1 Wednesday, 18 June 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice. We must ask you to finish within the

7 hour, given the constraints of time.

8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I may have to abandon a lot of material.

9 I shall do so. I have planned on that basis.

10 Mr. Lilic, there will be many points where I shall be asking you

11 for yes/no answers; I hope you will be able to comply.

12 WITNESS: ZORAN LILIC [Resumed]

13 Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

14 Q. Exhibit 469, tab 24, is the minutes of the Supreme Defence Council

15 held on the 4th of October, 1998. You've reviewed this when preparing to

16 give your evidence. In it, we find Perisic arguing that a NATO strike is

17 unavoidable, Djukanovic stating that he is opposed to war, and suggesting

18 that everything should be done in accordance with the United Nations

19 Security Council resolution. Milutinovic and the accused make statements

20 consistent with one another. What was your inference from the fact that

21 they made statements consistent with one another, please, Mr. Lilic?

22 A. This is a very particular record of minutes that was being kept at

23 a time of great danger for the FRY, and there must have been a prior

24 meeting at which this overall situation was reviewed.

25 Q. Thank you very much.

1 A. The minutes provides alternatives --

2 Q. Thank you very much. That's all I need on that. We'll move on to

3 paragraph 194 in the summary, bringing the exhibit back, please.

4 Was there a meeting of the Kosovo staff coordinated by Milutinovic

5 on the 13th of June of 1998, attended by a large number of political and

6 military elite, including, apart from Milutinovic, Pavle Bulatovic,

7 Perisic, Dimitrijevic, Samardzic, Pavkovic, Stojiljkovic, Djordjevic,

8 Sreten Lukic, Sainovic, Stanisic, Obrad Stevanovic and possibly Minic, the

9 accused not being present?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. In the course of the debate, what did -- paragraph 198 -- what

12 about Stojiljkovic say in relation to the one and a half million Kosovo

13 Albanians in Kosovo? What was your reaction to his observation?

14 A. If I may, I must briefly explain that that meeting follows on to a

15 visit that occurred prior to that in Djakovica where Mr. Stanisic reported

16 on the overall security situation in Kosovo and Metohija and on the

17 behaviour of certain reserve police units. So at this meeting, that same

18 discussion was continued, and I cautioned Mr. Stojiljkovic regarding what

19 was going on at Kosovo and Metohija, particularly around the village of

20 Ponasevac, to which he responded very strongly. We had a heated dialogue,

21 and he said, in the final analysis, they should all be killed, but he was

22 irritated by what I had said. And I said that because of what certain

23 members of the reserve police force were doing, one day, we might be

24 ashamed for being Serbs and our children will be ashamed and the children

25 of our children will be ashamed. And I asked Milutinovic to intervene in

1 response to this outburst.

2 Q. Paragraph 199, line 3, did the purpose of this meeting apparently

3 have something to do with participation of the army in Kosovo?

4 A. My conviction is that that meeting was intended in the first place

5 to analyse the overall situation in Kosovo and Metohija primarily from the

6 security point of view. Secondly, to examine the behaviour of the army

7 top leadership, which did not wish to accept acting in coordination with

8 the police. And thirdly, to show that Mr. Stanisic was not conducting the

9 operations in Kosovo and Metohija properly in view of the fact that he was

10 insisting on a unity of command and more efficient activities,

11 particularly in the centres of terrorist activity.

12 Q. Paragraph 200, was there a meeting following that, a narrower

13 meeting, where it was decided to form a particular body?

14 A. This meeting on the 13th was the only meeting of its kind that I

15 attended, upon the proposal of Mr. Milosevic in the first place. But

16 according to my knowledge, there was a narrower meeting after that when it

17 was decided to form the united command of the state security and public

18 security forces of the police, and the command of those forces was given

19 to Mr. Sreten Lukic.

20 Q. Lukic's appointment said what of Stanisic's authority?

21 A. I believe that shortly after that, Mr. Stanisic was withdrawn from

22 Kosovo and Metohija and transferred to Belgrade, so his command position

23 was taken away from him with respect to the state security. Immediately

24 after that, a couple of months later, Mr. Stanisic was replaced from his

25 position altogether.

1 MR. NICE: Your Honours will see a reference in the summary to an

2 existing exhibit which I won't weary us with today, Exhibit 319, tab 9,

3 which dates from a little earlier, the 15th of May of 1998. The witness

4 has reviewed this document, which was signed by Djordjevic and related to

5 the formation of a staff in the ministry at Pristina. And at that earlier

6 stage was the body formed in Pristina, Mr. Lilic, a national security, not

7 a joint command body?

8 A. As far as I can remember, that order signed by Mr. Djordjevic, the

9 head of the public security service, it relates to the public security.

10 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 202, there was a decision to form a

11 ministerial staff for the suppression of terrorism. Tab 25. If we can

12 just briefly look at that. Very briefly. And you can see the composition

13 of this ministerial staff for the suppression of terrorism, Lukic, Gajic,

14 Djinovic, Lukovic, Trajkovic, Radosavljevic, Vukovic, Zdravkovic and

15 Vucurevic. Is this joint security forces, Mr. Lilic?

16 A. This decision was signed by Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Minister of

17 Internal Affairs. This is the unified staff of the public and state

18 security services, including special units. One can see that Sreten Lukic

19 is at its head, and there is a mixture of people from state security and

20 public security. Gajic is from state security, Milorad Lukovic is a

21 member of the special unit but he belongs to the state security, and so

22 on. But some of the people I don't know personally, but that is the staff

23 as it was at the time.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I apologise. This was previously tendered

25 through Babovic as 466, tab 6. 466, tab 6, I am told. We'll move on.

1 Q. We've covered already the changes in the rules of the Supreme

2 Defence Council. We can see them considered at tab 26, just for

3 reference, in the minutes of the Supreme Defence Council for the 23rd of

4 March of 1999, and the witness has already commented on the coincidence of

5 that date in relation to the NATO bombing. We don't need to look at it

6 beyond that. It can be exhibited, I hope, by my referring to it in that

7 way.

8 Just tell us this, please, Mr. Lilic: The new rules changed

9 certain previous arrangements. They no longer allowed for telephone

10 consultation and they included the requirement that the Federal Ministry

11 of Defence and the chief of the general staff must be present at sessions.

12 In your judgement, what did that say - paragraph 209 of your summary -

13 what did that say of the move of responsibility, if any, for what was to

14 follow from the accused?

15 A. Clearly, that's something that used to be the practice in the

16 previous Defence Council is now being formalised and made obligatory. So

17 I think it also implies the corresponding sharing of responsibility.

18 Q. So as a result of this, there would be less responsibility on the

19 accused? Is that what you're saying?

20 A. It is hard to say that he would have less responsibility, but

21 there was a possibility for certain decisions not being taken if the

22 provisions of the new rules of procedure are not respected. So possibly

23 it was possible for certain decisions not to be taken if taken in

24 accordance with the rules, that is, through the Supreme Defence Council.

25 Q. Paragraph 210: The witness has reviewed a previous exhibit,

1 Exhibit 245, instructions for the defence of inhabited places. I'm not

2 going to present that again to the Chamber. You've reviewed this

3 instructions for the defence of inhabited places. Are you able to form a

4 view, Mr. Lilic, as to whether that comes from the existing defence plan?

5 A. This document that I managed to see, the source of which I cannot

6 know, certainly is part of the country's defence plan adopted by the

7 Supreme Defence Council, the implementation of which is determined by the

8 Supreme Commander, and I must say I was surprised to see it in this form

9 without the accompanying decision of the Supreme Defence Council.

10 Q. Paragraph 215: Did you, Mr. Lilic, shortly after the start of the

11 NATO bombing campaign, hold discussions with various foreign officials,

12 including Frans Vranitsky, Moammer Ghadhafi, and Helmut Kohl? Were these

13 discussions held with the knowledge of and, as you understood it, with the

14 approval of the accused, and did they lead to your writing a letter to the

15 accused on the 5th of May of 1999, tab 27?

16 A. Immediately after the beginning of the bombing, or some 15 days

17 into it, it was clear that the raids would not last, as had been expected

18 by a certain number of people in the Yugoslav leadership, so I tried my

19 best to use connections and influential people that I had met earlier on,

20 and my answer to your question is --

21 Q. I'm sure you understand that the detail of what you would be

22 saying is contained in your summary so that people can know the detail if

23 they need to pursue it and it's just simply for the pressure of time that

24 I would ask you to be brief. Am I right in the question that I asked you,

25 that you had these international discussions and wrote the letter

1 concerned?

2 A. Yes, but I would like to finish my sentence, and I was going to

3 say yes, anyway, Mr. Nice.

4 Q. If we look at this letter, which sets out your cogently expressed

5 arguments in favour of the Kohl plan - and the learned Judges can consider

6 it in detail later - it ends on what is page 4 of the English text at the

7 foot and simply the end of letter. It ends with your saying to the

8 accused that: "The responsibility of each one of us is historic. Perhaps

9 we experience it differently." And you indeed conclude by saying that:

10 "The fate of the Serbian people, the fate of Serbia and the FRY, is in

11 your hands."

12 Now, did this draw any reaction from the accused himself?

13 A. Regarding what is stated in this letter, prompted by the wish to

14 make an attempt to stop the bombing, no. As far as my personal status and

15 the attitude towards me is concerned, it provoked a very tumultuous

16 reaction.

17 Q. Paragraph 218 of the summary: Were you called to a meeting with

18 Milutinovic, Marjanovic, Tomic, Jovanovic, Minic, at the Presidency of

19 Serbia's building on the 17th of May, 1999?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was this effectively a party hearing, or as you describe it, a

22 party tribunal?

23 A. In view of the fact that those were people who were the leaders of

24 state institutions and political bodies in the SDS, it was like a

25 political and state tribunal which acted in that way with respect to the

1 letter we referred to. It was literally a trial for something that they

2 themselves did not understand and in which they themselves had not

3 participated.

4 Q. And the particular complaint against you, in a sentence, was what?

5 A. That I shouldn't have given myself the liberty to write such a

6 letter to Mr. Milosevic.

7 Q. Was there a concern as to how such a letter might be interpreted

8 or subsequently used as evidence?

9 A. Yes, this was quite openly stated by Mr. Milutinovic, though that

10 is something that really never occurred to me.

11 Q. Tab 28, did you write a further letter to the accused on the 17th

12 of May? Again, the Chamber will be able to review it at leisure, Mr.

13 Lilic, so we can deal with it in a sentence. Did this reject the

14 criticisms made of you and did it end, as we can see on the second page,

15 the penultimate paragraph, your asserting your desire to help without

16 personal interests and your willingness to step down after the aggression

17 was concluded?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And in the following months, months that followed these events,

20 did it become clear to you that one of the political or military options

21 was being favoured? If so, which one?

