1 Wednesday, 21 May 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: May I raise something in private session for a couple

7 of minutes.

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10 [Open session]

11 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

12 MR. NICE: I trust the Chamber has a summary of this morning's

13 date.

14 JUDGE MAY: We have.

15 [The witness entered court]

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

18 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

19 JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. If you would like to take a

20 seat, Mr. Kucan.

21 WITNESS: MILAN KUCAN

22 [Witness answered through interpreter]

23 MR. NICE: Your Honour, before we start the testimony, the witness

24 is -- before we start the testimony, may the witness's exhibits be given a

25 general number.

1 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 447, Your Honours.

2 Examined by Mr. Nice:

3 Q. Mr. Kucan, you are Milan Kucan, president of Slovenia between

4 April/May of 1990 and the year 2002, having been elected three times to

5 that office?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Other matters of your history, of course, well-known as a matter

8 of public record and are contained, for the assistance of the Chamber, in

9 summary at Exhibit 447, tab 1.

10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, of course this witness could deal with

11 enormous numbers of background matters. We don't propose to do anything

12 except take him through the critical and significant events, in light both

13 of pressure of court and his time and also because the Chamber is already

14 very well-informed from other evidence on many matters of background.

15 Q. I turn first, Mr. Kucan, to the Central Committee meeting of the

16 30th of January of 1989, the Central Committee of the League of Communists

17 that was held in Belgrade.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honours will find that we have for this a

19 translation of a speech made by the accused. It's at tab 2.

20 Q. Before we come to look at that speech, Mr. Kucan, can you just

21 give us the setting for what was happening there. What were the issues

22 being focused on at that committee meeting?

23 A. Your Honours, this was a period when the crisis in Yugoslavia

24 reached its culmination. It was a crisis which was multi-faceted. It was

25 not just a political, economic crisis or a crisis between the relations of

1 nations and ethnicities but also a crisis of social values.

2 By then, the recognition became obvious that changes are indeed

3 needed in Yugoslavia. The Slovenian political leadership conceived and

4 understood these changes as a new agreement about a common life within

5 Yugoslavia. And then within the direction of a new definition of the

6 common interests and the common life. The then Serbian political

7 leadership was thinking along a different line, which is that changes are

8 indeed necessary, that changes in terms of persons and personalities

9 should be made in the first place to thus achieve support for the changes

10 that the Serbian political leadership had been advocating.

11 Changes in persons and personalities, in fact, were made also

12 through the organisation of large mass meetings and rallies through which

13 first the leadership of Vojvodina was replaced, then the leadership of

14 Montenegro. And at this session of the Central Committee we initially

15 discussed the issue whether we should talk about the political

16 circumstances and constitutional changes and amendments with the new

17 leadership which brought about a new relation of power within the Central

18 Committee or with the former leadership that had represented their League

19 of Communists on the Central Committee. It is within this context that

20 the discussion went on which the Prosecutor has referred to.

21 Q. Was the accused the keynote speaker at this event?

22 A. No. He was one of the speakers. The keynote speaker was the then

23 president of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of

24 Yugoslavia, Stipe Suvar.

25 MR. NICE: Nevertheless, the accused made a significant speech,

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1 which we have in B/C/S for the witness and which we can, I hope, put up in

2 English. We can't put it up in English. We have it only in English at

3 tab 2 of Exhibit -- I've forgotten the number already -- 447. And if Your

4 Honours would be good enough to go with me through certain highlighted

5 passages, Ms. Wee will, on the B/C/S version, take the witness, if he's

6 able to see it on the screen at this stage, to the same passages and I'll

7 ask his comments on those passages later.

8 Within tab 2, if the Chamber would be good enough, please, to go

9 to page 2, a third of the way down, there is a passage reading as follows:

10 "Things that cannot be changed institutionally, and they must be changed

11 because people don't like them or they lasted for too long, will be

12 changed uninstitutionally. It's always been like that in any society."

13 If the Chamber would then turn on to page 4, and the middle

14 paragraph: "Therefore, I would like to say to all those who obviously

15 cannot easily get rid of their habits to judge Serbia, that Serbia is

16 equal and united and that they should not get excited about that. Once

17 this becomes clear to them, we should all solve the difficult problems of

18 the Yugoslav crisis together more easily and equally."

19 Over the page, please, in the English, to page 5, the second

20 paragraph: "I have to say that if Yugoslavia were to be conceived as a

21 community in which Serbia is divided into three parts and on its knees,

22 then Serbia would be against such a community, against such a Yugoslavia.

23 Then we would be for a different Yugoslavia. In other words, for the only

24 possible Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia in which everyone would be equal and,

25 therefore, Serbia as well. In that process, we would not care at all

1 whether somebody would call it the third, fifth, or tenth Yugoslavia."

2 And finally, if the Chamber would turn to page 7 and the paragraph

3 starting at the foot of the page and going over, did the speech of the

4 accused end in this way: "This session was expected to be a session of

5 conflicts and differences, and we shouldn't be afraid of them. They're

6 unavoidable in order to remove obstacles and to find solutions, but

7 procedure will not bring that solution that's big and small traps, small

8 and big artifices, intrigues and frameups. A politics chosen by people

9 institutionally and non-institutionally, statutory, and non-statutory, on

10 the streets and inside, populist and elitist, with or without arguments

11 can only reach the solution. But in any case, it is clear that it is

12 politics for socialists non-aligned and democratic Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia

13 where people will live unitary, equally, richer, and more cultured but

14 above all where they will live unanimously. Thank you."

15 Q. Mr. Kucan, with a reminder of the speech by those extracts, what

16 was the message you perceived the accused to be giving?

17 A. The message, to put it in very simple terms, was the following:

18 Changes such as they had been advocated by the Serbian leadership will

19 take place whether the institutional or non-institutional approach will be

20 used to achieve them; i.e., whether constitutional provisions will be

21 respected or not. And this is where we differed essentially. The

22 dilemmas were known to one and all, but as far as these dilemmas that

23 Yugoslavia faced at that time is concerned, we applied for different

24 answers. We opted for different answers. Where these answers brought us

25 is apparently very well illustrated by the current status of Slovenia,

1 which opted for the institutional, legal, and constitutional approach, and

2 the status and situation in other parts of the former Yugoslavia that have

3 also become independent states by now.

4 Q. One matter of precision. We see from the text that the accused

5 used the words "institutionally or uninstitutionally." In your answer,

6 you have referred to "constitutionally." In the setting in which he

7 spoke, is there an identity or proximity between something that is

8 non-institutional and something that is non-constitutional? If not, can

9 you explain why you used the word "constitutional."

10 A. In terms of its substance, this syntax "institutional" or

11 "non-institutional" in fact implies the respect of institutional, i.e.,

12 constitutional paths and non-constitutional paths if non-institutional

13 approaches are opted for. This was a period of mass rallies and meetings

14 which insisted upon and achieved replacement of leaderships through the

15 demand of the populace on the street whereby none of us believed that the

16 people at large should be deprived of their right to voice their

17 dissatisfaction with the circumstances. My view at that time was that of

18 course you can go and rally on the streets to voice your dissatisfaction,

19 but you cannot go to the streets to devise a new concept to find a way out

20 of the situation. In other words, for legitimate political objectives to

21 be reached, not every means can be used.

22 Q. Are you able to express a view on the accused's attitude to the

23 use of people demonstrating on the streets?

24 A. Well, at that time in Slovenia, there was no one who would believe

25 that these mass meetings and rallies that were given different names, the

1 Meeting of the Truth about Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, whose

2 situation was difficult indeed and full of trials and tribulations, or

3 they would be called the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution. So other names

4 were given to this. So none of us believed in Slovenia that these were

5 spontaneous meetings and rallies.

6 One of the meetings that was to spread the truth throughout

7 Yugoslavia was an announced meeting on the 1st of December, 1989, to be

8 held in Ljubljana. The leadership, the then leadership of Slovenia, the

9 then Executive Council of the Republic of Slovenia and the Ministry for

10 the Interior banned this meeting through the use of a provision of our law

11 since the meeting could escalate into very serious clashes and

12 inter-ethnic conflicts on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. So

13 this is the continuation of that discussion and the discussions we had had

14 on the 20th, a session of the Central Committee of the League of

15 Communists of Yugoslavia which the Prosecutor referred to.

16 Before that, we had the 17th and 18th session where we also

17 discussed changes, including constitutional changes. My view at that time

18 was the following: We need to reach a consensus about these issues and

19 such very significant changes cannot be made given that tense situation in

20 Kosovo.

21 The answer to our reservations was the following: Consensus

22 cannot be reached. Socialism wasn't introduced through a consensus

23 either, and that these changes will take place even if a state of

24 emergency would have to be declared for that to take place.

25 Q. Two supplementary questions --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. Two supplementary questions on the speech of the accused to which

4 we've been referring. First, we know that the accused made a speech in

5 June of 1989, the 28th, I think, the Battle of Kosovo speech. Did that

6 connect back to or resonate with this earlier speech?

7 A. In my view, this speech had been a logic continuation of the

8 former discussions and views that changes will take place regardless the

9 means. In fact, this speech was held to commemorate the 500th anniversary

10 of the Kosovo Battle, which was an important battle in the history of

11 Europe and the Serb people. At that time it was said that through

12 these --

13 Q. Forgive my interrupting you. On this matter the Chamber has heard

14 a lot of evidence already and is familiar with the speech, so if you could

15 simply answer briefly whether there is a connection between the two, and

16 effectively you've already done so. That's all I want from you at the

17 moment.

18 A. So my answer will be very brief, but let me just finish my

19 thought. At that time, it was said that the Serbian people are entering

20 again battles, as it was said, not armed battles as yet; however, this is

21 what one could not exclude. One could anticipate that there would be

22 armed battles to follow and that changes will take place regardless the

23 means to be used.

24 Q. And the final question is: Did you at some stage - paragraph 9 of

25 the summary - reply to the speech that the accused had made? If so, when

1 and to what effect? In absolute summary form, please.

2 A. On the basis of an agreement reached by the Slovene delegates at

3 this session of the Central Committee, Mr. Boris Muzic took the floor the

4 next day to respond to these assumptions.

5 Q. At this time, then, 1989, insofar as one can crystallise states of

6 thinking, do you take the view that there were two concepts by which

7 Yugoslavia was being approached, one of which was that it was a vehicle

8 for many people to live under a single roof and the other of which was

9 different? If so, please explain, but very briefly.

