1 Thursday, 19 June 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

7 MR. NICE: On the question of Mr. Lilic's return, his lawyer would

8 like to address Your Honours.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

10 MR. SAPONJIC [Realtime transcript read in error "PANCESKI"]:

11 [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may be allowed to say a few words,

12 with respect to the end of Mr. Lilic's testimony, Mr. Lilic responded to

13 the Court order for the first time last year. However, the conditions

14 weren't ripe for testimony then. He has been informed that -- he was now

15 informed he is invited to testify next June, on the 16th of June, and on

16 Thursday, the 19th of June. Bearing in mind the fact that the Prosecution

17 completed its examination-in-chief on time, and that the cross-examination

18 of the accused is under the supervision and control of the Trial Chamber,

19 in keeping with Rule 90(F) and (H) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,

20 and as by having a schedule for today, and by disposing of our time today,

21 we are able to ensure a footing of equality for both parties and

22 additional cross-examination. We should like to ask, with the Court's

23 indulgence and all due respect, that the testimony of Mr. Lilic be

24 completed by the end of today.

25 Mr. Lilic has kindly requested that you take into consideration

1 the facts presented by him as well as his business engagements and others,

2 personal reasons included, and unfortunately, this makes it impossible for

3 him to come back to the Tribunal to testify at a later date. Thank you.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kay.

5 MR. KAY: May I address the Court on this matter. I think this is

6 really an unwarranted interference in the conduct of the court business.

7 It's a matter for this Court to decide how appropriate it is for a witness

8 to give evidence, and the length of time, balancing the interests of the

9 need for expedition and the need for a fair trial. The Court knows that

10 Mr. Milosevic is very concerned to put his case in full to this witness.

11 He's an important witness. He has been mentioned continuously throughout

12 various significant events in relation to the trial. The Prosecutor has

13 an advantage in being able to get his information and facts quickly and

14 directly before the Court through expeditious rules of procedure. But for

15 Mr. Milosevic, it is a harder task in cross-examining and asking questions

16 that require more time for a witness of this nature.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, thank you.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We are very concerned. We have to tell you

20 about interference in the way that we run this trial. But of course,

21 we'll hear what you've got to say.

22 MR. PANCESKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I should just like to

23 make a technical remark and correction. I see that in the transcript it

24 states that when Counsel Saponjic addressed the Trial Chamber, it also

25 says that I addressed you because it says "Mr. Panceski". That's my name,

1 so I'd just like to make that clear and correct that for the transcript.

2 The name, actually.

3 JUDGE MAY: Very well. That's a perfectly proper intervention.

4 Yes.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE MAY: There should be proper time for cross-examination of a

7 witness of this importance, and we, for that reason, will permit the

8 accused the extra session this afternoon in order for him to conclude his

9 cross-examination. It is, of course, a matter for the Trial Chamber

10 whether the witness comes back or not. We bear in mind, though, his

11 difficulties, the fact that he has made himself available to give evidence

12 here, and that shouldn't be to the exclusion of any other considerations.

13 However, it will be a matter essentially for the Prosecution whether they

14 wish this witness to return or not. It's a matter whether they insist

15 upon, or think, that re-examination is a worthwhile exercise.

16 So we will lead the matter in that way. We are not fully

17 constituted at the moment, so we cannot give a full ruling. When we are

18 fully constituted, if there is an application made to us in respect of the

19 witness, we'll consider it. Meanwhile, Mr. Milosevic, you've got today to

20 conclude your cross-examination.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

22 WITNESS: ZORAN LILIC [Resumed]

23 [Witness answered through interpreter]

24 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

25 Q. We were talking about events of 1995, and you explained certain

1 aspects of those events. Do you happen to remember that there was a whole

2 brigade of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, Izetbegovic's,

3 asked by mediators for my agreement and permission, for them to cross the

4 Drina River and find their salvation in Serbia, and there were 840 men,

5 that's what the brigade numbered, a whole brigade. And they asked simply

6 refuge in the onslaught that was -- to destroy them. Do you remember

7 that?

8 A. Yes, I do remember that event. I don't recall the details, but I

9 do remember the event.

10 Q. And do you remember that we gave permission for them to cross over

11 the river, the only condition stipulated was that they should cross

12 without bearing arms, and we put them up in a police camp, they had

13 physicians to attend to them. They were given food, et cetera. And the

14 same day, or rather the next day, we sent representatives of diplomatic

15 missions to visit them, the Red Cross and so on, for them to see who these

16 people were. And for them to see that they were being well cared for.

17 A. Yes. And I think there was a general sentiment that we were all

18 very satisfied with this humane gesture on our part towards the Muslim

19 side.

20 Q. All right. Now, I have a report from the Politika paper about

21 that event, so I don't want to waste any time on that now, as you agree.

22 And I'm sure you'll remember that at that time, both sides asked that we

23 return them, send them back. When I say "both sides," I mean the

24 leadership of Republika Srpska wanted us to hand them over to them for

25 them to be exchanged later on, and via international intermediaries, the

1 leadership led by Alija Izetbegovic wanted us to return these men to him.

2 But I refused to grant my permission to both sides, and the explanation I

3 gave was that I didn't want to send them back because they were under my

4 protection.

5 And as far as the army was concerned, the Bosnia-Herzegovina army,

6 from where they had come, I did not have any evidence showing that they

7 were volunteers in that army and so I didn't want to send the men back to

8 them either. I wanted to ensure that, as they were well taken care of,

9 had recuperated, were clothed, fed, and sent to some neutral country from

10 whence each of them could decide of their own free will whether they would

11 go back, return there, or whether they would go to cousins in Australia,

12 America, Germany or anywhere else in the world. Wasn't that how it was?

13 A. Yes, that was your position which was publicly declared.

14 Q. And then after a fairly lengthy period of time, and they weren't

15 treated as prisoners of war at all, they were treated as refugees, we

16 transferred them to Hungary where they were taken over by the

17 International High Commission for Refugees, and then they enabled them to

18 go off to different parts of the world if they so desired. So was it

19 quite clear, then, that when the soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army

20 are seeking refuge in Serbia, that there can be no mention of the fact

21 that they were seeking refuge with an aggressor side, as they wanted to

22 ascribe this to us on a political level?

23 A. Yes, that is correct. And I can freely add that Serbia, as to its

24 ethnic composition, was almost the same as the former Socialist Federal

25 Republic of Yugoslavia was, ethnically speaking, and that during the war

1 in Bosnia and Croatia, there were all kinds of ethnic groups living in

2 Yugoslavia, or rather, Serbia.

3 Q. You mentioned, or rather, you were asked by Mr. Nice something

4 with respect to Abdic. He asked you whether you had seen Abdic in

5 Belgrade, I think. Now, do you remember that the visit was broadcast on

6 television?

7 A. Well, I said in response to that question that the media covered

8 the visit, and it was covered by the information media as a whole, in

9 fact.

10 Q. And is it true that Abdic at that time set up an autonomous

11 province of Western Bosnia and concluded a peace agreement both with

12 Republika Srpska and with Croatia, that is to say, he wanted to have this

13 enclave and preserve it and pull it out of all kinds of war activities and

14 to continue to cooperate normally. Is that clear?

15 A. I think that Abdic did make a statement to that effect, or a

16 similar one. I can't say precisely what he said, but I think he told

17 the information media in Belgrade the same thing, words to that effect.

18 Q. And do you recall that an agreement was even signed between them

19 that took place in the Presidency of Serbia building, and I signed the

20 agreement as a witness? I witnessed the agreement as it was signed.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So as far as that part of Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, for the

23 time being, the war stopped there in those parts, and the relationships

24 between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, but unfortunately, the 5th Corps

25 of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the command of Atif Dudakovic,

1 continued the war. Now, do you remember there were many events, many

2 atrocities carried out by the members of that corps against the Muslims

3 precisely, those who were advocates of peace, who supported peace in the

4 autonomous province of Western Bosnia?

5 A. According to the information we received, it was not only the 5th

6 Corps but the Muslim leadership from Sarajevo, too, which was highly

7 dissatisfied with Mr. Fikret Abdic's position, the position he had taken,

8 and it was precisely against that Muslim population that the repressions

9 were most severe, after the proclamation of the autonomy of Western

10 Bosnia, in fact.

11 Q. Now, do you remember that in fact it was at those first elections

12 for the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the war that Fikret

13 Abdic was a personality who won the majority of votes, more than Alija

14 Izetbegovic, and he was to have been the president of the Presidency of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina by rights?

16 A. Yes, that could be seen from the official reports and from the

17 information media.

18 Q. However, he ceded that right to Izetbegovic, and the supremacy.

19 He said he was a businessman and not a politician, and that he didn't want

20 to delve in political matters and he just stayed on as a member of the

21 Presidency. That's right, isn't it?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Later on, this led to fatal consequences, and you will remember,

24 I'm sure, the extent to which the Islamic declaration was made use of and

25 generally the extent to which the doors were opened to Islamic

1 fundamentalism at that time in Bosnia-Herzegovina when Izetbegovic came to

2 head the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

3 A. Yes, I personally think that that was one of the greatest evils

4 that engulfed Bosnia-Herzegovina, the presence of the Muslamic [sic] or --

5 rather, Muslim or Islamic fundamentalism and the enormous resources that

6 flowed in as assistance, monetary assistance to Alija Izetbegovic.

7 Q. We had a witness here testifying several days before you here, and

8 among other things he said that we extended aid and assistance to

9 Republika Srpska and Srpska Krajina, and we discussed that subject

10 yesterday in this courtroom, too. I asked the witness: "All right, what

11 do you find strange in that, that the Serbs should help --"

12 JUDGE MAY: He can't comment on what some other witness said.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Let's move on, then, to another area. But I think I can ask the

16 witness whether he knows and whether it was challenged at all that the

17 Muslim side in the war received aid and assistance from a whole series of

18 countries and states, including a large group of the Mujahedin volunteers

19 and so on who took part in the atrocities perpetrated against both the

20 Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that the witness is well

21 placed to answer this, in view of the post he occupied. He received

22 information of that kind.

23 A. No, that is not challenged or contested as is not the presence of

24 certain fundamentalists and their identification on the territory of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. Even in the combat units of Alija Izetbegovic.

1 I think there are very valid and strong arguments in the army of

2 Yugoslavia pointing to that.

3 Q. Very well. Is it true and correct -- now we're talking about

4 Kosovo -- that in our leadership, it was common knowledge amongst our

5 leaders that America was publicly advocating an agreement between Serbia

6 and the Kosovo Albanians, whereas through its secret diplomacy and

7 intelligence work, it was delving intensively in the reorganisation of the

8 KLA, which already in September and October of 1998 had been thwarted.

9 A. According to the intelligence information that we received, and

10 information from the centres where Albanian terrorists were being trained,

11 there was a great role there by them on that territory.