22 A. It was quite clear that as far as the attitude towards NATO was

23 concerned, the conviction was that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

24 could even have some influence; at least, some people believed that NATO

25 could be defeated, and this was later stated in certain public statements,

1 to break the spine of NATO, as people said. So I really do believe that

2 those were unreasonable beliefs, and that every effort should have been

3 made to stop the bombing as soon as possible.

4 Q. Paragraph 222 of the summary, Perisic, Stanisic, and Dimitrijevic

5 were all replaced or sideways moved. Do you believe there to be a link

6 between those moves and the accused's wife's JUL Party?

7 A. Yes, I'm convinced of that.

8 Q. Paragraph 224, Perisic was replaced by Ojdanic. I think he was

9 somebody who you yourself had actually relieved of command, is that right,

10 or moved from one post to another as your judgements on the man?

11 A. Yes. From position of commander of the 1st army, he was moved to

12 the general staff, which was a position that was higher - I think he was

13 deputy chief of staff - but it had marginal powers, insignificant powers,

14 in fact.

15 Q. Tab 29, please. We can see how this matter was dealt with at the

16 Supreme Defence Council meeting held on November the 14th of 1998. Page 3

17 of the English, under "Personnel Issues," and at the top right-hand corner

18 for you, Mr. Lilic, 2465, is the page number, it's the bottom of the page

19 where the session is opened with the accused reminding of the necessity to

20 replace the chief of the general staff because it was said he had been on

21 duty for a long time.

22 If we look further on, we see about a page further on that

23 President Djukanovic of Montenegro expressed a contrary view.

24 Milutinovic, on our page 4 of 3, it says -- it says concurred with the

25 views of the accused. And then at our page 5 of 3, as it's recorded,

1 Djukanovic's response was that "the Supreme Council of Defence is working

2 the way it does. If you agree with that, then it will be that way. I am

3 against." So there was a conflict. You can see it all in detail, if

4 necessary.

5 Any comments on that conflict between Milutinovic and the accused

6 and Djukanovic?

7 A. First of all, I think that such an important issue should have

8 been resolved by a consensus, and in the new rules, such a provision is

9 made with regard to such a high position in the army of Yugoslavia.

10 Secondly, it is really not important how long somebody's doing a certain

11 job, but how he's doing it. And thirdly, regardless of the fact that the

12 president of the Republic of Montenegro, Mr. Djukanovic, had a very firm

13 position, the decision was nevertheless taken by Milutinovic, who

14 concurred with President Milosevic and gave legitimacy to a decision which

15 in those days, according to the rules in force, could have been taken by

16 Milosevic alone without any polemics. But it is a fact that the chief of

17 staff was always appointed and dismissed with the absolute concurrence of

18 both Republics.

19 Q. You're recorded as saying the decision was taken by Milutinovic.

20 Did you mean Milutinovic or Milosevic?

21 A. Milutinovic agreed that Perisic should be replaced. And by

22 agreeing, in a sense, he made the decision. But the final decision is

23 made by President Milosevic, who confirmed it with his signature.

24 Q. Paragraph 226, what's your understanding or belief as to the

25 reason why Stanisic was relieved of his command and replaced?

1 A. I think yesterday we spoke at some length about the principled

2 positions of Mr. Stanisic, when it came to the struggle against terrorists

3 in Kosovo and Metohija regarding the need to have the public security

4 under a single command, the need for the army to provide logistics, but in

5 a legitimate way, and I think that was one of the reasons. But no less

6 important reason was the fact that it didn't suit the Yugoslav left. And

7 immediately after that, the story was spread about that Mr. Stanisic was

8 working for the GSYA, and this was rumoured for quite a long time until he

9 was dismissed. It is true that Mr. Dojic [phoen], the director of the

10 GSYA was in Belgrade, and he spoke with a different person, and he had a

11 tete-a-tete meeting of more than four hours with somebody quite different,

12 but I don't want to go into that now. The point was for the Yugoslav left

13 to have its people take over the leadership.

14 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Dimitrijevic, did you regard

15 Farkas as up to the job? Paragraph 227.

16 A. Without underestimating General Geza Farkas, I don't think that he

17 was somebody who could have replaced General Dimitrijevic, not only for

18 professional reasons but for certain other reasons as well.

19 Q. Paragraph 228, the failure to call a state of emergency resulted

20 in what, so far as responsibility falling on Milutinovic was concerned?

21 A. The fact that a state of emergency was not proclaimed has as its

22 consequence the illegal and unlawful deployment of the army of Yugoslavia,

23 and quite certainly, that somebody's responsibility ought to be sought,

24 and not only Mr. Milutinovic's as far as the Republic of Serbia is

25 concerned.

1 Q. Of course, the failure to call a state of emergency was the

2 decision of whom?

3 A. This was a decision, a possible decision, made by the president of

4 Serbia possibly. But under conditions of that kind, it ought to have been

5 a decision by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because

6 it implied the use and deployment of the army of Yugoslavia, or rather,

7 the Supreme Defence Council, their decision.

8 Q. Paragraph 229, voting on the Rambouillet accords was in which

9 Assembly?

10 A. If I remember correctly, I think it was the Assembly -- the

11 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

12 Q. Was that proper or improper, and if improper, what does that show

13 of the accused? What does that reveal of the accused's method of

14 operation, please?

15 A. I personally think that the fact that the National Assembly

16 discussed proposals and positions to be advocated at Rambouillet is its

17 legitimate right. However, at the same time, it was the duty of the

18 Federal Assembly to discuss issues of that kind as well. So this kind of

19 responsibility is left at the level of the Republic of Serbia and

20 marginalises the federal state in a way.

21 Q. Just dealing generally with the composition of those assemblies,

22 party composition gave authority to which party?

23 A. Well, de facto, the SPS was the party mentioned everywhere, at all

24 levels, but the SPS was not the party that covered the most important

25 regions of power, but my answer would be the SPS at any rate.

1 Q. Just remind us, we covered it in detail, but just to have a

2 general, would it be the case that the president of Serbia when he was

3 only the president of Serbia or was the president of Serbia, the accused

4 was able to control federal institutions? How did he achieve that? By

5 what method?

6 A. Well, when we're talking about Mr. Milosevic's -- if that's who

7 you have in mind, I think his influence should be viewed from two aspects,

8 one from the aspect of a head of state, and the authority vested in him

9 throughout those years. And secondly, as a leader of the political party,

10 first of one, then the other, and then both. So it was via the political

11 parties, in fact, the SPS and JUL, that this influence was dominant, by

12 the deputies in the Federal Assembly or via the deputies in the Republican

13 Assembly or rather the ministries in either government.

14 Q. Mr. Lilic, paragraph 230, you were shown or listened to, rather,

15 an audio recording. The number is given on the summary. We have nothing

16 like the time to go through it. It's audio recording T0000114. You heard

17 the recording in preparation for evidence. Whose voices did you

18 recognise?

19 A. On the tape, there are a number of voices. I was able to

20 recognise just one of them.

21 Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ...

22 A. It was the voice of General Mladic, in fact.

23 Q. Thank you very much. That's at tab 30, Your Honours. And now I

24 must sweep up matters that were postponed yesterday on grounds of possible

25 sensitivity, but I think there's no need for any closed session. A couple

1 of matters of detail, please. Can you have tab 17 in front of you.

2 This shows the termination of professional military service for

3 Galic, General, whom you're aware has been on trial here. And we see your

4 signing off on his termination. Can you just explain that, please.

5 A. I assume that I signed this document because this isn't a decree

6 that is specific for decrees of the Supreme Defence Council, which I

7 presided over, and I don't know this Colonel Branko Fezer either. But I

8 don't think that's of any importance. Now as far as signing this decree,

9 the members of the 30th cadre's centre, I think that I spoke about this a

10 great deal yesterday. We didn't view the personal centre and the

11 individuals in it individually, but we looked at the people who had

12 belonged to the JNA or who on a volunteer basis were on the territory of

13 Republika Srpska. This decree probably came as a proposal by Mr. Radovan

14 Karadzic, for example.

15 Q. I see. Now I want to turn to another topic. Yesterday you

16 volunteered to us in relation to Srebrenica that certain individuals were

17 responsible. Can you tell us, please, who those individuals were.

18 A. It is difficult that you can expect me to name any individual.

19 That would be difficult. I don't think you can expect me to do that. But

20 I think that there is individual responsibility, and I am sure that in the

21 course of this trial, you will be able to show and prove who those

22 individuals were. And I said I was convinced that that kind of order

23 didn't come from any political or military person from Belgrade, and that

24 I'm completely sure --

25 Q. Mr. Lilic, that's the third time you've told us that. Can you

1 help us please, because time is very short, with this: You volunteered

2 that individuals were involved. Can you just perhaps help us with who it

3 was.

4 A. No. Had we known who was involved, we would have taken the

5 appropriate measures ourselves.

6 Q. How soon after the massacre at Srebrenica were you aware of it?

7 A. It's difficult for me to be precise enough. I think it was a

8 relatively short space of time.

9 Q. Days, weeks, days?

10 A. Well, let's say several days.

11 Q. Thank you. How soon was the name of General Mladic, who, of

12 course, is indicted in respect of Srebrenica, associated with those events

13 publicly?

14 A. There were a lot of polemics and discussion as to that. According

15 to the intensity of President Milosevic's anger, the degree to which he

16 was angry, I don't think much time elapsed.

17 Q. Very well.

18 A. I can't be precise on that score.

19 Q. Can we now go to tab 20, please, Your Honour. And I'm going to

20 ask that you add to tab 20 so that it becomes part of it an earlier record

21 of the same general kind. Tab 20 at the moment is the 29th of August,

22 1995, Dobanovci meeting. The one that you're now being provided with is

23 the immediate preceding one is the meeting of the 25th of August. And

24 Mr. Lilic, I'd be grateful if you would take, please, the B/C/S version

25 which has page numbers in the top right-hand corner, small page numbers,

1 at least starting on page 2 it does, and I will guide you to the relevant

2 passage that I want you to look at.

3 Starting at the beginning, this is a record of a meeting of the

4 highest political and military leaders on the 25th of August in Dobanovci.

5 And it's in accordance with conclusions adopted at the 42nd session of the

6 Supreme Council held on the 23rd of August of 1995. Can you help us,

7 please, with this: Did General Mladic attend Supreme Defence Council

8 meetings?

9 A. General Mladic was invited in his capacity of a man who can exert

10 pressure on the leadership of Republika Srpska to accept the groundwork

11 and basis to prepare the peace negotiations in Dayton. So my answer is

12 yes, he was present at the initial stages of the Supreme Defence Council

13 meeting.

14 Q. Very well. Let's go then please to English page 4, at the foot,

15 and for you, Mr. Lilic, I think it is page 6 at the top. Now, this is not

16 a Supreme Defence Council meeting, it's a special meeting following on the

17 SDC meeting, and we see the following at the foot of page 4: "Since

18 General Ratko Mladic arrived at the meeting at about 1430 hours,

19 President Milosevic addressed those present and instructed them that this

20 meeting is secret, that is, it can never be mentioned or referred to

21 publicly, and he quoted a letter that President Karadzic sent him on the

22 23rd of August, saying that the letter entailed 'important elements.'"

