1 Wednesday, 9 July 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: I understand the witness is here.

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have the witness, please, Mr. Lilic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like you to tell me how you

11 plan to have these proceedings as cross-examination take place.

12 JUDGE MAY: Could you get the witness, please. No need to wait.

13 Yes.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You didn't hear me?

15 JUDGE MAY: No. It's getting the witness in.

16 But what is the question?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, here's my question: I'd like

18 to know how you're going to conduct these proceedings, the

19 cross-examination, because the night before last, which was the earliest

20 possible time that I could do so, because that's when my associate

21 received a binder with the transcripts --

22 [The witness entered court]

23 JUDGE MAY: Let Mr. Lilic take a seat.

24 Yes.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As I was saying, the night before

1 last, which was the time that my associate can visit me at 6.00 p.m.,

2 prior to yesterday's day and Mr. Riedlmayer's testimony, I received a

3 binder with the transcripts of some sort of telephone conversations, and

4 that's the binder I have here. And yesterday, when you finished work here

5 and I left, I was given another binder, this one here, with several

6 hundred pages to it of different stenograms with a large number of

7 exhibits, which I also had to read through. And I did manage to read

8 through all this, and of course I can conduct the cross-examination of

9 this witness with respect to the material contained in that binder.

10 However, it's quite obvious that I'm going to need --

11 JUDGE MAY: Let me interrupt you for a moment. We don't know what

12 this is about. We haven't had these documents, and we don't know what the

13 relevance to this witness is.

14 MR. NICE: I can deal with -- first of all, the stenographic

15 notes, the stenographic notes of the Council for Coordination, which the

16 Chamber will remember were brought in on the last occasion and have yet to

17 be identified by the witness, the Chamber will recall on the last occasion

18 I said I would go to them probably only for a couple of quotations, and

19 that's my intention in re-examination, because by their late production by

20 the authorities - they have been requested for over a year - it seemed to

21 be quite impossible to have a full examination of the notes by the witness

22 beyond the couple of passages I want him to deal with, one of which he's

23 already dealt with, and the notes will have to speak for themselves.

24 So that is the majority of the documents in the large binder

25 that's been provided to the accused. I wasn't aware that he was being

1 provided with the balance of the documents in that binder. There was no

2 need for him to be provided with those. It's really out of an abundance

3 of generosity, because they are actually documents I may refer to in

4 re-examination. So there was no need to refer him to them now and he's

5 had an advantage that he normally wouldn't otherwise have had.

6 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

7 MR. NICE: So that is what that all amounts to.

8 JUDGE MAY: So what are you proposing to do this morning? You are

9 going to ask the witness some further questions?

10 MR. NICE: Only in -- no, in re-examination. It's all

11 re-examination. If the Court remembers, I left over until today, at the

12 Court's instruction, the question of identification of the stenographic

13 notes, and the other documents are documents that would ordinarily arise

14 in the course of re-examination and have, by one route or another, been

15 provided in advance.

16 JUDGE MAY: Well, are they available for us now?

17 MR. NICE: They certainly are, yes.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we'll have them, please.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My comment and objection had to do

22 with the time that can be given me, because I received the documents just

23 before this session. Regardless of the fact that Mr. Nice just said he's

24 going to skim through them, get through them quickly, I have to ask the

25 witness a number of questions related to those documents. Now, you're

1 giving me one hour, according to Rule 92 bis, whereas I have two large

2 binders here which I was given the night before last and yesterday and --

3 JUDGE MAY: Let me stop you by saying this: We can -- we can

4 shorten this. In fact, you had half an hour left. But obviously in the

5 light of these new documents, we will consider further time, provided, of

6 course, it's -- it's reasonable. Now, if the Prosecution do not wish to

7 ask any more questions, what we'll do is this: We will go into your

8 cross-examination, you can start asking questions about these documents,

9 we'll see how far we get in half an hour, and then we'll review the

10 position. There's no question, of course, that the original limit would

11 apply if there is new material, which there appears to be. But at the

12 moment, we can't judge precisely how long that time should be. But, of

13 course, we have to bear in mind that the witness has come back especially

14 to continue this evidence and that, therefore, time cannot be endless.

15 But you begin now with your -- your cross-examination. It may be

16 sensible for the witness to have the -- the bundle.

17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, two points: One, I didn't answer one of

18 Your Honour's earlier points. As to the bundle, I repeat that the

19 majority of the documents are intended for re-examination, may or may not

20 be used, and there's no real need for the witness to have them in advance

21 and there's no particular need for the accused to deal with them in

22 advance, but he's simply been provided with them.

23 The other point you asked me about -- or rather, the accused

24 raised and I didn't deal with was transcripts of intercepts. There were

25 some transcripts of intercepts of phone calls with this witness. For

1 example, covering the French airline -- the French pilots and their

2 release, which were provided to the accused out of an abundance of caution

3 and in case they constituted Rule 68 material, and that is why they were

4 provided. So they fall into a different category. But I certainly

5 wouldn't press the witness or the accused to go through the binder of

6 documents at the moment.

7 JUDGE MAY: Well, the difficulty, Mr. Nice, is this: That the

8 more material you supply, the more material you try and use in the case,

9 the more opportunity there is for cross-examination.

10 MR. NICE: Absolutely.

11 JUDGE MAY: And further time. And I think I must ask you to

12 restrict the amount of materials that is now put upon us most carefully,

13 because not only is there the question of time; there's the question of

14 the sheer volume of materials and trying to cope with them.

15 MR. NICE: All that is very much in my mind.

16 As to the majority of these -- this particular binder, it is, as I

17 say, the stenographic notes. And those are documents that cannot be

18 resisted as documents of value at some stage for consideration but not

19 necessarily with this witness, because of course they -- as the Chamber

20 will recall, they relate to a period of time before he was in office.

21 Indeed, his account is that this particular committee ceased to operate

22 once he came into office. And he gave evidence about simply one passage

23 that he'd read in one of the minutes. There it is.

24 JUDGE MAY: Well, it would seem sensible if the witness had the

25 binder, in case there are questions to be asked about it. And I see the

1 first tab seems to be 34. Is it proposed it should be additional to the

2 exhibits which we already have for this witness?

3 MR. NICE: Yes. And I think 34 is one that I almost certainly

4 won't rely on. It's too substantial and serves a very limited purpose, so

5 I shouldn't trouble too much about that at the moment. But yes, for ease

6 of ordering and recording, they follow along sequentially.

7 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

8 Mr. Milosevic, deal if you would with this binder, with those

9 matters on which the witness specifically can deal himself. If there are

10 other matters with which he can't deal, then of course we will allow you

11 to address us on them or to deal with them with some other witness.

12 Yes. Let us begin.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, don't you think that the

14 fact that Mr. Nice calls additional examination or re-examination in view

15 of these new binders in fact represents the second half time of the

16 examination-in-chief?

17 JUDGE MAY: No. No. Let us see how we get on. We've got these

18 documents. The Prosecution say they're going to rely on them. We'll have

19 to see whether they are admissible or not. And what we need to do is to

20 start the examination now.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

22 WITNESS: ZORAN LILIC [Resumed]

23 [Witness answered through interpreter]

24 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

25 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Lilic, would you please take a look --

1 actually, I'm going to start with the binder which relates to the

2 so-called intercepted conversations, the intercepts. And I don't say by

3 chance alleged or so-called because there are things in this material

4 which the term "so-called" -- which merit the term "so-called."

5 Now, Slobodan Milosevic, General Perisic, that particular

6 conversation on the 1st of December, 1995, and the number, Mr. Lilic, is

7 02263006.

8 MR. KAY: The witness doesn't have this bundle.

9 JUDGE MAY: What is this? Mr. Kay, can you assist us in this

10 matter?

11 MR. KAY: Yes.

12 JUDGE MAY: I really find this amount of material so late

13 confusing.

14 MR. KAY: This is Rule 68 material that has been served on the

15 amici and the accused by the Prosecution. It comes as a -- a separate

16 bundle that was delivered to us on the 7th of July, and it is this file

17 that the accused is using to cross-examine the witness with.

18 JUDGE MAY: Have we copies of it?

19 MR. NICE: I can find some, yes. There's one copy available at

20 the moment.

21 JUDGE MAY: Well, the witness had better have that.

22 MR. KAY: Have mine, as we can share.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. 006, those are the last digits, the last three digits of this ERN

1 number. And it's in the second half of the file of the binder, because

2 the Serbian text is in part 2, 02963006.

3 A. I've found it.

4 Q. All right, fine. So the date is the 1st of December, 1995. And

5 for the most part, these conversations relate to the release of the

6 pilots. And I'd like to draw your attention to the fact that "M" is

7 Milosevic and "P" is Perisic. I assume you're able to glean that

8 yourself.

9 Now, I'm just going to refer to a couple of points.

10 "Milosevic: Mladic promised that day when we were in Dobanovci to

11 implement, him, he personally, the investigation to see what had happened

12 to the pilots."

13 Is it true -- do you know that Jacques Chirac called me up in

14 Dayton any number of times to insist that I intervene with respect to the

15 authorities of Republika Srpska to have the pilots found? You remember

16 that, I'm sure.

17 A. Yes, I remember him asking for that in Dayton. It was even stated

18 that France would place an ultimatum on signing the Dayton Agreement with

19 the release of the pilots, and I do know that he did call for that.

20 Q. We insisted, if you remember, on the fact they should give us an

21 answer as to what had happened to the pilots, and they took -- for a long

22 time they said that they had no information about the pilots, that they

23 didn't know what had happened to them; isn't that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And then I say to Perisic, he promised the day we were in

1 Dobanovci that he personally would launch an investigation into the

2 whereabouts of the pilots, because he said he didn't know what had

3 happened to them but he said that he would undertake an investigation to

4 find out. That is what Mladic promised.

5 A. Yes, that's what Mladic said, and the others said that they had no

6 knowledge as to the whereabouts of the pilots.

7 Q. And then I go on to say that it was -- that we had to do this post

8 haste because the conference was coming up and I meant the conference in

9 Paris where the Dayton Agreement was to be signed. And I said, "We have

10 to know their fate in the next day or two." And Perisic says, "I've

11 already called him up and he says he's working on it and he's grumbling

12 and complaining a lot because he's encountering problems." So these two

13 municipality presidents are calling him up. "They have to come and see

14 you. I'll do what I can again," and so on. And I say, "There's no

15 problem there. I will receive them all as of Monday onwards, but I find

16 this question critical because the French are now organising the

17 conference. They are the protagonists of everything. They're friends.

18 And we have to start negotiating with them, and I can't give them an

19 answer as to what happened to the pilots. It's not serious. And quite

20 simply, it devalues everything we've done so far."