10 A. In fact, what you have just described is true. However, this

11 difference in terms of Yugoslavia was born when Yugoslavia was born

12 itself. For some politicians in Serbia, Yugoslavia was always conceived

13 to be the state within which a single state all Serbs could live together.

14 Others, such as the Slovenians, the Croats, the Macedonians, and I'm now

15 speaking particularly on behalf of the Slovenes, never understood

16 Yugoslavia in such a sense. In fact, we conceived Yugoslavia to be a

17 state which provides for a peaceful life, development, and well-being as

18 well as prosperity for all peoples that live within it, on an equal

19 footing. And throughout all the crisis situations, this difference was

20 important, even in the period of the dictatorship which was announced in

21 1929 in the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia when the occupation of Yugoslavia

22 eventually took place by the Nazis. And in fact this is what was

23 emphasised in 1945 and after the war as well as in 1974 when the last

24 constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted.

25 Q. The Chamber has already heard much evidence about steps taken by

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1 Serbia in relation to the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and

2 Kosovo, and this as well, very briefly - perhaps even in a sentence - can

3 you just remind us or explain to us whether taking steps in relation to

4 those autonomous provinces had an effect on Yugoslavia as a whole

5 structurally?

6 A. Yes, it did have an influence. This constitutional structure of

7 the Yugoslav constitution and of the Socialist Republic of Serbia was

8 based on the basis that in the autonomous province of Vojvodina as well as

9 Autonomous Province of Kosovo, minorities lived. The bigger minority in

10 Vojvodina was the Hungarian one, and in the Kosovo province the big and

11 later prevailing minority Albanian. And in that sense, both autonomous

12 provinces functioned as a constituent element of the Yugoslav federation.

13 With the change of the position of these two provinces in the

14 constitutional setup of Serbia also the constitutional make-up of the

15 federal republic changed. With the changes of the Serbian constitution in

16 spring 1998, the constitution was changed, amended, and essentially this

17 was an announcement of how the changes should be attained also in

18 Yugoslavia. Because when you reduced the importance of the provinces in

19 the constitutional setup of Yugoslavia, the -- this is what the political

20 leadership insisted on, and this is what was done, that on matters of

21 Yugoslav matters, the vote remains to the two provinces. So Serbia had in

22 fact three votes on federal matters.

23 As I said, first the changes were introduced through mass rallies.

24 Personnel changes took place with introduction of persons who were

25 dedicated and devoted to the goals of the Serb leadership.

1 Q. Two topics about the army, reversed in order from in the summary

2 to take them chronologically, but to give us context, what was the

3 Slovenian expectation, or indeed what promises had been made to generate

4 expectations in Slovenia about its army after the Second World War?

5 A. Well, Slovenes during the course of the Second World War, after

6 the -- through the occupation of fascist Italy and Germany, we formed our

7 rebel army, and it never abandoned the territory of the Republic of

8 Slovenia. This decision was based on our conviction that this partisan

9 army cannot be separated from its nation, which would remain totally

10 without defence.

11 In 1990 -- in 1943, when the highest body of Yugoslavia met, the

12 anti-fascist council Ovnoy [phoen], the Slovene delegation, and there it

13 was promised to also our delegation and to General Jaka Avsic, that our

14 army would become a part of the Yugoslav party -- army and that Slovene

15 would remain also the language of command.

16 The Slovene army was in fact disbanded. This promise was broken.

17 The army was disbanded, it became a part of the Yugoslav army where in

18 communication you had the equality of languages, but the command language

19 was the Serbian language and the principle of equality of languages as a

20 communication -- languages of communications of use was also flagrantly

21 clear in the trial against the four in Ljubljana, trial of the four, and

22 formally there the trial was carried on in the Serbian language.

23 Q. Before I turn to my second point on the army generally, just help

24 us so that we can understand it. A Serbian foot soldier stationed in

25 Slovenia, would he typically be in a position to understand and

1 communicate with ordinary Slovenians in their language or not?

2 A. Well, with a bit of an effort, he could communicate, but logically

3 it was -- it was expected that everybody speaks in the Serbian. Not only

4 in the army but also at the federal level, at the Constitutional Court,

5 the Serbo-Croatian, respectively Serbian language be used.

6 Q. Paragraph 15, second topic on the army of general nature.

7 In your judgement, did the JNA in the time of Tito have, as you

8 described it, two homes? If so, what were they?

9 A. In a certain way, yes. This army became an ideological and a

10 political army, and in the central parts of Yugoslavia it became as the

11 armed force of the Communist Party which was leading the resistance. A

12 specific situation existed in Slovenia, but it's not important for this

13 debate. But in fact, it did have two homes. The ideological home was the

14 -- one was Yugoslavia. That was the political home of JNA, and it was

15 always convinced that it is a factor of unity and of the very existence of

16 Yugoslavia. This army was absolutely dedicated to President Tito, who was

17 both the president of the state of Yugoslavia and the president of the

18 League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

19 At his death in 1990, the -- it remained without its father, the

20 Supreme Commander, and then the Presidency of the state which replaced

21 Tito, it didn't recognise this Supreme Commander, and this led to the --

22 this meeting between the Presidency, the formal Supreme Commander, and the

23 leadership of the army in March 1990 where the conflicts, well-known

24 conflicts arose concerning who is in command and who is commanding the

25 JNA, the Yugoslav army.

1 Q. Thank you. Moving so far as is possible chronologically through

2 matters that are relevant, I want to take you next to a passage from the

3 diary of Borisav Jovic. Before we consider, if we do, extracts from that

4 diary, is this a book you've read and are you in a position to say whether

5 so far as factual matters related in it, they are or are not accurate?

6 Mr. Kucan, have you -- did you hear the question or --

7 A. No.

8 Q. I'm so sorry. Have you read Borisav Jovic's book, and insofar as

9 it contains matters of fact of which you are aware, are you able to say

10 whether it is accurate or inaccurate?

11 A. The description of events which the president of Presidency

12 participated as well as myself are pretty precise and correct, but for

13 other events, his description of them I cannot ascertain whether they are

14 exactly precise.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honours, we have extracted from that book some

16 passages which we would like exhibited separately, if they may be, to be

17 commented on by this witness, the issue of the admissibility of the book

18 as a whole falling for later determination, if that's convenient.

19 JUDGE MAY: That's correct. We have in fact, already, I think,

20 said we would do that in due course.

21 MR. NICE: Yes.

22 JUDGE MAY: But the passages about which the witness can speak, of

23 course can be admitted once he identifies and asserts they're accurate.

24 MR. NICE: May this clip of exhibits then be given a separate

25 exhibit number.

1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Prosecutor's Exhibit 448.

2 MR. NICE: The Court will see the preface to the book. I needn't

3 take you through that. If you'd turn on, at the bottom page numbering, to

4 what is page 44 as it reads, we see a long extract for the 21st of

5 September, 1989. I'm not going to go into it in full because it would

6 take too long. I'm going to ask the witness to make some comments upon

7 it, but I'll get the flavour of the entry before asking him those

8 questions, and I hope that the witness has the original before him.

9 If this is acceptable to the Chamber, he has with him a volume of

10 the book in Slovenian, as I understand it, but unless it's essential, we

11 prefer not to relieve him of it so he can take it back with him.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

13 MR. NICE:

14 Q. So, Mr. Kucan, we're looking here at an extract for the 21st of

15 September. And if the Chamber will follow to the second paragraph, this

16 is at a meeting that was held with Drnovsek. "He also wants to consult

17 with me in connection with yesterday's report in Trieste's Il Piccolo that

18 Yugoslavia is preparing for military intervention in Slovenia."

19 If we go further down, we see that, in the middle of the page:

20 "The Slovenes have agreed to come in the evening at 1900: Stanovik,

21 Kucan, Potrc, and Sinogoj."

22 If we look a little further down, we see a passage that says --

23 sorry, much further down. Towards the foot of the page: "Potrc briefly

24 explains for each controversial amendment what has been changed on the

25 basis of our objections. In essence, everything has remained the same,

1 nothing substantive has been approved aside from a few cosmetic changes,

2 but he stubbornly explains that absolutely everything is in keeping with

3 the SFRY constitution. In his opinion, what we are doing is

4 unconstitutional. He asks that we leave them alone to responsibly

5 complete the constitutional changes, and then let the Constitutional Court

6 react if there is reason to do so. Unfortunately, according to the

7 Yugoslav constitution, the Constitutional Court can conclude that a

8 republic's constitution is not in agreement with the federal constitution

9 and call on the republic to bring it into line ..."

10 We turn over the page to the first fresh paragraph: "Next, I took

11 the floor. I said very clearly that in the Presidency's assessment, the

12 adoption of the amendments in the proposed form would constitute a direct

13 threat to the integrity of the country and the disruption of the

14 constitutionally established order ..."

15 And if we go on a little bit further, we'll find just a little

16 over halfway down the page a reference to Ante: "Ante distances himself by

17 saying he is not familiar with all the details but he feels a timeout is

18 necessary until the issues are fully discussed. After our mostly uniform

19 remarks, Kucan, who is visibly agitated, asks me to explain what 'other

20 measures at the disposal of the Presidency' means. Veljko and I explain:

21 'What is provided for by the constitution and by the law, nothing beyond

22 that.' 'No, no,' he insists further, 'Just tell me exactly what you

23 mean.'"

24 Foot of the page, the last two lines: "We have lost our thanks --"

25 "Kucan turns to me and says, 'How do you explain that?' Of course I do.

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1 'We have lost our thanks to your (meaning the Serbian) two-year public

2 offensive against our leadership, and especially because of the letter in

3 which you invited us to come to talk to you as long as we first accept all

4 of your assessments and positions...'" and so on.

5 Mr. Kucan, reminding you briefly of those -- of that meeting, in a

6 couple of sentences can you explain to the Chamber, please, what was

7 happening here and what you were concerned about.

8 A. Distinguished Honours, this meeting was held on the 21st of

9 September. On the 26th of September, a session was foreseen of the

10 government -- of the Assembly of Slovenia which would adopt amendments to

11 the constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, and with these amendments,

12 Slovenia wished to ensure a legal path in order of asserting its interest

13 in the Yugoslav federation; namely, if it were -- that were not possible,

14 in order to ensure its legal and moral right to self-determination.

