1 Tuesday, 11 March 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 MR. NICE: We're at the foot of page 5 of the summary, paragraph

8 25.

9 WITNESS: MILOSAV DJORDJEVIC [Resumed]

10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

12 Q. General Djordjevic --

13 MR. NICE: Could we put tab 3 on the overhead projector.

14 Q. Was the coordination group of which you've spoken also involved in

15 assisting in the establishment and organisation of the Krajina Territorial

16 Defence?

17 A. Mr. Prosecutor, the coordination group did not engage in the

18 formation of the Territorial Defence, but it did engage in providing

19 assistance to the TO staff in organising certain structures and units of

20 the Territorial Defence, such as the TO brigades in the first place.

21 Q. Looking at the --

22 A. Furthermore, we also assisted them in organising the zonal staffs

23 of the Territorial Defence and the actual staff of the SAO Krajina. We

24 helped them in constituting the units out of the existing lower-level

25 units and manpower that they had at their disposal.

1 Q. Just looking at the chart, tab 3, and at the orange colour at the

2 bottom, show what that reveals of this part of the coordination office's

3 work.

4 A. [Indicates]

5 Q. Thank you very much. You've just drawn the orange lines which

6 reflect that you communicated with the General Staff of the JNA

7 administration, JNA organisation administration; is that correct?

8 A. That's correct, Mr. Prosecutor.

9 Q. And that orders on organisation and structure then would have gone

10 out from that body to the Krajina Territorial Defence.

11 A. From the administration for organisation and formation of the

12 General Staff.

13 Q. Can we look, please, at tab 9. Overhead projector, page 1. Order

14 on organisational formational changes in the units of Territorial Defence

15 of the Republika Srpska. And then to page 2, which we have a document

16 dated after your period of office, General, 2nd of March, 1992. Federal

17 Secretariat for National Defence to the zone command of the Territorial

18 Defence in Glina. "Please find enclosed order of the Federal Secretary

19 for National Defence."

20 Third page, please. State secret 2nd of February 1992 from the

21 Federal Secretary for National Defence. The order organisational

22 formational changes, item 1: "Establish General Staff of the Territorial

23 Defence of the Republic of Srpska Krajina ..."

24 Does this documentation reflect, although after your time, the

25 work of the coordination office in assisting the organisation and

1 structure of the Territorial Defence in the Krajina?

2 A. Precisely so, only this is a modification of what preceded it,

3 because in this period of time, the Republic of Srpska Krajina had been

4 inaugurated. In the meantime, it had -- it was the Serbian Autonomous

5 Region. Now it became the republic and the staff was adjusted

6 accordingly.

7 Q. Tab 3 again, please. Financial issues. Top of the chart. Can

8 you summarise, please, the role of the coordination office in financial

9 issues? We can see it in green to some degree.

10 A. [Indicates]

11 Q. Thank you. Tell us what the coordination office did so far as

12 finances are concerned.

13 A. I should like to remind you, Mr. Prosecutor, that yesterday I

14 mentioned that the TO brigades were financed within the framework of the

15 command of the corps and operative groups when they were subordinated to

16 them or, rather, when they were integrated within their system. They were

17 exempted from the command of the TO staff. When they were not directly

18 under their command, then financially they relied on their own Krajina

19 staff.

20 However, about two-thirds of the members of the TO were outside

21 the brigades. They were members of lower-level units. And since the

22 monetary and fiscal system had collapsed over there, the people who were

23 in the Krajina Territorial Defence did not receive salaries or any

24 financial remuneration, and these were mostly reservists with families who

25 had no livelihood.

1 And then from the SAO Krajina staff, they appealed to us that we

2 intervene with the government of Serbia and the Federal Secretariat for

3 National Defence for a lump sum to be paid out to them, a one-time payment

4 within reasonable limits.

5 We requested that the staff tell us the exact numerical strength

6 in categories; soldiers and non-commissioned officers and officers,

7 because their remuneration varied. Once they did that, my officers in the

8 coordination group went to the financial administration of the Federal

9 Secretariat for National Defence and set out the situation to them. And

10 the financial body, the financial officer in the Defence Ministry, that is

11 a permanent employee, contacted the Ministry for Finance and the budget in

12 the Republic of Serbia. Then these two financial officials of the Federal

13 Secretariat for National Defence and in the government of Serbia agreed on

14 how they would contribute, each in providing financial assistance in

15 accordance to the request we had received.

16 I didn't interfere any further with that because this was carried

17 out by the officials in charge.

18 Q. You only addressed or were aware of contacts being made with the

19 financial administration of the SSNO, but could that sector of the SSNO

20 have made the decision on its own or must it have gone to the highest

21 level for the decision to be approved?

22 A. It was necessary to go to a higher level. The head of the

23 administration for finance and the budget could not decide such a matter

24 on his own.

25 Q. Likewise within the Ministry of Finance for the Republic of

1 Serbia, could that decision have been made without intervention of or

2 approval by the Minister?

3 A. I assume they couldn't have without the approval of the

4 government. And yesterday we saw a document - I can't remember the date -

5 in which the Defence Ministry is addressing itself to the government.

6 Q. You only, because of the period of your office, you only know of

7 the one payment, but the problem, so far as you could see, was that a

8 problem that would inevitably continue and require further solution?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Was it forecast within your department or your office that a

11 regular payment system would have to be implemented?

12 A. We assumed so, but this was beyond our terms of reference.

13 Q. Tab 10, please. One month after your termination of office, a

14 document from the 2nd Military District Command, dated the 20th of

15 January, from them to the 622nd Motorised Brigade, reading: "In dispatch

16 with above mentioned mark and date, you requested explanation about the

17 rights of families of killed members of Territorial Defence on the area of

18 Croatia ..."

19 And then at the bottom of the block of text, just above Colonel

20 General Kukanja's signature: "Considering that you've sent the marked

21 dispatch to personal administration of the SSNO, it's to be expected that

22 the problems will be seen at the whole and that the just solution will be

23 found. We think families of killed Territorial Defence members on the

24 territory of the Republic of Croatia should be entitled to all rights as

25 well as the persons from the reserve forces units and the JNA

1 institutions."

2 Does this reflect the way in which financial responsibility for

3 those engaged in the territory of Croatia was shouldered?

4 A. Precisely so. The late General Kukanja, commander of the 2nd

5 Military District - he died last year - he provides here an explanation in

6 response to a request from below what his position is. And because it is

7 addressed to the personnel administration, he says that he expects that a

8 unified solution would be found.

9 Q. Tab 11, please. Again a month or five weeks or so after the end

10 of office but nevertheless you can help us with it. From the Republic of

11 Serb Krajina's Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Interior of the

12 Republic of Serbia, in particular to Minister Sokolovic, a letter signed

13 by Milan Martic, the last paragraph of which reads: "I inform you that

14 there is a --" "I inform you that there is an amount of 380 million dinars

15 in the SDK in Glina," which is the federal bookkeeping service, I think,

16 if we look at the paragraph above. "These resources were earlier

17 deposited for the Territorial Defence, but since the major part of the

18 defence, the defenders, that is, were financed from the army budget, the

19 above-mentioned resources have not been spent for some time. We ask you

20 to influence that these resources be transferred to the account of the

21 Ministry of the Interior of RSK."

22 So how does this relate to the Coordination Group? Does this

23 reflect the activities of the Coordination Group in transferring money?

24 A. Allow me to explain. The social accounting service, or the SDK,

25 in Glina, in Banja Luka, in Knin, and I can't remember where it was based

1 for the Eastern Slavonia, received money which had been agreed on between

2 the financial bodies of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Secretariat

3 for National Defence. And this statement by Mr. Martic that certain funds

4 had mostly been provided by the JNA I don't think is quite correct and

5 that what is involved is only inefficiency or errors in the work of the

6 bodies of the Territorial Defence of that particular zone which didn't go

7 to the SDK, withdraw the money from it and distribute the funds to its

8 members. But otherwise, it did affect us, of course.

9 Q. The money had come from Serbia?

10 A. From the SSNO and Serbia. And now what the ratio was between the

11 two, I don't know, but I do know that both participated.

12 Q. Same general period, 8th of February, 1992. Going to the

13 headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Serb Autonomous Region of

14 Krajina for the territories of Knin and Lika, coming from the Republic of

15 Serbia's Ministry of Defence and over the signature of Minister

16 Lieutenant-Colonel General Marko Njegovanovic.

17 The bottom paragraph reads --

18 A. Lieutenant-Colonel -- Lieutenant-Colonel General.

19 Q. Yes. "The resources are transferred to the headquarters of the

20 Territorial Defence for the territory of Knin and Lika in the amount of

21 500.000 dinars for the purchase of building material ..."

22 Does this, although comparatively modest in amount, nevertheless

23 match the system of coordination of office work on finance?

24 A. Yes, it does match. And this is actually evidence that these

25 obligations continued to be fulfilled.

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1 Q. Thank you. Tab 3, please, on the overhead projector.

2 In this chart, General, which you prepared or assisted in

3 preparing, we see at the bottom right-hand corner, right at the bottom of

4 the -- thank you very much. We see in the little black and white block

5 reference to other tasks which haven't been presented diagrammatically,

6 one of which was the preparation for the arrival of United Nations peace

7 forces. In a couple of sentences, please, the function of the

8 coordination office in relation to that.

9 A. Specifically, my offices were not involved in that with the

10 exception of myself, as far as I can recollect, and of course the Minister

11 of Defence. Upon instructions from the Minister, I went to the General

12 Staff of the JNA, to the General headquarters, and I had a briefing there

13 with the late Major General Slavko Jovic. He also died.

14 General Slavko Jovic, during the Iran-Iraq conflict, was a member

15 of the contingent of international peace forces, and for a cessation of

16 hostilities there, and according to assessments at the time, he had a

17 wealth of experience in the area. I presented to General Jovic the

18 situation such as it was in Krajina as far as I was familiar with it, the

19 rough distribution of forces and division of the territory and so on. And

20 then he, knowing Mr. Marrack Goulding personally from the period I just

21 mentioned, provided very brief instructions as to how steps -- which steps

22 should be taken in Croatia or in Krajina to receive the international

23 forces.

24 As far as I remember, though I didn't -- haven't kept the notes,

25 there were three points that were raised.

1 Q. I want to deal with this very briefly. Was this in November of

2 1991, and did you thereafter meet representatives of Serb Autonomous

3 Region's government such as Babic, Hadzic and Dzakula?

4 A. Yes. I personally, in the presence of the minister, explained to

5 them the instructions given to me by General Jovic as to what should be

6 done in Krajina in that regard.

