1 Thursday, 15 January 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 WITNESS: ANTE MARKOVIC [Resumed]

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Markovic, thank you for returning to continue your

9 evidence. There's no need, of course, to take any formal oath or anything

10 of that sort. You took one earlier. There are three hours left of

11 cross-examination of the accused. We will, of course, have the usual

12 breaks. If at any time you would like to have a brief, do say so, a brief

13 pause, of course just mention it, but we would normally have the first

14 break in about an hour and a half.

15 There will be three hours, as I say, ordered for his

16 cross-examination. There will then be, I trust fairly limited, some

17 questions from the amicus and also from the Prosecution, but we have, we

18 understood, to take this position, that one way or another the evidence

19 will finish today.

20 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something, please? Is it

22 permissible or customary? I owe you an answer to your question and your

23 request regarding where and with whom and how Mr. Milosevic established

24 control over individual people and thus changed their opinion.

25 I thought this question over, though I don't have any original

1 documents with me, but on the basis of my notes and my own memories, I

2 remembered certain instances which I wish to convey to you.

3 The first case is that of Mr. Ivan Stambolic. When the time came

4 for Mr. Ivan Stambolic to be re-elected to his position, Mr. Milosevic

5 spoke to me to the effect that Stambolic should not be proposed for

6 re-election. I discussed the matter with my associates in the government

7 who were from Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the first place with Aco Mitrovic and

8 with Gacic as well. Both of them were of the opinion that Ivan Stambolic

9 was doing so well in his new position that people in the economy,

10 businessmen, have a lot of respect for him and felt that he was doing a

11 very good job.

12 After Mr. Milosevic had spoken to these people and sent a letter

13 to the Federal Executive Council, that is the government, saying that Ivan

14 Stambolic should not be re-elected and that Serbia did not agree with such

15 a suggestion - and this letter was signed by Mr. Milosevic - then both

16 these gentlemen changed their opinion, and both of them started persuading

17 me that we should not allow Ivan Stambolic to be re-elected general

18 manager of the Yugoslav Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In spite

19 of this and in spite of the pressure they made and despite the fact that

20 Ivan Gacic was the person who, at the 8th session of the Central Committee

21 of the League of Communists of Serbia had supported Ivan Stambolic and as

22 a result has lost his position as Secretary-General of the League of

23 Communists of Yugoslavia, regardless, therefore, of the fact that he was a

24 very close friend and associate of Ivan Stambolic, he felt that he should

25 vote against his re-election to the position of general manager of the

1 Yugoslav Bank for International Economic Cooperation.

2 These are the examples that I could recollect. There are others,

3 but perhaps not so convincing that I would be able to explain for you.

4 There's something else that I wanted to add.

5 Mr. Milosevic, as he himself said, came with some old documents

6 from my former office which say and which testify to all the things that I

7 had done during the three years that I was in Belgrade, and he said with

8 satisfaction, "Where did we meet? Let Mr. Markovic tell us." I looked

9 through my notes, and fortunately I managed to find a note saying that we

10 did meet when I had said. I said that it was three or four weeks prior to

11 my departure from Belgrade. I left Belgrade on the 21st of December, and

12 the meeting with Milosevic was on the 21st of November. So that is quite

13 in conformity with what I had said, three or four weeks.

14 Something else that I managed to establish was that there had been

15 another meeting prior to that, that is about a month prior to this

16 meeting, and it had to do with the bombing of the Banski Dvori where

17 Mr. Tudjman, Mesic, and I were. I forgot to mention this in the

18 investigation or in the interview. Mr. Milosevic can check this out as he

19 has the documents. I don't have them. It doesn't say what we discussed,

20 but at least it says when it is that we met.

21 Thank you.

22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. May. I hope that the

24 time used by Mr. Markovic for his explanations will be subtracted from the

25 time planned for me.

1 JUDGE MAY: Your time begins now. So let us get on with it.

2 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

3 Q. [Interpretation] I must say, however, that this fact about a

4 meeting between you and me on the 21st of November, you didn't see that in

5 the review of your duties but that you found this in some notes you had.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So in the review of your duties, in the schedule, this meeting is

8 not mentioned.

9 A. Please look and see whether this meeting took place in November.

10 Q. This was the year 1991, and this is a schedule of your

11 obligations. I don't have that on me any more. I've handed it over.

12 Unfortunately, I didn't make a photocopy, but that doesn't change things.

13 It is quite clear that towards the end of the year, we did not meet.

14 A. It is quite clear that we did meet, and this can be checked from

15 that document. I don't know. The Court has it or the Prosecutor. That

16 can easily be verified that this meeting took place in my office on the

17 21st of November, which is four weeks prior to my departure from Belgrade.

18 Q. Very well. Did you come to see me or did I come to see you?

19 A. No, no. I came to see you, and I think I stayed for about two and

20 a half to three hours.

21 Q. Very well. But that again is different from what you said before,

22 because you say -- you've said that you had come to see me prior to your

23 departure. In fact, you now say it was a month prior to your departure?

24 A. I'm not changing my statement. In my statement I said that I came

25 to see you three or four weeks prior to leaving Belgrade.

1 Q. Very well. Let us continue where we broke off last time. In that

2 brief cross-examination, we covered the facts regarding your

3 responsibility for the war in Slovenia.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the stenographic notes that

5 we reviewed previously, that is the session of the 21st of August,

6 beginning at 11.00 in 1991, the first page ends with 082, ERN number 082.

7 I received it from the opposite side, and these stenographic notes clearly

8 show Mr. Markovic's responsibilities for the war in Slovenia, and could it

9 be tendered into evidence, please?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say anything in that

11 connection?

12 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Let's get this document. We'll find

13 it.

14 Mr. Nice, perhaps you can assist us on that matter. It doesn't

15 appear to have been a document provided already. Yes. We'll get a copy

16 from the accused and see what it is.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't give you this copy now.

18 This is the copy that I received from the opposite side. You can get it

19 from them, because I wanted to refer to it again in continuation of my

20 cross-examination with reference to the war in Slovenia.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

22 MR. NICE: I may not be able to provide it immediately. I will do

23 my best --

24 JUDGE MAY: Give us the date again, Mr. Milosevic, and give us the

25 details of it.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is a session of the Presidency,

2 which was expanded in composition, attended by us from the republics, held

3 on the 21st of August, 1991, and these are stenographic notes, and the

4 first page has the ERN number 00526082. That is the first page, the ERN

5 on the first page. And the last page ends with numbers 204. That is the

6 document that we reviewed last time.

7 I wish to remind you that on the page with the number 244 of these

8 minutes, 00526137, the president of Slovenia at the time, Milan Kucan,

9 says in response to Mr. Markovic: "I don't need to persuade you that you

10 will not find anyone in Slovenia, including these two, that is members of

11 the federal government who will return to the Federal Executive Council

12 and work there." SIV, S-I-V, which means the Federal Executive Council.

13 It is a SIV which is known in Slovenia to have started the war in

14 Slovenia.

15 So that is what we quoted. And why, in addition to other excerpts

16 that I don't have time to go into now because we covered them, but this is

17 the reason why I wish to tender this document into evidence as an exhibit.

18 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let's deal with one thing at a time.

19 Let's deal with the Prosecution. Do you think you can find that in the

20 meantime?

21 MR. NICE: We can certainly find it. It won't take very long, and

22 we'll make it available and have it produced.

23 JUDGE MAY: Clearly, if you're going to ask Mr. Markovic any

24 questions, he must have the opportunity of seeing what the document is.

25 Now, the most sensible course - and it may be well that it will be

1 exhibited - the most sensible course may well be to find this document.

2 JUDGE KWON: I find some page numbers the accused referred to are

3 matching with the page numbers of Exhibit 427, tab 6, but if the

4 Prosecution can check it later.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will do that, and it may well be that we will

6 admit it, but we need first of all to check it.

7 Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 Yes, Mr. Markovic. If you want to add something, you can.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In any event, Mr. Milosevic

10 extracted a segment from the evolution of relations. Relations from the

11 beginning when I joined the federal government between Slovenia and

12 Serbia, or Serbia and Slovenia, and also between Milosevic and Kucan were

13 extremely tense. In the final analysis, Serbia blocked all goods that

14 were due to come from Bosnia to Serbia long before the war. All economic

15 relations were suspended.

16 Serbia also organised - and that means Milosevic - the visit of a

17 large group of people, most of them highly radical, to go to Bosnia and to

18 organise a rally there, a popular rally, and Slovenia prevented this.

19 There was constant conflict over the problem of Kosovo and what

20 was going on in Kosovo, so that in that context, if you review events and

21 the war in Slovenia, it becomes quite clear that this was only a marginal

22 aspect of what had happened until then as well as what happened after that

23 when the decision was taken to pull out the army from Slovenia, and who

24 took that decision and who immediately agreed with that decision prior to

25 that. And it is absolutely not true that the Federal Executive Council

1 took such a decision. I'm speaking from memory as I don't have the

2 document now. It says clearly that the federal Secretariat for Internal

3 Affairs would organise supervision over those facilities in Slovenia which

4 were in their possession and that to do so they would use units which the

5 army has deployed along the border, border units.

6 The soldiers that were in Slovenia in the so-called Slovenian war,

7 were not in the border barracks but soldiers that came out of their

8 barracks with tanks and cannon. Therefore, someone else had taken the

9 decision to use military force to pull them out of the barracks under full

10 military gear. Such a decision was not taken by the Federal Executive

11 Council nor could it have been taken by it, because if it could, then the

12 federal Presidency would not have tortured itself and had endless meetings

13 over the possibility of using the army. Such permission was never

14 granted. And that is why it was felt that the Presidency was incapable of

15 functioning in such a situation, and that is why efforts were made to

16 topple the Presidency, and even through me to disband that Presidency and

17 to use me to carry out a kind of state coup as proposed by Kadijevic.