23 Was the proclamation of secrecy linked to Mladic's arrival, please?

24 A. No.

25 Q. You see following on from that, President Milosevic reminded him,

1 reminded Karadzic that he suggested that...

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. Reminded Karadzic, "he suggested that very thing a year ago. The

5 Muslims had to be offered something they deemed important, and they would

6 give us something we would be particularly interested in. Of course,

7 we're not referring to the enclaves. The three in Eastern Bosnia

8 (Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde) would blend into Serbian surroundings

9 without a fight." Was that the general view of the Serb leadership at the

10 time, please, Mr. Lilic?

11 A. No, but may I be allowed to put you right on one point, or rather

12 a detail in this document is not correct. The letter received by

13 President Milosevic from President Karadzic, and the response to your

14 question is no. My answer to your question is no.

15 Q. Further down, page 5 in the English, and at the very foot of page

16 6 for you, Mr. Lilic, we see at the end of the paragraph, two-thirds of

17 the way down, the accused saying: "... Under-Secretary of State Holbrooke

18 told him about the U.S. view according to which, if the Serbs fail to

19 accept the peace, the war would be made to escalate. And if the Muslims

20 refuse the peace solution they will be told they are to be left alone with

21 the sword of Damocles hanging above them in the form of General Mladic."

22 Was that the approach taken by the Serb leadership to the use of General

23 Mladic?

24 A. No. I think that from the text you can see, according to the

25 words of Mr. Milosevic, that this was stated by Mr. Holbrooke.

1 Q. Over the page, please, to our page 7, and for you, please,

2 Mr. Lilic, your page 8. A quarter of the way down in the English version,

3 Prime Minister Kontic "informed the others that the economic situation in

4 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been increasingly difficult and

5 that we would not be able to assist Republika Srpska as we have been so

6 far. When President Karadzic heard about this inability to assist

7 Republika Srpska, he asked President Milosevic, 'President, does this mean

8 that I shouldn't go to the Neretva and into Eastern Slavonia?' The

9 President of Serbia replied that what Karadzic was suggesting was a war

10 option." Do you remember that passage of debate?

11 A. Yes, of course I remember that debate.

12 Q. We move on, please, because I'm going to come to your contribution

13 to this debate in a second or so. But at the foot of our page 7, we have

14 Karadzic warning that the Muslims aspire towards all the territories west

15 of Brcko and are prepared to leave the Drina area east of Bosnia "to us.

16 Therefore, we must fight for a wider corridor and as compact a territory

17 as possible..." Is that the policy being accepted and discussed at that

18 time?

19 A. Well, yes, it's clear that as broad a corridor as possible was

20 needed at Brcko. As for the agreement and common position, this was quite

21 clear.

22 Q. Your contribution can be found on English page 9, B/C/S page 11.

23 This is what you said: "[President Lilic] stated that the question of

24 whether we are giving up on Krajina is now moot. We have done everything

25 to help Krajina, but what happened happened. They left their traditional

1 homesteads without a fight. You could rather say that the Krajina

2 politicians have given up on their mother country.

3 [The accused] added a less-well-known piece of information.

4 Namely, he mentioned a telegram sent to General Mrksic in which he was

5 told to hold out for just two days until we send him help. They did not

6 hold on. They fled."

7 You, Mr. Lilic, continued, stating that "the key question at the

8 moment was whether we would keep, whether we would retain Republika Srpska

9 or not. The question of Serbian destiny is now posed." You went a step

10 further than the previous speaker by saying that "for us the issue of a

11 quick war or a quick peace practically no longer exists. Now we must only

12 choose the quick peace" solution; and as the chairman of the Supreme

13 Defence Council, you warned that "military resources are fairly exhausted,

14 that some are depleted. That is why we are making a historical decision

15 today: Will Republika Srpska exist or not. It will if we accept peace,

16 not war." Is that your attitude?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Over the page to page 10, we see the contribution of General

19 Mladic. It's at your page 12 at the top. And in the middle of the page,

20 I haven't the time to read all of it out, but just point it to the

21 Chamber. It was Mladic expressing his satisfaction at seeing all Serbian

22 politicians gathered since, as he said, "This is no time for a tug-of-war

23 competition." Is that the reality of General Mladic's contributions?

24 A. In view of the specific way this sentence rang, yes, I remember it

25 well.

1 Q. No discussion recorded here on Srebrenica. Was the topic raised

2 at the meeting, please?

3 A. No, this meeting was related to the Dayton peace agreements

4 exclusively. Of course, Srebrenica was discussed before that, before the

5 meeting, as to what was actually going on, but for their part, there were

6 no explanations or recognitions of any kind, confessions or such.

7 Q. Did Mladic give any explanation? Was he challenged by anyone?

8 A. No. Mladic arrived -- No.

9 Q. Has Mladic ever given you an explanation?

10 A. Not to me personally, no.

11 Q. You speak to Mladic, do you, from time to time, or not?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. When most recently?

14 A. Our intensive conversations took place precisely after these

15 meetings, or to be more specific, in December sometime when I went with

16 General Perisic and Dimitrijevic to make an attempt to save the French

17 pilots, and this was a condition posed for the signing of the Dayton

18 agreement in Paris. And we had intensive conversations at that time, and

19 negotiations at Han Pijesak because President Milosevic, at my initiative,

20 had accepted the fact that I should go to Han Pijesak where I talked at

21 the time to practically the whole of the main staff of the army of

22 Republika Srpska. And after very difficult discussions and debates, we --

23 Q. Just yes or no: Mladic never explained Srebrenica.

24 A. No.

25 Q. The personnel centre continued to pay Mladic until when?

1 A. I don't know to Mladic himself, but to the whole group, the

2 personnel centre paid out the salaries until 1994. This afterwards,

3 social and welfare and assistance, and as far as I know, this went on to

4 the year 2001, up until March. Whether Mladic was paid out as well, I'm

5 not quite sure.

6 Q. Was there ever any investigation to your knowledge by the SDC of

7 what was being alleged about Srebrenica? Was there ever any decision to

8 cease supporting any of the VRS soldiers possibly implicated in that

9 event?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Can we go to the next part of the similar record, as I'm very

12 short of time. It's the other part of tab 20, and it's the record for the

13 29th of August, 1995. Just look at two excerpts on this, please. And in

14 the English version at the bottom right-hand corner, the page numbering is

15 6 of 19. Mladic is present at this meeting as well, as we can see. But

16 on page 6 of 19, which in your case, Mr. Lilic, can be found on page 5 at

17 the top right, we have Karadzic saying: "We ought to insist on having

18 Serbian territories compact --" sorry. "We ought to insist on having

19 Serbian territories compact, answered President Milosevic. Let us leave

20 Gorazde, Muslims alone would offer it on exchange." Is that an expression

21 or view that the accused offered?

22 A. I can't remember this, but as I know the principled positions

23 with respect to the exchanges, then I think yes.

24 Q. At the foot of the English page and just a paragraph or so on, we

25 have the accused warning again there wasn't much time left, "that it was

1 in our interest to reach an agreement, for if we fail to do so - neither

2 Republic of Srpska would exist, nor its Constitution." Was that the fear

3 you all had?

4 A. Yes, this is enormous pressure, and from President Milosevic,

5 too, to go to the Dayton negotiations.

6 Q. At page 8 of 19 in the English, and at page 11 for Mr. Lilic, we

7 see the beginning of -- we see Mladic's contribution. I don't have time

8 to go through it for want of time.

9 So far as the 30th personnel centre is concerned, can you

10 remember, please, we know that there was an embargo against RS between

11 August 1994 and sometime in 1995. When did the 30th personnel centre

12 actually resume paying salaries, please? What part of 1995?

13 A. In view of the position taken by General Mladic, which he

14 presented on the 10th, or rather, 11th of December while I was in

15 Republika Srpska at Han Pijesak myself, to abolish the borders on the

16 Drina, then I assume that that did not even take place in 1995. Perhaps

17 at the beginning of 1996, but the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was so

18 exhausted by that time that I don't think it was able to finance this at

19 the rate that it had been able to do previously, the monthly sums that

20 were paid out, and I spoke about that yesterday.

21 Q. Yesterday you said that the resumption of payments was in 1995,

22 and you dealt with the matter in preparation for giving evidence, and we

23 can find the paragraph number. What are you saying as to when the

24 salaries were paid in 1995, please?

25 A. If you allow me to say, after the sanctions were introduced

1 against Republika Srpska, we took a decision that the minimal part, that

2 is the social welfare part, should be given to the families of the 30th

3 personnel centre to continue their children's education, and I think that

4 part of it was continued. That's what I had in mind. But they were not

5 the entire amounts, they were just amounts that were guaranteed --

6 salaries guaranteed in the Federal Republic at that time, the guaranteed

7 wages in fact.

8 Q. And in what part of 1995 did those payments resume, please?

9 A. Well, those payments were hardly interrupted, this minimum

10 guaranteed portion, for a part of the members of the personnel centre who

11 were mostly threatened. And I think those lists exist today and you can

12 have them.

13 Q. Very well. You shall be asked some further questions.

14 Oh, one other question I should have asked you: You remained a

15 member of the SPS until when, Mr. Lilic?

16 A. In mid-August 2002, I was replaced. I was given my work booklet

17 and was left without a job in the state administration. And then I tabled

18 my resignation to all the other posts that I held in the SPS, et cetera

19 and other volunteer ones within the Federal state. So it was until

20 mid-August 2000.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 2000, not 2002.

22 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'll deal at the end of the evidence with

23 the tabs that haven't been produced. By and large they're SDC records

24 outside the period of this witness, it obviously being of only limited

25 value to have his comments on them.

1 JUDGE MAY: There's a query about tab 8, if we've dealt with it.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Tab 8 is currently marked for identification, Your

3 Honour.

4 MR. NICE: Tab 8 is one that --

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: Tab 8 is one that the government representative are now

7 happy that I should deal with because it falls outside the narrower period

8 for which they would otherwise want protection. In those circumstances,

9 may it now be marked as an exhibit.

10 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

11 MR. NICE: Thank you. The other matter is the confusion between

12 466, tab 6, and our own 469, tab 25.

13 MR. NICE: I'm told that the other exhibit is different from this

14 because it's only an extract.

15 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

16 MR. NICE: And therefore, since it was an extract upon which a

17 witness may have relied for his views and opinions, it's probably

18 preferable that it remain as a separate exhibit.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Lilic, I just want to take you back to an

20 early part of your testimony, the 1997 runoff for the elections. You were

21 the SPS candidate, and I believe you said that the campaign was obstructed

22 by the JUL, and Mira Markovic, and that their influence affected your

23 position. Could you tell me or let me know whether anything was done, any

24 strategy, specific strategy was employed by them to affect your campaign?

