1 Friday, 12 September 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Groome.

7 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, before I call the next witness,

8 Mr. Nice had suggested or said to the Court yesterday that it might be

9 necessary to change the order of witnesses. I'd like to inform the Court

10 that it is not necessary and that we will be maintaining the order of

11 witnesses as published two weeks ago, and that would be B-179 next,

12 followed by Mr. Van Linden. At this time the Prosecution would call

13 Mr. Robert Donia to testify.

14 JUDGE MAY: If the witness would take the declaration.

15 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

16 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

17 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. If you'd like to take a seat.

18 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Groome.

20 Mr. GROOME: Your Honour, I will be using two exhibits with this

21 witness. They are in one binder, however. I would ask that tabs 1

22 through 4 of that binder be assigned a number.

23 We've also included at the back of that binder a copy of CDs

24 containing the entire Assembly minutes. We are simply asking that they be

25 marked for identification. Should the accused or the amici at some

1 further point in the trial wish to work with these documents, at least the

2 foundation will have been laid and they will be readily available. So if

3 I could --

4 JUDGE MAY: So the idea is that the bundle -- the binder we have

5 here should have one exhibit number, is that right, and then the minutes

6 would have a separate number?

7 Mr. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, that can be done.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit Number 537 and 538 marked for

10 identification.

11 Examined by Mr. Groome:

12 Q. Sir, could I ask you to state your name for the record.

13 A. Robert Donia.

14 Mr. GROOME: And could I ask that the witness be shown Exhibit

15 537.

16 Q. Mr. Donia, I'm going to ask you to begin your testimony by

17 identifying some of the documents contained in Exhibit 537. If I can draw

18 your attention to the first tab. Is that a copy of your curriculum vitae?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. The Chamber will be able to read that for themselves. Is there

21 anything not contained on that document that is important for the Chamber

22 to be aware of?

23 A. There are two recent additions to my curriculum vitae. Number

24 one, that effective this fall, October, I will be the DeRoy professor of

25 honours studies at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor for the fall

1 semester; and second, that I have received a nominal appointment as

2 associate professor of history at the University of Sarajevo.

3 Q. This second, nominal appointment, do you receive any compensation

4 for holding that position?

5 A. No, I do not.

6 Q. I'd ask you to turn to the second tab in Exhibit 537. Can you

7 identify that document, please.

8 A. Yes. This is the report that I prepared at your request,

9 entitled "The Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1992 to 1995, Highlights and

10 Excerpts."

11 Q. Can I ask you to describe in a sentence or two what it was that

12 you were requested to do.

13 A. The Office of the Prosecution asked me to survey the sessions of

14 the Assembly from spring 1992 until the end of 1995 to identify meaningful

15 excerpts that pertain to the leadership of Republika Srpska, that

16 leadership's policies, and linkages with leaders outside of the Republika

17 Srpska.

18 Q. If I could now draw your attention to tab number 3. Can you

19 please identify that document.

20 A. This is a supplement to the report, which contains a few

21 additional citations, a couple of corrected quotations and translations.

22 And on the last page, a list of errata, errors in translation of the first

23 version of the original report, the most significant of which is the last

24 one on that page, referring to page 82 of the original report, note number

25 168.

1 Q. Now, sir, your report, is it correct that it is simply a

2 chronological arrangement of excerpts which you identified as being

3 relevant to the fulfillment of your task? Is it just simply arranged

4 chronologically?

5 A. That's correct. In chronological order by session number as

6 well, yes.

7 Q. Now, in preparation for your testimony here today, did you review

8 your report and create, with members of the Office of the Prosecutor

9 staff, a set of demonstrative exhibits arranging or highlighting some of

10 the more important excerpts according to topic?

11 A. Yes, I did.

12 Q. And I'd ask you to look at tab 4. And can you identify that

13 package of documents.

14 A. Yes. This is the demonstrative aid that I assisted in preparing

15 to highlight certain of the excerpts that are included in the Assembly.

16 Q. I'd now ask you to take a look at Exhibit 538. It's simply been

17 marked for identification purposes. If you look at the very last sleeve

18 in the binder that's before you. Do you recognise what that is?

19 A. Yes. This is a list of the Assembly sessions that I examined,

20 the ERN numbers for B/C/S and English when a translation existed, and an

21 indication of the source of the Assembly transcripts and minutes.

22 Q. Can I ask you to describe or comment on what you know about the

23 source of the material that you worked with in the creation of your

24 report.

25 A. The transcripts and minutes were turned over to the Office of the

1 Prosecutor in basically two groups. The first was given to the Office of

2 the Prosecutor by Rajko Stanisic in February of 1998. That pertained only

3 to sessions 16 and 50 on the table.

4 Q. What was her position at that time?

5 A. She was Mr. Krajisnik's secretary, I believe, and the secretary

6 of the Assembly.

7 Q. And the remainder of the sessions that you reviewed?

8 A. The remainder of the sessions were turned over to the Office of

9 the Prosecutor in December of 2001 and received in two batches on 18 and

10 21 January 2002.

11 Q. And they were received from what source?

12 A. And they were received from the Ministry of Justice of the

13 Republika Srpska.

14 Q. I'm now going to ask you to turn to tab 4, or I believe you have

15 a copy of that with you. I'm going to ask that we go through the topics,

16 or some of the excerpts according to topic. These will also be displayed

17 on the Sanction system on the screens in the courtroom. I'll give you a

18 second to get yourself organised, and then I'll give my first question.

19 A. Yes. Ready.

20 Q. The first topic I'd like to deal with is in your analysis of the

21 Assembly session minutes, did you find any important excerpts concerning

22 the idea or the importance of a unified state for Serbs?

23 A. Yes. In May of 1994, Mr. Aleksa Buha, reflecting the position of

24 the Bosnian Serb Assembly, stated - and I'm looking at the first entry on

25 the machine here - "Our primary option is unification with Serbia. And if

1 that doesn't fly, then independence."

2 Q. Were there other articulations of this that you identified?

3 A. Yes. There were in fact a large number of them in the Assembly

4 speeches themselves. Some of them referred specifically to the

5 unification of Serbs in the various Serbian areas. Mr. Milan Martic, who

6 was a guest at the 40th session, in May of 1994 the president of the RSK

7 said, "We are one and the same nations, and no matter how many times it is

8 said that we are two republics, two states, we are one nation, and be sure

9 that before long, whether it please someone or not, we will be one state."

10 Q. Are there any articulations by Mr. Radovan Karadzic that you

11 noted?

12 A. Yes. In October 1993, he stated, "... we must propose the

13 complete unity of the Serbian people, including Yugoslavia, the RSK, and

14 the RS."

15 Q. Now, in the course of your review of the Assembly session

16 minutes, did there emerge any -- or were any obstacles to this goal

17 identified?

18 A. Yes. The obstacle that was identified time after time was some

19 actor within the international community. In the 42nd session, in July of

20 1994, Mr. Karadzic referred to one of those actors, namely the Russian

21 deputy foreign minister, as having "... deceived us in Lisbon ... knowing

22 that they wouldn't give us Greater Serbia and unification, knowing that we

23 must do that in steps."

24 Q. Now, when Mr. Karadzic refers to "steps" is -- was there -- or

25 did you identify any portions of the Assembly minutes that identified what

1 was the final goal that these steps would be leading to?

2 A. Mr. Rajko Dukic, speaking in July of 1992, said that "If no one

3 prevents us in the future from being a united state, and that is, I think,

4 our final goal ... with the rest of the Serbian nation."

5 Q. Now, this concept of a unified Serb state, was it something that

6 was unique to simply members of the Assembly session or the Assembly

7 delegates? Was there ever a reference to agreement among other places or

8 other states where Serbs lived?

9 A. In one of the early sessions in August of 1992, Mr. Krajisnik

10 said, "I personally think that the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

11 is a temporary state that will exist until the situation allows all

12 Serbian lands to unite. ... This is not an agreement just among us, but

13 among us and Serbia, and us and the Krajina," and so on.

14 Q. Now, in your study of the Assembly session minutes, were there

15 any -- was there any discussion about the strategy to be undertaken to

16 achieve this goal of a unified Serb state?

17 A. Yes. There was much discussion. The first definitive outline of

18 objectives was passed by the Assembly, the 16th session, on 12 May 1992

19 and became known as the six strategic goals. When this concept was first

20 put forth in that session, Mr. Karadzic outlined what those goals were

21 proposed to be, and the Assembly subsequently voted to adopt them.

22 These goals in a sense come in two parts. The first was a

23 general principle, goal number 1, looking at that first paragraph,

24 "Separation from the other two communities, separation of states."

25 The other five goals each identify a certain specific geographic

1 objective. Goal number 2 identifies a corridor between Semberija and

2 Krajina, Semberija being a location in north-eastern Bosnia and Krajina in

3 north-western Bosnia. This corridor was often referred to as the Posavina

4 Corridor.

5 The third goal was to establish a corridor in the Drina Valley,

6 that is, elimination of the Drina as a border between two worlds. So this

7 goal actually is the elimination of an existing border that separated

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia, from the Republic of Serbia.

9 The fourth goal was establishment of a border on the Una and

10 Neretva Rivers, the Una River running through north-western Bosnia,

11 through the city of Bihac, and the Neretva River in Herzegovina running

12 through the city of Mostar.

13 The fifth goal was the division of the city of Sarajevo into

14 Serbian and Muslim parts.

15 And the sixth goal was the access of the republic -- the Serbian

16 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the sea.

17 Q. Of these six goals, do any emerge as reflective or echoing the --

18 your earlier discussion of this goal of -- this final goal of a unified

19 Serbian state?

20 A. Well, in fact, two goals would move -- if realised, would move

21 towards the establishment of a unified Serbian state. Certainly the

22 elimination of the Drina as a border between two worlds would be a step in

23 that direction. And the second goal, a corridor between Semberija and

24 Krajina, would not only link, to look at Mr. Karadzic's words here in the

25 second goal, Krajina, that is, Bosnian Krajina, but also Serbian Krajina

1 in the Republic of Croatia or alliance of Serbian states. So it would

2 link the RSK with the Republic of Serbia, as well as the eastern and

3 western portions of the Republika Srpska.

4 Q. Now, I believe in your introduction about these goals, you said

5 that they were adopted. Can I ask you to explain the procedure that was

6 followed and the significance of the adoption of these goals.

7 A. The Assembly voted, after some discussion which constituted

8 really elaboration of these goals, voted to endorse and adopt the goal.

9 And subsequently we find there are many references to the goals in this

10 and other sessions. Momcilo Krajisnik, for example, explained this

11 relationship that I mentioned earlier later in the session. "The first

12 goal is the most important one, and in relation to all other goals, all

13 other goals are sub-items of the first."

14 And in the 42nd Assembly session, Radovan Karadzic spelled out

15 another formulation of the first goal, which was, "... that is beyond

16 doubt insofar as we want to achieve the first strategic goal: which is to

17 rid our house of the enemy, that is, the Croats and Muslims, so that we

18 will no longer be together in a state."