12 Q. Did you consider at the time that they were preparing the KLA for

13 the spring onslaught?

14 JUDGE MAY: That's not a matter for the witness. Maybe some

15 evidence about it in due course which we can consider, but the opinion of

16 the witness on that is not relevant.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I think that it is a proper

18 question for the witness because we have his vision of the situation here,

19 and it is a document which relates to -- actually, it's a letter in which

20 he presents all these aspects, and the number 04449622, the Federal

21 Republic of Yugoslavia, the federal government, the signatory is

22 Zoran Lilic. And in that letter, he puts views forward that he talked

23 about. He was --

24 JUDGE MAY: Put the letter to him if you've got a copy of it, so

25 much the better.

1 MR. NICE: Tab 31.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, they do have a copy.

3 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have his copy.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Lilic, let's just clear one point up first, please. Is it

6 true that you endeavoured to give an overall picture, a comprehensive

7 picture here on the basis of all the information you had at your disposal,

8 the military services, the security services, the public security

9 services, information provided to you from the foreign affairs department,

10 the service for information of the foreign affairs department, or rather

11 the centre for the collection of information? So all the information that

12 was made available to you, you studied all of that and endeavoured to make

13 a summary and precis of it and condense it into a review and report of the

14 basic assessments, positions, et cetera. That's right, isn't it?

15 A. The letter that I addressed to you round about the 20th of

16 November was compiled on the basis of all the knowledge that I had,

17 intelligence information, information provided from different services,

18 intelligence from abroad and all the sources that you mentioned, but also

19 on the basis of an insight of what was happening on the ground. And I

20 think that it is very easy to document all this with JNA documents, SID

21 documents, and calling in other witnesses if need be and if the Court so

22 desires to present and document these views.

23 Q. Yes, I omitted to state that, and you're quite right partially

24 when you say that apart from all the information that was coming in on

25 that basis, this was also the result of your own visits to Kosovo in

1 agreement with me, with the corresponding representatives of the police,

2 army, local organisations and bodies and so on and so forth. That's

3 right, isn't it?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, at the time, was the assessment that was made this: That

6 they would be preparing a terrorist organisation called the KLA for its

7 spring operations?

8 A. Yes, on the basis of the knowledge we had, that was quite obvious.

9 Q. And is it true and correct that it was our conviction and belief

10 that they would use their -- they would wield influence on Albanian

11 leaders, and you mentioned Rugova by name here, but I'm sure you had

12 others in mind as well, that they would procrastinate in their

13 negotiations, take one step forward, one step back and to try and buy time

14 because the KLA was in a very poor state at the time?

15 A. Well, yes, that was precisely the time when the terrorist army of

16 Kosovo, the KLA or UCK, whatever you like to call it, I don't want to say

17 that it had been destroyed, but it was in a general state of disarray, and

18 facing ultimate -- an ultimate breakdown, so that the assessment here is

19 quite correct, not only by Mr. Rugova, but by most of the Albanian

20 leaders, and they tried to unite them around one goal because they were

21 disunited to a certain extent, even the Albanian leaders at that time and

22 they were trying to rally them around one goal.

23 Q. Is it true that the assessment made and the evaluation given of

24 the ultimate goal of the Clinton administration was to bring in the NATO

25 forces to Kosovo and Metohija? Is that right? Would that be right?

1 A. Yes, that was my impression on the basis on all the intelligence I

2 had and that is what I set out in my letter to you.

3 Q. Yes, that's right. Tell me this please: Is it correct that Hill,

4 then, and Christopher Hill at that time was the US ambassador to Macedonia

5 and in charge of these direct contacts in Kosovo, is it true that he made

6 offers to the KLA by way of various modified solutions that go outside the

7 framework of the agreement reached between Holbrooke and myself?

8 A. If I'm not mistaken, at that time it was Mr. Sainovic who

9 negotiated or talked to Mr. Hill at that time. This information is what I

10 received from people from the actual area, even people who were involved

11 with the KLA.

12 Q. Is it correct, then, that the main goal of the administration was

13 to make an external ring around Kosovo?

14 A. In this letter, I tried to answer that question in particular. As

15 I provided information about the number of soldiers in Macedonia and also,

16 according to this source that was highly relevant, what the number of

17 personnel that would come in would be. And if this is placed on a map,

18 then one can see that this actually closes the ring.

19 Q. Is it true that the buildup of foreign troops in Albania was not

20 aimed at stopping incursions by terrorists, but to manipulate refugees,

21 and once there's a conflict they would cross over to Albania and in this

22 way create conditions for portraying some kind of a humanitarian

23 catastrophe?

24 A. At the time when I wrote this letter or this report or this piece

25 of information for you, this seemed to be a sound assumption. But later

1 on, it proved to be true.

2 Q. Are you aware of the orders, instructions, and activities that

3 took place during the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in terms of the

4 KLA, what the KLA said to the population, instructing them to leave the

5 territory of Kosovo en masse and go to Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro?

6 A. At that time, I was not in a position to be in Kosovo and

7 Metohija, but I was aware of such orders that were issued. The

8 information I have shows that this is a fact. Actually, before the NATO

9 bombing began, the number of refugees in Macedonia and in Albania

10 altogether did not exceed the number of 35.000. After the NATO bombing

11 started, according to UNHCR figures, so these are not figures that come

12 from our sources but from UN sources, this number went up. And if

13 I -- if my memory still serves me well, it went up to about 780.000.

14 Q. Is it quite clear that at that time, they were not fleeing before

15 any kind of Serb operations, or that some kind of process of their

16 deportation had been organised by --

17 JUDGE MAY: I'm not sure this witness can answer that. He wasn't

18 there at the time. It is a crucial issue which the Trial Chamber will

19 have to determine. And his opinion on it may not assist.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not asking the witness for his

21 opinion, Mr. May, I'm asking him about the facts that he was aware of at

22 the time. At that time, he was Deputy Prime Minister.

23 JUDGE MAY: He can't say as to the facts. He cannot say as to

24 what happened. He can merely tell us, and he has been allowed so far, but

25 this is a crucial issue, to say what reports he had on your side. Now, he

1 can't say of his own knowledge what caused the Albanians to become

2 refugees. And as I say, that's a matter we're going to have to decide.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. All right, Mr. Lilic, do you know why the Albanians became

5 refugees?

6 JUDGE MAY: No, I'm not going to allow that question.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, it seems that questions are

8 allowed when a witness is brought in who heard and saw something in a

9 village in Bosnia, and it's not allowed to put questions to the former

10 president and Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia who was indeed competent

11 to give answers.

12 JUDGE MAY: Were you in Kosovo at the time?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. May.

14 JUDGE MAY: Do you have any direct evidence yourself which you can

15 give on this particular issue?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I have the knowledge that I

17 obtained from others.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, from second-hand sources. Is that right?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, Mr. Milosevic, what he obtained from some

21 other source isn't going to assist us. If you want to call evidence as to

22 what happened in Kosovo, of course, you're able to do that. But for this

23 witness to say "we received these reports" doesn't seem to me to add

24 anything.

25 Well, I'm going to allow this question. Did you talk to any of

1 these refugees yourself?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. May. At that time, I was

3 not in Kosovo and Metohija.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we proceed, Mr. May?

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

7 Q. Is it correct that at that time, Albania, and I'm referring to the

8 end of 1998, became the logistic base for terrorists and that it was used

9 for opening channels from Albania in order to bring in terrorists and

10 weapons?

11 A. Yes, that is correct, and we received daily reports about the

12 quantities of weapons seized. There were increasingly frequent clashes at

13 the border towards Albania. Quite a few people got killed, terrorists,

14 and also there was shooting against members of the Yugoslav army. We also

15 were aware of camps on the other side of the border where terrorists were

16 trained. According to our intelligence reports, that's the way it was,

17 and this information can be verified. In those bases, there were about

18 5.000 terrorists.

19 Q. As for verifiers, it correct that then the British and the

20 Americans were covering the border and creating a linkup with Macedonia

21 and Albania where there were NATO forces as well?

22 A. Our border units, I think, reported every day about the presence

23 of the verifiers that you've just referred to.

24 Q. Similar information, that is to say, from similar sources that are

25 reliable enough, is the kind of information that you received in respect

1 to the first question that has to do with refugees, the one that Mr. May

2 will not let you answer. Is that right?

3 A. Yes. But I respect the position taken by Mr. May.

4 Q. Very well. I'm just bearing in mind the fact that the Deputy

5 Prime Minister does not go to actual places where things happen and to

6 talk to each and every verifier. A Deputy Prime Minister has reliable

7 information from the appropriate services and agencies.

8 Is it true that it was agreed in Germany that Bukoshi would buy

9 weapons amounting to 12 million deutschmarks?

10 A. Yes, this is a well-known fact, and later through a mistake made

11 by the Albanian side this appeared in the local media. This is an

12 intelligence report of ours, though, and these weapons were in Kosovo. I

13 do not want to prejudge anything. I don't want to say where the weapons

14 came from, but the weapons were there, and they belonged to East Germany

15 before the reunification of Germany.

16 Q. Is it true that Berisha, the former president of Albania,

17 controlled the north of Albania, took it upon himself to organise

18 terrorists and to send them in from Albania?

19 A. According to our information, and I think the army of Yugoslavia

20 does have these intercepts of conversation. Berisha did hold this part of

21 Albania, and even after all the unrest in Albania, I think that he was

22 actually in charge of all the weapons reserves that happened to be in

23 Albania at the time.

24 Q. According to all the information that was made accessible to you,

25 were some sophisticated weapons supposed to be brought in by the

1 verifiers, too? Is that right or is that not right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Was it clear that the verification mission of the OSCE was being

4 abused for reanimating --

5 JUDGE MAY: This is only your opinion, and this is no doubt the

6 intelligence which your side had and the reports which your side had. It

7 really is of no great assistance for us to have this retold. You've put

8 it to the verifiers and they have denied it. We'll have to tell what the

9 truth was. If you've got some direct evidence about it, of course, you

10 can call it.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Is it correct that the new channel for bringing in terrorists was

13 via Sarajevo and then via Macedonia?

14 A. Yes, that is correct. And what was most interesting was, and it

15 can be seen from this letter that was underlined, that regular buses were

16 used for this. And they went through Belgrade in groups numbering from

17 three to five men. That's really interesting, and that's how they went

18 from Kosovo, and that's how they came from the airport in Macedonia.