7 Q. And what was Babic's attitude towards the mandate of the forces

8 that was explained?

9 A. I must admit that he wasn't enthusiastic about it.

10 Q. What was his concern about what the JNA might do if he didn't

11 accept the --

12 A. The key cause of his concern at the time, fully understanding the

13 function of the forces and their duties there, was that everything would

14 be okay but what if the Croatian forces, the National Guards or their

15 army, as it was called, launch an all-out offensive and Krajina had, in

16 the meantime, demobilised its Territorial Defence? What then would happen

17 to their autonomy, independence, and so on?

18 Q. Did he have any concerns about what the JNA would or wouldn't do?

19 A. And he linked that to his concern that they would be left to fend

20 for themselves as the JNA would have to pull out from Knin, the 9th Corps,

21 so that they would have no one to rely on. So that was his main concern,

22 judging by the conversations we had at the time and as far as I can

23 remember them.

24 Q. What was the belief or understanding on the part of the officers

25 of the JNA as to the JNA's obligations to Serbs in the United Nations

1 Protected Areas?

2 A. I cannot mention a specific document or a meeting or any

3 particular decision, but I do know that communicating with the officers

4 and generals, it was said that the Yugoslav People's Army was ready should

5 such an attempt be made by the Croatian side to come to their help and to

6 protect them and not to allow the war to flare up again.

7 Q. Next topic, very briefly: Volunteers. I don't think the

8 coordination office dealt directly with the administration of volunteers.

9 Correct?

10 A. Except for officers, no.

11 Q. On the 23rd of August of 1991, did the government of Serbia order

12 a -- issue an enlistment order for volunteers into the Territorial Defence

13 of the Republic of Serbia?

14 A. Yes, but may I make a correction? It's not mobilisation, because

15 that makes it obligatory, but, rather, enlistment of those who volunteer.

16 So it's admission of volunteers.

17 Q. On the 13th of September of 1991, by an instruction of the SSNO,

18 was there a further order?

19 A. Correct. This instruction dealt with the acceptance of volunteers

20 into JNA units.

21 Q. Was there an order banning political parties within the armed

22 forces on the 8th of October, 1991?

23 A. Yes, there was. This order was taken precisely because of the

24 earlier paramilitary forces which had mainly been formed by certain

25 parties.

1 Q. And the object of these orders, or one of the objects of these

2 orders would have been to have brought to an end political parties having

3 paramilitary organisations or military organisations. Do you know one way

4 or another whether these decisions were fully implemented?

5 A. If I may first make a comment. There was another order, issued by

6 the Presidency of the SFRY, on the obligation for the volunteers who were

7 already within the armed forces to be included in regular units of the TO

8 and the JNA, that they cannot exist in any other form, that they even had

9 to be disbanded, et cetera.

10 But in order to your question, I think that this was not fully

11 implemented as subsequent conflicts revealed later on as I was able to

12 follow from the media.

13 Q. That's the document we can now look at, tab 13, please, which is

14 dated the 10th of December. And if we'd simply go to the third page of

15 this. That's it. Thank you very much. This is a decree on the

16 registration of volunteers which regulates -- Article 1 regulates the

17 registration of volunteers; the reinforcement of JNA, people's army, with

18 volunteers is carried out in accordance with the regulations.

19 At the foot of this page sets out Article 3, and: "The

20 registration of volunteers in Territorial Defence is carried out in

21 wartime, in the case of immediate danger of war and state of emergency, in

22 order to fill units, headquarters, and institutions of Territorial

23 Defence."

24 I was wrong when I said December. If you'd turn over three pages,

25 you come to the date, which is the 14th of August, 1991. Thank you very

1 much.

2 Is this the order you were speaking of, General?

3 A. Yes. This is an order issued by the government of Serbia. It was

4 signed by the vice-president, Nikola Stanic, published in the Official

5 Gazette of Serbia on the 23rd of August --

6 Q. Was any of those -- sorry.

7 A. -- and issued -- pardon? I didn't understand you.

8 Q. Sorry. I interrupted you. But implementation required

9 declaration of one of the states, war and so on. Do you know if it was

10 implemented in that way or not?

11 A. For the most part it was, but imminent danger of war was declared

12 later, on the 4th of October.

13 Q. Tab 14. I don't think we need necessarily look at it. It's the

14 13th of September order. To save time, it's there. Perhaps it could be

15 counted as produced, in the absence of any objection, and we'll move on to

16 the next topic.

17 General, I want you to help us, please, with the Ministry of

18 Defence briefly, Tomislav Simovic. Did you meet him occasionally,

19 although he was always rather busy?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Did he receive reports about what your group was learning from the

22 Krajina field operations and what it was learning about the needs of the

23 Territorial Defence?

24 A. Depending on the time he had available, because he often had to

25 attend meetings of the government, we would meet, as a rule, two or three

1 times a week, because his office was in another part of town. I would

2 come to his office, telling him that there were certain things I had to

3 inform him about, or he would call me to come to his office and give him

4 information and brief him.

5 Q. And did you also speak to, and I suppose, brief his deputy, Brana

6 Kuzmanovic?

7 A. Only in the absence of the Minister of Defence if there was an

8 urgent matter that had to be dealt with.

9 Q. Then you deal with other people who you worked with, including

10 Colonel Mladenko Kovacevic, and a civilian called Hristoljub Cekic, but in

11 addition to those two, there was Dobrila Gajic-Glisic, who was Simovic's

12 chef de cabinet and she was in charge of all meetings with the Serbian

13 government, I think.

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Turning now to the accused, you were not present, I think, at any

16 meetings between Minister Simovic and the accused.

17 A. No. I wasn't present at any meetings, and I did not see or hear

18 Mr. Milosevic for almost 15 years, including in that period.

19 Q. Did Simovic tell you whether he'd had any meetings with the

20 accused about matters related to the work you were doing?

21 A. He did say things, but there are some things that I think we

22 should not discuss openly, in open session.

23 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can we go into closed session very

24 briefly?

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Private session.

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14 [Open session]

15 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

16 MR. NICE:

17 Q. General Djordjevic, dealing with your talks with Mr. Simovic, the

18 minister, did he ever let you know one way or another whether the accused

19 was aware of the Coordination Group and its activities?

20 A. I was told very clearly that he had met the president of Serbia

21 and probably some details about what we were doing, but I don't know what

22 they talked about in detail specifically except that he briefed the

23 president that such a group existed.

24 Q. From your discussions with the minister and from what was talked

25 about in your department, did you form a view as to whether the accused

1 had a close or less close relationship with the Ministry of Interior, the

2 MUP, than with the Ministry of Defence?

3 A. Yes. This was obvious.

4 Q. Namely, what it was -- he was closer to the MUP than the Ministry

5 of Defence. That was your judgement?

6 A. Mr. Zoran Sokolovic and Mr. Milosevic knew each other. They went

7 a long way back. They had worked together in the League of Communists and

8 maybe there was something else behind it as well.

9 Q. Did you have a discussion with Momcilo Perisic when he was chief

10 of the General Staff of the VJ?

11 A. At the time when he was a chief, I met him twice. On one occasion

12 when there was a reception on the occasion of the Day of the Army in the

13 army club when we from the Association of Military Pensioners were also

14 invited. This was a social organisation. And the other occasion was when

15 he briefed retired generals and admirals in Topcider on current issues

16 concerning the organisation of the J -- of the Yugoslav army, financial

17 problems, and so on and so forth.

18 Q. Was something said at one of those meetings, perhaps the second

19 one, about the comparative size of the budget of Serbia and the budget of

20 the FRY?

21 A. Mr. Martinovic, I think his name was, his assistant, since General

22 Perisic only announced what the topic would be, he informed us. And there

23 was another general there who was probably in charge of logistics.

24 When they completed their presentation, General Perisic threw the

25 floor open for questions and asked if there were any proposals or

1 suggestions concerning the topic that had been discussed. A few of us

2 took the floor. I put some questions about the funding of the army of

3 Yugoslavia. And in this plenary discussion among retired generals, I

4 asked the following: "General, all of us can see through the media what

5 the budget of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is and what the budget of

6 the Republic of Serbia is. It is common knowledge that most of the funds

7 from the budget of Yugoslavia go to fund the army, because that's what the

8 structure of the budget was then and still is. It is also common

9 knowledge that the Ministry of the Interior uses most of these funds. If

10 we compare these two budgets, I can't say what the figures are now, we can

11 see that far more funds are allocated to the police than to the army.

12 Furthermore, we are all aware of the fact that the police carries only

13 light weapons and that the army has heavy weapons - guns, tanks, ships,

14 planes, and so on - and that the needs for funding cannot be compared.

15 Besides this, in spite of the embargo and the difficult financial

16 situation of Yugoslavia, the police are given three new uniforms, an

17 official uniform, and so on, while the army cannot even get new insignia

18 and buttons. What does this mean?"

19 Q. You made this statement to --

20 A. Just let me add something, please.

21 JUDGE MAY: Well, listen, General. Just -- would you be guided by

22 the Prosecutor, please, because time is short, and he will know what's

23 relevant to this case, which is what we need to hear.

24 MR. NICE:

25 Q. It's very helpful, General, what you've been telling us, and the

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1 picture you're painting is a very full one. Did you form a view yourself

2 about what the accused was doing with his police and into what form of

3 guard he was converting them?

4 A. At that time, they were becoming the praetorian guard, which is no

5 longer the case today.

6 Q. And when you made these observations to Perisic, what was his

7 reaction to you on behalf of the authorities or speaking on --

8 A. Unfortunately, his reaction was as follows: "General Djordjevic,

9 don't say those things. That's what the opposition is saying nowadays."

10 Q. Before we part from this, can you just help me with a matter of

11 detail: Who was the Minister of Finance at the time?

12 A. I don't know.

13 Q. Two short topics, General, and then I'm done. The coordination

14 office, did it receive information about criminal behaviour of

15 paramilitary groups, in particular from Milan Paspalj and Dusan Kasum?

16 A. Yes, we did get some very general information, such as there were

17 certain incidents, and this all referred to the period of July, August,

18 September. There was a man who had been a partisan from the Krajina who

19 would come to our office and who spoke of individual incidents such as

20 operation Cadet or Opel, I don't know what he called it. He said that a

21 paramilitary unit had attacked a village - I don't know what village - and

22 that the group leader said the best fighter will get a car because there

23 is a new car in that village.

