1 Thursday, 12 February 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: Very briefly, may I address you in private session on a

7 procedural matter?

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Private session.

9 [Private session]

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 [Open session]

6 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

7 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the Prosecution calls General Morillon.

8 While we're waiting for General Morillon to be brought in, could I ask

9 that a number be assigned for a binder of exhibits containing 35 tabs.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

11 THE REGISTRAR: 648, Your Honours.

12 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, that binder, the Prosecution is

13 withdrawing three of those exhibits but will not renumber the tabs given

14 the volume of them. The tabs that the Prosecution is withdrawing are tabs

15 1, 3, and 31.

16 Your Honour, pursuant to an order of the court, there are two

17 representatives of the French government in Court. I will state their

18 name for the Court. There is Mr. Olivier Barrat and Mr. Daniel Warin.

19 They are seated behind me and will pass me written notes if they wish a

20 point to be raised.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we take note of that.

22 [The witness entered court]

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

25 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

2 WITNESS: PHILIPPE MORILLON

3 [Witness answered through interpreter]

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Groome.

5 Examined by Mr. Groome:

6 Q. I ask that we begin by having the witness shown tab 2 of Exhibit

7 648. This is a statement of General Morillon.

8 General, first, are you able to hear me in French?

9 A. Very well.

10 Q. Could I ask you to look at that document before you. Is that an

11 account of or a summary of your testimony regarding events in the spring

12 of 1993 -- or 1992 and 1993?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And now --

15 A. Yes, Your Honour, this is correct, perfectly.

16 Q. Now that you have taken the solemn declaration, is the document

17 before you accurate and truthful to the best of your knowledge?

18 A. Yes, for as much I can remember, yes, Your Honour.

19 Q. And does it also -- this document also include your observations

20 regarding the documents that are listed in the binder that you now have a

21 copy and are listed on the front of this document?

22 A. Yes.

23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Groome, he hasn't signed the document.

24 MR. GROOME: Your Honour I can -- I can ask him to sign it here in

25 court if the Court wishes.

1 JUDGE KWON: So he read his statement by English or in French?

2 MR. GROOME: I will clarify that.

3 Q. General, even though you are testifying in your native tongue,

4 French, is it true that you speak and read English?

5 A. [In English] That's correct, Your Honour.

6 Q. And this document, have you reviewed it in its English and is it

7 that English document that you are saying is truthful and accurate?

8 A. [Interpretation] Yes.

9 Q. Could I ask you to sign the last page of that document.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, continue Mr. Groome.

11 MR. GROOME:

12 Q. General, in this document it states that -- or one of your current

13 occupations as being a member of the European parliament. It also talks

14 about your service in UNPROFOR, which is of particular interest in these

15 proceedings, and it summarises your service in UNPROFOR as beginning in

16 March of 1992 as deputy commander responsible for Croatia, a command you

17 held until September of 1992, at which time you became the UNPROFOR

18 commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina until the 12th of July, 1993. Is that

19 correct regarding your time and service in UNPROFOR?

20 A. Perfectly correct, yes.

21 Q. Can I ask you to describe for the Chamber, what was your mandate

22 during the time that you served in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23 A. Yes, thank you. I think to understand matters, it's important to

24 see things in context, matters in context. We had a term of office by the

25 Security Council of the United Nations to perform, support the Vance Plan,

1 to consolidate the cease-fire in Croatia, which was put in place in

2 Croatia. Our mission, therefore, was to enable the evacuation of the

3 federal army of the zone it was occupying in the territory of Croatia and

4 also having interim protection of the population.

5 And we had no mandate for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been

6 mentioned in New York. It had been said that the headquarters of UNPROFOR

7 and its commander, General Nambiar, could be in Sarajevo -- could have

8 been in Sarajevo, but the idea was to be in a neutral capital in order to

9 be able to help and for the consolidation of this cease-fire and the

10 establishment of peace in Croatia. It had been decided that it would be

11 preferable to be neither in Belgrade nor in Zagreb in order to avoid being

12 exposed to any form of pressure from one or the other government which was

13 in conflict. Sarajevo was considered as a neutral capital halfway in

14 between the two, and therefore the decision had been made for that reason

15 to have the headquarters there while the forces were to deploy on the

16 territory of Croatia.

17 There was secretly a hope that the presence of this headquarters,

18 the presence of blue berets, blue helmets in the city of Sarajevo could

19 help to avoid or prevent drama, the threat of which could be felt at the

20 time, but we didn't have any real force except for the secretaries of the

21 offices of this headquarters in Sarajevo. We deployed as from the middle

22 of March.

23 When the drama started in the beginning of April, we found

24 ourselves in the position and we were solicited, we were asked to play a

25 mediator part. In particular one has to remember perfectly to help with

1 the evacuation of part of the forces of the federal army which was blocked

2 in Sarajevo, the headquarters of General Kukanjac, commander of the corps,

3 and also a school of cadets at the barracks at Marsal Tito.

4 The Bosnian Serbs had Izetbegovic prisoner when he had come back

5 from his trip, and upon the request of all parties, we tried to mediate in

6 order to have President Izetbegovic freed and that General Kukanjac could

7 then evacuate the city. It was one of the important roles.

8 Q. General --

9 A. And this is what a general must endeavour to do. Unfortunately,

10 matters continued to deteriorate in such a way that we were -- found

11 ourself in a position where we didn't have even the possibility of

12 fulfilling the mission which we had been given for Croatia because of the

13 situation. We were cut off --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: General. General, thank you for the background

15 information, which is helpful, but please allow counsel to ask specific

16 questions.

17 MR. GROOME:

18 Q. General, you've just been telling us about mediation that you were

19 engaged in in particular events. During the course of your duties did you

20 meet regularly with both political and military leaders from the region?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can I draw --

23 A. Yes, in particular. As long as we stayed in Sarajevo, that is

24 until mid-May, because at mid-May, we had angrily to abandon Sarajevo

25 provisionally because we couldn't perform.

1 Q. Can I draw your attention to the 30th of May, 1992. Did you have

2 a meeting with the accused, Mr. Milosevic, in Belgrade with respect to

3 what was going on in Sarajevo?

4 A. Yes. I repeat, we were led to leave Sarajevo because of the

5 anarchy which was there and the possibility -- an impossibility for us to

6 exert our command, and we went to Belgrade, thinking of deploy

7 alternatively to Belgrade and Zagreb in order to fulfil our mandate, a

8 mandate which the United Nations had bestowed on us. So it's quite

9 naturally that on the 30th of May, a few days after our arrival in

10 Belgrade, there was a meeting, a meeting was held between the headquarters

11 of UNPROFOR and General Nambiar, commanding the force, and the government

12 and Mr. Milosevic.

13 Q. Can I ask you to summarise what was discussed at that meeting. In

14 particular attention, what was said to Mr. Milosevic and what he said to

15 the delegates or the delegation from UNPROFOR.

16 A. Naturally, we took stock of the situation in Sarajevo, and General

17 Nambiar insisted on the absolute need to have the shelling stopped on the

18 city. Mr. Milosevic, as is reported in this document which was given to

19 the Chamber, members of the Chamber, Mr. Milosevic admitted that these

20 shellings were unacceptable and specified that he would do all he could to

21 have them stopped and to ask Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic to make sure

22 that they would be obliged to stop this shelling.

23 This is, therefore, the report which has been presented to the

24 members of the Chamber and which reflects very correctly what was said at

25 the time.

1 Q. And did Mr. Milosevic say what -- what he would do to help stop

2 the bombardment of Sarajevo?

3 A. He said, as is specified in this document number 4 --

4 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, that's tab 4 of Exhibit 648.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document was drafted by General

6 Nambiar himself, but I know that he looked at every detail. Mr. Milosevic

7 said that he would be do everything he could, he would use his influence

8 in order to have this shelling stopped, this bloody criminal bombardment,

9 and he indicated that he would tell Karadzic that he couldn't count on any

10 support if he didn't stop these bombardments.

11 Q. When Mr. Milosevic said that Karadzic could not count on any

12 support if he continued these bombardments, what did you understand that

13 support to include?

14 A. I think one should avoid any hypocrisy in this business. The army

15 of the Serbs of Bosnia was the federal army. Quite plainly overnight the

16 federal army, one which was under the orders of General Kukanjac in his

17 barracks of Lukavica, overnight was repainted with new insignia and became

18 officially the army of the Serbs of Bosnia, but they were the same forces,

19 the same officers, the same equipment. Part of the conscripts is true

20 came back to the federal republic, but most of the forces were, of course,

21 originally of that army. And therefore, the ammunition, the fuel, all

22 logistics and weapons themselves came directly from the federal army,

23 which was always submitted to the authority of the president.

24 Therefore, this sort of assistance or help, sort of direct help,

25 was obvious for everybody, and of course for us.

1 Q. General, in the document, the term "bloody criminal" is in

2 quotation marks. What do those quotation marks indicate in the context of

3 this document?

4 A. I think that the details which General Nambiar was looking to, he

5 wanted indeed to say that it was the very words used by President

6 Milosevic.

7 Q. Now, can I ask you in a few sentences to describe for the Chamber

8 the condition or the situation that existed in the eastern enclaves of

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time you assumed your command in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 A. I believe that indeed we had a mission in Bosnia to perform. It

12 was the mission I had been entrusted as commander of the forces on the

13 ground to help. Essentially a humanitarian aid operation. I was there to

14 assist Mrs. Ogata, the HCR, in her mission, which was to do everything

15 that was possible so that hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of Bosnia

16 which had taken refuge in enclaves, who were we besieged, who had

17 absolutely no means of subsistence would not starve or die of exposure,

18 which was the case of the besieged cities and it was in particular the

19 case for the enclaves in the east.

20 Q. Now --

21 A. In those enclaves, to be more specific, there was a great

22 insecurity, greater than anywhere else. These enclaves were partly

23 occupied by forces, Muslim forces under the command of Naser Oric, who

24 engaged in regular fights. So the possibilities of getting supplies of

25 food for the population from Bosnia, which it was hoped would come both

1 from Belgrade and from Split through Mostar were considerably hampered and

2 hindered, and the Bosnian Serbs were telling us that it was due to the

3 fighting which took place.

4 The Presidency in Sarajevo complained regularly about the fact

5 that the population were threatened within these enclaves, and tension was

6 gradually focused on this region with an insistent request on my part to

7 see that the local population could get supplies and food as was the case

8 elsewhere and could be free and have a freedom of movement and freedom of

9 passage for the humanitarian aid.