19 Q. They came in groups of two or three men just as passengers on

20 regular bus lines, and then they were transferred as civilians and then

21 they were equipped and armed down there; is that right?

22 A. And through Macedonia, Skopje, they also went into Kosovo. So

23 that is the information we have.

24 Q. Is it correct that already then, in 1998, they were armed and they

25 even had Hamber stingers and other weapons with 2.000 metre ranges,

1 weapons that could only be obtained with the assistance of certain

2 services of other countries?

3 A. I can talk about the first fact, and that is that they did have

4 such snipers. And that was seen on the casualties on our side, that is to

5 say, that they did have these weapons which in some situations and in some

6 of the operations carried out by our anti-terrorist units, such weapons

7 were actually seized.

8 Q. Was the estimate made then that it was -- the Albanian leadership

9 was buying time so that NATO could build up its forces in Macedonia and

10 Albania and so that they could get enough weapons to the terrorists and

11 that they could link up the territories under their control?

12 A. As for such activities, and the objectives of such efforts made by

13 them, this was something that was pointed to by all the information that I

14 had the possibility to see, and this coincides with what I said here, with

15 everything that happened in March when the NATO aggression started.

16 Q. Was it clear on the basis of all these facts that the

17 international community would not react in order to stop the activities of

18 terrorists? Is that right?

19 A. It was evident in the field itself. The terrorists behaved as if

20 they were on their own territory and as if the Serb side were the

21 terrorists.

22 Q. As far as I can remember, you then proposed that a special staff

23 be set up for organising special armed forces apart from the MUP and the

24 army, however, is it correct that the MUP and the army had their own

25 chains of command and that a third chain of command could not be

1 organised?

2 A. Within the army of Yugoslavia, there were special units which

3 could carry out the task that I had proposed. And within the police,

4 there were special units that were very well equipped. My proposal was to

5 set up a third special unit that would only deal with anti-terrorist

6 activities. Of course, obviously your assessment was different. But the

7 fact remains that units from the MUP and the army of Yugoslavia did have

8 their chain of command. Of course, this unit could have been set up

9 within one of these groups, either the army of Yugoslavia or the MUP. My

10 assessment was that at all costs, the terrorists should be broken up by

11 the month of March. And if this fails, then an ultimatum should be

12 delivered to them, quite literally they should be surrounded and then

13 operations should be launched against them, and of course the

14 international community would have to be notified thereof. So that we

15 would avoid subsequent problems.

16 Q. At that time, the international community had its own verification

17 mission in Kosovo. Isn't that right?

18 A. Yes, but my idea was that we should inform them about all

19 activities taking place against the terrorists so that we would avoid any

20 kind of speculations. Another thing that I consider to be particularly

21 important was to provide additional security for the border in order to

22 stop arms smuggling, infiltration of weapons, and as you know, with your

23 consent, I travelled to some countries to talk about possible electronic

24 surveillance and security for the border.

25 Q. Yes, I remember that very well. We tried to secure the border as

1 best we could. Now, let us briefly move on to this document that was

2 presented here, Perisic's letter.

3 JUDGE MAY: Do you have the tab number for that?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I please have a copy myself,

5 please.

6 MR. NICE: Tab 23.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Well, let's have a look now. Since you provided some explanations

9 in relation to this letter of his, I noticed during the

10 examination-in-chief that you first said that you did not wish to comment

11 upon Perisic's letter because it was his letter. But Mr. Nice insisted

12 that you do comment upon certain matters. So now, I would like to deal

13 with some questions related to that. First of all, is it quite clear that

14 this is a mere smokescreen in order to dodge responsibility for what was

15 supposed to be done in line with the duties that the army has in Kosovo

16 and Metohija?

17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm hesitating to object to any of these

18 questions for obvious reasons, because if the accused thinks he's getting

19 favourable answers from the witness, I don't want to be standing in the

20 way. But I wonder about the formation of that last question.

21 JUDGE MAY: Well, it's an interpretation of the letter. Can the

22 witness not put an interpretation on it?

23 MR. NICE: It's a matter for the Chamber.

24 JUDGE MAY: For what it's worth.

25 MR. NICE: For what it's worth.

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lilic, you're being asked about this letter. If

2 you can give your own view of it, if you consider it worth giving, of

3 course, you may, if you agree with the accused's interpretation. But if

4 not, just say so. Or if, indeed, you think you can't give a useful

5 opinion.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can hardly agree with what

7 Mr. Milosevic said, that this is a smokescreen.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

9 Q. Well, let us examine it and each of the allegations it contains.

10 Is it true that Perisic was advocating -- we'll come to those marginal

11 matters later. But he was advocating basically for the introduction of a

12 state of emergency?

13 A. Yes, that is what I said. There was another letter accompanying

14 this letter. I don't know whether it is included in these documents. And

15 from which it can be seen that Perisic was insisting on the introduction

16 of a state of emergency in a part of the territory of the Federal Republic

17 of Yugoslavia, or better still, Republic of Serbia, to acquire legitimacy

18 for the use of the army of Yugoslavia.

19 Q. And is it true, and I think that you're quite qualified to answer

20 this question in view of the position you held, that no state of emergency

21 is required for the army to react to terrorist attacks, which we had

22 established, were being resorted against members of the army?

23 A. General Perisic insisted that the army react in that way in the

24 area of responsibility of the army, that is, in the border belt which was

25 relatively narrow, depth-wise, and I think by decision of the federal

1 government, it was later extended to 5 kilometres. But that the use of

2 the army, together with the anti-terrorist units that were in Kosovo,

3 should be given appropriate orders through the institution of a state of

4 emergency. However, objectively, in view of the reports that I had

5 occasion to see in writing given by him, realising that his insistence

6 with you and your approval for me to visit Kosovo and Metohija on two

7 occasions to examine the situation there was really to confirm that most

8 roads had been blocked by the terrorists and could not be used.

9 Q. And do you know that on the basis of the relevant regulations, the

10 army even in peacetime, may be used to secure communication lines, in the

11 case of natural disasters, to respond to the struggle against terrorism,

12 et cetera?

13 A. In the peacetime conditions that you refer to, absolutely, yes.

14 Q. So to respond to terrorism, no state of emergency was needed. And

15 do you remember, according to the information which I hope you had access

16 to at the time, that in Kosovo and Metohija, the security was jeopardised

17 of the citizens by terrorist activities in a total of 213 inhabited

18 places, out of a total of 1.413 inhabited places in Kosovo, which means

19 1/6th roughly. Is that right?

20 A. I don't know the exact number, but it is a fact that there were

21 very many places where this was true. And in fact, most of the villages

22 were left without any Serbs under pressure of Albanian terrorists, and

23 even the Albanians themselves who had lived there for centuries moved from

24 the Metohija area of Kosovo and Metohija.

25 Q. There were 1.200 places in which there were no terrorist attacks,

1 and that the introduction of a state of emergency was not necessary in

2 order to respond to terrorism as we have noted, and such a state of

3 emergency would have been a blow to civil rights and freedoms in 6/7ths of

4 the territory in relation to 1/7th that was exposed to terrorist attacks.

5 Is that right or not?

6 A. That was your judgement, and you had the right to have such a

7 judgement at the time. And the Supreme Defence Council of the Federal

8 Republic of Yugoslavia had the right to say that. But it is a fact that

9 the army would have provided more logistics and be able to activate larger

10 units, to move artillery units and to act together with the police. For

11 all that to be possible, a state of emergency was necessary.

12 Q. Isn't the best evidence the fact that without a state of

13 emergency, the KLA had actually been broken up, and that the verification

14 mission arrived by agreement, and the presence of the army was reduced to

15 three main strategic crossroads at the level of a company with the

16 exception of the army and the barracks?

17 A. But we're talking here about General Perisic's letter and the

18 reasons for that letter.

19 Q. The reasons are obvious, to justify himself to his external tutors

20 recording the instructions he received as confirmed by subsequent course

21 of events when he was arrested for espionage?

22 A. I do not know, Mr. Milosevic, that Perisic, while I was president,

23 was working for any foreign service because I personally would have

24 arrested him if I had known. If something happened later on, I cannot

25 say.

1 Q. Very well. Have we cleared up the point that it is the duty of

2 the army, even in peacetime conditions, when it comes to lines of

3 communication - when I say that, I mean roads, main roads, traffic

4 communications, the struggle against terrorism, et cetera - that this is

5 covered by the regulations?

6 A. Yes, securing the territory beyond the border area is the duty of

7 the Ministry of the Interior. Certainly the army should react if any

8 member of the army is in jeopardy, but those are individual cases. It

9 could not entail any kind of frontal engagement of the army without that

10 state of emergency.

11 Q. And do you know that in the constitution of Yugoslavia, it says in

12 Article 133 -- I don't wish to offend you by asking you whether you know

13 it; I just wish to refresh your memory. It says the Federal Republic of

14 Yugoslavia has an army which defends the sovereignty, territory,

15 independence, and constitutional order. Therefore, the army is there to

16 defend the territory, sovereignty, independence, and constitutional order

17 were the territory, or at least one of these elements, and I believe all

18 of them were actually in jeopardy due to terrorist activities in that time

19 in Kosovo and Metohija.

20 A. That is absolutely not at issue. I'm not offended at all. I'm

21 very familiar with this article of the constitution. May I finish. I

22 know this article very well. But also, there is the law on defence and

23 the law of the army of Yugoslavia which clearly defines when and how units

24 of the army are to be used. Of course, the engagement of the army in

25 accordance with the decision of the Supreme Defence Council may be ordered

1 by the president of the Federal Republic without a state of emergency.

2 And that is not in dispute.

3 Q. And why, then, was it necessary for Perisic to write a letter

4 explaining that what can be done without a state of emergency can only be

5 done with a state of emergency? Have we agreed that this could be done

6 without a state of emergency and that this allegation that it can only be

7 done with a state of emergency is not right?

8 A. I do not wish to interpret Perisic. If he had an adequate order,

9 he should have used the army of Yugoslavia.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we have here a discussion about what

11 the army can do in peacetime and in a state of emergency. These are

12 constitutional issues and the Chamber has already said that the witness

13 may answer to the extent that he can on these issues. But to my mind, it

14 raises again the question of the need for a constitutional expert. You

15 did produce one and the Chamber did not allow him to give evidence, but

16 in the Chamber's view, it is clearly necessary for the Prosecution to

17 provide evidence on constitutional matters in this case.

