1 Thursday, 27 February 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I understand from the registrar that

7 there is a difficulty about the witness list, which has not been

8 transmitted to you. If that's so, it's obviously something we should look

9 into, but what we will do is we will hear the witness now that the witness

10 is here, and we'll look into those matters when his evidence is over or at

11 a convenient time during it.

12 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Perhaps you could look into this matter

13 of the witness list. One was apparently promised but has not been sent.

14 In any event, we'll hear about it in due course.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. And I would like to stress

16 that the witness is under a certain time constraint and, therefore, we

17 would suggest that all procedural matters be discussed after we heard --

18 JUDGE MAY: It is normally my practice, as you will have seen, to

19 discuss procedural matters when the witness is finished. Yes.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: He has to be sworn in.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not even a procedural

23 matter; it is a question of a correct attitude. I have no information as

24 to who the next witness will be after Mr. Okun.

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Milosevic, I'm not going to interrupt

1 you further, but we will deal with that later in the day. Let us hear the

2 witness first.

3 Yes. If you'd take the declaration, please.

4 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

5 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

6 JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. If you'd like to take a seat.

7 WITNESS: COLM MANGAN

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

11 Q. Please state your name for the record.

12 A. My name is Colm Mangan.

13 Q. You are the chief of the defence staff of the Irish national

14 defence force?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. What is your rank?

17 A. My rank is Lieutenant General.

18 Q. You were a team leader of the European Community Monitoring

19 Mission in Croatia in 1991 and 1992?

20 A. I was a member of the monitoring mission, and at times I performed

21 the duties of team leader, yes.

22 Q. When exactly were you in Croatia?

23 A. From July 1991 until the end of January 1992.

24 Q. Can you briefly summarise the mandate and duties of the ECMM and

25 yourself.

1 A. We went to the area initially to monitor the cease-fire

2 arrangements in the Federal Republic of Slovenia, and thereafter we became

3 involved in the monitoring of the ongoing conflict in the Federal Republic

4 of Croatia.

5 Q. In March 2001, you gave a statement to the OTP that you did review

6 yesterday and confirmed in a legal proceeding with an addendum; is that

7 correct?

8 A. That is correct.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we would like to tender this 92

10 bis statement.

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have an exhibit number, please.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 399, Your Honour.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: There is the addendum, Your Honours. The

14 addendum is at tab 9.

15 Q. In the addendum that you corrected, you corrected a reference in

16 paragraph 8 and 9 of your statement in relation to Dr. Milan Babic; is

17 that correct?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. These paragraphs, 8 and 9 of your statement, do they deal with the

20 cease-fire negotiation in September 1991 in the Osijek region?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. You were present?

23 A. I was present for a short period in that location, yes.

24 Q. The person you met as the chief negotiator on the Serb side, how

25 was he introduced to you, and who was he?

1 A. He was introduced to me as the Minister for Agriculture in the

2 Republic of Baranja, Srem, and Slavonia.

3 Q. While you had a discussion in preparation of your testimony, did

4 you review a list of ministries and officials in this SAO Slavonia,

5 Baranja, and Western Srem?

6 A. I did.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I want to avoid to put it to the

8 witness again. It's Exhibit 327, tab 6. We have discussed this list.

9 Q. And did you see there the Minister of Agriculture listed with the

10 name Slavko Dokmanovic?

11 A. I did.

12 Q. Did you have a recollection of this person and this name?

13 A. The man that we were negotiating with was the Minister for

14 Agriculture at that time and not the man I originally stated, yes.

15 Q. Did you ever meet Dr. Milan Babic, the president of the SAO

16 Krajina?

17 A. No, I didn't meet him.

18 Q. While you gave your statement, did you also provide copies of

19 several ECMM reports as attachments?

20 A. I did.

21 Q. These reports, do they deal with the overall situation in Croatia,

22 including Dubrovnik?

23 A. They do, yes.

24 Q. Where and by whom were such documents drafted?

25 A. The documents were drafted by a number of people who were working

1 at the tasking cell. That was at the headquarters of the mission in

2 Zagreb. They received reports from the various teams that were operating

3 throughout the country, and they consolidated those reports at the

4 headquarters, and they were then transmitted in the form of a report to

5 The Hague. It was the Dutch presidency at the time. These reports were a

6 consolidation of the reports that were made by the various teams that were

7 operating throughout Croatia.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, the tab numbers are tab 1 to

9 tab 8, and they are actually listed in the proofing summary, and we would

10 like to tender the proofing summary and have it marked as -- marked for

11 identification, not as an exhibit.

12 JUDGE MAY: Do you want the reports to be exhibited,

13 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes.

15 JUDGE MAY: Would it not be convenient simply to exhibit those

16 reports? They are attached to the statement. Can we discuss this with

17 the registrar about a convenient way to deal with it?

18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, Mr. Kay.

20 MR. KAY: There's one issue arising, and that was the missing

21 document RMCM01 which Your Honour will remember we didn't have when we

22 dealt with the 92 bis written argument. It's attachment 1.

23 Within that, in the second half, there's a section called

24 "Monitoring Experiences in Yugoslavia," and I've noted from the additional

25 statement provided by the witness for these proceedings today that there

1 is a disclaimer as to that part of the evidence, that it's anything that

2 he had written or to do with him.

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we note the disclaimer. We can take that

4 into account.

5 MR. KAY: Perhaps it should be taken out of the exhibit.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I will discuss this attachment

8 in particular with the witness.

9 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll hear about it. Yes.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the attachments will be marked

11 Prosecutor's Exhibit 400.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13 Q. While you were in Zagreb, did the ECMM get information that the

14 JNA were preparing an attack on Dubrovnik?

15 A. We received information from the Croat authorities that this --

16 that Dubrovnik was threatened, yes.

17 Q. What was your reaction to this information?

18 A. I have to say that we were disinclined to believe it at that

19 stage.

20 Q. And why?

21 A. Because all of the activities of the JNA before that time had been

22 in support of the indigenous Serb population, and we were aware that there

23 were no or very few Serbs in Dubrovnik, and consequently, we didn't

24 consider that the JNA would be threatening the city of Dubrovnik because

25 we couldn't see any reason for that.

1 Q. Did Dubrovnik have any military significance that you could see?

2 A. Not that we could see, no.

3 Q. Was an ECMM team with the name Whisky dispatched to Dubrovnik?

4 A. They were the first team that were dispatched to Dubrovnik to

5 check the reports that we were receiving of the city under threat.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

7 put to the witness tab 1 of Exhibit 400.

8 Q. It's actually several documents included here. The first

9 document, with the headline "Visit by Team Whisky," is that the report of

10 this team, the first team that went there?

11 A. That's a report of the team, yes.

12 Q. In the second last paragraph on the first page, there is a

13 reference to a press conference of this team appealing in the name of the

14 EC mission for those concerned to desist at once from these apparently

15 unprovoked attacks. Are you aware of this press conference or this --

16 A. I am aware that that was the opinion of that team who were in

17 Dubrovnik at that time, yes.

18 Q. And on the second page, in the first paragraph, there is a

19 reference made to extraneous attempts to contact the JNA directly but

20 without success. Were you aware that that was the situation?

21 A. When we took over from that team, we were aware that was the

22 situation. They so informed us.

23 Q. And in the middle of the second page there is a reference to the

24 successor team, Charlie. Would that be your team?

25 A. That is correct.

1 Q. If you would please now turn to the next document that is part of

2 this same exhibit. It's with the headline, "Subject: Visit to Dubrovnik

3 on the 29th of October, 1991."

4 Were you aware that ambassadors, politicians went there on that

5 day?

6 A. We were aware of that, yes.

7 Q. And I would like to quote from the first paragraph. It says here:

8 "Although physical damage to the old city centre is slight, the direct

9 surroundings of Old Dubrovnik shows random shelling, damage to streets,

10 houses and cars that can only serve one purpose; psychological warfare on

11 the civilian population in order to empty Dubrovnik of its people. The

12 party received information about far more extensive damage to the villages

13 immediately surrounding Dubrovnik for which there seemed to be no military

14 need either."

15 Was that the --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Could we ask counsel to slow down, please.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Sorry.

18 Q. Was that the prevailing opinion at that time?

19 A. Yes, it was.

20 Q. Would you now please turn to page 3 of this same Dubrovnik visit

21 document, and in the last paragraph, it says here: "All members of the

22 party, including those with military expertise, agreed that no conceivable

23 military purpose could be served by either destroying the city or emptying

24 it of its civilian population of which there still are tens of thousands

25 around."

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1 Could you comment on this paragraph?

2 A. That would have been not only the views of those who were on that

3 visit but it would have been widely held also within the ECMM at that

4 time.

5 Q. And your own view?

6 A. That would have coincided with my view, yes.

7 Q. And I would like you to turn now to the next document which is

8 called monitoring experience in Yugoslavia. Could you comment on this

9 document without going into the details?

10 A. I would just make one comment, and as you have seen in my

11 disclaimer, it was contained in the bulk of reports that I submitted, but

12 it is not a report. It's a highly personalised individual account and is

13 not one of the official reports. I don't know who wrote it, and I don't

14 know the origin.

15 JUDGE MAY: Having read the first sentence, I don't think it would

16 be right to put it in.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I do not insist on putting it in. It was

18 just the -- this group of documents that were provided during the

19 statement and -- yes.

20 JUDGE MAY: We will have it out. We will remove it from the

21 bundle.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Mm-hmm.

23 Q. And if you turn to the next document that belongs to that same

24 exhibit, it's called "Name Doc Dubrovnik," and I would like to quote to

25 you from page 1, paragraph 3: "The process at work in Dubrovnik,

1 Dalmatia, and along the other frontlines is one of deliberate

2 intimidation. The purpose is not necessarily occupation, which the JNA

3 now seems increasingly unlikely to sustain; but it is certainly

4 depopulation. To drive Croatians out of the agricultural and economic

5 heartlands of Dalmatia and Slavonia, wreaking havoc with their economy and

6 leaving them no homes to return to if, in any event, the JNA do withdraw.