10 Q. General, your statement details attacks by Naser Oric,

11 particularly the Orthodox Christmas Eve attack. Did there come a time

12 when you had a conversation with Naser Oric with which -- during which you

13 confronted him with respect to what his policy was or what he did respect

14 to the prisoners that he obtained during his operations?

15 A. I met Naser Oric much later, in March, when I intervened directly

16 on the ground. The actions that you are referring to were one of the

17 reasons for the deterioration of the situation in the area, especially in

18 the month of January.

19 Naser Oric engaged in attacks during Orthodox holidays and

20 destroyed villages, massacring all the inhabitants. This created a degree

21 of hatred that was quite extraordinary in the region, and this prompted

22 the region of Bratunac in particular - that is the entire Serb population

23 - to rebel against the very idea that through humanitarian aid one might

24 help the population that was present there.

25 Q. General --

1 A. Naser Oric, and I repeat, I met him only in March.

2 Q. If I could ask you, what if anything did Mr. Oric himself say to

3 you with respect to what he had been doing with prisoners during this time

4 period?

5 A. I think you will find this in other testimony, not just mine.

6 Naser Oric was a warlord who reigned by terror in his area and over the

7 population itself. I think that he realised that those were the rules of

8 this horrific war, that he could not allow himself to take prisoners.

9 According to my recollection, he didn't even look for an excuse. It was

10 simply a statement: One can't be bothered with prisoners.

11 Q. And you understood him to mean what precisely when he said that?

12 A. It -- I wasn't surprised when the Serbs took me to a village to

13 show me the evacuation of the bodies of the inhabitants that had been

14 thrown into a hole, a village close to Bratunac. And this made me

15 understand the degree to which this infernal situation of blood and

16 vengeance -- I think Subotic spoke very well about this blood and

17 vengeance, the degree to which this led to a situation when I personally

18 feared that the worst would happen if the Serbs of Bosnia managed to enter

19 the enclaves and Srebrenica.

20 Q. Now, General, the statement details your trip to Srebrenica on the

21 10th and 11th of March, 1993. Can I ask you to briefly describe the

22 general conditions, the living conditions of the people in the town of

23 Srebrenica when you entered it at that time.

24 A. It's true that there were tens of thousands trapped by the snow

25 and exposed to the risk in the case of the slightest shelling, of being

1 wounded and killed in the hundreds, because other towns in Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina, as opposed to other towns, Srebrenica had no shelter. They

3 used as food what they could collect from the trees, and I was informed

4 that there was such a degree of hunger and famine in Srebrenica that

5 supplies had to be provided by air and air drops were decided to provide

6 the means of survival for the area. This is what we could do.

7 And again, there were thousands converging there throughout the

8 nights with -- including elderly, women and children. They were very

9 numerous, who had been victims of shellings. There were many wounded.

10 There was a young medical student who operated on the spot, and I obtained

11 confirmation of this situation when I arrived on the spot. That is what I

12 saw, a degree of --

13 Q. Now --

14 A. -- absolute misery with a real risk of tens of thousands being

15 killed.

16 Q. Now, in your statement you describe five different ways in which

17 the Republic of Serbia had some involvement in the attacks on -- in

18 Srebrenica and the surrounding area. I'm going to ask you to just comment

19 briefly on each of those.

20 With respect to artillery bombardment, what did you know at that

21 time with respect to the involvement of artillery in Serbia bombarding

22 Srebrenica and the surrounding area? If I could draw your attention to

23 tab 8 of Exhibit 648.

24 A. I had with me a small team of observers, and they informed me of

25 the fact that when the offensive was being launched that it was supported

1 by fire coming from the other side of the Drina, which meant from the

2 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

3 Also, you know that there were two air raids by non-identified

4 planes without obvious markings which came to bomb the front, and again

5 they were coming from Serbia.

6 Finally, I was informed about identity cards of specifically two

7 Serb soldiers. One was a police officer who was a resident of the

8 Republic of Serbia and who had permission to enter the area of Srebrenica

9 and an identity card of another Serb soldier.

10 So these were several elements that support the conviction that I

11 had, and that was that everything that was happening in the area enjoyed

12 the support of the federal army itself, the Serb army. And this did not

13 surprise anyone, because that army had a common goal with the Serbs of

14 Bosnia, the Serbs of Mladic.

15 Q. Now, I'm going to ask that you take a look at tab 11 of Exhibit

16 648. I want to read a portion of that to you and ask for your comment.

17 It's going to be displayed on the screen in front of you or you may find

18 it in your copy of the exhibits that you have on the desk.

19 This is a Special Situation Report on Srebrenica from Colonel

20 Leentjes, and in it he says: "There is systematic cleansing of the

21 Srebrenica enclave that had been going on full force now since at least

22 the beginning of March and perhaps since early January. The Serbs are

23 ethnically cleansing one village at a time first by shelling the village

24 and then attacking with ground forces."

25 My question to you is: With respect to the involvement of Serbia

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 in what was happening, what was the relationship between the ethnic

2 cleansing that Colonel Leentjes is talking about and the involvement of

3 the forces from across the Drina?

4 A. At a minimum, there was direct support, which we called close air

5 support, and Colonel Leentjes reported things himself, and Colonel

6 Leentjes was the head of the team of observers who were with me in

7 Srebrenica.

8 Q. With response to the events, was the United Nations Security

9 Council notified and did it issue warnings and requests to the government

10 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease this activity, to

11 investigate these claims?

12 A. That is what I personally requested, and that is what was done.

13 You know that there was a prohibition, a no-flight zone imposed with

14 regard to the entire Serb air force, and the Security Council insisted

15 that the no-fly zone be respected.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Groome, if you can tell me where I can find that

17 passage in tab 11 once again, please.

18 MS. HIGGINS: I think it's paragraph 6, Your Honour.

19 MR. GROOME: Yes, it is, Your Honour. Thank you.

20 Q. Now, General --

21 JUDGE KWON: The passage that the Sanction showed is the wrong one

22 then.

23 MR. GROOME: We'll try to call up the correct one now, Your

24 Honour.

25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Go on, please.

1 MR. GROOME:

2 Q. General, in the interests of time I'm going to skip over several

3 significant events, among those being your remaining in Srebrenica for a

4 period of time, the fact that you were not permitted to leave voluntarily,

5 your declaration of Srebrenica as an area protected by the United Nations,

6 and then your issuance of an order to have a humanitarian convoy make its

7 way to Srebrenica with humanitarian aid, and we'll rely on the Chamber's

8 reading of this statement.

9 Can I jump ahead to the 19th of March during a time when you --

10 when you were personally escorting a convoy. Did you yourself come under

11 fire from a Bosnian Serb checkpoint?

12 A. That is correct. There was a guard at a crossroads, and as I was

13 joining the convoy that had been blocked on several occasions, he opened a

14 burst of fire with Kalashnikovs to try and stop me. I was so convinced

15 that it was a question of life and death for this population that I was

16 ready for anything to ensure this first sign of hope, first sign of

17 survival, which was received with so much relief by the population because

18 we finally managed to pass.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, may I ask you, would it have been clear

20 to the guard who opened fire at you who you were, that you were part of

21 UNPROFOR?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I think he even

23 knew that I was General Morillon. I was well known at the time. I was

24 known throughout Bosnia. And it was frequently very moving, because where

25 I passed, I would say, "I'm General Morillon," and all the obstacles would

1 be opened. And that is why I went to Srebrenica. That surprised many,

2 but I was the only one to be able to do it.

3 You may remember, Your Honour, of this quite extraordinary

4 situation of a man spontaneously coming to kiss my hand when I came out of

5 the car. And he was a Serb. It wasn't a Bosniak. It was on the

6 territory of Serbia, in fact.

7 But to answer your question, the man who fired at me - no, he

8 fired into the air, actually - he knew very well who I was.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

10 MR. GROOME:

11 Q. Did there come a time when the situation in Srebrenica became so

12 desperate that you took the decision to go to Belgrade and to speak to

13 Mr. Milosevic regarding what was going on in Srebrenica?

14 A. Yes. I knew from the beginning that the only person who could

15 assist me in this attempt to save the people was Mr. Milosevic, and I went

16 to tell him. And I have very -- a very clear memory of that. "There was

17 already a spot on the flag of your republic. Believe me, if you don't do

18 everything to help me to disarm this dreadful bomb that is now threatening

19 the entire population of Srebrenica because of the degree of hatred that

20 has developed there, you will have an even worse blemish on your

21 reputation and world public opinion will not forgive you."

22 I think Mr. Milosevic heard the message and that he assisted later

23 in establishing the peace process which at least started to dismantle this

24 bomb, at least temporarily.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Groome, can we get the date of that meeting.

1 MR. GROOME:

2 Q. General, can you recall the date of this meeting that you're

3 referring to now?

4 A. Yes. It was the 25th. Just a moment, please. It was at the end

5 of March.

6 Q. If I could draw your attention to tab 21 of 648. Is that a

7 memorandum of this meeting?

8 A. Yes, the 25th of March.

9 Q. General, before you started talking about the substance of the

10 meeting, you said that Mr. Milosevic was the only person in your view who

11 could help defuse the situation. Can I ask you to expand on that a little

12 bit and give us precise information regarding what led you to believe that

13 he was the only person?

14 A. At that point in time, Mladic, who was the true person, the only

15 person who really had authority on the territory of Republika Srpska, he

16 was still capable of obeying orders coming from Belgrade, and I knew that.

17 It is true that later, after the failure of the implementation of the

18 Vance-Owen Plan in May, he did what I considered to be a coup d'etat and I

19 think he completely went out of all control. President Milosevic had put

20 in motion a process relying on a certain number of dogs who seemed

21 enraged, and Mladic was one of them. But at the time, I still was

22 convinced that President Milosevic still had control over Mladic. And the

23 concrete result of that measure proved I was not wrong.

24 I said already that the population of Srebrenica, which kept me a

25 prisoner for some time -- not really a prisoner, but they kept me with

1 them because they considered that I would be a kind of scapegoat and a

2 shield and I would protect them from any attack, but I said, "If you don't

3 let me go to Belgrade, I will not be able to implement the plan to

4 evacuate your wounded, to establish an air convoy, to allow convoys to

5 pass that you rely on for survival." And that is then what happened.

6 Q. General Morillon, your statement and the accompanying official

7 documents and reports make it clear that those immediately involved

8 appreciated the severity of the situation in Srebrenica. Can I ask you as

9 best you're able to assist the Court, can you convey to them, what was the

10 reality of the people trapped in Srebrenica? What was the probable threat

11 that was poised over them at that time?