18 MR. NICE: Yes. Well, the Chamber ruled out the constitutional

19 expert at that stage on certain topics. I'm not sure whether it

20 particularly ruled it out on --

21 JUDGE MAY: Not on all topics.

22 MR. NICE: Not on all topics.

23 JUDGE MAY: On the Kosovo-related topics.

24 MR. NICE: The way it was expressed, I have to go back and look at

25 it. I'm not sure this is expressly ruled out. I can simply remind the

1 Chamber that, for whatever reason, finding somebody at the time who was

2 prepared to give evidence in this trial, with the appropriate

3 constitutional law credentials, was not easy. People were, frankly, on

4 several occasions, afraid to do so.

5 Now, we made available to you a constitutional expert, and I was,

6 of course, amused -- not amused. I permitted myself a wry smile at a

7 later occasion when there was a discussion in relation to Mr. Babovic

8 about who was to be preferred as to the legal matters on which he was

9 speaking as between the Judge of the Court and him. Never mind. It was a

10 wry smile.

11 We may be able to find another constitutional law expert with

12 suitable credentials, but the one we have been in a position to offer is

13 Mr. Kristan. He may be able to deal with this topic, because I think it

14 was revocation of Kosovo's autonomy that was the only topic expressly

15 ruled out.

16 And of course, if the accused wishes to raise constitutional

17 matters with a qualified Prosecution witness, then although we may have

18 been denied the opportunity to raise those issues with the witness, it is

19 open to the accused to raise them with him himself, especially since he

20 knows what his answers will be.

21 JUDGE MAY: What it amounts to is this: That the original expert

22 was permitted to give evidence on constitutional issues, apart from the

23 matter in which it was deemed that he might be said to have had an

24 interest and there was a ruling. But that was a fairly narrow issue, and

25 the rest of his report, as I recollect, dealt with broader issues, and

1 that was not excluded.

2 MR. NICE: Correct. And indeed, it's our intention to call him

3 back, as I made clear at the time, but it will probably be in the autumn.

4 Now, what I can attempt to do - and I will discuss this with the

5 team later to see when we can timetable his return - is to have him back

6 as soon as may be so that we can see how much of his report we can make

7 available to you, and discover from the accused how much in addition he

8 may put in himself. Then if there is a margin not covered, it will give

9 us a couple of months to go and find somebody else who may be able to

10 help. And of course, things may be a little different in the light of the

11 regime change that's happened, but we had very considerable difficulties

12 in finding somebody to come and assist you with the appropriate

13 credentials on the first occasion.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: We encourage you in those efforts, Mr. Nice.

15 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I think we've exhausted this topic as

16 to the state of emergency as far as this witness is concerned. Now, if

17 you've got any other questions about the letter, the Perisic letter, you

18 can, of course, ask them.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since you allowed Mr. Nice to smile,

20 allow me to smile too, wryly. I didn't object that Mr. Nice's witness for

21 constitutional matters testifies about Kosovo whatever he wants to. In

22 fact, it suits me even better to refute such testimony. It gives me

23 greater satisfaction to refute the evidence of witnesses brought here by

24 Mr. Nice than to try and prove this through my own witnesses, which I will

25 certainly not fail to do. You yourself ruled that this witness should not

1 testify about constitutional matters linked to Kosovo, and I wish to

2 remind you that I did not object at all. On the contrary, it would be a

3 pleasure for me to confront my arguments with his.

4 But let us move on.

5 MR. NICE: I wonder, may I try and save time, invite the Chamber

6 to reconsider its ruling in light of the express indication of the

7 accused. When fully constituted, the Chamber might decide that

8 constitutes a new fact upon which, unusually, it could reconsider matters.

9 But nevertheless, I will have the topic in mind.

10 JUDGE MAY: I very much doubt it. Of course, we will have a look

11 at it again. I very much doubt it. There was a particular reason why

12 that evidence was excluded, and it had to do with the witness's

13 involvement in the very activity in which he was going to give evidence

14 about as an expert. And it was from that point of view that the Chamber

15 excluded the evidence as not properly that of an expert.

16 MR. NICE: I quite understand that.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let's go on.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

19 Q. Mr. Lilic, did you have occasion to look at this reminder for the

20 members of the army of Yugoslavia engaged in the area swept by sabotage

21 and terrorist activities, this was the whole area which was swept by

22 sabotage and terrorist activities, passed in June 1998 by the general

23 staff of the army of Yugoslavia? I will give you a copy to look at. And

24 my question is whether you had occasion to see it. And it says here --

25 A. May I get a copy. May I have the document to look at it.

1 Q. It is 02093686. It is page 1. I received it in this set of

2 documents which the opposite side is providing.

3 JUDGE MAY: Let us find that. Is it in the binder, first of all?

4 The reference to June 1998.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The title page, 020936865, and it

6 has the coat of arms of Yugoslavia. I see they received this from the

7 general staff. It says: "Military secret, for internal use, reminder for

8 members of the army."

9 JUDGE MAY: What is it? What is the document?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's a document of the general

11 staff. Maybe the witness can explain it for you. He's quite qualified to

12 explain.

13 JUDGE MAY: If we can find it.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's a reminder.

15 JUDGE MAY: Let us find it, a reminder, yes.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Until they find it, I can read some

17 excerpts. Signed by the general staff, so it is a kind of order.

18 MR. NICE: It's not in the binder, I don't think.

19 JUDGE MAY: Let us see if we can find it first of all.

20 MR. NICE: The numbers given are not in the binder. The only

21 June -- was it 19th of June? I can't remember. Document of 1968...

22 There are a couple of documents, 25 and -- I don't think it's

23 those. We are looking through for other documents disclosed to the

24 accused. If he tells us what it is --

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well, while it's being looked for, you can read

1 it, Mr. Milosevic, and we'll see if we can get on in that way.

2 Mr. Lilic, we don't seem to have the document at the moment. The

3 accused can read what parts he wants to you, and then you can have a look

4 at it before you have to answer.

5 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

7 Q. Well, I'll let him have a look at it. Of course I will, yes. So

8 the title page, the first page, I've already indicated the general staff

9 of the army, military secret, internal. It's an aide memoire. I assume

10 they could have tabled this on the basis of a government order, and they

11 did so here, for members of the army engaged in the area engulfed by

12 sabotage and terrorist operations and activities. And then they go on to

13 say in point 1, the conduct of the members of the Yugoslav army and the

14 units from jeopardising people, materiel, resources and facilities in the

15 areas taken over by sabotage operations, so there's nothing else that is

16 endangered but people, materiel, goods, facilities, and so on. And then

17 it says should rebel terrorists sabotage and other armed units launch an

18 attack, I don't want to enumerate it all, use all available men and

19 materiel according to the principles of combat in order to defend

20 yourselves successfully to thwart and rout the enemy. I apologise to the

21 interpreters for reading so fast. I'll do my best to read slower. That

22 means to use all available human resources and materiel resources based on

23 the principles of units deployment in order to put up a successful defence

24 and thwart and destroy the groups mentioned.

25 In refuting an attack, ensure law and order, law and order should

1 prevail. Unconditional implementation and execution of orders, and a

2 responsible conduct. And preventing all unlawful conduct on the part of

3 members of units and commands. Then it goes on to speak of the sabotage

4 units to prevent their reconnaissance, abilities to effect reconnaissance,

5 and so on and so forth. And then it goes on to say that in the struggle

6 against the rebel terrorist sabotage units and other hostile armed groups,

7 in addition to other things, the following principles should be adhered to

8 in order to search these groups, attack them, destroy sabotage units, do

9 not use smaller units than companies. And it says company/battery. That

10 is, in two branches of the army.

11 And that means not to use and deploy small units such as platoons,

12 but that the units deployed should number at least one company. And from

13 enemy groups, built up areas and so on, after cautioning them, use

14 artillery for the selective destruction of enemy and facilities from which

15 fire has already come. In deploying the units of the artillery and tank

16 units, and then it says a tank company in brackets, strengthen them and

17 reinforce them by infantry units, engineers units and other units in

18 conformity with the tasks undertaken. Used to encircle and block built-up

19 areas and settlements, do not enter built-up areas with the units of the

20 Yugoslav army in order to control communications and territory jeopardised

21 through terrorist activity, use armoured mechanised units and necessary

22 reinforcements if these are required. There is a grammatical error here

23 but I'm reading out the way it says. [Indiscernible] are not allowed to

24 enter into operation if the unit is not fully prepared to do so.

25 Of course, the army acted upon these rules of procedure and

1 principles in keeping with the provisions stipulated. All I'm saying is

2 this has nothing to do with the state of emergency. Point 2 is to how the

3 men should act if the diversionary and sabotage groups should attack

4 because there was kidnapping of soldiers, ambushes, and so on. And then

5 number 3, how to behave towards sabotage units when they are taken into

6 custody and captured. Conduct therein. And it says that if sabotage

7 units use weapons to defend themselves, then act in conformity with the

8 rules and regulations. Once the sabotage units surrender their arms,

9 conduct should be as follows: Anything involving terrorist acts should be

10 confiscated, any weapons they might have, and the commanders of units have

11 the right to interrogate individuals on military matters. Intelligence

12 reports are filed as to the crimes committed, and they can be held in

13 custody for three days, for a maximum of three days, after which they will

14 have to be prosecuted and taken to court, et cetera. And particular

15 stress is laid on the fact that nobody can kill any POWs or inflict

16 physical attempts on them. Respect should be shown towards women and

17 children of the terrorist group members as required by their sex and age,

18 et cetera.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters apologise, but the text was very

21 fast.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'd like to say that you need to re-examine your

23 approach to cross-examination. I have been looking at the screen, and the

24 full-length of the screen has been gone through at least two times without

25 a question coming from you. This is not -- it's not practical. We have

1 limited time, and we take account of the fact that you are conducting your

2 own defence. But I think you have to make a very serious effort to

3 summarise matters and to put questions to the witness. After speaking for

4 four, five, six minutes, the witness has probably forgotten what you

5 started out with. I certainly have. And I have to follow it.

6 As a rule of thumb, I would suggest that when you have spoken for

7 about a minute, no longer than a minute, you should put a question. Look

8 at the screen, if you see that you have -- there are two or three

9 sentences that you have completed, the time has come for you to put a

10 question because we have to follow the cross-examination. Please bear

11 that in mind.

12 MR. NICE: We've located the document. I don't know how long it

13 will be before it's with us.