25 You eventually withdrew your candidature.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Robinson. This entire

2 campaign was obstructed in terms of the media, including the fact that

3 information from my election campaign and rallies were broadcast towards

4 the end of the evening news. And the TV was in our hands, so to speak.

5 I'm speaking from a political point of view, from the point of view of the

6 political party. And it's another thing that I found out later on, that

7 even the actual ballot counting was influenced.

8 But by your leave, I really would not like to discuss that

9 particular subject here.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, before I start

13 cross-examining this witness, I would like to hear your position

14 concerning the time that I have available. As you can see, Mr. Nice just

15 gleaned through certain documents. He just asked the witness to identify

16 them. Quite simply, we have a pile of documents here that had merely been

17 identified, and nobody went into their substance.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, we've got to bear in mind that the

19 amicus may have some questions. We have to bear in mind that there may be

20 some re-examination. But subject to that, you can have the balance of the

21 time until the conclusion tomorrow. But in this case, in particular, I

22 counsel you and warn you not to waste time arguing with the witness - if

23 you do, the time will be taken against you - or to deal with irrelevant

24 matters. Now, we'll see how we get on. We'll see what progress we make.

25 But that is the time at the moment that you have available.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That means until the end of the

2 day tomorrow? That is just somewhat longer, a bit longer, just a bit

3 longer --

4 JUDGE MAY: This is the way in which your time is taken up,

5 arguing. Now, move on. Ask the questions. And I suggest you begin with

6 the tabs about which there could be no dispute. There may be dispute

7 about the admissibility of other questions.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In order to be efficient, Mr. May, I

9 will try to move in some kind of order, taking the same order, perhaps,

10 that the examination-in-chief took. I think that would be appropriate,

11 and we are going to get to the documents, too. But before that, just a

12 few questions to the witness.

13 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

14 Q. The subjects that are being discussed here are Kosovo, Bosnia,

15 Croatia. In view of information offices held familiarity with the

16 situation, to which extent did the Serb people, the Muslims, the Roma, the

17 Turks, Egyptians, the Gorani and others, and other non-Albanian population

18 in Kosovo, to what extent were jeopardised in Kosovo by the Albanian

19 Separatist Movement?

20 A. All the members of these ethnic groups that you mentioned were

21 equally jeopardised, I would say, and it is certainly their survival in

22 Kosovo and Metohija were jeopardised and any kind of safety and security,

23 including their economic safety and security.

24 Q. Economic safety is very important, but this is something more

25 important than economic safety and security, and that is life jeopardy,

1 vital jeopardy. So what extent were they vitally jeopardised? To what

2 extent were their lives in danger in view of the constant killings that

3 were going on in Kosovo and Metohija?

4 A. I said a short while ago as number one that their safety and

5 security was truly jeopardised and yes, their lives were in danger.

6 Q. When you spoke about the fact that there were many killings,

7 Mr. Nice put the question as to whether I knew about that. I think that

8 this is a bit of a misunderstanding between you. I don't think you

9 understood each other correctly. You spoke about a large number of

10 killings whose victims were primarily Serbs and other non-Albanian

11 population and the perpetrators were Albanian terrorists; is that right?

12 A. That can be seen from the transcript. I was very precise. I said

13 there was a very large number of attacks by Albanian terrorists. It goes

14 without saying that they were not attacking themselves. They were

15 attacking the Serb and other non-Albanian population. But they even

16 attacked the Albanian population in some cases.

17 Q. That would have been my next question. Is it correct that there

18 was a large number of Albanians who wanted to live in peace, who wanted to

19 live in cooperation, tolerance, and who had very good and friendly

20 relations, and that they were also victims of the Albanian separatist

21 forces, especially the Albanian terrorists?

22 A. Yes, there are very precise reports to that effect, and I think

23 that these Albanians were a great force that we should have drawn on in

24 terms of improving the relations between Serbs and Albanians. These

25 prominent Albanians who were prepared to have this kind of coexistence in

1 Kosovo.

2 Q. Did this ever happen in our policy, or rather I am referring to

3 the time period when you and I were in the political -- on the political

4 scene. I'm not talking about before that. Was there ever a single moment

5 when a distinction was not made between the terrorists of the separatist

6 movement on the one hand and the Albanian people on the other hand? I

7 don't know if I have been clear enough in putting this question.

8 A. I just wanted to wait for the interpreters because I don't want to

9 make their life too difficult.

10 It's clear enough. If you're talking about this period until

11 1998, when in some cases there were some uncontrolled operations. I

12 talked about that, but that is really an exception. So this was an answer

13 to your question. There were no such situations.

14 Q. So we never identified Albanians terrorists with the Albanian

15 people?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. As for uncontrolled behaviour or rather, crimes, that you referred

18 to and that happened, did all officials know, political officials, police

19 officials, and military officials, that no operations should be launched

20 if civilians were to be imperilled by that?

21 A. Yes, this was a clear, principled stand that was often

22 highlighted. I was not often present at meetings after 1998, but I know

23 about the period when I attended these meetings.

24 Q. So my categorical position is that even as far as operations

25 against terrorists are concerned, these operations cannot be launched if

1 civilians lives would be jeopardised. You're aware of that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Are you aware of the position that for each and every crime, the

4 perpetrators should be held accountable and that not a single crime should

5 be concealed regardless of whether it is a question of looting, theft, or

6 the most serious crimes, like killings, rape, et cetera?

7 A. I'm aware of that position, but we also presented different

8 examples, and we sought investigations and we wanted to have this matter

9 looked into. But whether it was carried through, I don't know.

10 Q. All right. Generally speaking, since a sufficient number of

11 documents have been introduced here, I would nevertheless like to bring in

12 another one which shows what our political position was precisely in

13 mid-1998. I have a tape recording here of the 16th session of the main

14 committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia. At the end, there are even

15 the minutes and also the press release that was subsequently issued. In

16 the minutes, it says that the persons present -- that the meeting was

17 attended by Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Socialist Party of

18 Serbia, and then the vice-presidents who were present. I don't want to

19 use too much time, and among these vice-presidents was Zoran Lilic, and so

20 on and so forth. This is the 16th session held on the 10th of June, 1998.

21 So that is when the problem in Kosovo had truly escalated. Now, I

22 want to ask you the following: Do you remember this? I'm going to quote

23 only part of what I said in my final remarks. I am quoting this, and I am

24 putting a question in advance. Do you remember this position? This is a

25 meeting, a session of the top party leadership. There is a list of all

1 the attendants. There is a couple of hundred of people, and also

2 presidents of the municipal committees. That is in the meeting room where

3 we usually had about 400 people present at such big party meetings? Is

4 that right? So do you remember --

5 JUDGE MAY: Before you have to answer this, Mr. Lilic, you can

6 have a look at the minutes. The accused can read out the passage he wants

7 to rely on, and then you can have a look at the minutes yourself. Yes.

8 MR. NICE: May I ask for a copy at some stage because it's not a

9 document we have immediately available.

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let us have it here. We'll have it in evidence

11 in due course.

12 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You'll receive it. I have just one

14 copy. I have no reason why not to give you the entire minutes.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. So this passage that refers only to the item on the agenda that

17 involved the debate on Kosovo, do you remember when I spoke about that,

18 this is what I said: "Our policy is that Kosovo should be resolved by

19 political means. We approach this solution bearing in mind our

20 convictions, our programme which involves the principle of national

21 equality -- ethnic equality. We don't want to harm the Albanians in any

22 way, and we do not want Albanians in Kosovo to be second-rate citizens.

23 Therefore, we should bear in mind, as Minic pointed out in his report,

24 because he did submit a report in this regard, we should bear in mind,

25 therefore, that we should make a major distinction, and we have

1 highlighted this several times, between the separatist movement on the one

2 hand, and the Albanian people on the other hand, the Albanian people who

3 live there. No matter what this looks like," I mean, I'm skipping over

4 certain passages because I want to save time but you can have a look at

5 the entire text. "No matter what this looks like, this is precisely the

6 approach that we should espouse. A political solution and also promoting

7 the principle of ethnic equality. We should also bear in mind that those

8 who have been manipulated," because, beforehand, I said that some

9 Albanians, some people had been manipulated and some of our comrades said

10 that the majority was manipulated. So we should bear in mind that even

11 those who have been manipulated should be taken into account. "These are

12 unfortunate people who are being manipulated like all the pauperised

13 masses in the world. And it is these world manipulators who are trying to

14 use them in order to destabilise southern Europe. And in this way, they

15 are trying to create an alibi all the time in order to have a military

16 presence of the great powers. They are not the mainstays of activity." I

17 am referring to the Albanians. "They are being used by someone as their

18 vehicles."

19 Here it says Fukoshi, but I am actually referring to Bukoshi, so

20 it's a typo. He became a millionaire in Germany, collecting funds

21 allegedly for the needs of the Albanians, and so on and so forth. And

22 then I conclude by saying: "In relation to Kosovo, a political approach,

23 in relation to Kosovo the principle of ethnic equality. As for our

24 political activity down there in Kosovo, not only our personnel in Kosovo,

25 but also our people outside Kosovo who should be down there." And then I

1 say: "Dialogue." You may remember that I spoke at the end, and I

2 extemporised, I didn't have a written speech, but I hope that I have been

3 consistent enough. The dialogue that started, I am referring to the

4 dialogue when Rugova was there and so on and so forth. "The dialogue that

5 began is not reserved only for the state commission and for the

6 representatives of Albanian political parties, for Ratko Markovic, as you

7 recall, this was the Deputy Prime Minister who led the government

8 delegation there, and Mahmut Bakalli, or Bajazit Nushi, and Gani. This

9 dialogue is not reserved only for them. Of course, it is not only a

10 Serbian/Albanian dialogue, but it is also a

11 Serb/Albanian/Turk/Muslim/Roma/Montenegrin dialogue, everybody should be

12 involved. This dialogue should be present at all levels in the

13 municipality, at local commune level, in a formal and informal sense.

14 Formal and informal dialogue because people should be mobilised for life

15 itself."

16 And then I say that: "There is a clear difference in terms of

17 where the terrorists are operating as opposed to places where there is a

18 normal and peaceful life. They see this. And I think that all sensible

19 people do not want to see destruction, misery, suffering of the civilian

20 population. Everything that this process may bring forth. So on the one

21 hand, we are going to insist on dialogue. And we are going to work for a

22 political solution. On the other hand, we have to deal with terrorism.

23 If the Albanians themselves manage to halt terrorism, good for them. We

24 wish them all the best in this endeavour." Again, I'm skipping passages.

25 And then I move on to say: "The party should coordinate political

1 activities down there," so I emphasised that. "Political activity. That

2 is the role of the party. Milo Martic, Dusko Matkovic, Minic is in charge

3 of this three-man team for coordination on behalf of the party leadership

4 of political events down there in Kosovo." So I hope you remember this

5 meeting.