21 I'll read a little more slowly. Yes, thank you to the

22 interpreters, because they don't have the text.

23 And then I go on to say, "Please tell him -- let him tell you what

24 he knows straight away and do what he can. I want them found dead or

25 alive. He has to find them." And Perisic says, "Very well." And I once

1 again insist upon this and say that the whole of the public expects it,

2 and we have to be at the conference over there. So the public expects to

3 know."

4 "What do they need those two pilots for? Let them find them."

5 And then I once again say, "He promised, when he was here five days ago

6 --" and I'm referring to Dobanovci. And he said, "I didn't delve into

7 that personally, I couldn't have cared at the time, but I am going to take

8 it into my own hands and do it now personally." So if he is a man of his

9 word, let him see it through. So that, then, is clear, I think,

10 Mr. Lilic, our insistence, I mean, and the clear observation that up until

11 that time the authorities of Republika Srpska had refused to look into any

12 information as to the whereabouts of the pilots. And we insisted that

13 they should be found at all cost. Is that right?

14 A. Yes, that's right.

15 Q. And then turn the page, please. Milutinovic is calling me up, and

16 he says, "I apologise for having to call, but it seems that they're making

17 fools of us collectively." And I say to him the following: "Say what you

18 want." And he says: "Karadzic has stated or, rather, conveyed the

19 message by Daniel Schiffer to Chirac, that man Chirac, that Karadzic would

20 release those two pilots in return for a better status for Republika

21 Srpska." And I say, "You don't say." And Milutinovic says, "Yes. I

22 can't believe that they're saying things like that."

23 And then he goes on to mention some writings of Le Figaro

24 newspaper, and "I'll check it out." And then I say, "Well, check it out

25 and call him. Is it possible that they're taking hostages in that way and

1 making a barter arrangement or blackmail?" And now, our reactions, I say

2 once again, "I can't believe that they're going to be so stupid." And

3 then he says, "Well, we appear to be fools," says Milutinovic towards the

4 end. And I say to him, "We're fools because we want peace." And Milan

5 Milutinovic again says, "Well, quite possibly that he mentioned Schiffer."

6 And I say, "Are you listening to me, Milan? Call him up, because it's

7 impossible that he did something like that. Check it out. And then have

8 them deny it. I don't want -- deny it straight away. Don't shame

9 yourself by doing things like that. Anybody that does things like that,

10 we have nothing to say to him any more and we were resigned because of the

11 statement that reached us," and so on and so forth.

12 The conversation goes on, and I end on the next page and say, "Let

13 them deny this straight away so that they can't blackmail us with these

14 people. It's an ugly thing to do that. This is an opportunity. Fisher

15 gave them the opportunity --" I don't see what I meant there, but anyway,

16 I say, "This is a good opportunity and it's not a good idea for them to

17 blackmail people using human people, human persons." And I say, "Can you

18 explain them to them?" And he says, "Yes, I can." So I insist upon this

19 being done, not only not to complicate matters further but to stick to

20 their word. There's nothing to improve or not improve it. This would be

21 blackmail and the taking of hostages again.

22 Do you remember all that?

23 A. Yes. When it comes to those two pilots, I was very well informed.

24 I do remember the efforts that were made to have them released. And you

25 know that I personally took part in their release ultimately.

1 Q. Yes, of course. That's why I want to go through all this, where

2 your participation is quite obvious.

3 Take a look at the next page, please, 008 are the last three

4 digits of that page, and here is what it says: Slobodan Milosevic talking

5 to an unknown person, and that unknown person you will recognise as being

6 yourself; isn't that right?

7 A. Yes, that's me. I've had a chance to look through this. That is

8 me.

9 Q. All right. It says, "Good day, Mr. President. Hello,

10 Mr. President." And I say, "And where are you?" And the answer is, "Here

11 I am in Karadjordjevo." And it said, "I'm sorry, what did you want?"

12 "Well, nothing." And you say, "Well, there's no problem there." I

13 wanted us to meet because you were in Karadjordjevo. And I said, "There's

14 no problem. We won't have much time afterwards. Momir and I are here."

15 And I mean Momir Bulatovic. I wanted to see whether anything could be

16 done, finally, to have those pilots released. Can that man go there and

17 see them for him to show them to him. And if he does that, then this man

18 -- meaning Perisic; right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And then we can say that Perisic has seen them if he does manage

21 to see them, and then the chief of the general staff of France can come

22 over for negotiations, and that's all. And you say, "Well, I can come in

23 the space -- can I come within the hour?" And I say, "Yes, not later than

24 that." And you say, "I'll call Perisic." And I say, "Well, say that

25 matters are hotting up and tell him to go to Mladic, to show him whether

1 he has the pilots or not, because this is an ongoing agony. We haven't

2 had confirmation from him whether he actually has the pilots. If he shows

3 them the pilots, then in the course of the day we'll organise a meeting

4 with the French." And then your answer is, "I'll see to that with him

5 straight away." And when you say "him," you mean Perisic; right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And if he can tell us that he has the pilots, you say, "So Perisic

8 can be a guarantee, a guarantor that he has the pilots."

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So I am insisting that you, in view of your function and post, can

11 send Perisic there to establish whether they have the pilots or not. And

12 then Perisic can refer back to us and tell us how things stand. Then I go

13 on to say, "If he believes him, he doesn't have to go, but then he can

14 tell us in writing and sign it that the man has the pilots." And then I

15 go on to say that, "This is the last train out, high time that this were

16 done." And you say, "I'll see to it."

17 And then you continue the conversation on the next page, with the

18 individual -- that is to say, you. You say, "I found Perisic. He

19 believes he can get what you're asking for," and so on. And then I say,

20 "He should tell him that if he's going to bring in the pilots, the man

21 will come to take them over. So he should give guarantees that there

22 won't be any problems on that score." And your answer was, "All right,

23 fine. I've told him to write -- to put it down in writing first." And so

24 on.

25 And you say that you can come to Belgrade. And I say, "Well,

1 don't come to Belgrade before you have the letter, so that we can see what

2 the letter says." And then you go on to explain that you're there with

3 your wife, and I say, "My best regards to your wife." And that's all.

4 And now you have on that same page a conversation between you and

5 Perisic, in which you explain the problem to him. His response was, "I

6 can guarantee that to you." And then, "To hell with what happens to me

7 but that our state guarantees for somebody else's risky business." So

8 does that show that Perisic isn't sure he has the pilots?

9 A. Well, at that point in time, I don't think anybody knew where the

10 pilots were on our side. Their side, of course, did know.

11 Q. So not even Perisic knew.

12 And you say to him, "They accept everything Momo asked for and

13 Perisic asked "everything?" And you say, "Everything he asked for. They

14 guarantee everything." And Perisic says, "Yes." And then again you say

15 the following: "Let him write it down. Let him put in writing that they

16 have him. Let him come to talk and negotiate and hand the people over,"

17 and so on. And then you go on to say, "We'll call the French only once he

18 confirms that they have them. Otherwise, there's no point." And then you

19 threaten them and say that "If they fail to comply, they will have to bear

20 the consequences."

21 JUDGE MAY: Why is this being -- what has this been disclosed at

22 this stage in the proceedings? I don't -- I simply don't follow.

23 MR. NICE: Out of an abundance of caution and on the possibility

24 of it being 68 as against this witness, showing his measure of control.

25 And that is all. It's outside the indictment.

1 JUDGE MAY: Why wasn't it disclosed earlier?

2 MR. NICE: Where a decision is changed or where a decision is

3 modulated, one has to act accordingly. But the witness is capable of

4 giving a summary account of all this. And any point that the accused

5 wants to be put can be put summary. And there's one point that I will

6 want to raise in re-examination. That's all. But we also only got it

7 very recently, as a matter of fact, from sources that provided it. But it

8 has very limited value. Nevertheless, we have to be so careful with our

9 68 obligations that if in doubt, we provide.

10 JUDGE MAY: Well, Mr. Milosevic, will you take this as

11 expeditiously as you can.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will be very expeditious with

13 these transcripts. But I have to say that Mr. Nice's explanation

14 absolutely is not convincing, that this can be harmful to the witness,

15 because the role of the witness in this is a highly positive one.

16 JUDGE MAY: He didn't say -- he did not say it would be harmful to

17 the witness. But let's move on.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. To be more expeditious, I will skip over to page 13. "Milosevic,

21 with an unknown person, X," I assume --

22 A. That is me.

23 Q. That's quite obvious. You say, "Mr. President, this is how things

24 stand. I'm chasing this idiot. He was in Sarajevo. From Sarajevo he

25 went to Kalinovik, from Kalinovik to Srbinje. Anyway, he's walking around

1 the hills," et cetera. And then you say, "Perisic is suggesting two

2 things. I don't know why that we go there together to persuade him with

3 regard to the pilots. That is one possibility. And the other is for him

4 to go there alone." And I reply, "Let him go alone, but let him see

5 whether he has the pilots." You've found that place, haven't you?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So even Perisic can still not guarantee that they have the pilots.

8 Then I say, "Well, who can provide guarantees?" And you say,

9 "Perisic." And I say, "Let him write that down." And then you tell me

10 what he told you, that he can't do that in relation to another state but

11 he can provide us guarantees. And I say, "Well, let them provide us with

12 guarantees. Let him write down for you that he has them and that this one

13 will bring them over. And then we'll bring the chief of staff of France

14 for this to be over tomorrow." "Very well, Mr. President." So that is

15 it, as far as that intercept is concerned.

16 Then he's conditioning things. This is page 14. And you are

17 talking to Perisic, asking, "Is my word and your word and Chirac's word

18 and Slobodan's word, are they enough for him," as obviously he's doubtful.

19 Isn't that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And then you make arrangements for going there together, and

22 that's on page 15. I won't dwell on that any further. And just let me

23 draw attention to page 16. Again, a transcript of a conversation between

24 Mr. Milosevic and an unknown person, and that is you, isn't it?

25 A. Yes. Only it keeps says "president of the assembly." There are

1 many errors in this transcript.

2 Q. Yes, there are many errors. But the gist of the conversation is

3 there.

4 And then you say, "Fine. I'll go there if you say so. There's no

5 question about it." And then you say that "He should come with us to have

6 guarantees that what we have proposed is for sure, that he has them over

7 there. He doesn't have them 60, he has two of them." And I'm asking

8 again, "Well, will he bring them?" "No, he wants to talk to them and then

9 he says he'll come to Belgrade." And I say, "Well, let him come to

10 Belgrade, but you see those men first. You make sure you see them." And

11 you say, "So we should see them." And then several lines later, "And

12 convince him to bring them so that they can be near at hand for him to be

13 able to hand them over." And then you say, "He claims 100 per cent that

14 he has them. We've talked three times just now." And I say, "Yes, it is

15 important for him to say whether he has them or not and for Perisic to say

16 that he has them." And then you reply, "He says he has them 100 per cent.