14 JUDGE MAY: You've located it.

15 MR. NICE: Yes.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes, yes, Mr. Milosevic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it seems that good

18 intentions can be understood wrongly. I quoted all this in view of the

19 witness's competence and in order to save time, so I wanted to put it all

20 to him at once, and then ask him the question. And I'll just end by

21 saying that of course, special emphasis was laid on the fact that it was

22 forbidden to act against anybody's human dignity for the POWs, the persons

23 taken into custody and captured. But the title of this document, the

24 date, in fact, is June 1998. There's no other date. It just says "June

25 1998" at the bottom. But that is sufficient. That is on the title page

1 because President Perisic's letter is dated the 23rd of July, 1998.

2 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see it.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So that was at least one month

4 before he wrote his -- well, I don't want to say what it was, given the

5 qualifications. But with respect to this emergency situation, he is

6 behaving totally in keeping with the provisions and rules stipulating the

7 conduct of individuals on -- in the territory. So that is the document.

8 I don't believe that Mr. Lilic doubts that I quoted verbatim from the

9 text. That would be absurd.

10 JUDGE MAY: Let him look at it, and look through it, and ensure

11 that that is as you said it is.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

13 Q. My question is as follows --

14 JUDGE MAY: No, first of all let the witness confirm that that is

15 the document which is referred to.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I really don't need to read

17 through the document. The document does seem to be authentic. I think it

18 is the original used by the army of Yugoslavia as a sort of aide memoire.

19 I don't know of this -- of the fact that this document was published. I

20 assume that there was an order from the general staff prior to this

21 document. Otherwise it couldn't have been issued. But we're not

22 contesting the fact that a code of conduct does exist, the Supreme Defence

23 Council does compile documents of this kind. And it does state that the

24 army can be deployed and engaged under these stipulations and conditions.

25 Of course, if there's not a state of emergency that has been proclaimed.

1 So that is why this sort of reminder was compiled.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Well, I quoted Article 133 of the constitution according to the

4 fact that FRY has an army and the constitutional provision for it to

5 protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity and constitutional order

6 of the country, therefore the country is duty-bound to act along those

7 lines. And now a word of explanation with respect to the conduct of an

8 army on a territory where there is sabotage activity. The army directly

9 implements its constitutional obligations, so we can agree on that point

10 and then move forward.

11 So we can't speak of the unlawful and illegal deployment of the

12 army in that area, can we?

13 A. Well, the army can't decide on itself, regardless of Article 133.

14 But as we're discussing experts in constitutional matters and issues, we

15 can leave that to them, perhaps. It would be a good idea to have somebody

16 who is an expert in military law. But it's not up to me to say so. I

17 don't want to influence you one way or the other or make any proposals.

18 It is quite certain that the army can be engaged, along with the

19 corresponding orders and position taken by the Supreme Defence Council.

20 That competence under Article 133 is not being challenged. But let me say

21 that I never saw this document before. I'm seeing it for the first time

22 now, and its contents apply to conduct, application, and all the other

23 things that have been set out in detail. And it says June 1998. So those

24 two documents speak for themselves.

25 On the one hand, we're saying that these orders did not exist;

1 this testifies to the reverse.

2 Q. Well, I'm not claiming one or the other. That is what is stated.

3 So if the fact that people say that something is unlawful if a state of

4 emergency is not in existence, this proves the opposite. Now, it says in

5 rather pathetical terms, or rather Mr. Perisic has written this in rather

6 pathetical terms --

7 A. I apologise, Mr. Milosevic, but I just handed the letter back.

8 May I be asked to be given the letter again, Mr. Perisic's letter, please.

9 May I have it?

10 JUDGE MAY: Before we go on to that, I've got here the letter

11 produced by the accused -- any objection to this being exhibited? The

12 letter produced by the accused. It's in B/C/S, I know, but presumably

13 something disclosed by you.

14 MR. NICE: Yes --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

16 JUDGE MAY: Give it the next exhibit number.

17 Yes, if you've got a translation, so much the better.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Defence Exhibit 146.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Otherwise, Mr. May, as you said a

20 moment ago that this was disclosed by Mr. Nice, I should like to take

21 advantage of this occasion to say that, as we can see, Mr. Nice can have

22 access to documents, and does, from the archives of the Yugoslav

23 government and the army of Yugoslavia, whereas my associates cannot. They

24 do not have access to a single one and can't come by them, so I have to

25 use only the documents that Mr. Nice's associates are able to come by,

1 which is untenable, an untenable sort of relationship.

2 JUDGE MAY: No. That's according to the rules. They're under an

3 obligation, the Prosecution, to disclose to you any assistance, any matter

4 which may assist you, anything which is exculpatory. They do.

5 Yes, now let us go on with the Perisic letter, tab 23.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Therefore, a state of emergency, we've clarified that point up.

8 He says that under these conditions, as professionals who have preserved

9 the army and FRY, under these conditions, he considers it -- his merit for

10 having done so. Now doesn't that sound - how shall I put this? - a little

11 imbecile?

12 A. I really can't comment on that.

13 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to add, it's not a proper question.

14 Yes, anything else you want to ask about the letter?

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Well, let's take it in order, one by one. He says "constant

17 tendency to use the army outside the institutions of the system," and then

18 he links this up to the state of the emergency. We cleared that point up.

19 Otherwise, I'm sure you know - I hope you know, at least - and we

20 have the law here, the law on defence, in fact, the competency and

21 authority for a state of emergency, imminent war, war, and that is vested

22 in the Assembly of Yugoslavia; isn't that right, Mr. Lilic?

23 A. Yes, at the proposal of the government.

24 Q. Right, at the proposal of the government. And he says that he did

25 contact the government, that the government did not respond to his

1 requests, and I asked the Defence Minister something with respect to that,

2 and the answer I was given is that there was no need for that because,

3 according to the rules, and he indicated what was stated in the document

4 itself, they could act along those lines. And he goes on to say:

5 "Separation of units of the Yugoslav army outside the army of Yugoslavia,"

6 and then he goes on to say, or rather, to explain: "The Guards Brigade

7 was separated from the army of Yugoslavia by your decision."

8 Tell me, please, Mr. Lilic, who was in command of the Guards

9 Brigade before this occurred by my decision, as General Perisic puts it?

10 A. The Guards Brigade was within the corps of the special units. It

11 was subordinated to the special units corps directly.

12 Q. So what was the task of the Guards Brigade?

13 A. It was more of a protocol nature, its tasks and assignments.

14 Ceremonial, I would say.

15 Q. I assume you know that the Guards Brigade also provides security

16 for the Supreme Command?

17 A. Yes; I didn't finish what I was saying.

18 Q. That means to provide security for the residence of the president

19 of the republic, his offices, the office of the president of the republic,

20 and security for the Supreme Command. Is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, does the president of the republic, is he in command of the

23 army both in peace and war pursuant to the Yugoslav constitution? Is he

24 the Supreme Commander?

25 A. Yes, pursuant to the constitution of Yugoslavia and Article 135 on

1 the law of the army, Article 4 there, in that law.

2 Q. So is it considered that if the Guards Brigade, which otherwise

3 provides security for the head of state and is used for ceremonial matters

4 is subordinated to the military cabinet of the president of the republic

5 and is separated from the army of Yugoslavia, or is it within the

6 composition of the army of Yugoslavia? Or is it perhaps the president of

7 the republic which by virtue of the constitution commands the army and is

8 this not considered part of the Yugoslav army?

9 A. It's very difficult for me to have to interpret General Perisic.

10 That is a thankless task. He would be best placed to say what he meant.

11 May I finish what I was saying, Mr. Milosevic, please. Just a

12 minute, please, may I take a minute.

13 Q. Yes, go ahead, please.

14 A. If I'm not mistaken, we're talking about the disbanding of the

15 special corps unit here, and placing it under the direct command of the

16 Guards Brigade. Whether that was how it was when talking about the Guards

17 Brigade, I really can't say. I don't know. However, we must respect the

18 principle of subordination and singleness of command. You can't command

19 the Guards Brigade.

20 Q. And nor did I command it. But are you aware of the fact that

21 never did the Guards Brigade at that material time that was attached or

22 resubordinated to the military cabinet of the president of the republic

23 and was not deployed for anything else except to provide security for the

24 Supreme Command and the president of the republic and the ceremonial

25 business that it engaged in. Are you aware of that?

1 A. I can't say because I wasn't in a position to attend the Supreme

2 Defence Council meetings. So I don't think -- although I just don't know.

3 I don't believe that it was that way.

4 JUDGE MAY: The time has come for us to adjourn.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just have one question to ask with

6 respect to the Guards Brigade, not to separate this issue from the rest.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. You can see that on page 2 of his letter, he says that unless you

9 do not have confidence in the chief of the general staff, unless you have

10 no faith in the NGS, chief the general staff. That's what it says, that's

11 what he says. Is that what Perisic wrote?

12 A. Yes, that's what it says in that letter. But I was commenting on

13 the letter believing in the authenticity of what was stated here. Any

14 other interpretation on my part would be quite improper.

15 Q. All right.

16 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to adjourn now.

17 Twenty minutes. Mr. Lilic, could you be back then, please.

18 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

19 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

21 MR. NICE: I'm sorry to interrupt. May I make three points very

22 briefly. One, the document that the accused was referring to as showing

23 that we had access to a particular archives came from an individual, it

24 didn't come from an archive.

25 Two, and -- four points then. The second point is that the last

1 document produced has already been tendered as Exhibit 94, tab 72.

2 JUDGE MAY: In those circumstances, it may be convenient to delete

3 it as a Defence exhibit. Tab 72; is that right?

4 MR. NICE: Yes, tab 72; 94, tab 72.

5 JUDGE MAY: Otherwise there's going to be confusion. So we'll

6 delete it -- this is 146, I think was the last number.

7 MR. NICE: Yes.

8 JUDGE MAY: Delete that. Exhibit 94, tab 72. Yes.

9 MR. NICE: Third point, we've considered the position: We will

10 require to re-examine this witness. We falls into a particular category

11 of witness of a kind we've had before where re-examination is really

12 essential. No doubt the Chamber will -- perhaps I can invite the Chamber

13 to make the position clear to the witness, particularly in light of the

14 circumstances in which he is here, of which the Chamber is aware. Of

15 course, we will accommodate with our other witnesses his convenience.

16 Indeed, it is possible, I think, for a witness, if they catch the early

17 flight from Belgrade, to be in and out in a day, surprisingly enough. And

18 on that same topic, I can tell you that on the very early flight, or the

19 early flight today, we are receiving from the authorities, as we

20 understand it, the full records of the documents referred to on page 16 of

21 the summary, the records of the state Council for Coordination, positions

22 on state policy. Very important documents indeed.

