1 Friday, 28 February 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN [Resumed]

8 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

9 Q. [No interpretation]

10 JUDGE KWON: We are not getting any interpretation.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English? Can you hear?

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, we're having some trouble with

14 the interpretation. Can we have the question again, please.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Okun, can you hear me now? Can you hear the English?

17 A. Excuse me, Mr. Milosevic. I'm receiving the translation in

18 French.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English now?

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Yesterday, we started discussing your meeting in my office on the

23 13th of October, and we noted that I told you that a peaceful solution was

24 the only solution. Isn't that right?

25 A. Yes, you said that.

1 Q. And that Croatia and Slovenia had entered into a secessionist

2 undertaking. That's right, isn't it?

3 A. Yes, that's correct. You stated that.

4 Q. And furthermore, that in Croatia we saw the resurgence of Nazism

5 and fascism.

6 A. You stated that, and I entered it in the diary notes.

7 Q. And I also indicated to you on the occasion that any violent

8 change of borders was illegal, and you told me something along the

9 following lines, if I understood you correctly; that according to the

10 constitution, the republics enjoyed the right to make a decision on some

11 kind of separation on their part, and I asked you to indicate that

12 particular article of the constitution where this right was stated. I

13 don't know whether you can do so now. Can you point out the portion in

14 the constitution?

15 A. In response to that interchange yesterday, I noted that the

16 arbitration Tribunal of the European Community, when asked to reach a

17 decision on the state in which the former Yugoslavia found itself, reached

18 the decision that the state was in a process of dissolution and that,

19 subsequently, the decision was reached that the -- the states that were

20 seceding had the right to do so, that was their decision, and that is in

21 fact what happened, because the reality is they're all independent states,

22 they're all members of the United Nations today and widely recognised by

23 the international community. That is what ensued, yes.

24 Q. Yes. And as far as those facts are concerned, that they had truly

25 seceded is not being challenged. I was only asking about what the

1 constitution said, and that's where the crux of the matter lies, because

2 the international community committed a crime against Yugoslavia thereby.

3 Do you consider that that is so or not?

4 A. I don't -- I don't think it is within my competence to speculate

5 on whether the international community --

6 Q. All right, very well.

7 A. -- committed a crime. But, of course, that was your view at the

8 time. There is no question of that.

9 Q. And did I state loud and clear to you at the time that Serbia had

10 no territorial pretensions?

11 A. So you did.

12 Q. Did I also speak to you at the time about the great crimes and

13 pressure that was being brought to bear against them, the dismissals, the

14 violence against Serbs in Croatia?

15 A. You did.

16 Q. And did I draw your attention to the fact that history was

17 repeating itself from World War II when hundreds of thousands of Serbs

18 were killed in Croatia? Isn't that so?

19 A. So I heard you say.

20 Q. And did I also clearly indicate to you at the time that the

21 Yugoslav People's Army, as far as I knew, was just separating the warring

22 sides or sides in the conflict and that that was its exclusive role?

23 Isn't that right, Mr. Okun?

24 A. That was your contention, yes, that is correct. You stated that.

25 Q. And did I also tell you at the time that the Serbs in Croatia had

1 to have protection and that they had to have a special status accorded

2 them, because according to the constitutions of -- they were one of the

3 constituent peoples of the south Slav peoples, south Slav nations. Do you

4 happen to remember that?

5 A. Yes, I remember you stated that.

6 Q. And did I also tell you that according to my information, the

7 Yugoslav People's Army went into action only once it was attacked and

8 under no other conditions except when it was attacked?

9 A. Yes, you stated that.

10 Q. And didn't I also say at the time that the army was completely

11 neutral and that it avoided any ethnic clashes and conflicts or, rather,

12 that it endeavoured to prevent them and to separate the parties in

13 conflict regardless of the fact that the Serbs were the victims in the

14 violence that took place at that time in Croatia?

15 A. So I have heard you say.

16 Q. You mentioned or, rather, Vance mentioned the role of the army,

17 and I think that on the occasion we cleared up that matter. Did I tell

18 you on that occasion - and when I say "you" I don't mean you personally

19 but yourself and Cyrus Vance together - that we did not wish any kind of

20 Greater Serbia to be created?

21 A. That was your contention.

22 Q. Otherwise, you also had meetings with the top military leaders,

23 top military echelon, Veljko Kadijevic, the Federal Secretary for National

24 Defence and the Chief of the General Staff Blagoje Adzic; isn't that

25 right? On that same day, actually; right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is it true that General Kadijevic clearly indicated the desire of

3 the army to solve the issue peacefully?

4 A. He so stated.

5 Q. Did Kadijevic tell you unequivocally and quite resolutely that the

6 army wished to avoid a war?

7 A. That was the general thrust of his remarks.

8 Q. And is it true and correct that at that time they indicated to you

9 that there were blockades of the sea, the barracks, the airports, and that

10 they asked you to prevail upon NATO to deblock the garrisons?

11 A. There was no question that the issue of the blockaded JNA barracks

12 was very high, perhaps uppermost in General Kadijevic's mind. I'm not

13 sure whether he specifically asked that NATO do the unblocking, but he

14 certainly implored Secretary Vance and myself to do everything we could to

15 prevail upon the Croatian civil and military authorities to secure the

16 freedom of the blockaded JNA troops and their families.

17 Q. Well, he told you precisely all these things, and I'm reading from

18 your own block, that straight away, the barracks were to be deblocked and

19 that the Adriatic ports were to be deblocked, that the airspace be opened.

20 And he also told you that they did not deblock the garrisons but --

21 deblock the garrisons, but they had in fact blocked two more. And he also

22 told you on that occasion that they had taken control of over 100

23 garrisons during the cease-fire; isn't that right?

24 A. Yes. If it's in my diary notes, it's what he said. And I do

25 recall him stating that.

1 Q. And is it true that in The Hague, on the 15th of October, Milo

2 Djukanovic, the president -- the Prime Minister of the government of

3 Montenegro with whom you had a meeting also indicated to you the problem

4 of the violation of basic human rights of Serbs living in Croatia? Do you

5 remember that?

6 A. Yes, he stated that.

7 Q. If you happen to remember, did he also tell you that the Ustasha

8 movement had come to the fore and was rampant in Croatia again?

9 A. Could I consult my diary for that?

10 JUDGE MAY: Please, Mr. Okun, at any time.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. If this is -- poses a difficulty, I'll read it out. "The root of

13 problems in Croatia is the violation of elementary human rights of Serbs."

14 That's what Djukanovic said.

15 A. I see it now, Mr. President.

16 Q. [In English] [Previous translation continues]... "in Croatia

17 today. Fascism on rise."

18 A. Yes, Mr. President, I do so see that on page 93.

19 Q. Did he tell you on that occasion too that the status of the Serbs

20 had to be guaranteed by the international community, and you have that on

21 the next page. "Special status must be guaranteed by the international

22 institutions" is what you said. "International institutions."

23 A. Yes, that's correct. It's on page 94.

24 Q. Not to go further at this point, beyond the 15th of October. I'm

25 going to make a slight digression here and digress from your diaries,

1 because what I have to ask you about is the 18th of October and the

2 meeting in The Hague, the one that you testified about in your

3 examination-in-chief. I did not see this in your diary, but I would like

4 to ask you several questions in that regard.

5 Did I understand you correctly, Mr. Okun, to have said here that

6 Milosevic rejected Carrington's paper? And Mr. Groome asked you how you

7 understood this, and you said that you understood it as being a sign that

8 Serbia wanted war and that we demonstratively left the meeting of the

9 conference on Yugoslavia. That's what you said, I believe. Is that

10 right, Mr. Okun?

11 A. Yes, that's correct. It is noted in the diary on page 100 --

12 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish.

13 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct, and it is so noted in the diary

14 Vance mission 1, page 145.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I don't know what was noted in the diary. I don't have that

17 particular page before me. I'll take a look at it later on. But as you

18 were there, were you not, and I'm sure you recall what happened there very

19 well.

20 So I'm now going to ask you this: First, about the fact that you

21 claim happened, that is to say that we left the hall, the conference hall,

22 and that we had a negative attitude towards the peace conference in

23 general.

24 Now, my question to you, Mr. Okun, is this: Did you not perhaps

25 mix something up there?

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1 A. I believe not, Mr. Milosevic.

2 Q. All right. Fine.

3 A. If I may continue.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

5 THE WITNESS: The conference had six -- the entire Yugoslav

6 states. All the republics were there, with the full Presidency, that is

7 to say eight. Those who got up and walked out, that is to say physically

8 left the room - and this is on page 145 - were Mr. Jovic from Serbia,

9 Mr. Bajramovic from Kosovo, and Mr. Kostic from the Vojvodina. They were

10 the ones who physically walked out of the conference. So --

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. That's something else again.

13 A. -- it is not incorrect to say that the Serbian representatives

14 walked out of the conference.

15 Q. They were not representatives of Serbia. They were members of the

16 Federal Presidency. So I'm now going to jog your memory, and I hope

17 you'll be able to remember when I do, because the vice-president of the

18 Federal Presidency, Branko Kostic, was President of Montenegro prior to

19 that, and later on, he was member of the Yugoslav state Presidency and

20 vice-president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, as you know, I'm sure;

21 right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, do you remember something that I would actually call an

24 incident; that the president of the conference, who was Lord Carrington,

25 did not allow Branko Kostic, who was the vice-president of the Yugoslav

1 state Presidency at the time, to speak, to take the floor at the meeting,

2 at the conference, and that he questioned his right and denied him the

3 right to speak on behalf of the Presidency of the SFRY and that he

4 demanded or, rather, the EEC, the European Community, questioned the

5 legitimacy of what they referred to as the Rump Presidency, considering

6 thereby, and I'm going to quote what they said, "That the legal

7 representative of Yugoslavia was only the source Presidency of a state and

8 not a Rump Presidency." Do you remember that?

9 A. Yes, it is so noted in my diary on page 144.

10 Q. Am I right, Mr. Okun, when I say that this kind of position on the

11 part of the EEC was unacceptable, because the highest organ of any state

12 in the world does not have the right to abdicate and leave the country to

13 chaos, and if due to a death, for example --

14 JUDGE MAY: This sounds like argument. Ambassador, is this

15 something you feel you can deal with? It sounds like comment.

16 THE WITNESS: I think it's not my -- I think it's not my place,

17 Your Honour, to retrospectively try and read the mind of the EC in October

18 1991. That was their decision.