12 A. I could say, and I did say through the media - you may remember

13 that using radio amateurs the whole world learnt - that I said that this

14 was not just a rumour of which there were many throughout that war. For

15 example, around Christmas, apparently there was cannibalism in the enclave

16 of Zepa, but this was false. And there was a tendency on the part of all

17 to exaggerate the threats and to distort things. It wasn't systematic

18 misinformation, it was a difficult situation in which rumours spread and

19 created panic.

20 So I said, and I remember it quite clearly, I said to

21 Mr. Milosevic if convoys are not allowed to pass and if the situation is

22 not calmed down, the whole world at the time had hope that the Vance-Owen

23 Plan would be implemented, a demilitarisation that would occur quickly,

24 that the siege would be lifted from Sarajevo. The -- we discussed all

25 these things. And I said, in Srebrenica something terrible could happen

1 and it will block the entire peace process. There will be a terrible

2 drama. And I repeated that the world public opinion will not forgive the

3 Serbs, you will be satanised and you will not be forgiven. That was the

4 personal intuition I had; and unfortunately, two years later, and I'm

5 still haunted by this, my fears proved true.

6 Q. General, so the record is clear, what is the terrible thing that

7 you foresaw in 1993 that came true two years later?

8 A. I feared that the Serbs, the local Serbs, the Serbs of Bratunac,

9 these militiamen, they wanted to take their revenge for everything that

10 they attributed to Naser Oric. It wasn't just Naser Oric that they wanted

11 to revenge, take their revenge on, they wanted to revenge their dead on

12 Orthodox Christmas. They were in this hellish circle of revenge. It was

13 more than revenge that animated them all.

14 Not only the men. The women, the entire population was imbued

15 with this. It wasn't the sickness of fear that had infected the entire

16 population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the fear of being dominated, of being

17 eliminated, it was pure hatred. One can -- such hatred cannot be worse

18 than it is towards neighbours and brothers.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you saying, then, General, that what happened

20 in 1995 was a direct reaction to what Naser Oric did to the Serbs two

21 years before?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, Your Honour. I am

23 convinced of that. This doesn't mean to pardon or diminish the

24 responsibility of the people who committed that crime, but I am convinced

25 of that, yes.

1 There was a chance of the Vance-Owen Plan being realised soon. If

2 I did not have that hope, Your Honour, I would have evacuated the town

3 fully conscious of the risk. I would have undertook the evacuation even

4 if that would mean that I personally would take part in ethnic cleansing.

5 I didn't do it because just at that point in time I had very high hopes.

6 And I wasn't the only one. Karadzic himself, Milosevic, they signed in

7 Athens the Vance-Owen Plan in the month of May.

8 MR. GROOME:

9 Q. General, did you do your best to convey in the strongest terms

10 your fears about what would happen in Srebrenica to Mr. Milosevic during

11 your meeting with him on the 20 -- in March and subsequent meetings you

12 had with him?

13 A. I think he can confirm it. In a tete-a-tete, a long one which I

14 shall never forget, I did everything to convince him that the threat was a

15 real one, and I think he understood.

16 Q. Thank you, General.

17 MR. GROOME: I have no further questions.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Groome.

19 JUDGE KWON: Before the accused starts his cross-examination, I

20 think I have to express my concern though about the way the Prosecution is

21 preparing the 89(F) statements. I noticed that tab 2 here is

22 substantially different from what is tendered as 89(F) statement in

23 January. The number is different, there is some substantial parts

24 paraphrased and some sentences are inserted too. If you could clarify

25 this matter.

1 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, there -- since the filing of the

2 original, which was in draft form, the general has had an opportunity to

3 look at it, and the earlier draft was done in the third person as a

4 witness summary. There were attempts to turn this into first person so

5 that the language more accurately reflected the general using the word "I"

6 in his direct observations rather than his anticipated testimony which the

7 original document was describing.

8 JUDGE KWON: So my query is when this new version was disclosed to

9 the accused?

10 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it was -- it was given to the accused

11 just prior to the testimony today.

12 JUDGE KWON: So I don't think it will prejudice much because the

13 most important parts were given live, but it makes his preparation very

14 difficult. So please bear that in mind.

15 MR. GROOME: I will Your Honour.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I will bear in mind

18 the comments made by Mr. Nice at the beginning which indicate the

19 intention to allot a relatively short space of time for the

20 cross-examination of General Morillon. And General Morillon is a very

21 important witness. He was the UNPROFOR commander precisely in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina and precisely at the critical time, and therefore, I

23 consider that it would be important to give sufficient time for General

24 Morillon to be able to explain things, and I don't doubt that he will do

25 that.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, quite so.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that is why I would like to

3 ask you to tell me whether I can count on using the rest of the time left

4 today for us to review and have an exchange of opinions and views on the

5 basis of General Morillon's testimony.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 MR. GROOME: Mr. Milosevic, we will set a time of two hours, and

8 if necessary, we'll review it at the end.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

10 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

11 Q. [Interpretation] General, you arrived in Sarajevo, as you yourself

12 said and I assume that's not in dispute, on the 13th of March, 1992; is

13 that right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. In your statement, you said that when you arrived in Sarajevo, you

16 found the majority of the population wanting, and I quote you, "wanting to

17 see the situation calmed down, but at the same time the fear remained of a

18 possible unavoidable conflict"; is that right?

19 A. Yes, Mr. President.

20 Q. Thank you. And sometime during that period when you arrived in

21 Sarajevo, General Satish Nambiar also arrived in Sarajevo, and he at the

22 time was the UNPROFOR commander for the whole of that region; isn't that

23 right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. General Nambiar said at one time that in actual fact the first

1 person he encountered when he came to Yugoslavia was the Portuguese

2 diplomat Jose Cutileiro, who was head of the negotiations to solve the

3 crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, and if I understand you

4 correctly, you met him too upon your arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is

5 that right, General?

6 A. Ambassador Cutileiro was the representative of Portugal who at the

7 time -- which at the time held the Presidency of the European Union, and

8 as such, he was entrusted by the European Union to try and mediate and

9 avoid any drama.

10 Q. As to your mediation in that tense situation, you state, and I

11 quote you again, "This lasted throughout on the basis of Nambiar's

12 initiative and Cutileiro's initiative. With General Nambiar and his

13 staff, the presidents Izetbegovic, Ejub Ganic from the Muslim side would

14 meet, and Karadzic, Mrs. Plavsic and Koljevic on the Serb side," and

15 that's what you mention in your own statements.

16 So Nambiar immediately started to cooperate with Cutileiro in

17 order to calm the situation down. Am I right if I assume that you took

18 part in that too because you were, of course, informed of all those

19 activities.

20 A. I was second after General Nambiar. And if you allow,

21 Mr. Milosevic, according to what I remember, from the very first days we

22 met the parliament of Bosnia, and there was a speech by General Nambiar

23 who said, "We are here to calm your fears. I am an Indian general, I am

24 here with my head of the cabinet, a Pakistani, then there's also a French

25 general and a German diplomat. We are here to show you that

1 reconciliation is always possible." And this was a moving moment, because

2 in response to this speech, a Serb got up, and he said, "I am a Serb, and

3 next to me I have a Muslim. He's my brother. And I don't see how one day

4 we could be confronted against one another." Which means that the

5 population -- you remember there was the silent march, which prior to the

6 drama beginning made an attempt to remove the barricades. Unfortunately,

7 this was prevented and it was shot at by crazy soldiers of Karadzic from

8 the Holiday Inn hotel, and that was how the drama started. But certainly

9 I have a very clear memory of all those events.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, we are operating under a time

11 constraint, and I would be grateful if you would make your answers as

12 helpful but as brief as possible. Thank you.

13 Mr. Milosevic.

14 THE ACCUSED: Thank you.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Cutileiro was

17 known for the fact that it was under his leadership that a plan was

18 devised which the representatives of all three sides in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was at the time when you were already in

20 Sarajevo, on the 18th of March, 1992, signed. I'm sure you'll remember

21 that. That was a very important event, I assume, wasn't it, General?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And I also hope you will remember the fact that a week later or,

24 rather, on the 25th of March, Alija Izetbegovic withdrew the signature he

25 had already placed on the Cutileiro plan. And I assume you'll remember

1 that too.

2 A. I wasn't directly involved in that event, but I was told about it,

3 yes.

4 Q. I assume you remember that the ambassador of the United States at

5 the time, Warren Zimmermann, suggested to Izetbegovic, and he confirmed

6 that, that he take that step, that if he didn't like the plan, he could

7 withdraw his signature. I hope you know that.

8 A. I learnt it, I must say once again, by what I was told, but I did

9 not -- I was not directly implicated, I was not involved in that event,

10 but I knew it.

11 Q. In view of the fact that you occupied a very high position at the

12 time in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the top position when it comes to the

13 international community, I'm sure you know full well that before that

14 plan, there were no conflicts and that the plan, which all three sides

15 signed, proved to be the last chance to preserve peace and to avoid any

16 kind of conflict and bloodshed. Is that right, General?

17 A. Ambassador Cutileiro was persuaded of having achieved through this

18 plan a way of defusing the bomb. Unfortunately, this did not happen, and

19 I don't think that the responsibility had been -- can be placed

20 exclusively on Alija Izetbegovic. I think that there are other -- all

21 three are responsible; Karadzic, Mate Boban, and Izetbegovic each have

22 their share of responsibility. This was, I would say, a sort of illusion

23 to believe that that plan had a chance of being implemented. That is how

24 I saw things.

25 Q. We're not talking here about what would have been had it been.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 We're trying to establish the facts, and the facts are that neither

2 Karadzic nor Boban withdrew their signatures from the plan, whereas

3 Izetbegovic did although he had signed it to begin with. So I don't

4 suppose we're challenging that fact.

5 Now, do you remember, General, that that particular plan implied

6 the independent Bosnia -- an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is to

7 say the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims accepted it as being independent but a

8 cantonised Bosnia-Herzegovina at the same time; is that right?

9 A. Precisely. And I remember very well meeting Ambassador Cutileiro

10 tete-a-tete and telling him how it seemed to me to be dangerous to declare

11 too quickly the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even then, I was

12 aware that the barrel of gunpowder that we were on could explode. Why?

13 Because it wasn't just Izetbegovic who was reticent. I recall,

14 Mr. Milosevic, that those who opened fire on the crowd from the Holiday

15 Inn were Karadzic's men. So I think it was an illusion to believe that a

16 plan could have allowed the drama to be avoided.

17 Q. And when was that?

18 A. During that period, unfortunately. Everything developed very

19 quickly. You know that.