19 Q. Now, this first goal, did it have another -- or could it be

20 characterised in a different way, another characterisation, aside from

21 ridding "our house of our enemies"?

22 A. Yes. The first strategic goal was also articulated at times by

23 other members of the Assembly as a "gathering in of Serbs from areas not

24 under Serbian control." It was, for example, announced this way by Mr.

25 Ostojic at the 34th session in August of 1993: "We will achieve our goal,

1 the ethnic-geographic continuity of the Serbian people, by means of

2 accommodating refugees, and in fact creating a new demographic policy in

3 the RS."

4 A somewhat similar idea was expressed by Mr. Milinkovic at the

5 same session: "If we want our ethnically pure Serbian state, and we

6 desire it, don't we? If we all know and understand that common life with

7 them is impossible, then we must understand that this map offers it and

8 that people must relocate."

9 Q. Now, that reference to people relocating, is it true that that is

10 a reference to Serbs living in other areas of Bosnia that would have to

11 relocate into Serb-controlled areas?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, in addition to the discussion of the goals themselves, were

14 there discussions of how best to implement these goals?

15 A. Yes. Some of these statements in the Assembly sessions are

16 retrospectives. And in one such statement by Mr. Karadzic in January of

17 1994, he is speaking about the conclusions of the Lisbon Conference of

18 February/March 1992 and expresses the view that his preferred way of

19 accomplishing this goal would have been through the implementation of the

20 conclusions of the Lisbon Conference, saying, "If the Lisbon Conference

21 conclusions had been implemented without people getting killed, it would

22 have been easier to withdraw our people from their hearths, for we would

23 have created a state."

24 Likewise, in a more contemporary context, speaking of the time of

25 August 1992, Mrs. Plavsic said, "Therefore we must create conditions for

1 internal military and forced emigration and we cannot do that without

2 territory." That, of course, was a statement made at a time that the war

3 had already begun.

4 Q. Were there -- was there ever any discussion of concrete plans to

5 implement these strategic goals?

6 A. Yes. Mr. Karadzic, in one of these retrospective statements at

7 the 50th session, in April of 1995, referred both to the institutions for

8 separation and seizure of power and their roles. He said, referring back

9 to the 1991-1992 period: "In the municipalities where we were in a

10 minority, we set up secret government, municipal boards, municipal

11 assemblies, presidents of executive boards. You will remember, the A or B

12 variant. In the B variant, where we were in a minority -- 20 per cent, 15

13 per cent -- we had set up a government and a brigade, a unit, no matter

14 what size, but there was a detachment with a commander."

15 Q. Could I ask you now to turn your attention to what role, if any,

16 ethnic cleansing played in the achievement of these goals and any

17 articulations or significant articulations of that that you found in the

18 Assembly minutes.

19 A. Yes. Let me highlight just two. Mr. Pejovic, in April 1993, the

20 first quotation, speaking of East Bosnia -- Eastern Bosnia, specifically

21 Gorazde, said, "That's a single oasis that must be completely cleansed as

22 soon as possible, breaking all Sarajevo's links with the East."

23 And then at the bottom of the page, Mr. Srdjo Srdic, from

24 Prijedor, in 1993, speaking of the Prijedor municipality, said, "They

25 needed to --" speaking of other municipalities other than Prijedor, said,

1 "They needed to cleanse their municipalities the way we cleansed ours."

2 Q. You -- did you identify any similar sentiments expressed by

3 Mr. Radovan Karadzic?

4 A. Yes. In a discussion of the Union of Three Republics Peace Plan

5 in October -- or in 1993, Mr. Karadzic was -- expressed with pleasure,

6 saying, "We have preserved 250.000 places of the living space where

7 Muslims lived."

8 Likewise, Mr. Krajisnik, in January 1994, made a statement,

9 "Believe me, it would be the greatest tragedy if the Muslims accepted to

10 live together with us. You've seen how they ingratiated themselves with

11 the Croats."

12 Q. Could I ask you to continue and then read the next portion of

13 that quote in your report.

14 A. Yes. Okay. "We might lose our state."

15 Q. Could you please place that in context and explain the import of

16 that statement to us.

17 A. Mr. Krajisnik is expressing here the view that, really, to have a

18 Serbian state is to -- is one in which there was -- it would be a great

19 tragedy if -- if people were to live together.

20 Q. Now, in the course of your review of the Assembly session

21 minutes, do you ever or did you identify any time when an assessment is

22 made of progress toward this goal?

23 A. In summer 1992, July 1992, the 17th Assembly session conducts an

24 extensive review of progress to date. And Radovan Karadzic, expressing a

25 -- the viewpoint that, "... we have no further reason to fight; we have

1 liberated almost all that is ours."

2 Q. Now, in that Assembly session, is there consensus among the

3 delegates that Mr. Karadzic is right in saying that in July 1992, four

4 months after the outbreak of conflict, that -- that almost -- that almost

5 all that has been -- territory that was sought to be liberated has been

6 liberated?

7 A. Yes, there is. There is a viewpoint that about 70 per cent of

8 the land has been liberated. Several delegates argue individually for the

9 pieces of land, typically those areas which they represent which were not

10 yet liberated and that should be liberated in any final arrangement.

11 Q. Now, was there ever a time that Mr. Milosevic addressed the

12 Assembly of the Republika Srpska?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Can you please tell us when and the circumstances surrounding

15 that address.

16 A. Mr. Milosevic addressed the 30th Assembly session -- I'm sorry,

17 there's an error on this slide. It's -- the date is 5 May 1993. And I

18 believe it was in Pale. The situation was that the Vance-Owen Peace Plan

19 had been proposed by Mr. Vance and Owen in January of 1993, by this time

20 had been accepted by the Croats -- the Bosnian Croats in January 1993 and

21 by the Bosnian Muslims, specifically Mr. Izetbegovic, in April -- or March

22 1993. So the Bosnian Serbs were the lone hold-outs in agreeing to the

23 Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

24 On 1 and 2 May 1993, there was a meeting in Athens in which

25 Mr. Karadzic was subjected to great pressure, by his own account, and

1 finally signed the plan subject to the review of the Bosnian Serb

2 Assembly. It was this meeting, then, that was convened in -- on 5 May in

3 Pale, and present were four heads of governments, Mr. Bulatovic, the

4 president of Montenegro; Mr. Milosevic, the president of Serbia;

5 Mr. Cosic, the president of Yugoslavia; and Mr. Mitsotakis, the president

6 of Greece.

7 Q. Sir, before you go any further, can I ask you to -- in general,

8 Assembly session minutes, were they open or were they closed?

9 A. They were typically open for a brief period of time. The

10 sessions from the 16th session on, that is, May of 1992 on, were typically

11 open for a brief period of time for introductory comments, and then were

12 closed. Journalists were invited to resume their work elsewhere and so

13 discussions were then held in closed session.

14 Q. For this 30th Assembly session, did this follow the same format,

15 partially open in the beginning and then a closed session afterwards?

16 A. Yes, it did.

17 Q. And were you able or did you have the minutes from both the open

18 session and the closed session for your review?

19 A. Yes, I did.

20 Q. And did you have the closed session minutes for all of the

21 Assembly sessions for you review in this work?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did Mr. Milosevic address the Assembly in open or closed or both?

24 A. He addressed the Assembly in both. He made a -- a brief speech,

25 perhaps five to eight minutes, in the open session and a somewhat

1 lengthier speech, perhaps 20 to 25 minutes, in the closed session.

2 Q. Can I ask you to summarise what it was Mr. Milosevic said in the

3 open portion of the Assembly session?

4 A. In the open portion of his remarks, he identified -- he said that

5 "We have determined or established the goal of Serbian people in the

6 Balkans and that goal is freedom and equality." And he then argued that

7 the Vance-Owen Peace Plan provided freedom and equality to the Bosnian

8 Serbs and, therefore, should be accepted.

9 Q. Can I ask you now to describe what it was that he said in the

10 closed portion of the Assembly session?

11 A. He made a number of opening remarks in which he cited a speech by

12 General Mladic as the critical reason why the peace plan should be

13 accepted and then argued that the plan as it was essentially left nothing

14 of Alija Izetbegovic's Bosnia.

15 He then turned to the question of a goal. And I will just read

16 the first -- if I may, the first few sentences here. "The question was

17 asked, which I really find unacceptable: Whether we give up on our goal?

18 I shall tell you no! We do not give up on our goal."

19 If I may suggest, this translation into English is, I believe,

20 "understandable" but not the best translation. And my translation of it

21 would be that "whether we -- whether the goal be given up. I shall tell

22 you no, the goal should not be given up or abandoned."

23 Going on: "The question, if we look at the plan, is not whether

24 the plan represents completion of the goal."

25 Now, if I could just point out the context of this statement.

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1 During this presentation in closed session, Mr. Milosevic never defines

2 what the goal is. He is speaking to a group of people, which based on my

3 review of the Assembly sessions, understood a final goal or an ultimate

4 goal to be the establishment of a unified Serbian state, but he doesn't

5 say what he means and I don't know -- I can't say what he meant.

6 It is, however, clear that he now speaks of this goal. And I'll

7 just read the sentences. "The question is, though, whether the plan

8 represents a way towards the final goal. The goal was completed in many

9 aspects, but not in all of them. But, it represents the way towards the

10 ultimate goal, of course it does."

11 So in contrast to the opening presentation that he made, he's now

12 speaking of goals that have not been achieved in full but are on the way

13 to being achieved.

14 He speaks specifically in the second paragraph of this

15 presentation about what he means by those things that have been partially

16 implemented, and he's trying to -- he says here he's answering the

17 question: How do we consolidate the economy in our provinces? "Since you

18 are an Assembly, you probably know that we made a united system of money

19 transfer, that we intend to introduce the same money, that we intend to

20 have every possible link and transaction between the economies, as well as

21 that we are going to stabilise the entire unified area of economy, in

22 which those Serb lands shall belong economically, culturally,

23 educationally, and in every other aspect."

24 He finishes his speech with the thought, "Let me tell you in the

25 end, do not tell us that you feel abandoned. To us who felt your worries

1 all the time. And we did not only mentally feel them, but we solved them

2 and helped with all our powers and with all our capabilities, for the cost

3 of great sacrifices of the 10 million people of Serbia. We shall continue

4 to help you, that is not disputed."

5 Q. If I can ask you a few specific questions. First of all, can I

6 ask you to place that last paragraph of the second paragraph into -- or

7 explain it into a little more detail, the significance of that paragraph.

8 A. He is -- the context in which he's making these -- made these

9 remarks was the context of assuring -- giving a number of assurances of,

10 say, feeling of solidarity or commonness and that those common goals were

11 in the process of being realised.