24 Q. Was there a report of an attack on an ethnically mixed village of

25 Lika -- in Lika, I beg your pardon?

1 A. There was no special report. I gleaned this from the

2 conversations I'd had with the president of the Assembly, the Chief of

3 Staff, and other people. But we sent on information in a general way to

4 the General Staff that such things were happening.

5 Q. So notice went to the General Staff. Did it go to the minister,

6 information of these crimes?

7 A. The minister was aware of this, and he responded.

8 Q. Did he issue a warning?

9 A. He issued an oral warning to the president of the SAO Krajina,

10 Mr. Babic, and the commander of the TO of the SAO Krajina, and said that

11 if such things happened, they would have to be dealt with by the courts

12 that had been set up there.

13 Q. Tab 15, please. Last exhibit. Order of the 14th of October of

14 1991 by Blagoje Adzic, ordering JNA units to ensure international

15 humanitarian law regulations are observed, to prevent looting, not to

16 attack cultural goods.

17 Item 4, to submit breaches to the legal organs.

18 This reflects a recognition of the existence of crimes having been

19 committed, in your judgement?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you. Final point. Totally different topic. Matter of

22 detail. On the 26th of July of 1991, when the problems with Slovenia were

23 at a critical stage, were you aware of whether there was any preparation

24 to launch an airstrike against Ljubljana?

25 A. All the generals knew that preparations were under way for an

1 airstrike because the conclusion had been reached that the Slovenian side

2 was not complying with the agreement that had been reached on the

3 cessation of hostilities.

4 Q. When you say preparations were under way, what quantity of

5 aircraft are you speaking of?

6 A. I don't know officially, but I heard from a friend in the air

7 force that they had a brigade ready with weapons but then they gave up the

8 plan.

9 Q. A brigade, is that sometimes, in air force terms, called a wing?

10 A. No. It was misinterpreted. This is "wing" in Serbia, but that is

11 a regiment or a brigade.

12 Q. Very well. In any event, these planes were on a state of

13 readiness to go and bomb Ljubljana, and this is the sort of state of

14 preparedness that should be reflected by documentation still available to

15 the authorities.

16 A. I assume that's how it should have been, but I'm not sure.

17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we -- that's -- this will prove to be an

18 example of the ability of the authorities to respond to our now targeted

19 requests, or another targeted request. We'll seek those documents

20 immediately.

21 Q. Did the SFRY Prime Minister Ante Markovic go to Ljubljana in an

22 effort to prevent that attack, to your knowledge?

23 A. Yes. It was publicly reported that Mr. Markovic went there to

24 have talks with Mr. Kucan, the president of Slovenia, and also to be some

25 sort of guarantee by his person that there would be no such attack.

1 Q. And the attack didn't happen.

2 A. No, it didn't.

3 Q. Thank you. Wait there, please.

4 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, two administrative matters which we can deal

5 with very briefly. The first is this, while we have it in mind: You

6 provided a chart of witnesses or times last week to Judge Kwon and I when

7 we were sitting alone. I don't think one was provided to Judge Robinson.

8 Could you do that?

9 MR. NICE: Certainly.

10 JUDGE MAY: In due course. Together with, I think -- I'm not sure

11 it was ever filed with the Registry, your observations. I've forgotten

12 what it was called, but you produced a document on the same occasion.

13 MR. NICE: We produced a chart, a visual aid. I don't think I

14 produced any speaking notes. I might be wrong.

15 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

16 MR. NICE: But I can remember the chart, and we can provide that

17 if a copy didn't go to --

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. There was a -- there was a list of remaining

19 witnesses, but it may be that that was filed anyway. Yes.

20 MR. NICE: There was a list of witnesses which came with, I think,

21 a letter to the Registrar, Mr. Holthuis, and the only other document was

22 the visual aid.

23 JUDGE MAY: That's what I had in mind but certainly the visual aid

24 should be supplied, if you would.

25 The other matter concerns this: That we ought to try and make

1 progress with the Rule 92 bis witnesses for Croatia, which we made a start

2 on but haven't got very far. What may be convenient is to find some time

3 towards the end of the week, an hour or so, and try and get through some

4 more. That will require, really, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. I don't know if

5 she's here today.

6 MR. NICE: She is here. It would be particularly convenient to

7 deal with it at the end of the week. I shan't be here and we may have a

8 witness gap problem. I very much hope not, but we already considered

9 this morning raising 92 bis issues on Thursday or Friday. The amici, I

10 know, have looked for a longer time period to deal with it but we would

11 press them to be in a position to deal with them by Thursday or Friday.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I don't want -- we've got the witness here, I

13 don't want to enter into a lengthy discussion. What I'm simply asking is

14 that Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff is present later in the morning, and we can go

15 through, as it were, the next tranche of witnesses that we'll deal with so

16 that everybody can have them prepared.

17 MR. KAY: It's only the Dokmanovic transcript witness statements

18 that I'm waiting for. But as soon as I have them, I can finish what I've

19 already done in draft within two days.

20 JUDGE MAY: I can tell you what I had in mind: Moving off Vukovar

21 and going on to Dubrovnik and dealing with those witnesses at the end of

22 this week.

23 MR. KAY: I can deal with all those 92 bis ones that were filed in

24 January.

25 JUDGE MAY: And leaving the Vukovar transcripts to next week or so

1 when we've all had more time with them.

2 Yes. Well, if she could be present later we could discuss it.

3 MR. NICE: You want her later today.

4 JUDGE MAY: Today, please.

5 MR. NICE: In order to prepare for later in the week. Certainly.

6 I would use that opportunity to mention a couple of administrative things

7 as well.

8 JUDGE MAY: We'll try to do that towards the end of the morning,

9 or after this witness.

10 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

11 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

12 Q. [Interpretation] General, at the beginning of your statement, you

13 speak of the factors that -- or the events that preceded the armed

14 conflicts in the territory of Croatia and as far as I was able to note,

15 you mentioned first paramilitary formations; isn't that so?

16 A. No, it isn't, Mr. Milosevic.

17 Your Honours, I divided the introductory part of my statement into

18 two; first the political factors and, secondly, the military factors that

19 led up to the conflict.

20 Q. I'm talking about the military factors now. If we're talking

21 about military factors, then is what I say right or not?

22 A. No. That is taken out of context. If you are referring to

23 paramilitary organisations in Slovenia and Croatia, which were legitimate

24 but illegal, illegal in the sense that they were in contravention of the

25 federal law, then you're right.

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1 Q. Well, what is the misunderstanding then?

2 A. The question is generalised, because the Serbs also had

3 paramilitary forces which were neither legitimate nor legal.

4 Q. I'm talking about the things that I assume you're very well

5 acquainted with. Do you know that those first paramilitary formations

6 were those of Croatia? That is the first time we heard of such things.

7 Then we heard of the National Guards Corps, the ZNG, and various foreign

8 mercenaries who were coming. Do you know anything about that? Wasn't

9 that the beginning of the conflict in Yugoslavia, viewing it from the

10 military aspect?

11 A. In relation to the engagement of the Yugoslav People's Army, it

12 was put in a situation to get involved in the conflicts because it was

13 primarily that it was attacked first in Slovenia and then intensively and

14 on a large scale in Croatia. But when we come to events in the SAO

15 Krajina, then that's a different topic, when we're talking about

16 paramilitary formations. The JNA was still there, a buffer, up until the

17 time when I got involved.

18 Q. And tell me, what was the target of attack by all those

19 paramilitary formations that were formed in Croatia at the time?

20 A. It's easier for me to answer what was not targeted.

21 Q. But please try and answer my question.

22 A. I've written all that in my statement, but I'll repeat that.

23 There were attacks against the families, military personnel, kidnapping,

24 arrests, murders, harassment of various kinds. Then cutting off water,

25 electricity, heating for military barracks. Then it escalated into

1 putting up barricades in front of the entrance to barracks. Then even

2 machine-gun nests and then it climaxed with physical attacks against JNA

3 barracks in Croatia.

4 Q. But tell me, General, the Serbian population in Croatia, was it

5 jeopardised by those paramilitary formations?

6 A. Partially yes and partially no.

7 Q. And were the Serbs forced to organise themselves in their defence?

8 A. They started to organise themselves when members of the National

9 Guards Corps and special units of the Croatian MUP tried by force to

10 disarm certain police stations in Knin, Glina, Pakrac - I can't remember

11 all those details - and the Serbs resisted this. And I think it is

12 clearly stated over there that for the Serbs, the symbol of the

13 chequerboard, the chequerboard symbol meant something quite different to

14 them. It reminded them of events of the Second World War, of Pavlic's

15 Ustasha state, and so on, and this logically led up to conflict, sporadic

16 incidents. But when these became more large scale, then at the state

17 level, at the level of the Federal Secretariat a decision was taken to

18 establish a buffer zone to separate these conflicting groups; village

19 guards, MUP, Croatian patrols and I don't know who else.

20 Q. That is true. That is not in dispute. But my question is: Were

21 the Serbs forced to self-organise because they were attacked?

22 A. Mostly, yes.

23 Q. Thank you. You say that the civil war in Yugoslavia - this is on

24 page 1 of your statement - led to a monoethnic state with the exception of

25 Serbian Macedonia. You speak about that in your statement. And tell me,

1 how did these Yugoslav republics manage to become monoethnic in nature?

2 How did they become monoethnic?

3 A. Perhaps that is speaking too strictly, because in Slovenia there

4 were about a hundred or 150.000 people of a different ethnicity. But they

5 had become monoethnic over a period of decades. But now in the 1990s, by

6 the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, and later on Macedonia and

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this process is common knowledge.

8 Now, why this happened, that's another matter.

9 Q. Do you know how many Serbs lived in Croatia according to the 1991

10 census?

11 A. Approximately. Around 270.000.

12 Q. Very well. You don't know exactly.

13 A. Thirteen per cent of the population of Croatia, so I don't know

14 the exact figure.

15 Q. You don't know the exact figure, but that doesn't matter. How did

16 Croatia become a monoethnic state?

17 A. When the Serbs were expelled after the Storm campaign.

18 Q. And did you ever hear, because you were involved during the period

19 that you're testifying about but also earlier, as a citizen, were you, as

20 a senior officer in the JNA earlier on, had you ever heard, while the war

21 was being waged in Croatia and also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, had you

22 ever heard that the authorities in Serbia had expelled in any way a member

23 of any ethnic minority?

24 A. The authorities did not, but some did, and the authorities didn't

25 intervene with enough resolve.