7 A deliberate scorched earth policy."

8 Could you comment on this paragraph?

9 A. That paragraph is, as I said, put together in the headquarters in

10 Zagreb, and it would have been a distillation of the reports of various

11 teams working in the area, but that would have given a good sense of the

12 type of report that was being delivered by the teams working in Croatia at

13 that time.

14 Q. And I would like to quote also from paragraph 4.

15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters don't have the documents.

16 JUDGE MAY: The interpreters don't have the documents, they say,

17 so have you got a copy for them? Oh, they apparently do.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: They should have it. I'm just told it should

19 be under tab 1.

20 THE INTERPRETER: The English booth has the document, Your Honour.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. And it's an English document.

22 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's see how we get on. Perhaps you if you are

23 going to read, could you do it slowly.

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes.

25 Q. I quote now from paragraph 4. It begins with -- it's about a

1 pattern that is described here as such. It begins with: "Limited fire,

2 such as mortars, giving civilians the chance to escape with minimal

3 casualties. Then it escalates to tanks and artillery to destroy the

4 abundant villages more systematically."

5 And after some details, it then continues:

6 "These are the intentional product of this war, which explains

7 incidentally why the JNA are often keen to 'help' evacuate civilians, and

8 the Croatians sometimes reluctant to agree, vide Ilok."

9 Could you comment on these quotes that I just put to you.

10 A. That would be consistent with the nature of reports that were

11 being made from the EC mission in Zagreb at that particular time.

12 Q. And what happened in Ilok? Do you know that?

13 A. That was at the town of Ilok which was in Eastern Slavonia, and it

14 had been cut off in an occupied area but had not been subjected to any

15 shelling or destruction during the fighting in Eastern Slavonia. The

16 village was then evacuated by consent with the mayor of Ilok. The

17 Croatian authorities were somewhat disturbed by that, that the ECMM had

18 assisted in the evacuation of the village in that they were assisting in

19 the removal of the population.

20 Q. And further down there is a paragraph on Dubrovnik, speaking of

21 indiscriminate -- indiscriminate shelling and -- directed against civilian

22 targets. Is that something you --

23 A. That is correct. Indiscriminate insofar as that there were no

24 apparent military targets that would have been -- one would have

25 discriminated to take them on. So the targets were indiscriminate in that

1 sense.

2 Q. Yes. This would conclude this document. I would like now to turn

3 to paragraph 17 of the statement, and it refers to weapons used and your

4 observations in Sokar [phoen].

5 During your time in Dubrovnik, was the town shelled from land,

6 air, and sea?

7 A. That's correct, it was.

8 Q. And how many air attacks did you observe?

9 A. I would have observed one air attack, a naval bombardment, and a

10 number of mortar and artillery attacks on the town.

11 Q. And in which time period was that, approximately?

12 A. That was approximately the period from the 5th of October, 1991,

13 to the 7th of October, 1991.

14 Q. When you observed this naval attack, what did -- what was the

15 target, and what did you see?

16 A. The target was the Hotel Excelsior, which is just to the south of

17 the old town of Dubrovnik, and it was engaged by naval gunfire, either 57

18 millimetre or 76 millimetre cannon.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have the map in front of the

20 witness. That's the Exhibit 326, tab 24, the -- and --

21 THE WITNESS: I'm afraid my monitor is -- I've touched a button.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

23 Q. Can you please point out the Hotel Excelsior. On the ELMO,

24 please.

25 A. [Indicates]

1 Q. Yes. Thank you. Given your military background and expertise,

2 could you comment on the accuracy and the effectiveness of this weapon

3 that you've just described?

4 A. The weapon would be regarded as a very accurate weapon. It should

5 have been able to hit a target with some precision. And I was in the

6 Hotel Argentina and was able to observe the shelling of the area of the

7 Hotel Excelsior. I have no doubt that that was the intended target of the

8 naval gunfire.

9 Q. And was the hotel at that time a military target? Do you know?

10 A. Not that I was aware of. There was no apparent military presence

11 there at all.

12 Q. In relation to the ground forces that you saw active, what weapons

13 did they use, and could you see from where they fired?

14 A. I couldn't see from where they fired because they were indirect

15 fire weapons that were being used. They consisted of both mortars and

16 guns, artillery.

17 Q. And could you comment on the accuracy of such weapons?

18 A. The artillery gun is a relatively accurate weapon. The mortar is

19 less so. But it is all very dependent on a number of factors, including

20 very much the training of the teams, the crews that are handling the guns,

21 the fire control directors, and indeed the meteorological conditions at

22 any particular time?

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have now the map 326, tab 13 in

24 front of the witness. It's the wider map of Dubrovnik.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, for clarification for the record,

1 the map we just used is tab 23, not tab 24.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. Yes.

3 Q. Did you see which regions were targeted by the land forces? What

4 did you see? And please look at the ELMO. And could you tell us -- point

5 out and tell us what it is they targeted.

6 A. This area here is the area of a yachting marina that lay to the

7 north-east of the old town of Dubrovnik. That area was particularly

8 heavily engaged by mortar fire and caused extensive damage to both a large

9 number of very fine yachts and the buildings that were in the marina area.

10 Q. Was this region -- would you describe -- would you say this was a

11 military target or a civilian target?

12 A. I saw nothing of military value within the marina area.

13 Q. Did they also hit other regions at the time?

14 A. Yes. You would appreciate that it is at some time removed now,

15 and my -- there was quite a lot of shelling going on at the time, so I can

16 indicate the areas in which there was shelling ran along the area from the

17 marina.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. In that area there, but also on Mount Srdj.

20 Q. Yes. And were there any military targets that were hit or -- yes?

21 A. The only overt military target that I observed was, in fact, Mount

22 Srdj. There was an old Napoleonic fort there that was occupied by armed

23 Croats and there was a communications mast also on that height.

24 Otherwise, the area that I indicated between the marina and south of the

25 town of Dubrovnik, as far as I could see, was occupied only by civilians.

1 Q. And those shells that landed in the civilian regions, could that

2 have been accidentally?

3 A. I don't think so, no.

4 Q. Why don't you think that?

5 A. I think that the distance for error and the nature, the intensity

6 of the bombardments would indicate that, even allowing for a lot of

7 mistakes by the crews that were serving the weapons, I don't think they

8 were accidental fall of shot on the civilian area, no.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you. The maps can be turned away.

10 Q. Can you explain to the Court very briefly and in general terms the

11 degree of preplanning, coordination, and command and control of troops in

12 a joint operation of land and navy forces.

13 A. For a combined forces operation of land, sea, and air, there has

14 to be control and coordination by the commander of the operation, and to

15 do that, he has a coordination or a fire direction centre under his

16 command to coordinate the various fires. And they would plan the

17 resources that would be allocated to any particular target for engagement

18 and the fires that would be available to the elements on the ground. It

19 would take good coordination to mount a joint services operation.

20 Q. To your information, who was the -- this overall commander?

21 A. I was informed that it was General Strugar.

22 Q. Did you know his exact position at that time -- rank -- rank and

23 function?

24 A. We were informed that General Strugar was the operational -- the

25 commander of the Operational Group, and he had also been the regional

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1 commander in the area.

2 Q. Can you explain how the selection of targets is made in such

3 operations, in particular given the fact that there was residential areas

4 and even a cultural monument.

5 A. Well, the first factor that would be taken into consideration

6 would be the achievement of the mission, the most effective targets to be

7 hit to achieve the mission. The second factor taken into consideration

8 would be the safety and security of one's own forces. And the other

9 factor then of the -- both heritage or civilian areas and heritage. They

10 would also be taken in after the other two factors had been considered.

11 Q. From what you saw happening, could you -- could you conclude what

12 the mission was that was to be achieved?

13 A. It wasn't apparent what the mission at that particular time was.

14 Q. You have already mentioned the fire plan, that is preplanned. Are

15 there also situations when during an attack there are impromptu targets,

16 and can you explain that?

17 A. Yes. Obviously you can't cater for everything in preplanning, so

18 the fires that take place before the start of an operation can all be

19 preplanned, but once your operation starts, targets will appear that will

20 threaten the accomplishment of your mission or endanger the safety of your

21 own troops and those targets will then be engaged.

22 Q. And you have already mentioned that the overall commander, in this

23 case here Strugar, would be involved in the preplanning. What about the

24 impromptu targets? Who would make these decisions?

25 A. The decisions for impromptu targets could be made at a lower level

1 from the unit or formation that's under threat, but it would be

2 coordinated and the headquarters would be informed about the actions

3 taken.

4 Q. And what you personally observed in Dubrovnik, would that indicate

5 a preplanned fire plan or impromptu actions or targets?

6 A. I would not be in a position to say whether it was preplanned or

7 impromptu, but I would tend to the view that they were preplanned fires at

8 that particular stage.

9 Q. And why would you think that?

10 A. Because the -- there was nothing occurring that would direct

11 impromptu fire there. Obviously the shelling was -- to us, it was obvious

12 it was taking place against targets that had been there for quite some

13 time and nothing new had arisen that would cause them to be engaged in an

14 impromptu fashion.

15 Q. You have mentioned that the preplanning would be on a level of

16 Strugar. Would the planning of the attack on Dubrovnik that you saw also

17 involve the General Staff?

18 A. I would be surprised if it did not, that such operations had not

19 been coordinated with them.

20 Q. And would -- while these operations were ongoing, would the ground

21 troops be in constant contact with the overall commander, and would the

22 overall commander be in contact with General Staff, according to

23 experience that you have?

24 A. I would imagine so. I would be surprised if they were not.

25 Q. The navy involved in the action, even with impromptu targets,

1 would they coordinate with the land forces?

2 A. In an operation like that, I would imagine that they would have to

3 coordinate with the land forces, yes.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

5 put to the witness the Exhibit -- tab 2 of Exhibit 400. Tab 2.

6 Q. And I would like you to look at page 2 on this paragraph on

7 Dubrovnik, and it says here: "In Dubrovnik, our team also reported heavy

8 bombardment during the evening. JNA/Serbian forces appear so far to be

9 sparing the old town, but the naval and mortar attacks launched were aimed

10 at the civilian population. There were no military targets in the area."

