1 Wednesday, 26 November 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 WITNESS: ESAD VELIC [Resumed]

8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

10 Q. [Interpretation] So, Mr. Velic, according to the information I

11 have, you had the main say in your municipality regarding all decisions

12 that were taken at the time. Is it true that Semsudin Velic, your own

13 brother, was appointed head of the Secretariat of the Interior precisely

14 at your proposal?

15 A. No, that is not correct because at the time when he was appointed

16 to that position I was not president of the SDA of Bosanska Krupa at all.

17 Q. You were not president, okay, but was he appointed?

18 A. Yes, he was appointed immediately after the multi-party elections,

19 and I was elected president of the SDA only a year later.

20 Q. But is it true that the secretary of the Executive Board was Edhem

21 Dizdarevic, your relative?

22 A. Edhem Dizdarevic was secretary of the Executive Board but I'm not

23 aware that he's my relative.

24 Q. But is it true that Suad Alibegic, president of the Executive

25 Board, was appointed at your proposal?

1 A. Late Suad Alibegovic -- Alibegic, who died in a car accident, was

2 appointed at the proposal of the independent municipality of Buzim.

3 Q. You were not involved?

4 A. Of course I was not involved because I did not know Mr. Alibegic

5 at all at the time.

6 Q. But is it true that your uncle Omer Velic held one of the

7 managerial positions in Krupatrans company?

8 A. I have only one uncle, Kasim Velic. He was never employed with

9 that company in Bosanska Krupa. He worked abroad in Austria.

10 Q. And who is this Omer Velic?

11 A. I know the gentleman but we are not related.

12 Q. All right.

13 A. I know Mr. Omer Velic, but we are not related, as I said.

14 Q. So you were not involved in any of these appointments, were you?

15 A. As far as the appointment of my brother Semsudin Velic, chief of

16 the police station is concerned, I was not involved directly because I was

17 only a member of the Executive Board of the SDA of Bosanska Krupa at that

18 moment. And as far as the appointment of Omer Alibegic is concerned, I

19 was not involved because he was nominated by an independent organisation

20 of the municipality of Buzim.

21 Q. So what was your influence on it?

22 A. My influence was limited to presenting my positions and arguments.

23 Q. So in paragraph 4 you said that problems in the interrelations

24 between the SDS and the SDA in the area of Krupa resulted from the --

25 their attitude towards the role of the JNA in the conflict in Croatia.

1 A. I don't have that statement with me. It hadn't been given to me.

2 But problems did arise around that, because the SDA and the SDA [as

3 interpreted] had different positions -- had different views on the role of

4 the JNA in Croatia.

5 Q. You say in paragraph 4 that you didn't agree with the JNA being

6 used to resolve problems in Croatia. Is that true?

7 A. If you ask me directly about --

8 Q. I'm not asking you about your opinion, I'm asking you about your

9 statement.

10 A. I cannot find this passage at the moment, so I cannot comment upon

11 it, but in any case, I did not agree nor would I agree today with the use

12 of the JNA in any internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

13 Q. You are talking about the resolution of political problems in the

14 former Republic of Croatia.

15 A. I think that is a wrong interpretation of my statement.

16 Q. A wrong interpretation of your statement?

17 A. That's what I think.

18 Q. So you could not give me the example of a single political problem

19 in Croatia where the JNA would be involved?

20 A. You would have to be more specific. I don't know what you mean.

21 Q. You say that this is a wrong interpretation of your statement

22 because the resolution of political problems in Croatia was not something

23 the JNA was involved in or interfered with?

24 A. I did say it was a wrong interpretation of my statement because

25 political divergences in the multi-party political life of Croatia were

1 what they were. It was only later that the JNA -- in fact, even later the

2 JNA did not interfere with that.

3 Q. What would you consider as taking sides on the part of the JNA?

4 A. The commanding staff of the JNA were never given the opportunity

5 to present their views publicly.

6 Q. All right. In 1991, the year you are referring to, Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina was an integral part of Yugoslavia, wasn't it?

8 A. That is not in dispute.

9 Q. I suppose you agree, both as a lawyer, former judge, public

10 prosecutor, a person who is familiar with the law, that with the decision

11 on mobilisation that was adopted then by the federal authorities, the

12 decision was binding on everybody regardless of their ethnicity.

13 A. I am not aware that the decision on mobilisation that was then

14 adopted was adopted by federal authorities.

15 Q. All right. You say on page 4 in paragraph 2 that the SDS wanted

16 to have direct control over personal documents of military conscripts in

17 Bosanska Krupa. Is that correct?

18 A. What I meant, actually, was that the SDS wanted to dispose of the

19 military documentation of military conscripts of Serb ethnicity.

20 Q. So they wanted to have the documentation of military conscripts of

21 Serb ethnicity.

22 A. Yes. In inter-party negotiations, representatives of the SDS were

23 explicit. They wanted the documentation of military conscripts of Serb

24 ethnicity to be separated from the rest so that they could dispose of it

25 and mobilise these conscripts.

1 Q. All right. I suppose that you imply the files, the military files

2 of these conscripts, not their personal documents.

3 A. Of course.

4 Q. I suppose that the following imprecision is also accidental: The

5 documents did not belong to the conscripts. They belonged to the military

6 authorities that were part of the -- that had the Territorial Defence as

7 its integral part.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And this documentation was held by the Secretariat for National

10 Defence?

11 A. On their premises.

12 Q. Is it true, as you say, that the head of the Secretariat for

13 National Defence was a Serb, a man named Boro?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You say you don't know his exact name but he was a member of the

16 SDS.

17 A. Yes. He was nominated to that position by the SDS.

18 Q. How is it possible, then, that this man Boro, who was head of that

19 secretariat, was unable to get hold of that documentation?

20 A. He was of course authorised, as all the other senior staff of the

21 secretariat, to handle their documentation and use it for purposes

22 envisaged by the law.

23 Q. So he had access to that documentation and was able to use it.

24 A. Of course. He had every legal authority to review and use that

25 documentation in keeping with the decisions of the competent authorities.

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1 Q. But in paragraph 12 you say that the SDS was denied this so-called

2 control by the secretariat.

3 A. The SDS could not have control of that documentation. Only

4 authorised officers were able to handle the documentation, and that's how

5 you should understand my statement.

6 Q. All right. Does it mean, then, that the SDS -- sorry, the SDA had

7 actual control of the documentation?

8 A. No, it doesn't mean that. It means that the staff of the

9 secretariat disposed of the documentation in the legally envisaged way.

10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter missed the question. This is

11 going too fast. Would you please repeat the last question.

12 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Now -- just a moment. Both of you

13 must bear in mind that this has to be interpreted. So, Mr. Milosevic, you

14 know quite well, you've been here long enough to know that, so would you

15 bear the interpreters in mind.

16 We will go on from now. I don't think we'll be able to recover

17 what the last question was.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. All right, Mr. Velic. In paragraph 3 on page 4, you say that

20 after this decision was taken by the SDA, the JNA intervened, but: "The

21 police and the civilians managed to prevent this, and the JNA did not

22 attempt to do so." Is this a precise quotation of what you said?

23 A. You read my statement correctly, but what does it mean? Perhaps I

24 did not use the most precise terms.

25 One day a small military unit came to Bosanska Krupa, to the

1 office of the president of the municipality, Mehmed Mahic, and asked to

2 take away the documentation from the Secretariat for National Defence. As

3 far as I know, this was met with the dissatisfaction of a certain number

4 of citizens who gathered on the premises of the Secretariat of National

5 Defence. In talks with the president of the secretariat, Mehmed Mahic,

6 the military abandoned the idea of taking this documentation.

7 Q. So the JNA did not even try to intervene?

8 A. I think the term "intervention" is too strong. Armed soldiers,

9 about 15 or 20 of them, did come, but they did not try to use force to

10 take this documentation.

11 Q. All right. Is it correct, though, that then in early autumn 1991,

12 the documentation was the focus of negotiations between representatives of

13 military authorities and local officials, representatives of the SDA

14 rather than between the SDS and the SDA?

15 A. I don't know the details of these negotiations. I did not even

16 attend the talks between representatives of the municipality and the

17 military. And I don't know if there were any other talks.

18 Q. All right. But the talks were between military representatives

19 and representatives of the SDA?

20 A. Not representatives of the SDA but official representatives of the

21 municipality of Bosanska Krupa.

22 Q. But they were SDA members, weren't they?

23 A. In this specific example, Mr. Mehmed Mahic was a member of the

24 SDA. He was president of the secretariat. If you give me another name,

25 I'll be able to tell you.

1 Q. Is it true that your wife was taking out this documentation on the

2 quiet, on the sly, through the window while negotiations were going on,

3 together with Semso Sepic [phoen]?

4 A. I don't know about that, sir. She was a member of the staff of

5 the secretariat, that much is true.

6 Q. All right, Mr. Velic. You advocated the abolishing of the

7 secretariat and its attachment to the secretariat of the economy.

8 A. You cannot say that I personally advocated it. What is true is at

9 the time a reorganisation of municipal administration bodies was under

10 way. At that time, as far as I remember, there was a proposal to organise

11 the Secretariat for National Defence as part of the Secretariat of the

12 Economy.

13 Q. And what justification was given for that, pray?

14 A. I don't know, I couldn't tell you now but there are documents

15 about that and they can be made available to the Court.

16 Q. But can you tell me, based on pure logic, what could be the

17 justification for attaching the Secretariat of Defence to the Secretariat

18 for Economy?

19 A. I cannot give you an explanation. I told you that I worked as

20 president of the SDA from September 1991 as a volunteer, on voluntary

21 basis.

22 Q. All right. We'll move on to another topic. In paragraph 5, page

23 -- in paragraph 3, page 5, you say that in local commune of Otoka of the

24 municipality of Bosanska Krupa there occurred an arrest of some people you

25 refer to as Martic's policemen.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. However, I assume that your brother knows a lot more about this

3 incident, that is Semsudin Velic, the then chief of police.

4 A. I guess that's so.

5 Q. All right. That same evening, as you mention, Martic himself was

6 arrested who was together with Smiljanic, an officer of the JNA from the

7 Banja Luka Corps; is that right?

8 A. Yes, that's right. Perhaps arrest, it would be the wrong word,

9 though.