20 Q. Yes, but when did Karadzic and those people shoot at the other

21 people in Sarajevo? I really don't know anything about that, so please

22 tell me. When was that?

23 A. I think it was the 4th or 6th of April, but one can easily find

24 that in the documents because it was recorded. So in fact, it was after,

25 if that's what you're indicating, it was after the Cutileiro plan, the

1 failure of that plan.

2 Q. Let's understand each other, General: The reason for the failure

3 of the plan is clear. But tell me this, please: I'm sure you know that

4 it was the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina that made the first efforts,

5 and in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, they were in favour of

6 preserving Yugoslavia. I'm sure you'll remember that.

7 A. Perfectly.

8 Q. And I assume you know that these strivings to preserve Yugoslavia

9 were the sole strivings in conformity with the Yugoslav constitution and

10 the constitutions of the member republics, and also in conformity with

11 international law, because Yugoslavia was a unified state and as such had

12 its international legal legitimacy and sovereignty in all the

13 constitutions and in the Yugoslav federal constitution. Its integrity and

14 sovereignty were protected. I'm sure you will remember that, General, and

15 that you know that full well.

16 A. Yes. I also know, Mr. President, that a certain number of

17 republics composing the Yugoslav federation, Slovenia to begin with and

18 then Croatia, had already at that time consulted their people through a

19 referendum and decided to go independent. The federation was being to

20 fall apart, and this spread to other republics like an infection.

21 Q. Not to expand upon the topic precisely for the reasons mentioned

22 by Mr. Robinson, because our time is limited, let us -- well, we agree and

23 you know that the primary goal of the Serb side was to preserve

24 Yugoslavia, and therefore would you agree with me when I say that the Serb

25 acceptance of the Cutileiro plan, in fact, which envisaged an independent

1 Bosnia, represented a great concession by the Serb side precisely in order

2 to preserve peace? Because if somebody wanted to preserve Yugoslavia at

3 all cost and then through an international conference chaired by Cutileiro

4 finally agrees to an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, that that is indeed a

5 great concession and that this was a concession made by the Serbs in order

6 to preserve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thinking that all three nations

7 or ethnic groups would be equal with that plan in place. Is that right,

8 General?

9 A. I would accept that position, though I was not a witness of a

10 certain number of events in the forests of Pale and all around there who

11 were preparing for action, which unfortunately started very shortly after

12 that. Don't tell me that the good faith of Karadzic was total in this

13 matter. I wouldn't say so. He had this story about three brothers

14 fighting over their territory. Each one should have his part. And he was

15 a crazy supporter of ethnic cleansing.

16 Q. Yes, all right. That is your opinion, but it wasn't actually my

17 question.

18 Now, do you know that the strivings on the Serb side, even after

19 the withdrawal of Izetbegovic's signature, there was insistence to

20 continue the Lisbon process and to achieve an agreement on peace? There

21 were a series of letters sent by Karadzic to Cutileiro or Carrington

22 asking that the Lisbon process be continued, and I assume you'll remember

23 that because you were given all that information on your table as

24 commander of the forces there. That's right, isn't it?

25 A. Yes. I did meet Lord Carrington, of course.

1 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, would you please tell me this: You

2 remember that the negotiations were continued in Lisbon, but at the end of

3 May 1992 -- so that we're already in May 1992 -- the Muslim side left the

4 negotiating table, and that was the second time that the peace mediations

5 by Cutileiro failed because of the negative attitude taken by the Muslim

6 side. You'll remember that, General, won't you? And the pretext on that

7 occasion was about the mine grenade that fell on the breadline.

8 A. Yes, but Sarajevo and then other towns as well were already

9 besieged. I see very well what you would like to say in order to defend

10 Karadzic's position. Quite sincerely, I don't think that that would be

11 acceptable, because I believe that, unfortunately, he was the one who had

12 the force and not Izetbegovic at that point in time.

13 Q. General, three parties negotiated. Karadzic represented just one

14 of those three parties, and you know that full well. For three sides to

15 agree, each of the three parties must voice their agreement, and there was

16 no question of the Serb side not agreeing, and I don't believe anybody can

17 dispute that. Isn't that right, General?

18 A. Probably. It's not up to me to put that question to. Perhaps to

19 Mr. Cutileiro if you haven't done that already. I'm not denying that in

20 this matter the Bosnian Presidency, that is President Izetbegovic, was

21 engaged and renounced the negotiation, but I don't want to defend anyone.

22 I was there to calm fear -- calm the fear, but unfortunately the fear

23 continued growing due to people who, like you, reminded people of

24 ancestral massacres in Bosnia through the media. Fear reigned in

25 Sarajevo, that is true. And they were afraid that this cantonisation,

1 this plan, could actually lead to Serb domination. It was a sickness. It

2 was a disease, the fear of being dominated.

3 You know, in the hills around Sarajevo, Mr. Milosevic, most of

4 them were not there to dominate. I wrote about that. It is the people

5 who took the responsibility, who were responsible who are to blame, and

6 Karadzic, of course, when he said that all Serb women in Sarajevo were in

7 whorehouses, this was a way of exacerbating the fear, and those who fanned

8 that fear are responsible, and Karadzic was one of them.

9 Q. Very well, General, but please may I ask you once again to focus

10 on my questions.

11 I have several questions now here, and since you were there from

12 the very beginning, they relate to the beginning of the armed conflict,

13 because one must bear in mind the facts, after all. With all due respect

14 to your opinions about anyone, I am trying to establish certain facts.

15 You yourself said in your statement that it was only in April that

16 the crisis began, the fighting began, and the shelling began.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Very well. Now, do you know that the crisis already in March took

19 thousands -- tens of thousands of human lives, Serb lives to begin with?

20 Do you know about that? Just say yes or no, please.

21 A. We have no certainty. We heard the rumours, but there were so

22 many of them, Mr. President, so many, so many. And as we were not present

23 there, we couldn't be certain. I was told that in Zepa, for instance,

24 there were acts of cannibalism. Everywhere in this crazy situation there

25 was misinformation, very often false information.

1 Q. Yes, certainly there was misinformation, General. I'm not

2 challenging that at all, but I'm sure you know that when you arrived on

3 the 13th of March, several days prior to that the first victim of the war

4 fell, the first man killed in the middle of Sarajevo, in the centre of

5 Sarajevo, was a Serb, and I'm sure you'll remember that. It wasn't a

6 rumour, it was an event that happened in downtown Sarajevo, and it

7 happened at the doors to the Orthodox church. And there was general

8 unrest among the Serbs, and you knew that full well. It was an event, and

9 they saw this as a message given to them despite your goodwill and the

10 constitution of Yugoslavia and Bosnia. We came out in favour of

11 independence, and now we can kill you. That was what they thought. And

12 it started with the killing of this Serb. Is that right, General?

13 A. Yes, the Serb in question, according to what I know, was killed

14 during a wedding. He had a flag, apparently, a Serb flag in this wedding

15 procession. I agree with you that this event took place prior to April

16 and that it contributed to the sickness of fear.

17 Q. Tell me, please, General, do you know, and I assume you would have

18 to know about this, that the so-called Patriotic League which was

19 established as an armed wing of Izetbegovic's party or, rather, the SDA

20 party, was founded, in fact, in Sarajevo already on the 31st of March,

21 1991, that is to say one year prior to any conflict? And otherwise, the

22 31st of March, 1991, is still today the official holiday celebrating the

23 Patriotic League. It is Patriotic League Day in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

24 there is no dispute there.

25 Now, do you know that that, after World War II and Hitler's

1 experience, was a party army which appeared -- which was the first to

2 appear in Europe and be established in Europe? And this was on the 31st

3 of March, 1991. Do you know about that fact?

4 A. When I arrived in Sarajevo, around the 13th of March, I met a

5 Bosniak in the Presidency. He told me, "I am the minister of defence of

6 an army that has no soldiers." There were militiamen, but there was Juka,

7 there was this small bum who was living nearby. I noted on the other hand

8 that Karadzic had a very solid numerous army deployed in the woods.

9 So I understand very well that in this matter you wish to present

10 the Serbs as defending themselves. They were all defending themselves.

11 They were all afraid of being dominated, of being eliminated, and those

12 who recalled a memory of ancient fears are the most responsible; they set

13 in motion all these forces.

14 Q. Fanning the flames certainly wasn't a good activity. We from

15 Yugoslavia, or, rather, Serbia, did not fan flames of that kind. But,

16 General, I'm sure you'll remember, and you just mentioned a criminal,

17 their generals, the Muslim generals, including the commander of the Main

18 Staff, speak about this in their books, because they all seem to be

19 writing books now, and they all say that during the period that you're

20 describing, they say they didn't have an army but yet they had over

21 120.000 people under arms. And that's something that Sefer Halilovic,

22 their commander of the Main Staff, writes about in his book. And he brags

23 about it. He boasts about it. And others write about that too. So I

24 assume that if you were to take a look at all those writings, you wouldn't

25 believe what you believed then. But let's not belabour the point.

1 Do you know these names? You mentioned Juka Prazina, Juka Prazina

2 yourself. He was a criminal, and he was some sort of force or actually a

3 paramilitary formation under the command of Alija Izetbegovic. Do you

4 remember another name, Ramiz Delalic, for instance, who was also in

5 command of some paramilitary unit, who otherwise was known to have killed

6 the man, but he was never taken to trial? And he maintained links with

7 the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is another thing that --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness answer.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Juka, when he started these

10 activities, did not obey anyone at all. I saw President Izetbegovic every

11 day, and this Juka was no better than a criminal, a cad. And you know

12 that he was killed in a parking lot in Brussels for, I think, stealing too

13 much money or whatever, and he got what he deserved.

14 To say that Halilovic allegedly had 120.000 men, that is not true.

15 You know very well in Bosnia-Herzegovina there was this Territorial

16 Defence, but the real force was the JNA, and the federal army had heavy

17 weapons. There were militias, certainly, which spontaneously,

18 unfortunately, were part of this vicious circle.

19 I really don't accuse anyone --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, General, do you have an estimate of the

21 number of men under Halilovic?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the beginning, in March that

23 we're talking about, there were a few policemen. There was virtually

24 nothing. At least I was never able to establish that there was any kind

25 of organised force, and certainly not an army. There were militias which

1 gradually, due to the siege, started to organise themselves and were

2 formed by officers coming from the JNA originally. There were not only

3 Bosniak Muslims, but at the beginning, I think realistically on the Muslim

4 side, they didn't have any real forces. That is my personal impression.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes. We are at the time for the

6 break.