11 Would that have been your observation at that time?

12 A. Yes. That report was compiled on foot of reports that we were

13 making from Dubrovnik.

14 Q. On the same page, under the headline "Beyond Zagreb," paragraph 3,

15 there is a reference to -- in the middle of this paragraph is a reference

16 to what happened in Karlovac, and there is mentioned: "JNA-backed Serbian

17 irregular forces." Were you aware of such forces?

18 A. If you mean was I aware of such forces in the Karlovac area at

19 that time, I have to remind you that I was in Dubrovnik, and I was not

20 aware of any such forces in the Dubrovnik area.

21 Q. And when you dealt with Osijek, were you aware of any such

22 irregular forces there?

23 A. At an earlier time in Osijek, I was aware of some irregular forces

24 in that area, yes.

25 Q. And would you know who commanded them?

1 A. No, I would not know who commanded them.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would now like to put to the witness tab 4

3 of the Exhibit 400, and it's another report.

4 Q. On the first page, the last paragraph, it says here: "I should

5 like you to be aware that those indiscriminate attacks continue despite

6 statements to the contrary by the Serbian and federal authorities."

7 Can you explain this paragraph?

8 A. That particular paragraph refers to statements that Dubrovnik was

9 not being engaged, and that was issued by the headquarters in Zagreb, but

10 I was present in Dubrovnik on Sunday, the 6th of October, and was a

11 witness, as were the other members of my team, to the attack on the town.

12 Q. And when you say "issued by the headquarters in Zagreb," which

13 headquarters do you mean?

14 A. I mean the headquarters of the EC Monitoring Mission.

15 Q. Do you know with whom they were in contact? Because it says here

16 "... statements to the contrary by the Serbian and federal authorities."

17 A. They had contact with an Admiral Brovet in Belgrade. I think he

18 had been assigned as the liaison or contact person for the ECMM by the

19 federal authorities, but I know that that was the point of contact in

20 Belgrade.

21 Q. And on page 2 of this same report, there is a reference to the

22 population. It says here: "Meanwhile, the population bolstered by an

23 influx of refugees faces not only shortages of water and electricity but

24 also a deliberate campaign of intimidation." And then there comes some

25 details. Was that actually what you found at the time?

1 A. Yes. There was a large number of refugees in Dubrovnik or in the

2 Lapad area of Dubrovnik. They had been accommodated in hotels, and we

3 visited them and we got firsthand accounts from them of the leaving of

4 their homes, they had been driven out of their homes, and destruction and

5 looting that was going on in the homes.

6 Q. And here is mentioning of a deliberate campaign of intimidation.

7 Was that your position, your finding at that time?

8 A. The type of treatment to which the people were subjected to would

9 lead me to believe, yes, that they were being intimidated.

10 Q. Yes. Thank you. That should be enough for this report.

11 While you were in Dubrovnik, did you see hits in the old town?

12 A. You appreciate that it's quite some time ago now, but to the best

13 of my knowledge and memory, I, at maximum, saw two hits in the old town.

14 Q. And do you think -- according to what you observed, would you say

15 these were deliberate targeting the old town or more overshots or

16 mistakes?

17 A. I would be very much of the opinion that they were wayward shells,

18 that the old town was deliberately -- was not targeted. Because there was

19 so much shelling going on in other areas that it was apparent that the old

20 town at this stage was not being targeted.

21 Q. Are you aware that the old town was targeted in November,

22 mid-November and on the 6th of December, 1991?

23 A. At that stage, I was working in the headquarters of the EC

24 Monitoring Mission in Zagreb, and I was aware that Dubrovnik was targeted.

25 I'm talking of the old town of Dubrovnik was targeted at that particular

1 time, yes.

2 Q. Did you actually see a video or -- a video showing the December

3 shelling?

4 A. Not at that time but at some remove later I did, yes.

5 Q. And what you saw happening there, would that suggest to you that

6 it was preplanning or a, let's say, a spontaneous activity on the 6th?

7 I'm particularly referring to the 6th of December.

8 A. I would imagine by the level of activity and the intensity of the

9 fire that there was a level of preplanning had gone into it, yes.

10 Q. And just to give an idea, preplanning at that level and at that

11 time, what kind of a time frame would the preplanning take? Just an hour,

12 or more, or days? Could you say?

13 A. It would certainly have taken a lot more than an hour. It would

14 have taken 24 hours, 48 hours. I couldn't put an exact time limit, but I

15 -- the planning of a major operation like that would take quite some time.

16 Q. While you were in Dubrovnik, did you have free and uncontrolled

17 access to parts of the city not controlled by the JNA?

18 A. Yes, we did.

19 Q. And did you meet members of a Crisis Staff?

20 A. Yes. We met the chairman of the Crisis Staff and also the mayor.

21 Q. Was this a civilian Crisis Staff or a military body?

22 A. No, it was a civilian Crisis Staff.

23 Q. What was their stage of organisation?

24 A. It was chaotic, I think would be the best way of describing it.

25 They were extremely shaken by the events that were taking place in

1 Dubrovnik. They were certainly traumatised by the situation they found

2 themselves in.

3 Q. Did you see armed personnel in Dubrovnik, and could you estimate

4 the number?

5 A. In the entire Dubrovnik region, I would not be able to estimate a

6 number. In the old city, I saw, at most, ten to 15 armed Croats.

7 Q. Would the -- yes. Please continue.

8 A. But outside of that, at various occasions I did see armed Croats

9 in Mount Srdj and in other areas.

10 Q. Were these --

11 A. But not many. I saw very few.

12 Q. Were these professional soldiers to what you saw?

13 A. No, mostly not. I did see a number of the National Guard but not

14 many.

15 Q. And can you describe the uniforms, weapons that you saw on these

16 armed Croats.

17 A. The uniforms on the small number of National Guard that I saw were

18 of the disruptive pattern material type, DPM. I then saw police uniforms,

19 and the rest were civilians.

20 With regard to armament, it was all light weaponry; sniper rifles,

21 assault rifles. The heaviest weapon I saw with any one person was a

22 RPG-7. That is a hand-held anti-tank rocket. And the only other weapon I

23 saw was an armoured car with a light machine-gun in the police station.

24 Q. Beginning October at the time when you were there, was there any

25 effective defence in Dubrovnik?

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1 A. No. There was no defence put in place in any way. I could not

2 describe Dubrovnik as a defended city.

3 Q. Did the JNA know that, do you know?

4 A. I'm not party to what the JNA knew or did not know, but I would be

5 very surprised if they did not know the state of the defences, because

6 they had direct observation onto the area from the naval forces that they

7 had deployed offshore.

8 Q. While you were in Dubrovnik, did you observe any Croatian

9 positions or preparations for positions in the old town or near the old

10 town?

11 A. No, I did not.

12 Q. Did you see any such positions or preparations for positions in

13 the refugee hotels that you mentioned?

14 A. No, I did not.

15 Q. You mentioned the armed men that you saw in the old town. Were

16 they present there in any offensive or defensive role? Could you see

17 that?

18 A. No. They were not in any describable military role. The numbers

19 I saw appeared to be exhausted, they appeared to be traumatised by events

20 that took place in other areas, and certainly were in no fit condition to

21 fight.

22 Q. Did you see anything that -- did you see the Croats provoking the

23 shelling of the JNA?

24 A. No, I did not.

25 Q. Was the JNA under threat through the weapons that the Croats had?

1 A. Not under any threat or major threat that I could see.

2 Q. Was there any military advantage that the JNA could gain by their

3 attack on Dubrovnik that you could see?

4 A. No. I could not see that there was any great military advantage

5 to be gained by taking the city of Dubrovnik.

6 Q. While you were in Dubrovnik, did you also try to reach the JNA to

7 solve the situation through negotiations?

8 A. Our main mission in going to Dubrovnik was in fact to try and

9 effect a cease-fire in the area, and we made numerous attempts to contact

10 the JNA authorities. I should say that before we went to Dubrovnik, we

11 had been given the name of the commander, General Strugar, and we had been

12 given a telephone number, or telephone numbers, to contact his

13 headquarters. So when we were in Dubrovnik, during the time we were there

14 we made numerous attempts to contact the JNA by telephone. All of those

15 attempts were in vain.

16 Q. Was it because there was no connection did you actually get a

17 connection?

18 A. I had a member of my team who was a Serbo-Croat speaker, a Dane

19 Lars Boland. He made contact on a number of occasions and got somebody on

20 the other end of the line, and as soon as they heard that we belonged to

21 the ECMM, the phone went dead.

22 Q. Did you form an opinion about the JNA's willingness to negotiate?

23 A. It was obvious that they didn't want to have any contact with us.

24 Q. What about the Croatian authorities?

25 A. The Croatian authorities at this stage, as I have described, were

1 in a very bad and excitable situation and were desperate to achieve a

2 cease-fire.

3 Q. What about the Belgrade or Zagreb level? Any negotiations there

4 at that time, and between whom?

5 A. We were in contact with Zagreb, our headquarters in Zagreb, by

6 telephone, and we were describing the events in Dubrovnik, and we were

7 assured that efforts were being made to get the assault stopped at the

8 level of the headquarters. I understood that the headquarters were in

9 contact with the authorities in Belgrade, and I understood that it was

10 Admiral Brovet that they were in contact with.

11 Q. Were complaints from the ECMM lodged against what was happening?

12 A. We were assured by our headquarters that protests were lodged

13 about the matters that were taking place in Dubrovnik.

14 Q. To whom were these protests addressed? Do you know?

15 A. I was told that they were addressed to the authorities in

16 Belgrade.

17 Q. The military authorities?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What about the political authorities? Do you know whether

20 complaints were lodged with them?

21 A. No. The contacts, as I said, were with the General Staff contact,

22 Admiral Brovet.

23 Q. And what were the reactions on those protests? Do you know?

24 A. There appeared to be little or no reaction to them that I could

25 perceive from my position on the ground.

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to put to the witness tab 6 of

2 Exhibit 400. And it is a report again, and it's from the 10th of October,

3 1991.