10 Q. All right, so what's the word you would use?

11 A. Well, the previous events that took place with Martic's policemen,

12 as I said, caused unrest among citizens in Bosanska Krupa because they

13 were released from the Bosanska Krupa police station when yet another

14 20-odd policemen of Martic's came in. It was Sunday, the police station

15 was not properly secured, and that's how this happened. I thought then

16 and I think today that this was an armed provocation and an attempt to

17 destabilise the situation in Bosanska Krajina, specifically in Bosanska

18 Krupa.

19 In view of the anxiety among the citizens themselves, in Otoka

20 that evening about 500 to 1.000 citizens assembled around the bridge. It

21 was in the early evening. There was a police checkpoint there for

22 controlling traffic, and as the citizens assembled there, quite

23 accidentally a vehicle came up and Mr. Martic and Mr. Smiljanic were in

24 that vehicle.

25 Since the citizens noticed SAO Krajina insignia on the uniforms of

1 the persons in the vehicle, then this caused even greater unrest. The

2 policemen who were present were compelled to transport this vehicle to the

3 police station Otoka. It was only when he was identified at the police

4 station that Martic was recognised and Smiljanic introduced himself as he

5 offered his ID, his military ID.

6 Q. You say on page 5 of your statement -- because you say it just

7 now, that arrest is not an adequate word -- you say: "That same evening

8 Milan Martic, Serb commander from Croatia, was arrested near a small town

9 called Otoka." I asked you about that and then you also referred to

10 Colonel Smiljanic or, rather, Lieutenant Colonel Smiljanic.

11 JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered that question so there is no

12 need to go over it again. He has explained the circumstances and what he

13 means.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Tell me now, please, who issued the order to arrest Martic?

17 A. As far as I know, no one. As a matter of fact, I've just said

18 that "arrest" was not an adequate term at all, and it does not correspond

19 to the situation in which this happened.

20 That night I came to Otoka and I saw for myself that Martic was

21 already there at the police station in Otoka and that he was actually

22 protected by the police.

23 Q. All right. In view of the fact that your brother, as you said

24 yourself, was the chief of police at the time, is it correct that under

25 his command Muslim civilians were then given weapons by the police station

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1 in Bosanska Krupa?

2 A. As far as I know, that's not correct, Mr. Milosevic, but arms were

3 distributed to the reserve police force, or rather, part of the reserve

4 police force.

5 Q. So arms were distributed to part of the reserve police force as

6 you put it. And then further on you say that the -- the order for

7 Martic's arrest was annulled from Belgrade; is that right?

8 A. Well, when Martic was released, he was given an escort of the

9 republican MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he and Mr. Smiljanic were, and they

10 were transported to Bosanski Novi. In Bosanski Novi, Mr. Mahic Mehmed was

11 present, president of the municipality of Bosanska Krupa, who attended the

12 meeting between Martic and Mladic, General Mladic, who at that time did

13 not probably hold the rank of general. He deserved it later.

14 It was a cordial meeting. It ended with a hug. And this is what

15 Mahic told me about it: They were saying that the APB for Mr. Martic had

16 been annulled.

17 Q. But I'm quoting your statement. "An arrest warrant was issued for

18 Martic, the Bosnian MUP intervened, and then he was sent back to Bosanski

19 Novi. Mladic was waiting for him and the order was annulled from

20 Belgrade."

21 Do you allow for the following possibility, that it was not from

22 Belgrade that the arrest warrant was annulled. It wasn't even issued by

23 Belgrade but it was done by then minister of the interior of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Delimustafic?

25 A. Do you mean the APB or do you mean the arrest warrant? Well, as

1 far as I know, what was made public then was there was a federal APB

2 issued by the federal authorities but at the initiative of Croatia.

3 However, it was annulled after what happened in Otoka and if we are to

4 abide by the principles of legality, Mr. Delimustafic could not have

5 annulled something that was issued by the federal authorities.

6 Q. So you don't know who annulled it.

7 A. I don't.

8 Q. Is it correct that while Martic was at the SUP premises in Krupa a

9 large number of armed Muslims had assembled in front of the SUP building?

10 A. Mr. Martic was never at the police station in Krupa, he was at the

11 place station in Otoka.

12 Q. Otoka is in Krupa I believe.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please speak one at a time,

14 the interpreters ask.

15 JUDGE MAY: You're being asked again, you're being cautioned by

16 the interpreters. Just leave a moment after the other has spoken, before

17 you respond. Yes.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Otoka was a local commune within the

19 municipality of Bosanska Krupa, and that is where the police department

20 was, one of the police departments, and that is where Martic was during

21 the night between the 8th and 9th of September, 1991. As I had already

22 said, a number of citizens of Otoka had assembled in the centre of that

23 area, but no, there was no harm done.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. However, they had assembled and they wanted Martic to be handed

1 over to them so that they could judge him.

2 A. Mr. Milosevic, they had gathered there. Some of them were under

3 the influence of alcohol, but the police held everything under control and

4 there were no concrete requests put forth by the citizens, as far as I

5 know.

6 Q. All right. On page 5, in paragraphs 9 and 11 you say that you

7 from the Party of Democratic Action made every effort to increase the

8 number of reservists of the police force and that that was the only way in

9 which you could legally obtain weapons. Is that right?

10 A. That is quite right.

11 Q. This initiative was started in the autumn of 1991. Is that right,

12 Mr. Velic?

13 A. I think that that initiative was launched much earlier, perhaps

14 even about a year earlier, perhaps the spring of 1991, and it was launched

15 from official quarters, the municipal authorities of Bosanska Krupa. It

16 was also addressed to the appropriate authorities, that is to say the

17 then-Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18 Q. Tell me, why did you need weapons at the time, that is to say in

19 the spring of 1991? There were no conflicts then. How did you know there

20 would be some kind of conflict? Why did you need weapons then?

21 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, what was asked for was a legal increase in

22 the police force, because our area, Bosanska Krajina, had been

23 destabilised a lot earlier before the war conflict actually started in

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to the conflicts in Croatia, all of this was

25 reflected in our area, Bosanska Krajina, and almost for one year people

1 could not travel through the part of Croatia called the Serb Krajina.

2 Some people were even killed when they tried to travel through that area.

3 Q. When you say that you linked this to what happened in Krajina, let

4 me mention something that did not happen in Krajina, that happened in your

5 region, as a matter of fact. You certainly remember when the following

6 happened: In 1991, in Bosanska Krupa, when a monument disappeared, the

7 monument dedicated to the author Branko Copic, and it was supposed to be

8 placed close to the public security station building and it simply

9 disappeared.

10 A. The monument did not disappear, Mr. Izetbegovic [sic]. It cannot

11 be treated that way. This is something that happened actually at the

12 beginning of 1991.

13 The dispute over the monument started because the permit to place

14 the monument there had been issued against the law, illegally. All of

15 this was done by the then-president of the SDS, Miroslav Vjestica, as

16 secretary of the Secretariat for Social Services.

17 Q. All right. Already twice you've addressed me as Mr. Itzetbegovic.

18 It's probably your subconsciousness speaking. You probably have some

19 reason for that.

20 A. Well, probably I do.

21 Q. All right. You're trying to say that this was organised by the

22 secretary of the Secretariat for Social Services. Is it true that the

23 monument was stolen from the very centre of town during the night?

24 A. Of course that's not right.

25 Q. Well, what happened to the monument?

1 A. As I've already said, the monument never existed. When the

2 preparations started to build the base for the monument, a procedure was

3 started to annul the permit that had been issued illegally. So then the

4 authorities in charge said that the entire activity should be halted.

5 Just before the first church service was supposed to be held in

6 the Orthodox church in Bosanska Krupa - and I can't remember exactly on

7 which date this was - persons unknown left a bust of Branko Copic right

8 next to the place where the works had started. As far as I can remember,

9 this bust was removed by the authorities in charge in a legal way.

10 Q. Is it true that this led to inter-ethnic tensions because of which

11 a meeting was held among the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina attended by

12 Alija Izetbegovic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Ejub Ganic, Avdo Hebic [phoen],

13 Halil Delimustafic, Mehmed Mahic, and Suad Alibegic, officials from your

14 municipality; is that right?

15 A. Yes. There were certain tensions. I think that that is why the

16 whole thing was prepared as such, to bring yet another thing into the

17 situation that prevailed at the time that would lead to further

18 destabilisation.

19 Actually, the representatives of the SDS and the local

20 representatives of the Orthodox church in Bosanska Krupa visited the

21 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they launched the initiative to have

22 such a meeting held. The meeting was not actually held in the Presidency

23 of Bosnia-Herzegovina because the representatives of the SDS did not wish

24 to participate in the meeting until the then-president of the SDS of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Karadzic, withdrew the statements that he made on

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1 TV Bosnia-Herzegovina in this respect, and what he said was wrong. As far

2 as I know, only a press conference was held.

3 Q. As far as I know, Mladen Drljaca, a Serb, attended this meeting

4 and for a while he was secretary of the municipality of Bosanska Krupa; is

5 that right?

6 A. I repeat yet again there was no official meeting held, only a

7 press conference was held. As for Mladen Drljaca, Mr. Mladen Drljaca, I

8 know him personally, I do not remember that he was present there. I don't

9 remember him coming to Sarajevo, because I was one of the representatives

10 of the SDA from Bosanska Krupa.

11 Q. So you attended the meeting?

12 A. I attended the press conference, Mr. Milosevic.

13 Q. All right. Do you know, then, since this was not held as an

14 official meeting, that Ejub Ganic at this meeting, not knowing that Mladen

15 Drljaca was a Serb, said to Mehmed Mahic that, "All these Serbs should be

16 cleansed." Did Mahic inform you about that?

17 A. Mr. Milosevic, Mahic Mehmed was not present at this press

18 conference, and he was not on the delegation of the SDA of Bosanska Krupa

19 that was supposed to participate at the planned meeting. As a matter of

20 fact, we concluded in Bosanska Krupa that it would not be right for the

21 official representatives of the authorities from Bosanska Krupa to attend

22 the meeting because that could be interpreted as pressure against these

23 representatives of the authorities in resolving this particular case. So

24 practically only Mr. Kabijevic [phoen] and I were sent to attend this

25 meeting.

1 Q. I'm asking you whether you know that Ejub Ganic then said that all

2 these Serbs should be cleansed.

3 A. If there was no meeting, that means that I cannot be aware of what

4 you say just now.