18 So what Milosevic is now saying is not right, because when the

19 decision was to be taken to withdraw the army from Slovenia, that decision

20 was in fact taken by the army, Milosevic, and Kucan. The rest of us -- I

21 had no right to vote at the Presidency, but other members of the

22 Presidency were also extremely concerned over what was happening, and from

23 there the army was transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24 I have to make myself quite clear: I was against the withdrawal

25 of the army. I wanted it to continue to be dispersed throughout the

1 country because it would have less opportunity of committing aggression if

2 it is not concentrated in one place, but this was not in my hands. I

3 couldn't take any such decision. Nowhere is there any possibility

4 envisaged for the federal government to have command over the army. It

5 was only the Presidency that could do that. Who negotiated with Kadijevic

6 in the Presidency for the troops to come out of the barracks, I don't

7 know, but it was never officially reported anywhere.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Markovic, that is the whole point. Even the president of the

10 Presidency at the time, Jovic, was not aware of your intervention in

11 Slovenia. So what you're now telling us at great length, quite

12 unnecessarily, is absolutely untrue. And to prove that to you, I will

13 quote from you this same stenographic report. It is on page 247 of that

14 report. The last digits of the ERN number are 6140. And trying to

15 respond to accusations against you by Kucan and others and myself to the

16 effect that you had provoked the war in Slovenia, you even quote from your

17 own decision, and you say yourself: "The Federal Executive Council took a

18 decision on the implementation of federal regulations regarding the state

19 border in Slovenia," et cetera.

20 And then in the next paragraph, you say, and you quote from that

21 decision: "Immediate enforcement of federal regulations will be achieved

22 by the federal Ministry of the Interior in direct cooperation with the

23 federal Secretariat for National Defence so as to engage border units of

24 the JNA to secure the state border at border crossings and in inhabited

25 areas in the border belt."

1 So it was by your decision that you obliged your two federal

2 ministries, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National

3 Defence, to intervene in Slovenia. No one else knew about it, not even

4 the Presidency of the SFRY.

5 A. That is not so. You read out correctly this segment. The police

6 of Yugoslavia was meant to get the cooperation of border units, those

7 protecting the border and who do not have tanks or cannon but only light

8 weapons, and to carry this out in cooperation with them.

9 In the first place, that was not done. Neither the police nor the

10 border units took part, but those that did take part were tanks and cannon

11 and units that came out of the garrison. There were even units that came

12 from Croatia. There were units from Istria, units from the surroundings

13 of Zagreb. Therefore, someone had taken that decision. These were not

14 border units but military units from several garrisons. We know that even

15 some generals had problems afterwards because they had taken people along

16 a 200-kilometre-long journey to reach Slovenia. No one else could have

17 taken such a decision except the person who had the army under full

18 control. And it was you, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, that had full control of

19 the army.

20 Q. That is not right, Mr. Ante Markovic. You were the federal Prime

21 Minister. You had the army under your control. And as for communication

22 with the military leadership, in your schedule of responsibilities you can

23 see how many times you met with the military or police leadership in the

24 course of 1991 and how you acted as the most responsible person, as the

25 president of the federal government of SFRY.

1 And as regards what you said about my especially tense

2 relationship --

3 JUDGE MAY: The witness must have the occasion to answer,

4 particularly important points which are made. The witness must have the

5 answer -- chance to answer the allegations.

6 Mr. Markovic, you've heard what the accused alleges. Perhaps you

7 would care to respond, however briefly.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I do not have all the

9 documents that Mr. Milosevic has, and I am completely in an inferior

10 position because I was unable to get anything from my office whereas he

11 got everything. However, certain things are abundantly clear.

12 If the government had been able to make decisions on how to use

13 the army, then it would have been unnecessary to hold multiple sessions of

14 the Presidency of Yugoslavia and take votes on using the army to calm the

15 situation down in Yugoslavia. The Presidency discussed umpteen times, as

16 well as at the closed sessions of the joint staff, this issue, and if the

17 government had been able to decide on this, nobody would have bothered

18 with the Presidency. So this is a blatant lie.

19 We didn't stand a chance in all this affair. We had no

20 communications with the army. If there had been communication between the

21 government and the army and General Kadijevic who was in charge of the

22 army and as such was accountable to the government, but in actual fact, he

23 as a commander was completely subjected to the Presidency. The Federal

24 Executive Council had nothing to do with it.

25 I repeat, you can take original documents and read them. The only

1 function according to which the army, or in this case General Kadijevic

2 were a member of the army, were in terms of finance and administration.

3 The federal government had no other competence over the army.

4 And I would like to say once again, as far as Slovenia is

5 concerned, units from garrisons with cannons, tanks, and other equipment

6 were used, even units from the environs of Zagreb and from Croatia were

7 used. And the phrasing in the decision of the federal government was that

8 units that were already stationed on the border crossings should be used

9 in cooperation with the police using only light weapons. But none of this

10 was implemented. What was effected was an invasion. Who could have

11 allowed this -- built this?

12 In March 1990 when a huge number of people came out into the

13 streets of Belgrade, over 100.000, to demonstrate against Mr. Milosevic,

14 somebody decided to bring out tanks to stop them. Who was able to

15 sanction this? Everything was done as it was done.

16 Of course, formally Mr. Milosevic did not take this decision, but

17 in actual fact he did. He was behind that, and he was behind what

18 happened in Sarajevo.

19 JUDGE MAY: Just help us with this so we can follow and make sure

20 it's clear, and if you could keep the answers short, please.

21 Did you have any control at all over the army?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, none.

23 JUDGE MAY: Did you have direct -- any communication with the

24 army?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did. I said, in

1 administrative terms and financial terms, I did have contact with the

2 army. Everything else was under the command of the Presidency of

3 Yugoslavia.

4 JUDGE MAY: Were you in a position to get the army to do anything

5 or to ask them to do anything? Were they prepared to do it? Did you have

6 any control over them at all.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No. So help me God, no.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Markovic, what you're saying, is -- would

9 that be confirmed by the constitutional system?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Completely in accordance, in

11 conformity with the constitutional system. Anyway, it's very logical.

12 The army was financed from the budget of Yugoslavia. The budget of

13 Yugoslavia was under the control of the Federal Executive Council.

14 One item of this budget related to the army, and that was

15 practically the only communication between the army and the federal

16 government. There was no command or control communication, no information

17 as to where units were deployed was given to the government, because that

18 was not within our purview. Specialised functions of the army came under

19 the exclusive competence of the Presidency, and the Presidency held many,

20 many sessions to decide where and how the army would be used. All, all of

21 them.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Well, Mr. Markovic, that is precisely the point. It is not in

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1 dispute that under the constitution only the Presidency of Yugoslavia has

2 the right to command the army, but in the instance of the war in Slovenia,

3 which Kucan himself says was caused by the Federal Executive Council, it

4 is obvious that you had abused and usurped the function of the Prime

5 Minister of Yugoslavia, bypassing the constitution, because you are

6 quoting your own decision in this shorthand notes when you say that: "In

7 the implementation of this decision, the Federal Executive Council will

8 immediately cooperate, directly cooperate with the federal Ministry for

9 National Defence in order to engage also the border units of the JNA."

10 Therefore, with this decision of the government, you directly

11 engage both the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of the

12 Interior. And you are not engaging them in the financial sense as you are

13 trying to represent. On the contrary. You are talking about using JNA

14 units to carry out this decision of yours.

15 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. So the fact that the constitution says --

18 JUDGE MAY: The witness must have the chance to answer these

19 points.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, Mr. May. Would you kindly

21 refrain from switching off my microphone before my sentence is over,

22 because --

23 JUDGE MAY: No. I shall cut off your microphone at any occasion

24 when you abuse it, in particular by these over-lengthy questions which are

25 not allowing witnesses to answer. The witness must have the opportunity

1 to answer your question. You are simply to ask questions, not make

2 speeches.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Markovic.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I will have to repeat

6 what I have already said. Namely, in the conclusion it was written that

7 the police, which had full competencies, should intervene on the Slovene

8 border on behalf of the federal government and to reassert the governance

9 of the federal government, because it was still one country. And when the

10 police were doing their job on the border, they may also use certain

11 border army units which are normally deployed there anyway. There was no

12 mention of engaging army units on the border.

13 So what was written about linking up with the border units was not

14 actually -- did not actually happen, because the police never arrived on

15 the border and had no chance to link up with border units. What happened

16 was that the army came out of its border barracks and garrisons.

17 Moreover, some units from Croatia were moved in with tanks and even air

18 support. Somebody made a decision to do this. Who it was, I don't know.

19 I didn't even know that this happened, because at 4.00 a.m. in the morning

20 when all this took place, I was woken up by Milan Kucan who called me on

21 the phone and told me, "Tanks are on the march through Slovenia." I said,

22 "That's impossible. Why didn't you call the Presidency?" And Kucan says,

23 "I cannot get through to them, and I can't speak to them, I can't find a

24 common language with them anyway, but could you please try to put me

25 through to the army." And then I helped him speak with Kadijevic.

1 But I have to add one more thing. A couple of days later I

2 boarded my plane with some of my associates, although everyone including

3 Mesic, who was president of the Presidency, and the minister of foreign

4 affairs of Croatia, who met me at the airport, were begging me not to go

5 to Ljubljana, saying that I would be arrested there at the least and maybe

6 even killed. However, I still went to Slovenia to stop this completely

7 senseless war. And I think I succeeded in doing that.

8 Moreover, when the army made the decision to bomb Ljubljana, I

9 called up Kadijevic and told him, "You would then be bombing the Prime

10 Minister as well, because I'm going to Ljubljana."

11 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I just do a couple of things. The

12 exhibit that the accused was dealing with was indeed Exhibit 427, tab 6.

13 We looked at it on the last occasion, and although I see that I didn't

14 explain the problem to you, the problem is that it's only partially

15 translated into English in that exhibit.

16 The topics that the accused is raising now he actually raised on

17 the last occasion after dealing with that exhibit, and indeed the

18 questioning ended with Your Honour reminding him that we weren't directly

19 concerned with Slovenia and invited him to turn to other topics, so that

20 we parted from the exhibit at that stage. It remains only partially

21 translated into English in 427, tab 6.

22 JUDGE MAY: We seem to have moved on from that. Thank you for

23 that assistance to everybody. We'll move on.

24 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. Mr. Markovic, you mentioned heavy weaponry, tanks, artillery and

2 so on and so forth. Where was it in Slovenia that the JNA used tanks and

3 artillery? Where was tank or artillery fire used to destroy anything, to

4 kill? Do you know of a specific instance of something like that

5 happening?

6 A. I am aware of more than one instance. There were many photographs

7 of armoured unit upon armoured unit coming out into the streets of

8 Slovenia. Armoured units accompanied by cannons, among other things,

9 surrounded the airport of Ljubljana. They also landed in other cities.

10 I, who was on my way to Ljubljana --

11 Q. Mr. Markovic, could you please be more brief in answering. The

12 airport of Ljubljana was a border crossing, and they did so following your

13 decision. Isn't that so?

14 A. No, it isn't.

15 Q. So it wasn't the case that they took over the border crossing, the

16 only airport in Slovenia which is on the border, and blocked it. They

17 were doing something else. That's what you're saying. Did somebody fire

18 from these tanks?