19 JUDGE MAY: Whether it was right or wrong may be an issue in the

20 case. It may be something we'll have to decide. But for the moment, it's

21 not for the witness to comment on things like this. You can ask him what

22 happened, you can ask him about what's in his diary, but these sort of

23 argumentative comments are not for him to deal with.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the witness was a diplomat,

25 a career diplomat for many years, and at the beginning of his testimony,

1 he himself said that he taught at university - I think you mentioned

2 Georgetown University, in fact - and that the subject he taught was

3 international law. Or perhaps some university in Washington, was it? Is

4 that right? So therefore, it is within his competence to answer the

5 question, in view of his presence at the international conference. He is

6 able to answer questions concerning international law. Therefore --

7 JUDGE MAY: Let me explain. The reason -- just a moment. The

8 reason he can't answer the question, or won't be allowed to, is that this

9 is a court of law, and in a court of law, the Judges are the deciders as

10 to the law. They decide what the law is, not witnesses, unless they're

11 experts in some particular field, and this doesn't apply in this case.

12 This witness is giving evidence about events which he dealt with.

13 Those you can ask him about. His opinions as an international lawyer are,

14 with respect to him, totally irrelevant to us. It's not a matter for him

15 to answer.

16 So can you confine yourself not to questions about law or anything

17 of the sort, and politics, but as to what happened.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this won't be a great

19 obstacle for me. When my turn comes, there will be some very prominent

20 experts of international renown to explain to you what all this is about

21 and how that crime was committed from the standpoint of international law.

22 So I don't necessarily need this explanation. I just wanted to hear

23 Mr. Okun's opinion. If you're prohibiting that, I don't mind.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. But is it in dispute, Mr. Okun, that a representative of the

1 Presidency of the SFRY, rather, the vice-president of that Presidency who

2 headed the Presidency of the SFRY at the time, was not allowed to speak

3 and that that is why they walked out, as a sign of protest? Is that true

4 or not? Just say yes or no. We won't dwell on this. I do not wish to

5 argue with you because there are records about all this. Just say yes or

6 no, please. Is it true that he was not allowed to speak and then they --

7 that they walked out in protest; is that right?

8 A. After Branko Kostic stated that the terms of the AGS, the general

9 settlement that we've discussed already, after he stated that those terms

10 were not acceptable, Lord Carrington heard him say that, he then went on,

11 and Lord Carrington asked him to stop. This is all in the diary. And

12 then he threatened to walk out. That's the line at the top of page 145.

13 And then the three members of the Presidency from Serbia, that is to say

14 Mr. Jovic, Mr. Bajramovic, and the other Mr. Kostic - there were two

15 Kostics, Your Honour - those three gentlemen walked out of the conference.

16 That was the sequence of events, as recorded in my diary.

17 Q. Those four representatives. What the European Community called

18 the Rump Presidency, they walked out of the hall after the vice-president

19 of the Presidency was deprived of the right to speak by Lord Carrington;

20 is that right?

21 A. You're correct, Mr. President, Branko Kostic did walk out; it was

22 four who walked out, not three.

23 Q. Very well, then. So the incident occurred because he was not

24 given the right to speak and not because they wanted to undermine the

25 peace conference. We're just speaking about facts, only about facts. I

1 hope that it is not in dispute that this proposal that was reviewed, that

2 the most important point was the first chapter, first paragraph of the

3 first article, which envisaged the disappearance of Yugoslavia as a state

4 and as a subject of international law on the basis of a consensus among

5 the leaders of the Yugoslav republics, specifically those that the

6 European Community had invited to The Hague. Is that what that document

7 stipulated?

8 A. That was the partial area of the document. I don't have it in

9 front of me, but I assume you're reading from it and that it's correct.

10 This is the AGS, Your Honour, that Mr. Milosevic is referring to.

11 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I'd ask that Prosecution Exhibit --

12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

13 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Yes, Mr. Groome.

14 MR. GROOME: I'd ask that the Prosecution Exhibit 396, tab 5, be

15 placed in front of Mr. Okun so he can refer to this particular chapter.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Just a moment. Let the witness have the

17 document.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's no dispute whatsoever over

19 that document of Carrington's.

20 JUDGE MAY: There may not be a dispute, but the witness should

21 have the document in front of him if he's being asked about it.

22 Ambassador, would you remind us what "AGS" is standing for.

23 THE WITNESS: It stands for Arrangements for General Settlement.

24 It's document number 124.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have it.

1 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. The witness has the document.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Does it appear to you from the standpoint of your profession and

4 on the basis of your considerable international experience that the

5 disappearance of a country by auto destruction is surely an innovation?

6 JUDGE MAY: No. That's precisely the area which we've ruled

7 you're not to ask him about. You can address us in due course about it,

8 but it's not for the witness to comment. He's here as a witness as to

9 facts, not to give his opinions about things.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Okun, as a person specialising in international law, are you

12 familiar with a single case of a state destroying itself?

13 JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Milosevic, time is short, so repeating these

14 questions which are disallowed is simply taking up your time.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. As you will not allow

16 him to express his opinion, I will ask him, and I assume that is

17 legitimate, for me to ask him what actually happened at the conference.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's precisely what you should ask him.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As he was present there and as he

20 followed it very carefully, and as Mr. Okun knows exactly what took place

21 at the conference. So I assume I'm allowed to ask him that.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Okun, precisely what it says in Article 1,

24 that is that Yugoslavia ceases to exist, that I spoke then. I was not

25 deprived of the floor, and I did not walk out. I will quote myself

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1 actually what I said, and you tell me if you remember that, please. Just

2 please tell me whether you remember that and was it as I am saying it was.

3 I said that the proposal could not be accepted because it suspended the

4 valid constitutional order and abolishes Yugoslavia as a state which had

5 been in existence continuously for 70 years.

6 Is that right, Mr. Okun?

7 A. You may have said that, Mr. President. I do not recall your

8 saying it at that time, nor do my diary notes show it. The diary, on page

9 145, reads -- The walkout was at 3.56 p.m. I noted the time in the

10 diary. And the next line reads: "Carrington announces that the

11 Conference on Yugoslavia is adjourning," and that was at 4.00 p.m. So

12 from the time of the walkout until the time of the adjournment was four

13 minutes.

14 I'm just repeating to you, Mr. President, what's in the diary and

15 what it shows. So whether you spoke or not, I didn't record it. I'm not

16 disputing what you're saying, but I have no recollection of your speaking.

17 Q. And do you recollect that I said at the time that a decision on

18 the abolition of a state cannot be taken by any international forum, that

19 a decision can only be taken by that subject or entity that had originally

20 created the state and that the mandate to accept such an arrangement was

21 not given to any of the participants in the conference, nor can such a

22 mandate be given to the conference as such. Do you remember that?

23 A. Yes, Mr. President. It is so recorded in the diary on pages 139

24 and 140. Those were your earlier remarks, and they are recorded in the

25 diary.

1 Q. That's fine. So I'm not asking you what I said when the

2 conference adjourned, I'm asking what I said at the conference, and you've

3 noted it, I see. So I said not a single participant at this conference

4 has the mandate to accept this, nor can such a conference have such a

5 mandate, the valid constitutional order of the country, which is being

6 ignored by this arrangement. The only exception is being made to the

7 existing federal units and their borders, their administrative borders,

8 and those federal units were formed at the time of and immediately after

9 the Second World War, and their borders were never determined by any legal

10 act which was democratically verified.

11 I went on to say: By these arrangements, the unilateral act of

12 secession is being legalised and a unilateral secession of republics was

13 the cause of armed conflicts. Avoiding the real causes of the crisis

14 could move us further away from a lasting and stable peace in Yugoslavia,

15 an aim which we all want to achieve. It is clear to all that the crux of

16 the conflict in Yugoslavia is the position of the Serbian people in

17 Croatia which is threatened by extermination for a second time in a

18 century, and there can be no settlement to the Yugoslav crisis without

19 providing protection and national survival of the Serbian people. Those

20 were my words.

21 Is that right, Mr. Okun?

22 A. So I've heard you say.

23 Q. How, then, 12 years later, are you telling us that it became clear

24 to us that Serbia wanted war. So what I was saying was in favour of peace

25 because what happened caused war, because what happened --

1 JUDGE MAY: Let him answer. You've asked a question. He must be

2 able to answer it.

3 THE WITNESS: I said that, Your Honour, because of the six

4 Yugoslav republics present at that meeting on October 18, five of the six

5 republics accepted the AGS as drawn. The only republic that did not

6 accept it was Serbia, the representatives of Serbia, to use the

7 phraseology of Mr. Milosevic, and therefore, you had five of the six

8 republics accepting the comprehensive settlement of the problem proposed

9 by Lord Carrington and the conference and one rejecting it. I think that

10 speaks for itself.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Mr. Okun, the conference continued. It lasted for some time after

13 that. It went into October and then the next year also. Then there was

14 the London conference, the Geneva conference, and so on. Therefore, this

15 was not the end of it. To this day, I consider that my arguments were

16 right and failure to take them into consideration had led to war, because

17 what we had was a forcible act of secession whereby genocide was committed

18 against a whole people. You don't agree with that, do you?

19 JUDGE MAY: No. That's not for the witness to answer. All he can

20 deal with is what happened at the time. You can ask him about anything he

21 says about the conference, of course, but his opinions, and particularly

22 his opinions about what happened afterwards, are not relevant.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. And do you remember that in October the conference met for a

25 second time?

1 A. I don't have that in my records, but I imagine it could be the

2 case.

3 Q. At this plenary session at the level of the presidents of the

4 republics was scheduled for the 25th of October, according to the notes

5 that I have here. And even after that, if you remember, this fresh

6 meeting, Tudjman, who had spoken to me, and his statement can be found in

7 the press of the time, in which he said that Serbia had no territorial

8 claims. The affair around Dubrovnik started at that time, and Tudjman

9 said that I had condemned any kind of violence related to Dubrovnik.

10 Do you recollect that? This was precisely at the following

11 meeting of the conference that was held at the end of October.

12 A. I was not present at that meeting, Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Vance and I

13 returned to the United States, I believe it was either on the 18th or the

14 19th of October, after the first mission. It was on the 18th, immediately

15 after the walkout - I see that on page 145 - and we were in New York at

16 the United Nations and doing our work in New York, and we returned -- if I

17 could just give you the timing. We returned on Monday, November 4. So

18 between October 18 and November 4, we were in the United States.