1 Q. And who did this, then? Who expelled people?

2 A. The Vice-Premier of the government, as he used to be, and now a

3 colleague of yours detained here in Scheveningen.

4 Q. So you're saying that the authorities did not intervene

5 energetically and did not protect each and every citizen.

6 A. I cannot speak in absolute terms and say every citizen, but what

7 was quite evident was that the Croats were being expelled from Srem. I'm

8 not saying that they were killed but they were being harassed in various

9 ways. And the Serbian authorities kept silent about it.

10 Q. So you have no information as to how the authorities protected

11 members of other ethnic groups where they were in jeopardy. You know

12 nothing about that?

13 A. I do know that police patrols were reinforced and a system of

14 control intensified. I know that. But when a system of fear developed

15 among those who were put in those -- in that position by those who were

16 bringing pressure to bear on them and that were harassing them, all that

17 was too late. But I'm not talking in general terms about the attitude of

18 the Serbian authorities towards any particular ethnic group in Serbia.

19 I'm just talking about these specific cases.

20 Q. And do you know that all the cases which the police in those days

21 intervened to prevent were actually committed by refugees from Croatia and

22 Bosnia and Herzegovina and not by citizens of Serbia?

23 A. I don't know that.

24 Q. So you're not aware of that?

25 A. I am not.

1 Q. Very well. Tell me, please, do you believe that secession from

2 the federal state, first by Slovenia and then by Croatia, was the main

3 cause of the break-up of the country?

4 A. I cannot answer that question with a yes or no. I can answer it

5 in several sentences.

6 Q. Please do so.

7 A. De jure, Slovenia and Croatia violated the existing system of

8 reaching agreement about such matters as the integrity of the country,

9 separation, independence, and so on, whatever you like to call them. They

10 did not respect that system. In Dr. Drnovsek's book entitled "Moja

11 Resnica" in Slovenian, or "My Truth," he himself acknowledges this that

12 Slovenia did not respect the procedure envisaged by the federal

13 constitution, the laws, et cetera. However, at the same time, he

14 justifies this by saying that with respect to the other side, let's say

15 the Serbian side, a common language could not be found about the proposals

16 that were coming from Slovenia in those days. He doesn't talk about

17 Croatia.

18 And that is true too. But, Mr. Milosevic, it is also true that

19 you and the leadership of the country at the time and the Federal

20 Secretariat for National Defence - and I'm talking about the leadership -

21 assisted this process, in speeding up this process, and you were not

22 sufficiently responsible statesmen to find a solution modelled on the

23 separation between the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

24 Q. Let's not start a debate about that Czechoslovakia.

25 A. But you're asking me --

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you ask him these questions. Whether

2 they're relevant or not, we haven't stopped you. You don't like the

3 answer, so you stop him. Let him finish.

4 Now, General, is there anything you want to add to what you've

5 said?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. May, Your Honours, if I may use

7 not my own personal evidence but a book that has been tendered here as a

8 document of some kind -- I don't know exactly what kind, a book by

9 Dr. Borisav Jovic, the closest associate of Mr. Milosevic. Page 160,

10 pages 243, 257, 347, I repeat. On those pages alone, Mr. Boro Jovic gives

11 the real truth, opinions, and assessments of all these questions. De jure

12 it is the Slovenes and Croats who are at fault - I mean their leaderships

13 - and de facto something quite different. So let Mr. Milosevic read this

14 so I don't need to quote what is said on those pages.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Very well. Tell me, in your statement you speak about this. I

17 understand your position. But in your statement, you say that the new

18 Croatian authorities introduced new state symbols, coat of arms, flag, et

19 cetera. Do you know that up until then, up until the amendment to the

20 constitution in Croatia, the Serb people were treated in the

21 constitutional sense as a constituent people and then were thrown out of

22 the constitution? Do you know that?

23 A. Yes, I do. And that was one of the causes for the rebellion of

24 the Serbs in Krajina, yes.

25 Q. And do you believe that this resurrected fascism and Ustasha

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1 policies is something that the authorities were to blame for and Serbia

2 was to blame for?

3 A. No, Mr. Milosevic. But until all that happened, there were no

4 reasonable steps taken or attempts for you in the leadership to come to

5 some sort of an agreement. There were even malicious attitudes towards

6 what was allegedly in preparation in Slovenia and Macedonia, et cetera.

7 Q. I think, General, that you know full well that we had no reason to

8 be in conflict with the Slovenes.

9 A. The peoples did not.

10 Q. Nor the leadership.

11 A. I doubt that.

12 Q. And do you know that the leadership of Serbia was not even

13 informed about the intervention of the army in Slovenia, which was the

14 idea upheld by the then Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic and his

15 bodies?

16 A. The idea of Mr. Markovic, in order to protect legality and the

17 functioning of the customs system, the frontier services and the rest was

18 well-intentioned. However, the decision that he signed as the Federal

19 Prime Minister, that was president of the government then called the

20 Federal Executive Council, was exhorted from him. What Mr. Markovic had

21 proposed to the Slovenes the Slovenes did not accept. And on the other

22 hand, he was under pressure from the Federal Secretariat for National

23 Defence and from several people in the federal authorities, the

24 Presidency, et cetera. And then such a decision was taken which was a

25 compromise. Let me call it that.

1 Q. What did Serbia have to do with that? Did Serbia have anything to

2 do with that? According to your own knowledge, your knowledge today and

3 everything you knew from before.

4 A. According to my knowledge, and I repeat from the book of your

5 personal friend Mr. Borisav Jovic, you had agreed -- discussed with him on

6 the 27th of June, 1990, how to get rid of Slovenia, how to cut it off

7 overnight. Slovenia and half of Croatia. That is the truth.

8 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, we can ask Jovic about his book. You don't need

9 to explain his book. But I am asking you about your own knowledge and not

10 about Jovic's book. You're not testifying about Jovic's book here.

11 A. According to my own knowledge, the Republic of Slovenia advocated

12 an asymmetrical federation, the Republic of Croatia a confederation,

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia favoured some kind of a loose federation.

14 However, the Serbian side - but allow me - I personally also was in favour

15 of a federation of a firm country, but that -- what we wish is one thing

16 and when we come to a solution that would avoid war is another. But that

17 is the politicians that are responsible for that.

18 Q. Without any doubt. The politicians bear the greatest

19 responsibility. But when you mention a compromise solution advocated by

20 Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, you're referring to that well-known

21 formula Izetbegovic-Gligorov.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And do you remember that Serbia accepted the solution that they

24 proposed, Izetbegovic, Gligorov? This was published in all the

25 newspapers.

1 A. If I say yes then I must add something else that I know and it's

2 better for us not to talk about that. I think we're wasting time.

3 Q. Very well, Mr. Djordjevic. When discussing the responsibility of

4 politicians, tell me, how was the Yugoslav crisis affected by the support

5 of Germany and some other external factors for the secession of Croatia to

6 be precise?

7 A. Totally destructively, as is well known.

8 Q. Do you know what assistance was provided to Croatia apart from

9 political support and the urgent recognition which took place before

10 political problems had been solved?

11 A. I know that they received instructors from Germany, that

12 descendants of the Ustasha emigres came back to the country as well as

13 various mercenaries, that they obtained weapons secretly from Hungary and

14 by ship from other places. I know all this.

15 Q. Do you know something about the material assistance that these

16 secessionists in Croatia received and the paramilitary units in Croatia

17 and the regime received?

18 A. Yes. About 150 or 200 million dollars from somewhere. I don't

19 know whether it was Germany or the USA or Austria but I know it was from

20 abroad.

21 Q. I'm asking you this because the opposite side here has been asking

22 you about 500.000 dinars given by Serbs to help Serbs. So I wanted to

23 clarify whether you knew something about this assistance provided by

24 Germans and from other countries. Let's not go into discussion of Bosnia

25 and Herzegovina and other countries now.

1 Tell me what you know about who was in the National Guard Corps.

2 A. Yes, I know this. Should I explain?

3 Q. Yes, yes.

4 A. Members of the Croatian Democratic Union. The party that won the

5 elections in 1990. And later on, this was legalised by the parliament

6 which transformed these people into the National Guard of Croatia.

7 Q. The fact that the ruling party for the first time after World War

8 II was the first party to arm its members, I don't know if anything like

9 this occurred between World War II and this phenomenon in Croatia, after

10 the political rhetoric and the constitutional changes, was this also a

11 decisive factor that caused the Serbs to organise themselves and organise

12 their defence?

13 A. Yes. It was one of the major factors.

14 Q. As you are a general, a very high-ranking general, tell me, do you

15 remember how many barracks were attacked and how many officers and

16 soldiers were killed in the first wave of violence that erupted on the

17 territory of Croatia in an attempt to achieve secession?

18 A. Mr. Milosevic, I have forgotten the figures, but what is important

19 is that not a single barracks or a single military facility in Croatia was

20 not attacked. So that's a full reply.

21 Q. Yes, it is. Do you know that there were -- that there were plans

22 to liquidate JNA officers and to retaliate against their families?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you know that this was a general practice?

25 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. Do you consider that the National Guard Corps was in fact an

2 anti-Yugoslav and especially anti-Serb formation, armed formation?

3 A. That's well known. But all extreme nationalist parties were the

4 same, more or less, in other parts of the country as well.

5 Q. Since you say that the Serbs engaged in civil disobedience, is it

6 true that they were disobedient to an illegally established state, and at

7 the same time obedient to a country where for decades they had realised

8 their rights and been respected?

9 A. Mr. Milosevic, Croatia was legally established at the elections,

10 but it became independent illegally. These are two separate matters.

11 Q. I'm not asking about a state.

12 A. Yes, you asked me that.

13 Q. Tell me, how did the Federal Secretariat for National Defence

14 respond to all these events?

15 A. I quoted from what General Blagoje Adzic, the Chief of the General

16 Staff said when he briefed us in July 1991: "With deep concern." That's

17 the answer to your question.

18 And another thing. The Federal Secretariat had a full picture of

19 the events, and they also had evaluation -- an evaluation of the prospects

20 for the future and what might happen. It wasn't fortune-telling, it was

21 an evaluation of possible future events.

22 Excuse me. The constitutional court has nothing to do with it,

23 but the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order of

24 Yugoslavia and other bodies, and the minister spoke of this in public.

25 And I'm not, however, called upon to analyse whether the SSNO and the

1 military leadership actually did the right things based on all this.

