov, this, picking up on

4 what the learned Judges have just raised, all of you at the conference

5 with your general intellectual experience and your more particular

6 knowledge of the Balkans and the Balkan personalities knew that there was

7 a potential for criminal violence of the worst kind if this matter wasn't

8 settled, didn't you?

9 A. Yes, quite. That is why I personally was against it, against the

10 withdrawal of the army into the barracks, because that automatically meant

11 legalisation of the paramilitary forces of the secessionist republics.

12 Q. And as you explained yesterday, the only grounds - and we'll see

13 whether these are justified or not later - for the use of force by Serbia

14 was its fear of a repetition of World War II genocide, the only ground you

15 gave --

16 A. Not Serbia but the Serb people self-organised in the areas where

17 they lived.

18 Q. And despite that knowledge, the Serb side through the accused - I

19 must ask you about this - put pressure on Mr. Bulatovic so that he changed

20 his mind and joined in the rejection of the Carrington proposal and that

21 by his joining in the matter was dead because it was now Serbia and

22 Montenegro against the rest. He was pressured to change his mind, wasn't

23 he?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Are you putting that question to

25 me --

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, I've stopped you. If do you not have

2 the information to provide an answer to the question, then just say no and

3 we move to the next question.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Bulatovic will give you an

5 answer on that, not me.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Nice, it's time for the break.

7 We'll break for 20 minutes.

8 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

9 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay.

11 MR. KAY: Before we restart, Your Honour, I want to, if possible,

12 have in mind a timetable in relation to this witness. We know she's got a

13 plane to catch, and it's important that there be a margin of time for

14 re-examination, and I would be seeking the leave of the Court for

15 Mr. Milosevic to be able to re-examine this witness and in preference to

16 my own time. Whether he exercises that right or not is another matter; I

17 can then re-examine. But I would like that built into the timetable so

18 that there is a sufficiency.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let me ask a question of the Professor.

20 Professor, yesterday you told us you had a plane to catch at, I

21 think, somewhere in the region of 2.00 p.m., and you could sit here until

22 11.30.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I was told later, I can stay

24 until 12.00, perhaps even until 12.15 on condition that the traffic is not

25 too heavy on the road to Amsterdam.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: 12.15. Mr. Nice, how much longer do you have?

2 MR. NICE: I have -- well, I certainly have half an hour.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Half an hour.

4 MR. NICE: I have longer than that, but I'll --

5 JUDGE KWON: You're going to spend more time than the Defence had.

6 MR. NICE: There is a problem. We had no knowledge of the details

7 this witness was able to give and on this particular witness, not knowing

8 what other witnesses are going to come, I want a fair opportunity -- I

9 wanted to, if I can, put points to this witness. Two more documents on

10 The Hague Conference, four maps, some cuttings from The Death of

11 Yugoslavia, and a couple of general questions.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, how long do you plan for your

13 re-examination?

14 MR. KAY: I could certainly take 15 minutes, but I'm more

15 concerned about Mr. Milosevic's position than my own.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if you are to seek our leave to

17 re-examine, we are inclined to grant it. How long would you take?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I said yesterday that

19 in what you consider as my Defence, and which it obviously is not, I have

20 no intention of participating with --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- re-examination. I'm asking that

23 you restore my --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Kay, you will then re-examine for

25 about 15, 20 minutes, where we will be within the time frame.

1 MR. KAY: Thank you.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

3 MR. NICE: Thank you. May the next document come to the witness,

4 please. It's the second-to-last Hague document.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: We didn't give a number to the last document.

6 MR. NICE: My oversight, I apologise. May it be given a number

7 then.

8 THE REGISTRAR: The next exhibit number will be 778.

9 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

10 Q. On this document, Professor Avramov, dated the 25th of October, so

11 after the rejection, we see in the first page Lord Carrington in his

12 opening remarks condemns the attacks of the JNA on Vukovar and Dubrovnik,

13 expressing regret that General Kadijevic didn't attend.

14 We turn to the second page, the only long passage I'm going to be

15 looking at starts off at the top of the page, "... impossible to circulate

16 the so-called Kostic proposals." Next paragraph but one, "As the general

17 remark introducing his intervention on Chapter II of the Chairman's draft,

18 President Milosevic stated the new paper differed little..." Next

19 sentence, "... continued to make an unfair discrimination concerning the

20 right of self-determination of peoples. Any solution should be based on

21 the continuity of the Yugoslav state for those who wish and on the

22 principle of legality and legitimacy. President Milosevic questioned the

23 general approach of the Conference on the question of special status. A

24 special status should only be given to the two Krajinas in Croatia. There

25 was no point in extending this status to other regions. Furthermore --"

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "-- relating to the return to the 1974 constitution ... was

3 unacceptable --" referring to Vojvodina -- "was unacceptable as an

4 intervention in internal affairs." And now, "President Milosevic

5 concluded that the Chair's document paved the way for new instability."