4 Q. And I would like to direct you to page 2, the paragraph 5, and it

5 says here: "A bombardment directed from JNA positions around Cavtat and

6 Plat ceased within an hour of notification to Belgrade, indicating that

7 the news of the cease-fire may not have reached the units concerned."

8 Can you comment on this paragraph.

9 A. Well, the -- the hour delay would be indicative of the time lag

10 for the instructions to filter down from Belgrade to the units on the

11 ground, because that is not an instantaneous thing, it takes time to

12 happen.

13 Q. And given your experience, does that indicate anything in relation

14 to command and control?

15 A. Well, it would indicate that the units that were fighting in the

16 Dubrovnik area were in the command chain from the General Staff in

17 Belgrade.

18 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And now I would like to put to the witness

19 tab 8 of Exhibit 400.

20 Q. And in relation -- on page 2, there are several paragraphs

21 relating to Dalmatia, referring to discussions about -- or even

22 cease-fires, in relation to deblocking barracks and cease-fires along the

23 coastline. Are you aware of that?

24 A. Yes, I am aware of that.

25 Q. And in paragraph 11 of that document, there is a reference to

1 cease-fire violations, and it says here -- it gives here two

2 choices: "There could be a selective minimum associated with regrouping,

3 or equally the product of an imperfect control of local JNA and irregular

4 units." Could you please explain this.

5 A. That is somebody in the report offering a reason for the breaches

6 that may have occurred within that area.

7 Q. And it is here the Vukovar area. Did you observe anything or did

8 you get information on anything happening to this effect in Dubrovnik?

9 A. At this particular time, I was not in Dubrovnik, but I was aware

10 that the Dubrovnik area was part of the wider cease-fire, and that had

11 taken place within that area. Our successor team, I was aware that they

12 had made contact and had effected a cease-fire.

13 Q. Summarising what you saw happening in Dubrovnik while you were

14 there and also what you heard afterwards, would you call this a battle

15 between two opposing forces?

16 A. No, I would not call it a battle between two opposing forces. As

17 I have said earlier, I saw very little evidence of Croatian armament or

18 preparation for actions and, consequently, it could not have been said to

19 be a battle between two forces.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, these are the questions of the

21 Prosecution.

22 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

23 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

24 Q. [Interpretation] A preliminary question first, General. Most or

25 almost all of your testimony relates to Dubrovnik.

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. When you came here, did you come to testify with the conviction or

3 any knowledge that the Republic of Serbia had any connection -- the

4 Republic of Serbia and I personally, for instance, had anything to do with

5 those events around Dubrovnik?

6 A. I did not have a conviction or evidence that you personally were

7 connected with the events in Dubrovnik. I have evidence of what I saw

8 within Dubrovnik and the factors that indicated to me that what was taking

9 place in Dubrovnik was taking place with the control of the General Staff

10 headquarters.

11 Q. I am not speaking only about me, because I hope that is not in

12 dispute, me personally, but I'm asking about the Republic of Serbia. Did

13 you come to know that the Republic of Serbia had any role in the events

14 that you have described?

15 A. The forces that were engaged in the Dubrovnik area were the forces

16 of the JNA, as far as I was aware.

17 Q. Thank you. Were you present during any meeting between

18 representatives of the authorities of Dubrovnik and representatives of JNA

19 command staff in the area?

20 A. No, I was not. As I said, we made strenuous efforts on numerous

21 occasions to make contact with them, to no avail.

22 Q. Yes, but you probably know that there were a number of such

23 meetings that have been testified about by witnesses sitting in the same

24 seat that you're occupying now and who had attended those meetings, and

25 they were held almost or most frequently in the presence of

1 representatives of the international community. Do you know anything

2 about those meetings?

3 A. I know that subsequent to my time in Dubrovnik, the team that

4 succeeded us conducted meetings in the Cavtat area with the JNA and the

5 Croatian authorities, I do.

6 Q. And do you have any information gained from documents, because you

7 were not there, the same way that I learn about these things from

8 documents, that the main demand of the JNA, the main and only request was

9 for the armed formations, irregulars -- irregular armed formations to

10 leave Dubrovnik and that they did not make any other demands?

11 A. I'm aware that those demands were made, yes.

12 Q. Now, I find something rather strange or illogical. A moment ago

13 you were saying that there was some sort of intention - and I really hear

14 this for the first time - on the part of the JNA to depopulate Dubrovnik,

15 whereas at meetings held between the JNA and representatives of Dubrovnik,

16 there is exclusive emphasis on the demand for armed groups to leave

17 Dubrovnik with their weapons and along secure routes where they would not

18 be exposed to any danger. Are you aware of that?

19 A. I am aware that that took place subsequent to my time in

20 Dubrovnik. The events that I spoke about were from the 5th of October to

21 the 7th of October, and at that time, there were no -- there was no

22 significant armed presence of Croats within the area.

23 Q. What do you consider to be "significant armed presence"? You said

24 that "there was no significant armed presence." Why would there be any

25 military presence in Dubrovnik, which was a demilitarised town for

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2 JUDGE MAY: There are two questions there. The first question --

3 THE WITNESS: Significant armed presence, if I could take that. A

4 significant armed presence would be a coherent, directed, and armed with,

5 I would suggest, more than assault rifles and light weapons. I would have

6 expected to have heavier weaponry in a coherent force that would present a

7 threat to the very considerable force of the JNA within the area.

8 The second question: Why should there be an armed presence within

9 the area at all? Well, the light arms that I saw were certainly not a

10 significant armed presence, and why they should be there at all, the

11 reports we had received, which initially I said we were disinclined to

12 believe, about the city of Dubrovnik becoming under threat turned out to

13 be very real indeed. So I would have thought that there would have been

14 some necessity for it.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Very well, General. Let us try and be efficient and cover the

17 matters you have testified about.

18 In July 1991, you were based in Zagreb. This was a monitoring

19 mission of the European Community in those days to prevent the crisis, as

20 the wording was in those days.

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Do you know who are the signatories of the memorandum on the

23 presence of the monitoring mission of the European Community? It was

24 signed on the 13th of July, 1991, and it served as the basis for your

25 presence there.

1 A. I am afraid at this remove I don't remember who the signatories of

2 that document were.

3 Q. Well, let me remind you. Representatives of the Federal Ministry

4 for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, and Croatia. And on behalf

5 of the European Community, an ambassador in the Foreign Ministry of the

6 Netherlands because, as you quite correctly noted, the Netherlands at the

7 time was chairing the European Community, and the name of the Ambassador

8 was Christiaan Kroner. Do you now remember?

9 A. I don't remember that ambassador as being the head of mission of

10 the EC monitor mission. In July 1991, Van der Valk [phoen] was the head

11 of mission. He subsequently handed over, in September, to Van Houten.

12 Q. I'm talking about the signatories on the memorandum and not who

13 headed the mission.

14 Tell me, please, very briefly with a yes or no, were you familiar

15 with the contents of the memorandum of the mission of which you were a

16 senior official in those days?

17 A. At this remove, I'm not familiar with the memorandum you mention,

18 but I certainly would have been at that time.

19 Q. Is it true that the main mandate of the monitoring mission was, A,

20 to assist in stabilising the cease-fire within which the blockade of units

21 and facilities of the JNA would be lifted; and B, to oversee the

22 suspension of the declarations on independence for three months, as agreed

23 on by Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia, the parties hosting the missions.

24 Do you recollect that? Is that what is stated in the memorandum?

25 A. Perhaps not in those exact words, but that was the sense of the

1 memorandum, yes.

2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you're going to quote from the

3 document and you want to rely on it and ask the witness questions about

4 it, the fairest thing is to put the document to him. Now, have you got it

5 in English so that we can all see it?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't have it, Mr. May. But if

7 the witness believes that I didn't quote from it correctly, he can simply

8 say that he doesn't remember or that it is not right so that I am not in

9 any way trying to mislead him in his testimony.

10 JUDGE MAY: No, I'm not saying you are trying to mislead him, but

11 for the efficient conduct of the case, if this is a document of

12 importance, we should have it.

13 Perhaps the Prosecution can assist us, in due course, if they've

14 got a copy of it.

15 Yes.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that the opposing side can

17 gain possession of that document, because it must exist in their archives

18 and in the archives of Yugoslavia, too.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. So on the 13th of July, 1991, when the memorandum was signed, the

21 mission's task was to assist in stabilising the cease-fire within the

22 framework of which the lifting of the blockade would take place of the

23 units and facilities of the JNA, which only confirms that those facilities

24 and units were already under blockade at that time.

25 And secondly, which is extremely important from the political

1 standpoint, to supervise the suspension of the implementation of the

2 independence declarations for three months, as the parties had agreed.

3 The federal government of Yugoslavia had agreed on this with the

4 leaderships of Croatia and Slovenia. Is that right, General?

5 A. As far as I can remember, that is correct.

6 Q. And do you remember, General -- I'm just asking: Do you remember

7 that that memorandum should have ensured the consistent implementation of

8 the so-called Brioni declaration which, on the 7th of July, 1991, which

9 means only a few days prior to that, had been issued in the presence of

10 the ministerial troika of the European Community? Again, it was in the

11 presence of the federal authorities and representatives of Slovenia and

12 Croatia. And then this was followed as a consequence of that declaration

13 by this memorandum. Do you remember that?

14 A. I don't remember the -- I remember the Brioni agreement, the

15 issuing of it. In what presence it took place, I don't remember that.

16 Q. Very well. Without any doubt this can be found in documents, so I

17 won't insist on it, but do you recollect, as you say you know of the

18 Brioni declaration, that Slovenia and Croatia had pledged through that

19 declaration that they would deblock all units and facilities of the JNA

20 and restore the former regime on the frontier of SFRY within a period of

21 24 hours? Do you remember that?

22 A. I cannot remember all the detail of it, but I do remember that

23 certain undertakings were made with respect to the blockades, yes.

24 Q. And is it correct to say that representatives of Slovenia and

25 Croatia undertook specifically to refrain from any unilateral acts of

1 violence --

2 JUDGE MAY: You know, it would be much simpler if we just had the

3 document rather than asking the witness for a memory test. The chances of

4 remembering this kind of detail is small.