2 Q. On page 4, you say that the SSNO asked the Presidency of the SFRY

3 to take additional measures to raise the combat readiness of the JNA but

4 that the Presidency rejected this proposal in spite of numerous problems

5 and attacks on the JNA and the territorial integrity of the federal state.

6 Why and how did the Presidency reject this proposal by the military top

7 leadership?

8 A. Because they were bogged down. Tens of thousands of young people

9 from Serbia and probably from other areas too had left the country. The

10 mobilisation was collapsing. Whole units were leaving their positions.

11 The Federal Secretariat was asking for additional mobilisation of I don't

12 know how many thousand conscripts more than had already been called up,

13 and the Presidency evaluated that this additional mobilisation would not

14 solve the problems. That's how it was, more or less. That's why they

15 rejected additional mobilisation.

16 There were some disputes between Mr. Jovic and Mr. Kadijevic about

17 this. They were saying, "Do you need that much? Is this much sufficient?

18 You asked for so many and that's not enough now." But this was between

19 them, and I wouldn't like to go into that.

20 Q. Very well. Tell me, General, since you spoke here of

21 volunteers --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- the reasons you have just stated, were they also the reasons

24 for the issuing of these decrees or other documents on the enlistment of

25 volunteers in order to bring up to manpower levels the army units?

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1 A. Yes, but there were two orders issued by the Presidency. One, as

2 far as I remember, was in January 1991 on the disbanding of

3 paramilitaries. That is the ZNG. And they even referred to the

4 Territorial Defence of Slovenia. But this second order refers to all

5 paramilitary units, including those from Serbia who were going here and

6 there with or without someone's knowledge. If they wanted to fight for a

7 single state, they would have to enter the single system of armed forces.

8 Q. I hope you agree that this was the only proper thing to do.

9 A. Yes, it was the only proper thing to do, but it was probably not

10 fully complied with. Not just probably but certainly.

11 Q. While you were in the Ministry of Defence of Serbia, while you

12 were active --

13 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt. It's time for the adjournment

14 now. We'll go on to that question afterwards.

15 We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

16 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, please make your answers as brief as possible because my

21 time is limited.

22 Tell me in brief, what was the position of the staff of the

23 Supreme Command of the JNA toward paramilitary formations?

24 A. Negative; they were to be eliminated.

25 Q. Were orders issued to that effect?

1 A. Apart from the instructions of the government, there was also an

2 order of the Federal Secretary and of the government.

3 Q. Do you know how imprisoned members of the JNA were treated in

4 Bjelovar, Gospic, and so on?

5 A. Yes, I know.

6 Q. Can you tell us how they were treated?

7 A. According to my information, inhumanely. In Gospic, an officer

8 had his throat cut in front of a line of ten of his soldiers in a

9 barracks. And in Bjelovar, an officer of mine who used to serve under me

10 in the Subotica, he was now the brigade commander in Bjelovar, he was --

11 his brigade was surrounded by the ZNG members. They couldn't shoot at

12 them from the barracks because there were buildings all around. And they

13 imprisoned the commander and two other officers, stripped them naked, and

14 shot them. I think this illustrates what happened.

15 Q. Yes. Tell me, how were families of JNA officers living in Croatia

16 treated?

17 A. There was a slogan that they were Serb Chetniks, that is, the JNA.

18 That's how they treated their families too.

19 Q. Tell me, since from your statement I can see that you say that the

20 HOS numbered over 250.000 soldiers at the time; is that correct?

21 A. Well, I did say that, but that's not reliable information because

22 it varied between 200 and 300.000 soldiers, as General Kadijevic said.

23 Q. Is it true that the --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please slow down.

25 JUDGE MAY: You're both being asked to slow down for the

1 interpreters. You speak the same language, there is a temptation to go

2 too fast.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. May.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. According to your information, on the territory of the Republic of

6 Croatia, how many members of the JNA were there?

7 A. I don't know exactly but I think it was between 12 and 15.000

8 members of the JNA.

9 Q. Very well. What was the role of the JNA at the time, or to be

10 more precise, is it correct that on the basis of the decision of the

11 Presidency of the SFRY the only role of the JNA was to create a buffer

12 zone between the paramilitary formations of Croatia and the self-organised

13 Serbs?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. In view of the circumstances you are aware of, is it true that in

16 Croatia the JNA was forced to defend itself?

17 A. Mr. Milosevic, I have mentioned this in my written statement.

18 They were to comply with the rules of the service. The commanders were

19 obliged to use the combat rules if they were attacked.

20 Q. Were they forced to apply these rules because they were attacked?

21 A. At the beginning, they had to defend themselves only when it was

22 necessary to -- to implement self-defence.

23 Q. Were there any operations on the territory of Serbia by the armed

24 forces?

25 A. Three or four. Sid between Ilok and Backa Palanka, around the

1 bridge in Backa Palanka, then in Apatin, and there was a terrorist group

2 that crossed the Danube in armoured personnel carriers. That's as far as

3 I know.

4 Q. Tell me what sort of attacks were these? What sort of units and

5 weapons were used?

6 A. Everything from rifles -- from rifles to 350 or 55 millimetre guns

7 near Sid.

8 Q. What was the response of the JNA and the government of Serbia to

9 these attacks?

10 A. Serbia then decided to mobilise the Territorial Defence from

11 several municipalities, and there were political protests, and I don't

12 remember all the details.

13 Q. In your opinion, did the JNA want some sort of war?

14 A. No. Had the JNA wanted war, I would have taken off my uniform. I

15 would not have left in the regular way that I did.

16 Q. Is it true that the Presidency of the SFRY under these

17 circumstances on the 3rd of October declared that there was an imminent

18 threat of war, in accordance with the constitution of the SFRY?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. What did the imminent threat of war consist of?

21 A. Potential threats of armed attack on part of Yugoslavia, that is,

22 Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina. But may I add in connection

23 with that decision --

24 Q. Please do.

25 A. The decision of the Presidency, composed of six members out of

1 eight -- six were present; the Slovenian representative, Dr. Drnovsek, and

2 the president of Croatia, Mr. Mesic, were absent. So the Serbian four,

3 conditionally speaking, were there from Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and

4 Metohija, and Montenegro. There was also Bogic Bogicevic of Bosnia and

5 Vasil Tupurkovski, Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski of Macedonia.

6 This decision was reached on that occasion, but as far as I know,

7 the last two, from Bosnia and Macedonia, almost never turned up at

8 meetings of the Presidency any more. And this was - I have to say what my

9 opinion is - a manoeuvre to evade the Presidency rules of procedure which

10 says that if five out of eight members vote in favour of a certain

11 decision, then the decision is valid.

12 The six who were present declared an imminent threat of war, and

13 in this way the Presidency was transformed into the Supreme Command. The

14 Supreme Command does not have the same rules of procedure, so the same

15 number of members is not required to be present.

16 We, the generals and the citizens, have no idea how many members

17 of the Presidency were meeting when something was announced, when a

18 communique was issued, whether they were meeting as the Supreme Command or

19 whether all of them were present. So that's how it was.

20 Q. In any case, when this decision was reached, six members were

21 present?

22 A. Yes. So this decision was issued legally.

23 Q. Please, is it true that the Presidency of the SFRY requested that

24 UN peacekeeping forces and European Union monitors come to the territory

25 of the SFRY? Yes or no.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Tell me, please, whether the Supreme Command of the JNA had direct

3 command over the Territorial Defence of SAO Krajina.

4 A. No. Here and there perhaps the General Staff would address the TO

5 staff of Krajina if there was a break in communications. But the command

6 of the military district was there.

7 Q. Tell me, the Ministry of Defence of Serbia, did it carry out its

8 tasks in accordance with the constitution of the SFRY and the constitution

9 of Serbia?

10 A. Yes, it did. I stated that in my statement.

11 Q. Let us clarify one point, General, because when on page 16 you

12 quote the constitution --

13 A. There's an error. Paragraph 3, 9, 119. That's a mistake. I

14 tried to correct that later on. But the numbers are wrong, that's all.

15 Q. In any event, I don't wish to refer to your statement too often.

16 You mentioned the competencies from the constitution of Serbia, and you

17 failed to mention a particular article. And I don't take it against you,

18 because it does not cover competencies, but it does have great

19 significance because Article 135, paragraph 1, says: "The rights and

20 duties which the Republic of Serbia, which is within the SFRY and which it

21 has according to this constitution and which according to the federal

22 constitution are implemented in the federation, will be implemented in

23 accordance with the federal constitution."

24 A. That is exactly what it says.

25 Q. So let us now move on to what you said yesterday about your

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1 Coordination Group. As a Coordination Group, your task was to collect

2 information about the situation in Krajina on the basis of, let us be

3 specific, a task received, an assignment received from the Secretariat for

4 National Defence; is that right?

5 A. That is how it should be, but I cannot assert that because I

6 wasn't present when such a decision was taken. Not by the Republic of

7 Serbia but the Federal Secretariat. So as to ease the burden on the

8 commands, the ministry was given this task to coordinate.

9 Q. Does that mean that this group worked for the Federal Secretariat

10 for National Defence, a part of the -- its duties which were increasing

11 and which, in a sense, meant assisting the bodies of the Federal

12 Secretariat for National Defence?

13 A. Yes, and partly also for the Republic of Serbia, which is quite

14 normal as it was a body of Serbia.

15 Q. Is it true that the Ministry of Defence of Serbia did not take

16 part in any operative planning?

17 A. I said that in my statement, Mr. Milosevic.

18 Q. That's why I'm saying it. The ministry assisted within the tasks

19 of the SSNO. That is the Federal Secretariat. Is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So the ministry did not -- was not engaged in the training of

22 forces of Krajina.

23 A. No. Only that one case I mentioned when Captain Dragan came, and

24 nothing came of it. I know of no other.

25 Q. And so this group was an ad hoc group, wasn't it?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And you were assigned to that group by the personnel

3 administration of the Federal Secretariat, the SSNO; is that right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. I gathered from your live testimony here and the explanations you

6 gave, and please correct me if I'm wrong, that you had already handed in

7 your request for retirement, but in view of the situation, you felt that

8 it would not be right for you to retire because you could still be of

9 assistance. Were those your motives for asking your retirement to be

10 postponed, to be able to assist in the newly created situation which was

11 extremely grave? Is that right or not?

12 A. That's right.

13 Q. And that was your only motive?

14 A. Basic motive. No other ambitions. And the direct cause was the

15 killing of an officer, my colonel, that I attended his funeral, and this

16 was the last drop that prompted me to take that decision. I had no

17 ambitions of acquiring any orders or any honours or anything of that kind.