17 We spoke three times, and he says that the only problem is the Tribunal,

18 that he promised him that and then what happens?" My answer is, "Nothing.

19 Tell him we promise him that we will not surrender him." Is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Anyway, we didn't surrender anyone to this illegal Tribunal

22 anyway.

23 "And give us the men." The reference is to the pilots. And then

24 you say "let me -- should I give him my word?" I say, "Write it down,

25 that we will not surrender him to the Tribunal if he surrenders the

1 pilots," and you say, "Fine." "And don't let him come here, but let him

2 give you the pilots," et cetera. To save time, I won't go into any

3 details. These are marathon-like conversations between you and Perisic

4 regarding guarantees. Mention is made of Slobodan and Chirac, et cetera,

5 et cetera. I won't dwell on this any longer now.

6 On page 25, or rather, 030 are the last digits, we make

7 arrangements for Perisic to host his French counterpart and remind him

8 once again, I say that, "This man cannot go back without taking those men

9 with him."

10 And then again, on page 31, a conversation between Perisic and

11 Lilic. You say, "I've passed on to Slobodan the main points. I didn't

12 say what the special terms are so as not to cause problems right out.

13 What is important for me, and I think you agree, is that this chief of

14 staff come tomorrow," and the reference is to the chief of staff of the

15 French general staff.

16 And then, after that, you did go to Republika Srpska, together

17 with Perisic. I cautioned you that they shouldn't show you any idiots.

18 And your answer is, "Well, surely they must speak the language of the

19 country they come from so that they don't cheat you." Isn't that right?

20 And all the whole story ended fortunately, had a happy ending. The pilots

21 were released, and we can see from this that no one among the people in

22 Yugoslavia until the very last moment knew whether those men were in their

23 hands, whether they were alive at all, whether they could be handed over,

24 et cetera.

25 In your opinion, was it possible to invest more effort than we did

1 to ensure the success of this operation and for the pilots to be found?

2 A. You know that I was personally involved in this, and at one point

3 you were against my involvement. You said that it would be better for

4 Perisic to go alone. But then we decided that I should go after all. I

5 think that I never had a more difficult task in my life than to save those

6 two pilots, in view of the overall behaviour of the entire main staff, not

7 General Ratko Mladic, who were concealing their whereabouts. And I think

8 that the intelligence administration of the Army of Yugoslavia did

9 everything possible and used all possible channels to find them, and they

10 couldn't, until General Ratko Mladic himself said that he was holding them

11 at Han Pijesak, and even then he didn't want to show them, he just

12 promised to hand them over. I could describe in detail the whole event

13 and the conditions he set and all the things he demanded in return for the

14 pilots. And among other things, that the whole Supreme Council should

15 sign this document. This happened during the night. I know I came to see

16 you at 1.00 a.m.

17 In any event, I think that as far as the Federal Republic of

18 Yugoslavia is concerned, an enormous effort was invested to save those

19 pilots in the first place, to save their lives, and that the chief of

20 staff of the French army - I think his name was Jean Douin - himself

21 caused some problems when talking to Ratko Mladic. He didn't want to talk

22 to a man who was on the list of suspected war criminals. But when all is

23 said and done, I think that it ended happily, and I think that it was a

24 good move prior to the signing of the agreement in Paris.

25 What is also interesting, with regard to those pilots is that I

1 think it was the 11th of December when Radovan Karadzic himself called up

2 and he wanted to get the Russian intelligence service involved in this,

3 and I warned Perisic to take care that they don't spoil the whole

4 arrangement made with Ratko Mladic in that way.

5 The pilots were handed over to General Douin at the bridge at

6 Zvornik safe and sound, and I think they had even been operated on in the

7 hospital in Han Pijesak in Republika Srpska. That would be the story in

8 very brief.

9 So it was thanks primarily to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

10 that this was achieved. I did sign that famous paper on which Ratko

11 Mladic insisted that he shouldn't be surrendered to The Hague Tribunal,

12 referring and relying to our constitution.

13 Q. Absolutely so. And that is not at all at issue. That was our

14 position throughout and continues to be my position today.

15 Now, will you please help me. Will you turn the page, 039. It

16 doesn't relate to you, but it does relate to a phenomenon illustrating the

17 kinds of things that can be found in transcripts of this kind. And what

18 is the purpose of planting such documents. 039.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to ask the audiotape of

20 this conversation to be played so that Mr. Lilic and those listening can

21 see that this allegedly is a conversation between my wife and Rajko

22 Banduk, Mladic's secretary, a low-ranking officer, in which she asks him

23 to explain, and at the very beginning TV France is saying something in

24 three parts. Could --

25 JUDGE MAY: We'll deal with this. First of all, I need to be

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9

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12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 pointed to the position in this transcript. Where in the English is this,

2 please?

3 MR. KAY: It's 11/12/95 is the date on the intercept, so --

4 MR. NICE: [Previous interpretation continues] ...

5 MR. KAY: Yes.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 11th of December, 1995.

7 Mr. May, this is just a drop in the sea of untruths that are being

8 published daily against me and my wife.

9 JUDGE MAY: Don't -- don't make speeches at this stage. Now, what

10 is the point that you want to make with this?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I want to prove that this is a

12 complete falsehood, because my wife never spoke to some sort of secretary

13 of Mladic, asking him whether the pilots were alive. Just imagine. It

14 says -- she talks to Rajko as if they were on good terms. And said, "I

15 don't want to be an obstacle to President Milosevic. And we spent our

16 whole life together" and she says that she doesn't want to stand in my

17 way." A whole lot of nonsense. I'd like the sound to be played. Because

18 Mr. Lilic knows my wife and her voice, and this absolutely cannot be her.

19 This is not just a drop in the ocean of lies published daily against me

20 but also as evidence that false documents are being produced here,

21 unverified documents. This is not the yellow press; it should be

22 least one step above.

23 JUDGE MAY: If the witness can identify the voice.

24 Mr. Lilic, do you think you can identify the accused's wife's

25 voice?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I think I could.

2 JUDGE MAY: I don't know if we can get it played.

3 MR. NICE: I'm not even sure we have the actual audiotapes. We

4 have the transcripts. These have not been produced by us. They've been

5 provided to the accused under Rule 68 as material coming into our

6 possession. We know that the witness confirms the accuracy of the

7 transcripts that he's reviewed, but there's no part of our case that the

8 other material is going in.

9 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Well, no doubt you'll see if you could

10 find the tapes, if that's been put in evidence.

11 We haven't got the tape.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Mr. Lilic, please look at the transcript itself. Look at the end

14 of the page, please. "I don't wish to be an obstacle to President

15 Milosevic." It's not -- I'm not saying that this is a suspicious

16 conversation. This person is enquiring into the life of the pilots. But

17 this is a fabrication simply that my wife would communicate at all with

18 the secretary of General Mladic.

19 JUDGE MAY: The witness can answer -- you've made your point. The

20 witness can answer as far as he can.

21 Mr. Lilic, do you know anything at all about this? You've heard

22 what the accused is -- is putting. Can you say whether -- can you add

23 anything to it? That's his account. Do you know if Mrs. Markovic was in

24 touch with this man? Can you help either way?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether she was in

1 touch with him, Mr. May. But if I may, I have read through these

2 transcripts. I said of some of them that they certainly correspond to the

3 time and events I was involved in at the time, but I must admit that I was

4 sincerely astonished when I read this text that Mr. Milosevic is referring

5 to and also the method of communication with Warrant Officer Banduk,

6 surprised by any direct link between them and surprised by the contents of

7 this text, because the day before that I was in Bosnia. I was in Han

8 Pijesak on the 10th of December. So my astonishment was extreme when I

9 saw this, and I said that I wasn't sure that this was possible. If it's

10 possible, then it indicates quite different relationships that I was not

11 aware of.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Is anything like this possible at all?

14 A. I'm really not sure, especially this last conversation where

15 you're calling from your daughter's on a private telephone, talking about

16 such things. I don't know. I must be quite frank. This was -- I was

17 astonished by this text.

18 Q. And this woman says, "I'm calling from my daughter's apartment."

19 It's absolute nonsense, this. Isn't that clear, at least?

20 A. The text appears to show that Mrs. Markovic has extremely good

21 relations with Ratko and Tolimir, which was not the case.

22 Q. She didn't even know who Tolimir was, nor the generals that are

23 mentioned there, and you know that very well.

24 But I would like to tape to be played for the witness to be able

25 to hear it, and I would like to hear it too. It's really disgraceful that

1 something like this should be tendered.

2 JUDGE MAY: Have you got any more questions?

3 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I must repeat: This isn't being tendered

4 as evidence. It's being produced by the accused because material of this

5 kind has to be produced by us to him for him to use. But if he doesn't

6 believe there's any truth in it, then it's a waste of time for him to

7 refer to it, because I'm not going to refer to it.

8 JUDGE MAY: They're not going to rely on this in evidence. Now,

9 let us move on.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Very well. Fine.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. And now we come to the last conversation from these transcripts,

13 which I would like you to comment on. The page is 042. It says:

14 "Slobodan Milosevic calling from Karadjordjevo with Ljubica, Zoran Lilic,

15 and General Momcilo Perisic, or rather, the other way round. You were in

16 Karadjordjevo with your wife and Perisic and I'm talking to you and

17 Perisic; right? But it doesn't matter. That's just a technical point.

18 First, a few sentences -- I exchange a few words with your wife.

19 I wish her bon voyage, because you were off to China and so on. And then

20 she sends her regards to my wife and she says, "Here's Zoran for you.

21 Goodbye." Milosevic says, "Hello, Zoki." Lilic says, "Here I am with

22 Momcilo and we're discussing something," and Milosevic says, "That's very

23 good. It would be a good idea for him to contact these friends of his

24 because it would be an important thing" - and bear in mind that this is

25 the 16th of December, 1995 - "it would be important for them to assume a

1 positive position at the assembly, not with respect to the plan. They

2 have to accept the plan. That is not the problem. And they have accepted

3 it. They have accepted it. But they must realise that the most important

4 thing now is to have good relations with IFOR, to have good relations with

5 these peace forces." Isn't that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So the agreement was accepted. We discussed it in the previous

8 conversation when we were discussing Dayton. And then I go on to say the

9 following: "The only question is: Are they going to confirm the thing

10 that they are allies with the Americans or are they going to leave that to

11 the Muslims? We have traditional relationships of alliance with the

12 Americans," and so on and so forth.

13 And then I say, "bon voyage," and then I ask to speak to Perisic,

14 who spoke to me in your presence. And then I say the same thing to him,

15 "It would be a good idea if you were to hear -- contact those people of

16 yours across the Drina." And he says, "Yes." "With respect to the

17 assembly." There's just one question, as the plan is no longer contested.