12 I want to make sure that -- I also turn to this last line of the

13 first paragraph just briefly, if I may. "We should employ our heads a

14 little more, our brains, and we should spill a little less blood." In

15 this presentation, he makes a very forceful plea for the acceptance of the

16 Vance-Owen Peace Plan and states elsewhere that the war should not only

17 stop soon, it should stop now, and portrays very negative consequences if

18 the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the Vance-Owen Plan.

19 Q. Is there anything in his speech or his endorsement that you can

20 find that qualifies or suggests that his endorsement of the Vance-Owen

21 Plan was anything less than genuine?

22 A. I think his endorsement of the Vance-Owen Plan was genuine. The

23 -- based on the speech as I saw it.

24 Q. In the course of his address, does he give an assessment -- or

25 his assessment of the progress towards the ultimate goal?

1 A. Yes. And we have some of it here, but he states that "We are

2 well on the way toward achieving that goal and the costs to the people of

3 Serbia at this point have been substantial and cannot continue to be

4 borne."

5 Q. And what is the -- his interpretation of the role that the

6 Vance-Owen Plan plays in the progress towards that goal?

7 A. His interpretation or his -- his statements say that the

8 Vance-Owen Plan means that the Izetbegovic government is done, that there

9 is no meaningful central government left, and that life in the three

10 Serbian provinces provided for in the plan can be consolidated under

11 Serbian leadership over time in a peaceful manner.

12 Q. Now, if I can change the subject a bit. Are there other excerpts

13 that you've identified in the Assembly session minutes that speak to how

14 the Bosnian Serb leadership perceived their relationship with

15 Mr. Milosevic?

16 A. Yes. Going to the next -- the next slide here. Mr. Karadzic on

17 several occasions reflected upon that relationship, and in August of 1995

18 said, "Milosevic personally told me --" there's an implied quote here:

19 "Zimmerman was here and sought to put down your movement. He wants me to

20 close the border on the Drina. I will never put down my own people." End

21 of implied quote. "I remember that and I've counted on it and I never

22 could have a doubt that the border on the Drina would be closed because he

23 said that he could never put down his own people, and I depended on his

24 word and we all depended on it and I shared this with you."

25 In 1995, at the same -- or a somewhat later session, Karadzic

1 referred to a session in 1991 of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, in which he

2 said, "In 1991 --" and I indicate that there's no indication of the month

3 or time of this statement. "In 1991, we said in the Presidency of

4 Yugoslavia - this was all recorded and remains there - we said that we

5 have a chance to move to our borders, to create a state, that they would

6 disparage us, that they would attack us but they would recognise us.

7 There was neither the masculine strength nor the state vision to do that."

8 Q. Is it clear from the context of that speech who the "they" refers

9 to?

10 A. The "they," it seems to me the context makes clear is the members

11 of the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia. I'm sorry, the "they" in the

12 latter part of the quote there clearly refers to the adversaries of the

13 Serbs.

14 Q. Can I now turn your attention to the next quote that you've

15 identified by Mr. Karadzic in the 54th Assembly session. Can I ask you to

16 explain that and the general attitude of Mr. Karadzic towards

17 Mr. Milosevic.

18 A. In these numerous statements that Mr. Karadzic made, he was

19 consistently loyal to President Milosevic, and this is perhaps a

20 representative statement: "I always told the opposition in Serbia, don't

21 weaken President Milosevic. A weak President Milosevic weakens Serbia.

22 Strengthen him! Praise his every move."

23 Q. In the Assembly session minutes, are there any characterisations

24 by members of the Bosnian Serb leadership with respect to how they

25 perceived whatever guidance or instructions they received from Mr.

1 Milosevic?

2 A. In the 34th session, Mr. Karadzic characterised the relationship

3 in response to an inquiry from another delegate. He said, "I must say to

4 you that they are very cautious with us." "They" being Milosevic and his

5 representatives. "They highly respect us. I cannot say that they don't

6 exert pressure, but they don't exert pressure in the form of ultimatums.

7 They converse with us, and they show great patience with us. They would

8 rather persuade us than to exert pressure. And Milosevic is, I must tell

9 you, cunning as a snake and he has helped a great deal to make things

10 happen in that way. He especially helped with constitutional

11 principles ..."

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: What was the precise inquiry from the other

13 delegate that prompted that explanation?

14 THE WITNESS: The inquiry was a critical one. I can't remember

15 the exact words, but the inquiry was such that it was saying that

16 Milosevic has had far too much influence and we've made a mistake in

17 following his -- his policies, is that not the case? And so the response

18 here of Mr. Karadzic is to refute that impression.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

20 MR. GROOME:

21 Q. Mr. Donia, if Judge Robinson or any of the Chamber has a

22 particular question about something not contained in your report, is it

23 possible for you, during the break, to refer to the actual minutes and

24 return with a very precise answer?

25 A. Yes, it is. I probably would need access to my laptop in which

1 I've indexed all these references, but yes.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Groome, I noticed from this CD, most of the

3 English translation are not available, if you check it later.

4 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. I will do that.

5 JUDGE KWON: So I think it's important to have the full text to

6 understand the context, in what context it is spoken.

7 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.

8 I would just explain that I believe the entire collection is

9 about 10.000 pages. Mr. Donia speaks the language, and part of the

10 process was to identify those portions to be translated. We can certainly

11 have any portion or the entire collection translated, if that's of

12 assistance to the Chamber.

13 JUDGE KWON: I don't think either the entire B/C/S version are

14 not included in this CD, only parts of it.

15 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.

16 Q. Can I draw your attention to the 55th Assembly. Did Mr. Djuric

17 make any statement with respect to what Mr. Krajisnik said about some

18 instruction he received from Mr. Milosevic?

19 A. Yes. Mr. Djuric stated, "President Krajisnik said that Milosevic

20 prevented the offensive, so that we couldn't take Bihac."

21 Q. Can you just put that into context. Where is Bihac in Bosnia and

22 what was this referring to?

23 A. This was in reference to the events of very late 1994, in which

24 there was an effort to take Bihac by the Bosnian Serbs or an offensive

25 that was mounted with that apparent goal. And Bihac, of course, is in the

1 extreme north-western -- north-western corner of Bosnia and was held

2 through -- it was one of the six protected areas but also held through the

3 war by the various forces, the Bosnian government or Bosniak forces.

4 Q. Did Mr. Karadzic at some point in one of the Assembly sessions

5 discuss or relay his first encounter with Mr. Milosevic?

6 A. Yes, he did. In October 1995, he described this first meeting in

7 the end of September 1990, recalling it as follows: "We are not inferior

8 in relation to President Milosevic, and never have been. The first time I

9 visited him, just when I understood that we had great power, that was at

10 the end of September 1990, ... I invited Koljevic and Kozic, I took them

11 with me, since I didn't want to go alone. I immediately assumed a status

12 of equality ..."

13 Q. The Chamber has already heard that the -- the Bosnian Serb

14 Assembly ultimately rejected the Vance-Owen Plan. Can I ask you to point

15 to an example of a discussion of the relationship between the Bosnian Serb

16 leadership and Mr. Milosevic post the rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan?

17 A. In 1994, Mr. Karadzic recalled, "I think that everything Slobo

18 says can be accepted, except one thing we have not abandoned. We are

19 leading them to our goal. ... Without Serbia, nothing would have

20 happened. We don't have the resources and would not have been able to

21 make war, and that is seen in disagreements with them. The primary big

22 disagreement was over the Vance-Owen Plan, and that was serious and not

23 any kind of game, but it's better that the people believe it was a game."

24 Q. That quote begs the question about what "one thing" refers to.

25 Were you able to discern what this one thing was, "the one thing we have

1 not abandoned."

2 A. This, I think, apparently is a reference to that goal which is

3 for the Bosnian Serb leadership always consistently meant a unified

4 Serbian state.

5 Q. Did Mr. Karadzic at any time describe the relationship with

6 Mr. Milosevic with respect to his participation in international

7 negotiations on their behalf?

8 A. Yes. He spoke of the Geneva negotiations, which took place in

9 1992 and 1993 at the 53rd Assembly and said, "We have no desire to remain

10 a separate state. At most we would want to unite today and at some future

11 point for Milosevic to negotiate."

12 Then speaking of the impending negotiations, "However, if we form

13 a common, not a united but a common delegation, where naturally Milosevic

14 will be at the head, formally or informally he will be the head -- and in

15 Geneva he was the head every time, it was clear that he was the head."

16 Q. Now, moving to a different topic. Was there ever a discussion

17 about a phenomenon that the delegates had observed about a parallel

18 government existing in Serbia?

19 A. Yes. Mr. Mijatovic referred to that in saying, "We have a

20 vice-president of the government with responsibility for the economy, who

21 sits in Belgrade. ... Someone said the President of the Economic Chamber,

22 a former minister, also sits in Belgrade. We have plenty of people who

23 sit in Belgrade."

24 Q. Was there ever a reference to what authority these people had who

25 were sitting in Belgrade in this other shadow or parallel government?

1 A. Yes. The Prime Minister Lukic, speaking in 1993, said, "We need

2 a certain number of people to sit and work in Belgrade, but we don't need

3 a whole firm of officials and with such authorisations that even the

4 government of this republic doesn't possess."

5 Q. So is the prime minister of the Republika Srpska in this passage

6 complaining that some of this staff, reportedly RS staff in Belgrade, had

7 authority that even he didn't possess?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I'm going to ask you to look at the next slide and just treat it

10 quite briefly. Were there general statements about the -- or recognition

11 of the dependence of the Republika Srpska on the FRY or the Republic of

12 Serbia?

13 A. Yes, there were. And Mr. Peric, in February of 1995, said,

14 "Gentlemen, as a person I am worried how to live without Serbia ..."

15 This is a time following the date of 4 August 1994, when an embargo of

16 sorts was imposed and the members of the Assembly were complaining about

17 the failure of support from Serbia.

18 Q. Now, I'm going to ask you to turn to a topic of which the Chamber

19 has heard much evidence, and that is the distribution of arms. Was there

20 ever a discussion about the circumstances under which arms were

21 distributed to the Serb population of Bosnia?

22 A. Yes. There were several such discussions. Among them,

23 Mr. Karadzic speaking in April 1995, "The distribution of weapons was

24 carried out thanks to the JNA."

25 And on the bottom part of the page, General Tolimir, at the same

1 or a somewhat later session, August of 1995, said, "I can only say that

2 active officers secured the material and technical means with which 35 per

3 cent of the population succeeded over four years in holding over 70 per

4 cent of the territory on which lived over 65 per cent of the inhabitants

5 of our enemies."

6 Q. Did there ever come a time when Mr. Karadzic commented on the

7 circumstances surrounding the reassignment of General Mladic to duties in

8 the Knin Corps while he was still a member of the JNA, prior to the

9 separation of the JNA or the former withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia?