6 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see those minutes. Would you mark the

7 passage or indicate somewhere the passage you've relied on so that he can

8 check that. Yes, if the usher would collect them, please.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can give the whole minutes to the

10 witness, and he can look at page 52, the passages that I have marked,

11 begins with Kosovo to the end. And I've marked what I have quoted. But

12 I'm quite sure that the witness remembers very well that meeting.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These are tape recordings, I assume,

14 from the session.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Yes, it's a transcript of the tape recording.

17 A. Mr. May, I do indeed remember this meeting very well. I don't

18 know whether it was on the 10th of June exactly, as Mr. Milosevic just

19 said. I certainly cannot confirm the authenticity of the entire speech,

20 but the political positions and the principled positions that you referred

21 to were certainly the positions that you upheld and the positions of the

22 SPS, and that is indeed what was considered at the main board; an appeal

23 for dialogue, for cooperation, for a peaceful solution of existing

24 problems. Efforts of the state commission consisting of a commission of

25 the Republic of Serbia headed by Mr. Markovic, that is also not at issue.

1 I was present there, but what actually happened on the ground, I wasn't

2 there, nor can I testify whether this principled policy was actually

3 implemented in the way you put it.

4 Q. Was -- was it clearly stressed at this meeting and always, at

5 least when the party leadership was involved, that we could be a

6 progressive country, a country developing successfully only if we respect

7 the principle of national equality or ethnic equality?

8 A. I can give you a very short answer to that: Yes.

9 But I must also add that this meeting was held not long after my

10 lengthy tour of Kosovo and the information I conveyed to you as to what

11 was actually happening over there at Kosovo and Metohija.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we will exhibit the minutes. It can get the next

13 Defence number, please.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 142, Your Honours.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I ask the registry to copy

16 this document and return this copy to me, please.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. You will have the copy back in due course.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you know as to whether ever, throughout all these events, there

20 was any political position to the effect that the Albanians from Kosovo be

21 expelled?

22 A. No, meetings that I attended of the main board, executive board,

23 meetings with you, I'm not aware of any such position.

24 Q. Was there ever any plan to expel the Albanians from Kosovo?

25 A. I am not aware of any such plan.

1 Q. Those are some general questions with which I wish to embark upon

2 the question of Kosovo. I should now like to go on to Bosnia with a few

3 general questions as well.

4 I assume that you followed this so-called trial here, at least

5 partially. I said with regard to Bosnia and Croatia, that we were there

6 concentrating on peace and not war. Is it well known and is it true that

7 Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I personally, invested

8 all our efforts with respect to both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to

9 achieve peace as soon as possible? Is that so or not?

10 A. Yes, the outcome of that was the whole series of peace plans that

11 were offered, either to the Bosnian side, if we're talking about the Serbs

12 in Bosnia, or the Serbs in Croatia.

13 Q. Did anyone from Serbia, and when I say "anyone from Serbia," I'm

14 talking from the authorities including the police, the state security, and

15 other bodies, any bodies, did anyone from those bodies instigate, through

16 any activity on its part, the war in Bosnia or Croatia?

17 A. It is rather hard for me to answer that question.

18 Q. Very well. Tell me, please, when talking about the events in

19 Croatia, did anybody from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or in those

20 days it was still the SFRY, or from Serbia participate in those events in

21 Croatia when those pressures came about on the Serb populations, when

22 people were dismissed, fired from their jobs, when they were eliminated

23 from the constitutions, silent liquidations and everything that was

24 reminiscent of the Ustasha genocide of the Second World War due to which

25 the people were frightened, and with reason. Is that so or not?

1 A. Yes, exactly the way you put it.

2 Q. And the Serb population that was in jeopardy at the time, and what

3 they did to protect themselves, did they do so as an act of self-defense?

4 A. Yes, I would say so, absolutely so.

5 Q. Are you aware that they, when I say "they," I mean the Serbs in

6 Croatia, had lived in those areas for centuries?

7 A. Of course. I'm very familiar with that area, the people who lived

8 there and who are now mostly living in the territory of the Republic of

9 Serbia.

10 Q. And is it true they were not conquering territories on which they

11 did not live or rather that they wanted to defend the territories on which

12 they had lived for centuries?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is it true that apart from the problems we are familiar with, they

15 took up arms to defend themselves, but immediately accepted -- though

16 there were problems of course --

17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I think these are matters which the

18 Trial Chamber is going to have to decide. I've allowed you to ask the

19 witness's opinion about some of them, but strictly it's irrelevant.

20 Unless he has got direct evidence on matters, he can't give evidence about

21 these things. So if you've got some direct questions, concrete questions

22 to ask, of course, you can, but not evidence of opinion.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that Mr. Lilic, with

24 regard to the suffering of the Serbs in Croatia in 1990 and 1991, up to

25 1995, has many things to say on the basis of his own direct knowledge.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Mr. Lilic, do you have any direct knowledge as to what was

3 happening?

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. Therefore, just briefly, in one sentence, please tell us what was

6 going on.

7 A. I think, to put it mildly, when talking about the Serbs in

8 Croatia, not to use too heavy a word, but in view of the percentage of

9 Serbs that lived there, 18 to 22 per cent, today there's less than 2 per

10 cent remaining, so this in itself speaks for itself. On the other hand, I

11 think as early as 1992, thanks to the activities of the Federal Republic

12 of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, that the Vance Plan was a good

13 opportunity for Krajina, the opportunity was missed in the first place I

14 would say because a part of the leadership of the Republika Srpska Krajina

15 were not serious enough. Of course, that does not justify the two major

16 operations of the Croats and the expulsion of the Serbs from that area

17 through Storm and Flash.

18 Q. I think you've told us enough in general lines about those

19 matters. What happened to the Serbs in Bosnia as a politician and as a

20 functionary from that time period? You knew that we all referred to

21 Bosnia as Yugoslavia in miniature precisely because it was inhabited by

22 both Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Is that right?

23 A. The ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if we're talking

24 about the time of the SFRY, I think fully reflected the ethnic composition

25 of Serbia until recently. So what you say is quite correct.

1 Q. Was the practice and the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina

2 such as to require a consensus of all three constituent peoples as defined

3 in the constitution regarding all decisions, that is, Serbs, Croats, and

4 Muslims?

5 A. As far as I know, yes.

6 Q. Is it true that the decision on independence of Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina was taken without the participation of the Serb people as a

8 constituent people, and that it couldn't be considered lawful and legal?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Is it true that the Serbs and Muslims had achieved something that

11 they called a historical agreement?

12 A. I'm not familiar with the details of that agreement, but I do know

13 that it existed.

14 Q. And is it true that all three parties eventually signed - and

15 Carrington was chairing the conference at the time - signed this plan but

16 the plan itself was under the leadership of Ambassador Cutileiro, and all

17 three sides eventually signed it.

18 A. Yes, that is true, and this was not long after the beginning of

19 the war. And I think that, later on, it was the Muslim side that reneged.

20 Q. The Cutileiro plan was signed before the beginning of the war, and

21 when the Muslim side changed its mind, recognition occurred, and the war

22 broke out.

23 A. Yes, in broad lines, but there were, I think, individual clashes

24 even before the Cutileiro plan.

25 Q. Is it true that all those initial attacks were mostly such that

1 the victims were Serbs? I'm talking about the incursion into Northern

2 Bosnia, Slavonski Brod, the killing at the wedding ceremony in Sarajevo.

3 The first victims of the war were Serbs, were they not?

4 A. According to my knowledge, yes, and I think that the war in Bosnia

5 actually started with the killing of somebody called Gardovic, if I

6 remember correctly, at a wedding ceremony in Sarajevo.

7 Q. Very well. We shall now follow the order in which you testified

8 to the extent that I will be able to keep track of that order, because Mr.

9 Nice did occasionally go from one topic to another.

10 JUDGE MAY: If you're moving to another topic, that would be a

11 convenient time to adjourn. We'll adjourn now for 20 minutes.

12 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

13 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Lilic, in view of the fact that you held one of the highest

17 positions, and afterwards, in fact, the highest position, in those peace

18 efforts, you yourself were also involved in a certain way, were you not?

19 A. Yes, one could put it that way. I didn't participate in the

20 foreign political diplomatic and in the negotiations themselves, but

21 otherwise, yes.

22 Q. Do you remember my letter published in Politika immediately after

23 the outbreak of the war in Bosnia, addressed to the Islamic conference in

24 Istanbul, saying that the Serbs and Muslims were brothers and that the

25 conflict should stop immediately, and that the conflict served only the

1 interests of the enemies of both Serbs and Muslims and that the problems

2 must be resolved by peaceful means?

3 A. I don't remember the details, but I do know of that letter, and I

4 do know that its substance was in accordance with what you just said.

5 Q. Do you remember my visit to Turkey and the talks I had with the

6 president of Turkey at the time, Ozal, and the Prime Minister Demirel, and

7 my position that Serbia would support every solution that the three

8 peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina agree on?

9 A. Yes, that was our political position later on.

10 Q. And do you remember that immediately after that, the international

11 community invested certain efforts and sought our assistance to achieve a

12 peaceful solution, and that as a result of those efforts that lasted

13 several months, I would say, in Athens in the 1st of May, 1993, the

14 Vance-Owen plan was signed?

15 A. Yes, you participated in all the negotiations with representatives

16 of the international community, whichever group we are talking about, then

17 and later, and I do remember that that Vance-Owen plan was initialled in

18 Athens, that it was initialled by Mr. Radovan Karadzic, I believe, in the

19 presence of Mr. Mitsotakis, if I'm not mistaken, and that met with general

20 approval in -- amongst us in Belgrade.

21 Q. Do you remember who contributed most to the leadership of the

22 Republika Srpska headed by Karadzic - and the whole delegation of the

23 Republika Srpska was present - who contributed most to them accepting that

24 plan and signing it in Athens?

25 A. I think certainly you made the greatest contribution, and you have

1 the greatest merit for it.

2 Q. Do you remember that they had the proviso that that signature had

3 to be confirmed by the Assembly of the Republika Srpska?

4 A. Yes, that is what you conveyed to us at one of the meetings we had

5 in Belgrade, that there was a possibility for them to betray the trust

6 shown in them by you personally and the international community.

7 Q. Do you remember that I went to attend that Assembly meeting in

8 Pale, we drove in the same car, the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis and

9 myself, and Mitsotakis invested maximum efforts to help achieve peace in

10 Bosnia and Herzegovina?

11 A. I assume that that Assembly meeting at Pale should have verified

12 what had been initialled in Athens. And in addition to you yourself and

13 Mr. Mitsotakis, I think that our delegation from the Republic of Serbia

14 included Mr. Dobrica Cosic, Mr. Momir Bulatovic, representing Montenegro,

15 and even I was present, so that I remember that trip very well and our

16 attendance at the Assembly in Pale.