15 The adoption of these constitutional amendments, the intention was

16 to stop that in any way possible. On the eve of the 26th of September, a

17 session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

18 was convened, and they asked us to suppress both that meeting and the

19 amendments. And this meeting also concerns that. Dr. Drnovsek was the

20 president of the Yugoslav Presidency, and representing Slovenia and our

21 interlocutors. The entire leadership of Slovenia was there, not only the

22 president of the federal government but also the Minister of Defence.

23 After requesting that we do not adopt these amendments, and as the

24 Prosecutor has quoted, it was said that all other means would be used at

25 their disposal.

1 Now, my question: "What does it mean all other means will be

2 used?" It remained unanswered. But we all knew what it implied: The

3 state of emergency and the possible use of the army in order to ensure

4 the -- and secure order in Slovenia.

5 So this was how we lived in Yugoslavia the last few years. It was

6 either accusations of counter-revolutions, anti-Yugoslav activities, and

7 then proclaim a state of emergency and then give the authorisation to the

8 army to suspend the legal authorities and to operate in line with the

9 interests of those who wished to have this state of emergency introduced.

10 And this is how we understood this meeting and the discussion we had.

11 Q. Thank you. I'm going to pass over the 22nd of September entry

12 because of time and move to the next -- at least I am at the moment -- and

13 move to the next topic, which is this: On the -- in January of 1990, was

14 there the 14th Congress of the League of Communists? It was on the -- the

15 appropriate four yearly interval but it was accelerated, so to that extent

16 an Extraordinary Congress, and at the end of it, did your delegation walk

17 out? Just confirm that, if you will, because I'm going to play a tape

18 first and ask for your comments later.

19 A. This was the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of

20 Yugoslavia. Indeed they were usually typically held every four years, and

21 in 1990, it was a Congress year. However, in the atmosphere that existed,

22 the atmosphere of emergency that was in the air and of extraordinary

23 situation in Yugoslavia, this Congress that was to be an ordinary Congress

24 was requalified into an Extraordinary Congress.

25 And at the 18th session of the League of Communists, this proposal

1 was turned down. Then the 20th session, upon the demand of the provincial

2 conference of Vojvodina which called for an Extraordinary Congress, which

3 again was refuted, and then the 22nd session which was -- which approved

4 this being an Extraordinary Congress. And in my own -- in my own

5 contribution, I had pointed out that this was an Extraordinary Congress

6 against the will and stand of the Slovene delegation.

7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we will now play an extract from the film

8 Death of Yugoslavia made by the BBC. May it become, I think, tab 7 of

9 Exhibit 447.

10 JUDGE MAY: This is the extract.

11 MR. NICE: It is the extract. It includes not only the footage of

12 the Congress itself but observations by others. Those are available for

13 the witness to comment on. There's not a transcript available yet - I

14 apologise for that - it will be provided in due course, but it is in

15 English so I hope it will not inconvenience the Chamber.

16 [Videotape played]

17 "The instrument Milosevic chose was the Yugoslav Communist Party.

18 He called an Extraordinary Congress. As the delegates stood for their

19 hymn to brotherhood and unity, they all knew that this Congress had been

20 summoned to crush the defiant Slovenes.

21 "[No interpretation]

22 "Kucan had only one hope. Yugoslavia's second largest republic,

23 Croatia.

24 "[No interpretation]

25 "Milosevic selected as chairman one of the leaders who owed him

1 his career. It was the first party Congress the president of Montenegro

2 had ever attended.

3 "[No interpretation]

4 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Well, it was thought that the

5 Slovenes were not brave enough to take this crucial step.

6 "[No interpretation]

7 "This latest example of the Serb's domineering behaviour shook the

8 delegates from other republics.

9 "[No interpretation]

10 "The Serb bloc showed no mercy. In the break, the Slovenes held a

11 crisis meeting. Kucan knew if they walked out he would be blamed for the

12 chaos that could consume Yugoslavia. He offered a deal.

13 "[No interpretation]

14 "The second before the final vote was announced, I was still at

15 the speaking podium when Ribicic requested the floor. Nobody gave him the

16 floor. He simply walked up.

17 "[No interpretation]

18 "Ribicic, one of the Slovene delegates, had been primed to give

19 them their signal.

20 "[No interpretation]

21 "He said, unfortunately, the Slovene delegation could not accept

22 the Krynots [phoen] in the Central Committee.

23 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "That, unfortunately, the situation

24 is such that we have to walk out.

25 "[Previous translation continues]... from the presiding head

1 table, and they started leaving the plenary session from one single door."

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. Mr. Kucan, does the footage we've looked at, together with the

4 observations made, reflect the tension and difficulties of that Congress?

5 A. Yes, they do reflect it very faithfully, especially the round of

6 applause that we were given when we were walking out of the room.

7 Q. We saw the card voting. Did you observe something about the

8 actions of the accused at the time of card voting?

9 A. Your Honours, I should say a few sentences before I answer this

10 question. At this Congress, what was discussed were most crucial

11 political questions in Yugoslavia, and what we proposed is that the

12 discussion at the Congress should concern a concept of future living

13 together in Yugoslavia, whether there is an interest of such living

14 together, under what circumstances, what is this interest, and also, under

15 what conditions to remain members of the same organisation, and that in

16 this way political life in Yugoslavia be democratised. And the contents

17 of the amendment that we proposed for this reason was the following: To

18 first to endorse political pluralism that has already become a reality in

19 Yugoslavia, then the parliamentary elections had been held in Slovenia at

20 the time of the Congress, that political processes start evolving in

21 Yugoslavia, then also an article of the law sanctioning the so-called

22 verbal offence was also proposed, that all political prisoners be

23 released, that torture be also forbidden in proceedings, and so forth.

24 And also what we demanded is that we should go through with the logic

25 whereby in fact communists within their individual leagues be autonomous

1 and that it was not possible to outvote the stance or positions of any one

2 of these organisations.

3 There was an atmosphere in which the Slovene communists and their

4 positions at this Congress be in fact isolated and should not receive any

5 support from delegates from other republics and provinces. And this had

6 happened already during the debates within the commissions or committees

7 and also at the Congress session, and thus our amendments were largely

8 refuted and rejected. And Milosevic, who was -- and Ribicic then said

9 that we -- the Slovene communists could no longer see a place within such

10 an organisation and that we were going to decide on these issues at home.

11 So this is to briefly describe the situation once it has already

12 culminated.

13 I would also say the following: There were voting cards, and the

14 accused was the first or among the first to lift it, and then this was

15 followed by the majority at the Congress who showed the corresponding

16 colour of their cards, and that meant rejecting the Slovene amendments.

17 Q. You already volunteered the observation that the applause at the

18 end of the Congress, as you left, was significant. And if you want to add

19 just a word or so about that, do, before we move on to the next topic.

20 A. Yes. Perhaps what needs to be said is that all those who

21 applauded us when we walked out did not really thought that this was and

22 spelled the true dissolution of Yugoslavia or the end of it. And Ivica

23 Racan, who was heading the Croatian Communist delegation proposed that the

24 Congress should interrupt the session so that the necessary consultations

25 may be carried out and that the Congress may then resume its session. And

1 while the accused said that there should be no interruption in the

2 deliberations of the Congress, that a new quorum should be established, a

3 new majority whereby the Congress would adopt decisions, because if Ivica

4 Racan's proposal were to be accepted, that would mean beheading and

5 disbanding the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. And this is what

6 happened. The Congress indeed had been interrupted, but it had never been

7 resumed again. And it had also announced the end of Yugoslavia as a

8 state.

9 Q. Thank you. We turn in the summary to paragraph 26, to May of 1990

10 and to the disarming of the Slovenian Territorial Defence.

11 For speed, can I ask you, please, Mr. Kucan, to look at Exhibit

12 447, tab 3, the English version of which can, if possible, be shown on the

13 overhead projector.

14 To save time, we'll abbreviate our description of this document

15 dated the 14th of May, coming from the Secretariat for National Defence,

16 strictly confidential, headed "The safekeeping of weapons" and ordering,

17 under number 1, that: "The military district commands, together with TO

18 staffs, shall organise the takeover, storage, and safekeeping of the

19 complete stock of Territorial Defence weapons and ammunition in the JNA

20 supply dumps and depots. Within the scope of further organisational and

21 establishment improvements, Territorial Defence commanders shall consider

22 the possibility of abolishing certain smaller Territorial Defence

23 units ..."

24 Perhaps we should look at number 2 as well further down the page.

25 "Exceptionally, where facilities are very far away and where conditions

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1 are not conducive to it or it is impossible to find a place for

2 Territorial Defence weapons and ammunition ... they should be stored and

3 safeguarded in Territorial Defence depots guarded by JNA units."

4 And we see that this comes from General Adzic, the order to be

5 completed by the 21st of May.

6 If we then turn to the Jovic diary extracts, Exhibit 448, and

7 using the page numbers at the foot, page 131 for the 17th of May, is there

8 an entry: "We take measures to ensure that weapons are taken from

9 civilian Territorial Defence depots in Slovenia and Croatia and

10 transferred to military depots. We will not permit Territorial Defence

11 weapons to be misused in any conflicts or for forcible secession.

12 "Practically speaking, we have disarmed them. Formally, this was

13 done by the head of the General Staff, but it was actually under our

14 order. Extreme reaction by the Slovenes and Croatians, but they have no

15 recourse."

16 18th of May: "I am at my weekend house in Niksic. In the evening

17 Milan Kucan calls me. He complains about the seizure of weapons. He says

18 that the people are opposed to this move, that there could be casualties.

19 He's called a session of the Slovene Presidency over the question and he

20 asks whether we can meet to discuss the matter.

21 "Sure, I tell him. He should contact me Monday morning so that we

22 can set up a meeting. By the way, I tell him, I have heard about this

23 campaign on the radio. I do not know what is going on, but I advise him

24 not to get into conflict with the army, to surrender the weapons and on

25 Monday we will clear up everything, if necessary.

1 "A rough start. They immediately summon Stipe Suvar to Zagreb to

2 report on what we have concluded in connection with the speech before the

3 Yugoslav Assembly."

4 I don't think I need to finish that. We go to the 21st of May,

5 the same page, 131.