5 Q. So if you don't know, then just say that you don't know and let's

6 move on.

7 On the same day after the meeting was held, the monument was found

8 at the chapel of the municipal cemetery in Bosanska Krupa.

9 A. After a meeting that was held in Bosanska Krupa itself, this was a

10 day before the church service at the Orthodox church, the bust of Branko

11 Copic was handed over to the gentleman who had actually financed the

12 building of the monument. He actually ordered this bust. He commissioned

13 it. And I assume that this was at the chapel of the cemetery in Bosanska

14 Krupa.

15 And also, there was a written argument -- agreement that he should

16 keep the bust in his garage.

17 Q. In paragraph 2, page 6, you refer to what happened in the village

18 of Arapusa. You call it an incident.

19 A. Yes, I remember that.

20 Q. You say that on that occasion that there was a bit of shooting and

21 that a young Serb was wounded.

22 A. Yes. I heard about this indirectly. Mr. Mehmed Mahic, president

23 of the municipal Assembly, was involved in the entire course of these

24 talks, and I can only convey the information I learned from him.

25 Q. But you certainly know that three young Serbs were wounded,

1 gravely at that, from firearms.

2 A. I'm not aware of that, Mr. Milosevic. As I said, I can only have

3 information that I received from others in this regard.

4 Q. When you say some shooting, but -- that means an exchange of

5 gunfire, but these young men were ambushed. There was no exchange of

6 gunfire. Don't you know that?

7 A. According to the information I received, there was some shooting.

8 It was a skirmish because this happened during the night. Arapusa was a

9 village that was populated by Bosniaks only. These young men, who were

10 driving in a car through the village, came a cross a checkpoint of the

11 reserve police force. As far as I was informed, there was a skirmish,

12 there was an exchange of gunfire.

13 Q. In this same paragraph on page 6, you say that this was staged by

14 the SDS in order to cause an incident.

15 A. That is what I believed then, and I still believe that.

16 Q. So you believe that the SDS sent young Serbs to a Muslim village

17 and also that the SDS sent members of the Muslim police force to go to

18 that village and to shoot at these young Serbs and to seriously wound or

19 kill these young Serbs, because those men who were in the ambush could not

20 have known whether they killed them or not, so that they could afterwards

21 attack Bosanska Krupa. So is that what you're trying to say?

22 A. That's not what I said and that's not what I'm trying to say.

23 Q. You say the SDS staged this. So they sent these young men there

24 and they probably sent the Muslim police to shoot at them.

25 A. These are speculations, Mr. Milosevic.

1 Q. How can it be speculation if it says in paragraph 2, page 6, that

2 it was staged by the SDS, this shooting at the young Serb men?

3 A. I think I've already answered this question. If you need

4 additional explanation, I would kindly ask you to say so.

5 Q. All right. Your brother knew then and knows now who exactly shot

6 at these young men, but nothing was ever done. The police was under his

7 command. Nothing was done to arrest the perpetrators and to calm down the

8 inter-ethnic tension that resulted.

9 A. As far as I know, Mr. Milosevic, this incident took place two days

10 before the attack on Bosanska Krupa. Whether measures had been taken

11 against these reserve policemen, I don't know, because already on the 21st

12 of April -- and I must say that in the meantime, between the 19th and the

13 21st of April, SDS representatives did not show up for planned meetings

14 and negotiations in Bosanska Krupa, and I had no information from them.

15 Q. All right. But you say in another paragraph on page 6 that the

16 SDS reacted to this incident by sending their paramilitaries to this

17 village to surround the village. Was it an organised action of the

18 paramilitaries of the SDS or was it just a spontaneous reaction of the

19 local residents?

20 A. As I said, a representative of the municipality of Bosanska Krupa

21 went immediately to that village on a visit - I'm speaking about Mehmed

22 Mahic, president of the Municipal Assembly of Bosanska Krupa - and from

23 talking to him, I learned that he toured the village in the presence of

24 Gojko Klickovic, president of the Crisis Staff that had been formed by the

25 SDS. When they were touring the village, they were able to clearly see,

1 in fact, Mr. Mahic clearly saw armed paramilitaries, and he had the

2 impression that they were commanded by Mr. Klickovic. He even told me

3 that when touring this area, one of the members of the paramilitary units,

4 whether deliberately or not, fired a volley of automatic fire.

5 Q. But during this siege, as you call it, nobody was wounded or

6 killed. The only demand was made to surrender to the police, and I

7 repeat, the police, not local residents, the perpetrators of the crime

8 against young Serb men.

9 A. The people who were responsible for this incident - and I'm not

10 going to call it a crime - were available to the police from the very

11 beginning, but I cannot agree with you when you say that in this operation

12 of the paramilitaries, the Serb paramilitaries, nobody was killed.

13 Arapusa remained under seige for the next two days and even after

14 the attack on Bosanska Krupa. All civilians were subsequently driven away

15 from their homes, and some people, at least two of whom I can name, went

16 missing. They were taken to concentration camps and were never seen

17 again. These two people are Ibrahim Ibrahimovic, and Sulejman

18 Ibrahimovic.

19 Q. I don't know about these camps.

20 JUDGE MAY: You have two minutes left now, Mr. Milosevic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will do my best.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. I would appreciate short answers, Mr. Velic. I have just a few

24 more questions. It will take two or three minutes.

25 On the 21st of April, 1992, a meeting was held in Bosanska Krupa

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1 to discuss this incident, and it was attended by General Spiro Ninkovic

2 from the 10th Banja Luka Corps.

3 A. Well, not exactly. It was his liaison officer who arrived. I

4 don't know his name. He was a captain by rank. And Mr. Spiro Ninkovic

5 turned up just in time for the beginning of the meeting. He did not want

6 to attend the meeting, he only wanted to talk to the president of the

7 Assembly, Mr. Mehmed Mahic.

8 Q. All right. Is it true that he came to Bosanska Krupa to talk to

9 the local authorities who were then located in Jasenica village in order

10 to convey the position, the message of Blagoje Adzic, chief of the General

11 Staff, that every effort must be made to defuse the tensions that occurred

12 after the incident of the killing of Serb men?

13 A. I cannot say that, but I can say that Mr. Ninkovic left the

14 building accompanied by Mr. Mahic, and he went on to visit the village of

15 Vranjska and Jasenica. However, a couple of minutes after Mr. Mahic

16 returned to the building, the shelling of Bosanska Krupa began precisely

17 from that direction.

18 Q. Is it true that two kilometres away from the entrance to Bosanska

19 Krupa the vehicle containing Ninkovic and his entourage came under fire

20 from automatic weapons?

21 A. I don't know that that is true. Muslim positions did not exist

22 then. There was only a police checkpoint at the exit from the town. He

23 passed through that checkpoint accompanied by Mr. Mahic.

24 Q. Precisely during -- due to the fact that fire was opened against

25 him, he wanted to be escorted.

1 A. I'm not aware of that.

2 Q. It was then, as you say, that the attack on Krupa occurred, and

3 shooting continued throughout that night.

4 A. Well, the shooting lasted for about an hour, and then there was a

5 lull. There were no more activities, no more operations during the night,

6 and the shelling resumed at 6:00 a.m. the next morning.

7 Q. Who was it who opened fire at Bosanska Krupa then?

8 A. I cannot name any names and I cannot tell you anything specific; I

9 can only tell you what I think.

10 Q. All right. So you didn't see anything. But is it clear to you

11 that it wasn't the JNA that was firing?

12 A. My opinion is that it was the armed formations of the SDS firing

13 from guns of the JNA.

14 JUDGE MAY: This must be your last question.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. So it was not the JNA that attacked the town. On the contrary.

17 At the meeting of the 25th of April attended by Fikret Abdic, Miroslav

18 Vjestica, and others, General Spiro Ninkovic suggested that neutral areas,

19 neutral zones, be established to prevent this from re-occurring.

20 A. I attended another meeting in Bosanski Petrovac which was another

21 attempt to discuss the case of Bosanska Krupa. This meeting in Bosanski

22 Petrovac was indeed attended by General Spiro Ninkovic as well as Fikret

23 Abdic. The talks that took place at that meeting were too vague,

24 unspecific. General Spiro Ninkovic did speak about some kind of role for

25 the army, but he made no specific proposals. We thought that the case

1 could be resolved within the institutions of the system without any

2 participation or involvement of the JNA.

3 JUDGE MAY: That's your last question.

4 Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that

6 there is one thing that remains unclarified with regard to the statement

7 of this witness.

8 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

9 Q. [Interpretation] If you would be so kind, Witness, look at the

10 last paragraph on page 8 where you spoke first about the meeting between

11 the SDS and the SDA, which turned out to be the last meeting. You did not

12 mention any negotiations with the JNA, and then you say: "The front lines

13 around Bosanska Krupa narrowed. The town was divided into two parts. The

14 Una River became a front line. In that period, there were no serious

15 attempts on the part of Serbian forces to capture the left bank. They

16 seemed to be content with the territory they held at the moment."

17 And then you mention further on that you discussed possible ways

18 of defending yourself.

19 My question is: This defence line, this front line, existed

20 between your forces and the forces of the SDS, that is your paramilitaries

21 and their paramilitaries; is that correct?

22 A. Excuse me. My microphone wasn't working. "Front line" is not a

23 term I would use, and it certainly does not correspond to the situation on

24 the ground in Bosanska Krupa at the time.

25 You say that the participation of the JNA in that meeting is not

1 mentioned, but what is mentioned is the presence of General Ninkovic and

2 his specific proposals.

3 As for front lines, they did not exist in the true military sense

4 of the word. There were only police forces in Bosanska Krupa who were

5 disorganised over a period of three or four days that followed, and there

6 was a certain number of volunteers, if I can call them that, who

7 self-organised in order to defend the town. I can accept that the

8 remaining part of your quotation is true.

9 Q. But you do speak about front lines and the division of the town in

10 two parts. Then you say in the next paragraph they managed -- in fact:

11 "We managed to hold these lines until November 1992. Serbs moved to the

12 left bank and captured some parts of the town."

13 Could you explain this?

14 A. I can. After a few days in which chaos reigned in that part of

15 the town on the left bank of the Una River, the population of Bosanska

16 Krupa withdrew to the left bank of the Una River, and that situation

17 continued for the few months that followed. And then the events that I

18 mentioned already occurred. I wasn't in town any more, but the

19 information that I quoted here is information I received from others who

20 did live there.