7 General, we're going to take the break now for 20 minutes. During

8 the break, you are not to speak to anybody about your evidence.

9 We are adjourned.

10 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

11 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. General, two weeks after your arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

15 the exact date is the 26th of March, 1992, I assume you remember a large

16 massacre of Serbs in the area of Bosanski Brod in the village of Sijekovac

17 when entire families were massacred. Do you remember that event?

18 A. I remember the event as it was reported to us. We were not

19 witnesses. There were massacres, unfortunately, from the moment this

20 bloodshed spread throughout the country, but I remember that a report of

21 this massacre appeared in the press on the 26th of March.

22 Q. Very well. All this is within the context of the suffering of

23 Serb civilians before any conflict actually occurred between the two

24 sides. And do you know that from the 3rd to the 6th of April, 1992, when

25 the army of the Republic of Croatia raided Kupres in Bosnia and

1 Herzegovina again 56 Serbs were killed virtually on their thresholds?

2 This was in your area of responsibility, so I assume you remember it.

3 A. The contingent placed at our disposal disembarked at Rijeka on the

4 4th of April. Before that, we were the staff and -- however, in Sarajevo,

5 we didn't have anyone, as you know, Mr. Milosevic. The contingent arrived

6 in Rijeka on the 4th of April, and I met them on the spot, I welcomed them

7 there.

8 Q. I am not raising that, but you were present at the time this

9 massacre occurred. I assume you remember it because you were in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.

11 A. Unfortunately, there were so many massacres, Mr. Milosevic,

12 throughout this area. Yes, I remember it.

13 Q. And do you remember also on the 4th of April that exactly when

14 your contingent was arriving in Rijeka, that Serb refugees from Barice and

15 Kostres were killed by armed Muslims, inhabitants of the village of

16 Korace, when 117 Serbs were killed, including old men, women, and

17 children. Do you remember that?

18 A. Quite frankly, I do not, Mr. Milosevic.

19 Q. Very well, General. The acts formally declaring war were passed

20 at the beginning of April, if you remember, by the Presidency of Bosnia

21 and Herzegovina in the absence of Serb members who were then Nikola

22 Koljevic and Plavsic, and in the absence of one of the Muslim leaders,

23 Fikret Abdic, when a decision was taken on mobilisation.

24 And then on the 8th of April, the immediate threat of war was

25 declared and the Republican Staff of Territorial Defence was abolished and

1 the TO of Bosnia-Herzegovina founded. Do you remember that? Just tell me

2 yes or no, please.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So before that, I have given you a number of examples that you

5 recollect. You do not recollect one. Before this formalisation of the

6 war, tens of if not hundreds of Serbs had already been killed in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Did the Serbs kill anyone in that period? Do you

8 have a single example that you could mention?

9 A. Rumours, of course, because once again we didn't have anyone on

10 the ground, no one in Sarajevo. Therefore, I must repeat, to ask me and

11 those conditions which may have happened throughout the territory of the

12 former Yugoslavia and specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I can't tell

13 you anything except what the journalists reported, but there was no

14 presence of ours anywhere to be able to pass on this information to

15 General Nambiar.

16 So I understand your position to show that the Serbs were only

17 responding and defending themselves, but it is a method that was developed

18 throughout when I was there, including at the end in Srebrenica. Everyone

19 was telling me, "We're not attacking," throughout the time I was present

20 in Bosnia. I was always hearing people saying, like Koljevic, "We are

21 defending ourselves." And he probably had the sincere wish to do so.

22 Karadzic also pretended that he wanted peace, but in that case, I

23 told him, "Stop your generals."

24 There was this infernal cycle. There was within each of the

25 communities this feeling of revenge.

1 Q. General, in your statement you mention that upon returning to

2 Sarajevo after Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised, you noticed the

3 presence of Karadzic's armed units in town. Now, tell me, with respect to

4 the existence of the Patriotic League, ever since March in 1991 and in

5 view of the killing of Serbs in Sarajevo and outside it, doesn't that

6 indicate that there were armed men on the Muslim side, and how is it

7 possible that you didn't see any such men on the Muslim side?

8 A. There were men. I didn't say that there weren't. I said that

9 when I arrived, around Karadzic there were a certain number of Rambos who

10 were completely crazy, maybe out of fear, anyway they were not

11 controllable, and who were in Sarajevo itself. And this was before the

12 declaration of war on the 8th of April. Police stations started to

13 separate, the Serbs went to one side, and Karadzic assembled in the woods

14 around Pale a certain number of men coming from Serbia, radicals.

15 I was informed about this because I had patrols in that sector.

16 That is what I saw on the ground.

17 Q. General, I asked you, in view of the fact that Izetbegovic's

18 Patriotic League had been formed a year prior to this, how is it possible

19 that you didn't see any of those men? You keep mentioning Karadzic's men.

20 A. I can only tell you what I saw on the ground.

21 Q. Very well. Let us move on to save time. You are saying that upon

22 your arrival in Sarajevo, the JNA was quartered in the Marsal Tito

23 barracks. And you say, and I quote you, "I believe that the JNA under the

24 command of General Kukanjac truly tried to bring their influence to bear

25 for all sides to show restraint, though it didn't conceal its sympathies

1 for the cause of the Bosnian Serbs."

2 So is it beyond dispute that the JNA acted as a stabilising factor

3 at the time of your arrival in Sarajevo?

4 A. It tried to do so. You are right.

5 Q. Now, you as a professional soldier know that a component part of

6 the training of any soldier is patriotism, love for their country. Isn't

7 it logical for people from the JNA, because you say they had sympathy for

8 the Bosnian Serb cause, it is normal for them to favour those who

9 advocated the preservation of the country, and the country at the time of

10 your arrival was Yugoslavia. Isn't that beyond dispute?

11 A. I wrote that down, yes.

12 Q. And wasn't it the secessionists in the various republics who, to

13 achieve their plans for secession, started attacking the JNA, first

14 verbally and then physically; isn't that right?

15 A. All this occurred after the declaration of independence. You know

16 that, Mr. Milosevic. And from that moment on, this attempt to forge any

17 tanks to enter Sarajevo, fighting in the town itself, and this -- these

18 events that happened in Slovenia, Croatia, barracks that were besieged,

19 encircled, efforts to regain freedom of movement, we were aware of all

20 this. At least I can say that as far as Sarajevo is concerned.

21 Q. Very well. In your statement, in answer to a question put to you

22 as to when in your opinion the real siege of Sarajevo started and why,

23 your answer was: "I believe this was on the 2nd of May, 1992, after the

24 command and recruits of the JNA were surrounded in the Marsal Tito

25 barracks and the JNA attempted to pull them out." Those are your words.

1 Therefore, it seems the media version as to who surrounded who is

2 not quite correct, because it was first the JNA members who were placed

3 under siege, and then the siege of Sarajevo was actually in response to

4 that. Is that right, General?

5 A. Initially, yes, but from the moment I came there, and I did

6 everything to talk to Karadzic to make him lift the siege, I said that the

7 way to Ilidza had to be kept open. And it wasn't initially, that this was

8 in September or October, the siege of Sarajevo was kept up, and I believe

9 sincerely that Karadzic wanted it lifted, but Mladic was opposed.

10 Q. Very well. After the agreement on withdrawal from Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reached regarding

12 members of the JNA who were not natives of Bosnia, you know that the

13 Muslim forces obstructed this withdrawal. The best known event is the

14 attack on the military column in Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo. You

15 remember that?

16 A. Yes. That was one of the dramatic events that I experienced on

17 the spot and we all suffered because we didn't have the means to prevent

18 it. We tried everything through negotiation to allow things to happen

19 differently, but there was a massacre.

20 Q. So the JNA was pulling out. The Muslim forces attacked them and

21 committed a massacre of soldiers who were normally pulling out and

22 withdrawing and, according to the agreement, were supposed to go to

23 Yugoslavia. You remember that?

24 A. They were going towards Lukavica, yes.

25 Q. And you know very well that there were several such attacks on JNA

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 columns, either on barracks or other facilities. You surely know of the

2 event of the 15th of May, 1992, in Tuzla, when the JNA was withdrawing

3 from Tuzla, that there was an ambush and a large number of people were

4 killed. According to Hasan Efendic, who was commander of the TO staff of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, and I assume he knew the facts, he wrote

6 in his book that 160 JNA members were killed and 200 wounded, and all they

7 were doing was pulling out of Tuzla in accordance with the agreement. You

8 certainly knew of that crime. Can you say anything about it?

9 A. I am not going to defend those who at that time contributed, from

10 whatever side they may have been, who contributed to the very fast anarchy

11 that spread throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. I compared this process to

12 what happened in Lebanon. In Lebanon they spoke of Balkanisation, and

13 throughout Bosnia they spoke of Lebanonisation, each one being --

14 considering themselves to be commanders of the war. And I say,

15 unfortunately, that each community shut itself within their own borders

16 and warlords started to reign by terror from that very period on.

17 There were horrors, I am aware of that, and attacks against the

18 forces that were withdrawing did indeed take place. These were attacks

19 against soldiers. It was a state of civil war. There were other

20 massacres as well, unfortunately, and you're aware of them. There were

21 those committed against the civilian unarmed population as well.

22 Q. What I told you about were massacres of Serb populations. As you

23 were the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia and as I assume or, rather, there's

24 no doubt that UNPROFOR was a source of information from the ground for

25 officials in the United Nations, I assume that reports of the

1 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina

2 were based on your reports. Is that right, General?

3 A. Those of the Supreme Command as a whole and General Nambiar in

4 particular, and when I took over command of Bosnia-Herzegovina in May, on

5 my reports as well.

6 Q. I assume that you also know that on the 30th of May, Boutros-Ghali

7 sent a report to the Security Council relating to the application of

8 Resolution 527, and that report speaks about the withdrawal of the JNA

9 from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the relationship between the army of Republika

10 Srpska towards the authorities in Belgrade or, rather, says that it was

11 not under the control of Belgrade and also speaks about the presence of

12 the regular Croatian army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you

13 remember that, General?