17 Q. You were present at that Assembly meeting in Pale.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And do you remember that I spoke twice at that Assembly meeting in

20 Pale?

21 A. Yes, I remember all the speakers who took the floor, who were

22 trying to exert pressure, but in inverted commas pressure. I think it was

23 the most reasonable solution which, unfortunately, was not accepted at the

24 time. The effort was to persuade the Assembly majority, if we can talk

25 about the majority, in which the SDS almost held all the seats in the

1 Assembly of Republika Srpska.

2 Q. What you're saying is quite correct because with the exception of

3 four members of the Reformist Party, or whatever they were called, the

4 Assembly actually consisted of members who were all SDS members.

5 Do you remember that after my first speech, there was an extensive

6 debate by representatives of the Republika Srpska against the plan, and

7 that I took the floor a second time, insisting that the plan be adopted

8 and explaining why peace was in the interest of all the peoples, including

9 the Serb people, that it was the only option, and that the plan had to be

10 accepted. Do you remember that?

11 A. Yes, I must be even a little more precise, if I may. I think it

12 was quite clear that the Assembly meeting itself had already been prepared

13 so that the plan would not be accepted and that a part of the members

14 acted in that way, and that did require two of your interventions. I

15 think Mr. Dobrica Cosic also spoke, Prime Minister Mitsotakis spoke, Momir

16 Bulatovic, you're taking the floor a second time. In my conviction,

17 almost achieved the result of the plan being accepted.

18 Q. That is precisely what I wanted to ask you because in my second

19 address, I sought to refute the arguments used to reject the plan. And

20 that the Assembly, in spite of its composition and in spite of that

21 atmosphere, responded with applause. Do you remember that?

22 A. Yes, that's precisely what I wanted to say a moment ago.

23 Q. And then the proposal was put forward by individuals who did not

24 want the plan to be adopted to have a timeout situation. Do you remember

25 that, in order for the SDS deputies' club and its members to be able to

1 consult each other, to confer?

2 A. Yes, a members' club was held. That was the proposal made,

3 although that was superfluous according to my mind.

4 Q. Do you remember how many hours we waited down below for them to

5 hold this members or deputies' club meeting up above, on the storey above?

6 Do you remember?

7 A. I think we even asked, or rather it was -- they asked some of us

8 to attend the club meeting, but that they refused, and they went on

9 conferring for several hours. I can't give you a precise answer. But it

10 was indeed several hours.

11 Q. Yes, and I insisted that we attend this meeting of the deputies'

12 club, and they refused to allow us to take part because the conviction was

13 that we would have our opinions prevail and convince them. Wasn't that

14 how it was?

15 A. Well, I think it was just slightly different within the context of

16 what you just said in your last sentence. They thought that they wouldn't

17 be able to speak openly and frankly in front of us and that they had

18 already decided not to adopt the plan. So if there were any reservations,

19 it was possible they thought that under our pressure -- not pressure, but

20 by force of argument that the deputies would be prevailed upon to

21 understand that this was the best possible moment and option. And I'm

22 certain from this distance of time that that for the Republic of Serbia

23 was the best way in which to achieve a peace plan.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Republika Srpska, correction.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC:

1 Q. And the rigorous sanctions were introduced at the time against us

2 and the Republika Srpska as well and against one and all, in fact, and the

3 war continued in which countless people suffered, many more people lost

4 their lives than had lost them until then, until the conclusion of the

5 Vance Owen plan. Isn't that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So after this deputy club meeting, the matter was put to vote, and

8 the plan was rejected. Isn't that right?

9 A. Yes, the plan was rejected. This happened in the early hours of

10 the morning, if I remember correctly, or deep into the night.

11 Q. After that, in view of the fact that our reactions were highly

12 negative to this kind of wrong decision that had been taken, if I can put

13 it that way, and a tragically erroneous decision, if I might say, we

14 introduced a blockade in order to attempt to force them to reconsider

15 their policy and position and accept the peace plan in the long run.

16 Isn't that right?

17 A. I think you are confusing the Vance Owen plan and the plan of the

18 contact group, Mr. Milosevic.

19 Q. Well, it doesn't really matter, but I'm sure you'll remember that

20 Serbia, and I personally, lent our support to five different peace plans,

21 in fact, which were put forward and placed on the negotiating table,

22 always on the basis of the negotiations that were marathon ones held in

23 Geneva, mostly in Geneva, actually, but in other places too, of course.

24 And that it was not successful.

25 A. Well, what is certain when it comes to the Vance Owen plan is that

1 following your decision, we stormed out of the meeting prior to dawn,

2 regardless of the fact that they wanted us to stay on because there was

3 the threat of a Muslim attack, and quite certainly there were a lot of

4 restrictions in 1994 with respect to any assistance from the Republic of

5 Serbia.

6 Q. So the war continued, and at the end of the examination-in-chief

7 today, you commented on a note on the records from a meeting of the

8 highest top military leadership and political leadership of the Federal

9 Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, as it says. This is the

10 document that you were asked to comment on and that you looked at a moment

11 ago. And the meeting was held on the 22nd of August.

12 JUDGE MAY: Tab 20. Let the witness have the document first.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assumed that he already had the

14 document and that it was in front of him. But of course, he ought to have

15 it, yes.

16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. On page 1, it says that the Yugoslav side was represented at the

19 meeting by: "The president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

20 Zoran Lilic; the Republic of Serbia president, Slobodan Milosevic; the

21 Republic of Montenegro president, Momir Bulatovic; Federal Prime Minister,

22 Dr. Radoje Kontic; Chief of the Army of Yugoslavia General Staff, Momcilo

23 Perisic, General; Federal Minister of Defence, Pavle Bulatovic, and Chief

24 of the FRY President's Military Cabinet, General Slavoljub Susic."

25 And the delegation of Republika Srpska consisted of the following

1 persons: Radovan Karadzic, who was the president; the vice-presidents of

2 Republika Srpska, Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic; the president of

3 the Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik; the Prime Minister, Dusan Kozic; the

4 Foreign Minister, Aleksa Buha; the Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS,

5 Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic; Assistant to the VRS GS Commander for

6 Security, General Lieutenant Zdravko Tolimir; the man in charge for

7 religious affairs, legal information, and moral guidance, Milan Gvero; and

8 for logistics Djordje Djukic, General.

9 And also attending the meeting were the Patriarch of the Serbian

10 Orthodox Church, Mr. Pavle, and Irinej Bulovic, the Orthodox bishop;

11 isn't that right?

12 A. Yes, I remember the meeting well.

13 Q. At the beginning, I asked the representatives of Republika Srpska

14 to inform those of us present as to what had happened at the last meeting

15 of Republika Srpska and the American peace plan was welcomed and the

16 readiness expressed on the part of the delegations of the Republika Srpska

17 together with the delegation of Yugoslavia should take part at the

18 forthcoming international peace conference; isn't that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Krajisnik proposed that Koljevic take the floor and expound on the

21 issue. Koljevic considered that on behalf of one and all, this should be

22 done by Radovan Karadzic, president of Republika Srpska. That's what it

23 says here. And then Karadzic goes on to explain that they had a lengthy

24 discussion, there was a lot of fear expressed, not enough confidence, but

25 finally that the conclusions were adopted according to which the Assembly

1 supported the American peace initiative and accepted to -- accepted that

2 people should go to the peace negotiations. They said that they feared

3 that the -- with the delegation becoming part of the Yugoslav delegation,

4 the Muslims would have the advantage. They didn't want to have Republika

5 Srpska lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community,

6 that the Serbs could become a national minority. These were all the

7 anxieties that were expressed, and they were all nonsense actually, and I

8 assume you were of that same opinion, were you not? Is that right? Is

9 that correct?

10 A. Are you asking me a question?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. Yes, that is right. Except for the fact that I think that at that

13 point in time, the Assembly of Republika Srpska had still not reached its

14 decision to go to Dayton, and that was a pretext later on to try and

15 prolong this process and continue negotiations with respect to the

16 delegation's composition, in view of the fact that Karadzic insisted that

17 there were two delegations, one of Republika Srpska, and the other of our

18 own with six members and under pressure from us, that is to say from you,

19 primarily, they accepted and accepted to go to the negotiations as it says

20 in these second minutes or records.

21 Q. Pay attention to a sentence in the middle of that paragraph. On

22 page 2, paragraph 3, it says according to the opinions of Republika

23 Srpska, America wouldn't like the relationships between the Republika

24 Srpska and the FRY of Yugoslavia to improve, it would not suit them. So

25 this sentence, which was just mentioned by the by, in passing here, I hope

1 for you who were well aware of the situation speaks miles. We helped the

2 people, did we not, and we had fairly poor relationships, especially since

3 the Vance-Owen plan, with the leadership of the Republika Srpska; isn't

4 that right?

5 A. Yes, that is right.

6 Q. Do you know that the party cooperation of the SDS was for the most

7 part with opposition parties in Serbia, that there was never party

8 cooperation between the SPS and the SDS, in fact?

9 A. You're right, there wasn't party cooperation at the level -- at

10 this level or at any level, but yes, there was party cooperation between

11 the SDS and some opposition parties of the day. I think they are in power

12 in Serbia today, actually.

13 Q. I'm so sure you'll remember that Karadzic had criticisms of the

14 media in Yugoslavia and their conduct. He mentioned specifically in the

15 last paragraph - you have that portion - criticisms of the radio which

16 said that the people had finally come to realise what was happening and

17 that they said that the time has come to place matters on healthy

18 foundations, and he emphasises that cooperation between Republika Srpska

19 and Yugoslavia was open and frank and sincere. Is that right?

20 A. Yes, that's right, and I think that he was promised at the time

21 that the media would change their position somewhat.

22 Q. Now I should like to draw your attention to page 4 of the same

23 document. They were having a discussion, and the discussion is contained

24 in these minutes, second paragraph. It says, President Slobodan Milosevic

25 referred to speeches made by the previous presenters and assessed that

1 they were still in the slow-thinking phase as regards the direction in

2 which the situation was progressing. We must abide by the key conclusion

3 from the last meeting that now we had to choose between either prompt

4 peace or prompt war. And he added that we only had a few more weeks left

5 and that we were not in a position to discuss principles which we had

6 already debated numerous times with the international community. Should

7 you believe that -- and I'm being quoted here in this record, and it says:

8 "Should you believe that you can reach a solution with Muslims alone,

9 just go ahead and try it. We shall support you, but I doubt that you'll

10 be successful," said President Milosevic, addressing the Republika Srpska

11 leadership. And he once again put forward the conviction that Alija

12 Izetbegovic did not have a strategy for peace, but a strategy for war, and

13 he said that he was working to provoke the Serbs to make some

14 thoughtless move which would make NATO do the work for them. America

15 would like to have peace, it suits them, they would like to have talks,

16 and the model was the five-plus-three makeup, the contact group members

17 representatives of FRY, Croatia, and the Muslims. And I reminded them

18 that proposals were needed to have the Yugoslav delegation include several

19 people from Republika Srpska who would accept peace, who would accept what

20 was discussed and debated at the conference, and the results of the

21 conference itself.