10 A. Yes. Mr. Karadzic in one of his retrospective statements said,

11 "Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for. I asked for Mladic. ... I

12 took an interest in him, and together with Mr. Krajisnik, I went to

13 General Kukanjac's office and listened to him issuing orders and

14 commanding around Kupres and Knin." General Kukanjac was at that time the

15 commander of the military district that included both Bosnia and Croatia.

16 Q. Now, if I can draw your attention to the 22nd Assembly. And can

17 I ask you to comment on the passage you selected from or spoken by the

18 delegate Dr. Dragomir Kerovic.

19 A. Yes. Mr. Kerovic, again speaking retrospectively in November

20 1992 said, "These problems did not begin yesterday. These problems

21 date --" and he's speaking now of the difficulties of the financing of the

22 VRS, which was a regular topic in the Assembly, and the lack of salaries

23 and support for the VRS, as well as its organisation. "These problems

24 date from October to September 1991, when the first soldiers began to

25 deploy to those territories that in large measure the Serbs control

1 today."

2 Q. Is this statement a recognition that the JNA, as early as

3 September 1991, had deployed forces to the areas that Serbs eventually

4 would control in Bosnia?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. If I can now ask you to turn your attention to the issue of the

7 payment of members of the VRS Officer Corps by the VJ. Were there

8 expressions of the circumstances surrounding that?

9 A. Yes. And many of these expressions likewise came in the context

10 of discussing the military -- the problems of the VRS and the discrepancy

11 that this payment created. A delegate who is unidentified in the

12 transcript is quoted as saying, "We have to see about these people who

13 Milosevic pays, whether they fight on our side or not. A good number of

14 officers receive their pay there."

15 And Mr. Mijatovic, in May of 1993, next session, said, "We

16 accepted nearly all officers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

17 At the 50th session, at the bottom of the page, quoting General

18 Milanovic, "We did not regard these salaries as charities, nor did we

19 accept them as someone from the benches is shouting, in order to serve

20 them. We received them following an agreement which the RS Presidency

21 made with the Presidency of Yugoslavia."

22 Q. Now, General Milanovic is referring to a specific agreement

23 between the RS Presidency and the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Is there any

24 indication in the -- this session or other sessions about the date of that

25 or any other greater detail about such an agreement?

1 A. The -- as far as the date of such an agreement, no. The -- it's

2 clear it was very early, because a list of -- go on to the next page, the

3 statement of General Mladic, which gave a -- a precise accounting of the

4 expenditures of certain kinds from the beginning of the war to the end of

5 1994.

6 Q. This is a rather lengthy passage, and the Chamber will also be

7 made aware of this passage in a military report. Can I ask you to

8 summarise the most significant figures that Mladic quotes that indicate

9 the level of support that he received or he credits as the Yugoslav army,

10 the VJ, as having provided to the VRS.

11 A. Yes. He actually breaks down the munitions into three categories

12 and in each of those three categories identifies how many were received

13 from inherited supplies, that is, supplies that were in Bosnia-Herzegovina

14 when the war began and under the control of the JNA --

15 Q. Before you give us the specific figures, to what time period is

16 General Mladic referring to when he gives these figures?

17 A. He speaks of the time from the beginning of the war to the end of

18 1994.

19 Q. Please now give us the specific figures.

20 A. And in the -- the first category, infantry ammunition, he

21 identifies a total of 9.185 tonnes, of which only 1.49 per cent was

22 self-produced, 42.2 per cent came from supplies that we inherited, of the

23 former JNA, and 47.2 per cent was provided by the Yugoslav army.

24 Q. In that statement, then, it appears that -- is it almost 90 per

25 cent of the infantry ammunition was provided either from the JNA or the

1 VJ?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Please continue.

4 A. The same breakdown, then, is provided for artillery ammunitions,

5 26.2 per cent of which came from production; 39 per cent from supplies,

6 which by the previous order would suggest that this was inherited

7 supplies; and 34.4 per cent provided by the Yugoslav army. Likewise, in

8 anti-aircraft production, this third category, "We secured none from

9 production, which means we didn't produce one shell, one bullet. 42.7 per

10 cent came from supplies, 52.4 per cent were provided by the Yugoslav

11 army."

12 Q. Now, you've said that the -- the topic of how to finance the VRS

13 was a regular topic for discussion. Was there ever a discussion of how

14 war booty or proceeds taken by looting in -- in battle was to be used in

15 this regard?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Please explain.

18 A. Mr. Krajisnik, at the 33rd session, stated, "Through compensatory

19 contracts with enterprises in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and sale

20 of goods from war booty and commercial reserves, making the effort to

21 secure the means for purchase of munitions of war equipment in the Federal

22 Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad."

23 Q. In this sentence is Mr. Krajisnik identifying three sources of

24 funding; one, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; two, the sale of war

25 booty; and three, their own commercial reserves?

1 A. The first category is enterprises in the Federal Republic of

2 Yugoslavia, yes.

3 Q. Was there ever any discussion in the Assembly regarding the VRS

4 actually conducting an operation on FRY territory?

5 A. Yes. A periodic complaint of several delegates was the number of

6 deserters who were living in the Republic of Serbia, who had fled to the

7 Republic of Serbia and were living there undisturbed. And in the course

8 of the 39th session in March of 1994, Mr. Kovacevic referred to the one

9 operation in which -- quoting beginning the second sentence here, "The

10 Ministry of Defence sent people into all areas of Serbia and Montenegro,

11 sent notices to about 12.000 of those with military obligations,

12 actually, there are about 19.000 of them there."

13 Q. Now, if you could place this into context for the Chamber. What

14 happened? What was the response of the Serbian Republic to the presence

15 of VRS or this type of operation?

16 A. Mr. Kovacevic goes on to spell out that reaction. In summary, he

17 says, "But their return evoked a very negative reaction in the FRY -" in

18 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - "political parties used it against

19 the ruling parties in Yugoslavia and against the Supreme Command, but the

20 Defence Council of the FRY forbade this approach and completely prevented

21 us from any manner of returning our draftees to our territory." He then

22 proposes a solution, or the only solution as he sees it: "There must be

23 an agreement between Republican President Karadzic and President

24 Milosevic."

25 Q. So is Mr. Kovacevic saying that after this date in 1994, any

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1 future return of desertees would have to be by agreement of Mr. Karadzic

2 and Mr. Milosevic?

3 A. That is his statement, yes.

4 Q. Drawing your attention to the 53rd Assembly session, did

5 Mr. Karadzic in that Assembly session ever make a kind of a conclusory or

6 summary observation regarding the relationship between the VRS and the VJ?

7 A. Yes, he did. He stated, "Gentlemen, you must know that we have

8 adopted a structure that depends on Yugoslavia and that it is tied to

9 Yugoslavia in pay, pensions, use of arms and ammunition, et cetera, and

10 though we have paid for a good part of it, we have received a good part."

11 Q. Now, if I can ask you to deal with the topic of paramilitaries.

12 Can I ask you what you found in the -- the Assembly minutes with respect

13 to discussions of paramilitaries and paramilitary formations.

14 A. The -- there are a number of references in the Assembly sessions

15 to volunteers and paramilitaries, and this particular excerpt from the

16 54th session states: "Those volunteers that Zeljko Raznjatovic leads as

17 patriots, I have heard that they achieved success. But in his

18 presentation, General Milanovic said he would not accept this kind of

19 help, which amazes me."

20 Q. Was the word "volunteer" used to describe paramilitary such as

21 Arkan's men or Arkan's Tigers?

22 A. It was used -- it's used that way here and was used in other

23 cases as well, yes.

24 Q. Was there ever a specific discussion with respect to Arkan's

25 activities in Bosnia in 1995?

1 A. Yes, there was, at the 54th session, which is October 1995, a

2 statement by Mr. Vojo Kupresanin, who was the director of the TV of the

3 Republika Srpska. It should be pointed out that Mr. Kupresanin frequently

4 made proposals that were not shared by the other delegates, and just

5 before this he had actually made a proposal for a complete population swap

6 of the Serbs of the Republika Srpska and all the Muslims living in Kosovo

7 and -- and the Sandzak. So he was viewed as a person of hair-brained

8 ideas, if you will. But this one, he made a proposal and received a

9 response from Mr. Djuric, which I think is interesting. Mr. Kupresanin

10 said, "I propose that Mr. Arkan come here and become the commander of the

11 city of Banja Luka. Please, you shouldn't take offence. What he did in

12 Eastern Herzegovina, those were practical results. That which we did in a

13 short time in Novi, he saved Novi, Prijedor, et cetera, and the results

14 were exceptional."

15 That evoked a response from Mr. Djuric, saying, in the second

16 paragraph, "Arkan serves Belgrade's policies, as far as I know.

17 Otherwise, he wouldn't exist."

18 Q. Now, the Chamber has heard comprehensive evidence on the

19 destruction of mosques and other cultural and religious property. Can I

20 ask you to briefly comment on any references that you've found to the

21 destruction of such property?

22 A. In 1993, in considering the events in Bosanska Krupa and the

23 prospect, the possibility of that area returning to control of the Bosnian

24 Muslims, Mr. Miroslav Vjestica said, "We will have to compensate them for

25 everything we destroyed and burn there and the 17 mosques we razed to the

1 ground."

2 Another reference came on 9 May 1993 by Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin.

3 This statement took place just two days after the destruction of the

4 Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka. And he is responding to the -- he is

5 responding in the Assembly to the -- to his impression that there is a

6 great deal of discussion about that in Banja Luka. The -- "The main topic

7 in Banja Luka day and night is about the mosque. I don't say that we must

8 thank those who destroyed it, but you mustn't complain so much, at least

9 not in our media. For all those who complain, I'll enlarge a postcard in

10 colour and they can carry it with them."

11 Q. Now, if I can change the topic to Srebrenica. Could I ask you to

12 identify for the Chamber the first reference in the Assembly minutes to an

13 appreciation by the Bosnian Serb leadership that if they were to take over

14 the enclave of Srebrenica, that a -- a terrible tragedy would befall the

15 people who were seeking refuge there?

16 A. In 1993, Mr. Karadzic says, "How does that apply to Srebrenica?

17 I think that's a point for us, for if we had entered Srebrenica, those

18 people entering would be those whose families were killed, 1200 Serbs

19 killed; there would be blood to the knees, and we might lose the state for

20 that. Therefore I think Morillon saved us, not the Muslims when he

21 entered Srebrenica."

22 Q. Now, this is two years before the tragic events of Srebrenica

23 unfolded. Can you please place into context what Mr. Karadzic means or

24 what he is saying when he says "We might lose the state for that."

25 A. His reference here is to the prospect of the international

1 community responding in such a way that the Bosnian Serbs -- the Republika

2 Srpska would not be recognised or that it would shrink geographically by

3 some sort of international decision.

4 Q. Was there a discussion about the timing of when -- what happened

5 at Srebrenica, when it did happen? Was there any discussion about the

6 significance of the time that was chosen to attack Srebrenica?