23 Now, they're coming up, having been provided. The Chamber will

24 remember that the witness was able to identify them because he saw some

25 left over from the period of Cosic's Presidency. We would be grateful,

1 though there will be no re-examination, simply for an opportunity, once

2 the documents arrive, for him to look at them and to confirm that they are

3 in line with the documents that he saw, so then that the process of

4 identification is complete and the documents can be processed in the usual

5 way.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. To make it plain, we will sit until 1.45, the

7 usual time, today. We will deal with any future hearings for the witness

8 in due course.

9 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

10 MR. PANCESKI: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Your Honour, I do beg

11 your pardon for interrupting. Just another brief correction. The

12 documents that Mr. Nice referred to have been handed over by the national

13 council, although these are documents that are part of the request for

14 cooperation and on which the Trial Chamber ruled on the 12th of June, and

15 it was rejected as too broad. The position of the National Council for

16 Cooperation with The Hague Tribunal is that these documents should be

17 handed over as an act of courtesy. Thank you, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Lilic, do you remember that the commander of the Guards

21 Brigade in 1997, and that was General Bojovic, was appointed at the

22 proposal of General Perisic to be ADC to the president of the republic?

23 A. I do remember, because at that time, it was General Susic who was

24 in charge of both duties. He was head of the military office of the

25 president, and when necessary he was also ADC to the president. So at the

1 proposal of the senior staff of the chief of general staff, General

2 Bojovic was appointed ADC.

3 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the question.

4 A. Yes.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. At the end of Perisic's letter, it says in relation to the Guards

7 Brigade, "unless you do not trust the chief of general staff." So what if

8 I do not trust the chief of general staff?

9 A. I really don't know how to answer this question. It was the right

10 of the Supreme Defence Council to appoint a new chief of staff, to keep

11 the old one, to transfer him somewhere else. I don't think that this is a

12 right that should be denied in any way.

13 Q. And it is also not to be denied that General Perisic was dismissed

14 according to legal procedure and in accordance with the law.

15 A. Yes, I had the opportunity of reading the minutes from the SDC,

16 although he was not relieved of his duty by consensus. If I'm not

17 mistaken, Mr. Djukanovic was against this, but this does not alter the

18 legitimacy of the decision.

19 Q. I just asked whether it was a legitimate decision, and that is not

20 being denied. Right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So what is strange about the fact that the Guards Brigade, whose

23 commander is my aide-de-camp, should be subordinated to the military

24 office of the president of the republic. And I assume --

25 JUDGE MAY: I don't think the witness can speculate about this.

1 This is General Perisic's letter. You can ask him to interpret it if he

2 can, but this is going to be pure speculation on his part.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. If so, then there was no

4 need for him to comment upon the letter during the examination-in-chief

5 either.

6 JUDGE MAY: He can comment on it, but to ask him speculative

7 questions isn't going to assist anybody.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. In relation to that, in relation to General Perisic's allegation

10 that officers were being appointed or rather generals were being appointed

11 and promoted, apart from the general staff, I would like to ask you to

12 take a look at the minutes from the fifth session of the Supreme Defence

13 Council, so that was the 9th of June, 1998. This was just a month before

14 his letter.

15 A. I had the opportunity of seeing these minutes.

16 Q. Yes. Point 2, personnel matters, the minutes. And I am quoting

17 from the minutes: "General Perisic informed the participants in the

18 session that the senior staff discussed this issue."

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it all right now? Have you got

20 this?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't.

22 MR. NICE: Tab 9.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. It says here that what the chief of general staff said is

25 approved, and so on and so forth. And it says that if the activities of

1 the Albanian --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please be asked to read

3 slower.

4 JUDGE MAY: Read more slowly, would you. Read more slowly. The

5 interpreters are asking.

6 And where are you -- identify where you are reading from, please.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I am reading the minutes

8 from the fifth session of the Supreme Defence Council, from the 17th of

9 June, 1998.

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes, whereabouts?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll tell you straight away.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, it's the 9th of June.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. No, it's the 17th of June.

15 A. But the meeting was held on the 9th. And it was just registered

16 then.

17 Q. Oh, yes, yes, that's right. But I'm just looking at the date on

18 the document when it was entered into the records, but it's true that the

19 session was actually held on the 9th of June, 1998. That's right. And

20 this is where the chief of general staff spoke about the situation in

21 Kosovo, and then on page 3, it says that "if terrorist activities

22 escalate," so these are the conclusions that were adopted unanimously by

23 the SDC, it says, number 2, "that if the terrorist activities of the

24 Albanian separatist movement escalate, the Yugoslav army will intervene

25 appropriately." So in relation to the instructions that you read out a

1 moment ago, is it clear that there is full legality in terms of using the

2 army there in order to combat terrorism in Kosovo?

3 A. If these instructions are based on this decision, then absolutely

4 so.

5 Q. Please tell me now, item 2, personnel issues, it's on the same

6 page, the text continues right after the conclusions related to item 1.

7 It says: "General Perisic informed the persons attending the session that

8 with regard to that issue - and this is in reference to personnel issues,

9 is that right?

10 A. Yes, that's what's written here.

11 Q. It was the senior staff of the general staff that discussed this

12 and it was approved by the Ministry of Defence according to the law of the

13 Yugoslav army, and thereupon he made the following proposal to the Supreme

14 Council of Defence. And then under number 1, it says: "On reaching a

15 decision on the cessation of professional military service," and then it

16 is mentioned according to the assessment of a medical military commission,

17 then by force of law, and then according to the needs of the service and

18 promotion to a higher rank in appropriate order, and then promotion to the

19 rank of major general, and then regulating the situation, the service of

20 general personnel, and then who was appointed where to command which

21 particular unit and so on and so forth. There are several pages that go

22 on. And ultimately, it says: "The Supreme Defence Council has fully

23 adopted the proposal of the chief of general staff of the Yugoslav army,

24 Colonel-General Momcilo Perisic on personnel issues in the army." So that

25 is written on the minutes of the session of the 9th of June. And a month

1 after that, Perisic writes in this letter of his that promotions take

2 place without consulting the general staff. Do you know what this

3 actually referred to? Because even in these minutes a month before that,

4 it is obvious that there were consultations and all his proposals were

5 unanimously accepted by the Supreme Defence Council. So what did these

6 writings of his refer to?

7 A. When I read this letter that Mr. Perisic wrote to you in the month

8 of July, precisely this item 5, that is to say, conducting personnel

9 policies without legal basis and without criteria or decree, I imagine

10 that this pertained to promotions and transfers. That is to say, without

11 the general staff and the senior staff of the general staff knowing about

12 this. Then also what it says here in the minutes from the session of the

13 SDC held on the 9th of June, 1998, this is not binding upon the SDC.

14 During the four years of my term of office, practically the senior staff

15 of the chief of general staff made proposals, and the assumption was that

16 they knew best what the quality of the generals was, and I see that it was

17 done in this case, too. And the Ministry was consulted as far as I can

18 see according to the names of the persons, the generals who are retired.

19 These were generals who were in the Ministry of Defence, and I imagine

20 that's why the Ministry was consulted. And the conclusion itself shows

21 that the Supreme Defence Council accepted all the proposals of the chief

22 of general staff. So I believe that this paper is self-explanatory, at

23 least the one from the Supreme Defence Council.

24 Q. So there is no denying that all of this went through the general

25 staff. Was anybody promoted without the knowledge of the chief of general

1 staff, or the general staff as such?

2 A. During my term of office, no one was. I don't know about your

3 term. But even Article 136 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of

4 Yugoslavia provides for this possibility. Only to notify the chief of

5 general staff that the president has the right to -- this kind of

6 promotion.

7 Q. Of course.

8 A. But it's a good thing for him to be notified.

9 Q. Well, he certainly was notified. But he points out here that he

10 has some right that is not based on the constitution or the law on the

11 army that this has to be his proposal. That would practically mean that

12 he were usurping the right that is only vested in the president of the

13 FRY. Is that right or not right?

14 A. It is only the right of the president of the FRY to promote

15 generals and appoint them.

16 Q. That will do. Thank you, Mr. Lilic. And then it says "material

17 allocations outside the framework of regulations." Now, I would like to

18 remind you of what you said. Materiel resources. You said during your

19 testimony that this was done through the Ministry of the Interior

20 according to a decision reached by the government of the FRY. Is that

21 what you said?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, he says: "You frequently order me to provide immoveable and

24 moveable property for the needs of the MUP." Since you were in Kosovo at

25 the time as well, and since you were very well informed by the -- about

1 the entire situation, I assume that you will remember that there were many

2 ambushes that were organised by Albanian terrorists. They shot at police

3 vehicles, they killed policemen who were moving along roads in order to

4 change shifts at checkpoints or people who were simply patrolling roads in

5 regular police vehicles. Do you recall that there was casualties, there

6 were deaths of policemen?

7 A. I said that the communication routes were in a way under the

8 control of terrorists from Kosovo and Metohija and that police checkpoints

9 were often exposed to their attacks. And also, the fact that I travelled

10 to Kosovo and Metohija was highly risky. We had to use different means of

11 transportation therefore.

12 Q. Very well. Now, since you were the person who commanded the army

13 in war and peace over four years of time, and then as Deputy Prime

14 Minister, you were there and you testified about these attacks against the

15 police, was it logical for the army to make available a few APCs to the

16 police so that they could safely communicate when they were going to

17 change shifts? They were not supposed to be sitting pigeons that would be

18 killed by Albanian terrorists and ambushed by them.

19 A. May I just correct you. There was no need for me to command the

20 army during a war. I was not its commander in chief in war. As for the

21 status of president in peacetime, that is clearly defined. But this was

22 an explanation.

23 As for whether it was necessary to give a few carriers or several,

24 I believe that it was not only necessary but it was absolutely

25 indispensable to protect the lives of these people who were exposed to

1 terrorist attacks every day. But of course, this could have been

2 regulated through all the necessary documentation. And I don't believe

3 that anybody is denying that, that it should be transferred to the police

4 in that way.

5 Q. Well, it was not a question of transferring resources; this was

6 simply in order to protect the lives of policemen who were unprotected in

7 Kosovo. And therefore, it was logical to make available to them some of

8 these technical resources that the army did not really need. The army,

9 therefore, did not remain without the technical equipment they needed; on

10 the other hand, the lives of policemen were protected. Isn't that

11 logical?

12 A. Well, yes, I think that the lives of these men were supposed to be

13 protected, by all means.