6 "Kucan and Drnovsek came to discuss the seizure of Slovene

7 Territorial Defence weapons based on the Presidency decision that the

8 weapons be seized from all republican Territorial Defences and placed

9 under JNA control. On our side, Vjelko Kadijevic and Anton Stari beside

10 me.

11 "Kucan spoke at length: 'We were not notified by anyone.' The

12 weapons were first transferred and then they learned of the action. They

13 do not know the essence, the reasons, and the goal. They regard this as

14 disarmament. They feel that this threatens the republic's sovereignty.

15 He asks that they be showed the order, how it reads, and who issued it. He

16 regards the General Staff's explanation as inadequate. He thinks that

17 there is no basis in the constitution for such a measure. They brought

18 the weapons, they are responsible for directing the Territorial Defence,

19 and now they are being treated this way, without being told, and the

20 weapons are seized. He believes this is a case of political intervention

21 and that is a threat to their sovereign rights. Perhaps the direct cause

22 of this is the climate that has emerged in Slovenia after my inaugural

23 speech and the criticism of that speech in Slovenia and Croatia. The

24 political situation in Slovenia is very serious because of the weapon

25 seizures --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could you slow down, please.

2 MR. NICE: Yes. And I'm very sorry. "He is not sure how it can

3 be remedied.

4 "He asks that they be accurately informed about what is going on.

5 "That the weapons be returned to them and they will look after

6 their storage conditions;

7 "That the commander of the Territorial Defence for Slovenia be

8 replaced;

9 "That we take a look at how to reduce political tensions.

10 "Veljko explains that the measures were taken throughout the

11 country, not only in Slovenia, because the depots were poorly secured and

12 the inter-ethnic and general political situation is rapidly worsening;

13 that this is exclusively the military's jurisdiction --" I go over the

14 brackets -- "that this is not the republic's concern, and that they, the

15 republics, want to interfere with military questions and have no right to

16 do so. If they provide good conditions for protecting the weapons,

17 returning them might be considered, but that presupposes at least one

18 armed unit and not one sentry, which in the event of an attack will

19 repulse the seizure of weapons. All of their authorities remain,

20 including using the weapons from the military depots for training

21 exercise.

22 "Naturally, Kucan was not satisfied."

23 And then on the 21st of May:

24 "Veljko informs me of a conversation with Ante Markovic. Spoke

25 with him for three hours. Seems to have persuaded him to accept our plan

1 for trying to impose legal and constitutional order. He has serious

2 doubts about Ante Markovic's real intentions but will monitor that

3 closely."

4 And so on, and I think, for reasons of time, I'm going cut to my

5 questions to you with those materials in mind.

6 Were you aware in advance of this disarmament of you?

7 A. No. Nobody notified us about these plans.

8 Q. The order that we looked at first, did you discover whether it was

9 an order that applied to the federal Yugoslavia as a whole or not?

10 A. Well, this order, such as it is, is something that I have in front

11 of my eyes for the first time. I had an opportunity to see an order which

12 was issued on the basis of this order by the commander of the 5th Military

13 District in Zagreb, and that order also had to do with the withdrawal of

14 the arms of the Territorial Defence in Slovenia.

15 This order was issued on the 15th of May, which is the very day on

16 which the term of office expired of the president of the Presidency of the

17 SFRY, Dr. Drnovsek, who represented Slovenia, and when Dr. Jovic took

18 office as president of the Presidency on behalf of Serbia.

19 This happened after a situation in which, through the first

20 democratic elections held in April, we had already had elected a new

21 Assembly, new parliament in Slovenia, and the Zagreb order entered into

22 force on the day when our parliament sat for the first time, when our new

23 government was elected, and when the new Presidency took oath. And I was

24 elected during the general elections the president of the Presidency.

25 So as far as this order is concerned, when people called in from

1 the municipalities, telling us about this order, telling us that the army

2 came in with the demand that they hand over the weapons, so we were -- we

3 received this information from the people in the municipalities, and we

4 considered this order to be an order to disarm the Slovene Territorial

5 Defence.

6 At a later stage, in the course of our conversations and

7 discussions, it turned out that the argument they used was to prevent the

8 new authorities in Slovenia to use these weapons.

9 Let me draw your attention to the fact that this is May 1990. In

10 formal terms, Slovenia decided and discussed its independence, its

11 autonomy, its dissociation from Yugoslavia only when we launched

12 preparations for the referendum of independence which was held in December

13 1990. So reasons to think and to believe that Slovenia could use these

14 weapons to dissolve, by use of force, Yugoslavia were not there. And in

15 fact, there was no theft of the weapons no Slovenia because the Slovene

16 Territorial Defence very carefully guarded and protected its own weapons.

17 Q. Everything else that I want you to help us with in relation to the

18 disarming has been covered by the documents we've looked at, I think, save

19 for this: Did you have -- paragraph 27 of the summary. Did you contact

20 General Hocevar and did he explain to you what was happening?

21 A. Yes, indeed, this did take place. I tried to establish contact

22 with General Hocevar. However, Your Honours, may I be allowed to say a

23 few statements before. The Territorial Defence of Yugoslavia was part and

24 parcel of the armed forces of Yugoslavia. It was established in 1968

25 after the attack of the Warsaw Pact forces upon the Czechoslovak republic.

1 In peacetimes, it was under the competency and authority of the republics

2 which from their own national budgets funded the procurement of the

3 weapons and other capabilities required by the Territorial Defence should

4 a state of war be imposed upon Yugoslavia.

5 The Territorial Defence commander was appointed by the Presidency

6 of Yugoslavia but always on the basis of consultation with the republic's

7 authorities.

8 General Hocevar was appointed in -- was appointed

9 Commander-in-Chief of the Territorial Defence, however, without any

10 approval of the Republic of Slovenia which otherwise was provided for by

11 law. When I was informed from the municipalities that the Territorial

12 Defence's weapons were withdrawn from them, I asked General Hocevar to

13 explain the situation. He said, "We are in fact replacing the old trophy

14 weapons with state-of-the-art weaponry." Since this went on, I insisted

15 on meeting with him, and what he said was the following: "In fact, I have

16 received, he said, instructions that neither you nor anyone else from the

17 leadership of Slovenia were to be informed about this activity, and that

18 he has -- he found himself in a situation in which he's not quite clear

19 whose orders to follow and that he will simply follow this order because

20 he's supposed to.

21 Q. Thank you. May we now turn to tab 2 of Exhibit 447.

22 MR. NICE: The Chamber has a translation, or a transcript and

23 translation of this speech, but there is a difference between that

24 improved version and the version that may be shown up on the screen. It's

25 -- beg your pardon, it's tab 6.

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1 JUDGE MAY: Tab 6?

2 MR. NICE: Yes, tab 6. Before we play this, this, I think, is an

3 address in or about June 1990 of the accused at the Serbian parliament.

4 [Videotape played]

5 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The president of the Presidency of

6 Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, addressed the deputies of the parliament of

7 Serbia with these words, explaining the draft version of the most

8 important republican document. According to the new constitution, a

9 unified Serbia was to be established as a sovereign state."

10 The interpreters apologise but the tone is incomprehensible of the

11 tape.

12 MR. NICE: Your Honour, in those circumstances, the transcript

13 that you have being available, I think the best course is for me to read

14 out from the English, and the witness has heard the tape played yesterday

15 in circumstances where it could be listened to and I think he recollected

16 it.

17 JUDGE MAY: Since we have it in front of us and time is short, if

18 you would take the matters you rely on particularly.

19 MR. NICE: Yes, of course.

20 If we go down from where we are, the summarising passage by the

21 journalist says that: "... the new constitution, the unique Serbia is to

22 be established as a sovereign state..." Next sentence: "Stressing that

23 the federal Yugoslavia is the main political choice for Serbia but with

24 regard to strongly expressed disintegration and confederation tendencies

25 in some parts of the country, Milosevic said: This is why this draft

1 constitution of Serbia has been prepared respecting other possible options

2 of Serbia as an independent state; passing the new constitution, among

3 other things, should prevent every attempt of silent conversion of federal

4 Yugoslavia into confederation, i.e., it represent a moment when Serbia is

5 to clearly and on time say that the Serbia's administrative borders are

6 linked only with the federal system in Yugoslavia because, should the

7 system in Yugoslavia change, i.e., should there be a confederalisation,

8 all the constitutional issues would be opened. A confederation is not a

9 state but a union of independent states. Therefore, there is no

10 confederation even if all the political subjects of Yugoslavia want it

11 within the existing administratively set borders among the republics. In

12 that case, in the case that they do not want the federal Yugoslavia, the

13 issues of borders of Serbia is an open political issue."

14 Further comments by the journalist, and then the accused speaks on

15 the second page: "Therefore, because of the significance and because of

16 the far-reaching consequences of fulfilment of the projects of political

17 reform in Serbia and in interest in stable political conditions in Serbia,

18 I suggest that the citizens express their views about the draft of the

19 Presidency of Serbia through a referendum first. In that way, we would

20 simply eliminate unnecessary conflicts and deprive the coalition, which

21 acts against Serbia, from any basis for accusations that we want to impose

22 the new constitution in a non-democratic way. Today especially when

23 anti-Serb coalition leads to an unprecedented campaign against Serbia in

24 the country and abroad and when in Kosovo yet another pitiful show is

25 taking place whose playscript gets even the parliament of the region

1 involved. Pulling in the highest organs of the government in the region

2 in a non-constitutional and illegal way in the fight for Albanian

3 separatists' causes in the name of democracy is the best proof that

4 so-called Albanian Democratic Alternative is nothing else but nationalist

5 movement for the separation of Kosovo and Metohija, i.e., a movement

6 against the Serbian state and its integrity. Therefore, from this place I

7 would like to say that the Serbian state will consider every attempt of

8 seizing its territory to be an act against the state and the people and

9 will act accordingly."

10 Mr. Kucan, you saw this tape yesterday in circumstances where the

11 sound was audible. We see what is said by the accused there about the

12 borders being potentially an open issue. Remembering, please, that we are

13 very pressed for time and if you could put it very summarily, what was the

14 meaning, as you understood it, of this speech and what was its effect on

15 you and others?