19 Q. And you didn't follow developments, the course of the conference?

20 You had no insight into that? You attended that one meeting, and after

21 that, you didn't keep track of it. Very well.

22 Is it also true you that Borisav Jovic, at a meeting you had with

23 him on the 17th of October had drawn attention specifically to the

24 secession of the republics?

25 A. If I might revert to your previous comment, we of course did

1 follow the conference, and Mr. Jovic, on the 17th, if I might consult my

2 notes -- yes. I found that on page 128 of Vance mission diary number 1.

3 It records Mr. Jovic stating, and I quote from the diary: "I predicted

4 war if secessionists were allowed to carry out their plans. I was

5 correct, but the West would not listen. Now we have violence caused by

6 the secessionists," et cetera. And I noted parenthetically to my comment

7 on his demeanour: "Aggressive tone from the start."

8 Yes. Mr. Jovic did state that the secessionists had caused the

9 war. That was his opinion, and I duly noted it in my diary.

10 Q. And did he tell you how many people had left Croatia, that the

11 Croatian military operations were the causes of many unfortunate events?

12 Is that right?

13 A. That was his opinion.

14 Q. And did Jovic personally draw attention to the fact that the

15 Croatian government was not ready to deblock the garrisons and that it was

16 continuing to attack the army and that, on the other hand, there were

17 orders in the army not to return fire, not to respond to those attacks

18 except in necessary self-defence?

19 A. That was his view.

20 Q. Did Jovic tell you at the time that the only important thing was

21 to try to bring influence to bear on the Germans to tell Croatia to stop

22 what it was doing?

23 A. He said that.

24 Q. Now let's go back to the conference. You advocated that the Serbs

25 in Croatia must be given special status. Wasn't that right? Both you and

1 Cyrus Vance.

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And that international institutions should be the guarantors of

4 that status.

5 A. Through the UN peacekeeping operation, that was our view.

6 Q. Do you know that at that meeting that I had with Tudjman, that he

7 too was very close to accepting autonomy for the Serbian regions in

8 Croatia? He wanted to accept it.

9 A. If you -- I wasn't present at that meeting, but if you say so.

10 Q. And do you know when he turned around and decided not to agree to

11 anything? Do you know that the -- there were no reasons for continuing

12 talks with them after the visit to Germany when the Germans told him that

13 they would recognise him within his administrative borders and that he

14 should forget about the Serbs?

15 A. I'm listening to you. I hear you say that. I have no knowledge

16 of it.

17 Q. So you know nothing about that. There will be occasions on some

18 other occasion for this to be demonstrated here.

19 Very well, then. When Jovic said to you that attempts should be

20 made to influence Germany to change its position towards the break-up of

21 Yugoslavia, you remember that, don't you?

22 A. That was Jovic's position, and it was the general Serb position.

23 Q. We also had a meeting on the 18th of November. Did I tell you and

24 Cyrus Vance on that occasion very explicitly that it was indispensable to

25 continue the negotiations?

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1 JUDGE MAY: Ambassador, if you find the entry in your diary, if

2 you can, refer to it, of course.

3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. You remember that meeting, don't you?

6 A. Yes. I'm trying to find --

7 Q. Mr. Jovanovic was with me.

8 A. I'm consulting my notes, Mr. Milosevic.

9 Q. [In English] "Negotiating WO bloodshed."

10 A. What page would that be on?

11 JUDGE MAY: Can somebody assist the witness.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. 18th of November, 1991, page 17 of this typed text in English.

14 It's easier for me to use than the photocopies of your original

15 handwriting. I assume it was correctly typed out.

16 A. I can assume that you are better off with the text, but it does

17 give us different page numbers, so if I might find that quote.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Can the Prosecution assist as to what page that

19 would be.

20 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, Ms. Wee will go up and get the typed

21 copy so the Ambassador will have both. It may take a minute to get that.

22 My apologies.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I found it, Your Honour, the statement of

24 Mr. Milosevic. It followed the initial discussion of the peacekeeping

25 plan by Mr. Vance. He asked for President Milosevic's views, and this has

1 already been stated, President Milosevic stated: "This is completely

2 suitable for what we have in Yugoslavia," that is to say, the peacekeeping

3 operation. Then the next statement was then: "Back to negotiating

4 without bloodshed."

5 Yes, that is correct.

6 JUDGE KWON: So you are referring to page 41.

7 THE WITNESS: Precisely, page 41. The top of page 41. And then

8 the president went on, we all have the notes in front of us, by stating:

9 "The situation is complicated. There are different kind of troops,

10 commands, national guards, et cetera, on the Croatian side," and then,

11 "Croats began by attacking Serbs living in compact areas in Croatia in the

12 form of military Krajinas of the old Austro-Hungarian empire. Before

13 World War I, there were only two independent states," et cetera, et

14 cetera. And I noted in the diary that - in the brackets, you'll see --

15 with due respect, Mr. President, I've noted in the diary: "Milosevic's

16 lecture." We had heard it so often -- we had heard it so often from you

17 that we referred to this as your lecture.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. I assume that you don't mind, since you lecture as well. You give

20 lectures.

21 At the beginning, Mr. Okun, you said that you ended your mission

22 in January 1992, that the mission had succeeded in halting the war, that

23 the blue helmets arrived in the areas under protection that were then

24 known as the UN Protected Areas, and you assessed that the mission had

25 ended successfully and returned to the States after January 1992. Isn't

1 that right?

2 Then you came back in October 1992 when the problems started that

3 Cyrus Vance was dealing with once again, this time in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

4 is that right?

5 A. No, that's not correct, Mr. President. We departed in January

6 after the conclusion of the cessation of hostilities in Croatia, and that

7 I refer to as a successful conclusion. We were -- we did not, however,

8 wait until the following October to return. We were back in the former

9 Yugoslavia in March, specifically March 3. So we were in there earlier.

10 Q. All right. I understood you to have said so. But never mind,

11 it's not an essential point.

12 But what we discussed, this mission, you came to see me, or

13 rather, Cyrus Vance did together with you, to ask for my assistance and

14 support to the peace plan and the establishment of a peace mission which

15 would not pre-empt a political solution but would prevent the war, stop

16 the war. Isn't that right, Mr. Okun?

17 A. That was the purpose of the peacekeeping operation, yes, to

18 provide a situation of calm with protection for the Croatian people and

19 the Serb people in Croatia in order to allow the political negotiations

20 being conducted by Lord Carrington to continue.

21 Q. Now, when we link all this up, you came to see me for me to help,

22 first and foremost, by wielding political influence, and the role that

23 Serbia had, as big as it was, first of all, first and foremost, to prevail

24 upon the leaders in the Krajinas, in the east with Hadzic and in the Knin

25 Krajina with Babic and his associates. Wasn't that how it was?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So you asked me to talk to them; right?

3 A. In connection with the peacekeeping operation, yes.

4 Q. Well, I supported the peacekeeping operation just to stop a war,

5 to prevent a war, and to opt for a peaceful solution. Isn't that so,

6 Mr. Okun?

7 A. Yes. And others did it as well, under your direction and, of

8 course, on the Croatian side.

9 Q. Well, I hope that you used the expression "under your direction"

10 incorrectly, because I told you at the time as well that my political

11 influence could only be political, public in view of the post I held, and

12 only a political one as far as it was supported by the public, by public

13 opinion, and that I would invest my all to strive for peace. And that is

14 what I did; isn't that right?

15 A. That is what you told us.

16 Q. All right. Then tell me this: Apart from the facts that aren't

17 challenged, that is to say the 18th of November, the meeting and the need

18 to go back to the negotiating table, this portion you read out from your

19 diary a moment ago, did I indicate to you that the Croatian extremists

20 were starting to attack the Serbs throughout the territory of Croatia?

21 A. That was your persistent contention.

22 Q. And did you know how many refugees there were from Croatia in

23 Serbia already at that time? Did you make a point of finding out about

24 that?

25 A. We heard numbers from various sources, and we took account of

1 that.

2 Q. Did I reiterate on the occasion that the army had the exclusive

3 role of separating the parties in conflict at that meeting as well? Did I

4 repeat that to you?

5 A. So you did. I must note, Mr. President, that we saw with our own

6 eyes on repeated occasions that was not in fact the case. And I have

7 testified to that fact.

8 Q. Well, what happened we shall be able to establish looking at it

9 from all sides, but tell me this, please: Did I tell you on that occasion

10 that we in Serbia would not allow any kind of paramilitary formations?

11 A. Yes. I've already reported on that.

12 Q. In your notes, you frequently make mention of the fact that I

13 referred to Serbian paramilitary formations being under the control of

14 Hadzic, or words to that effect. Now, as I never used that expression

15 myself, I hope that that was a misunderstanding, because under Hadzic's or

16 Babic's control, all that could have been under their control was the

17 Serbian Territorial Defence, which were not paramilitary formations but

18 Territorial Defence of Krajina. The Territorial Defence of the Serbian

19 Autonomous Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, and

20 the Territorial Defence of Krajina in the Knin region.

21 So we were talking about the Territorial Defence and not

22 paramilitaries. Isn't that right, Mr. Okun?

23 A. I would not agree with that. We witnessed, as I've previously

24 testified, Serbian irregulars in Dalj at the corps commander of the JNA's

25 headquarters. We saw numerous highly irregular troops. I wouldn't want

1 to characterise them beyond that because any characterisation would be too

2 negative for the Court. But we saw people like that in Vukovar after the

3 fall of the city. So I'm reporting what I saw.

4 JUDGE MAY: But the question is when the accused was referring to

5 paramilitaries, as you have noted, was he in fact simply referring to the

6 Territorial Defence or was he referring to something else? Could you

7 perhaps clarify that, Ambassador, from your note.

8 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes, Your Honour. At the top of page 43,

9 within quotes, I quoted President Milosevic, then President Milosevic, as

10 stated: "We in Serbia did not allow any irregular or paramilitary

11 troops." "In Eastern Krajina, some local Serbs helped the army." He did

12 not say they were Territorial Defence units. He may have meant that, but

13 we could see what kind of troops they were when we visited the

14 battlefront.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. You quoted very precisely. I did say we in Serbia do not allow

17 any paramilitaries or irregular or paramilitary troops but in that chaos

18 of conflict and clash that they could appear. However, I say now in

19 connection with the portion you talk -- you mention who is in control of

20 the paramilitaries, and when I talk about Hadzic, I say he was at the head

21 of the Territorial Defence. He was not at the head of any irregulars,

22 irregular Krajina troops, and I hope that is quite clear. Those forces

23 were the regular forces of the Territorial Defence of the SAO Krajina.