6 Then the next paragraph, "President Bulatovic of Montenegro said

7 that although the text had certain improvements, including the

8 demilitarisation of special status areas, these are what he termed

9 disturbing novelties," and so on.

10 Two points: The accused was determined that the only group, the

11 only ethnic national group that should enjoy special status was the Serbs

12 out of Serbia, wasn't he? It says it here in black and white.

13 A. If that is what it says, then that is the position of those who

14 wrote it, but it is their mistake that they did not take minutes which we

15 also would sign as one of the participating parties. So these texts are

16 not authorised. I had my own notes.

17 Q. Professor Avramov, you were there. The conference failed --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- very special opportunities were made for the minority Serbs in

20 the Krajinas. The accused is recorded as saying that there should be no

21 extension of that principle to other groups. Was that, please, his

22 position? You were there.

23 A. It's a little unclear to me. I don't remember. I cannot place it

24 in the proper context, this second part of the sentence, not to allow it

25 or permit it other groups. The question was on the status of Serbs in

1 Croatia, as far as I recall, and this is what we insisted on. I cannot

2 simply remember whether we talked about other groups. What other groups?

3 Q. Let me then make my point and explain what I was referring to

4 earlier when I asked you about the equality of states -- of peoples and

5 groups in your minds at the time. Is this the truth, Professor Avramov,

6 that for the accused to have accepted the Lord Carrington proposals,

7 generous though they were to Serbs in Croatia, would have meant his having

8 to extend similar rights, or might have had to involve his extending

9 similar rights to, for example, the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo, and that

10 he could not afford?

11 A. The Albanians in Kosovo had the maximum status which Europe

12 recognised to minorities. Therefore, this equality, sir, the equality of

13 minorities was never questioned in all of our positions and proposals. We

14 as the delegation, and Mr. Milosevic as the head of the delegation, never

15 questioned this equality.

16 The second thing is the institutional solutions, autonomy and so

17 on. What Mr. Milosevic did not want to accept and the reason -- for which

18 he had complete support in the parliament, was the break-up of Yugoslavia

19 based on consensus.

20 Q. I put my case on that and I'm going to move on to the last

21 document for The Hague Conference. I've excised or cut out most of the

22 others.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Number for that.

24 THE REGISTRAR: The exhibit number will be 779.

25 MR. NICE: And my apologies again to the interpreters, the one

1 coming up is R0414911.

2 Q. And this document is dated the 4th of November, which thus comes

3 after the rejection that's been recorded by the accused but is in fact an

4 amended version, a corrected version, and sets out the general principles

5 of what was on offer, and I only desire you to look at, please, two pages.

6 On the first page, the Treaty Provisions for the Convention,

7 paragraph 1, based on the following, "sovereign and independent republics

8 with an international personality for those which wish it; a free

9 association of the Republics with an international personality as

10 envisaged in this Convention; common state of equal Republics which wish

11 to remain a common state; comprehensive arrangements, including

12 supervisory mechanisms for protection of human rights; European

13 involvement, where appropriate; and in the framework of a general

14 settlement, recognition of independence within the existing borders unless

15 otherwise agreed..."

16 And then if you turn over, please, one page -- no, beg your

17 pardon. Two -- three pages to the page at the foot is numbered 4.

18 Special status, subparagraph C. Do you have that? Page 4, special

19 status, subparagraph C.

20 "In addition, areas to which persons belonging to a national or

21 ethnic group form a majority shall enjoy a special status of autonomy.

22 Such a status will provide for: The right to have and show the national

23 emblems of that area; an educational system which respects the values and

24 needs of the group; a legislative body, an administrative structure

25 including a regional police force and a judiciary responsible for matters

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and

13 French transcripts correspond

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 concerning the area ... with provisions for international monitoring."

2 Now, this is the level of generous, you may think -- you may

3 agree, provision made for the Serbs in the Krajina where they were in a

4 majority in Croatia and in Bosnia, but I must suggest to you that this

5 treaty was rejected because the accused, and you must have known this,

6 could not have accepted this for Kosovo.

7 A. I'm very familiar with this document. We worked through this

8 document after we received it, and we made a series of remarks. The first

9 one was of a principle nature. What does that mean, "Treaty Provisions

10 for the Convention" from the standpoint of the international law? This is

11 a contradiction in the title. That's one thing.