7 A. Yes. In the retrospectives about the Srebrenica events at the

8 52nd Assembly session on the 6th of August, first General Karadzic and

9 then General -- Mr. Karadzic and then General Gvero each reflected on the

10 timing of taking Srebrenica being calibrated to international conditions.

11 Karadzic said, "Had we taken Srebrenica and entered it when Morillon was

12 there -" that would be a reference to 1993 - "they would have bombed us,

13 you know -- you know how, carpet bombing. They would have scorched us."

14 Then he switches his attention to 1995 and says, "The moment came

15 with Directive number 7, I signalled the taking of Teocak, Srebrenica,

16 Zepa, and Gorazde."

17 General Gvero, in the lower part of the page, says in reference

18 to the question of timing, "With the problem of Srebrenica we also created

19 adequate reserves. We accomplished when we assessed that the

20 international community would not react immediately after the events in

21 Western Slavonia, and we entered exclusively because of that." That is a

22 reference to Western Slavonia being taken by the Croatian forces shortly

23 before the -- at that time.

24 JUDGE MAY: Getting back to the previous quotation, there's a

25 reference here to Srebrenica. Karadzic says, "The moment came, and with

1 directive number 7, I signalled the taking of Srebrenica. Everything was

2 signed and we entered in force." Directive number 7, Mr. Groome? Can you

3 assist us to what that is?

4 MR. GROOME: I believe the witness may be the best to be able to

5 explain.

6 Q. Can I ask you to deal with that directive and explain what you

7 know about that?

8 A. I'm sorry, I'm not familiar with the contents of the directive,

9 per se. I am aware of another -- a citation in which Mr. Karadzic says

10 that he signed altogether seven directives, and here he identifies this

11 one as the most important. But I'm not aware of the contents of that.

12 JUDGE MAY: It plainly says that that directive signalled the

13 taking of a number of places, including Srebrenica. "Everything was

14 signed and we entered in force." I assume this is a document you do not

15 have.

16 MR. GROOME: I cannot answer that definitively, Your Honour.

17 There is another attorney working on that particular part of the evidence.

18 I believe there will be significant evidence about that directive, as well

19 as the others.

20 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

21 MR. GROOME: And I can get more information about it in advance

22 of that witness if the Chamber desires.

23 Q. Can I ask you to continue with this -- with what Mr. Karadzic

24 says about who gave the order with respect to the actual attack on

25 Srebrenica?

1 A. Yes. Again, speaking retrospectively, a few months after the

2 events in Srebrenica. "I personally looked over the plans without the

3 knowledge of the General Staff, not intentionally but by coincidence,

4 found General Krstic, and advised him to go into the city and proclaim the

5 fall of Srebrenica, and after that we will chase the Turks through the

6 woods. I approved that radical mission, and I feel no remorse for it."

7 Q. Now, just so it's clear, when he says this, this is long after

8 the -- it's become public knowledge about the thousands and thousands of

9 Muslim men and boys who were massacred in Srebrenica; is that correct?

10 A. That's correct. This is almost to the day two months after those

11 events had taken place and were being well aired throughout the global

12 media.

13 Q. Did Mr. Karadzic make other statements that indicated his

14 appreciation of the crime that had been committed to the Bosnian Serb --

15 the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica?

16 A. In the session of 6 August, which was about three weeks after the

17 events, he said, "Lieutenant Colonel Milutinovic gives catastrophic

18 pictures to -- pictures to foreign news agencies. These could cost Mladic

19 if they are shown at The Hague. He allows those who wish --" he there

20 being Milutinovic. "He allows those who wish to take pictures of the

21 corpses of women on the streets of Srebrenica and then releases them to

22 foreign media."

23 Q. Is that reference to "shown in The Hague" a reference to this

24 Tribunal?

25 A. It could be, yes. It certainly could be.

1 Q. Can I ask you to comment on what Mr. Dodik said in the 54th

2 assembly session.

3 A. Mr. Dodik was at this time very critical of the Bosnian Serb SDS

4 leadership and made this statement in the Assembly: "And the greatest

5 mistake of the war was Srebrenica and Zepa, and someone has to take

6 responsibility for that. Who is responsible? We legalised before the

7 international community that a safe area can be taken, and then five days

8 later clamored when the protected areas of the RSK was attacked ..."

9 Q. To help the Chamber understand the context of this next excerpt,

10 can I ask you to give us some idea generally when did what happened in

11 Srebrenica become public knowledge and the subject of great media

12 attention.

13 A. The -- generally speaking, the events were covered by reporters

14 right there and became a topic of international media discussion within

15 hours of their taking place and so were fed into, let's say, the

16 international consciousness within a day or two of the time they took

17 place.

18 Q. I want to draw your attention now to the 53rd Assembly,

19 approximately one month after what happened at Srebrenica occurred. And

20 I'd like to draw your attention to what Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik said with

21 respect to Mr. Milosevic. Before I ask you to deal with that quote, can I

22 ask you to describe for the Chamber what also occurred at the time of this

23 Assembly session.

24 A. This was, I believe, the day of the bombing of the -- or the

25 rocketing of the Markale market in Sarajevo. Just for context, the first

1 NATO bombing began two days later, on the 30th of August.

2 Q. Can you please describe what it was that Mr. Krajisnik said at

3 that time.

4 A. Yes. He said, "We were at a meeting with President Milosevic,

5 that's secret and for now should not leave this circle."

6 Q. Please continue with what he says.

7 A. "That was our initiative --" Let me be clear here that the

8 initiative for the meeting is not what he's speaking about. The

9 initiative that he's speaking about was "that we unite all resources and

10 defend the Republic, looking at what happened in the RSK, we cannot have

11 that approach, and the Serbian bloc must always have a common policy. We

12 must always seek unity for Serbs, for we know that they build their

13 strategy on that."

14 Q. Now, this statement by Mr. Krajisnik at the 53rd assembly, was it

15 made in the public portion of the Assembly or the private portion, the

16 closed session?

17 A. It was made in the closed session.

18 Q. And he's advising that he's had this secret meeting with

19 Mr. Milosevic but that they are not to tell anyone about this meeting.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Can I now draw your attention to the subject of genocide and

22 whether or not the delegates or speakers at the Assembly had an

23 appreciation of the -- the implications of what ethnic cleansing and its

24 effect or its relation to committing a genocide.

25 A. Yes. The word "genocide" occurs many, many times in the Assembly

1 sessions, almost always in reference to the Serb belief that Serbs were

2 the target or object of genocide in the Second World War and were likely

3 to be or had been victims of genocide during the war of 1992 to 1995. The

4 excerpt here from Mr. Dragan Kalinic, who was the Minister of Health of

5 Republika Srpska in 1992, is speaking of Sarajevo when he says, "...

6 knowing --" he's not speaking of Sarajevo, he's speaking in general.

7 "... knowing who our enemies are, how perfidious they are, how they cannot

8 be trusted until they are physically, militarily destroyed and crushed,

9 which, of course, implies eliminating and liquidating their key people."

10 Q. Drawing your attention to one of the earlier Assembly sessions,

11 on the 12th of May, 1992, did General Mladic give an ominous warning to

12 the members of the Assembly gathered at that time?

13 A. Yes. At the same Assembly session which Mr. Kalinic was

14 speaking, he said, "People and peoples are not pawns nor are they keys in

15 one's pocket that can be shifted from here to there. ... Therefore, we

16 cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only Serbs would

17 stay, or that the Serbs would fall through and the rest leave. Well that

18 is, that will not, I do not know how Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic would

19 explain this to the world. People, that would be genocide."

20 Q. If I can draw your attention now to Sarajevo. The first question

21 I have for you: Is there any indication in the Assembly minutes as to

22 when the plan for the division of Sarajevo was first conceived?

23 A. Yes. There are indications of that -- that time. Karadzic,

24 speaking in March of 1994 said, "Before the war, Professor Milojevic,

25 planning what would happen with BH, we planned - and it came about quite

1 similarly - what will happen in Sarajevo, and we considered conquering the

2 Zvijezda Mountain. That would be the border, and the canyon of the

3 Krijava River would serve to link Sarajevo and Banja Luka ... that's a

4 state, that's a well-integrated nation, that was our plan long before the

5 war."

6 Q. Is there any discussion about the rationale behind the -- the

7 siege of Sarajevo which on its face seems to be somewhat different than

8 what happened or what occurred in other parts of Bosnia?

9 A. Yes. This concept, as I see the various quotations -- citations,

10 evolved somewhat over time and involved two things: Number one, that

11 Sarajevo was to be a hub of Serbian lands connecting the various Serbian

12 territories; and second was the siege of Sarajevo as a way to isolate the

13 city so that the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not work. Karadzic

14 said in July of 1992, "Thanks to the Sarajevo battlefield, the government

15 and Assembly and all other organs of Alija Izetbegovic do not function."

16 Going on to the next page, he expressed in October in 1993 this

17 sense of Sarajevo as the hub. "For us, Sarajevo integrates Eastern

18 Herzegovina, Old Herzegovina, and Romanija. Romanija has its market in

19 Sarajevo. Serbian Sarajevo is of inestimable importance."

20 Again, in the 53rd session, he refers to both these concepts in

21 saying, "We cannot abandon Sarajevo, for only there can the Muslims have a

22 good state and we would be shrunk to these three regions of Eastern

23 Herzegovina, Old Herzegovina, and Romanija. There would be nothing left

24 if we don't have our Sarajevo."

25 Q. Is there any discussion about the role that cleansing will have

1 in the campaign against Sarajevo?

2 A. Yes. Speaking -- there's an error on this slide, if I may

3 correct it. The speaker here is Mr. Prstojevic, not Radovan Karadzic in

4 July of 1992.

5 Q. Can I ask you just to spell that last name, since it's unusual.

6 A. Yes, P-r-s-t-o-j-e-v-i-c.

7 Q. Please continue.

8 A. "Furthermore, in the first days, we didn't know if Karadzic was

9 alive. And when he walked among us in Ilidza and embolden us, Serbs in

10 Sarajevo held the required territory under their control and in certain

11 areas extended their territory and drove Muslims from territories where

12 they were effectively a majority."

13 Q. Can I draw your attention to the 56th Assembly session and a

14 quote by Mr. Krajisnik?

15 A. Yes. This is a quote from December 1995, after the Dayton Peace

16 Agreement has been signed and the Assembly is debating whether to continue

17 to apply the first strategic goals to those Serbs who are living -- would

18 be living in areas not under Serbian control. "The mission of this

19 republic and its first strategic goal is for us to divide from Muslims and

20 Croats, and no one has the right to create a strategy whereby Serbian

21 Sarajevo remains in a common state. No one is allowed now to create a new

22 solution to stay together."

23 Q. Was there ever an assessment as to when Sarajevo had been

24 successfully and completely encircled?

25 A. The session of 12 May, the 16th session, contains such an

1 assessment by several speakers. Karadzic summarises, saying, "We hold all

2 our areas, all the municipalities, all the settlements around Sarajevo,

3 and we hold our enemies - now I must and can say - we hold our enemies in

4 complete encirclement, so that they cannot receive military assistance,

5 either in manpower or in weapons."