14 A. Yes, yes, indeed. There again it's the 30th of May, 1992 - one

15 has to be specific for the Chamber - as from the beginning of the process

16 which went on. But I don't deny the fact that this report may have come

17 from intelligence given by our headquarters, headquarters of General

18 Nambiar of the date you have quoted. You know we had left

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so this has to be specified. But unfortunately, we

20 had only in Sarajevo a very small unit, elementary unit, left inside

21 Sarajevo, unfortunately.

22 Q. General, the date of the report of the Secretary-General is the

23 30th, but I assume that the information received from you must have come

24 in before the 30th, because the date of the report itself was the 30th.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, a few days ago when we

1 heard testimony here, or the day before yesterday, by Venezuelan diplomat

2 Mr. Arria, he said that he hadn't seen the report. And he also said that

3 there was no number to the report and things of that kind. Not to take up

4 more time on this, but I now have a copy which includes the number,

5 because it was up above the report. It says Security Council,

6 distribution general. It says distribution general, and under that

7 S/24049 of the 30th of May, and it says "original English." The number

8 24049, and that is the report which speaks about the fact that the JNA had

9 withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the army of Republika Srpska

10 was not under the control of Belgrade and also that the Croatian army was

11 in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

13 Q. So those, I assume, are the observations that were made on the

14 basis of your reports, General Morillon, and they were included into the

15 report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros-Ghali.

16 A. What I personally observed was that, overnight, the units which I

17 had seen with the JNA star at Lukavica had been sort of repainted with the

18 insignia of the Republika Srpska. We were not duped. We were not

19 completely duped by all this business. All the heavy weapons were

20 remaining and had been transferred.

21 Colonel Mladic, I think he was still a Colonel at the time, he

22 wasn't yet a general, was arriving from Knin and still belonged to the

23 JNA. Therefore, this report you are mentioning, I do not question it

24 personally.

25 As for my part, what I've seen and observed on the ground was that

1 indeed, like with a magic wand, the JNA that was supposed to withdraw,

2 transferred practically the whole of its equipment to what became the army

3 of the Serbs of Bosnia during this period, around and as from the moment

4 when General Kukanjac, having been evacuated, was relieved of his command,

5 and this is all I can say about this.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I believe that report was already

7 tendered. I must ask the registrar.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 91, Your Honours.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Well, you know full well, General, that the JNA had withdrawn and

11 that Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent and recognised state and

12 that the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina themselves who were up until then

13 within the JNA remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the army of Republika

14 Srpska was established on the 15th of May. Is that right or not, General?

15 A. Yes. This being said, I shall read that there were a certain

16 number of conscripts who came with trucks and who had left their equipment

17 behind in Belgrade from the JNA. But the officers were not all born in

18 Bosnia. You know it very well. A certain number were voluntaries and

19 asked to stay. That's all I can say. On the 15th of May, yes.

20 Q. Yes. And here in the report by Ghali, I'm not going to quote him

21 because we don't have time for that, but he says quite clearly that

22 independent actors apparently beyond the control of the JNA.

23 A. Apparently. You've said so.

24 Q. Yes, yes. And that's what it would appear to be, and that's what

25 Ghali claims.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Groome, are you familiar with this report?

2 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I'm just looking for it now.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. This report together with the Resolution has its number and all

5 the rest of it, if that can be of assistance to you. I can place it at

6 your disposal, but let's move on.

7 General, do you know that the then presiding officer of the

8 Security Council, the Austrian diplomat, Mr. Peter Hohenfellner, retained

9 this report by Mr. Boutros-Ghali and waited for the UN Security Council to

10 pass by at which sanctions were introduced, and this was quite different

11 from the report. Do you know anything about that? If no, tell us you

12 don't, and if you do, tell us what you know. Thank you.

13 A. I don't remember that. I have no memories about that.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, to be fair to the witness, I think

15 the witness should see the report and the relevant paragraphs to which you

16 refer.

17 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have located a copy of that report, if

18 it's of assistance.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you pass the report to the witness.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I shall provide the general with a

21 copy.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: And what are the specific paragraphs of the

23 report on which you rely for your contention?

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. For example, take a look at this. Paragraph 3. Paragraph 3.

1 Then we have paragraphs -- within the frameworks of paragraph 5 there is

2 (a), section (a) and section (b), and they speak about the withdrawal the

3 JNA. Therefore, the withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 Then you have paragraph 8 which speaks about the fact that since

5 the representatives of the JNA from Belgrade are conducting negotiations

6 with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency with respect to that withdrawal,

7 that it had become clear that their words were not binding upon the army

8 or, rather, the army of Republika Srpska.

9 And finally, we have paragraph 10 which speaks about the fact that

10 the Croatian army was now in Bosnia, as it says, and that that is without

11 a doubt, although they refute that but all sources testify to that.

12 So that is not in dispute because it's all set out in the report

13 and can be easily verified.

14 So I'm asking you now, General, isn't it obvious that the contents

15 of Ghali's report does not create a grounds for sanctions to be enforced

16 against Yugoslavia? All that could be done was sanctions towards Croatia

17 in view of the fact that it states that it was the Croatian army that was

18 in Bosnia-Herzegovina whereas the JNA army was withdrawing. Was that

19 clear when we are discussing this particular report, of course?

20 A. Mr. Milosevic, at that time, I was probably joining with some

21 difficulty Belgrade, getting to Belgrade. We were in Sarajevo, under

22 siege, and everything which is in this report which I've just looked at

23 has to do with the reality. We've spoken about it, this period, the

24 siege, the Marsal Tito barracks, and so on, and this indeed can be read.

25 It's the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as

1 correctly reflecting of what we have seen. For the rest, I can't tell you

2 anything.

3 Of course, I was very far from New York, and we were not at all

4 associated during that time in the discussion between the Security

5 Council. If you want me to say that in this business the JNA was not

6 concerned officially, officially it wasn't concerned any more. This is

7 the reason why in what has been written under the signature of the

8 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, there is

9 apparently, but I can't say more. Apparently the Republika Srpska, the

10 army of the Republika Srpska, was no more under the control of Belgrade.

11 In reality, we knew very well that Belgrade continued to exert its

12 authority on Mladic. We have to say things as they are. And I'm

13 absolutely convinced. And what I said a moment ago I suppose helped the

14 Chamber to understand what the situation really was.

15 Q. General, Belgrade in no way could have ordered General Mladic to

16 do anything, and that is even written down in the quotations of our own

17 conversation from the Srebrenica days where I endeavoured to help calm

18 things down, which I assume is not in dispute. And it's in tab 21, I

19 believe, where you speak about your meeting with me. And I'm going to

20 quote from that document. Paragraph 5, in fact, towards the end of that

21 paragraph.

22 "[In English] Though making unusually forthright statements of

23 support for UN requests, Milosevic stated that he could not give orders to

24 BSA."

25 [Interpretation] And at the end of paragraph 7, since we are

1 drawing various observations collectively, at the end of paragraph 7, the

2 last sentence reads as follows, and it's: "[In English] Milosevic's new

3 role as decisive peacemaker and honest broker was rather apparent."

4 [Interpretation] Therefore, since you have spoken about the

5 efforts made to stop that tragic event that was to come to pass in

6 Srebrenica, I assume it is clear that for our part we used all the

7 political influence which we had, and that was the only influence that we

8 did have to achieve that. I assume that's not in dispute, General

9 Morillon.

10 A. Right. Now, Mr. Milosevic, we pass suddenly from 30 May 1992 to

11 March 1993. On the 30th of May, 1992, you have yourself seen the document

12 which reports on a meeting which was General Nambiar who was presiding,

13 and we have told the Chamber about it in this document. You said you

14 exerted all the possible pressures which were in your power or all the

15 power you had in your -- at your disposal to have the shelling stopped,

16 the shelling on Sarajevo.

17 I will not go along your attempt to refuse recognising,

18 acknowledging your responsibilities. You had the possibility, I repeat it

19 and I say it to you, that's the reason why I went to Belgrade. You had

20 the possibility until Mladic really finally escaped your authority, until

21 the moment when he refused the Vance-Owen Plan in May, you still had the

22 possibility to act. And this cannot be disputed. This is the reason why

23 I went to Belgrade, to ask you to help me have this plan executed, and

24 this is when Mladic was trying to avoid to see me, and this is what I am

25 now saying today.

1 Q. Of course. I mediated, and I don't suppose you will deny that I

2 was successful in doing so, because everything was stopped. Isn't that

3 right?

4 A. Precisely. And I was saying that precisely in this document you

5 have quoted.

6 Q. Therefore, the influence that I could have wielded, and that was a

7 political influence, was used to stop any kind of bloodshed from taking

8 place over there. I don't suppose you're disputing that. Is that right,

9 General?

10 Now, to go back to the 27th of November, 1992, and the meeting

11 with the Serb and Croatian representatives --

12 A. [No interpretation]

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: We didn't get an answer to --

14 JUDGE KWON: The witness said "Oui," but the stenographer didn't

15 get it.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, we don't have an answer to the last

17 question from you. "I don't suppose you are disputing that. Is that

18 right, General?" And the general said, "Oui." It's not on the record.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With respect to the role of

20 mediator, the one that Mr. Milosevic played, as far as I can remember when

21 I was with him in Belgrade, it is true that after that meeting with him, I

22 was able to put into action the totality of the plan, but of course this

23 proved how much political mediation during -- at the time, and that

24 Mr. Milosevic wielded authority on Mladic and influenced Mladic and the

25 Serb army of Bosnia, Bosnian Serb army.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Very well. All my political influence to stop the bloodshed seems

4 now to have taken on some negative connotation, become a negative factor

5 in that, but we'll come back to that General, in due course. In the 27th

6 of November 1992 report, with the meeting of the Serb and Croatian

7 representatives on the 26th and with the Croatians on the 27th, which you

8 sent to the command of UNPROFOR in Zagreb, you state the following in

9 point 2: "To answer your query at [In English] [Previous translation

10 continued]... General Bobetko admitted the presence of Croatian forces in

11 B and H. Admitted the presence of Croatian forces in B and H.

12 "A. General Bobetko frequently referred to only withdrawing

13 Croatian forces once Croatian territory was no longer under attack and

14 once the international community has guaranteed its borders and territory.

15 "B. In response to direct question, he refused to admitted he had

16 any forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17 "C. This obvious inconsistency was not pursued as it was obvious

18 to all parties that General Bobetko does have troops in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was willing to discuss practical details in the

20 interests of pursuing peace but was not willing to acknowledge their

21 presence formally."

22 [Interpretation] Therefore, half a year after this report by

23 Boutros-Ghali of the 30th of May, where he says the Croatian army was over

24 there, the official army of Croatia still kept under control part of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Isn't at that right, General Morillon?

1 A. Yes. I denounced that. I was present to keep, and it was never

2 easy to stay as impartial as possible, and I said that we had information

3 which led us to believe that the Croatian army was still present in part.