5 We'll get both these documents, please. Just a moment. We'll get

6 both these documents. If the Prosecution would get them during the break,

7 please.

8 I think we've had the Brioni declaration. I have a recollection

9 we've got that exhibited, but I may be wrong.

10 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Brioni declaration is one thing,

12 and then came a second document, the memorandum on the presence of the

13 monitoring mission of the European Community, dated the 13th of July,

14 1991.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll get both.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. I don't want to fatigue you, General, with questions regarding

18 general political matters.

19 On page 1 of your statement, and I quote, you said that you were

20 first sent to Slovenia to monitor the safe withdrawal of the JNA from

21 Slovenia. Is that right?

22 A. Among other duties that we had there, that is correct.

23 Q. And do you know that what was involved was the relocation of the

24 commands and units of the JNA from Slovenia to other parts of the Federal

25 Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of a decision of the Presidency of the

1 SFRY taken on the 18th of July, 1991?

2 A. Yes, I am aware of that, and we witnessed the withdrawal of the

3 JNA units from Slovenia to other parts of the Federal Republic, that's

4 correct.

5 Q. And did you have in your hands this decision of the Presidency?

6 I'm asking you this because the decision was taken to relocate them

7 outside of Slovenia, but that that would not preempt the future regulation

8 of relations in Yugoslavia nor would it call in question its territorial

9 integrity. Did you have access to that Presidency decision, the

10 consequences of which you were monitoring?

11 A. I don't remember that we had access to that Presidency decision at

12 the time.

13 Q. If you did not, do you remember that after that decision and after

14 the decision started to be implemented, that in spite of this goodwill

15 shown, that both in the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia,

16 a series of attacks were launched against JNA units?

17 A. No, that's not my memory, particularly in respect of Slovenia.

18 The situation in Croatia was a lot more complicated than that, but again,

19 I am not mindful of any attack that took place in Slovenia after that.

20 Q. Since you are not aware of it, I will not ask you any more

21 questions about it.

22 Did you ever receive any information as to the number of attacks

23 made by the police and the Territorial Defence of Slovenia against

24 officers, soldiers, and JNA convoys during those activities, including

25 their mistreatment, harassment, and where these incidents took place? Do

1 you know anything about that?

2 A. I have to be very clear on this one at this stage. There were

3 reports of conflict between convoys and police and armed elements in

4 Slovenia prior to our arrival in the area, which would have been at the

5 end of June 1991 and early July, perhaps. But from the end of the -- from

6 the implementation of the Brioni agreement and our arrival in the area,

7 there were no reports and no evidence was offered to us of any conflict

8 between the Slovenians and the JNA subsequent to that time.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, just that the Brioni declaration

10 was just mentioned. It is Exhibit 330, tab 35. But it is only marked for

11 identification. It was actually part of the binder from President Mesic,

12 and it's only marked for identification, and maybe this is the possibility

13 to now actually tender it.

14 JUDGE MAY: Let us deal with that after the adjournment. We will

15 find it, and we can deal with it. And if you would get us, if you can,

16 the 13th of July memorandum, if you can get that up during the break. We

17 will come back to it afterwards.

18 Thank you. I've just been handed a copy. It might be convenient

19 to exhibit it.

20 We will exhibit the Brioni declaration separately now. I will ask

21 that copies be made and it will take the next Defence exhibit number.

22 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Defence Exhibit 104, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE MAY: Can I hand it back. Thank you very much.

24 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

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1 Q. Since you're saying that there were no attacks after this document

2 and signature of representatives of Slovenia and Croatia together with

3 representatives of the federal authorities, are you aware and there is any

4 report of your mission about Croatian paramilitary units, the National

5 Guards Corps, on the 29th of August - so you see yourself how much later

6 this was - attacked a railway column, 29 freight trucks in the village of

7 Ivankovo when the escort was disarmed and JNA property looted. This was

8 during the process of dislocating this development from Slovenia and on

9 the railroad, a part of the railroad running from Zagreb to Belgrade.

10 JUDGE MAY: Now, we are moving from the witness's evidence. Since

11 he was present, I take it, in Croatia at the time he can answer it, but it

12 may be he's got no particular knowledge of this matter.

13 THE WITNESS: Could I emphasise one thing? When I said that there

14 were no attacks or fighting between the JNA and the Slovenians, I meant

15 exactly that in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. What the

16 defendant has just referred to took place on Croatian territory, and I

17 would have to refresh my memory on the reports with regard to that

18 particular incident. I don't remember it. But it's -- I'm not -- I am

19 not ruling it out. What I'd specifically said was that there were no

20 attacks within the Slovenian area. That's what I was referring to.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I'm talking about the memorandum that followed the Brioni

23 declaration and that was signed by the authorities of the Slovenia,

24 Croatia, and the federal authorities. So it is one whole.

25 Tell me, do you recollect that armed members --

1 JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Milosevic, you specifically asked the witness

2 about Slovenia, and he's answered. Now you want to move on to Croatia.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked him this happened in

4 Croatia, but I had in mind that the general was a senior officer in the

5 monitoring mission of the European Community in Zagreb, and that's why I'm

6 asking him this.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. And do you know that armed members, or do you remember that armed

9 National Guards Corps members on that same day and the next day again, on

10 the 30th of August, in the village of Mirkovci, again looted JNA property,

11 seizing quartermaster supplies and other supplies? Do you remember that

12 incident?

13 A. I don't remember that specific incident. I would have to refresh

14 my memory on any reports we had on it.

15 Q. And is it correct that the mandate of the monitoring mission of

16 the European Community was reinforced and expanded on the 2nd of

17 September, 1991, with a memorandum on the monitoring mission?

18 A. The precise date I don't remember, but it was in September, yes.

19 Q. Tell me, please, in principle, since you probably cannot give me a

20 very concrete answer, but as concretely as you can, within the context of

21 your monitoring of what you said the safe withdrawal of the JNA from

22 Slovenia and Croatia, in view of these attacks on JNA property, tell me,

23 please, the monitoring mission of the European Community, in your opinion

24 - and I'm asking you for your opinion - did it successfully fulfil its

25 mandate of the 13th of July, 1991?

1 A. The specific instance you've mentioned, I would have to refresh my

2 memory of them, as I said, from reports at that time. Whether you're

3 asking me in the overall whether the European Monitoring Mission was

4 successful, I would have to say that in the -- with respect to preventing

5 an outbreak of fighting in the area, it certainly didn't succeed in

6 preventing large scale fighting taking place, because as you well know, in

7 November and December, which was much later, there was very heavy fighting

8 throughout the area of Croatia.

9 Q. All right. And is it true that you could have assessed and

10 investigated the violation of the agreement about a cease-fire, which was

11 agreed upon on the 1st of September, 1991, in Belgrade? Once again,

12 between the federal authorities.

13 A. The investigation and reporting on the numerous cease-fires that

14 were agreed was the mission of the monitor mission, and they saw reported

15 upon all of the breaches that took place in respect of cease-fires, yes.

16 And the expansion of the mission that you referred to on the 2nd of

17 September would have encompassed that, and the monitor mission became much

18 more active in the area of Croatia after that.

19 Q. All right, then. And is it true and correct that, pursuant to

20 that agreement, and you were duty bound to supervise its implementation,

21 that all the paramilitary and irregular forces and units had to be

22 disarmed and disbanded, including the reserve forces of the Croatian

23 National Guard Corps? And that's what it says in Article 1 of the

24 mentioned memorandum of the 2nd of September, 1991. It is the memorandum

25 concerning your monitoring mission.

1 Do you know that? Do you happen to remember that?

2 A. As I said to you, I can't remember the detail, but I remember that

3 the mission did undertake the supervision of cease-fires within the area

4 and that there were certain conditions attached to it. But this is

5 another document, and I ask that I should have sight of it also.

6 Q. Unfortunately, I haven't got it here with me?

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I'm sure you will be able to

8 find it in the archives, and could you provide the witness with a copy,

9 please.

10 But the point is, on Article 1 of that same memorandum, where all

11 the paramilitaries and irregular units had to be disarmed and disbanded,

12 including the reserve force of the Croatian National Guard Corps.

13 JUDGE MAY: We've already dealt with this. Again, perhaps we can

14 try and find that memorandum of the cease-fire. Perhaps the Prosecution

15 can assist us with those two documents now.

16 It's time for an adjournment.

17 Mr. Milosevic, you can have another three-quarters of an hour, if

18 you want it, in cross-examination. That will allow for the fact that the

19 witness has given live evidence but also that his statement was admitted.

20 You get extra time for that.

21 General, could you be back, please, in twenty minutes. I must

22 formally remind you not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's

23 over, and that does include the members of the Prosecution team.

24 We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

25 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

1 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We have located both

3 memoranda.

4 JUDGE MAY: If we could have them, please.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, they are not exhibited so

6 far.

7 JUDGE MAY: We'll deal with this now.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the memorandum will be Defence

9 Exhibit 104, and -- Your Honours, I apologise for that. The memorandum is

10 Defence Exhibit 105, and the memo of the cease-fire, dated 2nd September

11 1991, is Defence Exhibit 106.

12 Your Honours, Defence Exhibit 106 is titled the Memorandum of

13 Understanding on the Extension of the Monitoring Activities of the Monitor

14 Mission to Yugoslavia.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We've now got those documents, Mr. Milosevic.

16 If you want to ask the witness about any of them, then he will need a

17 copy. Yes.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I assume that the witness now

19 has a copy of this. Is that right?

20 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. As I mentioned a moment ago, General, in Article 1, towards the

24 end of the page, everything else is enumerated before that, and then at

25 the very end of that page, it says: "The Croat National Guard reserve

1 forces shall be demobilised." And so on and so forth.

2 So that's what I was referring to when I asked you about it.

3 So tell me now, please, General, in your statement, on page 2,

4 paragraph 1 of your statement, you say that on one occasion you went to

5 Slavonia with a man named Branko who was a member of the National Guards

6 Corps; is that right?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Did you know at the time that the Croatian National Guard Corps

9 was in fact a paramilitary and illegal armed formation precisely

10 incorporated in this agreement?