21 Q. Because at that time, you were in the War Presidency of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was located in Zagreb at the time. Is that

23 true?

24 A. This is a completely wrong interpretation of what I said. I was

25 in Zagreb according to the decision of the War Presidency of Bosanska

1 Krupa. I was sent to Zagreb on a certain mission.

2 Q. So it's not true if it says here: "I left Bosanska Krupa in

3 November 1992. I was sent to Zagreb to work in the War Presidency."

4 A. That's not true. The War Presidency was located in Bosanska

5 Krupa. It should say, "... according to the decision of the War

6 Presidency." I don't know how this error found its way into my statement.

7 MR. AGHA: Yes, Your Honours. With permission, I'd just like to

8 ask a few questions in re-examination

9 Re-examined by Mr. Agha:

10 Q. Mr. Velic, in your evidence you mention that you were shown a

11 study on the administration division of Bosanska Krupa as being the first

12 steps in creating a Balkan state. Do you remember that study? Now, how

13 many other municipalities were shown similar studies like that?

14 A. Yes, I did mention that study which in everyday talk we referred

15 to as the feasibility study on the division of the Bosanska Krupa

16 municipality. The official title was probably different.

17 It was not a step towards forming a phantom state. It said in the

18 first paragraph of the study it was -- it said it was the first step to

19 the establishment of the first unified Serbian state in the Balkans. I

20 later learned that a similar study was done for the municipality of Bihac,

21 and in subsequent informal contacts, I found out that in municipalities

22 with mixed population - mixed consisting of Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and

23 others - the SDS suggested and offered similar studies.

24 Q. Now, I think this is quite an important point which the Trial

25 Chamber would like to know about, and being a lawyer and one of the

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1 leading SDA people, perhaps you can help. You refer in your evidence that

2 there was a decision of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency that no one

3 should join the JNA. At that time, which ethnic groups made up the

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency?

5 A. Yes. That happened during the events in Croatia in 1991. At that

6 time, there were seven members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

7 including representatives of the three constituent peoples, because there

8 were three constituent peoples at that time, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats,

9 plus one representative of the group called Yugoslavs; that is, there were

10 seven members in total.

11 Q. Now, that decision, who was it legally binding on in the Republic

12 of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

13 A. That decision of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina was, of

14 course, binding on all authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were

15 subordinated to the Presidency including, of course, Secretariats for

16 National Defence in various municipalities.

17 Q. So that would include the Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian

18 population; everybody?

19 A. Certainly, because the authorities, the bodies of administration,

20 the bodies of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were unified and

21 single, and they were elected after multi-party elections in 1991.

22 Q. Now, I have one final question for you, is that you mention that

23 the mosque and the Catholic church on the bank of the Una, which the

24 Serbian forces were occupying at Bosanska Krupa, were destroyed. What was

25 the fate of the Orthodox church?

1 A. Well, the buildings that you mentioned are at most 100 metres away

2 from each other in Bosanska Krupa. The mosque was set on fire as soon as

3 Serb forces entered Bosanska Krupa. The Catholic church was destroyed

4 under circumstances that I'm not familiar with because I only saw that

5 when I returned to Bosanska Krupa after the war, and the Serbian Orthodox

6 Church remained intact, in the condition in which it is still today.

7 MR. AGHA: That completes my re-examination.

8 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Mr. Velic, that concludes your evidence.

9 Thank you for coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are

10 now free to go. If you would just wait one moment.

11 [The witness withdrew]

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I want to avail myself of this idle

14 time to ask you a question. I received this schedule. It says 9th

15 December to be decided. Are we sitting on the 9th or not? I am not clear

16 on that, because I need to know for purposes of my own planning.

17 JUDGE MAY: That is undecided. It depends on the health of Judge

18 Robinson. You should keep it clear for sitting. If he is fit enough, we

19 will sit. Otherwise, we won't. But I'm afraid we can't make a firm

20 decision on that because, as I say, it depends on his health.

21 MR. NICE: Your Honours, the next witness -- I'm not sure whether

22 we're in private or open session.

23 JUDGE MAY: We're in open session.

24 MR. NICE: We can be in open session, there is no problem. The

25 next witness --

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

2 MR. NICE: The next witness is Mr. Deronjic. We haven't made a

3 formal written application to have his statement admitted under 89(F).

4 The Chamber will possibly recall that we first, I think, provided draft

5 copies of his statement before the order to make written applications was

6 made, and we didn't get a final signed version until yesterday.

7 The position on disclosure of his material is as follows: Leave

8 was granted to call him on the 16th of October, and in anticipation of

9 that, transcripts of his interviews have been disclosed on the 10th of

10 October. The first draft of his statement in English was provided on the

11 13th of November, and much of that cross-referred to his interviews.

12 Another draft in English and B/C/S was provided on the 24th of November.

13 The witness signed the statement with minor amendments yesterday, and that

14 was provided in English and B/C/S yesterday, the Chamber having had the

15 earlier draft version and having had, I hope now by the form of a

16 memorandum, a notice of the very limited changes to some six paragraphs.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will admit the statement.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm very grateful. The statement deals

19 with a large number of matters. The witness has given evidence twice

20 recently publicly, once as recently as last week. In the interests of

21 saving time, and unless the Court orders otherwise, I would not propose

22 necessarily to take him through any of his evidence in chief, although I

23 might ask him simply one or two general questions and get him to produce

24 one exhibit additional to those that have already been produced by other

25 witnesses. I don't know if that approach is acceptable to the Court.

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

2 MR. NICE: May the witness come in.

3 [The witness entered court]

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

6 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

7 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

8 WITNESS: MIROSLAV DERONJIC

9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 Examined by Mr. Nice:

11 Q. Can you give us your full name, please.

12 A. My name is Miroslav Deronjic.

13 Q. Mr. Deronjic, it's a matter of public record that you have entered

14 pleas of guilty at this Tribunal in respect of an indictment and are

15 awaiting sentence in respect of matters to which you've pleaded guilty;

16 correct?

17 A. Yes, that is correct.

18 Q. You've already given evidence before component parts of this

19 Tribunal on two previous occasions and have cooperated with the Tribunal

20 in the preparation of an extensive witness statement, now in some 232

21 paragraphs.

22 A. Yes, that is correct.

23 Q. You reviewed that statement in your own language in the course of

24 the last couple of days and signed a version of it and signed every page

25 of that version yesterday?

1 A. Yes, that is also correct.

2 Q. And is that statement and its contents true and accurate to the

3 best of your knowledge and belief?

4 A. This statement is completely accurate, and I agreed to sign it as

5 a completely accurate statement.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. It should be given the next exhibit number.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 600, Your Honours.

8 MR. NICE:

9 Q. In the course of your statement, you identify really four

10 exhibits, three of them exhibits that have been produced before.

11 MR. NICE: And, Your Honours, for purposes of ease of reference,

12 can I deal with those.

13 Q. At paragraph 45, Mr. Deronjic, you dealt with the question of

14 Variant A and B municipalities, as described, and with instructions that

15 had been disseminated.

16 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, that's Exhibit 434, tab 3. I don't

17 desire to go through it, I'm just doing this for identification purposes.

18 Q. At paragraph 68 of your statement, you dealt with the question of

19 the strategic goals of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the

20 document that sets out those strategic goals is Exhibit 451, tab 12.

21 At paragraph 224, just to deal with exhibits already produced, you

22 dealt with the document signed eventually by Mr. Franken after he'd

23 amended it. And we've heard from Mr. Franken recently, and that document

24 is Exhibit 591, tab 9.

25 Have you reviewed those three exhibits and do you confirm that

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1 those are the documents to which you were referring?

2 A. Yes. I looked at all three documents, and these are the documents

3 that you referred to just now.

4 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm not - it's my mistake. I'm not --

5 Q. I should tell you, Mr. Deronjic, that the Trial Chamber has agreed

6 to accept your statement in full as your evidence-in-chief so that I'm

7 going to be asking a very limited number of questions and we'll be moving

8 rapidly to cross-examination. But before I do that, there is the one

9 additional exhibit that I want to produce through you, and you're entitled

10 to look at your witness statement at any point, subject to the decision of

11 the Trial Chamber, if you wish to. And at paragraph 206, dealing with

12 both the evacuations and executions that occurred on the 13th of July,

13 1995, you speak of a phone call that you made to Karadzic. And if you

14 please look at the exhibit that is presently before you, which is a

15 transcript of an intercept of a telephone conversation between you and

16 Karadzic, have you reviewed the transcript of that intercept?

17 A. Yes, I have reviewed that transcript.

18 Q. Are you in a position to help us whether that appears to be an

19 accurate transcript of a conversation you had with Karadzic?

20 A. Yes. This is an accurate transcript of the conversation that I

21 had with Mr. Karadzic on the 13th of July.

22 MR. NICE: If the usher would be good enough just to place the

23 first page of the English version of this on the overhead projector.

24 Q. Mr. Deronjic, we find in this transcript of the intercept

25 reference to -- at the bottom of the page if we see it, part of the

1 conversation goes -- "Can you hear me, President?" Somebody saying, "The

2 president can't hear, Deronjic, this is the intermediary." And you

3 saying: "I have 2000 here now by ..." and then your voice was drowned

4 out, and then X says: "Deronjic, the president says: 'All the goods must

5 be placed in the warehouse before 12 tomorrow.'" "Right." X says:

6 "Deronjic, not in the warehouses but somewhere else." You say,

7 "Understood." And if we can then go to the next page. It says: "I'm

8 waiting for a call to President Karadzic. Is he there?" "Yes." "Hello.

9 Just a minute, the duty officer will answer you now, Mr. President."

10 "Hello, I have Deronjic on the line," and then you speak to him.

11 "Hello. I can hear you." "Deronjic, the president is asking how many

12 thousands." You say: "Two for the time being but there will be more

13 during the night."

14 Now, what was being referred to as goods and by the number of

15 2.000, if you can help us, please.

16 A. The goods that are mentioned, or the 2.000 mentioned in terms of

17 figures, pertained to the imprisoned Muslims who were brought to Bratunac

18 during the night of the 13th, and they were put up at various localities

19 including the elementary school, the hangar, the stadium, and so on.