4 But it had exactly the same answers as the answer you gave today, which

5 was to say: But not at all, those are the forces of Mate Boban, HDZ, et

6 cetera. If you want me to say that in this business not only Serbs were

7 responsible, well, I've said it from the beginning. I refuse to see the

8 Serbs demonised, and I bore witness to this everywhere, and I said most of

9 these men and women were in good faith. There were men and women of

10 goodwill who had been, unfortunately, driven into these killings which

11 tore apart Bosnia for so many years. It was those who led them into this

12 drama which, according to me, are responsible and should be condemned.

13 There were some in Zagreb, and this is what -- what you want me to say;

14 there were some in Sarajevo too.

15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Groome, do we have this report in

16 our tabs?

17 MR. GROOME: No, Your Honour.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, that is the 27th of 1992,

19 sent to the UNPROFOR command in Zagreb, R0046647 is the number, and then

20 it says: "To answer your query," et cetera, et cetera, at ref. A, whether

21 General Bobetko, et cetera, what I read out.

22 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I be of

23 assistance?

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] All this that Mr. Milosevic is

1 presenting to the witness, General Morillon, is in fact or, rather, is

2 pursuant to Rule 66, and I think Mr. Milosevic has this in front of him.

3 All the information and data are questions and answers from the 19th of

4 November, 1999, which General Morillon gave to the Supreme Court in Paris.

5 That is his statement, a very complete one, and all that information is

6 contained there. And as far as I can see, there is an English version and

7 a French version, and we were disclosed that a long time ago, and those

8 are the documents that Mr. Milosevic is referring to.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is helpful, and perhaps the Prosecution will

10 be in a position to locate it now.

11 MR. GROOME: We're getting a copy of it now, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Very well. Now, in that statement, and I'm quoting you again,

15 General, you say the following amongst others: "To all parties it was

16 obvious that General Bobetko really did have units in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

17 And you go on to explain that it was the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina which

18 was north of Dubrovnik.

19 Now, tell me please, General, how many soldiers of the Republic of

20 Croatia were there? How much -- many forces did it have and how many were

21 there generally in Bosnia-Herzegovina during that period of time?

22 A. No, I can't give you any figure, because there once again it was

23 in the presentation given by the Croatians themselves to protect

24 Dubrovnik. So indeed it was this zone in the north, very much up north,

25 from which they allege once again they were going to ensure their defence.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 How many there were, I can't tell you, I don't know.

2 We had relations in this region of Dubrovnik when the JNA

3 withdrew, when we negotiated precisely with Bobetko the withdrawal. We

4 had some observers deployed but nothing which allows me to give figures

5 about the volume of forces. And I'm not saying at all that there was

6 Croatian forces who were present during all the crisis period.

7 Q. Well, there are facts and figures about that. If you can't

8 remember now, we'll find them quite easily. But you mention in your

9 report members of the armed forces from Sandzak who were deployed around

10 the airport and who were controlled by the Presidency, that is to say

11 Izetbegovic. And you know that what you call Sandzak is in fact a region

12 in Serbia where there is a significant concentration of the Muslim

13 population. And I assume you also know --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, not to have to wait

16 for the OTP to provide this document, we have the entire statement in

17 French, and that could help the general when discussing this matter with

18 Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. But I can perfectly see what

20 it's about, Your Honour. Of course November. It was this negotiation

21 which was in progress for the withdrawal of the JNA from the Dalmatian

22 coast and from the Dubrovnik region. So I'm not at all contesting what

23 Mr. Milosevic has said.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]...

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No, Your Honour.

1 We were talking about Sandzak, Mr. Milosevic.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Well, yes. And since that's a region in Serbia, there were many

4 volunteers from Sandzak in the army of the Bosnian Muslims. So can you

5 tell me, General Morillon, how many Muslims there were from Serbia who

6 fought on the side of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period you were there?

7 Because you mention the ones who were around the airport in Sarajevo and

8 so on and so forth.

9 A. We called them the Sandzaki. There were some units which, like

10 militias, probably several hundred but not much more. They were

11 essentially, the Sandzak were deployed in the region of Srebrenica, and

12 you know it, Mr. Milosevic. How many? I can't tell you. I never counted

13 them. But we knew that there were among those who fought against each

14 other, including targeting us when we were in the crossfire, taken in the

15 crossfire, and this was the fate more or less permanently of our blue

16 helmets. Some Sandzakis, and there was probably later, but you were going

17 to tell me about that, some Mujahedin, yes.

18 Q. Tell me, please, then, do you know about the participation of

19 foreigners in that so-called army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially those

20 fundamentalists -- fundamentally inclined from the different countries,

21 the so-called Mujahedin or the warriors of the jihad, for example?

22 A. They were active essentially in the region of Vitez. There was

23 there practically a brigade. And there again I didn't count them, I

24 couldn't, but yes, indeed, I saw them in action. It was shortly before I

25 left the territory. They were really present with a certain number and

1 active, to my knowledge, only as from year 1993. They were not there

2 originally at the beginning of action.

3 Q. So only as of 1993.

4 Now, I have here, and of course at that time you weren't -- you

5 couldn't have known that, but I have here, for example, an indictment in

6 the USA against Zacarias Moussaoui in that particular case before the

7 District Court of Eastern Virginia for associating in order to perform

8 terrorist acts outside the borders where it says that the Al Qaeda

9 functioned from various jihad groups in different countries, including

10 Bosnia --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, stop. What's the relevance of

12 that?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the relevance of that,

14 Mr. Robinson, is that at that time Al Qaeda was active in

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because it says here, and this is a document, an

16 original document, United States District Court for the District of

17 Virginia, indictment, conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending

18 national boundaries. And the background is Al Qaeda, and then in point 4

19 it says that Al Qaeda functioned both on its own and through some

20 terrorist organisations that operated under its umbrella, including [In

21 English] Islamic jihad at the times the Islamic group, et cetera, et

22 cetera, [Interpretation] and various countries are mentioned.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to stop you. In the Chamber's view

24 it's not sufficiently relevant. Move to another topic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. You said, General, that the siege of Sarajevo started once the

3 siege of the Marsal Tito barracks took place. So it wasn't the desire to

4 effect a siege over Sarajevo, it was a provoked reaction, in fact; is that

5 right?

6 A. Initially, yes, but when I came back on the spot and that's what I

7 was supposed to talk about because a mandate, a term of office was given

8 to me, in that territory of Bosnia, the first thing I did was to meet

9 Karadzic and tell him, Mr. President, if you wish, as you say, to have

10 peace because you know everybody is now alleging they want peace, you have

11 to lift the siege of Sarajevo. I arrived in October before deciding to

12 take my quarters in Sarajevo. I even proposed to have my headquarters in

13 Ilidza, in those hotels of Bosnia if you let me in there. Then you would

14 have given obviously the proof that you are accepting to lift the siege of

15 Sarajevo.

16 Karadzic, when I met him, was ready, but Mladic opposed this. So

17 let us not start simply from what actually happened originally, and as we

18 always do. I'm here to testify to what I have seen during my command

19 period.

20 Q. Yes. I make that same suggestion. And that's why I'm asking you.

21 In your statement you yourself say that the Serbs had the advantage with

22 respect to heavy weaponry and the Muslims had the advantage with respect

23 to their numbers and infantry; is that right? That is your observation.

24 And you go on to say that Izetbegovic was fully conscious of the danger

25 linked to lifting the siege to which his Presidency would be exposed to

1 once the siege was lifted. That's what you say.

2 A. Yes. But it wasn't Izetbegovic who opposed to the lifting of the

3 siege. It was Karadzic and Mladic. So let us not reverse the order of

4 the fact that Karadzic was aware of the fact that if the siege of Sarajevo

5 were lifted, there would be a total haemorrhage and everybody in their

6 conditions of life that were theirs would only have one idea, and I think

7 he was right, which was to flee this city owing to the fact that there

8 were the unfortunate people who were besieged were living like rats in

9 holes.

10 So the one who is responsible, and don't try and make me say

11 something else, of continuing the siege was not Karadzic, it was Mladic.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: The legal officer.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. I'm not trying to make you say anything, General. I am just

15 asking you questions, and it is up to you to answer them as you will.

16 In his book, Lord Owen, who as you know was involved for a long

17 time in the peace negotiations, he says: "In Sarajevo, it became

18 increasingly clear that in fact there were two sieges of the town, one

19 which was implemented by the Bosnian Serb army with shells, sniper fire

20 and blockades, and another by the army of the Bosnian government which

21 prevented their people from leaving through internal blockades and

22 bureaucratic complications. Able-bodied men from 18 to 65 and women from

23 18 to 60 were not allowed to leave because they were essential for the

24 defence of the town, but their main reason was a different one. The Serb

25 siege in the propaganda war evoked compassion on the part of the world,

1 and that is why they needed the elderly and the children to remain. That

2 was their most emotional propaganda weapon to draw the Americans into the

3 war, and they didn't want that to weaken."

4 And I quoted Lord Owen from his book. It follows from this that

5 the Serb forces around Sarajevo did not prevent people leaving Sarajevo,

6 because if they did, there would have been no need for any prohibitions on

7 the part of the BH army. They would have no meaning. Isn't that right,

8 General?

9 A. Well, I am not denying what Lord Owen may have written. I'm sure

10 when he testified here he answered those questions. What I experienced

11 was that I took responsibility in Sarajevo on the basis of an agreement

12 that was reached with the Serb forces and regarding the airport, that was

13 placed at our disposal. Afterwards, it was used and crossed, and I

14 repeat, the person who really opposed lifting the siege of Sarajevo was

15 when I made such suggestions to set up house in Ilidza, was Karadzic under

16 the influence of General Mladic. There were no others.

17 That the Bosniaks used the presence of their population, as you

18 have just said, to keep the attention of the world focused on their

19 situation, it is true, but similarly they prevented the evacuation from

20 Srebrenica. If that is what you wanted me to say, yes, that is right.

21 They refused to admit, at least officially, ethnic cleansing, and that is

22 how things happened.

23 But I tried to convince Karadzic that it was in his interest

24 precisely to contradict this propaganda. It was in his interest to lift

25 the siege. And I told him on endless occasions that by doing this he

1 would --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, exactly on that point, we have

3 sufficiently explored the question of who opposed and who supported the

4 lifting of the siege.

5 Move to another topic, Mr. Milosevic.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General, in your statement, you refer to the freedom on the

8 freedom -- the agreement on the freedom of movement of civilians concluded

9 at Sarajevo airport on the 13th of December, 1992, within the framework of

10 the mixed working group. With regard to this agreement that envisaged

11 three corridors for the movement of civilians from Sarajevo under

12 supervision of UNPROFOR, you say, I quote: "The Presidency accepted the

13 agreement with hesitation, which guaranteed freedom of movement for

14 individuals after this demand was made by the Serbs and they were joined

15 by the Croats."