12 Secondly, before you move to the [In English] Independent

13 republics [Interpretation] Please, before you move to establish

14 sovereignty and independence, you have to establish their legal basis.

15 Based on what did they become independent? What was their legal status

16 based on violent secession? We also must note the cause and the effects

17 and not move immediately to the derived questions of what will happen

18 inside. So that was our principled position; first of all to establish

19 the legal title, the legitimacy. Lord Carrington or the mediators could

20 not be the creators of new states, and we wanted to have that on the basis

21 of a referendum.

22 Q. Respecting your timetable, I must move on. I've made my case on

23 -- I have put my case on that. Let me move on to an associated point.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the magazines I referred to yesterday I

25 hoped were arriving by DHL this morning. They haven't. I have copies.

1 The originals will be with us, I hope today, probably may be in the

2 building somewhere.

3 Q. Professor Avramov, I've suggested to you the reason why Carrington

4 Plan was rejected, and I'm going to suggest to you that the underlying

5 desire to having put the interests of having all Serbs in one state ahead

6 of any other interest also lay at the root of the problem. And to make

7 that -- or to help make that point good, I'd like you, please, to look at

8 a copy of Epoka, the SPS magazine, for the 22nd of October.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Last document, 780.

10 MR. NICE: So sorry. I keep forgetting that.

11 Q. All right. Now, this -- we have a translation for this part of

12 the magazine and its article, but to save time I'm just going to look at

13 the map that's displayed via the other screens for those viewing, and the

14 caption that goes with it that the Court has for this map on page 2 reads

15 as follows: "Desirable possibility of territorial demarcation between the

16 third Yugoslavia and Croatia." And then it sets out by reference to the

17 shaded areas the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, number 1, Western

18 Slavonia, number 2; 3, Serbian region of Slovenia, a little above it and

19 to the right; 4, Western Herzegovina, which we can see not shaded but to

20 the left of the strong black line; 5, Samac, Posavina, the small black

21 line from the middle of the map; 6, the Dubrovnik Republic; and 7, the

22 line to the left of all the lines marked as this "optimal western border

23 of Serbian counties."

24 This map, did this reflect the underlying aim of the SPS at that

25 time and at the time that Carrington's plan for retaining all the parts of

1 Yugoslavia was rejected?

2 A. Sir, many scientific magazines were published in Belgrade, and you

3 cannot dispute the right of specialised sciences to express their

4 positions, and they could be different from their prevailing or official

5 position. So this cannot be taken, these positions cannot be taken or

6 imputed to somebody as evidence or to accuse them.

7 I must admit that I didn't really see this at the time. I didn't

8 have enough time to look through all the different magazines. Just

9 glancing at this quickly, it does not seem to be correct. More or less

10 this was the projection of the offer to Serbia in 1915 to give up

11 Yugoslavia and to stay as the Kingdom of Serbia. This was in London

12 during -- in the London treaty which the allies offered to Serbia. So

13 this was the basis for this particular map. I know the exact lines, if

14 you're interested, but if not, I won't go into that, but I will not take

15 this magazine at all as something that was legally relevant.

16 Q. I'm glad that you -- grateful to you for referring back to the

17 1915 agreement. You mentioned it yesterday, the London agreement of 1915,

18 in the middle of the war, because -- and I just have to tell you this for

19 want of time but the Chambers can find this, we have an intercept of the

20 29th of October of 1991. So at the same time as all this negotiation

21 between the accused and Karadzic where they discuss the possibility of

22 reviving the Yugoslav state according to the London agreement, which as

23 you say exactly matches this line.

24 Can we look at another map, please. You'll know, of course, of

25 the man Moljevic?

1 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt, Mr. Nice. If I can give the

2 exhibit number.

3 MR. NICE: I'm so sorry.

4 MR. KAY: Should this really be an exhibit? It wasn't adopted or

5 accepted by the witness and its relevance is marginal to her testimony.

6 MR. NICE: I respectfully suggest not marginal. First of all,

7 once we have the original or even copy of it if we're pressed for time,

8 its connection to the SPS will be manifest from the document itself and in

9 any event the witness effectively acknowledged it yesterday. She also

10 acknowledges that the map is a map that matched a much earlier map, which

11 is one of the things I was hoping to point to, and that continuity of

12 planning is extremely significant in the mindset of the accused.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is a basis for admitting it.