14 Q. Of course. And then it says "immovable property." No immovable

15 property was given to the police. It was simply requested in order to

16 economise, if I can put it that way. Some groups of special police units

17 were supposed to be staying at military barracks so that they would not

18 have to have special people who would be guarding them, having some of

19 their members stand guard. Over there, they could stay and they could get

20 their meals, et cetera, and then go on carrying out their regular

21 assignments. So that is nothing -- it's not that anything was done

22 without regard to regulations. And couldn't General Perisic take care of

23 this with the government and the Ministry without any problem? Would

24 anybody have raised the issue?

25 A. That is the duty of the Ministry of Defence, and it is quite

1 certain that everything you said is not being contested.

2 Q. So that is a misplaced, totally misplaced commentary, prompted

3 merely by an effort to stretch certain arguments to the extreme,

4 especially skipping over the lines of command for members of the army of

5 Yugoslavia.

6 JUDGE MAY: What's the question?

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. For instance, when certain levels of command are being skipped

9 over, do you believe that if an army commander asked to be received by the

10 president of the republic to brief him on the situation in his

11 jurisdiction, that the president of the republic may not do so if that man

12 addresses the military office of the president which is also headed by a

13 colonel-general, the same rank as General Perisic? Should the president

14 of the republic ask General Perisic whether he be allowed to receive him

15 or not?

16 A. I don't know which general you're referring to, but it isn't

17 important. It's just an infringement of the singleness of command, and

18 certainly the president of the republic doesn't have to ask. But

19 respecting that principle of subordination, General Perisic should have

20 been informed. He need not have been present.

21 Q. But the fact that he is objecting that I was receiving someone

22 means that he was informed. If he hadn't been informed, he couldn't

23 object to it. Is that clear, Mr. Lilic, or not?

24 A. I can't comment on that, Mr. Milosevic. I mean, this conclusion

25 of yours is something I cannot comment on.

1 Q. Very well. I don't think that the rest of the letter deserves any

2 further comment. In fact, the letter as a whole is a waste of time,

3 considering it.

4 JUDGE MAY: That's pure comment, a matter for us to consider. If

5 you've got any questions, ask them.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do have questions.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. It's difficult to find just now, the decision on the formation of

9 the staff. I think you have it, and you know what I'm referring to. You

10 said that --

11 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's find it. Just, let's find it so the

12 witness has got the copy. The decision on the formation of the staff, do

13 we have it?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There are two decisions, if you're

15 referring to the staff for Kosovo.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Yes, yes.

18 A. There are two decisions. I don't know which one you're referring

19 to.

20 Q. Both decisions, as I wanted to clear up one particular point only.

21 You --

22 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. We're going to find it, first of all.

23 Are these documents which the accused introduced?

24 MR. NICE: We're simply not sure, in the way it's described in the

25 moment. It's not in the binder, otherwise the accused no doubt would have

1 told us that.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. May, if I may be of assistance,

3 these are two documents, one I assume was signed by Mr. Djordjevic, police

4 general, in mid-May. And another by the Minister of the Police,

5 Mr. Stojiljkovic.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. That's right.

8 A. I think those are the two documents you're referring to.

9 Q. Yes, precisely so.

10 JUDGE MAY: Let's see if we can find them. There's certainly a

11 decision in tab 25, to establish a ministerial staff. That's dated the

12 16th of June. And there are two others that I recollect, but I don't know

13 that I can --

14 MR. NICE: Yes, but the document at tab 25... Yes, that's

15 probably one of them. And that one is signed by Stojiljkovic, yes. We

16 start off with tab 25, and we'll try and track the other one down.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Stojiljkovic.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness have the documents.

19 MR. NICE: The other one - Ms. Anoya very helpfully identified it

20 - is 319, tab 9.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I will be very brief in my questions regarding these documents.

23 On the basis of your own direct insight, you stated that there were

24 objections to the effect that the work of the security organs, public and

25 state security, were not coordinated fully in Kosovo and Metohija, which

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13 English transcripts. Pages 22827 to 22834.

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1 is always quite possible, of course. I'm not doubting such a conclusion.

2 But is it quite clear that this solution to find ministerial staff in

3 Pristina, signed by Colonel-General Vlastimir Stojiljkovic, assistant

4 minister and head of the public security service, and the solution to form

5 a staff, signed by the Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic, are documents whereby

6 this problem was intended to be overcome, the problem of the lack of

7 sufficient coordination. Is that right, Mr. Lilic?

8 A. I would agree with that with respect to the document signed by

9 Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic. As for the previous one, as far as I know,

10 at least, at direct briefings on the ground, it related only, I think, to

11 the public security service. When I said that the coordination was not

12 sufficient, it is not an assumption of mine. It was the conclusion

13 reached at that information meeting in Djakovica where state security

14 organs, or to be more precise Mr. Jovica Stanisic as head of that service,

15 reported on the need to form such a unified staff with a unity of command

16 because on the previous day, because of lack of synchronisation, during a

17 clash with the terrorists, several people from the state security, if I

18 recollect well, were killed. So this is the result of the information

19 that I received and that I had with you, and the meetings with Milan

20 Milutinovic. I think this staff was intended to overcome this lack of

21 coordination. And I see by the list of names in the decision signed by

22 Minister Stojiljkovic, that this was a mixed body of members from the

23 state and public security headed by Major-General Sreten Lukic.

24 Q. So a unified staff was formed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

25 consisting of people from both the Public and the State Security Services,

1 and even including heads of internal affairs secretariats in the territory

2 of Kosovo and Metohija. So this was a unification of the activities of

3 the police through this staff that was formed by his decision by the

4 Minister of the Interior.

5 A. Yes, that is true. I see that the commanders of special units

6 were there; one that was within the State Security Service and another one

7 that was within the public security department. So everything that

8 existed on the ground from both departments were unified.

9 Q. Was this a move made in accordance with the suggestions and

10 assessments that you yourself had made?

11 A. Yes. This staff was formed after that.

12 Q. And what was the date?

13 A. The 16th of June, and the meeting with Milutinovic was held on the

14 13th of June. As far as I know after that big meeting in terms of the

15 number of participants, another smaller meeting was held, and I think that

16 was when the composition of this staff was decided on.

17 Q. Can we then conclude that after that visit for which I gave my

18 approval and expressed the necessity to make it, after hearing the

19 information and comments and the meetings that you had on the 13th, as

20 early as the 16th, this staff was formed and problems overcome that were

21 highlighted at the time. Is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You said that you informed about all this at a meeting of the

24 staff coordinated by Milutinovic. Wasn't that his job, being the

25 president of Serbia and Kosovo being a part of Serbia?

1 A. I would be even more specific than you. I think that that should

2 have been his most important task at that point in time.

3 Q. In any event, that is what was done, and there were no

4 disagreements with respect to your assessments and the solution that was

5 subsequently adopted. You said that efforts were made to revive economic

6 activities, and that this task was assigned to Dusko Matkovic who was

7 general manager of Sartid, the Smederevo ironworks which had some units

8 even outside Smederevo. Do you know that certain efforts were invested

9 that resulted in the revival of economic activities in some companies in

10 Kosovo and Metohija?

11 A. Yes, I was convinced that we would not solve the problem in Kosovo

12 and Metohija, but we could at least activate some potentials which would

13 demonstrate Serbia's interest in the overall development of that part of

14 the country as well. And I think that Dusko Matkovic was a perfectly

15 qualified person for doing that. I think it's a good thing that the

16 initiative was taken. Unfortunately, the results were not such to

17 contribute to full stabilisation of the area.

18 Q. In addition to what you mentioned on page 9 of your statement,

19 when you say that Milutinovic headed this working group dealing with the

20 crisis in Kosovo, and you say that that should have been his main task,

21 which obviously it was at that time, you explain that senior

22 representatives of Albanian and Serb communities should have cooperated.

23 But that your proposals did not meet with understanding as far as I gather

24 from your statement. Perhaps this is some kind of misunderstanding

25 because I assume you know full well how many times a delegation of the

1 government of Serbia went for meetings in Kosovo to meet with a delegation

2 of the Kosovo Albanians. Do you know that?

3 A. There is no dispute regarding the activities of the government of

4 Serbia and the delegations led by Mr. Ratko Markovic, I believe, who was

5 vice-premier at the time. And the quotation that you refer to relates to

6 direct contacts with Albanians who were not in the top leadership or

7 high-level representatives of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija. It

8 relates to the actual inhabitants of the crisis areas, and I think that

9 you remember that there were some such meetings in the area of Batusa,

10 Junicko Polje. And even General Samardzic had concrete discussions with

11 several families who accepted the protection of the army of Yugoslavia.

12 Unfortunately, this was not developed any further, and I don't know what

13 happened afterwards. I was not involved in those activities in Kosovo and

14 Metohija.

15 I think a dozen of them came to the barracks in Djakovica asking

16 for the protection of the army of Yugoslavia. They were given that

17 protection and were taken by military buses back to their homes. After

18 that, I lost all touch, so I don't know why this method of communicating

19 with the population was interrupted because I'm convinced that dialogues

20 with prominent Albanians and Serbs were just as necessary as those at the

21 level of the top leadership of the Republic of Serbia and the Kosovo

22 Albanians.

23 Q. I quoted to you yesterday what I said at a meeting of the main

24 board of the party when I insisted on this dialogue. Emphasising that it

25 was not reserved only for government representatives and leaders of

1 Albanian political parties but that it should be conducted at all levels

2 from the level of villages, local communes, towns, formal and informal

3 occasions, and every other occasions so as to reduce tensions and to

4 achieve understanding. Isn't that so?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. In this connection, that is, the coming of Albanians seeking

7 protection, is it clear that they were seeking protection in order to be

8 safe from Albanian terrorists and other groups? Is that right?

9 A. Yes, that is so, but as far as my competence is allowed, I did

10 make an appeal to General Samardzic as well that they should equally

11 protect them from Albanian extremists, but also from Serb extremists.

12 Q. That was, in fact, their assignment.

13 Yesterday, we discussed this, and the position of the leadership

14 was that all citizens had to be protected, and that every perpetrator of

15 any crime had to be arrested and handed over to the judiciary. Is that

16 right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. I wish to save time. You mentioned some training centres, and a

19 decision was produced here. Is it true that the state leadership, our

20 state leadership, was opposed to any training centres being organised,

21 especially not for people who were not citizens of the Federal Republic of

22 Yugoslavia?

23 A. I assume you're moving from Kosovo and Metohija now to the

24 situation in Bosnia, if I'm not mistaken. If you're referring to the

25 centre from 1995 that I refer to.