20 MR. NICE: May this transcript of an intercept be admitted, either

21 fully admitted or admitted for identification purposes, but the

22 acknowledgement by the witness of its accuracy may take it into the

23 position of being an exhibit that can be fully produced.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE MAY: At this stage we're going to mark it for

1 identification because we're going to have evidence about these intercepts

2 in due course.

3 MR. NICE: Certainly.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, give it the next number.

5 THE REGISTRAR: 601, Your Honour, marked for identification.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I'm mistaken, but I have not

9 received either on tape or on CD this intercepted conversation, so I would

10 kindly ask to have this provided for me if it exists.

11 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice.

12 MR. NICE: I'll deal with that over the break and check whether

13 it's one of those that has been provided; and if not, I'll find out why

14 not.

15 Q. Mr. Deronjic, your statement, which is now an exhibit in the case,

16 covers a range of matters from the arming of the Serbs to your particular

17 position as commissioner at Srebrenica and so on. Can you help us,

18 please, by giving, just in a few sentences because you're an educated man,

19 a teacher, of all these events, can you, just in a few sentences, survey

20 the relevant history and explain how it was that people such as you came

21 to be involved in these events. And without leading you but simply

22 reminding you how you've described it in the past, I think you've used the

23 word "spiral" or spiral of events. If you could do it in a few minutes,

24 perhaps up to five, I think that would be very helpful for us.

25 A. Yes, Your Honour. I will try to answer this question. You have

1 noticed that my statement contains events ranging over a period of almost

2 five years, that is to say from 1990 until 1995. In that statement, I

3 tried to focus on the events that I participated in directly, namely the

4 events in Bratunac with reference to what was happening in the

5 neighbouring municipalities to the extent to which I followed these events

6 and was aware of them.

7 Also, I gave a broader survey of political activities, from the

8 lowest level, where I acted for the most part, all the way up to the top

9 level where I took part in 1993 as a member of the Main Board of the SDS.

10 Of course that is a question that preoccupied me, like many other people:

11 What really happened in that area, including the entire area of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

13 As I made this statement, I actually wanted to testify about the

14 following: First and foremost, the events that took place are well known,

15 and the political concepts of the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats are well

16 known in the early 1990s in the absolute crisis that the former Yugoslavia

17 was engulfed in.

18 What led me and many people to take part in these events were the

19 plans that were fully public in their first stage. Now I'm talking about

20 the plans of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They pertained to the need that

21 all Serbs should remain together in one state. At first this was an

22 endeavour to preserve a single Yugoslavia, and after that, these plans

23 were somewhat changed as events developed. This is something that is well

24 known in this Tribunal as well.

25 What did I try to show now throughout my statement: First and

1 foremost, that these public plans that I was involved in too from 1991

2 onwards, actually related to the establishment of an entity of the Bosnian

3 Serbs in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are known as the plan to

4 create Republika Srpska. This was a public plan. There were many

5 manifestations related to this plan. This was recorded in the media, in

6 speeches made by top people, including some of the activities I had at

7 local level primarily in the area where I lived and worked.

8 These plans involved certain stages in their implementation. At

9 first it was communities of municipalities that were established and later

10 on they grew into those well-known Serb autonomous regions. There were

11 five of them in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were formed in the period of

12 1991, and in the autumn they were verified at an Assembly, at a Serb

13 Assembly, as regions that were roughly supposed to grow into this Serb

14 entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15 Towards the end of 1991, I took part in these events to an extent

16 to which this surprised most people who were -- there were some measures

17 involved that surprised most people who were involved in political

18 activities in those days. These were the first secret measures that were

19 taken and that were supposed to contribute to the attainment of this

20 objective, namely the establishment of a Serb entity in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This Tribunal knows about them as Variants A and B.

22 This is what all the party authorities of the SDS in the former

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina received this at the time, with the obligation of

24 carrying this out in the field.

25 These political orders were strictly confidential, highly

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1 confidential, and it was the first time ever during my involvement in

2 politics that I then received this kind of paper that was strictly

3 confidential and marked as such. Namely, it was the executive and

4 legislative branches that were supposed to be divided in municipalities.

5 This primarily had to do with minority municipalities. When I say

6 "minority municipalities," that is where Serbs were minority, and there

7 were such municipalities. Bratunac, Zvornik, Srebrenica, Visegrad, not to

8 mention any others. This was within the Serb autonomous regions that I

9 spoke of earlier on.

10 After that, and I have to say this for the sake of the truth,

11 people in various areas interpreted this in different ways and implemented

12 it in different ways. There was even resistance to it, and people tried

13 to adjust to the local situation. And I described the way in which I

14 carried out these instructions. This was a rather special way. I carried

15 out this in Bratunac in the joint Assembly in agreement with

16 representatives of the Muslims in the joint Assembly of the municipality

17 of Bratunac. I just insisted on the singling out of one particular group,

18 and that was the police in Bratunac.

19 So I know that there were special situations in Zvornik too. I

20 knew the leadership very well there too and also in some other

21 municipalities.

22 In this situation, the beginning of April 1992, certain military

23 formations known as the volunteers of Arkan's guard arrived in these areas

24 as well as Seselj's volunteers, and so on and so forth, not to mention all

25 of them. They arrived in the Drina region and some other areas of

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they caused conflicts.

2 For many people, this came as a surprise. I'm not going to talk

3 about myself now but I know some of the things that happened in Zvornik,

4 some of the things that happened in Bijeljina. I know that some Serb

5 leaders were arrested, beaten, kept in prison, tortured, et cetera. So

6 this was a radical stage in the inter-ethnic relations in that area,

7 including the municipality of Bratunac.

8 When these people arrived, they were supposed to constitute a

9 secret part of these plans. So a certain number of people, I cannot say

10 how many, within the SDS leadership itself was not aware of such plans.

11 What happened later, in my opinion, is only a matter of cause and

12 consequence in the area, cause and effect.

13 Quite briefly, when these volunteers in these units from Serbia

14 came to the area, they started killing people, looting. They brought

15 panic to these municipalities, and the inter-ethnic relations that were

16 already threatened led to growing fear and predominantly Muslims started

17 fleeing from the area.

18 Now I'm going to focus on Bratunac because I am most familiar with

19 the situation there. It was to be expected that the Muslims would not

20 simply sit and watch all these things that were happening. Soon after

21 these people came to this region, Naser in Srebrenica, in the village of

22 Potocari, on the 20th of April ambushed these units and killed these men.

23 I don't know exactly how this incident occurred but I know that basically

24 most of the men were killed in this ambush, or practically all of them

25 were killed in this ambush, as far as I know.

1 After that, Goran Zekic was killed, who was one of the leading

2 Serbs in the area, in Srebrenica, on the 8th of May. And then on the 9th

3 of the May we already took some steps, and I explain these in detail in my

4 guilty plea or, rather, in the sentencing brief. All of this led to this

5 cause and effect that I already said, and that is how things evolved.

6 Already in 1992, after everything we did in Bratunac, then the

7 Muslims from Srebrenica took action. They attacked the area of Bratunac.

8 There was a lot of fighting there. Great territories were taken, there

9 were many casualties, military and civilian. In 1993 a counter-offensive

10 of the Serbs started in the area of Srebrenica, and then the well-known

11 Morillon affair, and Srebrenica was proclaimed a safe haven of the UN,

12 safe area, on the 13th of April, 1994.

13 In 1994, both sides made efforts to take the entire area. Muslim

14 area -- Muslim forces from Srebrenica made incursions in the Serbia area.

15 Also I managed to see here some orders of lower level and higher level

16 commands, orders issued to Serb forces around Srebrenica. All of this

17 testified to the fact that these people in the safe area were -- their

18 life was supposed to be made impossible by all means.

19 The logical effect -- I say unfortunately this is the logical

20 effect, and I'm not saying it's a normal thing, that was the offensive of

21 the Serb forces in 1995, the attack on Srebrenica and the denouement that

22 occurred. That is a fact that is well known. Several thousand imprisoned

23 Muslims in the area were killed.

24 I wish to show that what happened in Bratunac in the Drina region

25 and in the municipalities that I knew developed according to a domino

1 effect principle. People came from Serbia to that area that had already

2 been hampered by these different political concepts, and inter-ethnic

3 relations were already quite bad, and all of this led to what happened

4 afterwards. And in my opinion, Srebrenica 1995 is a logical finale, the

5 only thing that could be the result of these events.

6 I'm sorry if I took up a lot of time, but this is a very complex

7 issue, and I wanted to cover all these developments in my statement.

8 Q. Dealing simply with that last --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. Dealing simply with your last observation about Srebrenica 1995

12 being a logical finale, the only thing that could result, is that

13 something that you've simply judged looking back or was it something that

14 was in your mind as an observer at the time?

15 A. Your Honour, of course I was a participant in most of these

16 events, and I explained this in my statement in a very precise manner. Of

17 course I thought about everything that was going on during the war as

18 well. But I drew a great many conclusions after all these events when I

19 had the opportunity of having contacts with the Office of the Prosecutor

20 that went on from 1997 onwards. I saw a series of documents which

21 explained the situation that I was in from various other aspects. Most of

22 these documents, orders, et cetera, were things I was not aware of at the

23 time when I was engaged in my work that had to do with the war conflict

24 itself.

25 Q. I'm not sure that that answers the question, but you say --

1 whether you thought about these things at the time and thought that

2 something like this was going to happen or not, but if you don't want to

3 answer further, I won't press you.

4 A. I have said that I realised many things during the war itself but

5 that I finally came to my own conclusions after the war operations in the

6 area ended.

7 Q. Thank you very much.

8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I see the time. I'm slightly undecided in

9 my own mind whether the Court, having allowed the whole statement to go

10 in, it would be appropriate for me to go through any of the paragraphs.

11 At most I have about four that I might ask the witness to deal with, but

12 can I deal with that after the break, if it's appropriate. Otherwise, we

13 will just let the statement stand and move straight to cross-examination.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll adjourn now for the break.

15 Mr. Deronjic, during your evidence, don't speak to anybody about

16 it, please, until it's over, and that does include any members of the

17 Prosecution.

18 We will adjourn now for 20 minutes

19 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

20 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

22 MR. NICE: With Your Honours' leave, I'll identify about six

23 points of evidence in the witness's statement to give additional context

24 for those viewing who haven't read the statement.