14 MR. KAY: If I could just reply on that issue, because if there

15 are other means of proving it, use other means, but this is an article

16 written by someone else that the witness said quite clearly she had never

17 seen and never had time to consider. There's no evidence that she ever

18 directed her mind even to the production of this document. If there is a

19 proper way of dealing with it that is relevant to this witness or other

20 aspects of the case, perhaps that would be better than introducing

21 something in this form.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you allow me, sir, to say --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: The Chamber is -- the Chamber is consulting.

25 THE WITNESS: Sorry. Sorry.

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, the Chamber has consulted. We have

3 decided not to admit this as an exhibit.

4 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases. I will obviously attempt to

5 deal with these maps with another witness at a later time. I might have

6 been able to explore more with this witness, but nevertheless ...

7 Q. You explained how there was this plan in the London conference in

8 1915 for a much larger Serbia. Moljevic was a Chetnik who wrote a very

9 famous article in about 1941; correct? And if you'd like to look at this

10 map --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- which has been taken from -- there's a map --

13 A. I did not know Mr. Moljevic. I know of Mr. Moljevic only from

14 reading, from literature. So I cannot really speak about Mr. Moljevic.

15 But I would like to ask you, did you admit into evidence the map presented

16 by Mr. Tudjman at the annual conference of the HDZ where Croatia should

17 reach all the way to Zemun?

18 Q. I would just like to look at this map. Do you recognise this as a

19 map that was the Moljevic proposal in 1941, and do you accept that this

20 map has its similarities with the map of the London agreement of 1915?

21 A. I would like to compare this, please. Do not pressure me at this

22 point in time to do this comparison. I would have to think about it, to

23 see it. I would have to have my own maps, the ones that I have, you know,

24 original ones from London from 1971. I have all the maps of Croatia from

25 1941 and the proposals all the way up to 1999. I have all of these maps

1 in Belgrade but --

2 Q. Look at this map, then, and just yes or no. You're aware of

3 Moljevic having published his proposals in 1941, even though you didn't

4 know the man?

5 A. I don't know.

6 Q. Have you seen his map before?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Very well. Then without the map, just confirm this to me, because

9 you looked at an earlier map, you confirmed it reflected a 1915 plan. My

10 -- my suggestion is as follows: Quite regardless of the genocide in the

11 Second World War, which wasn't concluded, I must suggest, at the time that

12 Moljevic was writing with the genocide against the Serbs, there was a

13 long-standing concept of all Serbs living within a single state, having

14 the sort of borders that we've been addressing in looking at these maps

15 although they're not exhibits. Do you accept that there was a

16 long-standing understanding of the possibility of an enlarged Serbian

17 state?

18 A. Sir, in my scientific work, I base all of my positions on official

19 documents. I can talk about the London conference, I can talk about the

20 London proposals, but I cannot talk about inter-party proposals and the

21 inter-party struggles in the period between the two world wars and later.

22 This is a question for sociologists and those who study the relationships

23 amongst parties. I'm interested in official documents and official

24 positions of states.

25 Q. And finally, because of the time, you carried on negotiating for

1 this accused and for Serbia into -- into 1992, dealing directly with the

2 accused and Karadzic, didn't you, for negotiation purposes?

3 A. Yes. Yes.

4 Q. And I must suggest to you this: It was the notion of all Serbs

5 living in one state, regardless of the interests of others, that drove the

6 rejection of the Carrington Plan and that kept alive the conflict. Do you

7 accept that the notion of all Serbs living in one state had that effect at

8 that time?

9 A. No, absolutely not.

10 Q. Let's move on.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice is absolutely

13 distorting in the question that he's putting what the whole thing is

14 about. This is the aspiration or support for Yugoslavia and that it is

15 good for all Southern Slavs, that it's a good solution in particular for

16 the Serbs, because living in Yugoslavia, all the Serbs are living in one

17 state, all those living in Serbia and in the other republics. But this

18 also applies to all the Muslims living in a Southern Slav state. It

19 applies to all the Croats, that they would all be living in one single

20 state. Yugoslavia was the right solution. We're talking about Yugoslavia

21 here and not about some concept of Greater Serbia which is like some

22 phantom floating over this courtroom.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: The Chamber is considering the question of your

24 interventions. Properly speaking, these interventions ought to be made

25 through the Court-assigned counsel. We have been fairly flexible so far.

1 You have the opportunity to request us --

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sir --

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't interrupt. You have the opportunity to ask

4 us whether you can ask questions of the witness. I said earlier that we

5 were disposed to consider favourably a request for you to re-examine.

6 That would be the appropriate time for you to put -- put questions.

7 Otherwise, such questions and comments ought to come through the

8 Court-assigned counsel.

9 Mr. Nice, continue.

10 MR. NICE: I have four or five --

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not hearing you further on that.