19 A. Yes. These tanks were fired from, and there were dead,

20 casualties. Not many, but there were.

21 Moreover, when I arrived in Slovenia, I found out that a large

22 number of tank units comprising young men had gone out completely

23 unprepared, without supplies of water or food. They did not have the

24 basic supplies of food or water, and they were completely left to their

25 own devices, stranded. And it was I who organised that they get a

1 shipment of food and water.

2 And that time when I stayed for one day and one night, accompanied

3 by other people because I wasn't alone, I tried to stop this war and save

4 those people, and the result of my efforts was a success. It was a great

5 success.

6 Q. Mr. Markovic, this unfortunate war in Slovenia is your doing, and

7 that is written in these decisions. And I'm now going to ask you a

8 question relating to the alleged quarrel I had with Kucan. I never had

9 any quarrel with Kucan.

10 For instance, in these same shorthand notes, when Kucan is asking

11 for the floor, page 243, ERN number ending with 521636, he says: "I am

12 not going to be accountable to the Prime Minister," meaning you, "who now

13 that he has lost the war," he is again speaking of you, "wants to achieve

14 all this." That is in response to your advocacy of a certain programme.

15 He says three proposals were made, complete with arguments, and he

16 says that he agrees personally with the proposal and the economic plan

17 presented by Slobodan Milosevic.

18 So all this is happening after this unfortunate war where the

19 president of Slovenia is addressing you, telling you what you had done in

20 Slovenia. He's telling you that everyone in Slovenia knows that it was

21 you who caused the war. And regarding various proposals made, he agrees

22 with the one I made, not your proposal. How does that fit in with your

23 story?

24 A. It fits in very simply. Mr. Milosevic should answer this

25 question: What had gone on before this? Is it true that Mr. Milosevic

1 blocked the sale of Slovene goods in Serbia? Is it the case that

2 Mr. Milosevic had severed economic links in Slovenia back in 1990? Is it

3 also the case that Mr. Milosevic maintained other relations with Slovenia

4 which considerably deteriorated other ties between Slovenia and Serbia

5 involving Kosovo?

6 When some units came from Slovenia to -- when Slovene people

7 refused to go to Kosovo, how did Milosevic react to that?

8 It all boils down to one thing. Mr. Milosevic maintained all the

9 time relations with Slovenia that were very, very bad, and all his efforts

10 were aimed at pushing Slovenia out of Yugoslavia for all practical

11 purposes. How can Mr. Milosevic explain this? Why did Milosevic,

12 Drnovsek, Jovic, and Kadijevic agree very easily that the army should pull

13 out of Slovenia, although there was no official legal act to justify it.

14 Q. Mr. Markovic, if possible let's try to speed things up, because

15 Mr. Markovic [as interpreted] is not going to caution you by saying that

16 you're making speeches. Since you're the one who --

17 JUDGE MAY: You know, you --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.

19 JUDGE MAY: -- some 200 and -- I forget now how many witnesses

20 we're on now, 285, I think. You've allowed -- been allowed a great deal

21 of time for cross-examination, so it is not fair for you to try and

22 criticise witnesses in any way.

23 Yes. Let's go on.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May. I think that

25 the degree of protection that you afford witnesses is already a generally

1 known fact.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. In view of this decision of yours that you quoted yourself and

4 that I quoted to you only from these stenographic notes when you quoted

5 it, how can you possibly say that as regards the events in Slovenia that

6 took place on the basis of your decision were something that you heard

7 about from Kucan and that you knew nothing about before that? You passed

8 a decision. Your decision is being implemented, and you wonder over the

9 implementation of this decision when the person upon whom this decision

10 reflects calls you. Is there any logic in this, Mr. Markovic?

11 A. Yes, there is. If it is correct what I said a few minutes ago,

12 namely that the Federal Executive Council was not the one that passed this

13 decision. Somebody else passed this decision, as was indeed was the case.

14 Somebody else did pass this decision.

15 The extent to which you personally were involved in this is

16 something I cannot say, but your relationship with General Kadijevic is

17 very well known. At that time he was already doing everything in

18 agreement with you.

19 Q. That's not true.

20 A. The real perpetrator is not here. The real perpetrator sits where

21 you are sitting. And who then wanted to discredit the federal Prime

22 Minister who was the only one who still had some kind of a reputation and

23 who still had some support in the western world? This was a chance to

24 discredit him. So that is Mr. Milosevic. That is what he did through

25 Mr. Kadijevic. And that has nothing to do with the conclusions adopted by

1 the Federal Executive Council. That directly pertained only to the

2 borders that are protected by the police, and a border unit was supposed

3 to assist them.

4 In fact, what was carried out was an invasion of Slovenia with

5 troops that were in garrisons, and the troops from the garrisons had come

6 to Slovenia and started marching along Slovenian roads. They even put

7 obstacles on their roads and there was even shooting there. Fortunately,

8 not too many people were killed. As far as I can remember, there were 48

9 casualties altogether. But as far as I'm concerned, even if a single man

10 loses his life, that is unforgivable. There is not a single objective

11 that could justify or explain any such victim.

12 Q. Mr. Markovic, most regrettably tens of soldiers were killed, as

13 you had put it, quite innocent soldiers. They were killed in implementing

14 your decision. And if you wanted to discredit yourself through your own

15 decision, I don't know how you could link this decision up with somebody

16 else's accountability except your own, you as president of the Federal

17 Executive Council and head of the executive branch government at the time,

18 at that time of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

19 A. I have to repeat yet again that this has nothing to do with

20 anything. If anybody reads the decision that was passed by the Federal

21 Executive Council, they can see that it pertains to the police only and to

22 border units that are very, very few in number. And who ordered tanks and

23 cannons to appear? Who ordered the opening of garrisons? Who issued

24 orders for the army to march from Croatia to Slovenia? Who?

25 When Mr. Kucan called me, I had no idea whatsoever about this.

1 After that, I had conversations about this within the government. I also

2 talked about this to Veljko Kadijevic, and Veljko Kadijevic was then

3 attacked at the government meeting too. He was told then that he acted

4 outside any orders or approval. And who allowed him to do that? He

5 answered to that that it was his duty to defend the borders of Yugoslavia

6 and that no one had to instruct him to do that.

7 And the question I would raise is why did he not do the same thing

8 elsewhere? Why did he ask for the entire Presidency to give their

9 consent? So someone had reached agreement with him about this.

10 Q. Well, you're the one.

11 A. Heaven forbid. How could it be me? At the meeting of the Federal

12 Executive Council, I had a public debate with him about this. So no way,

13 it wasn't me.

14 Q. When you saw the consequences of your decision, of course you

15 criticised the consequences of the decision that you took yourself. But

16 let us establish some facts here, if possible, Mr. Markovic.

17 Is it correct that on the 4th of July, 1991, a cease-fire was

18 established and that, inter alia, a decision was reached to go back to the

19 original state of affairs; to deblock the JNA units, the units and the

20 institutions of the JNA, to return the resources of the JNA to the JNA, to

21 re-establish communications, to set free prisoners? However, in spite of

22 all of that, although the then-members of the Presidency from Macedonia

23 and Bosnia, Tupurkovski and Bogicevic, were entrusted with carrying this

24 out, do you recall that in spite of all of that the Slovenian leadership

25 practically evaded the implementation of most of these things that I've

1 quoted just now? Do you remember that?

2 A. I remember that, but I also remember that the Presidency of

3 Yugoslavia and you, Mr. Milosevic, took part in that particular meeting

4 too, and Drnovsek took part in it is well, that at that particular meeting

5 a decision was reached to have all troops from Slovenia transferred to

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis -- on the basis of an agreement, including

7 all the equipment they had.

8 Q. Let's try to speed things up. We'll get to that too. But let us

9 just look at something else. Do you remember something else? Do you

10 remember that three days after that in Brioni a meeting was held? I did

11 not attend that meeting in Brioni, but you did attend that meeting. So

12 this was a meeting in the presence of the three ministers of the European

13 Community at the time and a joint declaration was signed then. And it

14 says there, inter alia, that the peoples of Yugoslavia are the only ones

15 who can decide about their own future. So it's not the republics of

16 Yugoslavia but the peoples of Yugoslavia that will decide on their own

17 future. And what was agreed upon was that negotiations would take place.

18 In this declaration, it said that unilateral steps should not be taken; is

19 that correct?

20 A. At that meeting that you're referring to, on the basis of the

21 proposal of the Federal Executive Council that, by the way, I had drafted,

22 a proposal was made to have a three-month moratorium. As a matter of

23 fact, my first proposal was a six-month moratorium. However, it was

24 believed then that this would not be accepted so we reduced it to three

25 months.

1 Through these three months we would actually carry out all the

2 things that you are referring to just now, Mr. Milosevic. This

3 three-month moratorium would make it possible for us to make the country

4 capable of resolving its problems without resorting to war.

5 As a matter of fact, this session that you've referred to just

6 now, this session was held about a month after the Federal Executive

7 Council had already prepared a proposal as to how the country would

8 function during this moratorium period, and that was on the basis of what

9 this discussion took place. And the borders were discussed in that

10 context as well as this withdrawal.

11 As a matter of fact, the core of this proposal went much deeper.

12 It was supposed to go back to the status of the country that had existed

13 before that, that people who had walked out of the Assembly should return

14 to the Assembly, notably Slovenia and Croatia, in order to make it

15 possible to reach decisions, any type of decisions that would be passed.

16 If everybody is going to go their own ways, let the Assembly decide that,

17 as was done later by the Assembly of Czechoslovakia. So let us part our

18 ways without a conflict. Let's create pre-conditions, after all, for

19 somehow bringing yet another kind of Yugoslavia together that would hinge

20 on a minimum. However, this was made totally impossible to have these

21 three months.

22 Q. All right, Mr. Markovic. Your answer is yes, I assume, in

23 response to my question, because I said that in the presence of the

24 European troika, this declaration was made, and what I quoted is written

25 in this declaration. I assume that your answer is yes; is that right?

1 A. I gave an expanded answer in terms of the total question.

2 Q. All right, Mr. Markovic. Is it correct that the leadership of

3 Slovenia did not fulfil their obligations from this declaration?

4 A. Yes, that is correct. That is correct irrespective of the fact

5 that you said before that that you agreed with them.

6 Q. I did not agree with them at all.

7 A. Aha. You did not agree with them.

8 Q. I said that I personally never had any quarrels with Kucan. That

9 is a completely different matter. I did not agree with their policy, of

10 course, because I did not agree with secession.