25 Q. Mr. Deronjic, if you would be good enough just to look at the

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1 appropriate paragraph numbers as I come to them, starting at paragraph 8

2 where you're dealing with the arming of the Serbs. You speak of what

3 Karadzic told you about a conversation he had with the accused Milosevic

4 about the arming of the Serbs; correct?

5 A. Yes, Your Honour, that is correct.

6 Q. And as you put it, what had Karadzic achieved in the discussions

7 with Milosevic about the arming of the Serbs? What had he achieved?

8 A. At that meeting in the village of Milici attended by Dukic,

9 Mr. Zekic, and myself, Mr. Rajko Dukic uttered the following sentence: He

10 said that Mr. Karadzic personally convinced Mr. Milosevic that Serbs in

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina should be armed. I later had the occasion, and I

12 don't remember the exact date or the form of the meeting with Karadzic, to

13 hear that said from his own mouth, namely that he had persuaded

14 Mr. Milosevic that Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be armed.

15 There was some degree of disagreement about the involvement of the

16 army in the possible resolution of the crisis, and I think that is why

17 Mr. Karadzic wanted Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be armed. That is

18 what I meant when I said what I said in this paragraph.

19 Q. Thank you very much. Paragraph 63. You made an observation about

20 the pattern of events and the takeover of municipalities where volunteers

21 came first, killings, liquidations, and intimidation followed, and the JNA

22 arrived thereafter but in a short period of time; and your inference from

23 the pattern of events occurring in more than one place was what?

24 A. Yes. I called it a scheme of developments in Eastern Bosnia, and

25 I am referring to Eastern Bosnia because that's the area I'm most familiar

1 with.

2 There was a certain precise chronology, sequence of developments,

3 of course with certain nuances depending on the peculiarities of a

4 particular community's. I meant, first of all, that these volunteers such

5 as the Arkan's -- the Arkan guards and others would come to the territory

6 before the outbreak of a conflict where inter-ethnic relations had already

7 been disrupted, and we know that by referring to materials known as

8 Variant A and B.

9 The arrival of volunteers would create a certain climate in these

10 areas primarily due to the killings of innocent people, widespread

11 looting, robbing of private property, mainly from people of Muslim faith,

12 resulting in the intimidation of the Muslim community and their fleeing

13 from the area. Those were the complex events that took place in those

14 regions.

15 With the arrival of the army - and we are talking about the JNA

16 since this took place before the 15th of May - created an impression, a

17 false impression maybe, that the JNA would make efforts to prevent these

18 developments. But then from a series of facts, we could see that the

19 Yugoslav People's Army sided with the Serbs, and its activities in those

20 areas contributed to the deepening of inter-ethnic tensions, the fleeing

21 of Muslims from these areas, and as far as I know, in Bratunac

22 municipality and in neighbouring municipalities the JNA took part even in

23 the offensive actions undertaken by Serbs in that territory.

24 Q. The next paragraph is 136, but it's within a passage that begins,

25 to give you the context, Mr. Deronjic, it begins at paragraph 131 with the

1 Red Berets in Bratunac, and you speak of a meeting possibly in June,

2 possibly July. And then at paragraph 134 you explain that Mr. Simatovic,

3 known as Frenki, was there. And at paragraph 136, and it is only this

4 that I want your evidence on live, because you understand your entire

5 statement is in: Did Frenki Simatovic tell you at what level the task he

6 had to accomplish had been agreed?

7 A. Yes, Your Honour. Frenki, at that time meeting whose exact date I

8 don't know, said that it had been agreed at the highest level, meaning

9 probably the highest political level of the state of Serbia and of

10 Republika Srpska.

11 Q. Thank you very much. We'll move on, please, to paragraph 163, by

12 which stage in your statement we are into 1995, and indeed the spring of

13 1995. You deal with Karadzic touring the regions and scheduling meetings,

14 at one of which he spoke to you and said of Srebrenica what was to come.

15 Can you tell us, just in a sentence or so, what it was that Karadzic told

16 you about what was to come for Srebrenica as of that date, spring of 1995.

17 A. Yes. This is the first I ever learnt of that, namely that in

18 Bratunac, a neighbouring municipality to Srebrenica, certain military

19 activities would take place. He didn't say exactly which activities, but

20 he said certain military activities would be undertaken there, and I

21 should, if I deem it necessary, undertake the necessary preparations in my

22 area. Those were his words.

23 Q. And what if anything did he say specifically about what was going

24 to happen in Srebrenica itself?

25 A. At that moment, he did not say anything. He said some military

1 activities would be carried out around Srebrenica, that I should not talk

2 about it to anyone, that he was not going to divulge any details, but if I

3 thought it necessary, I should carry out some preparations such as making

4 sure that we had enough oil supplies and supplies of other commodities,

5 the usual routine activities related to the army, without explaining

6 precisely what was about to happen in Srebrenica in the military sense.

7 Q. About two or three more references at most. The next one, please,

8 at paragraph 175 when you are dealing with a meeting of the 9th of July in

9 Pale. You saw Karadzic --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- but you also saw another man, and at paragraph 175, you deal

12 with how he was introduced to you and who he was.

13 A. The person in question was Mr. Jovica Stanisic. I said that I had

14 been introduced to him in such a way that I understood that they had been

15 discussing Srebrenica at their preceding meeting, and I attended the

16 following meeting on the 8th or the 9th when I received confirmation, new

17 confirmation that the topic of their talks was Srebrenica. And he

18 introduced me as one of their people from the area, from the ground,

19 meaning Srebrenica. And the way he phrased it confirms that they had been

20 discussing Srebrenica at the meeting that they had just had.

21 Q. At about 200 -- paragraph 208, Mr. Deronjic, you deal with the

22 arrival in Srebrenica of a man called Beara who you understood to be the

23 man spoken of by Karadzic, and his instructions in relation to the

24 prisoners were to the effect that what should happen to them?

25 A. Excuse me, could you give me the number of the paragraph again.

1 Q. 209, Mr. Deronjic.

2 A. Yes. In that paragraph I spoke about the arrival of Mr. Beara in

3 Bratunac, I would say, because I'm not sure whether he had been to

4 Srebrenica. I spoke about the fact that he came to my office late at

5 night between the 13th and the 14th of July.

6 It is a well-known fact, and I mentioned it in my statement, that

7 on the 13th, at night, I talked to Mr. Karadzic, and the transcript of

8 that conversation is precisely the document which we read from a moment

9 ago.

10 Mr. Beara showed up at my office on the 13th in the evening, and

11 in this paragraph I described in detail the atmosphere in my office and

12 the orders he related to me regarding the Muslim prisoners who at the time

13 were located in the municipality of Bratunac.

14 Do you need any further details on this?

15 Q. No. It's in the statement, and people can read what his

16 instructions were.

17 And then finally in paragraph 227, you deal with the document with

18 which the Chamber is very familiar because it's been recently produced.

19 That's the document dealing with the apparently, or so said to be,

20 legitimate and proper evacuation of people from Srebrenica. It's the

21 document Mr. Franken signed, having amended it.

22 You deal with that document in paragraph 226 and 227, and you say

23 that the document did not correspond with reality. And if you'll go right

24 to the end of paragraph 227, we can read all the reasons why it didn't

25 correspond to reality if necessary, but you say finally the main reason or

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1 the basic reason for that document not corresponding with reality was

2 what, please, Mr. Deronjic?

3 A. I said that the main reason was that there was no real intention

4 to allow that population, and I mean now the civilians who found

5 themselves in the base in Potocari after we captured Srebrenica, to remain

6 there. All the preceding events and this event itself confirm my theory

7 which I may have explained earlier, namely that the Muslim population

8 should be cleared from that area, eliminated from that area. That was the

9 real intention. And the instructions I had received did not coincide with

10 the reality. And I am referring now to the options that I was instructed

11 to convey to the Muslims on behalf of President Karadzic.

12 Q. Mr. Deronjic, thank you very much. You'll be asked further

13 questions.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the audio -- I beg your pardon, the

15 intercept that the accused asked about, this is one of those for which we

16 do not have an audio version. We have the hard copy, and it will be

17 production of the hard copy that will be dealt with in later evidence.

18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it's now for you to cross-examine the

19 witness. We've considered the time which you should have available, and

20 we think you should have two and a half hours to cross-examine this

21 witness.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I don't understand how you

23 can allocate to me only two and a half hours for a witness who is for all

24 practical purposes not a live testimony witness, who comes in with a

25 statement containing 232 paragraphs, or in other words 232 different

1 assertions --

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- which means that I am supposed to

4 cover 100 paragraphs per hour, including all this documentation. It is

5 completely impossible.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Get on with the cross-examination. Don't waste

7 any more time.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not going to waste any time, but

9 can I establish first what kind of transcript is it which is not

10 accompanied by an audio recording? What is it a transcript of then? I'm

11 talking about this conversation between Deronjic and Karadzic.

12 JUDGE MAY: At the moment, the exhibit has purely been marked for

13 identification. We will decide in due course whether to admit it.

14 Yes. Let's move on.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, then.

16 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

17 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Deronjic, first of all I would ask you a few

18 introductory questions, background questions that have to do with your

19 assertion you made a moment ago in response to a question by Mr. Nice,

20 namely that you drew your conclusions about the events in question in 1997

21 at the time of your contacts with the Prosecution.

22 A. Mr. Milosevic, that is not what I said. I said that for the most

23 part, I drew my conclusions during the war, and some conclusions I drew

24 after the war was over.

25 Q. Well, you did mention the side opposite and your contacts with

1 them starting with 1997, and you said that in 1997, you arrived at some

2 sort of version of your own about the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. In that connection, I would like you to clarify a few things for

5 me. I have in front of me the agreement that you concluded with the

6 Prosecution, your plea agreement. I suppose that you are familiar with

7 it. You concluded a plea agreement with the side opposite; correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. I have no time to go through this entire document, but I will

10 refer to some things contained in it.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope, gentlemen, that you have

12 this agreement in front of you.

13 JUDGE MAY: We do not. We do not, but we will have it available.

14 THE INTERPRETER: May the interpreters say they don't have this

15 agreement either.

16 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.

17 MR. NICE: If we can make one copy available to the Bench straight

18 away, I have one other copy of my own, if we can get the others copied,

19 then the shortfall will be remedied as soon as possible.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. In that plea agreement you concluded with the Office of the

23 Prosecutor, from what I can see with regard to the key part of your

24 testimony, they are not charging you with anything related to Srebrenica;

25 is that correct?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. "Interpretation of the agreement on the part of the Prosecutor."