16 A. Well, this is footage from a meeting of the Presidency of the

17 Assembly of the Republic of Serbia where they discuss the proposal of the

18 Presidency of Serbia for a new constitution of the Republic of Serbia.

19 This took place at a time in which in Yugoslavia we all sought for ways

20 and means to resolve the crisis. At that time, different concepts were in

21 the offing. We in Slovenia, throughout this period, advocated either a

22 new agreement concerning the concept of the future state of Yugoslavia on

23 the basis on establishing the interest to live in a single state, what are

24 the interests and how to put them into practice.

25 Once we noted that there is no such interest, we offered a variety

1 of options. One of them was the possibility to establish a confederation

2 comprising the republics of the former Yugoslavia. This proposal or draft

3 Serbian constitution, which I think was adopted in the fall of 1990, in

4 fact speaks about the understanding of a confederation by the political

5 leadership in Serbia. It states that a confederation is not a state, and

6 it also emphasises that they could not adopt this option since the

7 political issue and question of the borders between the republics could

8 arise.

9 The point of departure in this matter was the following: The

10 borders between -- of the republics in Yugoslavia are supposed to be

11 administrative borders, which is contrary to facts. The first

12 constitution after the Second World War outlined the borders. The borders

13 were drawn on the basis of a consensus, and from that point onward, all

14 Yugoslav constitutions included a provision that the borders between the

15 republics cannot be changed without consensus of all the republics.

16 Now, how I understand this message, as you've asked me, sir, let

17 me answer in the following way: The message was that should Yugoslavia

18 fall apart and should other forms be opted for, such as a confrontation,

19 Serbia will never agree to a situation in which parts of the Serbian

20 people living outside the territory of the Republic of Serbia be left

21 beyond the Serb republic.

22 This is the difference in concepts that I referred to in my

23 introductory statements. Our understanding of the Yugoslav state

24 differed, on our decisions consequently differed. However, let me

25 emphasise that this is an approach through which Serbia, given the

1 circumstances such as they were, tried to resolve the Serbian national

2 question. This is, of course, a very difficult question to resolve. The

3 alternative would have been to use the European standards and criteria, to

4 use the international standards and criteria to safeguard and protect the

5 rights of ethnic Serbs living as minorities in other republics throughout

6 Yugoslavia, particularly in the Republic of Croatia as well as in the

7 republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the latter, the Serbs were one of the

8 three constitutive peoples in the republic.

9 As the Serb political doctrine emphasised throughout this period

10 that Serbs cannot live as an ethnic minority in any part of Yugoslavia,

11 this approach was a sort of a logical philosophical continuation of this

12 doctrine. But it may also have implied that borders might be redrawn by

13 use of force.

14 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, that's a convenient time.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may it be acceptable if I take another

16 half an hour, and I hope no more with this witness. That will mean that I

17 will have taken something in the region of two hours and I hope leave

18 enough time in the remainder of the morning for cross-examination.

19 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that.

20 Mr. Kucan, I should say we're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes.

21 Could you remember, please, during the adjournment not to speak to anyone

22 about your evidence until it's over. That's a direction we give to all

23 witnesses. Could you be back in 20 minutes, please.

24 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

25 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, you can have the extra half an hour now. We

2 may, as a result, have to sit rather longer into the adjournment period,

3 but we can do that, I'm told.

4 MR. NICE: I'm grateful.

5 Q. Mr. Kucan, I'll deal with some matters in brief because there's no

6 need for us to deal with them extensively. Paragraph 36 of the court

7 summary. The plebiscite you've already referred to in December with very

8 large figures in favour of having an independent state, that decision to

9 take place six months later, as I think you've already told us. Just yes

10 or no to that.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Paragraph 39 and 40 of the court summary. You're aware from

13 passages in Jovic's published diary of the possibility of meetings between

14 Kadijevic and Milosevic, closed meetings between Kadijevic, Milosevic, and

15 Jovic dealing with military matters. Were you aware - just yes or no

16 again - of those meetings at the time or did it only come to light when

17 you read the book or learnt about it afterwards?

18 A. No, I did not know about them then.

19 Q. Paragraph 41. Did Slovenia and Croatia at this time or about this

20 time favour the notion of a confederation of states, something that was

21 rejected at a Presidency meeting in January 1991 which was attended by

22 republican authorities?

23 A. Yes. In summer of 1990 at the Presidency of Yugoslavia, a

24 decision was made that Slovenia and Croatia should elaborate such a draft

25 contract and the rest of the four republics a modern confederation

1 concept. However, this concept, this idea was rejected at the following

2 session of the Presidency in January.

3 Q. Paragraph 42. Were there talks between Serb and Slovenian

4 delegations in January of 1991 where you headed the Slovenian delegation

5 and the accused headed the Serbian delegation where this confederation was

6 discussed; and then in February were there meetings of the republican

7 presidents in Belgrade, again consideration of confederation, confederal

8 system, again rejected by Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

9 Macedonia; and as a result of that, did you come to the view that the

10 notion of a confederal model was not going to be accepted?

11 A. On the plebiscite on Slovenia's independence was adopted on

12 December 23rd in 1990, and the results were proclaimed on the 26th of

13 December, when the documents were also made public. And there are two

14 characteristics to these documents that I wish to underscore. First, that

15 Slovenia wishes to settle all relations with other republics once its

16 independent, wishes to do so by consensus and wishes also to establish

17 what the possibilities are for the future institutional cooperation with

18 the republics of Yugoslavia.

19 And a second feature of the documents then published after the

20 plebiscite and around the plebiscite was the following; namely, that it

21 will be the Assembly and the -- the Assembly and the government that will

22 have to carry out all the necessary acts and measures necessary for

23 Slovenia to become an independent state and basing this decision of theirs

24 on the constitution and other legal documents of the Republic of Slovenia.

25 And the Slovene political leadership then also decided as regards their

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1 intentions about the mode of independence and ways of regulating relations

2 with other republics to do so in direct contact and talks with the

3 leaderships of other republics and do so also at the meeting of federal

4 bodies that we only saw as mediators between the republics and provinces.

5 Our stand was that the constituent parts of Yugoslavia are the republics

6 of the federation. Hence, the meeting that I had already mentioned, the

7 10th of January, 1991, when this bilateral meeting was held between the

8 leadership of Slovenia and the leadership of Serbia. And the delegations

9 at this meeting -- well, I was present there as well as the accused, and

10 we could establish there that this was the end of this concept of

11 transforming Yugoslavia into a confederation.

12 Q. As we move towards the time when independence of Slovenia was to

13 be --

14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters would kindly request you to

15 slow the witness down, please.

16 THE WITNESS: I got no translation.

17 JUDGE MAY: You're being asked to slow down a bit, Mr. Kucan.

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. As we approach the time when independence of Slovenia was

20 declared, we note that Croatia had announced an intention to declare

21 independence at the same time and that there was then a meeting in Brdo on

22 the 11th of April of 1991, in the process of continuing discussions and

23 negotiations. Paragraph 45 of the summary.

24 In the course of that meeting and during a break, did you go for a

25 walk alone with the accused, talking about the difficulties and

1 frustrations of that meeting, and can you tell us, please, in summary,

2 what it was the accused said?

3 A. Yes. This meeting did take place, and it was one of the meetings

4 that were regularly held. After January 1991, regular -- regular meetings

5 of presidents of Yugoslav republics to discuss, in fact, just one topic,

6 what a possible way out of the crisis is and also how to reshape living in

7 Yugoslavia and the co-existing in Yugoslavia and whether a formula could

8 be found for the future.

9 And this particular meeting that was held at Brdo near Ljubljana

10 was one such meeting, and at this meeting this is indeed also one of the

11 questions that was discussed. And I did say that 26 months between the

12 decision at the plebiscite and before independence was running out and

13 that this discussion should become much more concrete.

14 President Tudjman also said at the meeting that should Slovenia do

15 so, the very same day Croatia was going to act accordingly and do the

16 same. And we did discuss this with the accused at the -- when we took

17 this walk together, and also after that, the accused said to me, "Well, if

18 the Slovenes really want to leave the federation, well, in that case it

19 will not be possible for us to be opposed to it," he said. "However, the

20 conditions will have to be met before Slovenia can leave Yugoslavia.

21 However, the same could not go for Croatia in view of the fact that a good

22 portion -- number of Serbs were living on the territory of Croatia and in

23 this way they are -- they really have this blood link, blood ties with

24 Croatia."

25 And when we heard this proposal about the Serb constitution in the

1 tape and when it was said that it was not possible to accept any other

2 form of relations between the republics in Yugoslavia than the federation,

3 because otherwise all different questions are open, including also the

4 borders of Yugoslavia.

5 Q. Paragraph 49 in the summary. Slovenia's independence was declared

6 publicly on the 25th of June of 1991. I think you made the point that all

7 documents were published and open for consideration, and I think there was

8 inevitably some celebration on the day or the night of independence;

9 correct?

10 A. Yes. On the 25th of June, the Slovene Assembly adopted the

11 documents, the fundamental charter on Slovenia's independence, then also a

12 constitutional law to implement it as well as the independence declaration

13 stating again what I have been trying to say all along, namely that

14 Slovenia took this decision to exercise its right to self-determination

15 but does not wish to do so at the detriment or against the right of any

16 other nation in Yugoslavia, that it also wishes to settle all relations

17 from the past and for the future as well as agree on forms of cooperation

18 in the future. And these documents were published the following day, on

19 the 26th of June, and it is then on that evening that this was celebrated

20 and this was the sanctioned decision taken by the citizens of Slovenia

21 concerning the autonomy and the independence of the Slovene state.

22 Q. Very well. We know of the short conflict, military conflict,

23 between Slovenia and the JNA. Tell us when that started and when it

24 finished, please.

25 A. Well, the JNA carried out this aggression immediately in the

1 course of or after the celebration of independence. If my memory serves

2 me right, that was 2.30 or 2:00 p.m. that night with the tanks that came

3 out of the barracks on the way to the external borders of the republic of

4 Slovenia. And this decision, so it seems, although we knew nothing about

5 it, was adopted at a meeting of the federal government, but we considered

6 it illegal and unconstitutional because only the Presidency of Yugoslavia

7 could actually take such decisions, and this conflict or aggression or war

8 on Slovenia then was first of all interrupted and then came to an end on

9 the 7th of July with -- talks then were organised on the Brioni islands

10 upon the proposal of the ministerial Troika of the European Union, and

11 during the period of the 27th of June to the 7th of July made

12 interventions within the framework of these armed conflict, and it is

13 Hans van den Broek, the then Foreign Minister of the Netherlands that led

14 the talks.