18 Q. As far as I understand it, your coordination group consisted of

19 some 10 officers. You've said seven to ten. They were either retired or

20 about to be retired.

21 A. They had already received a decree on retirement on the 31st of

22 December or had already retired. So they were available.

23 Q. Their professional knowledge was being used in order to assist in

24 gathering information, reviewing the situation and briefing the

25 appropriate bodies of the SSNO about it; is that right?

1 A. Yes. Since the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, in

2 addition to its regular inspection service, the main inspection of

3 National Defence, can also form separate professional bodies and teams for

4 particular professional duties to assist the lower-level communities, and

5 on those grounds, pursuant to the law on national defence, we as the

6 professional body of the ministry were formed to establish contacts and

7 address those problems to relieve the burden on the Federal Secretariat,

8 the district commands, and so on.

9 Q. Very well. Is it right that Simovic informed me about the

10 formation of that Coordination Group?

11 A. Yes. It is true that he told you or briefed you about it. He

12 simply informed you about it.

13 Q. He informed me that such a group had been formed?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. In accordance with instructions from the SSNO.

16 A. I don't know what he said to you, but I do know that he informed

17 you about it.

18 Q. So I assume that if he informed me, he also told me that something

19 had been formed and not that a body of Serbia had formed such a group.

20 A. No. He informed you that a Coordination Group had been formed.

21 Now, what the explanation was that he gave you, I don't know.

22 Q. Very well. You listed several tasks that you had as a

23 coordinating group. You said to implement requests for replenishment with

24 officers, material assistance, assistance regarding the TO structure, and

25 preparation of or, rather, their education and training to accept the UN

1 forces, and also the question of salaries. Finances.

2 Q. Yes. Well, I included that under "material assistance."

3 Q. Did that group have any other tasks?

4 A. Not specifically. Tasks cropped up as unannounced people came

5 from Krajina raising various problems, from personal problems to various

6 others. A representative of the municipality or of the TO. And then

7 Minister Simovic would draw the attention of the TO command in Krajina

8 that all those requests and needs should be put in some sort of order and

9 united, pulled together so that individuals would not come with those

10 requests but that it should go through them.

11 Q. Very well. In connection with the meeting of these requests for

12 officers, what was your role except to forward those requests to the

13 personnel administration of the SSNO?

14 A. Either forwarding those requests in written form or I and my

15 officers went there in person, or the head of the personnel administration

16 would come to see us and we would arrange things together. Also, with the

17 command of the military district, we inquired about people who were

18 available, and we were a kind of link in all that.

19 Q. So can we infer that in view of the large number of requests and

20 the large number of people coming to seek assistance, a great deal of

21 pressure, some unrealistic demands, you were a kind of filter. You

22 carried out a certain triage of all these requests.

23 A. As far as we were able. If we had had greater authority, maybe we

24 would have done a better job.

25 Q. When talking about material assistance, is it true that all the

1 logistics were the responsibility of the competent JNA commands in the

2 particular zones?

3 A. In principle, yes, but there is a distinction that should be made.

4 Food, medical supplies, things that are not, strictly speaking, military

5 equipment. This was distributed among the municipalities. Manoeuvre

6 structures, that is brigades of the Territorial Defence, relied

7 logistically on the corps commands, the JNA commands of operative groups

8 and their logistic bases.

9 Q. Is that in its entirety in accordance with the forces -- with the

10 rules in force about the armed forces?

11 A. I said, Mr. Milosevic, that according to the law on national

12 defence of SFRY and, maybe this is something I didn't mention, the law on

13 the manufacture of weapons and military equipment and the distribution of

14 the same, Article 60. The Federal Secretariat for National Defence has

15 the exclusive competence in that area. This may be something that is

16 difficult to understand. Every republic pays for the weapons, but it

17 doesn't have the right to decide how many weapons it will purchase for a

18 particular factory. Those funds are distributed by the Federal

19 Secretariat.

20 Q. And this logistic reliance, as the whole of Yugoslavia was divided

21 into three military districts at the time -- yes, districts --

22 A. No, four. But the fourth was annulled.

23 Q. No, the military naval one.

24 A. No; Zagreb, Sarajevo, Belgrade and Skopje. But the Skopje

25 military district for the ground forces was abolished, so three remained.

1 Q. And they relied on the logistic bases of those military districts.

2 A. As far as I knew, that was how it was, yes.

3 Q. Very well. And according to your knowledge - I've taken this

4 down, I just wanted to check the figure - in connection with these

5 requests for officers, there were 20 to 30 officers sent to the staff of

6 the TO in Krajina.

7 A. That is to the best of my recollection, but I'm not claiming that.

8 Maybe a few more, but it would be easy to check from the documents that

9 Mr. Nice has presented.

10 Q. So this was within the competence of the JNA.

11 A. The system was as follows: When we agreed on the number of

12 personnel, the personnel administration would assign the officers to the

13 TO staff, sometimes specifying to a particular brigade or a particular

14 headquarters. As for the other officers with their names and surnames,

15 the Krajina command of the Territorial Defence would assign to particular

16 positions in the establishment. There was a combination of both systems.

17 Q. Some documents were produced here relating financial assistance,

18 monetary assistance. Was it provided in accordance with the laws in

19 force?

20 A. Yes and no. According to the law on national defence of the SFRY,

21 the officer or commander who gives assignments to subordinate commands, if

22 the planned funds which have been earmarked in advance for subordinate

23 commands are insufficient, the difference up to the necessary amount is

24 covered by the person issuing the assignment. So that is quite clear.

25 Now, why I said also no: Because each republic, out of its own

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1 resources, finances the Territorial Defence, including weapons, without

2 the part it earmarks for the federal budget and the JNA. So it is

3 twofold.

4 Q. But what I'm saying is that both is in accordance with the rules.

5 A. Yes, mostly.

6 Q. And tell me, was the relationship between the Defence Ministry and

7 the TO of Krajina a relationship of issuing orders?

8 A. Absolutely not. They gave advice, transferred guidelines, setting

9 requirements but not as a superior but simply for us to analyse those

10 requests and forward them on.

11 Q. In any event, you had no right of decision-making. The right of

12 decision-making was with the Supreme Command.

13 A. That's right. In the field, some people demanded that a division

14 of the Territorial Defence be formed, or a partisan division. But Milan

15 Babic wouldn't hear of it because it reminded him of the partisans of the

16 five-cornered stars and so on. He wanted something of his own. And then

17 they consulted with us, and we told them, "You can do as follows: You

18 have this option which has such consequences, this option has

19 such-and-such consequences." But we didn't decide. It was up to them.

20 Q. So actually, your role was that of some sort of professional

21 consultant.

22 A. I said a moment ago that we were a professional body attached to

23 the Ministry of Defence along the line of the SSNO and the ministry of

24 Krajina.

25 Q. So let us make that quite clear. You could not have any

1 authority, or rather, the Ministry of Defence of Serbia had no authority

2 to decide on the use of units of the TO of Krajina.

3 A. Nor with respect to the selection of personnel. The Minister of

4 Defence of the TO of Krajina, a certain Tarbuk or something like that, I

5 can't remember, had already been appointed by the government of Krajina.

6 And as far as we knew, he was undesirable. He was not a suitable person

7 for that position.

8 Milan Babic insisted on him retaining that position. However,

9 neither Minister Simovic and myself still less had any authority to order

10 him to replace him because this had to go through the Assembly and through

11 the authorities. Whom they elected later on I don't know, but this is an

12 example.

13 Q. Very well. Do you remember that anyone else apart from Milan

14 Babic having that type of intervention for personnel selection? Was

15 anyone bringing pressure to bear on you for someone to be appointed or

16 replaced?

17 A. I can't remember regarding Mr. Hadzic. He may have intervened for

18 one or two officers, but I don't remember.

19 Q. And is it now quite clear that the Coordination Group of the

20 Ministry of Defence that you headed, and the Ministry of Defence of Serbia

21 as a whole, could not have anything to do with deployment or operations in

22 the territory of Krajina?

23 A. Yes, that's right. That's what I said in my statement. There

24 were some disputes between the corps commands. Some wanted to have a

25 brigade under his command, and the TO wanted it under their command, but

1 they had to clear this up.

2 Q. On page 19, in paragraph 1, you said that you would occasionally

3 receive information about illegal activities of certain Serbian

4 paramilitary groups. Is that right?

5 A. Yes. I have testified about that. I think there's no point in

6 repeating that. I spoke about that this morning.

7 Q. Did the ministry require proceedings to be instituted against such

8 groups?

9 A. Yes. I said that General Simovic made a very sharp warning to

10 President Babic and the commander of the TO of Krajina that such cases,

11 should they arise, had to be processed. All the municipalities had courts

12 to do this. It had to go through the courts.

13 Q. Let us make this quite clear: The ministry of Serbia could not

14 have competence over them, but it did energetically issue warnings and

15 insist and request that such illegal activities be halted and the

16 perpetrators punished. Is that so?

17 A. Yes, that is so. And in a report to the General Staff, among

18 other issues, we referred to that too in written form. And then came the

19 orders on disbanding, on preventing parties to form units and so on.

20 Q. You say that such cases were mostly in August and September 1991.

21 Later they were reduced in scope. What contributed to that reduction of

22 undesired incidents?

23 A. With the exception of Vukovar, Slunj as towns and a little around

24 Okucani, the rest was stabilised, the front was stabilised. The situation

25 had stabilised. Authorities had been formed. The ZNGs did not enter

1 these areas except where there was fighting in these three locations.

2 There may have been some incursions elsewhere but I didn't have detailed

3 information.

4 Q. So these measures contribute to the scope of those illegal

5 activities to be reduced.

6 A. Yes, the overall situation contributed to that.

7 Q. While you were in the ministry, since you also mention the

8 relationship between the minister and the ministry with me as the

9 president of Serbia, was it based exclusively on limits required by the

10 law?

11 A. I think so.

12 Q. Are you aware of the fact that I, as the president of the

13 republic, at any time did I ask the ministry to implement any decision

14 within the competency of the ministry?

15 A. I don't know about this period. Only when you had discussions on

16 the law on national defence or the army of Serbia. I don't know what the

17 exact wording was. I know that you postponed further work on this, but I

18 don't know any details.

19 Q. Well, as regards legislation, it is the government that tables

20 bills, and the text is prepared by the competent ministry; is that

21 correct?