1 Q. I'm just asking you whether that is correct. I didn't wish to

2 leave out that question.

3 A. As a general position taken by the leadership, yes.

4 Q. I'm not quite clear on one point, an explanation you gave, in

5 fact. And it's on page 16 of the shorter statement that you gave, that

6 during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that two different

7 Territorial Defences existed, one legal one, pursuant to the constitution,

8 the other one set up and composed of volunteers. Whose Territorial

9 Defence do you mean?

10 A. Well, perhaps this wasn't quite the right translation of it

11 because the first statement was not authorised. I assume that I did

12 authorise the second one. But when we speak of the principle of

13 Territorial Defence, then it was pursuant to the constitution of the state

14 at the time, the legitimate armed force which, under given conditions,

15 acted together with the JNA. And these sorts of Territorial Defences were

16 republican, and they later formed the armies of the former Yugoslav

17 republics. And to use the term that is used here, unlawful or illegal,

18 this refers to volunteer units who were based on the principle of homeland

19 units, and the area in which its members lived. If that's what you mean,

20 the volunteer units made up of men from different parts of the regions,

21 the home guard sort of system, so not the complex organisation that these

22 generally imply.

23 Q. All right, fine. Now, as we're talking about these units, is it

24 common knowledge that, for the most part, the volunteer units of some

25 paramilitary formations were set up by some political parties, in fact?

1 That's right, isn't it?

2 A. I think that I mentioned that in the course of my testimony during

3 these two days.

4 Q. The Socialist Party of Serbia, did it ever set up any paramilitary

5 formation at all?

6 A. No, absolutely not. That went against the grain of our programme

7 provisions.

8 Q. Let's go back to Kosovo for a moment. Do you know that all the

9 officers had detailed knowledge of international law?

10 A. Of international war law.

11 Q. Yes, that's what I meant.

12 A. That was the duty of all officers, not only in Kosovo and Metohija

13 but in any other unit too, in any other part of the FRY.

14 Q. And there was even an order issued during the aggression in Kosovo

15 in 1999 according to which all the soldiers had copies of the Geneva

16 Conventions on them.

17 A. Yes, and as far as I know, they did have copies of the Geneva

18 Conventions, yes.

19 Q. In view of the fact that an army acts according to orders, and the

20 police are given -- also issued orders to catch criminals, if somebody

21 heard of a crime being committed, were they duty-bound to apprehend the

22 perpetrators and file a criminal report with the court authorities?

23 A. Yes, that was their professional duty, and their duties as human

24 beings. And I don't think anybody abused those.

25 THE INTERPRETER: On condition that they did not abuse those

1 authorisations, correction.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Now, to go back to your letter, I'm not going to dwell on it for

4 any length of time.

5 A. Which letter are you referring to?

6 Q. The letter to me concerning the talks. You said they met Kohl and

7 so on. And then we come to the letter.

8 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have a copy, if he doesn't already.

9 Remind us of the tab number. We have had it.

10 MR. NICE: 27 and 28, I think.

11 JUDGE MAY: These are the 5th of May and the 17th of May, 1999.

12 Yes, Mr. Milosevic, what is the question?

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Well, looking through this letter, and I should like to focus on

15 page 2.

16 JUDGE MAY: Which one is this?

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. It is a quotation which reads as follows: "The law --"

19 JUDGE MAY: Which letter?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is the letter of the 5th of May,

21 addressed to me by Mr. Lilic.

22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Tab 27, yes, we have it.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

24 Q. Actually, on page 1, you say that the essence of the talks and the

25 possible initiative on our part consists in the following: "All

1 activities must be directed towards the United Nations," et cetera. The

2 principles on which a decision in our favour may be reached, the return of

3 refugees, guarantees from the FRY, the OSCE, and the UN, and so on and so

4 forth.

5 Now, you say on page 2, in the middle of the page 2, that is why

6 after detailed talks with Dr. Helmut Kohl, the former chancellor of the

7 Federal Republic of Germany, and talks with Dr. R. Vranitsky, the former

8 chancellor of Austria, the most rational solution is as follows... That's

9 right, isn't it? That's what you say?

10 A. Yes. And it was Dr. F. Vranitsky, that was his initial.

11 Q. Accept a UN mission. That comes under -- well, it's not under a

12 number of any kind but it comes first, that's the first point. And then

13 it says as well as the presence of Russia, proposed the presence of one

14 more permanent member, England or France from Europe, which will, as you

15 say, attract the approval of the USA because this is a guarantee from my

16 interlocutors and with China create the conditions for the adoption of

17 such a resolution. And then you go on to state: My personal opinion is

18 that it is necessary to propose Italy, Greece, Poland, Slovakia,

19 Belorussia, the Ukraine, and especially Austria as a neutral country, and

20 of course, the presence of countries that are friendly towards us, and you

21 mention Libya as a case in point. And then you go on to say what the FRY

22 would obtain from all this, would gain from it all, in fact.

23 Everything that you put forward in this letter of yours which

24 emerges from the discussions you had with Kohl refers exclusively to this

25 brief quotation in the middle of page 2, that is to say, to accept a UN

1 mission, and as well as the presence of Russia, to propose two other

2 permanent members of the UN Security Council to create the necessary

3 conditions. And then you present your own personal views about that and

4 say what would be gained by behaving in that way. So the entire proposal

5 is -- consists, in fact, of this basic point: The acceptance of a UN

6 mission and who was supposed to be in it. Is that right, Mr. Lilic?

7 A. That is not correct, Mr. Milosevic.

8 Q. Well, all right, then. Explain to me what else this says because

9 the latter part of your letter goes on to explain what we would gain, and

10 you say accept a UN mission and who should be present. So what else is

11 there, in your view, which was Kohl's proposal, the gist of Kohl's

12 proposal?

13 A. That so on condition had the two of us not had a conversation two

14 days prior to that where I told you in great detail, and if you want me

15 to, I'll repeat what was said.

16 Q. We don't need to hear that again, we have the letter before us,

17 and the letter states to accept a UN mission, accepting a UN mission.

18 That is what it says in your letter. Now, I'm asking you this --

19 A. May I continue my answer, if I may. I'll try and explain to you

20 what I mean, if you will allow me to do so. The first and most important

21 principle was why the talks were held at all. The talks were held because

22 the NATO bombing lasted much longer than Belgrade thought it would go on

23 for. And it was my idea to try and make use of something that was

24 possible at the time. And so several meetings were held, and this is just

25 one segment from a meeting dated the 3rd of May from Bonn, and I don't

1 want to elaborate upon that meeting because you know the details of that

2 meeting very well. But all we had to do was to respond and it was to stop

3 the bombing, stop the air strikes, and what would happen after the air

4 strikes had stopped. So you extracted this from the contents of the first

5 page. And then it goes on to state what would happen after the bombing,

6 after the air strikes, the activities ranging from a political agreement

7 with the Albanians, the conference in Vienna, the withdrawal of the JNA

8 and special MUP units at the level before the NATO pact aggression. And

9 I'm sure you'll remember the meeting at the end of October at your office

10 with Mr. Solana and Mr. Holbrooke present, and I received information as

11 to what was proposed. If you would like me to do so, I will be happy to

12 repeat it but I don't think there's any need for me to do that.

13 And then there were talks to revive the microstructure after the

14 NATO aggression, the FRY's integration into the international and European

15 courses, and specific international institutions. And then afterwards, if

16 we act upon these modalities and solutions, it says what I think we would

17 gain. So the last four points are what I think would be gained. And I

18 think today, from this distance of time, I am far more convinced of this,

19 in fact, that we should have attempted to do so. Of course, you could

20 have had different information yourself, information and intelligence I

21 didn't know about. But we should have acted along those lines because it

22 was in everybody's interest to have the NATO bombing stopped. Of course,

23 we had the greatest interest in doing so with all the casualties and

24 destruction this caused, but I don't have to tell you of other people's

25 interest of those who were included in this project. I don't want to

1 mention their names, but if we want to open that chapter of the book, we

2 can do so. I think that this was a very good opportunity to attempt to

3 stop the bombings. And in Mr. Kohl's conviction, this was very possible.

4 And several days afterwards, the G7 plus one, or G8, meeting was

5 held in Berlin where it was possible to hold negotiations of this type,

6 and if I can say in invert the commas, as a service to our side, all that

7 was required was that you should accept this because you were the person

8 that made the decisions as president of the Federal Republic of

9 Yugoslavia. And it was up to you to state publicly that you accept this

10 or give an initiative for this plan to go forward. And I considered at

11 that time and still consider this today that it wouldn't have cost you

12 anything to discuss it.

13 Q. Well, of course it didn't cost anything to discuss these issues,

14 but we didn't need so many words, and we don't need so many words because

15 this proposal was -- in fact, boiled down to this: To accept the UN

16 mission. That is the crux and substance of the proposal. Is that right?

17 A. The substance of the proposal was a condition for everything that

18 I go on to enumerate. And the condition -- there were two things; first

19 of all, to accept a UN mission, and secondly, in view of the generally

20 accepted position, your position first and foremost that was generally

21 accepted in our country, that we could not accept NATO pact troops at any

22 cost. And the second point was a modality, ways and means to resolve and

23 implement this decision, and it is stated that this was a component part

24 for the condition of everything that was to follow.

25 So we had to have a majority in the permanent UN -- of the

1 permanent UN Security Council members. And I don't want to mention names

2 but we would not accept the USA at the time, Great Britain either, but

3 France was possible and logical. So that is the third member, along with

4 China and Russia, although you did have promises from Russia that it would

5 voice its veto, although I don't think they ever fulfilled that promise.

6 Q. Please, not to waste more time, because my time is very limited.

7 Do you happen to remember telling me that I should write with my own hand,

8 in my own hand and state that this kind of solution should be accepted,

9 that is to say, acceptance of a UN mission for our part. Is that right,

10 that is what Kohl asked of you?

11 A. I said that you ought to make a public offer via the information

12 media to that effect, and you wrote to me, and I still have that piece of

13 paper. I hold it very dear for everything else that happened in the

14 negative sense, of course, that's what I mean. And it says there that you

15 should reply with useful unclarity, a lack of clarity, and I knew what

16 that meant, ambiguous.

17 Q. Yes, I do have a concrete question, because the letter was made

18 public. Everybody can read it. And the proposal was to accept the UN

19 mission. And in my own hand, I did write this piece of paper, I haven't

20 got it, you've got it. You took it. But I do have a copy from this book.

21 It is called "Water and Flood" -- "Water and Fire." And the book

22 publishes this text of the pi