11 A. But I don't want it to seem now that it is only the Slovenians who

12 are to be blamed for that. Everybody is. You too. You also asked for

13 the moratorium to be carried out in the following way: If not

14 voluntarily, we are going to do what we want to do by force.

15 On several occasions that was pointed out during that session, and

16 I intervened and said, "These countries are --"

17 Q. Just tell me which session?

18 A. The same one you mentioned just now.

19 Q. Well, find it. Where is it written here?

20 A. Regrettably I don't have it. You have it.

21 Q. I said somebody should do something by force or would do something

22 by force?

23 A. No, no, no. Jovic said that several times, and I intervened and I

24 said, "Do you think that through force and punishment you're going to

25 resolve this?" And he said, "What's going to happen if you don't -- if

1 they don't pay customs duty again?" Then Jovic said, "You keep on

2 negotiating all the time." And I said, "But you are -- you are talking

3 about force too."

4 Q. Please answer my questions, Mr. Markovic. You answered one of

5 them, and you regretted that, and now you don't really want to answer.

6 JUDGE MAY: No. You can't --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.

8 JUDGE MAY: That is not a fair comment as far as the witness is

9 concerned. Ask him proper questions and you can do it, but trying to make

10 scores off the witness, they don't assist you or anybody else.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm just trying to have the

12 truth revealed here. Fortunately, truth -- the truth is a very powerful

13 thing, and it will always prevail, here too.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is right.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Is it right, Mr. Markovic, that during the conflicts in Slovenia

17 44 members of the JNA lost their lives, namely six officers, six NCOs, 30

18 soldiers and cadets and one civilian employed in the army and one

19 unidentified person? And also, there were 184 wounded soldiers?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Do you remember what the gravest crimes committed against the JNA

22 soldiers were when the paramilitary formations were then established in

23 Slovenia, when they brought children of officers who were underaged to

24 five border posts and threatened to kill them unless their fathers

25 surrendered? And also, they subjected them to other kinds of pressures,

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1 psycho-physical torture. That's what happened vis-a-vis the members of

2 the JNA. Do you remember that?

3 A. I remember the first thing. I do not remember the second thing.

4 Q. The first thing, yes. The killings, you mean, the woundings.

5 And tell me then, at that time you were Prime Minister. What did

6 you do in order to have the perpetrators of these crimes brought to

7 justice? Did you make any effort aimed at that?

8 A. Yet again I will have to repeat that while no one, including

9 Mr. Milosevic, made any effort whatsoever in order to stop this war --

10 Q. That's not what I'm asking you.

11 A. I took a plane --

12 Q. You already talked about that, Mr. Markovic.

13 A. I have to answer. You're asking me whether I did anything.

14 Q. I'm not asking you whether you did anything. I am asking you in

15 relation to the crimes committed. Did you do anything as federal

16 Prime Minister in order to have the perpetrators brought to justice?

17 A. Yet again I have to repeat that I intervened in order to bring the

18 war to an end and not to have further loss of lives. I have to say

19 objectively now that my trip to Slovenia then bordered on death, but I did

20 that.

21 Secondly, if people were supposed to be punished then, there were

22 appropriate judicial authorities to carry that out. There are military

23 authorities. There are civilian authorities, depending on who was under

24 which jurisdiction. I do not remember that any government in any part of

25 the world would try anyone.

1 Q. I do not recall any such thing either, but usually all of this is

2 being placed under some kind of responsibility of mine, although I was not

3 the judiciary or the legislation, and I did not command the army either.

4 So did you take --

5 JUDGE MAY: You can ask -- you can certainly ask the witness if he

6 took any action, but my recollection is that Mr. Kucan was asked about

7 these matters and gave evidence about them, who was able to do so.

8 Perhaps the witness can say if he's got anything to add.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Markovic, do you remember that when we were talking about

11 Slovenia, Slovenia in 1989, 1990 and 1991 adopted a whole series of laws

12 unilaterally actually undermining the legal order of Yugoslavia? For

13 instance, the amendments to the constitution of Slovenia in 1989, then the

14 constitutional law to implement the amendments in the area of national

15 defence, then the law to stop all proceedings that had been started if

16 they come under the federal laws. In other words, they annulled all

17 federal laws. Then there was the declaration on sovereignty of Slovenia,

18 then the plebiscite on independence and autonomy of Slovenia, then a whole

19 series of other documents. I don't wish to quote all of them because they

20 would take too much time. A whole page could be written listing all those

21 documents of which you are well aware.

22 Did the constitutional law review them all and establish that they

23 were unconstitutional and they had them annulled? Do you remember that?

24 A. Yes, I remember that, but I would like to tell you the context

25 within which I remember them.

1 In the first place, it was not Slovenia in 1989 or in 1990 that it

2 undertook those steps but later on.

3 Q. Wait a moment. Weren't the amendments to the constitution adopted

4 in 1989? Were they or not?

5 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer fairly.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The elections in Slovenia were

7 carried out sometime between the spring and the summer of 1990. So this

8 happened later.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. I am not talking about the elections but the amendments to the

11 constitution.

12 A. Do you remember when Serbia blocked Slovenian goods? When did it

13 block economic relations with Slovenia? When did Serbia, or, rather, you

14 personally made a breakthrough into the monetary fund, into the budget and

15 took, or not to say steal 18.2 billion dinars, which is two and a half

16 billion German marks? Don't you think that all this affected the other

17 republics?

18 Q. Mr. Markovic, the relationships between the central banks of the

19 republics and the central bank of Yugoslavia can be found in documents.

20 There can be no theft. Whether you go beyond a certain limit or not, this

21 becomes immediately visible. You will admit that all this is highly

22 transparent. It is not possible in -- to do anything affecting monetary

23 flow secretly. And then those relationships are later corrected,

24 adjusted, balanced out, et cetera. You were an economist; surely you know

25 that.

1 A. I hope I do. But I also know quite clearly that you took a

2 decision to take 18.2 billion from the central bank to the Bank of Serbia

3 for which you had absolutely no right to do. You had no right. And by

4 doing that, you actually carried out a diversion, an act of sabotage

5 against the whole Yugoslav system.

6 Q. Mr. Markovic, let us not go into monetary issues. If somebody

7 makes a primary issue for the purchase of wheat, that is not a blow

8 against the monetary system. This is something that can later be

9 regulated through mutual relations between the central banks and the banks

10 of the republics, and this is something that happened frequently. It has

11 nothing do with your exaggerations describing it as Serbia's incursion, as

12 Serbia's theft, or anything like that. So let's not use such

13 descriptions.

14 A. If you think that 18.2 billion dinars is a small sum, and this is

15 a sum that was established -- tell me, was it established or not?

16 Q. I'm not quite sure of the figure that was involved, but I do know

17 that someone was repeatedly -- various republics in various conditions

18 went beyond their limits. Later on this was ironed out in mutual

19 relationships, but that can easily be established, because all those

20 monetary flows are transparent. Primary issue is evident, and this can be

21 traced in the documents of the central bank and nothing can be concealed.

22 A. No one until then nor since then, I would be bold to say, carried

23 out such a theft of money that it was not entitled to as the Republic of

24 Serbia had done, or, rather, Mr. Milosevic. The more so as even what you

25 say, that it could have been used for agriculture, that its primary issue

1 could be used for agriculture, in those days issues of the National Bank

2 of Yugoslavia could not be used for agriculture or anything else. We

3 financed those needs through the budget.

4 And thirdly, any decision regarding primary issue had to be made

5 by the council of the National Bank of Yugoslavia. And it was the only

6 body competent for such decisions.

7 Now, if you know that, when did this council meet to allow 18.2

8 billion to be transferred to your account?

9 Q. Of course those decisions of the council of governors cannot --

10 without such a decision of the council of governors, no one could do any

11 such thing. That is not in dispute. And it is also not in dispute that

12 what you are talking about was not known in public.

13 Why are you using such ugly words like "theft"? Why are you

14 demeaning yourself?

15 A. Thank you for considering my position, but that was not true. And

16 it wasn't known until I revealed it anyway.

17 Q. When we first spoke, you said you had no idea.

18 A. Well, what I said then was quite true.

19 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to in particular refer to the accused, that

20 you must allow a chance for somebody to interpret. Our interpreters have

21 a lot of hard work, they keep up very well, but they should be given a

22 chance.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I will try to

24 speak more slowly for the benefit of the interpreters, but time is flying

25 and Mr. Markovic is explaining at great length some matters which I'm not

1 even asking him about.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Is it in dispute that the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia

4 annulled the decision taken by Slovenia? Just tell me yes or no.

5 A. Yes. Some of those, yes. They annulled them, yes.

6 Q. And is it true that during your term in office Slovenia ignored

7 the institutions, law and constitution of SFRY?

8 A. At first it didn't but later on it did. But also I wish to

9 mention here that the Federal Executive Council had proposed an amendment

10 to the constitution which would establish different relations and

11 elections throughout Yugoslavia, but the fact is that Serbia and Slovenia

12 from two different points of view prevented this.

13 Q. That is not true, but we'll come to that too. You say that the

14 decision on the withdrawal of the army was taken by the Presidency. When

15 I say the withdrawal of the army, I mean from Slovenia, that it was taken

16 by the Presidency under Milosevic's influence. That is what you said.

17 Now, my question is: Who voted in favour of pulling out the

18 Yugoslav People's Army from Slovenia? Do you remember that this was a

19 decision taken by the Presidency? So the presidents of the republics

20 don't have a vote. That the Presidency, all of the members except Mesic

21 voted in favour of the army being pulled out of Slovenia. Mesic voted

22 against the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia.

23 JUDGE MAY: The -- let the witness must have a chance. You've

24 been talking for at least a minute.

25 Can you answer that question?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can. A meeting of the Presidency

2 consisted of several parts, I would say. First there was some discussion

3 as to how to strengthen the position of the army in Slovenia, and then as

4 far as I remember, the proposal came from Mr. Jovic that the possibility

5 of withdrawing the army also be discussed. And this was immediately

6 accepted by the army, and they immediately elaborated on the idea. So

7 clearly such an agreement had already been reached by certain officials as

8 a final solution, for otherwise Kadijevic would not have so readily

9 accepted it. And then it -- an agreement was easily reached to pull out

10 the army.

11 At that meeting, it is true, as Milosevic says, that everyone

12 voted except Mesic. I think that Tupurkovski didn't vote either, as far

13 as I remember.

14 Q. Tupurkovski and Bogicevic agreed, being convinced that that would

15 avoid a conflict.