22 A. Yes, and the Assembly adopts legislation.

23 Q. The Assembly debates and adopts legislation. So the enactment of

24 legislation or, rather, the preparation for the enactment of legislation

25 is within the competency of the ministry; is that correct?

1 You say that I met General Simovic on only three occasions while

2 you were holding your office.

3 A. I can't be quite sure, but as far as I know, yes.

4 Q. How many months did you work in that group?

5 A. Two months.

6 Q. Does that mean -- that means I met him a little more than once a

7 month. Does that seem logical to you?

8 A. Well, I don't know if it's logical, but I think there's no point

9 in discussing this. It's a question of leadership style. It might be

10 more logical to meet more often. I know while I was the Secretary for

11 National Defence during peacetime, there was hardly a month when I did not

12 visit either the Presidency or the Council for the Constitutional Order or

13 some other body, so I don't think that's important now. Two or three

14 times a month.

15 Q. Well, you say that I didn't care about the Ministry of Defence

16 very often because I didn't esteem Simovic enough; is that correct?

17 A. That's my personal opinion. I assume because soon after his

18 appointment General Simovic was transferred from that duty and this was at

19 a crucial point.

20 Q. Well, how do you know that I didn't esteem General Simovic enough?

21 A. Mr. Milosevic, because you allowed him to be moved to a less

22 important duty, a less significant one.

23 Q. General, when the appointment of generals is at stake, it's the

24 SSNO that -- whose opinion is asked.

25 A. Can we pass over this question, for your sake?

1 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Why? Can you give us the answer to

2 the question? The question is, and perhaps you can help us with the

3 answer, help the Trial Chamber, General, with the answer: When the

4 appointment of generals is at stake, it's the SSNO whose opinion is asked.

5 Now, can you give us the answer, please.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, formally that is so,

7 but in reality it's not like that. Mr. Milosevic required his generals to

8 tell him what generals could be counted on and which ones couldn't be

9 counted on. I don't know what the exact formulation was. He'd say,

10 "Let's discuss the generals who are still in the JNA." At that meeting at

11 Mr. Milosevic's, while I was the Secretary for National Defence,

12 Mr. Bogdanovic, an associate of mine, was sitting there with his notebook

13 when these two generals came in. The Ministry of Defence of Serbia

14 reminded Mr. Milosevic by saying, "Mr. President, I cannot give you an

15 objective assessment because these are comrades of mine. I might be wrong

16 in either a positive or a negative way if you ask me about any of them. I

17 suggest that you talk to the SSNO, to the personnel administration. They

18 know which general served where, what his assessment was, his character,

19 his characteristics, and then you will get an objective picture."

20 The same moment, Mr. Milosevic interrupted the conversation and

21 said, "Oh, let's have a whisky. We won't talk about this any more."

22 Thank you for asking me this, Mr. Milosevic.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. You're welcome. I'm happy to oblige. But this has nothing to do

25 with the appointment or dismissal of Simovic, nor does it explain this

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1 question.

2 Tell me, please, was the relationship between me and Simovic, the

3 Minister of Defence, an official, professional one in view of the offices

4 we held at the time?

5 A. Probably, yes. But the conversation I have just described shows

6 how much you trusted him, whether he was your man or not.

7 Q. I don't know what "my man" means.

8 A. It means obedient to you in this case.

9 Q. I never considered -- I always thought that everybody was his own

10 man, and if he wasn't, he couldn't do anything worthwhile.

11 A. General Simovic was his own man.

12 Q. Tell me, the Ministry of Defence of Serbia, did it have any role

13 to play or any influence on the events? We've already discussed Croatia,

14 but any influence on the events in Slovenia or Bosnia-Herzegovina?

15 A. We had nothing to do with Slovenia at the time, either physically

16 or in organisational terms. As regards Bosnia and Herzegovina, I had no

17 contacts in connection with any issues concerning arming or preparations

18 or whatever.

19 Q. General, is it beyond doubt then that all these events and

20 everything that was done at the time fell within the competency of the

21 federal organs, the Presidency of the SFRY, the General Staff, and the

22 Secretariat for National Defence as the highest civilian and military

23 authorities?

24 A. That's how it should have been under the law.

25 Q. Doesn't this explain my infrequent contacts with Simovic? There

1 was a vertical chain of command, and as you know, the republican

2 officials, including the presidents of the republics, had no competency

3 there. Is that correct or not?

4 A. It's correct, but it doesn't explain what you asked.

5 Q. I'm glad that's how it is. Whether it explains my question,

6 that's another matter.

7 Please, let me just look, since your statement is quite

8 voluminous. I've made a note here.

9 A. It's voluminous where we speak of the causes of war. The rest is

10 relatively brief and concise.

11 Q. You say, on page 20, paragraph 3 -- I want you to clarify this.

12 In connection with these issues, it even refers to the Territorial Defence

13 of each republic, including Serbia. You say -- I'll read the whole

14 paragraph: "The Territorial Defence was directly subordinated to the

15 republics. At lower levels, such as zones, regions or municipalities, it

16 was subordinate to the local presidents of municipalities. One should

17 bear in mind that although the TO was subordinate to the presidents of the

18 republics, they did not -- they did not, I repeat, issue direct decisions

19 as to the deployment of the TO. The commander of the TO would do this,

20 and he was subordinate to the staff of the Supreme Command (the SSNO and

21 the General Staff)." Is this correct?

22 A. Yes, it is, but I wish to introduce a correction.

23 Q. Yes. Go ahead.

24 A. Yes. These are my question [as interpreted], but it's not

25 deployment, it's use. The use, not the deployment of TO units. So the

1 issuing of wartime assignments, not simple deployment.

2 Q. Even better. Thank you for this clarification. So the

3 Territorial Defence was fully integrated or, as you soldiers will say,

4 completely networked into the chain of command. And there was singleness

5 of command.

6 A. If part of the territory was on temporarily occupied territory,

7 that is cut off by enemy units, then there was an exception. Then the --

8 the authorities in that part of the territory would command.

9 Q. So the authorities, the local authorities on the occupied

10 territory?

11 A. Well, "occupied" is not the right word. It wasn't recognised in

12 the constitution, but it was a temporarily captured territory.

13 Q. We have already discussed this, so I won't quote. You say the

14 minister had no competence to punish any group, and he would apply to the

15 competent --

16 A. There are some repetitions here because there were two

17 investigators and when I was nearing the end of my statement, the second

18 investigator, who wasn't fully informed of what the first one had asked,

19 would ask me some questions again. But it doesn't change anything.

20 Q. Tell me, in connection with what you say in your statement on page

21 23, you say that some political parties started criticising the JNA. They

22 started establishing their own paramilitary units and sending them off to

23 Serbian areas in Croatia where they were at first welcomed by the local

24 TO. Later, this changed when they started looting and killing.

25 A. Let me emphasise. This is in the past in relation to my office.

1 I am not speaking of the second half of November, the second half of

2 December. This is it.

3 Q. Well, I'm not talking about the time here. But it says that

4 paramilitary units -- General, I want to establish here the fact that it

5 was not the leadership of the Krajina that could be held responsible for a

6 paramilitary formation somewhere on the ground in the maelstrom of war.

7 Do you know that they tried to drive them out of there because various

8 groups were roaming around, looting and murdering? They were not people

9 who had come to really assist in defence. Is this correct or not?

10 A. I'm not sure that's exactly how it was, but I have no reliable

11 information. I know that there was cooperation. I don't know whether

12 they were expelled. I don't remember anything like that, but I can't say

13 for certain.

14 Q. Well, I had hoped you would be able to say more about this because

15 here we keep coming across attempts --

16 JUDGE MAY: He can say no more, so there's no need to comment on

17 it.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Let's clarify this point now. It is not clear to me, General,

21 your explanation, that is, about Radmilo Bogdanovic. I understood you to

22 say that Radmilo Bogdanovic, when he was no longer a minister, continued

23 in a way to perform this office indirectly. From what you said, that's

24 what I conclude, and I want to have this clarified because this is not

25 correct.

1 A. Well, that's not what I said. He was a kind of shadow minister.

2 He was an advisor -- not a shadow minister, he was an advisor. He didn't

3 command the police of Serbia at that time, no way. But as Zoran Sokolovic

4 was simply not a man who was up to the job, he had no experience, it was

5 natural for Radmilo Bogdanovic to go there so that they could consult and

6 so on and so forth.

7 Q. Let's clarify this. You used a rather strong term when you say

8 that Zoran Sokolovic was not up to the job.

9 A. I don't want to insult him but this was not his profession.

10 Q. Profession is one thing but function of minister is a political

11 office.

12 A. I agree, but usually --

13 Q. General, are you aware of the fact that Zoran Sokolovic held a

14 much higher office than Radmilo Bogdanovic and that in no way could

15 Radmilo Bogdanovic have controlled Zoran Sokolovic?

16 A. I didn't say he controlled him.

17 Q. Zoran Sokolovic, if you remember, was the secretary of the Central

18 Committee at the time when Bogdanovic was the Assistant Minister of

19 Defence at the republic level, which means a secondary level. And later

20 on, he was the speaker of parliament. So in no way could Radmilo

21 Bogdanovic have had authority over him.

22 A. Mr. Milosevic, Zoran Sokolovic is dead. Let's not insult the

23 deceased. I have been quite clear. Please let's not go into this.

24 Authority. Of course he was an authority for Zoran. Radmilo was in the

25 SUP regional community, he was a minister in three or four or five terms,

1 the Minister of Defence; he knew the territory, he knew the people, he

2 knew the circumstances, he knew the security situation in Serbia. Zoran

3 dealt more with party work. That's what I meant to say. If you're

4 looking for something else, I don't know.

5 Q. I just wanted to clarify this one point. After he ceased to be

6 Minister of the Interior, he was no longer able to carry out this job

7 either directly or indirectly.

8 A. No, he wasn't.

9 Q. Certainly not through Zoran Sokolovic with whom he was not in a

10 close relationship.

11 A. I won't go into that.

12 Q. Let's discuss some other matters, General. You made some

13 corrections to your statement, and you say paragraph 24. I don't know

14 where it is but that's what it says here. The Federal Secretariat for

15 National Defence asked the Presidency of the SFRY to have the republics of

16 Serbia and Montenegro undertake to provide material support for the armed

17 forces. Why did you introduce this correction?

18 A. Because in the original text, it appeared that the Presidency was

19 asking this, but it was actually the general -- it was actually General

20 Kadijevic asking this of the Presidency.

21 Q. Of the Presidency. Not of Serbia and Montenegro but of the

22 Presidency that Serbia and Montenegro should fulfil their --

23 A. Yes, their material obligations to fund the JNA, because the other

24 republics had stopped investing in the budget, had stopped putting money

25 into the budget.