6 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have approximately five minutes more

7 of my examination. Would the Chamber wish me to continue or ...

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if the interpreters would indulge us, we'll have

9 another five minutes.

10 MR. GROOME: And if I can advise the Chamber. I have word that

11 directive number 7 is available, and it's here. If the Chamber wishes, we

12 can mark it for identification pending the appearance of that witness.

13 Q. Can I draw your attention now to the subject of the -- the siege

14 of Sarajevo as it pertained or affected civilians living in the city.

15 A. Yes. Again, at the 12 May session 1992 in Banja Luka, there were

16 several references to the position of civilians in -- in Sarajevo. On

17 page 43, first of all from Dragan Kalinic, who was the Minister of Health

18 of the Republika Srpska at the time: "Those who plan the Sarajevo

19 operation, the liberation of Sarajevo, or destroying the enemy forces in

20 Sarajevo, will have to plan what to do with the medical facilities. And

21 let me tell you this right now: If the military hospital falls into the

22 hands of the enemy, I am for the destruction of the Kosevo Hospital so

23 that the enemy has nowhere to go for medical help."

24 Likewise, a citation from General Mladic at that same session.

25 The highlighted portion: "We are not going to say that we are going to

1 destroy the power supply, pylons, or turn off the water supply. No,

2 because that would get America out of its seat. But gentlemen, please,

3 fine, well, one day there is no water at all in Sarajevo. Therefore, we

4 have to wisely tell the world it was they who were shooting, hit the

5 transmission line and the power went off. They were shooting at the water

6 supplies. There was a power cut at such and such a place. We are doing

7 our best repairing this. That is what diplomacy is."

8 Q. Can I draw your attention now to the 40th Assembly session on the

9 10th of May, 1994. Did Mr. Karadzic characterise the siege of Sarajevo?

10 A. Yes. This is one of two statements that he made before the

11 Assembly in which he draws a parallel between the siege of Sarajevo and

12 the Berlin blockade. "We must preserve the character of this Berlin

13 Corridor, so that we force them to definitively divide Sarajevo and make

14 compact territory, and we will give them a square metre of woods between

15 Vogosca and Visa for which we will take a square kilometre on the Drina."

16 Q. Can I draw your attention to the word "compact." Is that a -- or

17 a concept, "compact territory," that is used throughout the Assembly

18 sessions?

19 A. Yes. It's used principally in relation to the Posavina Corridor

20 and the concept of "compact territory" is referred to also as something

21 that was highlighted in the Graz Agreement of 6 May 1992, between Croats

22 and Serbs -- Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.

23 Q. Is there ever a time that Mr. Karadzic explains the rationale of

24 what's being done in Sarajevo and Mr. Milosevic's response or -- or

25 opinion about what is being done in Sarajevo?

1 A. Yes. At the 36th session, at the end of 1993, he states - this

2 is the bottom of the page, yes - "The policy of the SDS is to hold onto

3 Sarajevo. This Assembly approved that policy in the strategic goals and

4 it seems to me it was the 5th strategic goal."

5 And jumping to the last sentence, "I have already talked to

6 Milosevic about this. Serbian Sarajevo will be supported by all the 12

7 million Serbs."

8 MR. GROOME: I have no further questions, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn.

10 But before we do, I'm not sure, having mentioned this directive,

11 whether it really is an appropriate time to have it exhibited, since this

12 witness really knowing nothing about it. We'll see if there's any

13 reference to it in cross-examination. And if not, we'll consider the

14 position.

15 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE MAY: But thank you for producing it.

17 We're going to adjourn.

18 Dr. Donia, please don't speak to anybody about your evidence, as

19 we have to tell all witnesses, until it's over.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE MAY: Twenty minutes, please.

22 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

23 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before I begin the

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1 cross-examination, Mr. May, I should just like to say something with

2 respect to the observation made by Mr. Kwon in striving for having an

3 integral comprehensive text and approach to the subject matter. And I

4 should like to stress that over the past hour and a half, during the

5 examination-in-chief, to all intents and purposes, we were only able to

6 see fragments of certain statements made by certain officials or deputies

7 from a very large number of Assembly meetings of Republika Srpska, which

8 cannot in any way provide us with a comprehensive picture, especially not

9 provide us with answers to the basic questions that were raised with

10 respect to them. And prior to today's working day, I was given this

11 binder with a CD in it, and it says that it contains the transcripts of

12 all those meetings. I really don't have the time to look at all those CDs

13 with all the Assembly sessions on them and that is why I think we must

14 bear in mind that this is - how shall I put this? - a highly selective

15 approach to a whole heap of material and the contents of the meetings held

16 from 1992 to 1995. So I don't think that working in this way one can gain

17 a comprehensive picture at all. But, of course, under those circumstances

18 and conditions, I will start off with my cross-examination, of course --

19 because, of course, I do wish to clarify matters within the scope -- the

20 extent I'm able to do so with this selective approach and the time

21 constraints that I have.

22 JUDGE MAY: We will bear in mind this matter, and you should have

23 access to all these minutes, probably in electronic form.

24 Is there any reason why the -- the accused shouldn't have it? It

25 may be that it's been disclosed already.

1 MR. GROOME: It has been disclosed already, Your Honour, and

2 that's why the Prosecution asked it to be marked for identification. It

3 may not only be with this witness that the -- these minutes are relevant

4 but may be relevant in the Defence case itself. So we provided them,

5 they're in a searchable form. We are cognisant of Judge Kwon's comment

6 about translations. It's an enormous amount of material, one that

7 exceeded our capacity to translate entirely, but it's something I will

8 explore and will -- will certainly translate any particular session in its

9 entirety or any particular portion which the Chamber, the accused, or the

10 amici would ask us to.

11 JUDGE MAY: We'll see how we get on. We'll see how many portions

12 need translation. Meanwhile, the accused will have the ability -- should

13 have the ability and be able to search the entire record in case he wants

14 to adduce portions during his own case.

15 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. And you will have more time than is normally

16 allotted. Yes.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand that, yes. The point

18 of what I was saying is that the overall activity of the Assembly, the

19 Peoples Assembly of Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1995, which spans many

20 meetings and an enormous number of pages, cannot be presented through a

21 single witness through an hour and a half of examination-in-chief and

22 perhaps, let's say, double of cross-examination. That would be far too

23 superficial if we were to work that way.

24 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

25 Q. [Interpretation] But anyway, Mr. Donia, I should like to ask you

1 several questions to begin with linked to your curriculum vitae, or the

2 B/C/S version zivotopis, curriculum vitae, if you agree.

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. You are a historian. That's right, isn't it?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And in view of the fact that you have the title of Doctor of

7 Science, a Ph.D., was your Ph.D. in history?

8 A. Yes, it was.

9 Q. According to my information, you received your doctorate at the

10 University of Michigan in 1976. Is that right?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. Tell me, please: What is your special sphere of interest when it

13 comes to history? What was your Ph.D. in; what subject matter?

14 A. Well, my Ph.D. preparation was in European history with a special

15 emphasis on south-eastern Europe in the modern period, nineteenth and

16 twentieth centuries. And my dissertation dealt with the history of the

17 Bosnian Muslim movement for autonomy in the last decade of the nineteenth

18 century and the first 14 years of the twentieth century.

19 Q. That means that your dissertation dealt with the history of the

20 Muslims at the end of the last century and prior to that the nineteenth

21 century in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So we could say you were a historian and an Islamist?

24 A. No, I don't claim to be an Islamisist.

25 Q. I mean -- I don't mean to say that you are, religion-wise. I'm

1 not interested in that. But your field of interest and what you deal

2 with. If it is the history of the Muslims in the early nineteenth and

3 twentieth centuries, it is the history of the Muslims, and that's what I

4 mean to say, in calling you an Islamisist.

5 A. Well, I would define my doctoral work and primary interest

6 thematically as social and political history and have had -- I deal some

7 in that dissertation, and have dealt some professionally, with the history

8 of religion.

9 Q. Very well. And is it true that from 1970 to 1975 you were

10 frequently in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

11 A. I was in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 19 -- let's see, summer of 1974

12 until August of 1975, yes. And I was also there in 1978, but those were

13 -- those were two trips. The first one, I was there for a year; the

14 second one, for about three weeks.

15 Q. At the time, you did research and preparation for your doctoral

16 dissertation; is that right?

17 A. That's correct, yes.

18 Q. And you had a stipend by the Fulbright Foundation; is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Tell me, please, once you received your Ph.D., did you become a

21 professor at any of the universities?

22 A. I was an assistant professor of history at the Ohio State

23 University Lima Campus for three years, yes.

24 Q. So you didn't have a career as a professor, a continuous one. As

25 you say associate -- or assistant professor, that was one episode in your

1 life, your professional life. Can we put it that way?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. And is it true that between 1981, until 1998, you didn't actually

4 deal with history in a professional way?

5 A. That's -- that's correct, except as occasional, as I was able to

6 in free time from my other position, which was, I believe, like your own

7 background, in the financial services industry.

8 Q. Well, you worked for Merrill Lynch, did you not?

9 A. Yes, I did.

10 Q. From the beginning of the 1980s, that is to say, until almost the

11 end of the 1990s, if it's from 1981 to 1998, that would be it, wouldn't

12 it?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. And you were also vice-president of the company, were you not?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Otherwise, Merrill Lynch, in world terms, global terms, is a vast

17 financial investment company, is it not, with an enormous balance of

18 payments, turnover, et cetera?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And on the board of that company were distinguished individuals,

21 such as, for example, Bob Dole, who was a prominent Albanian lobbyist in

22 the USA, and Joseph Royer [phoen], who was the US ambassador to China, and

23 so on and so forth, a series of other very prominent personages. That's

24 right, isn't it?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So in this period of 19 years, the critical 19 year, that is to

2 say, from 1981 to 1998, although you received a doctorate in history, you

3 didn't actually devote your professional life to the study of history, did

4 you?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. But nonetheless, during that period of time, you did write about

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You wrote papers about it.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, in those papers of yours, do you deal exclusively with the

10 history of the Muslims or did you study the history of the Serbs and

11 Croats as well?

12 A. No, I've dealt with the history of Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Jews,

13 all peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14 Q. Is it true, Mr. Donia, that you were a witness here, an expert

15 witness in fact, in several trials?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. According to my information - and I'd just like to check them out

18 with you, run them through with you - you were in the Galic trial,

19 Brdjanin-Talic, Stakic, Kvocka, Simic, Kordic and Blaskic trials as a

20 witness, were you not?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. These were all trials which had to do with Serbs and Croats

23 exclusively. That's right, isn't it?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You didn't testify in a single trial against a Muslim, for

1 example, although you are a historian dealing first and foremost with the

2 Muslims?

3 A. Yes. I have -- I have not testified in any case in which a

4 Muslim was a defendant.

5 Q. So you testified as an expert historian in trials that came

6 before this court against persons who were not Muslims but who were Serbs

7 and Croats, and you are an expert, in fact, for the Muslims and not for

8 Serbs and Croats. That's right, isn't it, Mr. Donia?

9 A. I think I've indicated that I consider my expertise to be both

10 broader than that, in terms of being a social political historian of

11 south-eastern Europe, and also having written about all the peoples --

12 written and lectured, studied all the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 JUDGE MAY: It should also be noted for the record that no case

14 has come to trial with a -- an accused who is Muslim. So it wouldn't have

15 been possible for him to be a witness in such a case. But let's move on.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's a very useful observation,

17 Mr. May.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's move on.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Tell me, please, Mr. Donia: In your opinion, what makes you a

21 person qualified to analyse the Assembly meetings of the Assembly of

22 Republika Srpska?

23 A. I have previously used minutes of various Assemblies from

24 Austro-Hungarian times, from the inter-war period from the period between

25 the two wars, and also the socialist period, having had occasion to look

1 at those from time to time and use them in my research work. And I have

2 enough knowledge of the background pattern of events to understand many of

3 the references that take place in the course of these debates, and perhaps

4 at most I'm a bit of a document addict and one of the few people who

5 probably would spend this much time with the very extensive body of

6 debates in the Republika Srpska Assembly.