24 JUDGE MAY: Now, this is very important that we get this correct.

25 The issue which the accused is raising, Ambassador, is whether he

1 referred to Hadzic as being in control of paramilitaries.

2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it was my view then, and it remains my

3 view now, that he was referring to the paramilitaries. Later on in the

4 same dialogue, then President Milosevic said "Babic and Hadzic both

5 political and military leaders," and we understood that to mean that each

6 of these two gentlemen controlled their political situation and controlled

7 all of the armed forces, all of the armed men within their sphere of

8 influence. Whether they were territorials or irregulars, they were under

9 the control of Babic and Hadzic, and that was, I believe, widely

10 understood at the time throughout Croatia and throughout Serbia.

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ambassador -- just a minute, Mr. Milosevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Well, that's the whole point.

14 JUDGE KWON: Just a minute, Mr. Milosevic. Excuse me.

15 Were you aware of the existence of the Territorial Defence at that

16 time or the concept of the Territorial Defence or TO?

17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

18 JUDGE KWON: Were you aware that volunteers from Serbia or the

19 local area were subsumed -- some part of them was subsumed to the

20 organisation of the Territorial Defence?

21 THE WITNESS: We never checked that out ourselves directly. We

22 didn't interview people, for example, Your Honour, but we were aware that

23 that was said by various people.

24 JUDGE KWON: So is it possible for you to refer to those -- the

25 volunteers as paramilitaries who were in either the TO or the JNA?

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1 THE WITNESS: Well, the JNA I would certainly not refer to as

2 paramilitaries. The TO is a more complicated situation. It depended, I

3 think in every case, where they were active, what the command structure

4 was.

5 You see, Your Honour, as we discussed yesterday in the brief

6 interchange concerning the transition from the JNA to the VJ and then from

7 the VJ to the Bosnian Serb army, namely the VRS, during this entire

8 period, names changed and concepts changed, and very often the parties,

9 and it was usually the Yugoslav party in this case, made changes in

10 nomenclature that often concealed rather than elucidated the reality. So

11 it is a murky picture, and we're trying to separate the strands of

12 spaghetti from time to time here.

13 But I repeat, what we saw with our own eyes on the battlefields in

14 Croatia were not territorial troops, were not TO troops separate from the

15 JNA, in separate units, wearing separate kind of uniforms. The only

16 people who really wore different uniforms were, naturally, on the Serbian

17 side, the Serbian police, who wore police uniforms. The irregulars wore a

18 variety of civilian clothing, actually, often with boots, sometimes with

19 jackets thrown over. We were there in the winter, you'll recall, so they

20 were wearing sweaters and coats. This is the winter of 1991. But they

21 certainly did not indicate any type of military organisation. For

22 example, none of them, to my recollection, wore badges or insignia that

23 would indicate a rank. Now, if you're in an organised military structure,

24 everybody has a rank and wears it and displays it. The Geneva Conventions

25 require it and note it in the Conventions that one of the conditions of

1 being in an organised military unit is a badge of rank, that sort of

2 thing. So the paramilitaries didn't wear that kind of stuff, and

3 therefore, I think we were correct in using the terminology "paramilitary"

4 or "irregular."

5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. You may proceed.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Than you, Mr. Kwon. That's what I

7 wanted to clear up.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Because you noted -- you made a note of me having said that Babic

10 and Hadzic, both politically -- were both political and military leaders

11 in Krajina, one in the east and the other in the west; is that right?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. Now, do you know that they were nominated and appointed by their

14 governments, elected by their assemblies and appointed commanders of the

15 Territorial Defence in the Serb Autonomous Regions? Do you know that?

16 Are you aware of that?

17 A. I'm aware of that.

18 Q. So I told you something that was both de facto and de jure

19 correct; right?

20 A. It was de facto correct. Whether it was de jure correct is

21 another matter.

22 Q. All right. But without doubt, they had been nominated and

23 appointed by their Assemblies and by their governments. That's not in

24 dispute. And I assume you are challenging the legality of their

25 Assemblies and governments, but as such, they were appointed by their

1 Assemblies and by their governments.

2 So is it then clear that if they were nominated and appointed by

3 their Assemblies and governments, which is something you are familiar

4 with, that the troops then that were subordinated to them were no

5 paramilitary troops but first of all they were the Territorial Defence and

6 then later on --

7 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop this. This sounds like one of your

8 complicated arguments you're trying to run to us.

9 Ambassador, you made the note; what did you understand the

10 situation to be, whatever the accused is arguing now?

11 THE WITNESS: We understood that Babic and Hadzic were in

12 political and military command of their regions and that they were

13 responsible ultimately, if not directly, for the military activities that

14 took place on their side. We could see that the military activities were

15 being carried out by paramilitary and irregular forces.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. And do you happen to remember, Mr. Okun, that I said to you, I

18 believe -- you mentioned Hadzic, and I said that I believed that 95 per

19 cent of those troops were under control and that they would certainly

20 adhere to the agreement. I assume there could have been 5 per cent, say,

21 of some kind of paramilitaries, paramilitary troops, in all that chaos.

22 But as for the disciplined army that was there, the Territorial Defence

23 troops of Krajina, they adhered to the agreement, and that is not in

24 dispute. Is it being challenged? Are you challenging it or not?

25 A. Not at all. I so indicated earlier.

1 Q. Just a slight digression from your diaries now. I'm looking at

2 this official statement of yours, the one you gave to this institution

3 here, and I've already asked you something about one of the points there

4 in it, where they wished to emphasise that I was the sole representative

5 of the Serbian side that you negotiated with and then you explained to

6 them how it was. So it's in that same paper, that same document.

7 And you go on to say the following: When Slobodan Milosevic was

8 informed that there was news that the Serb paramilitaries - and you were

9 informing of that - were committing crimes and ethnic cleansing in

10 north-western Bosnia-Herzegovina, he tried -- he appeared to be

11 astonished, or he made it look as if he was surprised.

12 Isn't that right? "Feigned surprise." Is that what you said?

13 And when was that? In November 1991, was it?

14 A. What meeting are you referring to?

15 Q. I'm referring to point C on page 1 of your statement. The

16 official statement that you made.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Groome.

18 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I believe it's a meeting --

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. But to save time, we'll get to that and we'll get to your diary.

21 Let's move on. I am afraid this is -- I'm losing a lot of time over this.

22 We'll back to this question.

23 JUDGE MAY: You're losing time but we must have these documents.

24 The witness can have a copy of his statement, if that's of assistance.

25 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, there is no statement. Mr. Milosevic

1 was referring to the witness summary. I only have one with my notes.

2 We're getting a clean copy now, but I will direct that the passage Mr.

3 Milosevic is referring to is on book 3, page 98. It's a meeting of the

4 21st of November, 1991.

5 THE WITNESS: Yes, I've found it, Your Honour. Thank you. I have

6 page 98. It reads, briefly, not to take time: It refers to Secretary

7 Vance saying that he's heard disturbing reports of activities by Serb

8 irregulars in Bosnia, and I noted to myself parenthetically, "Then

9 President Milosevic feigned surprise." You pretended to be surprised,

10 yes. In my judgement, you were aware of what was going on and you were

11 pretending not to.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Mr. Okun, do you know that I'm surprised now too? Not only then

14 in 1991, but I'm quite surprised now as well. What conflicts were there

15 in Bosnia in 1991? In 1991, in November, in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was

16 completely peaceful, calm and peaceful. There were no paramilitary

17 troops. Nothing was going on in 1991 November in Bosnia. And you

18 yourself speak about the fact that the conflicts began after the breakdown

19 of the Cutileiro plan, and we'll come to establish that. So that was in

20 March 1992. So what kind of conflicts in Bosnia in November? What kind

21 of killings and crimes in November in Bosnia in 1991 at all? And

22 everybody would be surprised today to hear this, that at that time in 1991

23 there was any kind of violence in Bosnia at all. Quite the contrary. The

24 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina was still operational and functioning.

25 It was composed of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. The organs and

1 institutions of the republic were functioning. They believed that an

2 agreement would be reached about an equitable solution for the three

3 national communities, ethnic communities, and Cutileiro's plan came later

4 on.

5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, there was a question put to the witness,

6 "What conflicts were there in Bosnia in 1991?" I'd ask that he be

7 allowed to answer the question that was put to him.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

9 THE WITNESS: If I may answer, we had already heard reports of

10 fighting in November in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I refer you to Vance mission

11 diary number 2 where the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic,

12 discussed that with us. So it was known that there were -- there was

13 fighting in Bosnia.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. What was there going on in Bosnia? Where do you have any facts or

16 pieces of information about any kind of clashes or conflicts in Bosnia in

17 1991? Who was killed in 1991?

18 A. Prime Minister Markovic told us there was.

19 Q. Who?

20 A. Prime Minister Ante Markovic.

21 Q. Ante Markovic told you that.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I stand surprised even now that anybody could claim, and that

24 opposing side over there at least has information on Bosnia because it is

25 trying -- has been trying Serbs from Bosnia here for ten years already, so

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1 I don't know that anybody was accused of having done anything in 1991.

2 JUDGE MAY: The witness can only answer what he was told, and

3 that's his answer.

4 THE ACCUSED: Okay.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Okay. Fine. Tell me, please, at that meeting, the one I said

7 that -- where I said that Serbia would not allow and did not allow any

8 irregular forces - which is true, they never existed in Serbia - did I

9 indicate to you that at that time over 20 Serb villages in Eastern

10 Slavonia had been burnt? Do you remember that?

11 A. You said that.

12 Q. And on that occasion, did you hear my assessment and evaluation?

13 And you asked me to assist in this regard, that the Serb side - I'm

14 thinking of the Serb side in Croatia - and the army would accept the

15 International Monitoring Mission or, rather, the UN forces; isn't that so?

16 A. Yes, that is correct.

17 Q. So is that then an expression of my conviction that the Serbs

18 exclusively desired peace and that they wished in a peaceful way to settle

19 the problems they had and, of course, the violence that they were exposed

20 to?

21 A. We understood your agreement to Secretary Vance's initial

22 proposals for a peacekeeping operation, and we welcomed that, of course.

23 And we knew that with your agreement, the JNA would follow, as they did,

24 that the local Serb leaders would follow, as they did, and of course we

25 welcomed that. The diary is replete with references to that. And I may

1 say, if I could finish, that we hoped that the imposition of the UN

2 peacekeeping force would lead to a peaceful settlement. The peacekeeping

3 operation was not a peace plan, it was simply an arrangement on the ground

4 to allow the peace settlement to be achieved. Unfortunately, it was not

5 achieved.