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1 Q. Well, let's talk about the budget now. You said that the budget,

2 the federal budget, was spent mostly on the army and the republican budget

3 mostly on the police. General, would you allow that you do not know this?

4 A. I don't have specific information.

5 Q. The army is federal, and 90 per cent of the federal budget was

6 spent on the army -- 70 per cent. And the republican budget, of any

7 republic, had to finance health care, education, public services,

8 interventions in the economy, and so on and so forth. Can you say that

9 you do not know that most of the budget and that the share of the expenses

10 of the army in the federal budget cannot be compared with the share of the

11 police in the republican budget?

12 A. Mr. Milosevic, let's not weary the Chamber or the public. I do

13 not have precise information, figures, at my disposal. But if you're

14 talking about health care, it was a very small fraction, or other forms of

15 expenses. Most of the funds were spent on the police, just as in the

16 federal budget most of the funds were spent on the army. But there was a

17 disproportion between the Serbian budget and the Yugoslav budget.

18 Q. Very well. That's what you discussed at the meeting of retired

19 generals with Perisic. I just wanted to establish whether you know this

20 at all. And it's not hard to find the appropriate figures.

21 A. I don't need them.

22 Q. It's not even necessary to establish them. You said that I paid

23 more attention to the police than the army. But I was the president of

24 the Republic of Serbia, therefore I could not have any competency over the

25 army, and certainly I did care about the police as it was the police of

1 the Republic of Serbia. So what's strange there if I take care of what is

2 my duty to do and don't take care about things that it is not my job?

3 A. Mr. Milosevic, as a citizen of Yugoslavia, I feel ashamed to say

4 to you that the police, for the past I don't know how many years, shall we

5 say from the time when you came to power was better equipped materially,

6 better taken care of than members of the army of Yugoslavia. Even today

7 the situation, unfortunately, is not much better. Those are facts. And

8 don't fatigue me now with the figures, whether it's this much or that

9 much, when the entire public in Yugoslavia is aware of that.

10 Q. I'm asking you this because don't know that.

11 A. I'm sorry, I do.

12 Q. You don't know these things. I just asked you in view of your

13 allegation that I concern myself with the police and not with the army.

14 Serbia did not have an army for me to take care of them. I took care of

15 the army when I became president of Yugoslavia and when that was my duty.

16 Is that right or not, General?

17 A. Yes, it is, but Serbia was preparing the police to be transformed

18 into the army.

19 Q. That is not true. Do you have any evidence to corroborate this?

20 A. The quantity of weapons given by the army to the police is not

21 necessary under normal conditions. That is one of the parameters.

22 Another is financing. And I don't want to enumerate because of the shame

23 I feel of all that was done and what the army suffered.

24 Q. I think that no one in Serbia, at least when the authorities are

25 in question, had a negative attitude to the army.

1 A. In principle, no, but I'm talking about the funding, as a result

2 of which our soldiers had dry food three times a day, no heating, no

3 uniforms, they couldn't keep the equipment in good repair and things like

4 that.

5 JUDGE MAY: One at a time. One at a time, and remember the

6 interpreters.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Mr. President.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. General, do you know that the other day I quoted here when I was

10 accused of giving instructions to finance and provide funds outside the

11 budget to finance the army of Yugoslavia, and then I asked, So what if I

12 assisted the army of my state, of my country? How can you then say now

13 that I had a negative attitude to the army, for heaven's sake?

14 A. I'm not saying that it was negative by the Serb people or by you.

15 Q. But you testify against me here and you're saying my attitude

16 towards the army. Do you believe that I had a negative attitude towards

17 the army?

18 A. Mr. Milosevic, let me say first of all that I have not come to

19 testify against you. I have been invited and the federal government on

20 the 3rd of March gave me permission to appear here to testify about the

21 things I took part in and what I know from that period. Whether this will

22 be relevant for the Court against you or in favour of you, I don't know

23 that. So please don't make me say that you hated the army. You did not.

24 But you did not respect it in -- to the extent to which you could have to

25 assist the army.

1 Q. How do you know that I didn't assist it as far as I was able? How

2 do you know that? How did you know that I didn't assist as far as I

3 could? Do you have any information about that?

4 A. Not as much as you could but as much as was needed as compared to

5 the funds earmarked for some other purposes.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let us not allow this

7 to be transformed into a political debate. Let Mr. Milosevic put specific

8 questions to me.

9 JUDGE MAY: We will make sure it's not a political debate, but

10 this question about support for the police or support for the army may be

11 an important one which we have to consider. So if the accused has any

12 more questions about it, then he's entitled to ask them.

13 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You've got half an hour left, if you want it.

14 You don't have to use it.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I know that that is the

16 customary position taken.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. You have been shown here many exhibits concerning finances. I was

19 unable to register all of them, nor do I consider it important, but for

20 instance, they asked you to comment on Martic's letter to Zoran Sokolovic

21 to the effect that certain funds from the SDK in Glina be transferred to

22 the Ministry of the Interior which, as he says --

23 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Just identify it. Tab 11, let the

24 witness have it.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that's Prosecution 406.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do you need anything?

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. I'm asking you, so what if the Minister of Defence of Krajina

4 writes to the Minister of Defence of Serbia, therefore his colleague, and

5 appeals to him to intervene for certain funds which are already there to

6 be transferred? What's a mistake?

7 A. The Minister of the Interior to the Minister of the Interior.

8 Q. Yes, I'm sorry, I made a slip of the tongue. The Minister of the

9 Interior of Krajina, the Minister of Interior of Serbia. So these are

10 Ministers of Internal Affairs. When the minister of Krajina appeals to

11 his colleague the minister in Serbia to intervene so that these funds be

12 transferred to them which are on a particular account. Do you, in view of

13 your knowledge, experience, and the facts at your disposal from those

14 times, see anything in law -- illegal, suspicious, or criminal in that?

15 A. Mr. Milosevic, that was not raised at all by me, nor did I hear a

16 question to that effect being put to me. Then I was asked whether this

17 document is authentic, but let me explain.

18 The Minister of Internal Affairs of Krajina, Mr. Milan Martic,

19 asks for funds, financial funds, resources, which had already been

20 allocated to the Territorial Defence in the social accounting service of

21 Glina SDK and which had not been used, which had not been spent. And he's

22 asking Minister Sokolovic for these funds to be transferred to him. I

23 don't see that there's anything unjustified in this request. I was just

24 asked whether this can be linked to the financing of the Territorial

25 Defence. I apologise, Mr. Nice [sic], maybe you can repeat your question.

1 I don't know what is in dispute here.

2 Q. And the police of Krajina, was it then acting in defence of

3 Krajina?

4 A. I don't know why you're asking me something that is quite obvious.

5 Q. Since it's obvious, that's why I'm asking. Isn't all this

6 logical?

7 A. I didn't criticise this document. I don't know why you're asking

8 me that.

9 Q. I am glad to hear it.

10 A. I just commented on it, saying that these were funds which had

11 already been earmarked by Belgrade for Krajina. They were on an account

12 in Glina. They had not been spent. Martic knew about it, and he asked

13 for them.

14 Q. Very well. Please look at tab 15.

15 General, I put a question to you about the treatment for captured

16 prisoners or, rather, officers and soldiers of the army of Yugoslavia.

17 THE INTERPRETER: The microphone has been switched off.

18 JUDGE MAY: Can you put your microphone on again, please.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is on.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Do you remember when I asked you the question about the treatment

22 of captured soldiers and officers of the JNA in Croatia in 1991?

23 A. Yes, I remember.

24 Q. And you answered, if I remember well, I didn't note it down, that

25 they were treated inhumanely.

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1 A. Correct.

2 Q. You have here an order of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces

3 of the SFRY under the heading "Strict observation of international

4 humanitarian law."

5 Would you be kind enough, General, to comment on this order. The

6 best idea would be for you to read out what you consider to be essential

7 from that order, to read it out loud.

8 A. For me, the most important is paragraph 4, or point 4. "All

9 breaches of the regulations of international humanitarian law," et cetera,

10 "should be reported with documentation to proper legal military organs who

11 will take adequate action as envisaged by the law against the

12 perpetrators."

13 Q. I thought it was not necessary to read it all out.

14 A. Why do I think number 4 to be the most important? Because all the

15 rest under number 1, 2, 3 and 5 can be considered as something that was

16 already well known to the officers of the Yugoslav People's Army, because

17 at the military academy, the staff academy, especially the School of

18 National Defence, they had separate subjects, topics in strategy and

19 tactics under the heading "Procedure and care of prisoners of war." That

20 was the heading in short. But those lectures were based on the

21 regulations signed or proclaimed by decree by the president of the

22 Presidency of SFRY - I think it was Lazar Mojsov - in 1988. I'm not wrong

23 about the date. I'm not sure if he was still the president of the

24 Presidency at the time.

25 And in accordance with that decree, the Federal Secretary of

1 National Defence issued regulations about the implementation of

2 international humanitarian war law, the Geneva Conventions, The Hague

3 Conventions, the Customs of War, and all these relevant documents are

4 enumerated. In other words, the Chief of Staff by this order is reminding

5 of the officers of something that they should have known and gives them

6 order that what is written in those regulations should be implemented to

7 the letter.

8 Q. But what is important here is the date, the 14th of October, 1991.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So that was the time when, for several months if not for a whole

11 year by then, General, there were various horrific crimes being committed

12 against members of the JNA, bestial crimes, and also against Serb

13 civilians in Croatia, and the order is being given by reminding of all

14 those provisions that each breach - each; there is the word each and every

15 here, or all: "All breaches ... in the area of the unit's activities must

16 be reported and documentation available submitted to proper legal military

17 organs who will take adequate action against the perpetrators as

18 stipulated by law."

19 I'm asking you now, General, whether the JNA as a whole complied

20 with these obligations and the stipulations of this order regarding

21 humanitarian law.

22 A. As far as I know, it did, but I cannot assert that there were

23 individual excesses or deviations in relation to the rule.

24 Q. General, there may always be individual excesses. I'm not asking

25 you about them. I'm asking you, as you were active at the time, you were

1 a general and you know this, whether the JNA, the armed forces abided by

2 these rules prescribed.

3 A. They did, as far as I know.

4 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.

5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

6 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

7 Q. [Interpretation] General, at the end of today's

8 examination-in-chief, you were answering ques