7 Q. You will agree, I'm sure, that in addition to your historical

8 analysis, the subject that you treat has very marked political elements in

9 it as well. Am I right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. However, you are not a politicologist yourself, are you?

12 A. I am not a political scientist or politikolog. That's correct.

13 Q. And you're not a sociologist either.

14 A. No.

15 Q. However, as far as I can see, the absence of professionalism in

16 political science and sociology does not hamper you from dealing with

17 observations in your analyses with respect to the creation of conditions

18 for the subjects of different meetings which have a very marked political

19 character.

20 A. Well, I think that's true of really every historian, that one

21 develops a familiarity with a particular disciplinary approach. I think,

22 for example, of Professor Milorad Ekmecic, who was my mentor in Sarajevo

23 when I prepared the -- did the research for the dissertation, who's done a

24 wonderful analysis of the social origins of political movements in the

25 nineteenth century in -- among Serbs in Bosnia. That's a marvellous

1 expertise and yet I would also characterise him as not a political

2 scientist but an historian. So I think the lack of disciplinary degree in

3 a particular social science is not really relevant to my qualifications to

4 analyse these sessions.

5 Q. Very well, Mr. Donia. Now, tell me, are you president of the

6 Foundation of Donia Vakuf?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And the foundation was set up in the 1990s, was it?

9 A. I believe 1997.

10 Q. Where do you get the word "vakuf" from? Does it tie you --

11 connect you to a municipality in Bosnia, or how did you decide on giving

12 the foundation the name of Donia Vakuf? Because as you know in Bosnia

13 there's Gornji Vakuf and Donji Vakuf and so on. So where do you get this

14 title for the foundation?

15 A. Yes. I established the foundation under American tax law as a

16 family foundation, which means that donations can be made to this entity

17 but it -- distributions can only go to -- or most, the majority go to

18 other tax-exempt entities. And in setting up the foundation, I wanted to

19 indicate some relationship to its primary purpose, which is to support

20 projects or the study of the area of South-Eastern Europe, and I thought

21 that a Donia Vakuf sounded enough like the municipality of Donji Vakuf to

22 indicate that relationship.

23 JUDGE KWON: If you could tell me what "vakuf" means in Serbian.

24 THE WITNESS: That's actually a word that is in Arabic form

25 "lakuf" means "foundation." And the "vakuf," which is the

1 Serbian-Bosnian version of it really dates back many centuries. The

2 resources in a vakuf are devoted to the upkeep and maintenance of a

3 particular institution or structure.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. The expression dates back to the Ottoman occupation of those

7 regions; isn't that right, Mr. Donia?

8 A. It actually dates back further, yes. Mm-hm.

9 Q. Tell me, please: Via that foundation, was money transferred from

10 certain Islamic countries to the accounts of the government of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, paid into those accounts from them?

12 A. No. The only moneys in the foundation came from my personal

13 donations, and the distributions have gone principally to the University

14 of Michigan, St. Lawrence University, a foundation for business

15 development in San Francisco, none of which I would characterise as

16 Islamic countries.

17 Q. Are you aware of the contents of an article published in Vecernji

18 List of Zagreb on the 26th of October, 2000? The author is a Croatian

19 historian, Mladen Ancic, who is an advisor at the Croatian Academy of Arts

20 and Sciences and an associate professor at Zagreb University?

21 A. Yes, I am. The statements in that article are pure speculation.

22 They're fabrications. The donations and distributions of the Donja Vakuf

23 Foundation are filed each year with the American Internal Revenue Service.

24 It is clear from those records that the recipient money where the money

25 came exclusively from me and were distributed strictly to the institutions

1 that I mentioned. I would be glad to share that documentation with the

2 Court if it wishes to do so, but it's very clear those were false

3 assertions in that article, which appeared shortly after my testimony in

4 one of the cases here.

5 Q. Can you comment on what he says? And I will quote, since you

6 have read the article. He says: "The Prosecution in The Hague indulges

7 in very severe historical judgements through its universal historian

8 expert Mr. Donia, who worked for 20 years as a bank clerk." And then he

9 goes on to say that, "His credibility is perhaps best illustrated by the

10 fact that he is connected to this foundation. And it is even more

11 important to say that Donia writes his expert opinions without scholarly

12 apparatus and without mentioning the primary and secondary sources he

13 uses."

14 Can you comment on these quotes from the article by a Croatian

15 scholar?

16 JUDGE MAY: You needn't bother about the abuse which appears

17 there. Quite unnecessary to take any notice of the denigrating comments

18 which are made. It probably reflects on the writer, rather than the

19 recipient, in my view.

20 THE WITNESS: The statements are all, in my view, just false and

21 abusive, with the exception of one assertion, that I did indeed make one

22 submission to this Tribunal which was not footnoted, used no scholarly

23 apparatus. That was in the Kordic case. And felt at that time that that

24 was not an appropriate way to cover the historical background that I was

25 asked to cover. That statement is correct. The others, I believe, are

1 just utterly false.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Mr. Donia, please bear in mind that it is really not my intention

4 to insult you. My point was that this Croatian scholar said that you put

5 together your expert opinions without mentioning the primary and secondary

6 sources, without using the scholarly apparatus that's normal. And you

7 have just confirmed this. Isn't that so?

8 A. Yes. I thank you for your observation that you don't intend to

9 insult me.

10 As I indicated, there was one of the presentations or submissions

11 that I made to this Tribunal which did not use scholarly apparatus. The

12 others all have. They are rather richly footnoted and go specifically to

13 sources that are in the public domain and in some cases have been acquired

14 by the Office of the Prosecutor.

15 Q. To round off this topic, which relates to your curriculum,

16 bearing in mind all the circumstances in which you worked over the past 20

17 years or so, your profession and your sphere of interest, do you consider

18 yourself to have an objective approach to the topics that the opposite

19 side asks you to testify about against the Serbs?

20 A. Yes. My goal is to be objective and base any conclusions that I

21 reach or statements that I make on documentable evidence. That's my goal,

22 and I, you know, try my best to fulfil it, both in presentations to the

23 Tribunal and in answering any questions from either side.

24 JUDGE MAY: One thing should be clarified: You put in your

25 question, Mr. Milosevic, that he's being asked to testify about "against

1 the Serbs." The short fact is that you are on trial here, and insofar as

2 he gives evidence against anybody, he gives evidence against you. He does

3 not give evidence against the Serbs or anything of the sort. That should

4 be understood.

5 Yes. Your next question.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. If all the

7 minutes of the Assembly of Republika Srpska are some sort of evidence

8 against me, well -- and that from 1992 to 1995.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Donia, in the introductory part of your expert report,

11 "Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1992- 1995," important moments and excerpts

12 selected by you from material covering all these years, you say that the

13 Assembly, as you call them "the Bosnian Serbs," it's the National Assembly

14 of Republika Srpska, was the leading body which reached decisions through

15 frequent but irregular sessions. And therefore, I ask you: Before

16 analysing these sessions, did you read the constitution of Republika

17 Srpska as the highest legal document of that republic?

18 A. If I may go to the premise of your question first. I've chosen

19 the term "Bosnian Serb Assembly" to describe the body which in fact

20 changed names several times in the course of 1992. It actually began in

21 1991 as the Assembly of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

22 subsequently changed names. In fact, in the course of constitutional

23 changes to which you just referred, I have read the constitution of the

24 Republika Srpska. It was, of course, the duty of the Assembly to consider

25 and approve changes to that constitution, and there were many debates and

1 such changes implemented in the course of these sessions.

2 Q. Very well. So you read the constitution of Republika Srpska. Is

3 it indisputable that the Assembly of Republika Srpska, as the legislative

4 body, the highest legislative body, functioned in accordance with that

5 constitution, which prescribed for the activities of that body?

6 A. I'm not qualified to make a legal judgement on whether its

7 decisions were in accord with the constitution. In the general sense, the

8 constitution established and defined the jurisdiction of the Assembly.

9 Q. Did you also read the rules, the rules of procedure of that

10 Assembly --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- in order to familiarise yourself with the principles of work,

13 the methods of work, and the way decisions were reached by the Assembly?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Is it indisputable that the Assembly of Republika Srpska, just

16 like the Republika Srpska, was created in the period that you mention and

17 that it worked under conditions of war, economic sanctions, that is,

18 highly unusual conditions?

19 A. I'm sorry, I'm not sure exactly what your question was.

20 Q. My question was: Is it indisputable that this Assembly, just

21 like the whole of Republika Srpska, was created, operated, and reached

22 decisions under conditions of war and economic sanctions imposed by the

23 international community, that is, under specific circumstances?

24 A. Well, there are at least two questions there, and the first

25 concerns the Assembly of the RS, the second concerns the RS itself. And

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1 in fact, the two were created at different times and in different

2 circumstances.

3 The Serb -- the Assembly of the Serbian People of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it was first known, was created on 24 October 1991

5 by the -- those delegates of Serbian nationality, principally from the

6 SDS, who broke away from the Assembly of the Republic of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina to form their own body, although they continued to

8 serve in the other Assembly as well. That was on 24 October 1991.

9 The Republika Srpska was first formed and proclaimed, I believe,

10 on 8 January 1992 as a -- proclaimed independent by the members of the

11 Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At those times, the

12 war had not begun in Bosnia. So I would say that portion of your question

13 which asked whether they were created in circumstances of war and

14 international sanctions is not the case.

15 As for the functioning of the Assembly, its functions over the

16 period of time that I've examined were largely under circumstances of war,

17 sometimes high level, sometimes low level of war, except for the -- I

18 think the last session that I've cited, which actually took place

19 following the signing of the Dayton peace agreement.