18 There's just one outstanding question that is important for them. Are

19 they going to show from the very beginning that we are in an alliance with

20 the Americans, or is that alliance going to be left to the Muslims?" And

21 Perisic says, "Yes, I understand." We always had traditional allied

22 relationships with them. The Muslims were always at war with them. So

23 now is the best time to assert the traditional alliance and not leave it

24 to the Muslims. And I think that somebody should represent -- should do

25 something along those lines and to represent their army before the

1 assembly and speak. So you suggest that to them, please. You put it to

2 them, please."

3 And then I say again, "What I told you, that Clinton told me in

4 Paris that those Mujahedins would slit his throat first and then the

5 throats of all the Americans." And then I sad, "So the Serb side is

6 expected to behave towards them as towards friends and allies, and they

7 must be able to demonstrate that from day one. That is the basic point.

8 Everything else has been solved. I just don't want them to be led astray

9 by that man over there with all his nonsenses. That's the only important

10 thing."

11 And then I state again, "Let's see how things will evolve today,

12 because there might be individuals over there. And I ask you that your

13 service take this into account. I say this to Perisic, and see how people

14 are acting, because anybody working against --" and we mean the mission

15 and the implementation of the Dayton Accords -- "anybody working against

16 that," I say, "against the interests of the people and peace, we're going

17 to arrest them all. So do that, please, so we know who is on whose side.

18 See to it." And then I repeat at the end, I say to him, "It's important

19 that the army at the assembly should state this. We were always

20 traditional allies. America is there and we want those relations to be

21 placed in the best possible status urgently. So relations and cooperation

22 are the number-one priority."

23 Do you remember that conversation?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And do you also remember that we endeavoured at all events that

1 after the Dayton Agreements were signed, that we were to -- we wielded all

2 our influence to prevent a single incident from breaking out. And in

3 actual fact, no incidents did come to pass.

4 Now, I'd like to go on to the next tab -- or rather, not tab but

5 binder.

6 JUDGE MAY: Let's deal first of all with these tapes. Do you want

7 them exhibited, Mr. Milosevic?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, yes, I do, Mr. May, because

9 they indicate quite clearly not only goodwill and maximum efforts on our

10 part but that good faith should be -- should prevail in all these

11 undertakings.

12 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kay, first of all, thank you for the loan. I

13 think I'll return it.

14 Is there any reason why we shouldn't exhibit them? It would seem

15 sensible to do it.

16 MR. KAY: No.

17 JUDGE MAY: The Defence rely on it. It shows -- it shows

18 criticism of the RS leadership, that they weren't working together.

19 MR. KAY: It's crucial to the accused's case, and it's plainly

20 material that has been introduced through this witness that he's correctly

21 identified in the terms that the accused has put to him, and thereby

22 adopted the material. And plainly it would be admissible. This witness

23 was very much involved with those events that we're dealing with and was

24 able to speak of the accuracy of the content.

25 JUDGE MAY: We'll get an exhibit number for them, and then I want

1 to raise something about the binder.

2 MR. KAY: They're transcripts, of course, at this stage.

3 JUDGE MAY: The transcripts of tapes, not the tapes.

4 MR. KAY: Yes, rather than tapes. We have to wait the originals,

5 if they are available.

6 THE REGISTRAR: D160.

7 JUDGE MAY: They will be exhibited, and no doubt copies can be

8 made available for the Bench.

9 The next matter I want to raise is the status of this binder,

10 which I do not understand why this is arriving now.

11 MR. NICE: Well, it was a mistake. I wasn't intended to be

12 provided now. It's a sort of bit of good fortune for the accused. That

13 is the exhibits that I would have taken Lilic to -- Mr. Lilic to in

14 re-examination in certain circumstances, almost certainly. It also

15 includes the stenographic notes of the meeting of the Council for

16 Coordination, and those have got to be dealt with because those are left

17 over from last time.

18 JUDGE MAY: They -- is that right, that they had not been provided

19 at the time?

20 MR. NICE: Let me remind you of the history: Shortly before the

21 last hearing, there was a concluded 54 bis application with some

22 decisions. These minutes were not the subject of an order, and to our

23 surprise and pleasure they were provided voluntarily on, I think, the

24 morning of the first day that Mr. Lilic gave evidence, is my recollection,

25 something like that.

1 We heard about it, and we were able to produce them because they

2 were flown up specially on the day that he last gave evidence on the last

3 occasion. And I had announced that it might be thought convenient simply

4 for him to identify them so that they could be then processed as an

5 identified exhibit. In the event, we ran out of time and the Court

6 thought it better to put back their identification until a later stage.

7 And so that is an independent exercise that needs to be done at some stage

8 today, and that relates to the largest physical part of this binder.

9 Those documents have yet to be translated in full, and I have

10 simply two extracts from them translated that I want to raise with the

11 witness at some stage, one that he's already dealt with in evidence from

12 memory.

13 So that accounts for a number of these exhibits, and the number

14 that it relates to is in this particular bundle, it's numbers 39 and 40,

15 41, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

16 JUDGE MAY: What it -- the remaining documents, have they been

17 exhibited to date, or are you seeking now to put them in?

18 MR. NICE: No. They're documents that I would be coming to in

19 re-examination. Some of them are new documents that have simply arrived

20 since Mr. Lilic gave evidence, a couple of them, and the others are

21 documents that, in light of the answers he gives, I wish to put to him

22 along with one or two other exhibits already produced. Obviously,

23 typically he would not have seen these in advance of the conclusion of his

24 cross-examination and nor would the accused, so that they come to the

25 accused in a sense by way of the accused's good fortune. But the

1 appropriate course would be for him to conclude his cross-examination in

2 lines with his earlier plan, and for the matter to unfold in the usual

3 way.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Except that would mean he wouldn't be able to

5 cross-examine about the new documents you're putting in. So I think it's

6 better today --

7 MR. NICE: Yes. I can identify those to him in any event, because

8 they weren't available to him before. Let me just find their numbers.

9 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll allow the cross-examination to

10 continue.

11 Mr. Kay.

12 MR. KAY: Yes. New -- I'm very concerned about new material

13 coming in in re-examination, because it makes it very difficult for the

14 accused to respond in any effective form to it. And it may have -- the

15 evidence itself may have a completely different perspective from his

16 position. We've seen that in a number of cases with documents.

17 MR. NICE: 37 and 38 are the documents that are -- are simply not

18 available before, but I think - and I'll check this - I think that's the

19 only two that are other than previously available.

20 MR. MAY: I think it's right that the accused should have the

21 opportunity to cross-examine on the entire binder.

22 MR. KAY: Yes.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I see you -- your headsets

1 weren't on. I demand for reasons of principle that the tape of the

2 alleged conversation between my wife and that warrant officer, where she's

3 asking whether the pilots are alive, should be placed for expert analysis

4 to see whether the voice is hers. You have examples of her voice in

5 interviews and in other things. Because I don't think forgeries of this

6 kind ought to be allowed by the other side.

7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we don't have the tape. I've made it

8 plain twice.

9 JUDGE MAY: Let me deal with it in this way and explain the

10 position: The tape is not available. The Prosecution do not have it. We

11 will see if it can be obtained.

12 But you should also understand this, that the Prosecution are not

13 putting this forward as part of their case. It's merely part -- documents

14 that they've disclosed to you. Somebody has passed it to them and they've

15 passed it on to you. They're not going to rely on it.

16 Now, if it becomes relevant, we will try and pursue the matter.

17 But for the moment, it is not evidence at all in the case. So whatever

18 its background, it doesn't really matter.

19 Now, let's -- let's move on, because time is -- is limited.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm not speaking about the

21 context. The context is positive. She's interested about the lives of

22 the pilots and she speaks about the French interest. But I'm speaking

23 about maliciousness and that a contact of some kind is indicated. And it

24 is relevant because it's just a drop in the ocean of lies that are being

25 put out every day precisely against my wife, myself, and my family. So it

1 is relevant.

2 JUDGE MAY: The relevance here is what is evidence in this

3 particular case, and that is what we're concerned with. Now, let's move

4 on. You can ask questions now about this binder.

5 Does the witness have the binder? He has it.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I do hope that you have the

7 file too and that you can see that it numbers several hundred pages and

8 was disclosed to me last night -- or rather, yesterday, once you had left

9 the courtroom.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Lilic, first of all, let's just take a look at this. They are

12 stenographic notes from the extended meeting of the Council for

13 dovetailing positions of state policy. It was formed and presided over by

14 the then-president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic.

15 That's right, isn't it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. He was a highly respected personage, the greatest living Serb

18 writer. He is the senior of us all. He is the eldest. And his desire

19 was to collect together the representatives of Serbia, Montenegro,

20 Krajina, Republika Srpska, to hold consultations about political issues;

21 isn't that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So to the best of all intentions, to set a unified political

24 approach to questions and issues having to do with Serb national

25 interests; is that right?

1 A. Yes, that can be clearly seen from the stenographic notes

2 themselves.

3 Q. So is it then clear that the intention was a constructive one on

4 the part of Mr. Cosic and in all respects a good one? And judging by what

5 we're going to go through now, it is obvious that it is oriented towards

6 peace; is that right?

7 A. Well, this council was never a secret. It was -- it made public

8 for the information media individual positions taken by it, of course,

9 once they had been decided, and it was -- the decision to set it up in the

10 first place was made public too. It was public knowledge.

11 Q. Yes. I'm just speaking of this good intention and the efforts

12 made of the then-president of the FRY to gather together the leadership

13 and in the function of peaceful solutions and the best possible solutions

14 to hold consultations of this kind. Isn't that right?

15 Now, in these stenographic notes, we have several interventions on

16 my part recorded, and I notice that Mr. Nice has highlighted just one, one

17 of those several interventions. However, the comprehensive nature of the

18 efforts made at that meeting would be distorted were we not to take a look

19 at at least some of the many interventions made at the meeting.

20 And now please turn to page 39. I don't want to give you the ERN

21 number because the stenographic notes are paginated, so it is on page 39.