11 A. Yes, and there were other forces precisely incorporated in the

12 agreement in the Osijek area at that particular time; the weapons and

13 equipment of the JNA that were operating in the area and irregular forces.

14 That was the reason for our presence there, was trying to negotiate a

15 cease-fire between the two elements so that this agreement could then be

16 properly implemented. That is the reason. That was the purpose of the

17 monitor team that had been sent to Osijek at that particular time.

18 Q. All right. Now, do you know that, with respect to the illegal

19 formation of the Croatian National Guard Corps at the end of June 1991,

20 the federal government of Yugoslavia took steps before the Constitutional

21 Court of Yugoslavia calling for the fact that the ZNG as a professional

22 armed formation be characterised as an unconstitutional and unlawful act

23 on the part of the Republic of Croatia? Are you aware of that?

24 A. I'm not aware of the detail of that particular legislation, but

25 what I am aware of is that there were a number of armed elements on both

1 sides of the equation during the hostilities in Croatia, and as I said to

2 you, our objective was going there to ensure the carrying out of the

3 agreement and to bring about a cease-fire and peace to the area.

4 Q. And do you know that the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, on

5 the 16th of October, 1991, made the decision to proclaim it irregular and

6 unconstitutional, this formation and establishment of the National Guard

7 Corps? Because -- that apart from the armed forces of Yugoslavia, no

8 other armed formations could be set up, as did the Republic of Croatia in

9 placing the National Guard Corps under the command of the Ministry of

10 Defence of the Republic of Croatia. Are you familiar with that? Just

11 give me a yes or no answer, please.

12 A. As I said to you, I'm not familiar with the precise legislation,

13 but I have to say that there was a number of armed elements operating at

14 that particular time, and our objective was to bring about a stand-down of

15 all in a coordinated and precise manner, which we found, as I have to say,

16 extremely difficult.

17 Q. I understand that, General. But this question doesn't refer to

18 you yourself personally. What I'm asking you is whether you consider that

19 your mission consistently insisted upon the disarming and disbanding of

20 the ZNG and other paramilitary formations that were established at that

21 time in Croatia, at least with the same intensity that it attended the

22 dynamics of the dislocation of the JNA units from Slovenia.

23 A. I consider that the EC monitor mission carried out their mission

24 in Croatia in as evenhanded a fashion and as just a fashion as they

25 possibly could. I would have no doubt that they did not show fear or

1 favour to either side. But they did stand for the peace-making and for

2 human rights.

3 Q. In your statement, you say that the JNA forces at that time were

4 exposed to attacks when they were in their bases and barracks in Croatia;

5 is that right? And do you know anything about the number of attacks that

6 were launched, how intense they were, and so on?

7 A. It is not correct to say that I said in my statement that they

8 were exposed to attacks in their barracks and bases in Croatia.

9 Q. Well, were they or not?

10 A. They were on occasions, yes.

11 Q. All right, then. Now, did you know about - and I assume that you

12 would have had to have known - about the report by the Federal Secretary

13 for National Defence, General Veljko Kadijevic, dated the 12th of

14 September, 1991, in which it is stated that up until that date, that is to

15 say up until the 12th of September, 1991, or, rather, from the 2nd of

16 September, 1991, ten days, all the barracks and facilities of the JNA were

17 under a complete siege, complete blockade? Did you know about that?

18 A. I was aware of the barracks and facilities being blockaded, yes.

19 I would like to remind the defendant that at this particular time, I was a

20 monitor. I wasn't the executive chief of the EC monitor mission. Very

21 often I was in the field with a monitor team, so consequently, I would not

22 have been aware of the detail of all of the announcements and agreements

23 that possibly were made. But naturally in the spirit and in the carrying

24 out of our mission, I would have been made aware of the contents.

25 Q. And do you know that as of the date the agreement was signed, up

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1 until the 11th of September, the Croatian forces carried out 115 attacks

2 against members of the JNA and that in the barracks at that time five

3 officers were killed, six soldiers, and 40 members of the JNA wounded?

4 Did you have reports to that effect? So they were in their barracks.

5 They weren't engaged in any other kinds of activities.

6 A. That level of detail with regard to reports, I have no memory of

7 it at this time. I am aware that there were a number of attacks on the

8 barracks that were occupied by the JNA in Croatia at that time.

9 Q. So you do know that there were attacks against barracks and that

10 people were killed and so on. Have I understood you correctly? Was that

11 your answer?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And can you tell me, please, what your mission undertook with

14 respect to these flagrant violations of the cease-fire agreement, that is,

15 by the Croatian forces?

16 A. The mission, when there were breaches of the cease-fire agreement

17 on any side, endeavoured to negotiate with the parties and to bring them

18 to the realisation that it was only by cooperation with the mission and

19 the full implementation of the agreement could peace be restored to the

20 situation. So as I said, they operated in an evenhanded fashion to both

21 sides.

22 Q. But I was asking you, General, about these attacks against

23 soldiers sitting in their barracks. So they weren't in any kind of

24 military operation and activity except that they were in the barracks

25 where they had been for 50 years, in garrisons throughout Yugoslavia.

1 So in your own country, General -- let me ask you this, in view of

2 your experience and your official function: In your own country, attacks

3 on the regular army, the regular army of a sovereign country, in view of

4 the fact that you are well placed to respond to that question --

5 JUDGE MAY: I think this is going to be a question which is -- is

6 going to be a matter which we're going to have to decide it may be

7 ultimately. It's not a hypothetical question for the witness.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand, but I'm asking the

9 witness, Mr. May, whether in his own country --

10 JUDGE MAY: And I'm stopping you. So could you go on to the next

11 question, please.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. All right. Tell me this then, please: Is it correct and true

14 that in the Republic of Ireland there is a law in force against acts of

15 violence and terror which is called Offences Against the Act, and it is

16 the 31st --

17 JUDGE MAY: It is irrelevant what the Republic of Ireland's laws

18 are. What we're concerned with is what happened in Croatia. We'll

19 consider the situation in due course.

20 Now, would you move on to another topic, please.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Well, as to what happened in Croatia, can these attacks being

23 characterised as acts against the state and crimes against the state and

24 security of the state?

25 JUDGE MAY: Well, General, if you think you can answer it, do.

1 It's probably a matter which we're going to have to decide.

2 THE WITNESS: What I would like to say in that respect, there was

3 a particular situation pertaining at that time in Croatia, and the

4 legitimacy or otherwise of the regime that was in force is a political

5 question which I was not a party to and will not offer an opinion on at

6 this particular time. So consequently, I'm not going to stray into that

7 area.

8 I offered my evidence as to the facts of what I saw when I was

9 there and the manner in which we carried out our mission, and I'll confine

10 myself to that.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. All right. Fine, then. I won't ask you any more about that.

13 Now, when you talk about your stay in Dubrovnik in the Hotel

14 Argentina during a period of six days, I think you said that several

15 shells fell quite near to your hotel; is that right?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And some witnesses who were here before you said that the forces,

18 the Croatian forces, in fact, had deployed combat positions around that

19 hotel. Is that right or not?

20 A. Not at that particular time, they hadn't. During the time I was

21 there, they had not. The hotel in question was the Hotel Excelsior.

22 Q. Well, when you talk about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of

23 military targets in the Dubrovnik area, and you mean the targets hit by

24 the JNA when you say that, are you quite sure that what was hit by the JNA

25 in fact was an illegitimate military target?

1 A. If you wish to describe it as such, yes.

2 Q. And I assume most probably, General, that you know about The Hague

3 rules, about the laws of war and customs of war, 1907, determining the

4 status of an undefended place or town?

5 A. I do.

6 Q. Therefore, I assume that a place or town, in order to have the

7 status of undefended, it must fulfil the following conditions: That all

8 the fighters, military materiel and movable equipment have been evacuated,

9 that immovable military installations and facilities are not used for

10 hostilities, that the authorities and population do not take any military

11 acts or to support military operations. So those several elements. Let's

12 take them. Are you aware of those elements?

13 A. I am aware of that. And when I -- I didn't describe Dubrovnik as

14 and undefended city in the context of The Hague Convention, it having been

15 declared as such. So it was in the context of the verb "to defend," and

16 purely on that basis, on the military basis, that I was dealing with it.

17 Q. But I assume that you're not challenging the fact that members of

18 the armed forces were located in the town, however you wish to call them

19 or qualify them; regular, irregular, or whatever. From what you yourself

20 say on page 6: Groups of armed people with Kalashnikovs, snipers, hunting

21 rifles, et cetera, that you saw a mortar and that the Croatian National

22 Guard Corps had several mortars in its possession. This is on page 5 of

23 your statement. And so on.

24 So are you challenging that?

25 A. No, not at all. In fact, that is my evidence. The only thing I

1 will challenge is you say that I saw a mortar. I didn't say I saw a

2 mortar. I said I heard them.

3 Q. All right. You heard it, which means that fire was opened against

4 the JNA. Are you challenging that?

5 A. No. That is correct.

6 Q. And do you know how many members of the JNA were killed in the

7 Dubrovnik region from that fire, from the shooting?

8 A. No, I do not.

9 Q. Well, as you're a professional soldier yourself and occupy the top

10 positions in your army today, if I tell you that 152 soldiers lost their

11 lives in the Dubrovnik region, fired on and shot at by the Croatian sides,

12 do you consider that this shooting could be characterised in some kind of

13 non-intensive shooting or - how shall I put this? - weak fire or anything

14 of that kind?

15 A. Well, first of all, I would like clarification of the period in

16 which the 152 soldiers lost their lives, because as I said, I was there

17 from the 5th to the 7th of October inclusive. So was it during that

18 period 152 soldiers lost their lives? Is that what you're telling me?

19 Q. No, not during the time that you were there. I wasn't claiming

20 that, General. I'm just asking about this figure, whether you know about

21 this figure of persons killed in the area.

22 A. No, I do not know that that was the figure. And certainly the

23 amount of fire that I observed from the Croatian side would be -- would

24 not indicate to me that any number of casualties of that nature were

25 inflicted.