13 Mr. Nice.

14 MR. NICE: I have five short clips from a television series called

15 Death of Yugoslavia. I'm not going to -- I have transcripts now if you

16 want them at any time. The transcripts are from time to time not accurate

17 translations, I am advised. Each of these clips is very short. If we can

18 just play the clips, it may be better to listen to the interpretation

19 rather than to follow on a transcript that may be inaccurate, and with

20 your leave I'll play the first one to the witness.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we are checking the records because we

22 are of the view that the Chamber had refused to admit this in evidence.

23 MR. NICE: Refused to admit the totality of The Death of

24 Yugoslavia. You've had clips of The Death of Yugoslavia before in

25 evidence, passages of people speaking and parts showing this accused. I

1 think the first four of these all relate to the accused himself and

2 they're simply films of him.

3 I think there's also been a passage of the -- the passage played

4 of the meeting of the generals -- I beg your pardon, a meeting of the

5 Supreme Command in the basement room where it was very cold and they were

6 all in overcoats and where they tried to agree on the granting of special

7 powers and where the vote went against the proposal for special powers.

8 You may remember that.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, yes.

10 MR. KAY: That's right. The totality of the films was objected to

11 and leave refused, but there have been other clips which have been

12 specific to questioning. It might be an idea to put the question first

13 and then show the clips and then we can see exactly what is happening.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, put the questions first.

17 MR. NICE: Well, what I want to suggest to the witness is that

18 this accused and those who were working with him was indeed concerned, if

19 necessary, to fight to have the Serbia that had -- to have an enlarged

20 Serbia that had all Serbs living within it. That's my suggestion, and the

21 next two clips will help me with that, but I suspect it might be more

22 economic in time to play the clip first, but it's a matter for the Court.

23 Q. What do you say to that suggestion, Professor Avramov, that the

24 accused wanted an enlarged Serbia and was prepared to fight to get it?

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let her answer the question first.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, but could you please

2 repeat the question.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. Of course. The accused was prepared to fight to have an enlarged

5 Serbia with all Serbs living in it.

6 A. No; quite the opposite. Not an enlarged Serbia but the survival

7 of Yugoslavia. A maximum Yugoslavia, not an enlarged Serbia. That was

8 the position taken.

9 MR. NICE: Can we look at the first two clips then, please?

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. They are relevant to this issue.

11 [Videotape played]

12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Regardless of the fact that today as

13 one time that the enemies of Serbia are pulling up against her with those

14 outside the country and those inside the country, we have a message for

15 them and that is not that we are not afraid. We will enter every fight."

16 MR. NICE: The second one, please.

17 [Videotape played]

18 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "We are going to stop the counter

19 revolution in Kosovo and we'll reform the political system in such a way

20 that it will enable Serbia to regain, implement --"

21 MR. NICE: The text --

22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "-- authority over its entirety

23 territory."

24 MR. NICE: Thank you. As the Court will have observed, the

25 translation -- the translation on the screen read slightly differently.

1 It read, "regain its rightful territories." The interpreters expressed a

2 similar sentiment differently.

3 Q. These are two examples of speeches by this accused, and we know of

4 another famous one at Gazimestan. He was prepared to make battle and

5 fight --

6 A. I attended, yes.

7 Q. Yes. And this sort of sentiment, that Serbia would regain its

8 rightful territories or gain authority over its appropriate territories is

9 the sort of thing he expressed loudly and in a way that excited the

10 public, didn't he?

11 A. Sir, there was fighting on a psychological level, on an

12 information level, on a political level. That was the battle fought, not

13 only on the military plane. The military plane is the last instance. So

14 these were the battles going on. And I was -- I happened to be at

15 Gazimestan during the celebrations of the 600th anniversary of the battle

16 of Kosovo Polje, and he is speaking about Serbia, not about an enlarged

17 Serbia. He is speaking about the need to establish power and authority

18 throughout the territory, because in Kosovo, from time to time, there was

19 a rebellion against that authority. And it wasn't the Serbs who were a

20 minority in Kosovo as you're trying to represent it. They are part of the

21 majority population. The minority were the Albanians.

22 Q. You've moved from the topic. My next question arising from the

23 same clips, the speech at Gazimestan, with which the Chamber is almost

24 certainly familiar, is this: Although this accused didn't, so far as we

25 discovered, let the words "Greater Serbia" fall from his mouth, by what he

1 did and what he said, he adopted some nationalist sentiments in order to

2 generate enthusiasm for him, didn't he?