6 Q. Yes. Unfortunately. Precisely for the reasons that I'm

7 indicating. It was precisely for those reasons.

8 And on the 18th at that time, did you have talks with Kadijevic?

9 Did he indicate the problem about the attack on the garrisons and the

10 deblocking of the barracks and the blockade again? Did he indicate that

11 to you once again, although he had spoken to you about that previously as

12 well? Wasn't that how it was on that particular day?

13 A. Yes, indeed. The question of the blockaded JNA troops and their

14 families, as I've indicated, was very high if not uppermost in General

15 Kadijevic's mind.

16 Q. On the 20th of November, you attended a meeting with General

17 Raseta. Is it true and correct that on the occasion it was very precisely

18 in -- the problem of the JNA and the officers was precisely indicated, who

19 had been under siege and in an encirclement for two months, they couldn't

20 see their families, and they were blocked by the Croatian paramilitary

21 troops. Is that how it was or not?

22 A. Well, you've made three points in that locution, Mr. Milosevic.

23 Let me take them, if I might, one by one.

24 It is true that on October 20 we spent quite a bit of time in the

25 blockaded Marshall Tito Kaserne in Zagreb with General Raseta and his

1 troops. The report of that meeting, and it's a full report, because we

2 regarded it as so important for us to meet those troops, is in Vance diary

3 number 3 beginning on page 82 and going through page 85. So yes, we spent

4 a lot of time with the troops, listening to them and their concerns, and

5 they did have concerns.

6 Your second point, namely that they were blocked by Croatian

7 paramilitaries, I have no knowledge of that. They did not say that. We

8 were taken into the barracks --

9 Q. Just to ask you then, Mr. Okun, yourself: These Serb forces, you

10 consider them to be paramilitaries. Do you consider the Croatian ones to

11 be legal at that time or paramilitary forces?

12 JUDGE MAY: Can you answer that, Ambassador? It sounds like a

13 question which we may ultimately have to decide. Did you have a view at

14 the time about it or not?

15 THE WITNESS: Croatia had an army. It was constituted. It had

16 ranks. The names of the officers were known. General Anton Tus was the

17 Commander-in-Chief. I met with him. Many others did as well, and his

18 officers. I don't think anybody would consider them paramilitaries, no.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Your answer suffices. You consider that in Croatia they did not

21 have any paramilitary forces. That means that the forces that were active

22 in 1990 --

23 JUDGE MAY: That's not what he said. Just pay attention, if you

24 would, to the answers. The witness was describing what happened when he

25 went into the barracks. He said he didn't consider the people there

1 paramilitaries.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Do you know anything about Croatian paramilitary formations,

4 Mr. Okun?

5 A. Yes, I do. I was told that Paraga, a certain man named Paraga,

6 whom I never met, had under his direction a small band of troops that

7 opposed the Croatian government and also fought and I'm sure committed

8 acts. Paraga was the head of the so-called Party of Rights. His troops

9 were referred to -- his party and his group was referred to as the HOS. It

10 was widely reported, but I never witnessed it myself, that they actually

11 wore the Ustasha marking from the Second World War. So that there were

12 reports, widespread reports, of the activities of this group.

13 It was also reported that Paraga opposed President Tudjman and the

14 government of Croatia.

15 JUDGE MAY: It's time now to adjourn. In fact, it's slightly

16 after the time. Before we do, let me make one announcement about the

17 arrangements in early April. We shall be changing the sitting days as

18 follows: We shall take the rest break rather earlier. We shall not sit

19 on the 4th and the 7th of April, but we will sit on the 11th and 14th. In

20 fact, that will make a more rational break in our sitting pattern.

21 We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes. Will you be back then,

22 please, Ambassador.

23 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

24 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you have two hours more with this

1 witness, whose evidence we must finish today because he's had to hang

2 around in The Hague. So can you tailor your examination to that, please.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At least then let me use the time

4 for the rest of the day, if I may. This is very limited time for me for

5 this witness.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. So, Mr. Okun, you have absolutely no knowledge except Paraga, that

8 you mentioned, about the arming of Croatian paramilitary units through the

9 ruling HDZ party or about violence committed against Serb civilians, the

10 Serb population all over Croatia, precisely by those paramilitary forces

11 and the regular Croatian police. So you have no knowledge about these

12 things. Did I understand you correctly?

13 A. Let me take those points in turn. On the question of

14 paramilitaries, I did have knowledge. I was made aware of Paraga and his

15 troops, although, as I mentioned, I never saw them.

16 On your second point, whether the government of Croatia and the

17 HDZ armed them, I have no knowledge.

18 And on your third point that violence was committed against the

19 Serb people in Croatia, I was previously asked that question, and I said

20 that yes, I did have knowledge of that through statements from you and

21 from other Serb leaders. And as you'll recall, I added that the violence

22 committed against the Croatian people was much larger than that committed

23 against the Serb people in Croatia.

24 Q. Did you then know how many refugees there were in Serbia coming

25 from Croatia?

1 A. The exact number, no, I never knew. It was never made available.

2 Q. Did you know how many Serbs were killed all over Croatia?

3 A. I knew what you and others told us, but I don't believe you ever

4 gave figures except on rare occasions, and it was a statement, of course,

5 we took into account.

6 Q. Very well. Talking about this meeting with Raseta, he told you,

7 within the context of efforts and endeavours to deblock the barracks --

8 and you have this in your diary, but please, if you need to quote

9 anything, limit yourself to my questions because, as you see, my time is

10 extremely limited. Is it clear that he linked the blockade to what he

11 said, that is that he didn't want anything to be repeated of what had

12 happened in Vukovar? Was this a clear inference to the fact that what

13 happened in Vukovar happened because the barracks were blocked and because

14 there was large scale violence precisely by those Croatian paramilitary

15 forces that we're talking about?

16 A. In general, that was his contention. Of course, we were able to

17 see for ourselves what happened in Vukovar. I don't want to repeat it,

18 Mr. Milosevic - I agree with you, we shouldn't be repetitive, we need to

19 move on - but I did report rather fully about the complete destruction of

20 Vukovar.

21 Q. Apart from Paraga, had you heard of Mercep and his criminals who

22 had massacred Serbs in the area of Vukovar? Even representatives of the

23 Croatian government complained about them. That is Marin Vidic, a

24 representative of the government, wrote a letter to the Croatian president

25 about that. Do you know that? And he was the legal head of the forces

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1 constituted by the Croatian government. That was this Mercep who had

2 committed crimes. Had you heard anything about him?

3 A. We heard various reports of that nature.

4 Q. Very well. You had a meeting with Kadijevic in Belgrade on the

5 21st of November. At the time, you mentioned Vukovar. Did Kadijevic tell

6 you then what had happened in Vukovar, to the effect that the barracks had

7 been blocked for two months without food or water and that the people had

8 demanded that the army assist Vukovar? Is what -- is that what you took

9 down in your diary, what you wrote down in your diary?

10 A. That was the general burden of his comment.

11 Q. You spoke about peace. Is it true that you told me that Kadijevic

12 agreed with a peaceful settlement and that I answered that that was a good

13 thing?

14 A. Yes. We were pleased that Kadijevic followed your line -- yes.

15 Yes, we were pleased to hear that General Kadijevic --

16 Q. Is it true that you told me then that he, Kadijevic, had told you

17 that the army would withdraw from Croatia as soon as the garrisons were

18 deblocked? And my response again was, "Excellent."

19 A. As I've already reported, the unblocking of the garrison was of

20 the highest concern to General Kadijevic, and he did assure us that the

21 fighting would cease, that the JNA would cease its military activities

22 once the garrisons were unblocked. That is correct.

23 Q. I'm reading, actually, from your diary. Cyrus Vance says:

24 "Kadijevic agreed." Cyrus Vance says: "Kadijevic said the JNA would

25 withdraw from all of Croatia when garrisons unblocked." And then again I

1 say: "Excellent." And then you say that I feign surprise in connection

2 with certain Serb irregular forces in Bosnia. And this was a meeting --

3 now I can't find the exact date of that meeting. I suppose it's precisely

4 the one held in November. Let me see the date of the meeting. I can't

5 see the date, but we can move on.

6 MR. GROOME: It's the 21st of November.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. 21st of November, 1991. So if what we've just quoted is correct,

9 you informed me what Kadijevic told you and that he had agreed. Where,

10 then, did you come to the conclusion that I had control over Kadijevic and

11 that I had the army under my control? You are informing me or, rather,

12 Cyrus Vance, as you say here, said that Kadijevic agrees, that he will

13 withdraw, and I say fine, and so on.

14 How, then, did you come to make the conclusion so many years later

15 that I had control over Kadijevic and the army?

16 A. The conclusion was drawn at the time and not so many years later.

17 Let me recall for the Court the conversation of November 18 where

18 Secretary Vance and I introduced the peacekeeping plan for the first time

19 to then President Milosevic, who said, Yes, this is fine for us -- I'm

20 paraphrasing. You will have no problem, words to that effect.

21 We then went to General Kadijevic who said the same thing,

22 although there was no previous indication to General Kadijevic from our

23 side of what we were going to say.

24 So when Mr. Vance, three days later, said, as I've recorded, to

25 President Milosevic, Kadijevic has agreed, he was reporting the agreement

1 of the 18th which followed President Milosevic's earlier agreement. And

2 this was simply in the nature of summing up, because of course we assumed

3 that President Milosevic knew that. Why wouldn't he know that? If we

4 knew it, why wouldn't he know it?

5 Q. Doesn't this show that in the case of Serbia --

6 JUDGE MAY: Let him finish. Let him finish.

7 THE WITNESS: So it was not Mr. Vance informing President

8 Milosevic of General Kadijevic's assent, he was confirming something that

9 we assumed and indeed knew to be the case. It was just by way of

10 introduction.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. If we pursue that logic, Mr. Okun, at the first meeting with

13 Kadijevic, he also told you that the army support a peaceful settlement,

14 that it wanted to avoid war. The position of the army was to avoid war.

15 The position of Serbia too was to avoid war, to resolve problems by

16 peaceful means in Yugoslavia. Therefore, how, then, can you link this up

17 to some sort of control that I allegedly had over the army when both at

18 the federal level and at the level of the Republic of Serbia the people

19 were against the war?