1 Q. You mentioned, General, a moment ago during the

2 examination-in-chief, the fact that you had received information to the

3 effect that Dubrovnik was in danger, and your comments were that you

4 considered this information to be unfounded. When did you receive that

5 piece of information? That's my question.

6 A. The precise date I couldn't say, but it would have been towards

7 the end of September 1991, to the best of my knowledge.

8 Q. All right. Now, did you receive similar information and compare

9 it with the information that your team received, which was in Dubrovnik at

10 that time? I think the code name was the Whisky team, I think, as yours

11 was Charlie. The Whisky dispatch and yours was Charlie, I believe.

12 A. I think I'd better clarify something in that respect. The Team

13 Whisky was dispatched to Dubrovnik as a result of those reports we had

14 received, to confirm them or otherwise. That's the reason why they went

15 to Dubrovnik at that particular time.

16 Q. All right. But you received that information from the Croatian

17 side; isn't that right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And could we then conclude that giving out this kind of

20 information was in fact preparation for a future provocation against the

21 JNA by the armed forces concentrated around Dubrovnik at that time?

22 A. No, I wouldn't conclude that.

23 Q. But you mentioned that the reports in Zagreb were written by

24 people who were actually sitting in Zagreb and were not in the field on

25 the ground. Isn't that right, or have I misunderstood you?

1 A. The reports were sent by monitors in the field to the

2 headquarters, and the reports that were subsequently sent to The Hague

3 from Zagreb were constructed by people operating in the headquarters.

4 That is correct.

5 Q. And tell me, General, just in a few words if possible, why did you

6 give up this RMCM01 exhibit that Mr. Kay mentioned?

7 JUDGE MAY: The witness explained it had nothing to do with him.

8 It was somebody else's observations. So he can't produce it. That's what

9 he explained.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. General, you spoke about the JNA. Tell me, why when you're

13 referring to the JNA in your statement and the attachment which is number

14 RMCM02 of the 6th of December, 1991, why do you equate it with the Serb

15 forces?

16 JUDGE MAY: Would you like to have the document in front of you?

17 THE WITNESS: I would like to see the document, yes.

18 JUDGE MAY: Find the attachment and the tab number. Can you say

19 what it is, please, for the record.

20 Mr. Milosevic, let's find this document so we can make sure we

21 have it. It's -- you've mentioned the 6th of December. Do you mean the

22 6th of October for the numbered attachment?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 6th of October, that's it.

24 JUDGE MAY: It's our Exhibit 400, attachment 2. And you can

25 remind us what it is you put to the witness. Mr. Milosevic, where is it

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1 in the document?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I haven't got it in front of me just

3 now, but he equates the JNA with Serb forces. That's how he refers to

4 them and --

5 JUDGE MAY: Very well --

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- conceives of them.

7 JUDGE MAY: Let's find the passage that you're referring to.

8 MR. KAY: Paragraph 7, which is the second page, in the bottom

9 paragraph there. "JNA/Serbian forces."

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Why do you equate that, take that to be the same thing, General?

12 A. That is a report that was submitted at that time from Zagreb to

13 The Hague. That was the manner in which it was written. I -- it was a

14 perception at that particular time that on -- and I say it from a point of

15 simplicity, that there were Serbs and Croats in conflict with each other.

16 But strictly speaking, and the point is that as far as we were concerned,

17 at that time those of us who were in Dubrovnik, it was the JNA.

18 Q. So not Serb forces but the JNA; right?

19 A. That's my understanding, yes.

20 Q. And do you know the multinational structure of the JNA? Are you

21 aware of that, even at that time, particularly the officers, officer cadre

22 of the JNA, that they were multi-ethnic?

23 A. Yes, I am aware of that.

24 Q. You mentioned, General, the fact that there were certain protests

25 against the monitoring mission because of its activities in the Dubrovnik

1 region, and you said there were no reactions to the protests by the army.

2 Did I understand you correctly?

3 A. At our time there, you understood me correctly that the protests

4 were made by our mission headquarters in Zagreb. It didn't bring about a

5 reaction on the ground, yes.

6 Q. Well, if that's so, General, would you please comment on the

7 following -- this is also a document that I received from the other side

8 over there, Mr. May, and it is 00544945, page -- that's the page. And it

9 is a letter by the Deputy Federal Secretary for National Defence, Admiral

10 Stane Brovet, to the head of the monitoring mission, Ambassador GDY Horten

11 [phoen] in Belgrade. The 6th of November is the date.

12 And in that letter, among others, he says: "With respect to the

13 protests of the monitoring mission of the European Community for the

14 activities in the Dubrovnik region on the 2nd and 3rd of November, we have

15 collected information from which the following emerges."

16 And now I would like to ask you whether you were aware of that

17 information and facts. First, it says here, and I'm sure you know,

18 General, that Admiral Brovet was the Deputy Federal National Defence

19 Secretary, a Slovene by ethnicity. Are you familiar with that?

20 A. I am, yes.

21 Q. And first of all, it says: "On the 2nd of November, 1991, from

22 1300 to 1420 hours, the JNA positions in the Glogov-Kamen region, sniper

23 and mortar fire was opened on them from the Babin Kuk position, Mala Petka

24 [phoen], Lapad and the Nunziata fort [phoen]. And from the same

25 positions, opened fire between 15 and 1620 hours, from guns -- 85

1 millimetre guns and mortars of 82 and 102 millimetres -- 120 millimetres.

2 And the deployment of the fighter units, groups of six, members of the

3 Croatian National Guard Corps, a diversionary group, infiltrated into

4 their ranks; and it says that on the 2nd of November, all the JNA units

5 were ordered to cease fire at once because in agreement with the EEC

6 monitors work was started to set the Komuvac [phoen] transformer station

7 into operation and the Crisis Staff of Dubrovnik was informed of this as

8 was the EC mission with the violations of the cease-fire agreement. As

9 the attacks did not cease but, on the contrary, were intensified, about

10 1730 hours mortar fire and machine-gun fire was opened from the positions

11 from which the Croatian armed formations were active. And this is what

12 the letter to the head of your mission, Ambassador Van Houten contains.

13 Do you know about that?

14 A. I'm not familiar with the detail in that letter. As I said, my

15 period in the Dubrovnik area was not at the period that you're referring

16 to there.

17 Q. I am speaking about a response to protests because the JNA had

18 opened fire, and Admiral Brovet, in his letter, explains the attacks that

19 came prior to this response.

20 JUDGE MAY: The witness has said that he's not familiar with the

21 detail. He wasn't there at the period. Now, you can put it to other

22 witnesses or you can give evidence about it, but there's no point asking

23 the witness about something which he knows nothing of. It just takes up

24 time unnecessarily.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. Well, General, is it clear that at an adequate level of

2 responsibility held by Admiral Brovet provided an adequate answer as to

3 why fire had to be returned against positions from which it had been

4 opened against the JNA?

5 A. On that particular occasion, it would be -- appear to be the

6 response of Admiral Brovet. That is quite correct, in respect of that

7 particular incident of which I said I have no knowledge.

8 Q. And are you familiar with the letter of the Federal Secretary for

9 National Defence, General Veljko Kadijevic, addressed to the chairman of

10 the ministerial council of the European Community, Hans van den Broek and

11 the head of the monitoring mission, Ambassador van Houten, in which he

12 says - and this was dated the 6th of November, too - that on the 10th of

13 November, the conclusions of the government of the Republic of Croatia

14 come into effect, and after that date, members of the JNA in the territory

15 of Croatia would be treated as members of an occupying hostile army and

16 clearly Croatia wishes a further escalation of the conflict with

17 unforeseeable consequences. This is corroborated by the fact that

18 Croatian forces bombed certain areas in the Republic of Serbia, including

19 the town of Apotin.

20 Are you familiar with the contents of that letter?

21 A. I'm not familiar with the contents of that letter, no.

22 Q. And are you familiar --

23 JUDGE MAY: If this is another November letter, I think it's just

24 wasting time. Now, your time is going on.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I have quite a

1 number of documents here which I consider to be important to clear up this

2 matter. I too would like to clear it up. But let me move on then. I

3 will not refer to further documents.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. On page 6, General, you analyse the justification of the entry of

6 the JNA into the Dubrovnik harbour. You even link this to other naval

7 bases on the Adriatic as part of the protection of the integrity of the

8 SFRY.

9 So my question really is: Why would the regular army, on its own

10 territory in this case, a part of that army that is called the Navy,

11 should not use its own harbours and coastline, and on what basis are you

12 saying that the Dubrovnik harbour had no military, strategic or economic

13 significance for the JNA?

14 A. I didn't say that it had no economic significance for the JNA, but

15 what I was saying there is that they were not using Dubrovnik harbour at

16 that time, and they had a number of other bases in the Adriatic. So I

17 couldn't see that they needed to take on a new base in Dubrovnik. That

18 was the case I was making.

19 Q. That is the point, General, when you talk about taking. Don't you

20 think it is extremely illogical for the army to take the territory of its

21 own state? You also mention capitulation, that its own population should

22 capitulate. What logic can there be in this or what explanation can be

23 given for this?

24 A. That logic would be to ignore the factual situation that was

25 taking place on the ground, and that was that there was a state of

1 confrontation between the army that you mentioned and the population

2 within Croatia. Consequently, that was the situation that we were trying

3 to normalise and which we were trying to pacify. That was the whole

4 purpose of us being there.

5 Q. Yes, but, General, the behaviour of the JNA which held positions

6 on the fringes of the town and which never entered the town, doesn't that

7 confirm the statement of the JNA leadership that the army had no intention

8 of taking Dubrovnik? But it was the media manipulations and provocations

9 that turned this into a political event which was construed on the basis

10 of those provocations in order to speed up international support for

11 something absurd, as an attack on a tourist centre and a historical

12 monument would be. That was certainly not the intention of the army.