3 A. No, I don't see it that way, and I was there, I attended. I could

4 feel the prevailing mood. Of course, you had the representatives of all

5 possible political orientation represented there, not only socialists and

6 so on. And you know Kosovo, for the Serb people, is a specific moment in

7 history. That's what it represents. And it has its emotional

8 connotations and so on.

9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... the second suggestion --

10 A. No.

11 Q. The second suggestion is this, that he was able to use propaganda

12 in the form of mass meetings and to excite people by such suggestions as

13 the people would have to be followed and obeyed. Do you accept that he

14 used the crowd in order to generate excitement and to have his own way?

15 A. Well, using the crowd. Using crowds is always an element in

16 politics and the policies of all parties and states, and I see no

17 exception there in the case of Mr. Milosevic.

18 Q. Just look at clips 3 and 4 and have your comments in light of that

19 last answer on these. Clip 3, please.

20 [Videotape played]

21 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "That means that all those should be

22 replaced from their functions, the members of the Regional Committees, of

23 the Presidency, according to which it is justifiably, and I say

24 justifiably, who have received a vote of no confidence from the public

25 justifiably."

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. This was an example. Do you remember that incident, Mrs. Avramov?

3 A. Yes, I do remember but this is what I would like to say in that

4 regard: Mr. Milosevic made a mistake because he didn't implement it. The

5 Albanian generals who were generals in the JNA, they wouldn't have turned

6 their backs on Yugoslavia and found themselves in terrorist organisations,

7 the Siptars in Kosovo.

8 Q. He used the crowd to have his way with the Central Committee,

9 didn't he?

10 A. I didn't attend the Central Committee meeting. I wasn't a party

11 member, so I really can't say whether it was up before the Central

12 Committee.

13 Q. And finally, the last clip, fourth clip which we'll play.

14 [Videotape played].

15 THE NARRATOR: "The crowd had waited all day for Milosevic to tell

16 them that Kosovo would be theirs again."

17 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "There is no price or force on earth

18 that can stop the leadership of Serbia and the people of Serbia in their

19 fight for their cause."

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. Thank you.

22 A. Sir, in the period between the 19 -- between 1970 and 1980, about

23 200.000 Serbs were expelled from Kosovo, and I happen to remember that

24 exact figure because the Albanian population increased by 34 per cent

25 between 1970 and 1980. So those are statistical data, federal statistical

1 data.

2 Q. I have two more questions, in light of the time. The first is

3 this: As a matter of fact, although you dealt with the character of

4 advice that you've told us about and the involvement in the political

5 process at the international level, you were never privy to what happened

6 in the meetings of the Council for Harmonisation, the meetings of the

7 Supreme Defence Council, or bodies like that, were you?

8 A. No, never.

9 Q. So when you've told us, as you have, about the limited control the

10 accused had over people like Babic or over the JNA, you're not speaking

11 from having sat in with him and JNA generals at critical meetings or

12 anything of that sort; you don't have that experience.

13 A. No. I'm only speaking on the basis of official documents that I

14 had in my possession.

15 Q. And then that was what -- the first question. The second question

16 is this: This accused emerged as a leader in circumstances that we have

17 been exploring or will learn more about, in the late 1980s. Is the

18 position that from that moment on - this is my suggestion to you - he used

19 or instrumentalised, in the modern language, the opinions of others and

20 the emotions of others simply to retain control of as much territory as he

21 could regardless of the legitimate interests of others living on it? Is

22 that the reality, madam?

23 A. That is your understanding, whereas the emotions and feelings are

24 something that you cannot interpret. You cannot interpret the emotions

25 and feelings of the Serbian people and under what conditions this was

1 done. All I can do is speak about my own emotions and feelings and

2 sentiments. I never had the need, nor did I -- it ever enter my head that

3 I was a Serb. It was completely irrelevant as far as I was concerned.

4 But at the point at which the Serbs were slaughtered en masse, in their

5 masses, when they were expelled in their masses, when they launched an

6 appeal Help us, we've been left alone to fend for ourselves, then I said

7 to myself I am a part of that people and I'm duty-bound to help that

8 people. So those are my emotions and sentiments. But you cannot

9 understand them, and that is understandable too.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Kay.

11 JUDGE KWON: Before that, Mr. Nice, the speech, the accused's

12 speech at Gazimestan, do we have the full text of it?