22 And I cautioned to the fact that for the international community,

23 the existence of Republika Srpska was not a prerequisite for the

24 conference but that Republika Srpska ought to be the result of the

25 conference. Is that correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And was Republika Srpska the result of the conference, in fact?

3 Was that the upshot? It was sanctioned in Dayton?

4 A. Yes, that's right.

5 Q. And then I go on to insist that we have a clear-cut stand with

6 respect to the contact group as a plan as the starting point for future

7 negotiations because that was indeed the proposal made by the contact

8 group itself, and I also strove to ensure that there would not be more

9 than two representatives of Republika Srpska, that we should work speedily

10 and expeditiously, and that the peace process had to be continued.

11 And then there is an explanation where Karadzic tells us which the

12 two delegates would be who would take it upon themselves to have the

13 responsibility for such a crucial decision for the entire people in

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina and required that there be six delegates in the

15 delegation of Republika Srpska. We insist once again upon our views, our

16 views and positions were the same, to have a united delegation, including

17 the representatives of Republika Srpska, he said. And then he says at the

18 same time: "The Muslims with the support of NATO will hit us in our

19 positions until our territories are reduced to 20 per cent."

20 And towards the end of that page I once caution and say that

21 there's not much time left, that it is in our interest to reach an

22 agreement because if we fail to do so, there will not be a Republika

23 Srpska either. Because they referred to the constitution, I said there

24 will be neither Republika Srpska, and then I say neither will it have a

25 constitution, to which you refer when you insist upon the fact that you

1 must have the consent of the Assembly on all matters. Then we'll have

2 nothing, we'll end up with nothing.

3 And then of course we get to an explanation. They explain why,

4 why they should just be an appendage to Yugoslavia, and to that I say

5 quite directly, frankly, and to their faces in no meagre terms, I say that

6 is because we have had bad experience with you so far. Isn't that right?

7 Therefore, our insistence was upon what is accepted by the delegation and

8 signed by the delegation must be the final outcome and that we cannot

9 leave any possibility of having a repeat of what happened with the

10 Vance-Owen Plan. That's right, isn't it?

11 A. Yes, that's right, and I think that there was another condition or

12 position put forward that your vote should be the decisive vote if they

13 were to make any reservations on their part, because Karadzic, in part of

14 this conversation, indicates that in the international community there was

15 great concern that the mad Serbs, as he said, from Bosnia could reject

16 this peace plan, too. So I think that this was the purpose of setting the

17 conditions with respect to the composition of the delegation, and that

18 your vote should be the decisive vote, and I think that's what happened at

19 Dayton.

20 Q. Therefore, I'd like to draw your attention now to page 8 where

21 Milosevic cautions the leadership of Republika Srpska that his proposals

22 should not be taken to be as his will to impose anything that goes against

23 the grain of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he indicated the

24 lack of understanding as to the seriousness of the situation by the

25 leadership of Republika Srpska and did not agree with the views put

1 forward that they had overridden some of their stands of principle in

2 order to go along with Serbia. He said that if they really thought that

3 what they were doing was what they were doing for Serbia and for the SR of

4 Yugoslavia, they were along the wrong road. And vice versa, that

5 everything that the leadership of Yugoslavia was doing should be

6 understood as a service for good, something in the interests and to the

7 advantage of the Serb people as a whole.

8 And Perisic takes the floor - and this is on page 9 - that the

9 fact that people are saying that the international community is conspiring

10 against our own people and that there were situations of excess, that to

11 make the Serbs behave in keeping with the interests of the makers of a new

12 world order, he appealed to reasonable and well-thought-out steps on our

13 part, and then he goes on to advocate the fact that the contact group

14 should not be mentioned specifically but that we ought to enter the peace

15 process as soon as possible.

16 He then cautions that time is running out, that NATO is preparing

17 for its air strikes against Serb positions, and that the land forces would

18 be engaged, that that was not out of the question, and that this was not

19 the right to have discussions and debates among the leadership about

20 details because if the whole world is against us, we must be wise and

21 protect our interests, protect what can be protected.

22 And then President Milosevic suggested to the leadership of

23 Republika Srpska to issue a statement in which two things should be

24 highlighted: Firstly, to criticise the shelling of Sarajevo and the

25 killing of innocent civilians in a stronger manner; secondly, to propose a

1 cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of heavy artillery to a

2 distance of 20 kilometres from Sarajevo.

3 Do you remember that up until then, in that period of time,

4 officially the government of Serbia on several occasions, and this was

5 made public by the daily press, condemned in the strictest possible terms

6 the bombing of Sarajevo?

7 A. Yes, that's right, and not only the government of Serbia, but

8 others, too.

9 Q. I'm talking about the government because this is official

10 condemnation. Of course there was condemnation from other quarters as

11 well.

12 And then Karadzic, continuing on from Mladic's elaboration, voiced

13 his opinion that Muslims after the lifting of the Sarajevo blockade will

14 not want to talk and discuss anything with the Serbs. He was opposed to

15 the fact that only Krajisnik and Koljevic be part of the delegation,

16 taking into account that their participation could be manipulated because

17 both were members of the parliament, or rather, the former BiH Presidency

18 under Alija Izetbegovic's power and authority.

19 Milosevic once again warned that if, as of today, the two

20 leaderships did not reach an agreement to go to the peace process, then we

21 ought to know what would await us as a consequence of that. If we don't

22 go to the conference, if we're not there, and if we don't reach an

23 agreement with the opposing side, then the Security Council and NATO would

24 conduct a demarcation arbitrarily as it sees fit. People were upset

25 because, quite obviously the RS leadership did not understand the

1 seriousness facing the Serb people on the territory of the former Bosnia

2 and Herzegovina. President Milosevic said: "Your suspicions could cost

3 us dearly. If you don't have any confidence in the best intentions and

4 sincere wishes of the whole Yugoslav leadership, President Lilic,

5 Bulatovic, Kontic and the others who are present here to help you to the

6 best of their ability, then there's no point in discussing this issue any

7 further."

8 Then the patriarch joined in the debate. The patriarch, as a

9 support for the negotiations, and he says it is much more important what

10 is signed than who signs it, although it is good thing for the signatory

11 to be somebody who is trusted and respected by the people. And he

12 reiterated the church's appeal for Serbian unity in the interests of the

13 Serbian people.

14 And then, as there was a lot of pulling and tugging from all

15 sides, I'm sure you'll remember that once I had thanked His Eminence for

16 his wise words, President Milosevic put forward a new proposal that the

17 delegation to represent Serb interests number six members, three from the

18 FRY, and three from Republika Srpska. And to make all this official, he

19 proposed the text of an agreement for these two leaderships, clearly

20 determining the compositions and competence and authority of the

21 delegations involved. Krajisnik was against the formal signing of any

22 mutual agreement between the two leaderships. He said, Why should we have

23 a piece of paper? Is that not a trust of no confidence to the

24 leadership? And President Milosevic told him that he was forced to do so

25 on the basis of experience so far that he had had in agreements with

1 Republika Srpska which did not abide by many oral decisions and agreements

2 and brought us into a difficult situation vis-a-vis the international

3 community. He also said that it would be dangerous to prolong the

4 process, and that time should be bought, but any buying of time worked to

5 the advantage of the enemies. And then he quotes Radovan Karadzic as

6 saying that he always thought he had a better solution. He was prone to

7 waver. And he said that he always thought that if you don't accept the

8 written agreement between the two leaderships, then good luck to you, you

9 can fight alone. I merely wish to draw you to the fact that if you don't

10 accept the proper paper on mutual agreement, President Lilic, myself,

11 Bulatovic, Kontic, Perisic, and the others, we shall only think about the

12 interests of the Republic of Yugoslavia and you do what you want. The

13 responsibility is up to you, history will tell, and you will have to be

14 held accountable to history for your acts.

15 And then Momir Bulatovic goes on to say: "The only way to achieve

16 anything at all is if we have a joint appearance before the world, if we

17 pool our efforts." And Krajisnik ultimately agrees that the joint

18 delegation number six members. And if there is an equal number of votes,

19 there will be no solution. Then I insist upon the fact that as we have a

20 ratio of three to three, it will be the voice of the head of the

21 delegation that will prevail, that is to say, I will have the casting

22 vote.

23 Is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. The president of the FRY, Zoran Lilic, said that such procedure is

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1 common in the work of delegations, and he quite understands that it is

2 quite understandable that President Milosevic and, as you put it at that

3 time, being the most skillful and most experienced negotiator, decide when

4 and what is to be accepted in the interests of our people. Again,

5 questions concerning a single delegation are raised. A joint delegation

6 with equal decision-making rights, and so on and so forth. The others,

7 the majority, accepted this. The majority of the leadership accepted a

8 single delegation.

9 Then again there was a break at the proposal of Republika Srpska.

10 The atmosphere was tense, and there was uncertainty regarding the final

11 outcome. The discussion was continued in an even more tense atmosphere

12 burdened with apparent suspicion from the RS leadership side that, by

13 accepting the obligation, they would let down the trust of the Assembly's

14 delegates.

15 And in the meantime, I had prepared a text of the agreement that

16 should be signed. And then finally, after I don't know how much time, I

17 don't know how long this went on, again, around 2300 hours, a break was

18 requested. It is obviously angry because of the procrastination and in

19 view of the seriousness of the situation, President Milosevic proposed

20 that the leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sign the agreement

21 and this way they would confirm that they are working for the general good

22 of the Serb people and all citizens of Yugoslavia without any

23 reservations. The document was signed by the patriarch of the Serbian

24 Orthodox church, His Holiness Pavle and Bishop Irinej Bulovic. After a

25 long debate in a separate conference room, the leadership of Republika

1 Srpska was joined by the house representatives of the Federal Republic of

2 Yugoslavia, followed by Patriarch Pavle and Bishop Irinej. They asked

3 that priorities be set forth. Patriarch Pavle also signed the agreement,

4 and we finally reached it.

5 Now I'm asking you not only as a witness and as a participant in

6 this meeting, but as a politician as well who held the top office in the

7 state, was it possible at all -- would it have been possible to have

8 reached Dayton if this step had not been made, this interim step, if I can

9 put it that way?

10 A. Only one thing is certain, and I have repeated that many times and

11 there is no need for me not to say it today too: There wouldn't have been

12 any Dayton accords if had there not been this much persistence in exerting

13 pressure primarily from your side upon I should perhaps say almost the

14 entire leadership of Republika Srpska because Dr. Koljevic and, I believe,

15 Biljana Plavsic quite soon realised that this should be agreed to. And

16 Karadzic obstinately refused most of the proposals that were made.

17 Two meetings preceded this. Actually, a letter that you got from

18 Karadzic preceded these two meetings, and you could not trust him

19 therefore, in view of everything that had happened until then. And in the

20 letter he accepted that he would make concessions, as he had put it, in

21 terms of withdrawing heavy artillery around Sarajevo, and then at the

22 meeting itself he voiced his reservation, that is to say, that if the

23 artillery is withdrawn, that the Muslims would have an advantage, and so

24 on and so forth. Again, he showed that he was not a person you could

25 trust unless there were such clear-cut positions that are later translated

1 into a specific document stating that there would be a single delegation.