22 JUDGE MAY: Which tab? Which tab is it?

23 MR. NICE: Probably 40, because he's starting there. There are no

24 translations of these. They are not ready yet.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. It is tab 39. It is the

1 meeting of the 21st of January, 1993.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I assist you? It was the 9th of

3 January, 1993.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. I have it as being the 21st of January, 1993. They're the

6 stenographic notes from the expanded session, 21st of January, 1993, and

7 the number is 02944123.

8 A. Yes. I have 3994 as the last digits on my page.

9 Q. Then it's another number and another document. I don't have the

10 9th of January document, I fear.

11 JUDGE MAY: Have you got -- Mr. Lilic, it's tab 39. Perhaps if

12 someone would just assist the witness with the tab numbers.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance, it is

16 tab 40 is the one of the 9th of January, according to my binder. So maybe

17 under tab 40 Mr. Lilic has what is tab 39 in the other binder. So we're

18 talking about these two tabs, 39 and 40.

19 MR. NICE: No.

20 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness look at tab 39. Look at 39.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've found it, the 21st of January.

22 Thank you.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Have you found it?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Please, before we consider this page or these pages that I should

2 like to comment on briefly and quote from, I have noticed - and maybe you

3 have the same document - that out of the whole minutes, only one insert

4 has been chosen in English, and it comes before the Serbian stenographic

5 notes. And this abstract is a quotation of Zivota Panic, General Zivota

6 Panic. I assume that Mr. Nice did this to ask you about that, so I will

7 take the opportunity to put a question to you about it because afterwards

8 they won't let me have the floor.

9 What has been translated into English is to be found in the

10 Serbian language on page 34 of the original stenographic notes.

11 Have you found it, I assume?

12 A. Yes, I have.

13 Q. I will not analyse the entire text. It begins with Dobrica Cosic

14 asking, "Who wants the floor? I give the floor to General Panic." Then

15 it says, "Zivota Panic," and he speaks. And then on page 34, in the

16 central large paragraph, he explains that the situation is very bad. He

17 addresses himself to Cosic, saying, "What is happening on the left bank of

18 the Drina around Srebrenica, Bajina Basta, Bratunac, is so bad, and you,

19 Mr. President, should know that it's a disgrace for the Serbian people.

20 They're fleeing. They're abandoning everything. The aid we are giving

21 them in weapons, ammunition is in certain houses in the village. We were

22 not able to pull it out. We are preparing to destroy it. That is what

23 was left behind by the JNA."

24 And it is the following that I wish to ask you to comment on,

25 because he says, "In personnel, the army -- in terms of personnel, the

1 army should not go to alien territory but volunteers should be found, some

2 men who will save that part of the territory," and so on.

3 So my question is: Is it clear that since the founding of the

4 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and after the withdrawal of the JNA and the

5 formation of the Army of Yugoslavia, there were no units of the Army of

6 Yugoslavia that could be sent to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

7 Because he himself says, "We cannot send personnel to foreign territory."

8 So the question is: Is it true that whether we're talking of the Republic

9 of Serbia or the Republic of Montenegro, either, that only volunteers went

10 to Bosnia and Krajina?

11 A. I spoke at some length about this during the previous hearing, and

12 I even underlined that after 1992 not a single armed unit of the Army of

13 Yugoslavia was located in the territory of the Republic of Srpska upon

14 orders of the Supreme Defence Council. And this also applies to the

15 period when Mr. Cosic was president. Not then and not throughout your

16 term of four years. And your term of office ended on the 25th of June,

17 1997.

18 Q. So that is two years after the Dayton Agreement and the cessation

19 of the war; is that right? So you're able to testify about the entire

20 period.

21 Now, please look at page 39. Is this, too, the principled

22 position that I advocated within our leadership in the republic and which

23 I hope you are very familiar with? I'm asking for the floor. This is on

24 page 39. And I say, "I suggest that we try to see in concrete terms what

25 awaits us in Geneva." We are discussing the conference in Geneva. And I

1 say that "Momir and Sveta are right." And I'm referring to Momir

2 Bulatovic and Sveta Stojanovic. That is also my opinion. "Our position

3 is that of a principled participant who is advocating a peaceful

4 settlement to the crisis, and we have done our utmost for a principled

5 platform to be defined." Isn't that right? Isn't that our position

6 throughout, Mr. Lilic?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And then I say, I quote: "Our attitude, that is, that of the

9 delegation of Yugoslavia, is quite different with regards to maps,

10 military agreements, and other specific questions, which on the basis of

11 the principles that we have advocated truly belong to issues that the

12 three parties should negotiate." I mean the Muslim, the Serbian, and

13 Croat, within Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. I quote again: "Our position

14 should be one of principle, in favour of peace and a consensus among the

15 three parties for an equitable protection, an even-handed protection of

16 the interests of all three nations." Is that what it says, Mr. Lilic?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are you familiar with my position which I underlined frequently

19 and emphasised that peace in Bosnia would be achieved once the interests

20 of all three nations are treated even-handedly? Wasn't that my position

21 from the very outset?

22 A. Yes, that is true. And that was repeated umpteen times, not your

23 thesis, but your principled position.

24 Before you continue with your questions, Mr. May, if I may, I

25 would like to inform you and the Trial Chamber with the following: I did

1 see four out of seven of these stenographic notes in 1993 to inform myself

2 with them to the extent that this was necessary in view of the position I

3 took as president of FRY. I was not a participant in all these meetings

4 that were held. I can only analyse them from the position of my knowledge

5 and familiarity with the political situation but not as a participant. So

6 please appreciate that position, if I'm not very precise about it.

7 JUDGE MAY: We'll -- we'll bear that in mind.

8 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Yes. But surely you consider yourself quite qualified to assess

11 the political nature and content of certain quotations.

12 A. Yes. That's what I just said.

13 Q. So that was the policy that I advocated, wasn't it?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now, look at the next paragraph: "Therefore, we support all the

16 three parties, and that they should sit round the table and agree on

17 specific matters, maps, other military, and other matters. That is the

18 principled position of our delegation, which means that we support all

19 three parties and their mutual agreement. Whatever that may be, we will

20 support it." Isn't that right?

21 And then I go on to say that "We should not interfere into what

22 the three parties should negotiate." On the next page, second paragraph,

23 I say, "I spoke to Vance today and he asked me directly 'what do you think

24 the approach to maps should be?' I told him quite frankly that the maps

25 should be approach with a great deal of patience and as a highly delicate

1 matter and that maps were factual matters." And then I mentioned the 1991

2 census. I say that "We have the 1981 map, and the principle should be

3 that territory taken by force should not be accepted and existing maps

4 indicate what belongs to whom regarding the borders of the provinces."

5 This is all part of the Vance-Owen Plan, when they organised and drew up

6 provinces that were to be set up in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So you have the censuses. You have everything. We shouldn't -- I

9 don't say that we do not accept but that territory taken by force should

10 not be recognised and that things should be solved in a principled manner.

11 Then I go to point out -- and this is on page 42. I will skip

12 over things. I say in the third paragraph, fourth line from the top,

13 Since there is reference there to the entire Geneva package, including

14 military matters, I say, "I am not a military expert and I don't see -- I

15 don't know what is very important and what is not. We have a principled

16 position, and that is there can be no one-sided disarming. That

17 principled position is something we can defend with a clear conscience."

18 And then I repeat again: "We must respect the principle that

19 territory taken by force cannot be acknowledged, but this applies far more

20 to the Croats than to the Serbs," et cetera. And then I say, "If a

21 military agreement is agreed upon, we've taken an enormous step forward

22 for the shootings to stop and for these things to be done by political

23 means." And then there's a comment as to who is for peace and who is for

24 war. So is it quite clear what, as a matter of principle, Serbia, and I

25 personally as the president of Serbia, were advocating at that Council for

1 Coordination of Positions that was being held with the highest

2 representatives listed present?

3 Will you now look at page 47, please. When I intervene, after it

4 is said that it is contradictory for problems to be solved quickly, I say,

5 "It is in contradiction with the situation. It is normal and logical for

6 them to push the military document in the interest of a cessation of the

7 conflict." So I am saying that it is -- that we should accept as normal

8 their insistence of the military document because it is in the interest of

9 the cessation of hostilities, as soon as possible. And then I cannot

10 remember - and will you please remind me --

11 MR. NICE: Your Honour.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

13 MR. NICE: We don't seem to be getting to a question. And can I

14 raise now, just before we break, the general approach the Chamber, and we,

15 and the accused, and the amici may be obliged to take in relation to

16 records of this type. I've referred to it before, and I think the use of

17 this type of record has got to be seen in the history of the production of

18 the records to us and the problems that that has created. But

19 immediately, there doesn't seem to be a question. It just seems to be --

20 JUDGE MAY: I'm allowing him to read. If he wants to read into

21 the record, he can. He's entitled to rely on this.

22 Yes. Go on.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. May. You have

24 surprised me pleasantly.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

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1 Q. Mr. Lilic, Vladimir Vojvodic should be a general; isn't that

2 right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Because I know Vladimir Vojvodic who was the head of the military

5 medical academy. I can't remember this one. Was -- what was he?

6 A. I think that is the one, actually. I'm not sure.

7 Q. You mean the doctor? Oh, it could be.

8 A. Because I think he was in Mr. Cosic's team.

9 Q. Oh, yes. Quite. Perhaps.

10 Now, let's see. He explains on page 51: "Vladimir, Vojvodic, he

11 says, that must be done, because that is a precondition. That is what it

12 says, an agreement on peace. That is the heading." And then Ilija Djukic

13 takes the floor. Ilija Djukic at the time was the Minister for Foreign

14 Affairs?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. "Vlado, but they intimated they would seek a complete cease-fire

17 at midnight Saturday." Vladimir Vojvodic says, "That is something new."

18 Then Slobodan Milosevic, "That should be accepted immediately. It's

19 something that we should even propose, Saturday, midnight, a complete

20 cessation of fire, and we should abide by it and respect it." Is that

21 what it says?

22 A. Yes, that is what it says.

23 Q. Then Karadzic: "No, it's better for them to propose because if we

24 make the proposal then they call into question the second part of the

25 plan. It's better to put it forward at private meetings and with

1 friends." And I say, "Yes, but we should accept straight away a complete

2 cessation of hostilities on Saturday midnight."

3 Is it possible to insist in more categorical terms than this,

4 "accept immediately what they are suggesting, midnight Saturday? They

5 said something new and I react by saying, "It should be accepted

6 immediately. It should even be our proposal, a complete cessation of fire

7 on Saturday midnight and we should respect it."

8 A. Yes, that is what it says.

9 Q. Let me try and finish this. Again on page 54, Slobodan Milosevic:

10 "As there's a great deal of discussion about this, the Assembly of

11 Republika Srpska at Pale has taken a favourable position, and I say,

12 "Let's be specific. Last time a paper of 9 points was put on the table.