3 That's what it says. "Based on complete and significant cooperation of

4 Mr. Deronjic with the Prosecution, the Prosecution will recommend to the

5 Chamber to determine a sentence of ten years." Is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. B reads: "The Prosecution will undertake the necessary and

8 reasonable measures to ensure complete safety to Miroslav Deronjic and his

9 family." Correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. It reads on: "Based on this plea agreement, Miroslav Deronjic

12 assumes complete responsibility for his criminal acts in the village of

13 Glogova." That is, it reduces your responsibility to events in Glogova;

14 correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Further on, point D, it says: "Regarding the criminal

17 responsibility of Miroslav Deronjic for all other criminal acts he could

18 be charged with regarding events in Glogova on the 9th of May, 1992, as

19 described in the charges in the second amended indictment, the Prosecution

20 will inform the competent national courts that these acts have been dealt

21 with." In other words, they should not prosecute you; correct?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. It goes on to say regarding events in Glogova on the 9th of May,

24 1992, as described and so on and so forth in the second amendment

25 indictment: "The Prosecutor will --" I am warned by the interpreters that

1 they do not have the document so I will read more slowly.

2 "The Prosecutor will inform national courts that this particular

3 act falls under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal."

4 Correct, Mr. Deronjic?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Tell me, since we are dealing here with the second amended

7 indictment, in what way is it different from the first amended indictment,

8 Mr. Deronjic, or simply first indictment?

9 A. How is it different? Well, I cannot tell you precisely what the

10 differences are because I don't have the text in front of me, but it is

11 different, certainly, from the first one.

12 Q. The difference is, I suppose, that it reduces your responsibility

13 to Glogova, and you are promised a sentence of ten years. Isn't that

14 right?

15 A. Mr. Milosevic, the first indictment against me related only to

16 Glogova, exclusively to Glogova.

17 Q. Very well, Mr. Deronjic. We have a sub-heading "Cooperation by

18 Mr. Deronjic. He commits himself to meet with the representatives of the

19 Prosecution as often as necessary and provide them with the necessary

20 information related to the well-known events in the former Yugoslavia."

21 It goes on to say that: "Miroslav Deronjic agrees to testify

22 truthfully at any trial, at any hearing, in any other proceeding before

23 the International Tribunal where, in the opinion of the Prosecutor, his

24 testimony could be relevant be it a current case in front of the Tribunal

25 or any future case."

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1 Is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Therefore, your testimony is based on this plea agreement you made

4 with the Prosecution. Is that correct, Mr. Deronjic?

5 A. It is correct, Mr. Milosevic. However, I will tell you a couple

6 of things that you don't know.

7 During my first contacts with the Office of the Prosecutor - and

8 this can be confirmed by my Defence counsel - I said that even if I never

9 make a plea agreement, I will testify in front of this Tribunal. I don't

10 have the text in front of me, but you can check that with my lawyers.

11 Q. I have no intention of doing anything of the kind. In this second

12 amended indictment which refers only to Glogova --

13 A. Excuse me, Mr. Milosevic. Even the first indictment, and I've

14 said this already, relates only to the events in Glogova, and I would like

15 to say this again on record.

16 Q. Very well, Mr. Deronjic. My point is not the coverage of the

17 indictment, my point is your plea agreement with the Office of the

18 Prosecutor whereby they take it upon themselves to recommend to the Trial

19 Chamber to sentence you to ten years; and that is the basis on which you

20 concluded this agreement, isn't it, Mr. Deronjic?

21 A. Inter alia, this recommended sentence is an element of the plea

22 agreement.

23 Q. As well as other elements such as protection measures, relief from

24 Prosecution in national courts, et cetera, et cetera.

25 A. Mr. Milosevic, you know that this honourable Tribunal gives

1 priority to the Prosecution of persons guilty of war crimes in the former

2 Yugoslavia. I don't see anything wrong with the same formulation being

3 used in my case.

4 Q. I don't know what the priorities are of this so-called Tribunal,

5 but let us move on to your actual testimony which is based on this plea

6 agreement with the Office of the Prosecutor. Let us move on in accordance

7 with the main events involved. I don't know exactly how much time I will

8 get eventually, but first I'm going to deal with Srebrenica in 1995.

9 In paragraph 161 of your statement, you say that you often talked

10 to Karadzic on the subject of Srebrenica. And as you say about the

11 presence of international forces, relations with these forces personnel

12 matters, personnel issues with the army, military issues, and so on and so

13 forth. Is that right, Mr. Deronjic?

14 A. Yes, that's right.

15 Q. Because of all these frequent conversations and exchanges of

16 opinions, you must have been very well aware of Karadzic's views of

17 Srebrenica even before 1995 and what happened then.

18 A. To the extent to which Mr. Karadzic had the intention of telling

19 me openly about his intentions, so I know what I know.

20 Q. I assume that since you talked frequently and you were the person

21 who was in charge of Srebrenica that you had to be aware of all these

22 positions; is that right?

23 A. It is absolutely not right. If there are secret plans and if the

24 president does not deem it necessary to tell me about this, then he's not

25 going to tell me. At any rate, I can confirm that I was aware of some

1 plans related to Srebrenica.

2 Q. All right. Therefore, it seems that you were not aware of his

3 positions in Srebrenica, because otherwise you would have spoken about

4 them in your statement.

5 A. Yes, I had heard of some plans. I don't know how objective and

6 truthful they are, and that's what I said to the Office of the Prosecutor

7 in my extensive statement. I said that there were some stories to the

8 effect that it would be possible that Srebrenica would be exchanged for

9 some territory within the federation. I did hear of such plans in these

10 conversations, but I don't know how objective this was and how possible

11 this was at that point in time.

12 Q. All right. Some concrete talks that you had about Srebrenica with

13 Karadzic that you mention. I assume that you did not mention all of them

14 in this statement. You provide the information that in your opinion has

15 to do with your own behaviour there and the events that have to do with

16 you yourself.

17 This conversation took place when Karadzic once came to Zvornik,

18 and you say it's spring. It's the spring of 1995 or perhaps the month of

19 May; is that right? Then you say that he took you to the side and that

20 Karadzic told you then that in Srebrenica some military operation would be

21 taking place but he did not give you any details.

22 A. That's right. He said that to me, among other things.

23 Q. In view of the fact that he told you about that already then, he

24 told you that you shouldn't talk to anyone about this.

25 A. That's right.

1 Q. I assume that he had great confidence in you. Is that right?

2 A. I assumed that he had confidence in me too.

3 Q. Then he asked you that upon your return to Bratunac you should

4 take the measures that you deem necessary in relation to this military

5 operation, that he only hinted at, if I understood this correctly.

6 A. Yes, that's right.

7 Q. Tell me, what were the preparatory measures that you took in

8 relation to this military operation that he had hinted at to you upon your

9 return to Bratunac?

10 A. I explained this in one particular paragraph. These were routine

11 actions that were customary in preparation of military operations. I

12 checked whether we had among our reserves sufficient quantities of oil,

13 then also whether there was enough medicine at the health centre and also

14 whether we had sufficient food supplies at the time, and I asked the

15 municipal leadership to prepare this if they realised that there wasn't

16 enough of any of these materials. I said that there would be something

17 going on in connection with Srebrenica and that we should be ready, too,

18 as we did several times before that when operations took place in the

19 area.

20 Q. As you say yourself that you did not know anything about these

21 operations in greater detail, how could you on the basis of such scant

22 information know what were the quantities involved in relation to all

23 these supplies? What did you actually have to prepare and how much?

24 A. We never knew what the necessary quantities were. We made an

25 effort to have optimum quantities in relation to the possibilities that

1 the municipality had. For example, if in that area there is going to be a

2 military operation, then it is necessary for us to have a large

3 transportation company there. It is necessary to suggest to people that

4 they should have as many oil reserves as possible and also that the

5 municipality should make an effort to set up oil reserves. Of course we

6 never had any idea how much would be necessary. Oil supplies come through

7 military channels as well, but very often during this war the municipality

8 assisted the military, and I can give you countless number of examples to

9 this effect, and I can say that the municipality bought some food

10 supplies, oil reserves, et cetera, everything that was of priority

11 importance.

12 Q. All right. Mr. Deronjic, did you report to Karadzic in the

13 meantime at all about preparations carried out to that effect?

14 A. No. Even in the previous period in relation to these activities

15 that are normal for the civilian authorities in this area, there was no

16 practice of informing the leadership of Republika Srpska about this.

17 Q. All right. So Karadzic could not have known what he could count

18 on in Bratunac if this operation that he hinted at was to take place.

19 A. He could absolutely count on the preparations that were supposed

20 to be carried out by the military, and from that point of view he probably

21 had that information made accessible to him.

22 Q. But since you say that you did not report about your preparations,

23 then this could not have made it possible for him to count on you in

24 relation to the tasks that you carried out.

25 A. Well, no, not really but then he could have known that I acted

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1 within the scope of the material possibilities of the municipality and

2 that I did whatever I could.

3 Q. All right. In paragraph 164, you say that these preparations that

4 you took care of were not something that caused spectacular interest among

5 the population because you were not involved in the military aspect of the

6 preparation for Srebrenica.

7 A. The first part is contained in that paragraph first and foremost.

8 I said that these were routine actions, and I said that when the units

9 arrived in the second half of June in that area, and then the command of

10 these units and the reconnaissance that took place, et cetera, all of this

11 did not cause any spectacular interest among the ordinary people because

12 such operations had taken place in the previous period as well.

13 Q. All right. Does that mean that although you said that you talked

14 to Karadzic about this operation from the very beginning but that you did

15 not really talk to anyone else about Srebrenica?

16 A. That's right.

17 Q. When did the military operation regarding Srebrenica start in

18 actual fact?

19 A. I'm not sure when the action actually started. The first days of

20 the month of July, I believe. But some activities started already in the

21 second half of June. I cannot say exactly and I was not involved in them

22 but there were some activities of the military that were noticeable in the

23 second half of June. Specifically, I think that the Srebrenica action

24 started in the first days of July.

25 Q. It is my understanding on the basis of what you say in paragraph

1 167 that as a matter of fact during the first days when the operation

2 started, you did not even go towards Srebrenica, as you said yourself, in

3 order to see for yourself what was going on.