20 A. The question of words and deeds arises. We always listened

21 carefully. I noted, and you have quoted, the diaries. I don't just report

22 what we say. I reported as faithfully as I could everything that was said

23 to us of importance. However, one naturally had to check that against

24 facts on the ground. Let me give you an example.

25 The garrison at Vukovar. We had been told that that was the

1 ostensible reason for the JNA siege. In that siege of three months, a

2 city of 50 or 60.000 was reduced to rubble. We then saw the garrison. It

3 was small and hardly touched. And then Mr. Jovic, the former president of

4 the country, reported in his book on the break-up of Yugoslavia that, in

5 fact, he said the garrison had been freed on September 20, 1991. That's

6 what Mr. Jovic wrote in the book. I read it in the book. And if the

7 garrison had been freed on September 1991, then the question arises why

8 the siege and the destruction continued until November 18, for almost two

9 more months, two months.

10 So I answer simply to illustrate the difference between words and

11 deeds.

12 Q. Regarding Jovic's book, that can only be a printing error, because

13 it is impossible for him to be able to assert such a thing according to

14 information that I have. And as the army was present there, then surely

15 the most reliable collocutor for you must have been General Kadijevic and

16 not me or Jovic regarding what was going on over there.

17 A. So I hear you say.

18 Q. You say in this summary, or whatever it's called, official

19 statement, you speak about the meeting when I mentioned that, as you say,

20 I was the only representative of Serb interests, and you had come to my

21 office, and you say that during that meeting, "Milosevic made the

22 following remarks which point to the fact that he had control over the

23 Serbian police in connection with the political and military situation in

24 Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina."

25 My remarks that I made have been taken here as evidence that I

1 have control, and those remarks are the following: A -- since you refer

2 to those remarks on the basis of which you infer the conclusion that I

3 have control, according to what is stated here, though you had asked me

4 for my assistance.

5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you're questioning the witness. This

6 seems to be going on. Are you referring to these charts which we've had

7 in which statements and events are referred to? Is that what you're

8 referring to?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. It has 030404113. That's the

10 page of the translation. And it says "Official statement of Ambassador

11 Herbert Stuart Okun." And there are only a few points, actually five.

12 And it's signed --

13 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Groome, what is being referred to?

14 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it's a declaration that was submitted as

15 part of the confirmation materials. I have an English copy here for the

16 Chamber and for Ambassador Okun.

17 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps the Ambassador should have it. Let him see

18 what's being referred to.

19 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mr. Okun, you say under point 3 that I made remarks that are

22 indicative of my control regarding the political and military situation in

23 Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then let us look at these remarks.

24 Under A, you say: "In connection with the Serb leaders in Eastern

25 Slavonia, Goran Hadzic, Slobodan Milosevic basically said that he was in

1 principle in agreement with the establishment of a UN peace mission in

2 Croatia and that Goran Hadzic would not oppose it. When Slobodan

3 Milosevic was asked to provide a map or a list of locations inhabited by

4 Serbs in Croatia, he stated that he would ask Goran Hadzic to provide such

5 a map."

6 So let me -- so I was -- in order to help you. So why did you

7 need this? If I said that I would ask him to provide you with this map,

8 why would that be any proof that I have control over him if I am assisting

9 you to acquire a map that I don't have and which he could probably provide

10 you with.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters do not have the text. We

12 apologise.

13 THE WITNESS: Several things indicated your authority over Hadzic.

14 The comment that he would do something that we'd asked you to do was a

15 normal comment, and clearly the President of Serbia has other things to do

16 than to provide maps, so that's the sort of thing one asks a subordinate

17 to do. We understood that.

18 The other thing, if I might just mention, at the same meeting when

19 Secretary Vance initially asked you about Goran Hadzic, you said that he

20 was a nice young man, and I indicated that in my diary notes. And I think

21 that was an accurate depiction of your attitude towards him, that he was a

22 nice young chap and that he would do what he was told. And there were

23 numerous indications of that state of affairs.

24 You will recall that at one time, and I've already testified to

25 this effect, you said that we would have no trouble with Hadzic and Babic,

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1 "believe me." That indicated control.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. That is exactly what I'm asking you. Do you assume since it is

4 not contested that I had not appointed Babic or Hadzic -- they were

5 elected by their Assemblies, and then of course naturally they had

6 contacts with Serbia, primarily to seek assistance because they were very

7 poor. Would you allow for the possibility that I had asked Hadzic prior

8 to this for his opinion and advocated that this be accepted and then spoke

9 to you about it rather than on the basis of any kind of control or any

10 ordering authority that I may have had over him? How could I have any

11 authority over bodies elected outside Serbia and without me knowing about

12 it? I didn't -- I didn't even know them before they became what they

13 became, leaders of those autonomous regions. Would you allow for the

14 possibility that I had consulted them, talked to then, suggested to them

15 that they accept and that they agreed, and then on the basis of all that,

16 I tell you there will be no trouble because they agree. And that is

17 exactly what you had asked me to do, to assist to ensure his acquiescence.

18 You were explaining this yesterday. I told you I would talk to them, and

19 that is what I did. I talked to them and they agreed. Is that right or

20 not?

21 JUDGE MAY: We'll get your question now.

22 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honour, I didn't hear what you said.

23 JUDGE MAY: Let's have a question. I was talking to the accused.

24 What's the question?

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. Do you allow for the possibility that upon your request I spoke to

2 them and invested my authority in support of the peace plan and that I

3 informed you of this on the basis of the conversation I had with them and

4 not that I had any ability to give them any kind of orders?

5 A. Our understanding was that both were true: A, that you had spoken

6 with them; B, that your voice was controlling and they followed your

7 instructions.

8 Q. However, the fact that Babic refused to accept that plan, doesn't

9 it speak for itself, that is that in spite of my efforts, I could not give

10 them any orders? I used exclusively political and public means, writing

11 him a letter in which --

12 JUDGE MAY: That is the question. That is the question. The fact

13 that Babic refused to accept the plan, doesn't it show that in spite of

14 his efforts, he couldn't give them orders? That was the question.

15 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, Babic subsequently suffered a bad

16 accident, and I draw no conclusion from that, but the result -- the end

17 result, in fact, was that with the unblocking of the garrisons, which did

18 occur at the very end of 1991, the peacekeeping operation via the

19 Implementing Accord of 2 January 1992 went into effect and the

20 peacekeeping operation went forward.

21 Might I make a comment on the question of authority and titles for

22 the benefit of the Court?

23 JUDGE MAY: Briefly.

24 THE WITNESS: I'll be very brief. And I make this comment with no

25 comparative purposes or disrespect in mind. The comment is the following:

1 From 1929 to 1953, Joseph Stalin had no official position in the Soviet

2 Union. He was the general secretary of the Communist Party, that is all.

3 He was not the president of the country, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

4 Now, we all know who ran the Soviet Union between 1929 and 1953; a man who

5 had no official position. Thank you.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we continue?

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Did you yourself note down, Mr. Okun, in this conversation - again

10 I'm afraid I can't find the date.

11 A. The date, Mr. --

12 Q. 1st to the 9th of December. And then Milosevic/Jovanovic --

13 December the 2nd. That's right. December the 2nd.

14 I say I will use all influence I have, but I am not their boss.

15 But I am quite sure that they will fulfil their promises. [In English] "I

16 will use my influence but I am not their master. I'm sure they will

17 fulfil whatever is promised." [Interpretation] This is in your diary.

18 A. So it is, on page 33. And your influence was very, very

19 influential.

20 Q. According to this, Mr. Okun, Cyrus Vance and you came to see me to

21 ask me for my assistance and support for the Serbian side in Croatia to

22 accept and agree to the peace operations of the UN. I gave you that

23 assistance and support. I invested my whole authority behind it, and now

24 that is my greatest fault, because it is proof that actually I had control

25 over them.

1 So instead of thanking me for the assistance I gave in the

2 establishment of the peace operations, you're accusing me of holding

3 things under my control in Krajina and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is that

4 what you are saying?

5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you know that you can't comment. You

6 can ask the witness questions. He's agreed with you that he asked you for

7 your assistance and support. Now, that's as far as you can take it. The

8 rest is comment.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. I asked whether that was right. Nothing more than that.

11 JUDGE MAY: That wasn't the question.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. At your request for me to intervene with both authorities in both

14 of the Serbian Autonomous Regions, and I put my whole authority and

15 influence into it to support the peace operations, you draw the conclusion

16 that they are under my control on that basis. Do you consider that to be

17 logical?

18 A. Is that the question, do I consider it to be logical?

19 JUDGE MAY: It's not a question. It's another comment.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. All right, then. Now, do you know, on the 23rd of January, 1992,

22 Jovic, when he indicated how many soldiers had been killed and how many

23 incidents had broken out in Croatia, told you on that occasion and

24 indicated the problem of the leaders of the local Serbs and asked you for

25 assistance to wield your influence on them. Is that right?

1 A. Excuse me, what date are you referring to?

2 Q. I'm referring to the 23rd of January, 1992, the president of the

3 Yugoslav state Presidency, Jovic, indicated to you that you ought to

4 prevail upon them because we cannot ourselves achieve the results unless

5 you take an active part and become actively involved in it as well.

6 A. Yes. On page 43 I see Jovic saying: "We need your help to tell

7 people that a political solution would be found."

8 Q. Yes. That's right. Now, I have before me here a report by the

9 Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to UN Security Council

10 Resolution 721 of 1991, and in it he states in point 4 the following, and

11 he's talking about activities of Marrack Goulding -- you'll remember

12 Marrack Goulding, I'm sure, and his role in the preparations for the peace

13 operations, peacekeeping operations. He went to Eastern and to Western

14 Slavonia and also to Knin. And in the UN Secretary-General's report, it

15 says: "Up until the meeting of the leaders of the Serbs in three areas

16 under the protection of the UN, this came about following requests from

17 the federal and Serbian leadership that Mr. Goulding should give

18 additional explanations to the local leaders with respect to the UN

19 peacekeeping forces and plan and to react to the concern that was shown

20 and expressed by them with respect to that plan." Is that right?