13 MR. NICE: I think we do have a text of that. I'll look into it.

14 That's not one of the clips being played now, the clips being --

15 JUDGE KWON: In terms of an exhibit.

16 MR. NICE: -- Gazimestan's in separately, yes.

17 MR. KAY: Thank you.

18 Re-examined by Mr. Kay:

19 Q. Professor Avramov, you were asked questions about the

20 pre-secession period of the 25th of June, 1991, and what was happening in

21 the territory of Yugoslavia then. You mentioned the man called Dragan,

22 paramilitaries, and forces. And you responded by saying that the state

23 was faced with an existential difficulty. So pre-secession of the 25th of

24 June, 1991, what was the state's difficulty? The state of Yugoslavia,

25 what was the difficulty it was facing?

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1 A. That observation and the statement I made just now was stated in

2 much sharper terms, but of course I wasn't present, sir. Let me say that

3 once again. It was an official statement that was given to the press.

4 And let me see, I'll tell you exactly when that was. I think it was the

5 21st of March, 1991, or roughly thereabouts, during those days when the

6 General Staff took note of the fact that the country was facing a state of

7 civil war and that the individual terror that was being implemented,

8 illegal bringing in of weapons from Hungary, Austria, and through various

9 other channels was a forerunner of the need to proclaim a state of

10 emergency in the country because the country was on the verge of war, on

11 the verge of a civil war. So that was the observation made by the Supreme

12 Command. And I myself, like all the other citizens, knew full well

13 through the press about the individual terrorist acts against the Serb

14 population that became more intensified since 1990. At the beginning of

15 1990, in fact.

16 Q. You also used the phrase that the state was faced with a rebellion

17 and that was as a result of a speech by --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- President Tudjman. Perhaps if you can just put that into

20 context. What did you mean by "rebellion"?

21 A. It's like this: Mr. Tudjman held a speech -- delivered a speech

22 in Trogir -- and I can provide you with the entire text of that particular

23 speech. I haven't got it here with me because I assumed you would have

24 that speech. And he appealed to the Croatian people, called them to

25 rebellion. So what you can talk about their right to self-determination

1 today, it is no right to self-determination, it was a rebellion against

2 the state. And Tudjman, in that speech of his, and he was delivering it

3 to an enormous mass of the population, even more people than at

4 Gazimestan, just speaks about that, but you have made no mention of that

5 here. He was appealing to the Croatian people and the friends of the

6 Croatian people and the Muslims who had historic ties, or such some phrase

7 that he used, and he incited them to a rebellion.

8 Q. Now, within the context that you speak of, again before the

9 secession in June 1991, you mentioned the right of Serbia to defend itself

10 and the threats to Serbia which was one of the republics of the Socialist

11 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What did you mean by that? What was

12 Serbia defending itself from?

13 A. From the rebellion. The combat areas or armed actions, armed

14 operations moved from Slovenia through Croatia towards Bosnia and Kosovo,

15 and at the time throughout that territory you already saw the preparations

16 and organisation going on, the kind that the General Staff referred to and

17 the armed groups. And Alija Izetbegovic spoke about this in his articles.

18 And the assumption was, and this is something that Tudjman referred to,

19 that the rebellion should have started in Kosovo and then spread towards

20 the north. But what actually happened due to force of circumstance, who

21 changed that strategy I really can't say - you'll know that or be able to

22 assess that better than myself - the strategy was changed and what

23 happened was it began in the north and spread to the south. That's what

24 happened.

25 So this linkage, this link-up made the war a unified war, an

1 organically united war, an undertaking against the state of Yugoslavia.

2 Q. I want to turn now to one of the exhibits that was produced to

3 you, number 776. Exhibit 776, please. And I want to turn to page 5.

4 This is the statement made by President Milosevic to the Conference on

5 Yugoslavia.

6 A. Could you just give me a moment to look at the date. Yes, that's

7 right. I am well acquainted with the entire text. What page did you

8 say? 7? No, 5.

9 Q. Page 5.

10 A. [In English] Five, okay.

11 Q. I'll put it into context for you, Professor: At The Hague,

12 September the 7th, 1991, start of the Carrington peaks talks. And the

13 phrase in the second paragraph, "Boundaries to be altered only in case of

14 secession from Yugoslavia. This does not apply to the nations and

15 republics which remain in Yugoslavia."

16 It has been put to you that President Milosevic's strategy was for

17 a Serbia rather than Yugoslavia. Was that the case?

18 A. [Interpretation] No. That is completely incorrect. Mr. Milosevic

19 -- I can't find a better phrase and term, but to say that he was too

20 occupied -- he was preoccupied about how to save Yugoslavia, how to ensure

21 the existence and survival of a state against we see suddenly Slovenia and

22 Croatia rising up against, and the resistance was spreading. So that was

23 the crux of the matter and you can see that from later speeches delivered

24 by him.

25 Q. So the strategy was very much based on the lines of the notion of

1 Yugoslavia. Was that as a Serbian state of Yugoslavia or as a state of

2 all the Slavic peoples?