13 I believe that that piece of paper with nine points will be verified."

14 And then the next sentence is, "The reply of the Serbian side is yes,

15 because the decision of the assembly is yes." Before that, there are

16 comments about it, but I'm saying that the answer is yes. "It will be a

17 trick that I believe will be resorted to, and that is the question will be

18 asked whether the Serb side has any reservations in that connection," et

19 cetera, "in order to detract from the value of the positive outcome of the

20 Assembly meeting at Pale, because some parties will insist on that, not

21 Vance and Owen, but they will intervene with them to that effect. The

22 answer should be no tricks and no reservations. This nine-point document

23 has been accepted. Therefore, we have opened the way to discussions on

24 other matters; maps, a military agreement, et cetera, so we shouldn't fall

25 into the trap of admitting that there were any kind of reserves there,

1 that we are saying, 'Yes, but.' It is not 'Yes, but.' It is not 'Yes,

2 but.' It is 'Yes.' In response to the paper, the document put on the

3 table in Geneva at our plenary meeting that we held on Tuesday. And if

4 they'd note that in plenary --"

5 JUDGE MAY: We must bring this to a close now. It's time for an

6 adjournment.

7 Mr. Nice, you wanted to say something.

8 MR. NICE: Yes. I wanted to explain what I was going to propose

9 as a way of dealing with this type of record.

10 Self-evidently we've always wanted this material to be available

11 to the Court, because if it's the precise words of the accused, then it's

12 really the best evidence of what he was thinking and saying at the time.

13 That is why we've pursued these documents since we first learnt of their

14 existence from this witness. We've managed to produce for you the

15 Dobanovci documents, which were tab 20 of the Lilic exhibit, and we're

16 still hoping to get for you the rather larger volume of material from the

17 Supreme Defence Council minutes, at which this witness indeed was a

18 chairman and participant. We know there's a -- perhaps a short delay, but

19 they aren't yet with us, and the Chamber will also recall that the witness

20 was not inclined to deal with even the meetings at which he'd been a

21 participant without having a full record before him. But if we get all

22 those documents before you in due course, then there will be a long record

23 of what the accused said in meetings of this kind.

24 Now, it seemed to me that with that quantity of material coming

25 late, through no fault of ours, because we've been trying to get hold of

1 it one way or another for nearly two years, the better course would

2 probably be for all of us to read the material once it's in translation

3 outside court, if that is a possibility, thus to restrict

4 cross-examination on the material to what -- to that which can be

5 conveniently accommodated within the limited time available to us.

6 Because otherwise -- and I'm not, of course, standing in the way of the

7 material going in; to the contrary, I want it all to go in. And I of

8 course know in general terms what this amounts to, although it isn't

9 available in cross-examination. To allow it to be read in, if it becomes

10 the practice, will be enormously time consuming.

11 So I made some reference to this on the last occasion when I

12 expressed the hope the documents would in due course, as it were, speak

13 for themselves or be capable of being read rather than being read into the

14 record. And that is something I would urge the Chamber to consider

15 because of the real problems of time. Fundamentally, I stick by the

16 position that if this is - I have no reason to doubt it - the precise

17 words of the accused in various meetings, it's obviously valuable

18 material. The question is simply how to handle it.

19 JUDGE MAY: The question is the fair way in which the deal with

20 it.

21 How long is this witness here for?

22 MR. NICE: Well, he's only here for today. I don't know about his

23 availability for tomorrow. But, Your Honour, I mean, thinking, as it

24 were, ahead or back, had we had the material earlier, we might have been

25 able to schedule it and present it through a witness or an expert. But it

1 simply hasn't -- hasn't arrived until now. That's the problem.

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider the position and we'll consider the

4 time which should be available.

5 MR. NICE: But I realise you've already ruled against me on this,

6 but it would be my submission that for a witness who has said he's not

7 even prepared to deal with the meetings where he was a participant, say,

8 with a record, there must be a limited value to the answers he can give on

9 meetings at which he wasn't present.

10 The Chamber will recall that he, apart from the one extract we've

11 looked at in part, which was translated, he -- he was struck by one other

12 entry, which we can see at the beginning of tab 40. He gave an account of

13 that. And this is the -- as it were, the full and corrected version of

14 that. And those are the only two excerpts I'd be relying on.

15 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

16 We'll adjourn. Twenty minutes.

17 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

18 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

19 JUDGE MAY: We have to balance the various interests in this case

20 in deciding how to progress from here. We have in mind what the

21 Prosecution said about time, of course. At the same time, the accused

22 must be entitled, faced with this vast volume of documents, to make use of

23 them and to cross-examine upon them, on matters he considers relevant.

24 But we also have to take account the interests of the witness who has

25 returned to give evidence, here to assist the Court, who now also finds

1 himself confronted with a battery of documents, his having agreed to come

2 back for an hour and a half. As against that, we have the general

3 interests of justice.

4 We've come to this conclusion: Having regard to the matter which

5 the accused has to deal with today and having regard to the fact that the

6 amici, I think, asked for half an hour and the Prosecution half an hour,

7 we shall give them the last session to share between them. This next

8 session we will allow for cross-examination, which means the accused will

9 have had over two and a half hours this morning, which we deem to be

10 sufficient.

11 So, Mr. Milosevic, you've got the next session, if you want it, if

12 you require it, to cross-examine the witness.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So a shortened session, Mr. May.

14 But nonetheless, I'll do my best to get through my main points.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. And not to lose time, let me start, Mr. Lilic. Would you please

17 open tab 4 -- no, 40, I'm sorry, tab 40, which is also -- which is also

18 the stenographic notes from an extended session for the council on the

19 dovetailing of positions on state policy, dated the 9th of January, 1993,

20 the Council for Coordination. And as you've taken a look at both these

21 stenographic notes, they actually make up a whole, don't they?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, with the first stenographic notes, Mr. Nice highlighted a

24 portion and had it translated in English, the one we discussed with Zivota

25 Panic and his statement. And we explained that nobody from the army could

1 go across the Drina River.

2 Now, with these second lot of minutes, which is -- makes up a

3 whole with the first part, he highlighted another portion, that is to say,

4 a short intervention by me, and had it translated into English, but we'll

5 come to that later on, when the time comes, according to the order of

6 things. There were quite a number of interventions from my part, on my

7 part, and this one instance in the context of all the others is a very

8 good one too.

9 Now, take a look, please, at the stenographic notes. I'll try and

10 get through them as quickly as possible. But look at page 34, please.

11 Page 34, the penultimate paragraph. And I'm going to start off by reading

12 out the third sentence. We're all speaking round the table, and I assume

13 we all share each other's opinions, and then I go on to quote what I said

14 at the time. "It is our strategic goal that the Serb people in the

15 Balkans should be free and equal. Freedom and equality for the Serb

16 people in the Balkans implies each and every possibility for it to assert

17 fully and realise its interests."

18 And then I go on to conclude at the end of that paragraph, "For me

19 it is less important through harmony, institutional solutions, and stages

20 that goal is to be reached, and what is much more important for me is how

21 many people are going to die for those goals and whether anybody ought to

22 lay down their lives at all for any of those goals." So was that always

23 our position? We are not seeking anything more than equality. We want to

24 be equal and free. Isn't that right, Mr. Lilic?

25 A. Yes. Many of us took the same position that you put forward here,

1 and those were our positions of principle and publicly declared positions.

2 So that's not just something that happened at this meeting.

3 Q. And I'm sure you'll remember when the declaration of the Federal

4 Republic of Yugoslavia was established and when the constitution was

5 enacted the declaration was registered in the United Nations as an

6 official document of our country, by the way, and it stated that "The

7 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has no territorial pretensions vis-a-vis

8 the former Yugoslav republics." Do you remember that?

9 A. Yes. That was the document when the new constitution was enacted.

10 Q. And I'm sure you'll also remember that I stated publicly at the

11 assembly in Pale, I stressed the goal, the objective which was freedom and

12 equality and not -- nothing more than that, and of course nothing less

13 than that.

14 And then, take a look at page 35, the next page. I say that

15 "Nobody should lose their lives, regardless of the institutional phases

16 and stages necessary for the negotiations, that one should be persistent

17 in negotiating." And then I go on to conclude, at the top of the page,

18 that "Even one single head less for the realisation of goals, which means

19 if even one man is killed, that is always more than a phase, inter-phase,

20 step, inter-step, in an institutional solution on negotiations being

21 conducted." So what I am saying is that we must insist on negotiations

22 and a peaceful solution regardless of how long those negotiations will

23 last and how many negotiations we have to go through. Was that our

24 position and policy, the policy we pursued?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now take a look at page 36, please, where I state the following:

2 I mention the talks with Cyrus Vance and the formula, in inverted commas,

3 because this is taken over from a document prepared by them, "Three

4 constituent nations, peoples." And then we say that "That formula must be

5 asserted in the ten principles, three constituent nations, peoples." And

6 I say - and then he said - "All right. Very well. Let's do it this way.

7 Let's have the first principle read that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a

8 decentralised state composed of three constituent peoples and organised

9 into provinces with a high degree of the exercise of power and authority."

10 So that is what the international mediators agreed to. That was our goal,

11 and that was a function of the fact that the Serb people should be free

12 and equal, never to the detriment of the other two peoples. Was that

13 always our policy?

14 A. Yes. And in this case, I think it was -- it referred to a

15 preparation of that future, the future constitution should the Vance-Owen

16 Plan be realised. So this term "constituent peoples" is a very important

17 one, "three constituent peoples."

18 Q. At the end of page 36 there, the last sentence, "If you go with

19 the principle of three constituent peoples and their equality, then I

20 assume those three peoples must arrive at the definition of their

21 constitution." So we strove to have these three constituent peoples

22 define their constitution together themselves.

23 And then, I'm sure you'll remember, this was another topic of our

24 discussions. I think that after Dayton you signed this with the

25 representatives of Republika Srpska, that is to say, the agreement,

1 special relations or --

2 A. Yes, special relations.

3 Q. This was a topical issue. So I say -- another question that I

4 broached was the decisive exclusion of coming into relationship with

5 others, which Vance took in fairly well and said that that question wasn't

6 to be raised, to enter into a relationship with others, that that could be

7 relativised and improved.

8 So is it clear that we accept -- we were ready to accept any

9 solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina which showed a respect for the equality of

10 the constituent nations and it implied that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a

11 single state?