16 A. I said that I didn't agree with it but I had no right to vote. My

17 vote didn't count at that meeting.

18 Q. As you know, I did not attend, and I -- as I am not a member of

19 the Presidency, and I'm speaking on the basis of documents. Therefore all

20 the members with the exception of Mesic voted in favour of pulling out the

21 army from Slovenia; is that right?

22 A. I repeat: As far as I know, Tupurkovski voted against.

23 Q. Very well. That can be easily established. Even if Tupurkovski

24 had voted against, which he didn't, because he felt that was a way of

25 avoiding the conflict, the vote would still be 6 to 2. Therefore, is it

1 clear that your statement that the decision on the withdrawal of

2 Slovenia -- of the army from Slovenia was taken under Milosevic's

3 influence is completely unfounded?

4 A. I can't accept that, because certain things that are done behind

5 the scenes, and that was the case here, everything had been prepared

6 before people came to the session, things are not resolved at meetings.

7 Things had been prepared in advance.

8 Q. I see. So I had influence over all the members of the Presidency,

9 over a sufficient number except Mesic?

10 A. I don't even remember whether Bogicevic attended the meeting, but

11 I think Tupurkovski also voted against.

12 Q. Never mind. The things you don't remember, I won't ask you about.

13 Is it true that the JNA left Slovenia without armaments, without

14 its weaponry, that everything it had it left behind in Slovenia?

15 A. It isn't so.

16 Q. It is absolutely untrue that it took everything?

17 A. Yes, I agree with you. The army couldn't take everything. What

18 it couldn't take, it left.

19 Q. It is also untrue what you said in paragraph 13 of your statement,

20 that the JNA withdrew from Slovenia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JNA

21 withdrew from Slovenia to all the other Yugoslav republics with the

22 exception of Croatia, because the leadership of Croatia at the time was

23 opposed to a part of the army staying in the territory of Croatia. So

24 then the troops from Slovenia went to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Serbia and

25 to Macedonia and to Montenegro.

1 Therefore, in a dispersed manner, it went to all the other

2 republics. Is that right, Mr. Markovic?

3 A. No, it is not right. Some smaller units did go to Serbia or

4 Montenegro. As far as I recall, none went to Macedonia. On the contrary,

5 the withdrawal of the army from Macedonia was under preparation.

6 Q. Perhaps you're right. Not to Macedonia but to all the other

7 republics.

8 A. May I finish? So no one went to Macedonia. Now, whether troops

9 went to Serbia, I believe they did, some to Montenegro perhaps as well,

10 but most of the bulk of the troops went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

11 there is plenty of evidence to be found of that.

12 Q. My question is one of principle. The army that withdrew from

13 Slovenia withdrew to other parts of the territory of the SFRY where the

14 JNA was at the time the only legal armed force; is that right?

15 A. Yes, that is right, but at the same time it was legal throughout,

16 not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the legal force. Why didn't

17 it all go to Serbia?

18 Q. Why should it all go to Serbia? Serbia and the SFRY was not one

19 and the same.

20 A. Why would Bosnia-Herzegovina and the SFRY be one and the same?

21 Q. But it did go to Serbia as well.

22 A. Some smaller units that were unimportant.

23 Q. Well, we can easily establish which units went where. We don't

24 have to do that today. But the point is that the army withdrew to other

25 parts of SFRY.

1 As for the army in Croatia, the part from Slovenia didn't go to

2 Croatia, but there was JNA -- there were JNA troops in Croatia there, and

3 they were legal.

4 A. Yes, they were there and they were legal. But those troops from

5 Slovenia didn't go to Croatia. That is a fact. And it is also a fact

6 that smaller units went to Serbia and Montenegro. And it is also a fact

7 that the bulk of those forces went to Bosnia, because it was known that a

8 war was in the offing in Bosnia.

9 Q. Perhaps you knew that because you were the federal Prime Minister

10 and Bosnia-Herzegovina was under your competence, but for the -- to say

11 that the army went to Bosnia to prepare war, I don't know anything about

12 that.

13 A. You knew that better than me because you organised part of that

14 war in agreement with Tudjman.

15 Q. We'll come to that.

16 A. Excellent. I can't wait.

17 Q. It is also untrue what you say in paragraph 24 of your statement.

18 Boro Jovic was never consulted in connection with the JNA intervention in

19 Slovenia, nor was that ever discussed with you. He was never consulted

20 about that.

21 A. I don't know whether he was consulted, nor did I discuss that with

22 him. I just said that two of us had discussed that later and that he held

23 one position, I another. If you read that carefully, you would see that.

24 Q. Very well, Mr. Markovic. Is it in dispute that you had not only

25 de jure responsibility throughout that period, 1989, 1990, and 1991,

1 because you were throughout the federal Prime Minister, but in addition to

2 that de jure responsibility, you also had a number of meetings and engaged

3 in various activities in the federal government with all the important

4 departments of government throughout that period and de facto performed

5 those duties in 1989, 1990, and 1991?

6 Last time I provided that schedule for 1991, and similar ones

7 could be found for 1989 and 1990. So both de jure and de facto you were

8 the executive power at the head of the pyramid of executive powers in

9 SFRY. Is that right?

10 A. First of all, I would ask you kindly - and I apologise to the

11 Court for saying this - if I could have a copy of those documents which

12 actually belong to me and you have them. Maybe I will need them when I

13 decide to write my memoirs. I was unable to get hold of those documents.

14 It is a fact that my government -- I say "mine" of course in

15 quotation marks. I could say the Federal Executive Council, of which I

16 was the president, functioned well in the course of 1989 and 1990.

17 Q. We saw what happened in 1991.

18 A. Already at the end of 1990 certain things happened which seriously

19 jeopardised the already limited competencies that the federal government

20 had. Nowhere in Europe can you find a government with such modest and

21 limited competencies as was the case with the Yugoslav government, whereas

22 you, with your incursion into the payment system and the monetary system,

23 when you took 18.2 billion dinars, by doing this, the little authority the

24 government had, which relied on personalities rather than actual rights,

25 you called even those limited powers into jeopardy.

1 Regardless of the fact that I held that position and despite the

2 fact that I communicated a lot with other people, the truth is that my

3 ability, my capacities were reduced from one day to the next. I devoted

4 most of my efforts to preventing war and the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

5 To that end, I toured all the republics. I spoke to them. I went to the

6 Assembly of Slovenia. I held a speech there that is well known, which was

7 meant to convince the Assembly to change its decision. I went to the

8 Assembly of Croatia, and I spoke there for the first time in a way I never

9 spoke before, and I said some major things there. Let me not repeat those

10 things. If necessary, I can do that.

11 I also asked to be given the possibility to speak in the Republic

12 of Serbia. I was given that approval in principle, but I was not given a

13 chance of speaking in the Republic of Serbia. Though when I look back at

14 those events those were Don Quixotic events of mine, to save something

15 that couldn't be saved, but as an individual I even resorted to that.

16 Q. Mr. Markovic --

17 JUDGE MAY: The time has come for a break. We will try and ensure

18 that the witness has the document which he has asked to see. He should be

19 entitled to see that. We think we may have it, but we will, during the

20 adjournment, the half an hour break, we will see that he gets it.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, what is it?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I remember that several

24 days ago Mr. Nice asked you for permission to give the witness this 1991

25 schedule as the witness asked him for that, and you gave him that

1 permission. Now, why that didn't happen is perhaps an omission on

2 Mr. Nice's part, or maybe an omission on the part of the witness to pick

3 up the document, but I remember very well that this request was made of

4 you and that you granted it, because it was a document reviewing his

5 obligations and activities in 1991, and he obviously has that document.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we'll look at that. We're now going to adjourn.

7 We will take the usual break, 20 minutes. We've found, I think, I will be

8 grateful to the registry, the figure seems to be Defence Exhibit 207, and

9 the witness should have a copy that he can review during the break.

10 Yes, we will adjourn for 20 minutes.

11 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

12 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

14 MR. NICE: I understand Mr. Markovic did not receive the document

15 that he sought and for which permission was obtained to provide him. I

16 don't know why that is. We certainly sent it. I'll find out what the

17 problem was. I'm sorry. I apologise to Mr. Markovic that he didn't

18 receive it.

19 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

20 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I hope Mr. Markovic will

22 receive it sooner or later, at least, for his memoirs.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. But the point I wanted to raise is this: It is not in dispute,

25 Mr. Markovic that at the time of the aggravation of the Yugoslav crisis in

1 1989 when Slovenia adopted its amendments and in 1990 and 1991, and on top

2 of that there was arming at the time, the creation of first paramilitary

3 formations and various conflicts. It is not in dispute that you had a

4 full overview of the events and the instruments available to you in the

5 form of state instruments.

6 A. It is not in dispute that the Federal Executive Council has an

7 arsenal of these powers, but this was a very modest arsenal, and in every

8 area related to the army, directly or indirectly, the so-called defence,

9 the federal government had no competencies whatsoever.

10 Q. Very well. Since my time is extremely limited, I will provide you

11 with an overview of your activities for 1989 similar to the one for 1991

12 as well as for year 1990. And if you compare 1989 and 1990 and 1991, you

13 can see that the method of work is the same, and the method of

14 communication with all the important factors that were subjected to the

15 federal government were the same in relation to both the police and the

16 army and all the other agencies. I am not able now to go through all of

17 these activities of yours.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I want to tender them, Mr. May.

19 And since these are originals, I would like copies returned to me,

20 including the copy for 1991 that I already provided. And I absolutely

21 don't mind that Mr. Markovic should receive a copy of this overview,

22 because it will certainly be useful to him when he writes his memoirs.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I appreciate that very much.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. And now in return, I would appreciate brief answers to my

1 questions.

2 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. If you want to put the papers in now,

3 we will consider the position, and we will consider them to -- just --

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is 1990 and 1989. The one for

5 1990 I already -- the one for 1991 I provided already.

6 JUDGE MAY: Very well. What I shall do is -- Mr. Nice, if you

7 would look at those documents. They are not in English, but perhaps at

8 least the Prosecution can give us a view as to if there is any objection

9 to admitting them.

10 MR. NICE: Certainly.

11 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. From this we can see that in 1989, in 1990, and 1991 you had

14 regular meetings with the army, the police, the Presidency, with your own

15 members of the government, with officials of various republics, with

16 republican delegations, including those of Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia,

17 Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and so on and so forth. So

18 it is indisputable that over those three years you held executive power in

19 Yugoslavia at the time when these events took place. I don't think you

20 will challenge that, will you?