3 A. Well, Yugoslavia was the state of the South Slav peoples,

4 according to the concept at the Versailles conference, peace conference.

5 So this concept and notion of the South Slavs implied at the time the

6 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

7 Later on, during Tito's Yugoslavia, we had the production of new

8 nations, and there was a protest against that officially from the United

9 States of America, and I mention in my book the document in which this is

10 expressed, the USA document mentioning this. But anyway, 1946 they

11 already lodged a protest to the effect that the Macedonians were not in

12 fact a nation, that it was artificial, an artificial creation. Later on,

13 when the Muslims were upgraded to a nation, America protested again.

14 So therefore, in socialist Yugoslavia, we saw an increase in the

15 number of nations or constituent peoples, as they qualified in the

16 constitution. And now you have the following situation: If you take into

17 account the fact that the Muslims in fact were Islamised Slavs, then the

18 notion of the South Slavs or the South Slav people can cover Yugoslavia in

19 its totality. If you take the other view and take the view that the

20 Muslims are not originally Slavs, which it is difficult to prove

21 historically, then one could say that the title of the South Slav peoples

22 does not fully cover the entire territory of Yugoslavia as it stood.

23 Q. I want to look now at the second sentence in that paragraph.

24 "This does not apply to the nations and republics which remain in

25 Yugoslavia." So the concept is that the boundaries of those states that

1 secede from Yugoslavia should be altered.

2 A. The borders remain open, that was our position. And they have to

3 be established at an international conference, not through one-sided acts.

4 That was the point. Please take a look at the position of the Supreme

5 Court of Canada in respect of Quebec, or I can quote individual authors to

6 you who are the same opinion.

7 Q. Was it also a factor which you mentioned in your testimony

8 yesterday about the ethnicity of states? Was Croatia seen by those

9 remaining in Yugoslavia as creating an ethnic Croatian state?

10 A. Well, you have this constant feature. Please, at the meeting of

11 the Supreme Defence Council, which was attended by Franjo Tudjman and the

12 generals, that was held on the 12th and 19th of September, 1993, a

13 decision was reached to ethnically cleanse Croatia. You have an official

14 document about that, and you have that document.

15 In addition to that, take a look at this. This is a newspaper

16 that is still published in Croatia until the present day, and look at the

17 title or look at this sentence which is there throughout. This is

18 Hrvatski Vjesnik: "Be damned, Serbs, wherever you may be." That's what

19 it says. This is a newspaper they publish, a daily newspaper.

20 Q. If you could give the date of that again, of the newspaper.

21 A. Oh, this one, yes, I will. The 10th of April, 1994. I can leave

22 you a copy if you wish.

23 Q. Thank you. I want to move now, because time is limited, to

24 looking at Exhibit 779. It is the notes of the 25th of October, 1991, at

25 the Carrington conference. I'd like you to turn to paragraph 2.3, which

1 is on page 4 of the document.

2 A. Which page?

3 Q. Page 4 at the top. It's 643 that's stamped on it. Paragraph 2.3.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Have you got that? It says: "President Milosevic, Serbia."

6 A. Yes, yes.

7 Q. You were asked questions about the shelling of Dubrovnik, about

8 the territorial ambitions of -- of the accused and Dubrovnik. In this

9 document here, it's stated: "President Milosevic indicated that he had

10 asked General Kadijevic and Vice-President Kostic if it was true that JNA

11 were shelling the city of Dubrovnik. They said that this was untrue.

12 Whatever the situation was, he, Milosevic, could not accept the shelling

13 of Dubrovnik, which could not be justified."

14 From your dealings with the accused, was it ever part of his

15 strategy, so far as you knew, that he was using force to achieve

16 territorial aims against the other parties negotiating over the future of

17 Yugoslavia?

18 A. No. No. I categorically state that President Milosevic never

19 wanted any such thing. He insisted on a peaceful settlement, because

20 often, I have to admit that, armed actions got out of control. They got

21 out of control -- not only out of the control of the superiors involved,

22 even under local control. They got out of local control. Very often they

23 -- their nature was one of anarchy. You did not know who was shooting

24 from which side. This was a moment when discipline went down and when

25 control over the armed forces simply disappeared. In certain moments it

1 simply disappeared and there was this atmosphere of panic, and there was a

2 wish to place it under control somehow. But it was very difficult because

3 there were individual acts of revenge. Groups here and there, groups of

4 mercenaries who came.

5 You see, I remember these statements of some of these mercenaries

6 who came from Great Britain. They were brought to Belgrade, and