16 So this statement of yours confirms what Owen said. And then you

17 also say in your statement: "Not more than several thousand people were

18 evacuated after the signing of that agreement. There were 20 buses of

19 Serbs and Croats, and to the best of my recollection, there were even a

20 few Slovenes. The Serbs were evacuated via Lukavica, and some Croats.

21 However, the Presidency did not allow a single Muslim to leave Sarajevo."

22 Not a single. Those are your words. So obviously the need for

23 the means of propaganda was to sacrifice members of their own people for

24 propaganda purposes. Is that right, General? You say the Presidency

25 would not allow a single Muslim to leave Sarajevo.

1 A. Maybe I didn't put it quite like that. At least I remember very

2 well the difficult negotiations we had, like all the others that I had

3 during my term there. And the evacuation allowed Slovenes to leave as

4 well, you're quite right about that, among others. Also Serbs who wanted

5 to leave.

6 I'm not denying. I'm accepting the fact that it was not in the

7 interest of the Bosnian Presidency and Izetbegovic to allow the town to be

8 deprived of its population, and I quite agree with that.

9 Q. As you've said that you didn't quite put it like that, please

10 believe me, I quoted you verbatim, and that is what is written on this

11 page 0108104 of your statement. At the very top in the Serbian

12 translation the sentence reads: "However, the Presidency would not allow

13 a single Muslim to leave Sarajevo." And I quoted the rest of the text a

14 moment ago.

15 A. Unfortunately, at that point in time when we opened those

16 corridors, and that was basically at the request of the Serb side, the

17 siege was not really lifted in the hills around Sarajevo. There was still

18 people manning the batteries, and they were Serbs, and that is what

19 actually happened. And I think it was a serious political error on the

20 part of Karadzic not to understand to what extent he needed to open the

21 door. I suggested to him that to create a kind of Vatican in Ilidza for

22 the UN so that we could regulate things over there, but this could not be

23 done.

24 Q. General, that is another matter. I am just at this point not

25 talking about that.

1 In your statement about -- in your statement in Paris, when you

2 referred to the devices used by the Presidency headed by Izetbegovic, I am

3 quoting you now, you say: "The aim of the Presidency from the very outset

4 was to ensure the intervention of international forces for their own

5 benefit, and that is one of the reasons why they never were inclined to

6 engage in talks. In those days, the Serbs were ready for talks since they

7 considered that they were winning. Whenever such an agreement was signed

8 on humanitarian corridors, the problems came from the Presidency.

9 Finally, the corridors would be accepted. The beginning of their

10 implementation was to be the withdrawal of heavy weapons, which should

11 have taken place at 1700 hours on the 24th of December. However, on that

12 day, my residence in Sarajevo was shelled. The shell was fired by the

13 Bosnian forces. That is quite certain."

14 These are your words: "The position of the Presidency was highly

15 delicate. They had been defeated on the battlefield, and it is quite

16 certain that in the strategic sense so far as the war was concerned, at

17 least, it is considered normal for the Presidency to reject a major step

18 towards peace." That is what you said. And they even shelled your

19 residence just when peace was to have been ensured, and they did not wish

20 to make that step towards peace.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you have been speaking for some

22 time without directing a question to the witness. Do so now.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will, Mr. Robinson. You're quite

24 right. I have been speaking for some time, you're quite right, but I was

25 quoting General Morillon.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. So can we infer that the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed

3 by Alija Izetbegovic, was ready to resort to the most radical means,

4 including this one you mentioned, and I'm quoting you, "to achieve their

5 strategic goals"?

6 A. Mr. Milosevic, there was a war. Izetbegovic had lost just then.

7 He had lost. And Mladic had realised almost all his objectives, only he

8 didn't manage to enter Sarajevo and to cut it in two as he wanted to to

9 make his capital there. So Izetbegovic had no other recourse at that

10 time, in my opinion. But I'm not passing judgement. He had only the

11 possibility of defending himself with whatever means he had at his

12 disposal. And he was not in a position to strategically win a battle.

13 You know when the Vance-Owen Plan was about to be implemented, you

14 accepted it, and Mladic, when he did his coup at the parliament in Pale,

15 he showed two maps, one showing the conquest of the territory that he had

16 managed to capture through the blood and sweat of his soldiers, and

17 another map corresponding to the Vance-Owen Plan, which was of course less

18 important.

19 So regarding the period we are talking about, I did everything at

20 the time as the mandate I had was to try and establish peace. If you want

21 me to say that it was not in Izetbegovic's interest to comply, I agree.

22 Q. But he rejected peace, in fact.

23 A. He rejected -- he rejected defeat, abdication.

24 Q. Now, this mentioned incident, the shelling of your residence, when

25 you say that it was quite clear that it had been done by Muslim forces,

1 did the Muslim side try to attribute that incident to the Serb side? Do

2 you remember that?

3 A. No. They didn't even try, because I had the proof by analysing

4 the crater that the shot had come from areas under Muslim control.

5 Mr. Milosevic, as we're talking about this whole period, a little

6 time after that I received an American senator, and he asked me, "Where

7 are the good guys?" And I said unfortunately there are no good guys and

8 bad guys; they're all bad guys. Caught in this infernal cycle they had no

9 other means on all sides. They didn't have the ability to act in a

10 different manner. That's all that I can say. At the time, my

11 headquarters was shelled, true.

12 Q. But in addition to propaganda reasons, were there military reasons

13 also behind this position that we are now talking about, that is the

14 position of the Muslim Presidency and Izetbegovic? Did they have, in

15 addition to propaganda aims, certain military aims?

16 A. Yes. That was more or less the only territory they held under

17 their control. It was symbolic. The whole world had their eyes focused

18 on Sarajevo, you're right. And therefore, Izetbegovic couldn't, and I

19 believe that quite sincerely, he couldn't let Sarajevo be emptied of its

20 inhabitants. If that's what you mean, you're right.

21 Q. General, could we please focus on facts, because we don't have

22 much time. If the whole picture of the city as a victim --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, as you mentioned time, I am to say

24 that at the break at 12.15, when we resume, you will have 12 minutes more

25 to complete the two hours.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I really believe that

2 this is a very important witness, and I already requested that you let me

3 question him until the end of the day today, because I assume General

4 Morillon, who is very fit, wouldn't mind staying here until a quarter to

5 two.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, regrettably, it doesn't depend on

7 General Morillon's fitness. When your time is up, we'll make an

8 assessment. Continue.

9 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Groome, the statements Mr. Milosevic is

10 referring to is the different one from what we have in front of us, a

11 different witness statement.

12 MR. GROOME: It's an official record of interview done by Paris

13 authorities in 1999. If the Court wishes, I can have copies procured

14 after the break.

15 JUDGE KWON: The witness should have it in front of him, and if

16 Mr. Milosevic -- Mr. Milosevic, is it your intention that you wish to

17 exhibit that statement into --

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assumed that what accompanied the

19 oral statement of General Morillon, that his written statement is part of

20 the record. It is R0184013.

21 JUDGE KWON: It's okay. Then the Chamber would like to have them

22 in front of us, please.

23 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. Your Honour, I do have a copy, but

24 if the Court will give me a few minutes to check that we have the

25 entirety.

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please go on, Mr. Milosevic.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kwon.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. If the overall picture, General Morillon, of the town as a victim

5 undermined the Serb position internationally, can it be said that it was

6 not in the Serbs' interest to keep Sarajevo under siege, but quite the

7 contrary, if you're considering their real interest?

8 A. Yes, but unfortunately they didn't understand that.

9 Q. But let me ask you a few questions about that. Could they perhaps

10 have had to keep the town under siege, and I'm asking you as an

11 experienced general -- let me explain my question. In Sarajevo, the

12 Bosnian army had its 1st Sarajevo Corps and the headquarters were in the

13 centre of town of that corps. And the Serbs had, on the edges, the

14 Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the VRS, which had its main headquarters in

15 Lukavica. So both sides had a corps each in Sarajevo or around Sarajevo.

16 You're aware of that, aren't you, General?

17 A. Yes. And they confronted one another occasionally around the

18 city, one corps against the other.

19 Q. Now, had the Serbs withdrawn their army that was deployed around

20 Sarajevo, in parts of Sarajevo under Serb control, what would have the

21 Muslim army done?

22 Let me just tell you that I wish to quote David Owen again from

23 his book when he says: "I answered that when talking about lifting the

24 siege, Juppe is not right and that he has over-simplified the situation.

25 The parts of Sarajevo under Serb control, such as Grbavica, will not

1 surrender their heavy weapons unless through negotiations they get

2 guarantees from the UN that the more numerous Muslim infantry will not run

3 them over. Only through more detailed negotiations can obstacles be

4 removed on the sniper routes and along the confrontation lines. The

5 removal of heavy weapons is precious, but on its own it will not end the

6 siege."

7 So it follows from this quotation that the Serb forces around

8 Sarajevo could not withdraw even if they wanted to because they would have

9 allowed a Muslim military offensive from Sarajevo itself, and this would

10 have been an offensive by an entire corps. Did you see things similarly

11 to the way Lord Owen saw them?

12 A. Lord Owen was not present in Sarajevo as I was, though he visited

13 it regularly. He didn't have knowledge of all the elements. Clearly, in

14 the negotiations that were engaged in to open these corridors and to

15 achieve the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo that we're talking about, the

16 guarantees should have been given to accompany this request regarding the

17 surrender of heavy weapons, and those guarantees should have been provided

18 by the international community. But that was not an opportunity for the

19 Bosniaks to start offensives or attacks. Grbavica, for example, or in

20 Ilidza that you mentioned.

21 Unfortunately, I have to say here that I obtained in a regular

22 manner announcements of goodwill, decisions on a cease-fire, of a truce,

23 but these were all undermined, and this applied to all.

24 To answer your question, if the siege had been lifted, as we were

25 trying to achieve, it was with a view to implementing the Vance-Owen Plan.

1 That was the perspective, the perspective of demilitarisation of Sarajevo.

2 And that demilitarisation would involve the demilitarisation of the

3 Bosniak forces themselves and not just the removal of heavy weapons.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, in quoting from Lord

5 Owen's book, which has been exhibited, you said, and it didn't come out on

6 the record, that he said somebody is not right and has over simplified the

7 situation. Who is the person that was referred to, and give us the page.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Int