21 A. Thank you for showing that I have been quite active in this

22 period. This extensive activity of mine in this period does not mean that

23 I had actual power in whatever I was doing.

24 You characterised my own work as being of negotiating character.

25 Using my own methods, I was looking for a solution, trying to avoid

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1 conflict and dissolution of Yugoslavia, and to that end I engaged all the

2 forces that were available to me. I toured, tested, looked for people who

3 were willing to help me to prevent a war, et cetera.

4 Q. For instance, you say with regard to the army that you only had

5 competencies in the administrative and financial sense, but I will now

6 show you a document that I received from the side opposite, which is an

7 excerpt from some sort of shorthand notes that I was not provided with in

8 its entirety. The ERN number is 01024563, and from this we can see that

9 General Kadijevic informs you, for instance, of the casualties in

10 Slovenia, of inter-ethnic conflicts, arming activities, et cetera. And

11 then he says, "Losses in Slovenia, 44 killed, 144 wounded." Ante Markovic

12 says, "First you said it was 298 in total." Kadijevic says, "In

13 inter-ethnic conflicts and other conflicts in Yugoslavia, the total was

14 298 only for this year." Markovic says, "How many were wounded?"

15 Kadijevic answers, "472, and the total is 770, and there are other

16 conflicts." He mentions Kosovo, the north of Macedonia, Sandzak.

17 And from this it is clear that you are discussing the security

18 situation with the minister of defence. And we can also see in these

19 agendas of yours various meetings to discuss the security situation, the

20 activities of the army and the police, not only financing aspects.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, please. If I may

22 assist the Court. This document was tendered through Mr. Mesic. It's

23 328, Exhibit 328, tab 16. What is now being shown to the witness is

24 contained in this document. So we can look it up.

25 MR. NICE: While we've interrupted the flow, there is no reason to

1 object to these documents on the grounds that they may not be what the

2 accused says they are. They're similar in category to the document that

3 should have been provided in copy to the witness over the adjournment, and

4 the Chamber will recall my observations on the last occasion about how

5 surprised I was that the accused had access to this original material when

6 it hadn't been available to us or to the witness, but there is no reason

7 to doubt they are what they are. Whether they merit becoming an exhibit

8 is a matter for the Chamber. They're quite voluminous.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE MAY: Well, in due course when we've had a moment we will

11 allow the witness to see those documents, but let us not for the moment

12 interrupt the flow of the examination.

13 Yes.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I just quoted to you from the document I received from the side

16 opposite. I believe it is authentic. We can see that General Kadijevic

17 is reporting to you on all these events, that you are discussing them with

18 him. So there is no question that you are discussing the financing of the

19 army or anything else which would be in the exclusive competence of the

20 federal government. You are discussing military activities. Is that

21 true?

22 A. First of all, I don't have this document. So as far as this

23 document is concerned, I cannot give any opinions.

24 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think I can be of

25 assistance again. This is another exhibit that has been introduced, and

1 it is available in the language Mr. Markovic understands, in B/C/S. I can

2 give him a copy.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can tell you that I don't need

4 this document now because I have no time to study it here. Mr. Milosevic

5 obviously studied it already. I can answer without looking at the

6 document.

7 It is logical for a president of an institution, including the

8 president of a government, to discuss with his Ministers something that

9 falls under their purview. I did have such discussions with all

10 Ministers. And if Mr. Milosevic is consistent, he will admit that I had

11 such discussions with other Ministers much more often than I talked to

12 Mr. Kadijevic about his sphere of work.

13 Another thing, within the Presidency of Yugoslavia, there is a

14 sector that is in charge of security issues, and that sector comprises

15 representatives of various institutions, including representatives of the

16 federal government, and briefings are held there too in that sector for

17 the purpose of preparing Federal Cabinet meetings to discuss such issues.

18 It is also logical for the Prime Minister to be interested in the

19 progress of the harvest, the situation in tourism, the situation

20 concerning commodity reserves, monetary issues, financial situation, the

21 problems of banks, and various other issues including those that relate to

22 the army.

23 I don't see how a high official is supposed to lead his agency

24 without being informed of its work. But that is one thing. It is quite

25 another thing to have direct control and command over something.

1 When the army is concerned, things are defined very clearly in the

2 constitution. I suggest we don't waste much more time over this. The

3 army is within the competence of the Presidency of Yugoslavia under the

4 constitution.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. That is true. I'm just saying that you are discussing with the

7 Minister of Defence military activities, not those things which you claim

8 are your exclusive competence.

9 A. But that does not mean that I am taking military decisions. I am

10 only being briefed on what is going on, and that is very logical. I am

11 being briefed as the Prime Minister. But as far as decision-making is

12 concerned, heaven forbid. It was just an insinuation the way you tried to

13 put it.

14 Q. I said what I said about your role in the war in Slovenia, and I

15 need not go back to it.

16 But here is another thing relating to Dubrovnik, a report by

17 Hrvoje Kacic of the 1st of October, 1991, ERN numbers ending with 75129.

18 We all attended that conference in The Hague; you, I, representatives of

19 all republics, members of the Presidency of Yugoslavia. All of us were

20 there. And they say here there are problems around Dubrovnik, and they

21 say if you can't talk to Jokic, who came to replace Djurovic, who was

22 killed and who used to be the commander, here in The Hague they have

23 Kadijevic and the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic.

24 So concerning this event in Dubrovnik, even those people who were

25 in charge of Croatia put you in the foreground. They say you have

1 Kadijevic here in The Hague and Prime Minister Ante Markovic, and they

2 rely on you to deal with these problems.

3 And then reference is made to the officials of Montenegro, because

4 this is in the immediate vicinity of Montenegro. And there is no

5 reference to Serbia. How can you comment on that?

6 A. First of all, I don't have this document either, and I don't know

7 what it says, so I cannot check whether -- what it really says is what you

8 quote or maybe it is something different, but it is a fact that the war

9 that was waged there in Dubrovnik but also in Vukovar, if you wish, and in

10 other parts of Croatia, this war was something that the Prime Minister,

11 the federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic had nothing to do with. Ante

12 Markovic took every possible measure to prevent this war. And in this

13 context, precisely at that session Mr. Milosevic referred to, I asked him,

14 "Can you see what's going on in Vukovar? Can you see that Dubrovnik is

15 being shelled?" He said, "Are you mad? Who would be crazy enough to bomb

16 Dubrovnik?"

17 Q. Who said that? Yes, that's what I said. It was madness.

18 A. And I replied, "Let's go and see Tudjman." And I said to Tudjman,

19 who was there with his escorts Saronjic and other people, I said to

20 Tudjman, "I'm speaking to Milosevic about the bombing, the shelling of

21 Dubrovnik, and he's telling me that Dubrovnik is not being shelled. He's

22 telling me it's not true." And I wrote in the end what Tudjman's answer

23 was: "Milosevic says it is not being shelled, otherwise, I would have

24 known about it." And the fact is that Dubrovnik was shelled. There are

25 photographs about that. There is even a brief film about it.

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1 Q. I didn't say at any point I would have known if it was shelled. I

2 said, "Who would be mad enough to do that?"

3 A. There is a film about that. You said, "Who would be mad enough to

4 do that," but you also said, "If it were true, I would know about it."

5 Q. I only quoted to you one sentence from this report of Hrvoje

6 Kacic, the ERN number ending with 7529. Those who have it in front of

7 them can compare. The sentence reads, "If you cannot talk with Jokic who

8 came to replace Djurovic who was killed, you have here in The Hague

9 Kadijevic and Prime Minister Markovic."

10 A. In which way was Hrvoje Kacic competent? You could have named

11 anybody. Tell me who this Kacic is.

12 Q. Well, I suppose he was a Croatian official at the time, who is

13 relying upon you to resolve the problem.

14 A. He would have done better to rely on you. He would have had a

15 better chance of resolving it.

16 Q. Well, I am quoting him, and you know better than I do who Kacic

17 is.

18 Now, look what it says further on. As Spegelj says, and I suppose

19 you know who he is, you were playing two cards. Here is what Spegelj said

20 to Vladimir Jagar. You not only provided Spegelj with data and

21 information saying that you don't like Serbia and you would not leave

22 Serbia until you managed to take over - that is ERN number 01112475 - it

23 says: "Spegelj told me he has a man in Belgrade who says he can effect an

24 arrest of him. He says army has the intention of arresting him. Spegelj

25 says he got this information from Ante Markovic who advised him on the

1 same occasion that he should leave Belgrade, otherwise the army would

2 arrest him."

3 So instead of preventing this illegal transport of arms that

4 Spegelj was involved in, you call Spegelj on the phone and warn him that

5 he should run away before being arrested by the army for this illegal arms

6 delivery.

7 A. Can you tell me when this was?

8 Q. I hope I can. It's the minutes from the 18th February 1991.

9 A. There were times when telephone communication between Serbia and

10 Croatia, Belgrade and Zagreb did not exist at all. Very often I had to

11 phone through Sarajevo or through some other institution.

12 Another thing, I did not see or talk to Spegelj at that time at

13 all, and I had nothing to do with Mr. Spegelj at the time. I had no need

14 to have any communication with him.

15 Q. Very well. I'll quote to you very shortly again from page

16 01112478, where it says: "At this meeting somebody asked Spegelj, what's

17 the situation with Ante Markovic? And in this connection, Spegelj said,

18 Ante Markovic, Prime Minister, is a person playing two cards. He's very

19 fond of power. He said that he, Markovic, cannot stand Milosevic or

20 Serbia, and until he destroys Milosevic and Serbia, he will not leave

21 Belgrade."

22 A. What do I have to do with the private opinions of Spegelj?

23 Anybody, Tom, Dick, or Harry could say here you have Milosevic and here

24 you have Markovic; Markovic hates Milosevic. This has no importance at

25 all. He is not someone who is close to me. I didn't socialise with him.

1 I had nothing to do with Spegelj so he cannot know what I thought. He

2 used this for some purpose of his own. This has nothing to do with me.

3 And anyway, I believe there are many other arguments, many other materials

4 that could clearly prove who advocated what.

5 Q. So you claim that what Spegelj says and what pertains to your

6 assessment in terms of your behaviour and attitude toward Serbia, that

7 that is all simply incorrect?