4 A. Yes. This does say the month of July. Perhaps during the first

5 two or three days in the month of July. That's the period I meant when I

6 said that I did not go in the direction of Srebrenica.

7 Q. All right. But in paragraph 168 you say that on the 1st of July,

8 or perhaps a day or two before that --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You say on the 1st of July or perhaps a day or two before that, so

11 then perhaps on the 29th or 30th of June, you went to the forward command

12 post at Pribicevac and that is the first time you briefly saw General

13 Krstic; is that right?

14 A. Yes, that's right. That's what I said because I cannot remember

15 exactly the date when I was present myself at Pribicevac. That is why I

16 said the 1st of July, a day or two before that, or perhaps a day or two

17 after that. I cannot say exactly.

18 Q. Tell me, how is that possible when in the previous paragraph, 167,

19 you say that during the first days you did not go anywhere from Bratunac

20 and that you were only guessing that this was fighting for the road

21 between Skelani and Milici.

22 A. What do you mean that it's not possible? I said that the

23 preparations of the military in that area started in the second half of

24 the month of June, certain activities of the army. So I did not take part

25 in this, and I was not present myself during these activities. When I

1 went to Pribicevac, and that has to do with those days approximately, I

2 cannot exactly remember, then I saw for myself what the activities were

3 like in the actual area.

4 Q. Very well. Since you say that on that occasion you had a brief

5 meeting with General Krstic, tell me, what did you talk about?

6 A. Nothing special. I said that this meeting was a very brief one, I

7 said that I met Mr. Krstic at Pribicevac during those days in the month of

8 July. I spoke to him briefly, I introduced myself to him, I said who I

9 was and what I did, and nothing special. I didn't discuss anything

10 special with him because he was busy issuing certain orders in that area.

11 Q. I see. So you just said hello to him and you didn't really talk.

12 A. Well, of course I cannot remember very precisely. These are

13 events that took place a long time ago. I explained that there was this

14 table in front of this forward command post, perhaps we sat down and had a

15 cup of coffee. I personally did not know Mr. Krstic, and he had not known

16 me either. This was a courtesy talk. I did not want to be a hindrance in

17 any way and I cannot say how long this lasted.

18 Q. In paragraph 170 you say that one day you went to the actual

19 combat site on the south side of Pribicevac where you say the actual

20 military operation was taking place.

21 A. Yes, that's right.

22 Q. On which day did you go?

23 A. I cannot say exactly which days these were. It was these days in

24 July, and I cannot say exactly whether it was the 10th. Perhaps it was

25 the 10th, the 7th, the 6th of July. I cannot say exactly because at this

1 point in time it's not quite clear to me when the military part of the

2 operation started, but that is where I saw the commander of the Zvornik

3 Brigade. I said hello to him, and I saw directly how these operations

4 around Srebrenica were evolving.

5 Q. All right, you say that you saw the commander of the Drina Wolves

6 at the time, whose nickname was Legenda, the Legend.

7 A. I remember that I saw Vinko Pandurevic, and I saw this man whose

8 nickname was Legenda. I didn't know his real name.

9 Q. All right. Did you talk to him then?

10 A. I can explain this quite accurately. This is a trench where they

11 were, a communicating trench -- communication trench towards -- facing a

12 locality on the other side. During the actual operation while these

13 elevations were being taken, they are called the three tits, that's what

14 they're called in that area. I did not stay for very long there. I just

15 said hello to Mr. Pandurevic and I realised that he was in a great hurry

16 and that this operation was already under way and whether it continued

17 later, I really don't know about these details, because I did not stay

18 long there and I went back.

19 Q. All right, Mr. Deronjic. As for General Krstic or this Legenda or

20 Pandurevic, so these men who are officers, commanders within the command

21 that was involved in the operation, you did not ask any one of them about

22 the objectives of the operation. You simply inferred your own

23 conclusions; you did not get any information from them.

24 A. No, I didn't.

25 Q. However, not knowing about the goals of that military operation,

1 you decided then to seek your own information from Radovan Karadzic

2 directly and to suggest to him to involve a special police unit of the MUP

3 of Republika Srpska commanded by Ljubisa Borovcanin and to have them

4 involved in all this. That's what you say in paragraph 171; is that

5 right?

6 A. Yes, that's right.

7 Q. Tell me, why did you get this idea, this military idea, if I can

8 put it this way? You say that you were layman and that you didn't know

9 anything about this, and so how did you get this idea that Borovcanin's

10 special unit should be involved in all this?

11 A. Mr. Milosevic, in my statement I explained in greater detail that

12 as I spent time during the first half of July at this particular place

13 that is called Pribicevac, I visited the units of the Bratunac Brigade

14 that were for the most part deployed in that area. And I spent one night

15 or even more in the area talking to people about various things, of

16 course, but we were mostly interested in the plan regarding Srebrenica,

17 and people were asking me about the plans, the military plans that had to

18 do with Srebrenica that they were taking direct part in. So this was one

19 of the motives involved. And I told the men that I would see how I could

20 get more information about this because I did not they anything about it.

21 That is one of the motives that led me to go and see Mr. Karadzic.

22 Another motive was that I should make the proposal that I already

23 referred to, that Mr. Borovcanin should come with his unit. I noticed

24 during this war, which was not a war between classical armies, it was the

25 armed people that were waging war for the most part. I saw that some

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1 casualties were completely unnecessary and were due to the fact that these

2 people were not well trained to conduct military operations.

3 I must tell you that when I was touring the units this area, many

4 of my colleagues, teachers, were at these positions, as well as managers

5 from companies, people who were even elderly, who were unable, or at least

6 that was my assessment, to make any major breakthroughs or take some

7 fortified positions of the enemy, and so on and so forth. I understood at

8 one point in time that the actions around Srebrenica were not only routine

9 matters but that there was a serious objective involved to enter

10 Srebrenica itself, and I understood that while I was in the field, and I

11 thought that that would be disastrous for a great many people that I saw

12 myself. Bratunac is a small town, we are all acquaintances and friends,

13 and I thought that it would be a good thing that if the plans were the way

14 they were, that a trained professional unit should come to the area.

15 I knew Mr. Ljubisa Borovcanin, I knew some people from his unit,

16 and I thought that they were absolutely capable to carry out such a task.

17 Of course it was for me to make a suggestion but it was up to the

18 president to decide whether he would act in accordance with my suggestion

19 or not.

20 Q. All right. From what you say and from what you wrote in paragraph

21 171, it follows that you had actually noticed that apart from these Wolves

22 from the Drina, it was ordinary men who were involved in combat, not

23 trained soldiers, and that's why you suggested to Karadzic that the

24 special unit of the MUP of Republika Srpska should be involved.

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. And you now explained that in order to accomplish these missions

2 which you knew nothing about, a unit like that was needed.

3 A. Mr. Milosevic, I didn't say that I didn't know anything about it

4 at that moment. I didn't know anything about the goals of the military

5 operation in Srebrenica and around Srebrenica in the preceding period. At

6 that time, I saw very intensive activity going on on the ground, and I saw

7 that the move to take Srebrenica was impending. If I hadn't seen on the

8 ground what I had seen, I wouldn't have gone to see President Karadzic.

9 But since I witnessed the previous routine operations that took place, I

10 could compare them to the current ones and see that it was not the same

11 thing.

12 Q. I understood you as saying that you did not know the combat

13 objectives of the units which were involved in those attacks and those

14 operations around Srebrenica.

15 A. Mr. Milosevic, none of the people on the ground who were involved

16 and who commanded these operations told me those goals word-for-word, but

17 I was able, based on logic and experience, to make my own conclusions

18 about the events I was witnessing.

19 Q. Very well. I received from my associates a couple of documents

20 that I will try to clarify with your assistance.

21 Are you aware that the corps commander, General Zivanovic, on the

22 2nd of July, 1995, issued an order to carry out active combat operations?

23 That referred to the operation known as Krivaja 1995.

24 A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I'm not aware of it.

25 Q. I will read out to you. It's dated 2nd of July, 1995, military

1 secret, strictly confidential, copy number illegible, Krivaja 1995, order

2 for active combat operations. There is reference to maps.

3 On page 2, item 2, it says: "Command of the DK," meaning Drina

4 Corps, "based on the instruction OP 71 of the Main Staff of Republika

5 Srpska and based on the situation in the area of responsibility, has the

6 order to carry out active combat operations, to separate the enclaves of

7 Zepa and Srebrenica as soon as possible and reduce them to their urban

8 areas."

9 That's as far as I can see the objective. "Completely separate

10 and reduce the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, improve the tactical

11 position in-depth." That is the order of the commander. It is a pretty

12 lengthy one. Order issued by Major General Zivanovic.

13 You know this general, don't you?

14 A. I do.

15 Q. In this order, it is very clearly formulated what the objective

16 is. The date is the 2nd of July. And then further on, I will quote from

17 page 5 of this document. It reads: "Security organs and the military

18 police will designate areas of assembly and the security of prisoners of

19 war and war booty. In treatment of prisoners of war and the civilian

20 population, adhere to the Geneva Conventions in full."

21 That is what is written in the order of General Zivanovic

22 regarding operations around Srebrenica.

23 Are you saying, Mr. Deronjic, that you knew nothing about this,

24 you as the person holding the highest responsibility for this area?

25 A. Yes, that is what I'm saying.

1 Q. Very well. But can we conclude from this order that already on

2 the 2nd of July it was quite clear what the objectives of the operation

3 were and how one should treat prisoners of war and the civilian

4 population? It is written in this order and everyone who received this

5 order behind the lines must have been aware of it.

6 A. Well, I can't say anything about this. I don't know who received

7 the order. I didn't, and I don't see how I could be aware of it. But I

8 do not dispute that the persons who did receive the order were well

9 acquainted with its contents.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I would like to tender this

11 order.

12 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see it. Show it to the witness,

13 please.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, the witness may see it. This

15 is a photocopy, and I don't have the original, but he will be able to see

16 that it is an authentic order.

17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Deronjic, I know you haven't seen this order, but

18 perhaps you'd like just to have a look at it, and if you have any comment

19 on it, to make it now. If not, we will simply take it, and we'll have a

20 look up here.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Your Excellency, it

22 would take too much time for me to read all of this. I can only note that

23 I'm seeing this for the firs