12 A. Yes. But the three sides were to reach an agreement.

13 Q. Yes. And that with full conscience is the only proper course and

14 principle to take. I hope you'll agree with that.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now take a look at page 50, because this also relates to

17 this -- these relationships. Once again, "Slobodan Milosevic: Regional

18 institutions are not excluded at all and I broached the question with

19 Vance." And then I go on to say, "With Serbia, for example. Within the

20 of the former Yugoslavia we had relations with the Northern Rhine area,

21 for example, that is the Westfalia German province of the North Rhine or

22 with an Italian province, for example." As there, we had the Heilongjiang

23 province of China as this relationship and with Russia within the Soviet

24 Union, so there was no restriction for relations of that kind. "Tomorrow,

25 for example, the province of Banja Luka" - which were the provinces as

1 they were drawn up by Vance and Owen in their plans - "will have

2 relationships with the province of Vojvodina, economic and cultural ones,

3 others. They would sign protocols, exchange various matters and so on.

4 Is that what it says?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So we're focussing on cooperation along those lines.

7 And then I go on to say that "All this can be incorporated into

8 the writing of the constitution." Therefore, it is not something that is

9 being challenged. We're talking about the set-up for Bosnia-Herzegovina,

10 that there are no pretensions on that score.

11 I should just like us to take a look at Cosic's intervention. He

12 took the floor and came out in favour strongly of continuing the

13 negotiations and that all that should be done is negotiate, on no account

14 to go to war. And Cosic says, "What we must not do" - on page 55, at the

15 bottom - "is to interrupt our negotiations. I'm afraid, Radovan" - and

16 he's addressing Karadzic - "that as the two of us took part in the

17 negotiations in Geneva that with regard to your proposal, which I agree

18 to, we're excluding ourselves from the Geneva negotiations. This should

19 not happen for the reasons well known to us." And then in the next

20 paragraph he goes to on say, "Therefore, I strive and propose that we hold

21 negotiations at all costs. Negotiations must be held at all cost, which

22 means basically to accept the proposals tabled by them and then to fight

23 for its modification -- their modification." Is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So Cosic's position is quite clear, and his efforts to negotiate,

1 that we must negotiate and negotiate until a solution is ultimately found.

2 Now we come to page 69, and that is the portion that Mr. Nice

3 provided for us in English and extracted from the context of the rest.

4 And I say -- it says "Slobodan Milosevic." "Please, I have to interrupt

5 you. Paspalj said" -- I have to stop you. You've got this, Mr. May, in

6 English. It is the only excerpt from the two minutes, and everything I

7 said in my aspirations for peace.

8 "Paspalj said that we had to have the unity of the Serbian people

9 and de facto we do, because objectively speaking, on all levels,

10 political, military, economic, culture, educational, we have that unity.

11 The problem now is how we could get recognition of this unity, that is,

12 how we could legalise this unity, how we can transform the situation which

13 de facto exists and which could de facto not be threatened, how could we

14 transform it into both de facto and de jure. Therefore, this past, de

15 jure, to get to that, is like --" and then this in inverted commas -- "a

16 small labyrinth." So is that clear that we're referring to negotiations

17 there, Mr. Lilic?

18 A. Yes. This whole portion relates to negotiations.

19 Q. Yes, re: negotiations. "But, we will never allow a change in

20 this de facto situation, and we will achieve things through the

21 'labyrinth', if not in half a year, then in a year; if not in a year,

22 then in two. What will we gain? We will gain a decrease in the deaths

23 and therefore preserve our people. Everything must be sacrificed for the

24 people, except the people."

25 Therefore, within the context of everything I said when I took the

1 floor, is this yet another example that negotiations should be continued

2 and that the situation should be solved through negotiations? And then

3 Dobrica Cosic goes on to say that he is in complete agreement, and we

4 continue.

5 And then I go on to say - and these are the most important things

6 for me - the last two words or page 69, that is where this is. "If it

7 says in the first principle constituent people, nation, then we have

8 finished our job." A constituent nation. So that is what we wish to

9 assert and nothing more than that. Isn't that right, Mr. Lilic?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I'll do my best to abridge this next portion. Once again, on page

12 79, there's a brief intervention on my part, once again with regard to the

13 papers. I say, "They complicate matters too much." And I say, "All they

14 have to do is to change it and put in 'constituent nation' and lighten

15 some of the other things and then that is a good basis for you to sit down

16 and prepare the constitution, the long-term preparations for the

17 constitution." And that is what I had to say that time.

18 On page 82, we go back to cooperation between the provinces, and I

19 asked whether the Banja Luka province can have relationships with

20 Vojvodina. Of course it is logical that it can, logical and normal. And

21 that is the response to the question raised by the Prime Minister of the

22 day, Kontic. Is that right, Mr. Lilic?

23 A. Yes, that is what it says here in the stenographic notes.

24 Q. Now, somebody interjects. I don't remember who Zdravko Zecevic

25 was. He says, "What borders? Borders can only be established through

1 war." Slobodan Milosevic: "No. These borders, with slight adjustments,

2 will be excellent borders. How many -- how much of the percentage of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina is in these borders? Radovan Karadzic says "40 per

4 cent." Well, this will be increased to 50. There are some 20 that are in

5 dispute at the moment. And Karadzic says, "Posavina and Podrinje are the

6 ones under question." And in Dayton wasn't the agreement 49/51?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Well, that was the solution, in fact, that ratio. And do you

9 remember that Owen said that the war could have ended two years earlier

10 had they had America's support?

11 A. I remember that, and I also remember that the essential point here

12 was to accept the Vance-Owen Plan, and the fact that there were certain

13 disagreements on certain small -- other points should be negotiated later

14 on and put right, if possible. So the percentage was the same. It would

15 have perhaps been greater with respect to Republika Srpska.

16 Q. Now take a look at page 95, whereas this fear is expressed again

17 in the following way: Radovan Karadzic says, it's a quotation:

18 "Provinces are not internationally recognised legal entities." He's

19 quoting from the document. "And they cannot enter into agreement with

20 foreign states or international organisations." And then Slobodan

21 Milosevic says, "Of course they're not internationally recognised. The

22 states of America are not internationally recognised legal entities

23 either."

24 And then there's mention of Quebec having 700 agreed conventions

25 with France, and I say, "Well, that is excellent. You'll have as many

1 with Serbia, each province." And this is on page 96. "We have an

2 advantage because Serbia is not an independent state but is within the

3 framework of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so it will be cooperating

4 also with non-independent states that are part of others." So all these

5 remarks are in the interest of a peaceful solution being found.

6 And then, as during the examination-in-chief, you said that I was

7 the one who negotiated. I don't have my notes exactly how you put it, but

8 that I was the main negotiator with the international community.

9 A. With the international community.

10 Q. Yes, that is correct. But do you remember that was always upon

11 their request?

12 A. That is what I said, and that can surely be seen from the notes.

13 The international community insisted on talking to you. So that is

14 nothing terrible about that. It was accepted by the Serbian side. I even

15 remember very well Mr. Holbrooke's speech in the State Department when he

16 said, "Negotiations in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika

17 Srpska should focus on you and that the other parties should be part of

18 the delegation." And I think that is how it was, and it bore fruit, as we

19 know.

20 Q. My point, Mr. Lilic, is that they insisted upon this and that I

21 endeavoured, as can be seen from these notes, when Yugoslavia was formed

22 that Yugoslavia should take over those things and that we should not

23 interfere.

24 So look at page 112, please. Cosic says to me, "You have an

25 invitation from Vance and Owen" - this is to go to that meeting - "and

1 Momir Bulatovic and me." And Bulatovic says, "Jansen has reiterated that

2 invitation, as he was at the time presiding in the European Community."

3 Cosic says, "We didn't say no to Vance and Owen." Milosevic: "The

4 invitation addressed is up to us. They cannot determine the composition

5 of the Yugoslav delegation. They can give you advice regarding the

6 composition, but that is something quite different. The possibility of

7 going there I am reviewing from one standpoint. Should we, because of his

8 explicit request, accept that invitation?" I'm referring to us from the

9 republics, because I'm advocating that Yugoslavia should be the party

10 negotiating. And when we came before the cameras, he said, "On behalf of

11 the European Community, I have invited President Milosevic to participate

12 in the work of the Geneva conference, to make his contribution," et

13 cetera. I didn't give a response. "We need to think it over. And there

14 is the possibility that if I fail to go, they could say that they are

15 refusing to contribute to the success of the Geneva conference. That is

16 all. That is the whole point." And then Vladislav Jovanovic, who was

17 Foreign Minister at the time, said, "Please review that in a positive

18 light." And on the following page, page 113, this is in the context of

19 the point I'm making that it is the international community that insisted

20 on us making a contribution. It was not us pushing our way in there, but

21 on the contrary, because we thought it was Yugoslavia's duty, that of the

22 federal organs.

23 And on page 113, I say once again, "I will communicate with Vance

24 once again, and if I decide that we shouldn't go, then I will say that a

25 Yugoslav delegation will go without me. I refuse to go three times."

1 Cosic says, "I understand you, and I would refuse it also in your

2 position."

3 Yes, I note the interpreter's remarks that we need to slow down.

4 Slobodan Milosevic said, "We are not a party to the conflict in

5 Bosnia. Serbia is not represented at the conference in Geneva. The

6 Yugoslav delegation is there, and it is the responsibility of the Yugoslav

7 federal institutions. Therefore, we as Yugoslavia are represented." But

8 he insisted, "You cannot refuse to make a contribution."

9 And then I say, "I think it would be a good thing if we resolve

10 the problem in a spirit of understanding, that we should not be stubborn

11 about it," et cetera. Is that right, Mr. Lilic?

12 A. It says everything here in this document, and there's no doubt

13 about the fact that your presence there was extremely significant.

14 Q. Well, that is why they requested that I go all the time.

15 I don't know how I come to the next page. Oh, yes, tab 41 now.

16 This is a continuation of the session which was held in several parts.

17 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. It should be noted for the record

18 that we're dealing with Exhibit 469 and these various tabs come in that.

19 Yes.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. It is from this meeting of the council, held also on the 11th of

22 August, and I am suggesting that we send a letter of the following

23 contents. And then I read out a draft of the letter that I wrote. "With

24 reference to the invitation to the 13th Plenary Session of the Conference

25 on Yugoslavia --"

1 A. I'm sorry, I don't have tab 41 here.

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] It is tab 41, Your Honours.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but Mr. Lilic doesn't have that

4 tab.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Do you have it now?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. On page 4, I say that we should send them a reply in response to

10 Carrington's invitation to the 13th Plenary Session in Brussels. And I

11 read, "With reference to the invitation to the 13th Plenary of the

12 Conference on Yugoslavia, I wish to remind you that at the last, 12th,

13 Plenary Session in Brussels, we informed the conference that following the

14 proclamation of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

15 the delegations of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro in future will

16 be considered a single unified delegation of the Federal Republic of

17 Yugoslavia."

18 And then I say that, "This should be sent to Lord Carrington and

19 signed by Bulatovic and myself," because we had received the invitation.