8 A. It is not correct.

9 Q. Now I'm asking you something else. Since it is being claimed here

10 that some kind of a plan for a Greater Serbia existed, and you say that

11 too, in the opinion of this other side it -- this was controlled. So now

12 I'm going to show you what you said at the session of the Presidency in

13 July 1991. This is a long document, stenographic notes. I was not

14 present at the session, but I am going to quote to you something from page

15 61. The ERN number is 02017995. Ante Markovic says --

16 MR. NICE: Before we do all that, the accused knows quite well we

17 can't just pull out ERN numbered documents, probably provided under

18 substantial Rule 68 disclosure, like that, and of course the documents

19 come with no observation as to their truth value. It would help the

20 witness probably, he doesn't seem to have any trouble with the documents

21 so far but it would probably help if he could at least see the document

22 and follow it. We can't produce it just on the spot.

23 JUDGE MAY: No, of course not. But so far we have in fact not

24 done too badly considering the difficulties which we're in, given an

25 accused in person, one who is liable to quote very large parts of --

1 voluminously from documents. At the same time, he is in person and we

2 have to bear that in mind.

3 MR. NICE: Well, we'll do our best to check --

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will ask him to quote it. We will ask you to

5 pursue it if you would.

6 Yes, what is this document you want to quote to the witness again,

7 Mr. Milosevic?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document is called Stenographic

9 Notes from the 125th session of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal

10 Republic of Yugoslavia, held on the 12th of July of 1991, starting at

11 10.30 a.m., and it also says that it's strictly prohibited to have this

12 document copied. It is a strictly confidential document. Of course Mr.

13 Nice has this. I don't.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And where was this session held?

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I assume in Belgrade. It doesn't say where it was held, but it

17 does say, "After using this document, return it to the general secretary

18 of the Presidency of the SFRY, Presidency of the SFRY, Stjepan Mesic," et

19 cetera.

20 Now I'm quoting Stjepan Mesic, who is chairing the meeting, and he

21 says, "I give the floor to Ante," and then a brief quotation. "We noted

22 that actually things are progressing autonomously, in a spontaneous

23 manner, that they are getting out of control increasingly and that this

24 getting out of control applies to all segments, actually, not only in

25 terms of mutual conflicts. And on this basis, certain units are being

1 established. They have started to operate autonomously, but this also

2 pertains to the economic and social fields. There is deep erosion," and

3 so on and so forth.

4 So you yourself say that things are progressing in a spontaneous

5 manner and that they cannot be controlled. They're getting out of

6 control.

7 And then on the next page you say --

8 JUDGE MAY: No, we can't possibly deal with this in that way.

9 It's very hard at all for the witness to be able to deal with it, and I'm

10 going to ask him if he can remember - he's remembered, remarkably, several

11 things - whether he can remember this and whether he can answer in order

12 to try and save time and get on. But we have a note from the Prosecution.

13 Yes.

14 MR. NICE: I believe - I'm grateful to Ms. Dicklich - this is 328,

15 tab 16. It was something produced for identification and therefore is in

16 B/C/S but is not translated. It's a voluminous document.

17 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's ask the witness about it first of all.

18 Yes.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember this, but it's a bit some

20 -- it's a bit different from what Mr. Milosevic just said. This is an

21 assessment of part of the process that was evolving at that time and that

22 was initiated from other quarters. It is also true that in the materials

23 I did write, I mean the ones that I worked on and that I wrote for the

24 OTP, Mr. Milosevic never advocated a Greater Serbia in my presence.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. All right.

2 A. But I also wrote that in fact he worked in favour of one, but he

3 never advocated it.

4 Q. All right. You stated here that things are developing

5 spontaneously, and then you're saying the situation is getting out of

6 control and the governments and republics and even individuals, highly

7 authoritative individuals, can no longer control various events and so on

8 and so forth. So you're talking about a general erosion. Is that right,

9 Mr. Markovic?

10 A. Yes. I would have to know which time period this refers to, where

11 this can be incorporated, because you see, when you extract a quotation

12 like this, it can be just out there hanging in the air. It can be about

13 anything. Since I do not know all the things that were being discussed

14 there and in connection with what, I would not be in a position to give an

15 accurate answer. If I could have the opportunity of studying this, I

16 could certainly be in a position to give an answer.

17 I do remember that this was discussed, but it was discussed in the

18 context of overall developments in Yugoslavia.

19 Q. All right. Markovic, as far as the time period is concerned, this

20 is a session of the 12th of July, 1991. I am not going to burden you with

21 quotations from this session any longer. This also has to do with your

22 quotation, but I don't want you to make any comments but -- in any other

23 way except for what you actually said.

24 A few minutes ago, I also quoted you, only I did not draw any

25 conclusions. You say: "In our assessment, there is a central issue which

1 is one of the basic issues in our country." That is what you say. And

2 that is the relationship between the Serbs and Croats or, rather, between

3 Serbia and Croatia.

4 So is your position clear, therefore? I also believed, and I

5 still believe today, that this was the key relationship, that this was the

6 central issue, as you had put it, one the basic issues in our country,

7 that is the relationship between the Serbs and Croats; is that right?

8 A. May I answer now? Several times I presented that point of view.

9 I would take up a lot of time now, so I can't go into all of this, and I

10 cannot explain what the first meeting between Tudjman and myself was like.

11 We had not known each other before. We met one evening in Zagreb, in the

12 offices that I had in Zagreb as federal Prime Minister, and we talked for

13 over two hours. There were five conclusions.

14 One of these five conclusions was Serbs should be talked to within

15 Croatia, not via Serbia itself and Milosevic.

16 Secondly, when I spoke in the Croatian parliament, I think it was

17 towards the end of May or beginning of June, but at any rate before any

18 decisions were made. I said then, because I went there to intervene, in

19 order to prevent the decisions that were being prepared then for the

20 parliament of Croatia. I made a long speech there, and I said that among

21 other things. And also, as far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned too.

22 So Serbs should be talked to in Croatia, not via Serbia and via Milosevic.

23 I thought that was a sine qua non.

24 Q. Yes, sine qua non. That is what I claimed too, that that was the

25 key issue, the relationship between the Serbs and Croats, and that is what

1 you say, or, rather, the relationship between Serbia and Croatia. That's

2 what you said.

3 A. Well, all right. After that, you reached a very nice agreement.

4 You did with Tudjman in Karadjordjevo. Milosevic and Tudjman agreeing in

5 Karadjordjevo that they would split up Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6 Q. That's not true but we're going to get to that as well. I just

7 wanted to clarify this particular matter, that the key issue in our

8 country is the relationship between Serbs and Croats or, rather, the

9 relationship between Serbia and Croatia, because here this is being

10 presented in a distorted fashion. I am glad that you explained it in the

11 same way.

12 Mr. Markovic, you said that I wanted to put everything under the

13 control of the army, and I had control over the army, and I had control

14 over the members of the Presidency. In this very same document, the

15 stenographic minutes, this is what one of the members of the Presidency

16 says. This is the member of the Presidency from Vojvodina, Jugoslav

17 Kostic. Jugoslav Kostic says: "I am not prepared to vote for that

18 solution which would give the army carte blanche to secure the state

19 border by force," and so on.

20 So isn't it clear that Serbia and what you called the Serbian bloc

21 was not in favour of giving the army a free hand so that it could secure

22 the state border? And then he adds: "When we see that there are flags of

23 the Republic of Slovenia on the state border and --"

24 JUDGE MAY: It's quite impossible for a witness to deal with this

25 length. Now, we've allowed some leeway because of the need for time, but

1 we must also be fair to the witness in order that he could answer what's

2 being put.

3 Mr. Markovic, I don't know if you could briefly deal with what is

4 being alleged at this stage.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very interesting that Milosevic

6 extracted only a very partial element that speaks of relations between the

7 army and Serbia and relations within the Presidency of Yugoslavia.

8 It is well known, and I believe there is no need to prove this,

9 that in the Presidency of Yugoslavia as the Supreme Commander that the

10 army was subordinated to there were two groups within the Presidency. In

11 one group was Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. And

12 the other group consisted of Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro.

13 That is four to four.

14 So why were these sessions held so many times in order to get a

15 majority? If that had been Kostic's vote, then it would have been

16 rejected. But the fact remains that sessions were held, even sometimes in

17 army premises where it was very cold. And they sought to break

18 Bogicevic's will and to make him vote in favour of giving the army a free

19 hand in order to deal with the situation in Yugoslavia. However, they did

20 not succeed in that. Bogicevic, although he was a Serb from

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he was accused of being a traitor.

22 So this one example that Mr. Milosevic quoted doesn't really mean

23 much. As the Germans say, one swallow does not bring spring.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Well, the Serbs say the same thing.

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1 A. Yes. I'm German oriented.

2 Q. But this shows no doubt that there was no agreement involved

3 within this Serbian Bloc, as you call it, because Kostic is opposing this

4 proposal to give the army a free hand to secure the state borders.

5 I'm not going to keep you any long with these stenographic notes,

6 but please, since my time is restricted, give me answers that are as brief

7 as possible.

8 Is it correct that at that time at the peak of your term of office

9 only Croatia and Slovenia opposed the quest for a constitutional setup of

10 Yugoslavia that would be reformed on the basis of the existing

11 constitution of Yugoslavia?

12 A. No. The Federal Executive Council also asked for a constitutional

13 change.

14 Q. Well, that is what I'm saying, that only Slovenia and Croatia were

15 opposed to finding a constitutional solution for a future Yugoslavia on

16 the basis of the existing constitution?

17 A. That's not exactly the way it was. On the 18th of December, 1989,

18 when I presented my programme of reform, then the Federal Executive

19 Council presented as a prerequisite for carrying out this reform, and also

20 for continuing the reforms that were already taking place, requested that

21 the constitution of Yugoslavia be changed then, and this change of the

22 constitution was supposed to make it possible to carry out elections

23 throughout Yugoslavia.

24 Q. All right.

25 A. However, this was prevented by the delegates from Slovenia and the

1 delegates from Serbia. The delegates from Croatia were prepared to

2 support this.

3 Q. Please. That is not correct. The delegates from Serbia tried to

4 prevent this. Do you remember that the Presidency of Yugoslavia -- I'm

5 not talking about the Federal Executive Council now, your Federal

6 Executive Council. But the Presidency of Yugoslavia in mid-1989 launched

7 an initiative to change the constitution of the SFRY. Do you remember

8 that?

9 A. Well, a change of the constitution of the SFRY had started already

10 in 1996 [as interpreted] when these governments were not even in place.

11 After all, I was a member of this constitutional changes commission. We

12 had been working on that for two years, so some changes had already been

13 effected.