15 Q. The withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia, please. When it

16 happened, what did you notice about where the JNA withdrew to?

17 A. The decision on the JNA's or the rest of the army's withdrawal,

18 there were no longer Slovenes or Croats in JNA or members of other

19 nations. This decision was adopted at the federal Presidency's meeting on

20 the 18th of July, the first ten days after the Brioni meeting, that is.

21 And the Presidency decided to ensure this withdrawal within a period of

22 three months, and the last soldier left the Slovene territory on the 26th

23 of October the same year.

24 Now, among the documents that were adopted by the Assembly of

25 Slovenia on the 26th of June, well, the period that was decided upon was

1 five years to start with. However, then the Presidency decided that it

2 would just be three months.

3 The JNA did not withdraw to elsewhere in Slovenia or Croatia but

4 mainly to Bosnia-Herzegovina and especially the territories with the

5 majority -- which was majority -- with a Serb majority.

6 Q. Thank you very much. In Exhibit 448, the extracts from Jovic's

7 diary, there are entries that you have reviewed on page numbered 311 at

8 the foot for the 5th of July, and I'm going to just touch them rather than

9 go through them because of the time.

10 The 5th of July which begins with Jovic saying, "Slobodan and I

11 scheduled a meeting with Kadijevic which we regard as critical. The

12 situation in the country is almost tragic. The JNA has been defeated and

13 routed in Slovenia. Army morale has hit rock bottom." Matters of that

14 sort.

15 We go over the page, in fact over two pages to the 15th of July on

16 page 326: "We finally adopted a decision on withdrawing the JNA from

17 Slovenia. Formally the decision states the JNA units from Slovenia will

18 be redeployed to new positions," and so on.

19 And then the 30th of July: "Veljko, Slobodan and I are sitting in

20 my office before the Presidency with the presidents of the republics and

21 the future of Yugoslavia." Next paragraph: "The JNA should be

22 transformed into a military force of those who want to remain in

23 Yugoslavia."

24 We are very pressed for time now, Mr. Kucan. You've reviewed

25 those entries. Anything you particularly want to refer to in them? Do

1 they reflect, although you may not have known it at times, what you

2 understand was going on?

3 A. Except for the meeting of the Presidency that I mentioned, I said

4 the 17th of July, it was the 15th of July. We did not have information

5 about this meeting, but withdrawal to the positions to which the JNA

6 withdrew from Slovenia confirms actually what we find in these notes as to

7 the reasons why they go there and what their tasks is.

8 Q. Have you also reviewed passages in a book by Kadijevic, which we

9 haven't yet exhibited but will become a separate exhibit, if it may,

10 please. The same terms.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that's Prosecution Exhibit 449.

12 MR. NICE:

13 Q. Without looking at the extracts, in order to save time, if you can

14 deal with this, Mr. Kucan, what's your view on how Kadijevic describes the

15 process of nationalisation of the army following its withdrawal from

16 Slovenia?

17 A. Which extract is this, please? If you're referring to the book --

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. The book. When the book was published, I read it, so what would

20 you like to know exactly in connection with this book?

21 Q. Do you have any immediate recollection of any particular passage

22 dealing with the withdrawal of the army? I'll withdraw that question for

23 the time being. It can possibly be raised in cross-examination.

24 A. Well, if you are referring to those excerpts and their description

25 and his thoughts as to where the army should withdraw and what it should

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1 be done, obviously this is true, because it was part of the recognition

2 that Yugoslavia no longer can be kept together. The army had been an

3 integrating factor. Now with the withdrawal from Slovenia, its strategic

4 mission changed. Not to protect and safeguard Yugoslavia but, rather, to

5 protect the smaller Yugoslav borders, particularly the parts inhabited by

6 ethnic Serbs.

7 In fact, how I understand it is that apparently they do not want,

8 or he doesn't want to, agree to parts of ethnic Serbs living outside a

9 single state.

10 MR. NICE: Your Honours may want to have an eye on this extract on

11 page 73 at the foot in particular and towards the foot, and the witness

12 may wish to recall that there's reference in the book by Kadijevic to the

13 Karlobag-Virovitica lines and thereabouts.

14 Q. Do you have any comment to make on what has been said about those

15 lines?

16 A. Yes. Now, as to where would be the borders of the limited

17 Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia without Slovenia and parts of Croatia inhabited

18 predominantly by ethnic Serbs, well, these do coincide with this line

19 Virovitica-Karlovac further down to the south of Herzegovina and

20 Montenegro. This had been spoken about in Yugoslavia quite often before

21 and afterwards, and in fact, this book by Kadijevic simply confirms the

22 reasoning that we had known from before.

23 Q. One other matter of fact, two other matters of commentary before I

24 finish.

25 The matter of fact I didn't deal with, it's at paragraph 14 of the

1 summary. It goes back in time. In the build-up to the decision to secede

2 or to have independence, did you have limitations on the information you

3 received from the army? Did Slovenia suffer limitations in what it was

4 told by the army?

5 A. As far as the relationship between Slovenia and the JNA goes, this

6 was characterised by a series of conflicts from 1988 onwards. The events

7 that I'm sure the Chamber is fully familiar with. Therefore, it is quite

8 understandable that we either had received no information from the JNA or

9 we received very scattered information, particularly as far as their

10 position and plans for Slovenia.

11 We did know, however, that a special staff had been established to

12 regulate the situation in Slovenia. This is what we have been told by the

13 Slovene generals. However, we had no possibility whatsoever to verify

14 this and check this at a later point in time.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honours, there are two exhibits I haven't touched,

16 tabs 4 and 5, being articles where this witness was interviewed in 1992

17 and 1993. The purpose of them, and they can be seen from the extracts

18 included, that the phrase "Greater Serbia" was in use at the time even if

19 not used by the accused. It was used as reflecting the ideas that were

20 going on so far as Serbia was concerned.

21 Q. My two conceptual questions that I want you to deal with in about

22 one minute or two minutes each. As the -- paragraph 61.

23 You take the view, I think, Mr. Kucan, that there were different

24 values of what Yugoslavia should become after its break-up, and you take a

25 view as to how it was that nationalism came to play a part. Could you

1 express that, but really, I'm afraid, very shortly.

2 A. In my introduction, I emphasised that one of the typical features

3 of the crisis in Yugoslavia was also a crisis of values, ethical and

4 others, and that in fact Yugoslavia as a non-aligned state and such as it

5 had been had performed its role. Once the values, the system of values

6 fell apart, it was the nationalist concept that had become the single

7 criterion of any action and activity which by itself and in itself is not

8 a tragic development.

9 The desire and aspiration for freedom and independence by a people

10 is a legitimate right. However, the question is whether this right can be

11 exercised at the detriment of other people's rights, and this is where one

12 of the major conceptual differences lies.

13 Q. Yes. Do you take any view about how there was an absence of

14 values, or a vacuum, indeed, that needed to be filled?

15 A. Yes. In fact, our proposals made at the 14th Congress of the

16 League of Communists of Yugoslavia, i.e., the proposals made by the

17 Slovene delegation, in fact were emphasising the need to fill this vacuum

18 out with a new system of values and standards which Yugoslavia or, rather,

19 Europe had been promoting since the Second World War, and I'm referring to

20 Europe that had -- stood for the values such as democracy, open market

21 economy, openness towards the world, and the need to safeguard the image

22 that Yugoslavia had had internationally.

23 I should also like to emphasise the following: Officially,

24 "Greater Serbia" is not a term that had been used by the Serbian

25 leadership, but the Republic of Serbia per se and the Republic of Serbia

1 including all ethnic Serbians of course makes a big difference.

2 Q. You spoke earlier of the two concepts of Yugoslavia, one as the

3 vehicle where all Serbs lived under one roof, the other as a community --

4 as nations in a community.

5 The break-up, did it reflect one or other of those concepts, in

6 your view?

7 A. The manner in which the concepts were implemented as well as the

8 facts that took place in fact speak for themselves, and they are now shown

9 today very vividly in the concepts that have been pursued by the current

10 parts of the former Yugoslavia, and it is now obvious which parts are

11 living under circumstances and values and standards that are

12 characteristic of modern Europe, of today.

13 Q. And finally, at paragraph 62, do you feel it important to compare

14 the break-up of the former Yugoslavia with the break-up of other

15 territories into constituent parts at the same time or similar time?

16 A. By all means. This is very important for at least two reasons.

17 Number one, our proposal also to the international community as well as to

18 the European Union to realise and recognise that Yugoslavia's days were

19 over and that their intervention is needed for this break-up to be

20 controlled and free of violence.

21 The second reason is closely associated with the first one. The

22 response to our requests and proposals always was: Yugoslavia cannot be

23 broken up because this would be a very bad model for the Soviet Union, and

24 the Soviet Union is a much more complex case than Yugoslavia.

25 In these changes and restructuring after the fall of the Berlin

1 Wall, when the former Czechoslovakia fell apart, the Soviet Union fell

2 apart and both these states fell apart on the basis of an agreement,

3 peacefully, without the use of violence and without bloodshed. In a

4 tragic and bloody manner, it was only Yugoslavia that broke up. The

5 question, the crucial question, is why this took place and why did it

6 happen in Yugoslavia alone?

7 Q. Thank you very much. There will be further questions from the

8 accused.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm not quite sure how much

11 time you're going to give me for the cross-examination of this witness,

12 because I can see that it's already after half past eleven.

13 JUDGE MAY: We're going to give you the same as the Prosecution.

14 That will be one hour, 50 minutes. We might extend that, if you don't

15 waste time, to two hours.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that that's too short a

17 time, but that is your -- the practice you have applied here.

18 JUDGE MAY: The witness is only available today. We must get

19 through his evidence and we must do so as equitably as we can.

20 Mr. Tapuskovic.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I should like to

22 ask your indulgence for a minute of explanation by me. As the amicus

23 throughout all this time, I have truly endeavoured to save as much time as

24 possible. I think that I can say on behalf of the amicus that to bring in

25 a key witness of this nature for only one day is not sufficient. I don't

1 think it is enough time for us to get through everything that is

2 necessary.

3 I shall abide and respect your decision with regard to the time

4 allotted for cross-examination, but I fear that we're going to find

5 ourselves in a situation in which I will have no time to ask the witness

6 anything, whereas I have very many key questions and issues to raise.