20 And then Milan Panic, who was at the time already federal Prime

21 Minister, an American of Serb extraction, says, "No one has anything

22 against. No one is opposed. And I propose that the text written by

23 Mr. Milosevic be adopted as written."

24 So we were endeavouring to have Yugoslavia assert itself, and that

25 is what I say on page 10 again. "Our position is that we have done

1 everything we can to create Yugoslavia and for it to survive. We will be

2 talking about the question of state continuity and all other matters."

3 And then I say in the middle of the next paragraph, "Are we going to

4 respect this state that we have formed or not?" So my efforts were

5 directed towards these -- the authorities being -- the authority for this

6 being taken over by the federal institutions.

7 Now, look at page 13 now, please. There's just one remark. I

8 join in when Milan Panic was explaining something, and I say, "The

9 responsibility is with the European Community, which has created the war

10 in Bosnia, and we need to be blamed for it. We need to cover up their

11 crime committed in breaking up an independent state." Panic then says,

12 "But we mustn't say that to him because if you say that, then it's

13 pressing the point and everyone is aware of it anyway." Is that right,

14 Mr. Lilic?

15 A. That is what it says here in the stenographic notes.

16 Q. And then on page 10, I say: "If I may add, we should show a

17 maximum respect for the political content of the declaration proclaimed by

18 the Federal Assembly when the constitution was proclaimed. This was

19 achieved through a broad-based democratic process. A platform was

20 established for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I don't see that we

21 need to change the approach taken in the declaration. It is obvious from

22 what we are all saying today that the need is being confirmed of asserting

23 the contents of that very declaration. And I would also add that that

24 declaration has met with a positive response of the international

25 community. It was not met with repulsion or rejection. On the contrary,

1 it was seen as a constructive approach following the formation of

2 Yugoslavia. The world will not start with us around this table. We have

3 a continuity in political behaviour and the platform defined in the

4 declaration."

5 Cosic then says, "I support and confirm this statement."

6 That was our position and I assume you remember that.

7 A. Yes. The declaration was registered in the United Nations too.

8 Q. That's right. This is not directly linked to what we have been

9 saying, but as the situation in Kosovo was referred to, please look at

10 page 88. Slobodan Milosevic: "We have to separate as many Albanians as

11 possible from the separatist movement. The members of the separatist

12 movement and those acting under their pressure will never vote in the

13 elections. Therefore, we must separate the Albanians -- the mass of the

14 Albanians from the separatists. That is the only strategy on which our

15 policies should be based."

16 And then on page 90, in response to what Milan Panic says, "Make

17 him come not because he likes you but make such a situation that he should

18 come." And Milosevic says: "Milan, if they had voted at the elections

19 two years ago today in the People's Assembly of Serbia, they would have 30

20 members of parliament." I'm referring to the Albanians. "It's not a

21 question of them not being represented. They would be represented indeed,

22 those 30 deputies could have said what they wanted and they could have

23 made draft bills and laws. That is the line of separation, the separatist

24 movement in Kosovo. And I'm not referring to the Albanians as such. The

25 only aim of the separatist movement is to separate Serbia -- Kosovo from

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13 English transcripts.

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1 Serbia and join it to Albania."

2 And then I explain to Panic that, "In spite of the boycott on the

3 elections, we do have several Albanians in parliament from among the ranks

4 of those that did not boycott the elections."

5 So please look at tab 43 very briefly. My criticism of Panic, in

6 connection with the London conference, at which he agreed -- and this is

7 on page 15, page 15. Have you found page 15? At the bottom of the page:

8 Slobodan Milosevic speaking, "That interventions should cease across the

9 border with Bosnia-Herzegovina".

10 "We are not intervening over there. If we had discussed that

11 document, we would have to disprove that." And then he goes on to explain

12 things. I say, "Simply one should write down the truth." That is what is

13 said on page 16. And one can see how many people were sitting round that

14 table at the time.

15 Then there's reference to the assertion of the results of the

16 London conference. Cosic and Panic speak about that.

17 I have not managed last night to read through the entire binder,

18 but I will devote the rest of my time to questions which were left over,

19 had it not been for these binders, that I wanted to address to Mr. Lilic.

20 Mr. Lilic, tell me, please, since you were involved in politics

21 from the beginning, president of the party, president of the Assembly of

22 Serbia, and later president of FRY, vice-premier, et cetera, when did you

23 hear for the first time of the expression "ethnic cleansing"? Was this in

24 connection with the situation in Kosovo?

25 A. I must admit that if you mean in our country, in the territory of

1 the Republic of Serbia -- because I heard the expression long since in

2 some other situations.

3 Q. Yes, of course in Yugoslavia.

4 A. I think, as far as I know, at least, it was linked directly to the

5 beginning of terrorist activities, or to be more precise, the beginning of

6 the NATO air raids.

7 Q. Very well. Do you remember that in Serbia this was an expression

8 used to denote a crime, the worst crime?

9 A. Yes, absolutely.

10 Q. And when there was reference to this in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

11 Croatia, or anywhere else, when ethnic cleansing was referred to --

12 A. That is why I'm asking you whether you meant in the territory of

13 the Republic of Serbia.

14 Q. No, I'm talking about the broader context of the former

15 Yugoslavia.

16 A. Then it is certainly linked to the early 1990s, the beginning of

17 the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia.

18 Q. My precise question is the following: Was this an expression used

19 by us in Serbia to denote a crime, the worst crime?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. During all those crises - that is, from the beginning of the

22 conflict in the early 1990s until the end - did the authorities in Serbia

23 and Yugoslavia and I personally seek to protect our entire population,

24 regardless of their ethnicity and on a non-discriminatory basis?

25 A. In answer to one of the questions during the last hearing, I said

1 that the ethnic composition of the Republic of Serbia was reminiscent in

2 many ways of the ethnic composition of the former SFRY. Therefore, all

3 those living on the territory of the Republic of Serbia and also the

4 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were given all the necessary care and they

5 were represented in all our legal documents and had -- were able to use

6 those rights.

7 You mentioned a moment ago the failure of the Albanians to utilise

8 their right to vote, which they refused to do. Therefore, throughout the

9 events of the 1990s, Serbia had an almost identical ethnic composition, up

10 until the moment when the Serbs were expelled, upon which the composition

11 changed; there were far more Serbs living in Serbia than before.

12 Q. All right. Tell me, please: Throughout the time that you spent

13 in political life, which means this whole time coincides with the duration

14 of the conflict, were the Croats and Muslims persecuted during the war in

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in Serbia at that time?

16 A. No. Quite the reverse. And this is easy to prove, not using our

17 own documents but United Nations sources, that thousands of Albanians,

18 yes, and thousands of Muslims crossed into the territory of the Republic

19 of Serbia. There's the case of the brigade, but there are many more

20 drastic cases where people crossed over from Bosnia-Herzegovina to find

21 protection in Serbia. And there are similar examples with members of the

22 Croatian ethnic group. And what I considered to be the highest quality of

23 life living on the territory of the Republic of Serbia is that there were

24 no excesses, no excessive behaviour on an ethnic basis or religious,

25 confessional, national composition. There weren't cases of that kind.

1 Take the example of Vojvodina, for example, which could serve as a

2 standard for Europe as a whole, not only for the Republic of Serbia,

3 Vojvodina province.

4 Q. Now, you mentioned the Muslim refugees too. I had information,

5 facts and figures at that time, which I assumed that you as the president

6 of the Serbian assembly are disposed of too. And they told us that we had

7 when the war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in that first year, 70.000

8 Muslim refugees coming in to Serbia from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9 A. Yes, quite correct. I think that actually the figure was far

10 greater later on and 200.000 is the figure mentioned. But this is

11 statistical data. But your figure was quite correct, but as I say, I

12 think there were actually more than 100.000.

13 Q. Therefore, those people, the Muslims who were fleeing from Bosnia

14 and taking refuge in Serbia, I assume that they did not consider that they

15 were going there to take refuge with the aggressor side. Isn't that

16 right, Mr. Lilic?

17 A. Yes, certainly.

18 Q. And tell me, do you know whether any religious sites were damaged

19 at all -- desecrated at all in Serbia during the duration of these

20 conflicts?

21 A. During the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, no.

22 According to my information, no, they weren't. I think later on there was

23 a mosque in Novi Pazar which was destroyed, but I think that was during

24 the bombing and that we reconstructed it. I think it has been rebuilt

25 with the participation of the government of the Republic of Serbia.

1 Q. All right. Fine. Now, let me go on to another matter, something

2 I didn't have a chance to look into because of the short time I had at my

3 disposal. I wasn't able to ask American Ambassador Galbraith, who

4 testified in the meantime between your first testimony here and today.

5 And he presented a report here, dated 1992. August was the month. I

6 don't want to burden you with the report itself. But what I do want to do

7 is to ask you this: I want to ask you this question, and it is entitled

8 "Camps in Serbia." It comes under the heading of "Camps in Serbia." And

9 here is what he writes on page 37, what page 37 of the report says: "A

10 list of concentration camps. [In English] Prisons at the territory -- at

11 the territory of Serbia and Montenegro in which the citizens of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina are captive." [Interpretation] And then there are nine

13 enumerated ones in Serbia, two in Montenegro. And I'm going to read out

14 the list. This is what it says: [In English] "Loznica, sport recreation

15 centre." [Interpretation] Sports recreation centre in Loznica, therefore.

16 And the number of detainees, 1.880. And then it says, "Belgrade, the

17 Batajnica airport, 2.200 prisoners there." Then it says, "Belgrade, the

18 barracks, the 4th of July Barracks, 2 and a half thousand detainees."

19 Then Nis comes next, the military centre, military camp, it says, 1

20 thousand - it's rather small print, so let me have a look, not to make a

21 mistake - 1.540 is the figure there. Then we come to Subotica, and it

22 says, "Assembly point, 5.000 detainees." Then "Aleksinac, closed mine,

23 4.000 detainees." Sabac is next, 1.440 there. Then Mokra Gora, near

24 Uzice, with 3.000. Then Prijepolje, 480.

25 There you have it. I don't want to go into the second part of

1 that report, but the year is 1992. And this was written -- it was written

2 by, I assume Mr. Galbraith. Yes, it says "Galbraith," and "Michael Miner"

3 the two of them compiled that report.

4 Now, please, is there any truth whatsoever, and could you comment,

5 please, about a piece of information like this.

6 A. First of all, I listened to what you