14 Other changes that were being sought, well that is true, the

15 Presidency did ask for them.

16 Q. In 1989.

17 A. And also then in 1989, the Federal Executive Council sought

18 changes but the way they saw them, not the way the Presidency of

19 Yugoslavia saw them. And as for these changes that were sought by the

20 Federal Executive Council, a vast majority were in favour of most of them.

21 However, as regards multi-party elections throughout Yugoslavia, all

22 Yugoslav elections, the representatives of Slovenia and Serbia were not in

23 favour of that.

24 Q. On the contrary. The representatives of Serbia were in favour of

25 multi-party elections. And do you remember that on the 28th of May, 1990,

1 in the federal executive -- in the Federal Assembly, the representative of

2 Serbia asked for the right to secession to be regulated by law in order to

3 prevent any kind of tensions or to avoid chaos, to have all of this

4 regulated by law?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Do you remember that at the time the Federal Assembly, meeting on

7 the 29th of May, 1990, supported the right to self-determination,

8 including the right to secession?

9 A. Yes. And it was only then that the law was adopted enabling

10 elections at the level of the whole of Yugoslavia, only then.

11 Q. And do you remember what was the main idea behind that proposal;

12 to ensure protection of fundamental human rights, a peaceful settlement of

13 disputes, equality of all the Yugoslav peoples, and all this was built

14 into this proposal of the Presidency, as you know; is that right?

15 A. Yes, it was so, but very often what was written in documents

16 wasn't so important. What was important was the way they were

17 implemented, and they weren't implemented very well.

18 Q. And do you remember after extensive procedure in preparing the

19 amendments four republics and two provinces submitted a proposal on the

20 constitutional reconstruction of Yugoslavia to the Federal Assembly, and

21 four republics plus two provinces submitted a unified proposal on the

22 constitutional reconstruction of Yugoslavia, while simultaneously Slovenia

23 and Croatia submitted a proposal on confederation? An agreement was not

24 reached as there was no consensus. But it wasn't Serbia that had a

25 different concept than Slovenia and Croatia, but the ratio was 6 to 2. Is

1 that right, Mr. Markovic?

2 A. Mr. Milosevic, the discussion you are referring to took place

3 mostly at meetings of the presidents of the Presidencies of the republics

4 and provinces. And you moved from one town to the next, discussing these

5 matters. You excluded the rest of us from these discussions because you

6 were the actual people in power. That is, the republics rather than the

7 federal institutions.

8 None of us attended those talks, and that is where you differed.

9 Among other things, at one of those meetings, I think it was the

10 representative of Croatia or Slovenia, I don't remember exactly who, when

11 he proposed that a confederation be opted for, you used the well-known

12 expression "Malo Morgen." This could also be an indication who you're

13 close to. So you see, you showed an inclination that you accused me of a

14 moment ago, an inclination towards Germany.

15 Q. I don't speak German, but in Serbia very often the expression is

16 used, "Malo Morgen," meaning never, really.

17 A. Well, obviously there were two ideas, a loose confederation was

18 one option, and the other one. And you were in favour of the other

19 option. You headed that option and would not accept any kind of

20 compromise.

21 Q. My question was a precise one. I am not talking about meetings of

22 the presidents of the republics, because when you say "you," you mean

23 presidents of the republics; not just me but all the presidents of the

24 republics.

25 A. Yes, that's right. You excluded the rest of us.

1 Q. Very well. But I was asking you about a proposal submitted to the

2 Federal Assembly by four republics and two provinces on the constitution.

3 So this was a proposal submitted to the Federal Assembly; is that right?

4 A. As far as I remember that never came up before the Federal

5 Assembly. I say that a proposal was submitted. I say it never happened.

6 Q. Mr. Markovic, that can easily be established. There are documents

7 about that.

8 A. Very well.

9 Q. Wasn't it quite clear already in 1990 that Slovenia had started

10 with the secession, followed by Croatia, and that armies started to be

11 formed in Slovenia and Croatia? Is that right or not?

12 A. I couldn't put it that way. In Slovenia, yes. In Croatia, no, as

13 far as I know. That's one thing.

14 And secondly, this was part of the evolution of mutual

15 relationships, relationships within which you were already manifesting a

16 tendency to rule the whole country. And this was clear, among other

17 things, from the way you crashed into the monetary system. You blocked

18 goods coming from Slovenia. You organised people to hold public rallies

19 in Ljubljana. So in a sense, you participated in the decisions made by

20 Slovenia. You forced their hand.

21 Q. Mr. Markovic, the fact that a group of people from Kosovo wanted

22 to go to Ljubljana to seek solidarity from the people of Slovenia with

23 their suffering was not organised by Serbia, and you know that very well.

24 And the fact that relations between the republican banks and the central

25 banks was certainly not within the competence of the president of the

1 Presidency of the republic but was within the competence of the national

2 banks. And you're highly sensitive when you're attributed competencies

3 that do not belong to you, but you are not so sensitive when you attribute

4 everything else to someone else.

5 A. Who could prevent the purchase of goods by Serbian companies in

6 Slovenia? No bank could do that. No administrative decision of Serbia

7 was taken. This was a kind of civil revolt because of their attitude

8 towards Kosovo and because of the way they treated the sufferers from

9 Kosovo who wanted to address the Slovenian public to tell them the truth

10 about their suffering and the persecution they were exposed to.

11 Q. So you're saying it was spontaneous.

12 A. It was partially spontaneous, but it certainly wasn't a state

13 measure or a measure taken by the republic or any kind of administrative

14 decision. It was simply generalised feelings of revolt because of such an

15 attitude towards Kosovo. You know that very well. And why didn't you

16 prevent the blockade of purchase of Slovenian goods?

17 Q. Mr. Markovic, let's go back to the question of secession of

18 Slovenia and Croatia in 1990. Is it true you were the federal Prime

19 Minister in 1990? You were informed that already in mid-1990 a meeting

20 was held between delegations of the HDZ and the Slovenian Demos, their

21 ruling party at the time, to coordinate their tactics towards the JNA.

22 You remember that? This was confirmed by Vasiljevic too, who in those

23 days was head of the military security.

24 A. No, I'm not aware of any such meeting.

25 Q. So you received no information about that.

1 A. No, I didn't receive any such information. I do know that in

2 those days the HDZ, headed by Tudjman, had constituted its authority in

3 Croatia, and as early as that date I don't think he could have done any

4 such thing. He was the head of a party that was of no interest to me.

5 What I was interested in was the work of state institutions.

6 Q. Tell me, is it true that early in October 1990 there was

7 intensified illegal arming of certain units in Croatia in cooperation with

8 similar such institutions in Slovenia? And do you remember that the JNA

9 discovered nine channels of illegal arming of Croatia and Slovenia in

10 those days? Is that right or not?

11 A. I must say that there were some indications I received about

12 arming in Slovenia. However, regarding arming in Croatia and what the

13 army discovered by filming Spegelj and the import of Kalashnikovs and

14 other weapons from Hungary, I learnt about it when it was broadcast on

15 television. Even General Kadijevic never told me a word about it. And we

16 asked him at a meeting why he hadn't informed the federal government of

17 this. Since this was his duty as a military man, he should have informed

18 the Presidency, but he should also have informed us so as to be kept

19 informed. Not in the sense of us as commanders. But he didn't.

20 Q. Is it true that it was in your term of office that the government

21 of Croatia, in July 1990, decided to form the National Guards Corps?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. At the same time the decision was taken to withdraw the weapons of

24 reserve police forces in areas where the majority Serb population which

25 caused conflicts there?

1 A. That has its certain genesis, a course of development. Most of

2 those weapons had already been handed over to the army, and the previous

3 government in Croatia had done this. That is, the weapons of the

4 so-called Territorial Defence. And all this had been handed to the army.

5 Q. Very well. You were the Prime Minister when the Serbs were thrown

6 out of the constitution of Croatia. What was your reaction to that?

7 A. As opposed to you who did not intervene to what the Serbs were

8 doing in Croatia, I did intervene in response to what the Croats were

9 doing.

10 Q. But that was your duty.

11 A. But that was your duty as well. I intervened by requesting a

12 meeting in the Croatian Assembly at which I spoke about this at length.

13 Among other things, I said what should be done to put an end to this. And

14 I said quite clearly and listed things, starting from revanchism, the need

15 to stop the army, to need to sit round a table and talk to the Serbs, et

16 cetera, et cetera.

17 Q. My question was: What was your reaction when the Serbs were

18 thrown out of the Croatian constitution? You were the president of the

19 Presidency of Croatia for a time. You know the constitution of Croatia

20 which defined Croatia as a state of the Croatian people, the Serb people,

21 and others. What was your reaction?

22 A. My reaction was that it was a bad thing.

23 Q. And what was your reaction when the police raided Pakrac,

24 Plitvice, or Borovo Selo and all the incidents that took place there?

25 What was your reaction? You were the federal Prime Minister.

1 A. All these things, via the army, was part of the competence of the

2 Presidency of Yugoslavia. One could also ask what was the reaction was of

3 the Federal Executive Council when the Serbs attacked Croatian villages,

4 and there were such instances too. That was not in your competence so it

5 was only within the competence of the Presidency and the army.

6 Q. Thank you for your answer.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Could there be pauses, please, between question

8 and answer. I'm sorry.

9 JUDGE MAY: You know, the interpreters have really done remarkably

10 well considering the difficulties they've had. Particularly with the

11 witness and also the accused in particular taking up much room and time.

12 Would you bear in mind -- we'll ask Mr. Markovic too, to pause, if he

13 would, please. It's difficult, I know, because you're used to the

14 language, but give the interpreters time.

15 And you, Mr. Milosevic, you should also take time. You're not

16 really allowing time for everybody.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Markovic, please give me brief answers, because I have very

19 little time.

20 The agreement reached between the leaderships of Slovenia and

21 Croatia regarding joint actions towards the JNA on the 20th of January,

22 1991, and before that on the 6th of January, 1991, the Defence Ministers

23 met in Otocac to agree on coordinated action towards the JNA. Do you

24 remember that? Yes or no.

25 A. I don't remember that, but I do remember that the army or, rather,

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1 the General Staff was preparing an attack on the leadership of Croatia and

2 Slovenia. That I remember.

3 Q. I don't remember that the army carried out any attack.

4 A. No, they didn't carry out an attack, but they were preparing it.

5 I said that clearly and wrote that in my report for the Prosecution.

6 Q. And is it true that Article 5 of the constitution of SFRY

7 stipulated that the borders could not be changed without agreement of all

8 the republics and provinces?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Is it true that the Yugoslav People's Army was absolutely

11 pro-Yugoslav in orientation?

12 A. Well, that depends on o