7 So I should like to know how much time I can count on, as the

8 amicus, for my questioning. Thank you.

9 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, we have in this trial, as in any

10 trial, to balance the need for evidence with the availability of

11 witnesses, and in that availability we have to consider the convenience

12 and the possibility of witnesses coming. That's one thing to bear in

13 mind.

14 Secondly, with respect to the amicus, of course you have an

15 important role to fulfil, but it's more important that the time is taken

16 up with cross-examination by the accused, and he should have his allotted

17 time.

18 As you've heard, there may be extra time this afternoon, and we'll

19 consider whether it would be possible to fit as much as possible of your

20 cross-examination in.

21 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] May I just be allowed to add, I

22 don't understand, although I do respect the work obligations of Mr. Kucan,

23 however, witnesses of this kind, key witnesses, might I say, are brought

24 into the courtroom for only one day, and I think that we ought to extend a

25 caution to the Prosecution to ask them to find enough time, and I think

1 every man in his life has enough time to spare, so that people can come in

2 and have longer time with the witnesses. So that is the objection and

3 remark I have to make on behalf of the amicus. That's something we'll

4 have to weigh up and assess. Thank you.

5 JUDGE MAY: We must get on now with the examination and not take

6 up further time.

7 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As we were saying, it's 25 minutes

9 to 12:00 now.

10 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

11 Q. [Interpretation] Let me ask a preliminary question first. You

12 mentioned the war in Slovenia. You used three expressions; "conflict,"

13 "aggression," and "war." Did Serbia have anything at all to do with that

14 war in Slovenia which, as you said, went on for ten days?

15 A. Well, I used the expression "the war in Slovenia." I apologise.

16 A war against Slovenia. Slovenia was confronted with JNA. Who influenced

17 the acts of the JNA can be judged today on the basis of the documents

18 which are at the disposal of this Court.

19 Q. Very well. At that time, and I hope you also know today, that we

20 in Serbia didn't know about that intervention at all when it began. We

21 had no idea, and we couldn't have known in advance when we didn't know

22 when it actually began.

23 A. Distinguished Your Honours, we in Slovenia turned to the federal

24 bodies, believing that the federal bodies were controlling the JNA, and

25 the federation was the sole other party in this dialogue between the two.

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1 Q. Well, all right. But that -- does that then mean that Serbia has

2 nothing to do with the war?

3 A. I do not know. Documents speak about that, as well as books which

4 had been written later. My conclusions today on the basis of facts that I

5 know today I didn't -- and which I didn't know at the time they were

6 happening.

7 Q. What was the conclusion?

8 JUDGE MAY: Well, you know, it would be much easier and much more

9 productive to deal with what the witness himself knew and what he dealt

10 with, and what he said about this is that he doesn't know at the time

11 whether Serbia was involved. He dealt with the federal authorities.

12 Now, what I caution you against, Mr. Milosevic, because it wastes

13 time, is getting into arguments with witnesses, dealing with things which

14 they haven't come to give evidence about.

15 His conclusions are not relevant what -- unless they affected what

16 happened at the time. His conclusions about the evidence are subject to

17 what this Trial Chamber is going to find. We're going to make conclusions

18 about what the evidence is insofar as it's relevant to this indictment.

19 So there's not much point asking him about his conclusions.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not asking him about his

21 conclusions. What I'm asking him is about his knowledge.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. I have the transcript from the meeting of the 21st of August, and

24 I'm going to read out the first sentence and one sentence later on. "'I

25 am not going to be responsible,' says Milan Kucan: 'I'm not going to be

1 responsible to the Prime Minister who quite obviously, now that he has

2 lost the war, wants to win everything else,'" and so on and so forth.

3 And then there's another sentence. In speaking about the fact

4 that the two members of the federal government who had left would not be

5 returning, you go on to say: "I don't have to convince you that you're

6 not going to find a man in Slovenia, including these two men, who will

7 return to the federal government and work in it. That is the SIV, the

8 federal government for which we know in Slovenia started the war in

9 Slovenia." And those are your very words.

10 Have I quoted you correctly?

11 A. Yes, and it's clear that Slovenia acted in this way, and that was

12 also my stand in connection with that.

13 JUDGE MAY: Which year are we talking about and what were the

14 circumstances of the meeting? Which meeting was it?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was a meeting of the Presidency

16 of the SFRY in extended composition, as was the term used at the time,

17 which meant that those present -- we were present, the presidents of the

18 Presidencies or the presidents of the republics, the individual Yugoslav

19 republics. I attended the meeting and so did the witness.

20 JUDGE MAY: And which year?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The -- it was on the 21st of August,

22 1991, after the conflict in Slovenia. And therefore this observation made

23 by the witness, which quite clearly speaks about who did what at the time.

24 Q. But let's dwell for a moment on some more serious matters because

25 these are things you have talked about. I think they're essential.

1 Was it clear that the federal organs, as you yourself state,

2 undertook individual measures and took steps to make it impossible to

3 infringe upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the SFRY? Was

4 that the explanation that was given at the time?

5 A. Your Honours, Slovenia was not infringing upon the territorial

6 integrity of SFR Yugoslavia. It was -- in a legitimate way it was

7 availing itself of its right to self-determination.

8 Q. Is it true that the very next day, that is to say after the

9 proclamation of the independence of Slovenia on the 25th of June, already

10 on the 26th of June, the day after, you took control of the borders, took

11 down all the plaques which said "Yugoslavia" on it at the border

12 crossings, that you took over the customs control, customs offices and so

13 on and so forth?

14 A. In line with the decisions of the republican Assembly, after

15 proclaiming its independence, it effectively took over the authority on

16 the border and carried out these operations mentioned by the accused and

17 put up the border plaques with the name of Republic of Slovenia.

18 Q. So the activities that were taken by the federal government were

19 reactions to what had in fact taken place. That's right, isn't it?

20 A. Well, six months after the plebiscite and the announcement that

21 the decision of the plebiscite would be implemented in six months, there

22 were no other reactions with which we would resolve the situation after

23 the independence of Slovenia.

24 Q. Do you happen to remember the statements made by the US State

25 Secretary, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the 12th of January,

1 1995, in the American Senate, that the war was started by Slovenia? Do

2 you know about that statement?

3 A. I know also of similar statements, and I don't deny the right of

4 anyone to have his own opinion on what has been happening in Yugoslavia,

5 but of course I have a right to my own opinion, which I have also stated

6 in this court.

7 Q. I'm not talking about an opinion. I'm talking about facts. And

8 do you happen to remember, Warren Zimmermann wrote this, the last American

9 ambassador to the SFRY, in a journal called Foreign Affairs, the

10 March/April issue 1991, the title is "Remembering the Catastrophe in

11 Yugoslavia," and he writes the following: "Contrary to generally held

12 opinions, the Slovenes were the ones who started the war. Their

13 declaration of independence, which was not preceded by any efforts to

14 negotiate, really did place under their control all border crossings

15 between Slovenia and its two neighbours Italy and Austria. This meant

16 that Slovenia was the sole international passage between the Western

17 Yugoslavia and that it appropriated the right and goods intended for other

18 countries and the revenues from customs taxes which amounted to 75 per

19 cent of the national budget. Even a less primitive army than the JNA

20 would have reacted. The worst thing of all was the understandable wish of

21 the Slovenes to be independent, however, condemned the rest of Yugoslavia

22 for war."

23 And that was verbatim a quotation by him.

24 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness -- just a moment. You read that out.

25 The witness should have a chance to comment on it, part by part.

1 Mr. Kucan, you've dealt with the point about whether the Slovenes

2 started the war. What's said is there was no effort to negotiate

3 beforehand, and the effect was that Slovenia was the international

4 passage, as it's put, between Yugoslavia and that you appropriated various

5 rights in connection with customs and the like, so the JNA was bound to

6 react.

7 You've probably heard this, these sort of comments before, but

8 obviously you should have the chance of responding to them since the

9 accused has put them to you.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is the position of the former

11 Ambassador Zimmerman of the United States. I am acquainted with that.

12 There are also other and different opinions from that.

13 Of course the assertion doesn't stand that Slovenia did not -- did

14 nothing in order to assure that this would take place in a peaceful and

15 orderly manner.

16 Already at the meeting in January, in January 1991, after the

17 meetings when it turned out that no agreement could be achieved about the

18 reorganisation of Yugoslavia, our Assembly, the Assembly in February 1991

19 adopted a declaration on an agreed upon disassociation with a proposal,

20 which contained a proposal how to ensure Slovene self-determination where

21 it was also stated that it doesn't want it any other way than through an

22 agreement with other republics.

23 This declaration had been then sent to all the Assemblies of other

24 republics and provinces. The only answer and positive answer we received

25 was from the Assembly of Croatia. No other answer received.

1 So this was just one of the examples what Slovenia did in order to

2 assure that this would happen in agreement and in a peaceful way.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Kucan, I hope we're not challenging the fact that nobody in

5 Yugoslavia disputed the right of Slovenia to self-determination, the right

6 of the Slovenian people to self-determination.

7 A. No, that is not true.

8 Q. Well, who, then, did challenge the right to self-determination?

9 A. There is -- was a difference between the principled view, stand,

10 and the practical stand, namely that this right can be implemented up to

11 the right of secession or that the federal bodies determined that.

12 While in the federal bodies you had a majority decision-making.

13 We know what that looked like at the Congress, the 14th Congress in

14 January, 1991, when Slovenia came with its legitimate and rightful

15 proposals and through which it was brutally outvoted.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you comment on the passage that

17 Mr. Milosevic quoted to the effect that one result of your declaration of

18 independence was that you had the right to impose customs duties on goods

19 coming into Western Yugoslavia. I'm not sure I quite understand that.

20 Was that a consequence?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] One of the decisions of the Slovene

22 Assemblies was to take over the customs duties, customs duties which were

23 taxed on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. It would have been

24 paid into a special fund and then the decision concerning this fund would

25 be taken during the talks on the future.

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1 JUDGE ROBINSON: You mean the decision as to how the funds would

2 be distributed among the other republics. I see. Thanks.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. This was also specified in the

4 Brioni accord Annex 1. It was July 1991.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. July 1991. The Brioni agreement was after the war and here we're

7 talking about the war.