21 A. What is the date of that report by the Secretary-General?

22 Q. This is the 4th of February, 1992, when the problems arose. And

23 I'm sure you'll remember the difficulties we had. And we had to use all

24 our influence, both the federal leadership and the leadership of Serbia in

25 order to achieve results and to see that the peace operations,

1 peacekeeping operations, were put in place. It was no easy matter; it was

2 a highly complex operation. And this is the UN Secretary-General's

3 report. So of course, this took place earlier because it is the report

4 of the 4th of February. And in point 4, he says Mr. Goulding had

5 talks in Belgrade on the 22nd of January, 1992 and then up until the

6 meeting on the 29th of January, he had further consultations, and so on

7 and so forth. And then he went to attend a meeting in all three areas

8 with the leaders of all the three areas under UN protection.

9 So I assume you're not challenging that.

10 Now, what I'm asking you is this: Were these joint efforts on the

11 part of the federal leadership and the leadership of Serbia to bring all

12 their influence to bear on the leaderships in Krajina, in the Krajinas, to

13 convince them to accept the peacekeeping operations, because we believed,

14 as it said, this does not pre-empt a political solution, but it does

15 ensure a political solution to be found in peace. And that was our main

16 argument and our desire, to find a political solution in conditions of

17 peace.

18 I hope that's not disputed.

19 A. No, that's not disputed. If I could come back to the first point,

20 for the Court, that you made about the visit.

21 You will recall, Your Honours, the Implementing Accord was dated

22 January 2, 1992. Mr. Vance, myself, the Secretary-General, the council

23 had taken the view that a period of about six weeks would be needed to

24 test the situation on the ground before the council itself would vote a

25 peacekeeping force. As we know from the current situation, if I may put

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1 it that way, the situation of the Security Council is a very serious

2 matter. They didn't want to vote a peacekeeping force if the cease-fire

3 didn't hold. The reason for that was the EC, in the fall of 1991, had

4 declared 15 or 20, we lost the count, everybody lost count. They had

5 declared so many cease-fires and they hadn’t lasted longer than it took

6 for the ink to dry on the paper. Everybody was very sceptical about

7 cease-fires, so we had decided that we would wait about five, six weeks.

8 The UN cease-fire, Secretary Vance's cessation of hostilities

9 worked. It held. And during the period there were, of course, random and

10 occasional acts of violence. That was bound to happen. So we sent out

11 the peacekeeping fellow to check up on the situation and to tell everybody

12 what the requirements for the peacekeeping plan were and how they would

13 work, what a peacekeeping operation was all about. Bear in mind there had

14 never been a peacekeeping operation on the continent of Europe in history.

15 This was the first peacekeeping operation, since the creation of the

16 United Nations, to take place on the European continent. So it was

17 understandable that people didn't know about it. And that is the

18 situation that the Secretary-General was describing in this interim report

19 to the Security Council and that Mr. Milosevic has correctly read from.

20 The date is also important. January 2nd was the Vance cessation

21 of hostilities arranged by Secretary Vance. This was early February, you

22 see, four weeks into the testing period. Seventeen days later, the

23 Security Council acted and adopted Resolution 743. So you see, this was

24 an interim report.

25 But I repeat, Mr. Milosevic has characterised it correctly.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. All right. Fine, Mr. Okun. I don't think there's anything being

3 disputed there. I just wish to ascertain whether it was in dispute how

4 far the federal leadership and the leadership of Serbia and I myself

5 personally had invested in order to implement the plan, to have the plan

6 come into force, to stop the war and to find a political solution under

7 peaceful conditions. I don't suppose that is in dispute.

8 A. No, it is not in dispute.

9 Q. Please, then, tell me this -- just let me have a look here.

10 You mention in your summary Dubrovnik. Is it true that on the 1st

11 of December, 1991, Admiral Brovet, General Kadijevic, and Borisav Jovic,

12 the then president, at a meeting give you explanations according to which

13 it was demilitarised 20 years ago and that all this was a matter of

14 provocation? On the part of Croatia, that is.

15 A. I believe that was their contention.

16 Q. In this statement of yours, it says the 2nd of December, 1991,

17 Cyrus Vance says: "Can I be assured that there will be no shelling of

18 Dubrovnik?" [In English] Kadijevic: "Dubrovnik has not been attacked."

19 Cyrus Vance: "But surroundings have." Kadijevic: "We demilitarised

20 Dubrovnik 20 years ago. Let Croats do same. Croatian propaganda. They

21 threw a hand grenade onto a facade."

22 [Interpretation] And he promises that he will check this out, what

23 was going on, et cetera. But in any event, you talked with the federal

24 leadership in Dubrovnik; right? And with the army too.

25 A. We spoke with both the federal leadership and the leadership of

1 the JNA, but we did not speak with them in Dubrovnik. We met them in

2 Belgrade.

3 Q. Yes, yes, in Belgrade. Now, on that same day, you came to see me,

4 and with you -- with us was Minister Jovanovic. He was with me. And

5 Vance says the following: He was dissatisfied. He was unhappy that

6 Geneva, 11/23 accords had not been implemented fully. "Milosevic: Me

7 too." Cyrus Vance says: "Good talk with General Kadijevic, had to work

8 things out, will call." I don't know what it says next. It says "Tudj."

9 What "Tudj" is I don't know. I'm sure you might.

10 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness find it.

11 THE WITNESS: What page are we on?

12 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, what page are we on? Which day? 2nd

13 of December, it says.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 2nd of December. 2nd of December,

15 1215 to 1330 hours, meeting at my office and with Jovanovic present.

16 THE WITNESS: One moment, please.

17 MR. GROOME: It's page 30 of book 4.

18 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Yes. Mr. Vance says he had a good talk

19 with General Kadijevic, we have to work things out, and then it says,

20 "Will call Tudjman," meaning I - Vance - will call President Tudjman.

21 "We all have to work hard."

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Cyrus Vance then asked me what was going on in Dalmatia. My

24 answer was we had nothing to do with Dalmatia, just as we did not have

25 anything to do with Dalmatia. Is that right?

1 A. That's what the diary indicates you said.

2 Q. All right. Fine. And then on the 4th of December, once again you

3 had a meeting with Brovet. And he told you that Dubrovnik had been

4 demilitarised as far as the JNA was concerned but that weapons had to be

5 withdrawn from Dubrovnik and for that it was necessary to deblock the

6 barracks. That is what you yourself write in your diary, that you had a

7 conversation with Brovet. So first of all, you had a meeting with Jovic,

8 Kadijevic, and Brovet, you talked to them first, and that same day when

9 you came to see me in my office, you asked me what was going on in

10 Dalmatia and I told you that the Serbs had nothing to do with Dalmatia,

11 and then once again you talked to Brovet and he goes on to explain to you

12 what was going on in Dubrovnik. So you talked about that with the army.

13 A. Yes. We discussed the matter thoroughly. That was our job to do

14 so. I should also mention in this connection, since we're discussing the

15 very early days of December, that on December 6, Dubrovnik received the

16 heaviest shelling it received during the entire war, two days later. It

17 was the only time that Dubrovnik was shelled not only from land, I believe

18 it was the only time that it was shelled by sea.

19 Q. Yes, but, sir --

20 A. So when Admiral Brovet told us a few days earlier that the

21 shelling would cease, it's my duty to recall for the Court that two days

22 later, the shelling increased rather than decreasing, and that the navy

23 was involved. I'm not saying who gave orders to the navy, but we know who

24 shelled Dubrovnik from the sea.

25 Q. Mr. Okun, all I'm doing is looking at one aspect of this issue.

1 You talked to the federal leadership, you talked to the army, and you

2 discussed with them the issue of Dubrovnik. When you came to see me with

3 Cyrus Vance on that same day, Cyrus Vance asked me whether I knew anything

4 about Dalmatia, and I said that we had nothing to do with Dalmatia, that

5 the Serbs had nothing to do with Dalmatia. And then you continued, of

6 course, to communicate with the army or, rather, with the federal

7 leadership to discuss these issues. So that is quite undisputed.

8 May we move on now, please, because I wish to get through as much

9 as possible and quite obviously I'm not going to have enough time to ask

10 you all the questions I wish to ask you.

11 On the 1st of December, the 1st of December, therefore, did I in

12 our discussions indicate the great number of refugees from Slavonia and

13 that there was a great problem on the Croatian side, that they wanted to

14 continue the war and that in fact Genscher wished to continue the war.

15 And you made a note of this yourself in your diary. Is that how it was or

16 no? Just give me a yes or no answer, please, and then we can move on.

17 A. You're talking about the meeting of December 1. My recollection,

18 but I will confirm it, is that you gave the figure of 140.000 Serb

19 refugees from Western Slavonia.

20 I'm not finding it in my notes.

21 Q. I'll find it for you. It is at the bottom of the page. This is

22 the translation of it, and it says the following --

23 A. Are you sure that's December 1?

24 Q. Let me just check. I'm not quite sure. Was it the 1st -- no. It

25 was the 2nd of December. I do apologise. The 2nd of December. And then

1 further down, I don't know what you have in your original diary, but it

2 says: "That's why the Croats continue the world war. Genscher always

3 says, if war continues, recognition will follow. [In English] "That's

4 invitation to keep fighting." [Interpretation] That's an invitation to

5 keep fighting. That's what I told you and that's what you noted down.

6 I'm quoting from your diary.

7 A. Thank you. I have found your citation. I've found it.

8 Q. I hope that I've read it out correctly.

9 A. If I could take the first part, Mr. Milosevic. The -- it's on

10 page 34 of Vance diary number 4, where -- where you say that 140.000 Serb

11 refugees have fled Western Slavonia into "free" Slavonia. "Will get

12 information for you. Talk to Hadzic tomorrow." Yes, that part is in the

13 diaries on page 34.

14 I should add, for the benefit of the Court, that subsequent to

15 this, Mr. Vance and I checked the population figures of Serbs in Western

16 Slavonia through the opstina figures from the official -- sorry, from the

17 official Yugoslav census, and the population -- the Serb population in

18 Western Slavonia did not exceed 40 or 50.000 at the utmost. So the figure

19 of 140.000 Serb refugees from Western Slavonia was impossible based on our

20 check against the Yugoslav official statistics.

21 On the question of Genscher and Mr. Milosevic's -- President

22 Milosevic's remarks at the time, I'm not seeing them, but in the interest

23 of speed, I will assume you are correct in reading them. I just don't

24 find them. What I do see is concern over Germany, Italy, and the Vatican

25 on page 35.

1 MR. GROOME: I would direct the witness's attention to -- it's not

2 working. I will talk louder. The witness's attention to the bottom of

3 page 37 in that diary entry.

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you. I found it.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness, please. Mr. Okun.

6 THE WITNESS: Can you hear me?

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Yes.