20 Q. To remove this misunderstanding, Mr. Donia, when I speak of this

21 period, I'm referring to the period which you analysed, that is, 1992 to

22 1995, and the circumstances prevailing in this period. That was what my

23 question was about. As you did not analyse the previous period, but only

24 1992 to 1995.

25 A. The all except the last session took place in circumstances of

1 war. The first session analysed here, the 16th session, which was on 12

2 May 1992, took place before the imposition of international sanctions on

3 -- which I believe was with resolution -- UN Security Council Resolution

4 757 on the 30th of May. Other than that, I would agree that the sessions

5 took place under those circumstances.

6 Q. Very well. Since we agree on this, is it indisputable that in

7 the period you speak of, in spite of the state of war and difficult

8 economic, social, and other circumstances, the sessions were held

9 frequently?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Is it also indisputable that the Republika Srpska and its

12 Assembly were the result of an option chosen by the Serbian people in

13 Republika Srpska, including a referendum? So this was a decision reached

14 by a referendum of the people of Republika Srpska.

15 A. No, it's not indisputable. I would say it's a decision that was

16 -- that was reached by some Bosnian Serbs claiming to speak on behalf of

17 the Bosnian -- or the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the

18 referendum, per se, was not an -- the referendum had a specific content to

19 it which was frequently cited by the RS Assembly leaders as authorisation

20 and justification for their actions, but the referendum itself was really

21 one of -- I think two questions that were posed were questions of

22 independence and being part of Yugoslavia, as I recall. The referendum

23 was not a blanket authorisation for the subsequent development of the

24 Bosnian Serb Assembly. No, it was not.

25 Q. I'm certainly not claiming that, that it was a blanket

1 authorisation for everything that went on in the Assembly. But to be

2 precise, do you feel that through the work of this Assembly, in the period

3 analysed by you, the will of those who at the elections, that is, those

4 who were elected by the citizens at the elections, that they expressed the

5 opinions, needs, and interests of the people? The Assembly was made up of

6 I don't know exactly how many deputies - you have this information -

7 deputies elected at three multi-party elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8 Isn't that so?

9 A. I'm a little -- I'm not clear on exactly what your question was.

10 If you could -- if I could ask you to formulate it again.

11 Q. I will reformulate it. In the period you analysed, in this

12 period, in the work of the Assembly, was it those individuals, that is,

13 deputies, who were elected at general multi-party elections, elected by

14 the citizens, who expressed the will? They were elected by their

15 co-citizens, and they expressed the will of these citizens. They

16 represented those citizens.

17 A. There's several parts to that question, I think. They -- the

18 Bosnian Serb Assembly, as I've called it, was made up of most of those

19 persons of Serb nationality who were elected to the Assembly of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the multi-party election of 18 November 1990. Some

21 Serbs elected as representatives of parties other than the SDS and I

22 believe SPO did not join the Bosnian Serb Assembly. The Bosnian Serb

23 Assembly leaders always claimed to speak in the name of the Serbian

24 people. That was their firm assertion. That was not quite accurate, in

25 view of the fact that some of these persons of Serbian nationality who

1 were elected in 1990 did not join.

2 Now, I think there was another part of your question in which you

3 suggested that these people were representing the will of the people, and

4 I would say that's -- that's never -- never absolutely the case in any

5 representative body. It's hard to know what the will of the people is,

6 even for the deputies of the Assembly. So did they make that claim?

7 Absolutely. Were they doing so? It's not always clear.

8 Q. Did they have a legitimate basis to consider themselves deputies

9 or representatives, as they were elected?

10 A. They had a legitimate basis to consider themselves members of the

11 Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and took that authorisation

12 as further authority to represent their constituencies in the RS Assembly.

13 Q. Very well. That is your explanation. I don't have a list or -

14 how shall I put it? - classification of deputies according to their party

15 affiliation, but I would ask you to try to recall, because I think you

16 mentioned that Assemblyman Milorad Dodik left the Assembly, Assemblyman

17 Kalinic. As far as I can remember, neither Dodik nor Kalinic were members

18 either of the Serbian Democratic Party nor of the SPO. I think that

19 Kalinic was a member of the Reformist Party or the Party of Reformist

20 Forces or something like that, and Dodik was, I think, a member of the

21 Social Democratic Party or something similar. In any case, he was not a

22 member of the SDS, and there were other such deputies.

23 A. Yes. As I read the record, you're correct about that. Dragan

24 Kalinic was, in his own representations before the Assembly, a member of

25 the Reformist Party. And in -- you can see the echoes of these non-SDS,

1 non-SPO members in the formation of a club of independence in, I believe,

2 February of 1995, which is referenced in the report in that session, that

3 a group of, I believe, seven deputies formed a club of independence.

4 These were people who were -- had become critical of the SDS leadership at

5 that time.

6 Q. Very well. In the second paragraph of your introduction, you say

7 that in spite of everything we have just said, in connection with these

8 deputies, you say that "Despite this, the Assembly approved almost all

9 major measures proposed by the leadership." You wrote that, didn't you?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And you are aware that -- or at least, that's what I understood

12 you to say -- that the largest number of deputies in the Assembly of

13 Republika Srpska belonged to the Serbian Democratic Party, the vast

14 majority of deputies. Is that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So all the others were in a minority, compared to the SDS.

17 A. Yes. And a few joined the SDS in the course of the times under

18 consideration.

19 Q. I will not go into that now, but the party that the deputies were

20 elected from was an expression of the will of the electorate, because they

21 were elected. Isn't that so?

22 A. Representatives of that party received the majority of votes from

23 Serbian voters in November 1990, yes.

24 Q. Very well. And it is indisputable that the largest number of

25 leaders in leading positions were also from the SDS.

1 A. They were all from the SDS if by "leaders" one means the

2 president, vice-president of the republic -- or of the RS. Occasionally a

3 minister came from another party. Kalinic was an example of a reformist

4 who became Minister of Health. But very few, very few. Almost all were

5 SDS members.

6 Q. The largest number; that's what I said. Kalinic was a doctor, so

7 he became Minister of Health and he was from the Reformist Party.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And the Assembly, as far as I know, made decisions based on

10 proposals that were formulated in the Deputies' Clubs. Although there was

11 a Deputies' Club of the SDS which made up the vast majority, and then the

12 other parties had their own clubs of deputies, but they were a very small

13 minority. Isn't that so?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Therefore, the Assembly proposed -- tabled bills and voted, and

16 this was a reflection of the -- of the relationship of forces within the

17 Assembly and the parties that these deputies were elected from. Is there

18 anything illogical in what you say, that they, in most cases, adopted the

19 proposals put forward by the leaders? Because they were the majority and

20 they were elected at elections. Isn't that the practice in most

21 parliaments in the world, that those who hold a majority have their own

22 policy, which they adopt?

23 A. The first part of your question, is there anything illogical

24 about it, I would only say that I was often surprised at the unanimity or

25 relative unanimity of votes after many deputies had arisen to express

1 their criticism or opposition to a particular part of a piece of

2 legislation or policy. That was particularly the case, for example, in

3 consideration of the various peace plans that came before the Bosnian Serb

4 Assembly. Many deputies had objections to particular provisions, voiced

5 them, in some cases quite forcefully, but in the final analysis voted for

6 the draft resolution that was presented by the leadership. So that was

7 perhaps some -- not as logical as I might have expected it to be.

8 I would agree with the latter part of your statement, that the

9 practice in most democratic societies is that parties essentially exercise

10 party discipline and acquire the approval of their policies through the

11 appropriate legislative bodies.

12 Q. You yourself say that the sessions were full of -- were

13 remarkably open and often included pointed criticism of this same

14 leadership, Karadzic, Mladic, and others; isn't that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And did you gain the impression, as you reviewed both closed and

17 open sessions, that there was a particularly open discussion at the closed

18 sessions, with sincerity, sharp criticism, and even self-criticism?

19 A. Certainly more open, yes.

20 Q. And they did not refrain from making criticisms at open sessions,

21 criticisms levelled against the leadership; isn't that right, Mr. Donia?

22 A. That happened occasionally. It was much less pointed than some

23 of the comments and typically much less pointed than the comments in

24 closed session.

25 Q. Very well. The first session that you reviewed in this text is

1 the session held on the 12th of May, 1992 in Banja Luka. And you analysed

2 the discussions at that session, the decisions adopted. Though I must say

3 you selected only a very few important issues, as you considered them to

4 be.

5 A. Yes. I believe -- my own conclusion was that the two most

6 important issues at that Assembly were the confirmation of General Mladic

7 as -- in his appointment as the command -- Supreme Commander of the army,

8 the VRS, and the creation of the VRS, and the establishment of the six

9 strategic goals. Those were the two topics that dominated much of the

10 session.

11 I must, if I may, make a more general comment about the context

12 and volume of these minutes. I -- I must agree with you, that it's -- it

13 is an enormous corpus of information, and it's, you know, difficult -- I

14 would have loved to have done a 1200-page report on this topic, but I

15 don't think that the -- the panel would have appreciated that or -- nor

16 the Prosecutor. That's not what I was asked to do. But the context in

17 which these statements are made is extremely important, and I've tried to

18 identify the most important topics that were discussed insofar as they

19 were relevant to the charge that I was given and to indicate their, let's

20 say, importance within the particular session. The context -- if the

21 context is so unclear that I couldn't understand it myself, I didn't

22 include it. And in most cases context either will be clear from the

23 particular excerpt or is readily determinable by something close to it.

24 You know, it's a trade-off really between volume and appropriate context

25 that I found I had to make in every single submission -- or entry that I

1 made into the report.

2 Q. Yes. But I'm looking now - and I hope we will as efficiently as

3 possible go through all these sessions - you reduced this session to a

4 couple of quotations., which, as you yourself know, is a handicap if one

5 wants to have an idea of the whole. But let's take -- one gets the

6 impression on the basis of what you said that one of the general

7 principles of your analysis was to choose topics and to address them

8 through sentences which you thought were significant in order to

9 illustrate the significance of the topic, the topics that you considered

10 to be of the greatest importance.

11 Q. I think I lost the specific question there. I tried to select

12 passages that spoke to the key topics and that clearly and insofar as

13 possible clearly express a particular viewpoint or analysis of that --

14 that topic.

15 Q. Well, let me take an example, what you yourself have selected. I

16 didn't have even the physical possibility - absolutely not - to read

17 through those minutes, so I'm looking at what you have produced. And I'm

18 referring now to page 5, and the heading for this session is "Complete

19 Cleansing of All those who are Not Serbs would be Genocide." No one can

20 say anything that cleansing on an ethnic principle would not be genocide.

21 And then you have certain numbers. You say "General Mladic," and

22 then you have some numbers, which I assume are indications of the places

23 on the recording, on the CD. Whereas, General Mladic, during his speech,

24 says the following: "People and peop