2 The briefest answer would be that Dayton certainly would not have

3 happened had it not been for these meetings. These documents were made at

4 my insistence, and they were composed by General Susic. They were really

5 in great detail and they truly portrayed the atmosphere at these meetings.

6 So everything you have said just now is quite true.

7 Q. That's what I wanted to hear, because at the very beginning of the

8 text, you were nominated as the person who was in the top position, that

9 is, the delegation of the FRY and Republika Srpska, and the FRY delegation

10 is headed by President Zoran Lilic. So it is your responsibility that

11 this should be authentic by all means, and I believe that this is

12 authentic. So your secretary, or rather, the secretary, or rather the

13 head of the military office of the president compiled these minutes, and

14 therefore this is an authentic record.

15 A. I highlighted that fact, but my name is the first here, only de

16 jure, and I believe you'll agree to that, too.

17 Q. Well, I will agree. There's no doubt that my efforts in this

18 respect were crucial. I'm not denying it, and it is my understanding that

19 you're not either.

20 A. Absolutely. Your efforts, your influence, and as I said, your

21 negotiating abilities in view of all of the negotiations you conducted

22 over all those years in conditions that were not exactly easy. These were

23 important meetings. And certainly, or rather, it is a big question as to

24 whether there would have been any Republika Srpska had it not been for

25 these meetings.

1 Another thing you did not refer to is that the leadership of the

2 Republika Srpska, primarily Mr. Karadzic, did not believe that NATO

3 strikes were possible in the area around Sarajevo. They were cautioned

4 about that too by you in view of the intelligence that you received and

5 that we all had together, that the strikes would follow quite soon after

6 these meetings. And unfortunately, because of their obstinacy, this truly

7 happened only a few hours after this agreement was signed.

8 Q. After Dayton, you were familiarised with the negotiations that

9 were quite difficult, and that went on for three weeks in quite a bit of

10 detail. Isn't that right?

11 A. Yes, I think that at that time, I was practically the only person,

12 or rather, the only high-ranking official, if I can use that term, who

13 remained in Belgrade.

14 Q. The highest ranking official who remained in Belgrade. Well, do

15 you remember that at the first meeting in Dayton, the Muslim delegation

16 proposed that the territory of Republika Srpska be only 37 per cent of the

17 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18 A. Yes, according to the information that I could see.

19 Q. Do you remember that then the representatives from Republika

20 Srpska invoked the position of the contact group concerning the half/half

21 division, and they were given the following answer: "All questions are

22 open, and there are no obligations that had been taken over from the

23 previous period, that is to say that everything is subject to debate and

24 negotiations." Do you know, then, to what extent an effort had to be made

25 and what kind of negotiations we had to go through in order to reach this

1 half/half solution? I'm asking you this because there is a rather

2 distorted picture that is bandied about among the public, saying that in

3 Dayton, the Serbs got only 49 per cent, and the situation was quite

4 different. And it was quite different. In this 50/50, we then included a

5 significant part of the territories that had already been lost after the

6 NATO strikes and after the collapse that then followed in the army of

7 Republika Srpska. Is that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Mr. Lilic, several times you started out to say during the

10 examination-in-chief something in relation to Srebrenica but Mr. Nice

11 interrupted you. Now I'm asking you --

12 JUDGE MAY: That's not fair. He didn't. The witness was allowed

13 to give his views, although of course they are only views. He's only

14 giving an opinion about it. What Mr. Nice rightly pointed out was that

15 it's only a matter of opinion, it will be for the Trial Chamber to

16 determine the matter.

17 But yes, go on.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I believe that that is not

19 a correct interpretation because this is not the opinion of Mr. Lilic;

20 this is a question of what he knows in relation to the high office he

21 held. He is not the usual kind of witness that Mr. Nice brings here.

22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. You can ask the witness questions, of

23 course, about his knowledge, his detailed knowledge of the matters. But

24 certainly he was giving an opinion yesterday. But you ask him.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. Please be so kind as to answer my question. What was it that you

2 knew with regard to that? What did the leadership of Serbia know? What

3 did the leadership of Yugoslavia know? Because what happened was truly

4 dramatic, tragic. So I'm not asking you for your opinion only because, as

5 you can see, opinions are not allowed. I'm just asking you about your

6 knowledge.

7 A. I presented what I knew yesterday and today. And I also

8 established that no one from the leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia could

9 have issued such an order, and we were not aware of this either. I also

10 presented my own impressions regarding this tragic event several days

11 later at a meeting I had with you. I said that you were more than angry,

12 shaken, and you used the following sentence, or rather to this effect:

13 "These crazy Serbs from Pale" - and you were primarily referring to the

14 leadership of Republika Srpska or part of the leadership - "I cannot

15 believe that they did something like this."

16 I also presented my impression that I do not believe that in any

17 capacity you took part in any such thing. And quite simply, no one on our

18 side was informed about that unless there was some private communication

19 along certain lines between certain individuals who were outside our

20 day-to-day meetings in a way. I don't know what expression to use really

21 in this context. I think I explained this already: The Srebrenica case is

22 a truly tragic case. It was done by individuals. That is my opinion,

23 that is my impression, and it is certain that this Chamber will make a

24 final ruling on that. There was no organised participation of the Federal

25 Republic of Yugoslavia and the leadership of the Federal Republic of

1 Yugoslavia, at least not as far as I know.

2 Q. Do you know that the leadership of Republika Srpska, when we asked

3 what happened and how it was possible that something like that happened,

4 they answered that they were not aware of this either?

5 A. Yes, I said that. I tried to say it today, and I said it during

6 my examination yesterday, so my answer to your question is yes.

7 Q. I'm going to go back to the beginning of your examination in chief

8 from yesterday, then. Mr. Nice asked you about the role that was played

9 by the Socialist Party of Serbia in the legislative process. And he asked

10 whether it had a leading role. Is it being contested that a party that

11 has parliamentary majority in any parliamentary democracy does, of course,

12 have a leading role in legislation, or rather the work of parliament?

13 A. That's the answer I gave, and that's the explanation I gave. That

14 is the essence of parliamentary life in Serbia, that the parliamentary

15 majority which was almost absolute during the first term, as far as the

16 Socialist Party of Serbia is concerned, I think we had a total of 194

17 seats, if I'm not mistaken, and we passed legitimate decisions in the

18 Assembly, and we certainly influenced the bringing of laws. And after

19 all, this was our right therefore.

20 Q. When were you president of the Assembly of the Republika Srpska?

21 A. President of the Republika Srpska, that's what I became in January

22 of 1993, after the elections, the extraordinary elections that were held

23 in 1992 that you agreed to, although they were not regular elections, but

24 you did this in response to demands put forth by the opposition. And at

25 that time, the Republican Assembly, I think, had over 100 seats, or rather

1 the SPS had over 100 seats. And then we had a coalition within

2 parliament.

3 Q. At that time, we established a minority government. Is that

4 right?

5 A. Yes, yes, we had a minority government. And in parliament, we

6 were seeking ways and means of getting the necessary 126 votes, which was

7 only logical.

8 Q. Later on, the Serb Radical Party brought about a crisis in the

9 National Assembly, and then at the proposal of the government, I dissolved

10 the Assembly and new elections were held.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. At the time when we were -- when you were president of the

13 Assembly, we did not have a majority in the Assembly. Is that right?

14 A. Yes, that's right, we did not have a parliamentary majority.

15 Q. In that sense, consultations and preparations in bodies of the

16 National Assembly were held in parliamentary committees at the proposal of

17 the government with our participation which could not have been absolute,

18 only relative. We were relatively the biggest party, but we did not have

19 the possibility of reaching decisions on our own in relation to bills and

20 laws. Is that right?

21 A. Yes, that's right. During that term in the Assembly of Serbia,

22 our participation was not dominant. We did not have a majority.

23 Q. And then, after the extraordinary elections were held, we

24 were -- we had almost reached half of the seats in parliament, and then we

25 had a coalition with the New Democracy Party.

1 A. Well, if I'm not mistaken, we had 123 seats then. It is true that

2 we did have a coalition with the Nova Demokratija of Dusko Mihajlovic.

3 Q. Yes, and his party had a total of seven seats?

4 A. And we got the necessary majority.

5 Q. What was that?

6 A. The necessary majority.

7 Q. The necessary absolute majority in parliament.

8 Now, well, I don't know why Mr. Nice highlighted this as something

9 really important in your statement, but you say towards the end of 1995,

10 the Yugoslav Left was established. And the Yugoslav Left entered a

11 coalition with us before the 1996 elections. Is that right?

12 A. Yes, that's right. But if you allow me to explain, the 123 seats

13 from the previous Assembly, if I can. It is certain that it is

14 indispensable to have an absolute majority of 126 MPs in order to fully

15 control the work of parliament from the point of view of the political

16 party that has this majority. However, in view of the rule that for the

17 most part, decisions are passed by a majority vote of the MPs present,

18 then this majority didn't have to guarantee a particular outcome. I

19 wanted to explain this so that there would not be any wrong ideas in

20 respect of what I said previously.

21 Q. Is it correct that the Yugoslav Left was established at that time

22 in 1995 by 23 parties that had a left orientation, workers' parties,

23 socialist, social democratic, and so on and so forth? It wasn't the way

24 you put it, that this was done by me or my wife.

25 A. I really don't know that it was formed by 23 parties. I do know

1 what influence it wielded in the political and economic life of the

2 Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I do know that

3 they never took part independently at elections before 2000.

4 Q. We'll come to that, and because it's not correct, I'll remind you

5 now. My impression is not that you're saying something incorrect

6 intentionally, but only because, probably under the influence of the

7 present-day propaganda, you forget the facts as they were. But I'm quite

8 sure that when I remind you, you will remember.

9 So please, don't think that I consider anything you say as

10 malicious.

11 A. You know very well I was never malicious.

12 Q. Let me remind you as I have the programme here.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And if you have any interest, I have

14 it in English also, Mr. May.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. It says, on the 23rd of July, it was founded out of 23

17 left-oriented parties and a large number of individuals who joined the

18 movement on an individual basis. This left was seen flexibly: Communist,

19 socialist, social democrat, the wide spectrum, right up to the greens.

20 And then it says: "The Yugoslav Left is not an expression of

21 something new, only in terms of organisation. It is also new in the

22 understanding of its theoretical basis. By its theoretical basis, the

23 Yugoslav Left considers every idea of freedom or every thought

24 contributing to the liberation of man, of violence, poverty, exploitation,

25 humiliation, ignorance, contained in philosophy, science, religion, and

1 art."

2 Do you remember that, Mr. Lilic?

3 A. Not really, but I have no reason not to believe that that is what

4 it says in their programme.

5 Q. I'll let