9 THE WITNESS: On page 35 of the diary it records President

10 Milosevic as saying German attitudes is to give a gift of recognition to

11 Slovenia and Croatia before Christmas, and he expressed concern over

12 Germany, Italy and the Vatican.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. A little further on from there you made the following entry--

15 A. Yes, I see it. Yes, I see it.

16 Q. [In English] "That's why Croats continue war. Genscher always

17 says if war continues, recognition will follow. That's an invitation to

18 keep fighting."

19 A. Well, that was your assertion and I so noted it in my diary.

20 Q. [Interpretation] Was that true? Is that correct? Was that in

21 fact an invitation to keep fighting? Keep fighting and you'll get

22 recognition. Does that at least throw some light on the role that Germany

23 played in breaking up Yugoslavia?

24 JUDGE MAY: No. That's not a matter for the witness.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

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1 Q. Well, are we contesting Genscher's statement, "If the war

2 continues, recognition will follow"? That's why I'm saying it. That's an

3 invitation to --

4 JUDGE MAY: All he has recorded, the witness, I should say, has

5 recorded is what you said, and that's what you said. If it's relevant,

6 you can call some evidence about it or you can give evidence about it

7 yourself, if you want, but right now we're examining the witness. So

8 would you concentrate on that.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Fine. Let's move on

10 then.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Do you remember that I indicated to you, when it came to Bosnia,

13 you asked me about Bosnia, said that was a problem, and I said that the

14 problem was that Izetbegovic bore in mind a purely Islamic republic.

15 That's what he had in mind. And I'm sure you'll recall his declaration

16 that there can be no co-existence, cohabitation between the Islamic -- I

17 can't remember his exact words, the word he used, I've already quoted him

18 and it's been recorded, and of course, his documents are recorded, but

19 anyway, the Islamic and non-Islamic institutions, and the non-Islamic

20 institutions or communities, of course, were more than half of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in fact. And that I told you on that occasion that he

22 was receiving resources from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and that I was

23 surprised how come America and Europe could support something like that.

24 And that is something that you will find once again in that diary of

25 yours.

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Ambassador, if you would find that, please.

2 THE WITNESS: You made that assertion and I so reported it. It's

3 on page 38 of Vance mission diary number 4, the date December 2. You made

4 that assertion.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Very well. Did you have any contentions to make in that regard

7 then?

8 A. Secretary Vance and I did not believe that it was our position on

9 matters like that to get into an argument with you or with anybody. We

10 took on board what you said, we listened carefully, and as you see, I duly

11 noted accurately what you said. Whether we agreed with it or not, it was

12 important to get down the facts that you made the statement. And it was

13 at that meeting that you and Jovanovic suggested we meet Dr. Karadzic,

14 which we did, and which we've already discussed. This is all in the

15 diary.

16 Q. All right. Then you go on to speak about the meeting, and you

17 speak about the Presidency of Yugoslavia, and we draw your attention to

18 you, Milosevic/Jovanovic. It's a matter for the Federal Presidency, peace

19 and security. That comes under their competence and authority.

20 A. That was your statement, yes.

21 Q. All right. I don't assume that we're contesting that. But what I

22 want is to link this up, to link what we discussed then with the facts

23 that came to follow. So please let's move on.

24 Is it true and correct that at the meeting that we had on the 15th

25 of April, 1992, that I told you loud and clear that Serbs and Muslims can

1 live together and live together in peace and that the continuity of that

2 state was what was called for, but the problem was that Izetbegovic wished

3 to have a separate republic or, rather, he wished to have some kind of

4 Islamic federation. Is that right?

5 And I have it here. This is it. Milosevic -- this is what you

6 say: "Milo: Came promises [In English] B and H. Very tragic. Nobody

7 can win there. Only death will result. Serbs and Muslims can live

8 together. All citizens in B and H support peace. Need to continue

9 conference on B and H." [Interpretation] That's what I've just been

10 saying, and that's what I said then. The conflicts had started.

11 Have you found that passage? I'm afraid I've got this wrong

12 again, the date wrong. Is it -- yes, the 15th of April. That's right.

13 15th of September [as interpreted], Belgrade, 1030 hours. And 645. No.

14 That's another meeting. After that, 0645, Milosevic/Jovanovic. And then

15 we come to what I quoted. "The main problem is B and H. Very tragic.

16 Nobody can win there. Only death will result. [In English] Serbs and

17 Muslims can live together. All citizens in B and H support peace. Need

18 to continue conference on B and H."

19 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if I can be of assistance, Mr. Milosevic

20 is quoting from page 39, and that is a meeting on the 15th of April.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's on page 39. I see it. And you note we

22 agreed with that. We reported that General Hadzic agreed.

23 This, I have to note for the Court, was a conversation on April

24 15th. There had already been about five or six weeks of fighting in

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the shelling of Sarajevo was about to

1 commence.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. I apologise, Mr. Okun. I'm not talking about that now. What I

4 was asking you was this, about your entry here: "And that was our

5 position, that nobody could win and that the results would be death, only

6 death, that they could live together and that all the citizens support

7 peace," and then a few lines down, you go on to say "Ize" -- and I assume

8 that's Izetbegovic, I say, is using typical Islamic fundmentalism. [In

9 English] "Ize is using typical Islamic fundamentalism." [Interpretation]

10 That's the problem.

11 A. So I heard you say and so I noted in the diary, yes.

12 Q. Therefore, it was our position that nobody could win in that war,

13 that all that could ensue was tragedy and that we had to go back to the

14 conference table and support the peace effort. That was quite clear.

15 Now, do you know that all three parties accepted Cutileiro's plan,

16 the plan that was a sort of subconference to Carrington's conference, a

17 runner-up to Carrington's conference?

18 A. Yes, that's correct. All three parties initially accepted the

19 Cutileiro plan.

20 Q. Before that, there had been no conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina

21 whatsoever. The conflicts could have just been political and verbal, but

22 no physical conflicts took place. Is that right or not?

23 A. That is not correct. As we've reported earlier, there was

24 fighting as early as November 1991 and --

25 Q. You have no evidence of that. You say that Ante Markovic told you

1 that.

2 A. Well before April 1992, there were authenticated reports of ethnic

3 cleansing. That is -- that is to say, the forced expulsion of Muslims and

4 a few Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5 Q. Please. I'm not talking about April. The first attacks occurred

6 when the 100 and something Brigade from Croatia - I don't know the number,

7 I spoke about that here already - attacked Bosanski Brod and virtually

8 killed the Serb population of the village of Sijekovac. That was the

9 beginning of the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, by the invasion

10 of Croatian forces into the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that

11 occurred after the Cutileiro plan. Do you remember that or not?

12 A. I am aware that that was a Serbian contention.

13 Q. Very well. So you have no information about that. But since you

14 do know that all three sides signed the Cutileiro plan, do you know that

15 after that, being persuaded by your ambassador, Warren Zimmermann,

16 Izetbegovic withdrew his signature from the Cutileiro plan?

17 A. You've made two points there. First point is correct, that the

18 Bosnian government, President Izetbegovic, withdrew his assent to the

19 Cutileiro plan after he returned to Sarajevo from Western Europe where it

20 had been signed.

21 The second point, that he did so at the urging of Ambassador

22 Zimmerman, is not for me to comment on except to report that Ambassador

23 Zimmerman has denied that repeatedly, and I believe Ambassador Zimmerman.

24 Q. I don't know that he denied it. On the contrary, I think even in

25 his book he wrote that he was not very cautious when he said to him, "If

1 you don't like it, why are you signing it?" But I don't have to debate

2 that with you.

3 JUDGE MAY: No, you don't. It's not for this witness to answer.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. Certainly. I don't have to

5 discuss that matter with this witness. But I always respect solidarity,

6 even when it has nothing to do with the facts.

7 JUDGE MAY: That was a totally unnecessary comment, as you know.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Is it true that on the 6th of May, 1992, you had a meeting with me

10 when I told you quite specifically that I supported negotiations between

11 the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that we would like the problems

12 of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be resolved and that it was indispensable for

13 the UN to be present there and to control the situation there. Do you

14 remember that?

15 A. Yes. It's so noted in the diary that you made that statement in

16 Brussels on May 6. It's on page 141. And the previous page also has some

17 comments of yours concerning the situation in Bosnia.

18 Q. I said we support BH talks. Whatever you decide is all right with

19 us. Cutileiro says something then. [In English] "We want to finish those

20 talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's not up to us, not our problem."

21 [Interpretation] And I speak about talks in Skopje between Izetbegovic and

22 Adzic. And then there's reference to the UN, and I say if the UN

23 withdraws, it means war will start again. And then I also say that all

24 parties will agree to the talks and that that is the only way out.

25 Now, let us go back for a moment, because you mention here that I

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1 said to you that we had nothing to do with Bosnia-Herzegovina as it was

2 another country, and that Izetbegovic and Adzic were having talks in

3 Skopje when Izetbegovic asked that those members of the JNA who are from

4 Bosnia and Herzegovina should remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas

5 members from Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of the army who are situated

6 elsewhere outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be sent back to

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was what Izetbegovic requested. And you

8 explained here that the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been transformed

9 into the army of Republika Srpska, and I would like that to be cleared up

10 now.

11 The JNA, before the break-up of Yugoslavia, before the destruction

12 of Yugoslavia, was present throughout the territory of Yugoslavia, from

13 Vardar, the river Vardar to Mount Triglav.

14 When Yugoslavia was broken up - let's not discuss with you who was

15 behind it all; I've spoken about that - what happened then was that

16 virtually all the armies that came into being, the Croatian, the Slovenian

17 and the army of Republika Srpska, and the army of the Muslim Federation,

18 and the HVO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian forces, and the

19 Macedonian army and the army of the FRY came into being and were formed

20 out of the parts of the former JNA. Is that right or not?

21 A. We've already discussed that. Yes, of course that's correct.

22 Yes.

23 Q. Therefore, it is not right to speak about the control of the army

24 of Yugoslavia after the army of Republika Srpska had been formed because

25 it had become the army of Republika Srpska and the army of Yugoslavia

1 existed separately, and we've already discussed all this. And all the

2 members of the JNA up until then who were from Serbia would withdraw to

3 the territory of Serbia. They would not stay on in the territory of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 You mentioned General Mladic. I agree with you that he was an

6 exceptionally capable general. That is how people saw him.

7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic --

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. But do you know --

10 JUDGE MAY: Rather than rambling, can you come to a question,

11 please.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Do you know that General Mladic is also from Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina? He