8 So tell me, as you did have the possibility of stepping down from

9 Yugoslavia in the way Slovakia did, for example, and you opted for

10 violence and you played the decisive role, and of course Germany, Austria,

11 the politicians that you discussed this issue with, why then did you opt

12 for war when you could have stepped down peacefully? Why did you attack

13 the JNA in Slovenia?

14 A. The decision concerning the customs and the fate of the customs

15 was a decision adopted by the Slovene Assembly on the 25th of June. And

16 as far as other countries and politicians from other countries, I cannot

17 involve them concerning the Slovene decision. The decision was taken by

18 us. We weren't influenced by anybody else. The risk we took upon

19 ourselves.

20 As far as Slovakia is concerned, nobody set any conditions. It

21 was an agreement which was reached by the two presidents of the Czech and

22 the Slovak government.

23 Q. You just mentioned the fact that you weren't able to go to the

24 federal organs not to be outvoted, to avoid being outvoted. I think you

25 know that in the Federal Assembly, according to the constitution, nobody

1 could be outvoted and that the federal council and the council of chambers

2 and provinces existed at the time, so Slovenia could not have been

3 outvoted on an issue of this kind. A consensus was being offered.

4 So bearing this in mind, why, then, did you attack the JNA on your

5 territory, the JNA which went there to --

6 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer one question at a time.

7 The question was that you were being offered, it's said, a

8 consensus. Would that be true or not?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The law on secession as was proposed

10 would have been adopted in the federal chamber, not in the chamber of

11 republics and provinces where consensus was needed. It was the federal

12 chamber where the majority vote prevailed. And also, the Serbian

13 leadership, when speaking of greater efficiency of the federal bodies,

14 they also insisted one man, one vote, and it meant that for the smaller

15 nations within the federation, we'd be outvoted. So this assertion

16 doesn't stand.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Well, it is precisely the fact that this law was not adopted

19 because of a lack of consensus confirms that the assertion does stand,

20 because the law was not adopted because they could not agree on the basis

21 of a consensus. Isn't that so, Mr. Kucan? Why wasn't the law adopted,

22 then, if we had the majority in the Assembly, and those four other

23 republics, and were able in the federal chamber to adopt it by a majority

24 a vote? It wasn't adopted, wasn't passed because there was no consensus.

25 You did not allow it to be adopted, in fact, and to step down peacefully

1 as a result.

2 A. Your Honours, it would be difficult for me -- as a member of a

3 small nation, it would be difficult for me to dictate to the majority. It

4 was another matter was at stake. Was it a decision, Slovene decision of

5 secession or issue of disassociation from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia wouldn't

6 exist without Slovenia. We were a constitutive element of Yugoslavia.

7 And this has roots in 1918 when the country was founded and what it is.

8 That is why we proposed this concept of disassociation and the declaration

9 of the Republican Assembly in February 1991, it proposed it to the

10 assemblies of the other republics to reflect and reconsider it.

11 I know also of many other proposals concerning -- and drafts of

12 this law on secession, and there were two lines of thinking, the

13 indissolubility of the republics concerning all the debts of all the

14 individual republics, so how much each and every republic borrowed abroad

15 for its development, and it would be requested that the -- it would also

16 request that its workers be employed also in all other republics. So

17 these were the thinkings along the lines concerning this draft law.

18 Q. Well, that's precisely why I'm asking you this, because you

19 yourself said a moment ago the right to self-determination, which is the

20 right enjoyed by all nations, all ethnic groups, and that that could not

21 be realised at the expense of the same rights enjoyed by others. So is

22 that clear? Do we agree on that point at least?

23 A. As far as the fact that each nation has the right to

24 self-determination, yes, they all. But it's not an abstract category. It

25 lives in a reality, and it is linked to the republic in the context of the

1 border, because the borders between the republics were borders and borders

2 that cannot be changed without the agreement of the affected republic.

3 Therefore, the decision of self-determination was fixed on the territory

4 and not the changes of territories.

5 We have not tried to infringe upon the territories either of the

6 other republics of Yugoslavia or of other neighbouring countries.

7 Q. And the intervention of the federal government wasn't on

8 inter-republican borders but on the external borders of Yugoslavia which

9 it was its constitutional right to do, wasn't it? And you attacked the

10 army on your territory. The Yugoslav People's Army, the only legitimate

11 army in Yugoslavia at that time, and you attacked it on your territory,

12 which took up positions on the external borders of Yugoslavia. Isn't that

13 right?

14 A. For many years, Your Honours, I had this unpleasant duty to carry

15 on the political debates on what Yugoslavia is. The external borders of

16 Yugoslavia were also Slovene borders. And when Slovenia decided to go

17 independent legally, all Slovene borders became external borders. And as

18 I said before, there can be no Yugoslavia without Slovenia, so there was

19 no need to defend the Yugoslav borders, at least not there where Slovenia

20 was.

21 Q. Very well. Obviously this is changing the subject, because I

22 quoted Zimmerman who is giving the exact reasons why you did that. But to

23 be practical, let us move on.

24 Do you please remember your involvement on NTV television, one of

25 those private TV stations in 1995, in November, together with Mesic,

1 Tomac, Spegelj in a live programme? Do you remember that programme that

2 you were a participant of?

3 A. I would have to look at the footage. I would have to look at the

4 footage; we had many such programmes, I don't know exactly which you're

5 thinking about.

6 Q. Very well. Do you remember, I'm referring to the programme aired

7 on the 8th of November, on the NTV private TV station in which you

8 participated together with Stipe Mesic who at the time headed the party of

9 Croatian Independent Democrats, and also participating were Spegelj, Tomac

10 and others. It was a Kontakt programme. Spectators called in and you had

11 a lot of discussion. I'm sure you didn't have many programmes with the

12 same participants, especially on that date and that year, so surely you

13 remember that programme.

14 A. Your Honours, I do remember the programme but I don't remember the

15 date, and of course I don't have such a memory to recollect both the

16 programmes and the dates, but I do remember participating in the

17 programme.

18 Q. Very well. That's fine. Now, do you remember that in that

19 programme Mesic - you were present - declared, Mesic declared, that the

20 former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Hans Dietrich Genscher, and

21 the Pope John Paul II, by the direct agreement and support designed to

22 break up the former Yugoslavia had practically contributed most to that

23 actually happening? Do you remember the positions he took and the

24 explanations he gave along those lines?

25 A. Those were the stance of Mr. Mesic. I already mentioned before

1 that foreign statesmen will not be involved in this story of the

2 independence of Slovenia. Also, in connection with the concrete name --

3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kucan, let us just stick to whatever it is the

4 accused wants to put. That is what Mr. Mesic said, something along those

5 lines; is that right?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. But my experience with these

7 people is different. That is what I wanted to state.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. You mean with reference to Genscher and the Pope?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Yes. But I'm asking you whether Mesic said what I said.

12 JUDGE MAY: He has agreed.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, I see. Fine.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what you exactly want

15 from me.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. I'm asking you, Mr. Kucan. You are testifying here. Among other

18 things, half of your testimony referred to the book by Borisav Jovic. So

19 I'm now asking you, for instance, about a statement by Stipe Mesic in

20 front of you in a Kontakt programme in which you took part together. You

21 said here that you could confirm here what Jovic said at meetings that you

22 attended. Now I'm asking you whether you could confirm what Mesic said in

23 a Kontakt programme you were in.

24 JUDGE MAY: Let's move on, Mr. Milosevic. The witness has agreed

25 with that.

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1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's fine.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Let us just specify something else, please. Do you remember that

4 at the time Mesic said that he came to Belgrade, to the highest position

5 in the federation in order to, through the mediation of the Yugoslav

6 diplomacy at the time, to get in touch with the most influential factors

7 and to persuade them that the survival of Yugoslavia was nonsense? And I

8 have a quotation: "I wanted to convey that the idea of the break-up of

9 Yugoslavia to those who had the greatest influence on its fate, to

10 Genscher and the Pope. In fact, I had three meetings with Genscher. He

11 enabled a contact with the Holy See. The Pope and Genscher agreed with

12 the total break-up of SFRY." Was that what he said?

13 A. Your Honours, this programme which I participated together with

14 Mr. Mesic, I can confirm that. But to be able to confirm each and every

15 word, I'd need either a transcript or a video in order to be able to

16 confirm it. These are very weighty words, and to testify like this

17 wouldn't -- just wouldn't do.

18 JUDGE MAY: Were these put to Mr. Mesic? I don't remember. Just

19 a moment. Just a moment.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's not waste time.

21 MR. NICE: I do not recall these passages being put, no.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, they were not put because when I

23 was cross-examining Mesic, I didn't have this information about that

24 particular programme. Otherwise, I would have surely. But since Mr.

25 Kucan was a participant, I think it is quite relevant to establish that.

1 JUDGE MAY: The witness can't remember the particular detail, and

2 he's dealt with it generally. Now, let's move on.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Do you remember that Tomac at the time recalled that Slovenia and

6 Croatia, as long as 1990, had formed a strong partnership in favour of the

7 break-up of Yugoslavia? He was, according to his criteria, was favourable

8 for you, and this tandem, this couple, consisted of Franjo Tudjman and

9 yourself; is that right?

10 A. Your Honours, I and nobody else from the leadership of Slovenia

11 worked on the concept of the break-up of Yugoslavia. We only worked

12 together on the reorganisation, restructuring of Yugoslavia.

13 I mentioned the session of the Presidency in the summer of 1990

14 when it was agreed that Slovenia and Croatia prepare a concept of a

15 federation, and also a confederal agreement was drawn up but which wasn't

16 accepted by the other republics.

17 Q. Yes, yes. Four republics, as you yourself said, did not agree to

18 it. But then let us go back since I asked you why you attacked the

19 Yugoslav People's Army when it wasn't jeopardising anyone over there. I'm

20 asking you now, is it true that during the conflict in Slovenia 44 members

21 of the JNA were killed, 184 seriously wounded?

22 A. Your Honours, I must refute the assertion that -- the assertion

23 that Slovenia attacked the JNA. It wasn't the Slovene army that went out

24 of the barracks to attack the JNA, but it was the JNA, according to our

25 judgement, on the basis of an illegal, unconstitutional decision of the

1 federal government, moved out of the barracks not only in Slovenia but

2 also those located on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. And that

3 is a fact, and it's an unavoidable fact.

4 In this war, in fact, regretta