13 A. I was at a loss to interpret the intentions of the army at that

14 particular time, but I was aware that while I was there, whereas the old

15 city hadn't been shelled, the areas around it inhabited by the civilians

16 had been, and it was in that context that I was talking of the attack on

17 Dubrovnik.

18 Q. General, I find something illogical there. You use the

19 explanation that the probable intention was to depopulate Dubrovnik. On

20 page 2 -- no, not of your statement. But on the other hand, you also

21 mentioned Ilok, which was not attacked at all but was evacuated. I assume

22 because it was close to the area of conflict. It was not destroyed or

23 damaged in any sense, but it was evacuated by the Croatian authorities and

24 the Croatian mayor. Why was it evacuated? You even say that

25 international monitors assisted in that evacuation. Why was that town

1 evacuated when no one was attacking it? And here you say that it was

2 attacked for the population to leave.

3 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Question.

4 THE WITNESS: Information that we had in respect of Ilok was that

5 the people felt increasingly threatened in the town of Ilok, and they

6 asked that they would be evacuated. It struck me as strange that people

7 would be asked to be evacuated from their town unless they were under some

8 threat. So it is not illogical to say that the attack on the population

9 of Dubrovnik would bring about an evacuation.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. But didn't you know that at meetings held by the authorities of

12 Dubrovnik with JNA representatives in the presence of international

13 representatives, the only demand of the army was for the armed formations,

14 the irregulars, foreign mercenaries leave Dubrovnik?

15 JUDGE MAY: You've already been over this ground and the witness

16 has answered that he was not involved in any of these negotiations,

17 although he'd heard of that demand. No point going over that ground

18 again.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But that demand, as far as I

20 understood the witness, the witness said that he knew about it, the demand

21 for the armed formations to leave the town, Mr. May, nothing more than

22 that.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, exactly. Now, what new do you want to ask?

24 You've got about five minutes left.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will finish in five minutes,

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1 Mr. May.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. You said, General, that when you were in the old town of Dubrovnik

4 you saw only two minor damages and that your professional judgement was

5 that these had occurred incidentally.

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Allegations here are being repeatedly made that the army wanted to

8 capture Dubrovnik, and Dubrovnik was not captured. Allegations are being

9 presented that the army wanted to destroy Dubrovnik, and Dubrovnik was not

10 destroyed. Is that so or not, General?

11 JUDGE MAY: It's not for the general to comment on allegations

12 such as that, which in my recollection have not been made. I think that's

13 your misrepresentation. Now, move on.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, do you know that Croatian paramilitary forces - and your

17 mission was informed about this - opened fire in the area of Dubrovecki

18 Glebane [phoen] from a vessel against a vessel of the Yugoslav navy? Did

19 you have any report of that? This, for instance, occurred on the 11th of

20 November, 1991.

21 A. At this remove, I can't remember that particular incident as I

22 wasn't in that area. On the 11th of November, I was probably back in

23 Zagreb. But I can't remember that incident.

24 Q. Do you remember that fire was constantly opened against JNA units

25 in the villages of Bosanka, Kriza, Bogeja [phoen] and Knezica? Did you

1 have such a report? Did you have access to that information?

2 A. We had information that -- of fire being directed by one side

3 against the other throughout a number -- a large number of locations

4 within Croatia. I don't remember those precise locations on that

5 particular date. I think that there -- only those who were there at that

6 the time or those who would have made the exact report on it could be

7 expected to remember the detail of every incident that took place.

8 Q. General, you now use the expression "one side firing against the

9 other." Can we infer from that that there was a constant exchange of

10 fires between the two sides there, in your professional judgement?

11 A. I wouldn't use the word "constant," but there were outbreaks of

12 fighting quite frequently throughout November and December at that

13 particular time.

14 Q. So you're saying that there were outbreaks of fighting throughout

15 November and December, which means fire was opened by both sides. There

16 was a battle going on between two sides. Is that right, General?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Do you know that in those battles members of the Croatian military

19 or, rather, paramilitary forces were also opening fire from positions

20 within the old town? I have here a bulletin of the Federal Secretariat

21 for National Defence dated the 12th of November, 1991, where this is

22 stated. I have no other sources of information, but I assume that this is

23 correct. Are you familiar with that? That is that fire was opened also

24 from positions within the old town.

25 A. That is dated the 12th of November. I have no knowledge of fire

1 being opened from within the town on that date.

2 But let me clarify something. Can we go back to the question and

3 the answer I gave. "... there were outbreaks of fighting throughout

4 November and December, which means fire was opened by both sides. There

5 was a battle between two sides. Is that right, General?" That question.

6 I said, "That is correct," but my understanding of your question was

7 throughout the Federal Republic of Croatia, on Croatian territory, not

8 within the Dubrovnik area, and my answer was made accordingly. Now you're

9 specifically saying on the 12th of December -- or I beg your pardon, of

10 November, within Dubrovnik. I have no knowledge of that particular

11 incident that you're talking about because, as I said to you, I wasn't

12 there at that time.

13 Q. Very well. But if we go back to the area of Dubrovnik itself once

14 again, did you say that there was fighting ongoing there too for as long

15 as they lasted, that is, that there was an exchange of fire on both sides?

16 A. When I was there, there was certainly fire into the Dubrovnik

17 area, and there was some fire from the Dubrovnik area, return fire, but

18 not from the old city.

19 Q. Very well. Not from the old city. Why do you call the fire

20 coming from Dubrovnik as return fire? Does that mean that the JNA forces

21 fired first and then the Croatian forces responded or was it perhaps the

22 other way round?

23 I've read to you parts of the letter by Admiral Brovet from which

24 it is evident what patience they showed in endeavouring to stop the fire

25 against JNA positions.

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've been over all this ground. It's

2 pointless going on. You can ask one more question and then your time is

3 up, if you've got something else you want to ask. We've been over this

4 ground.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Yes, General, do you know that throughout that period that you are

7 talking about, the role of the JNA was precisely to separate forces that

8 were in conflict, and they were conflict because of the violence which the

9 new Croatian authority had committed against the Serb population? Are you

10 aware of that, that the role of the JNA was that, that it endeavoured to

11 separate the warring parties? And the Serbs in Croatia were the party

12 that was attacked. Do you know that?

13 A. I was aware that that was the justification given for many of the

14 actions that were taking place, but that was at variance with what

15 actually took place on the ground.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Kay, have you any questions?

17 Questioned by Mr. Kay:

18 Q. General, you were largely based in Zagreb; is that right?

19 A. Based in Zagreb and then we were deployed as teams to areas within

20 Croatia on occasions, yes.

21 Q. The ECMM, did it have only that main base in Zagreb or did it have

22 other bases or centres, if you like, elsewhere in Yugoslavia?

23 A. Initially it was in Zagreb, and then they developed a network of

24 centres, what they called Regional Centres, in a number of other

25 locations, first in Croatia and then in Belgrade.

1 Q. The setup in Belgrade was at what stage? Can you give us an

2 approximate date?

3 A. Approximately the end of October. I'm not sure exactly of the

4 date.

5 Q. The arrival of the ECMM to Zagreb, again, approximate date?

6 A. It would have arrived approximately the 13th of July.

7 Q. When you arrived, you were, so to speak, in the Croatian partition

8 of Yugoslavia.

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. When you arrived, would it be fair to say that you were viewed

11 with suspicion by the other side, the side that was not the Croats?

12 A. Initially -- yes. I would think that that would be fair.

13 Q. You said that there was no contact or response from the JNA when

14 you were trying to perform your task of implementing a cease-fire, the

15 cessation of hostilities. Again, would it be fair to say from your

16 dealings on the matter that that would have been because the other side

17 viewed you as being partial to the Croatians? Whether that's right or

18 wrong is another matter, it's their perception that I would like you to

19 give evidence about.

20 A. I don't think that that would be fair to say, because on a number

21 of other occasions, the JNA did engage with us and cease-fires were

22 arranged. I had personal experience of it in the Osijek area myself.

23 Q. If we can just turn to tab 8, second page, paragraph 6, the

24 Dalmatia section. I take it from the date on page 1, the 14th of October,

25 that this may well have been after you had left Dubrovnik. From your six

1 days, it seems you would have left around the 12th; is that right?

2 A. No, that's not correct. I would have been there from the 5th to

3 the 7th or 8th of October. So I was well gone on the 14th.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's -- the document date is

5 actually the 11th of October.

6 MR. KAY: Thank you.

7 Q. Is it outside your time, this report, or within your time? Just

8 see if you can help us.

9 A. The actual report refers to the changeover time. As you see, the

10 team reports another quiet day. That would have been the team in situ,

11 and then the other team was arriving. So the report covers the period of

12 the handover, as far as I can ascertain from it.

13 Q. Paragraph 6 reads as follows: "The same team reports that the JNA

14 has for the first time made contact to talk."

15 A. Yes. That refers to our successor team. I think in my evidence I

16 mentioned that, that the successor team made contact and did have a

17 meeting with the JNA and the Croatian authorities at Cavtat.

18 Q. And from the way we read it, it seems as though the JNA made that

19 contact rather than it being the other way around.

20 A. Well, as I say, it was the successor team. I don't know who made

21 the initial contact in that case.

22 Q. Moving on to other matters, in your period in Zagreb, were you

23 able to receive reports as to the kind of information that was coming out

24 of the media in Croatia itself?

25 A. There would have been a cell at the headquarters there that were

1 receiving media digests from all of the interested parties.

2 Q. The issue I just want to look at briefly here is your experience

3 of that, or the ECMM experience of it, and whether there could be any

4 assessment of the kind of reporting that was taking place within Croatia

5 as to the events that were happening. Were those local reports from the

6 Croatia media exaggerations of the hostilities and conflicts?

7 A. There was a dedicated press section at the headquarters who would

8 have had the responsibility of analysing and dissecting the media, so I

9 would feel that it would be -- a comment of that nature would be more

10 appropriate to them than to me.

11 Q. But were you aware, rather than having someone else come along,

12 were you aware of those reports that were being made within the Croatia

13 media? I say that because of those comments that were within the document

14 that we withdrew this morning of which you were not the author.

15 A. There were comments made, yes, that like would not have been fully

16 reflective of the facts on the ground, yeah.

17 Q. I just want to deal with this point: That the reports within

18 Croatia as to what was happening were an exaggeration of the real events;

19 is that right?

20 A. I would prefer to say that some of the reports in the Croatian

21 media were an exaggeration of the real events.

22 Q. Gaining an understanding that that was the situation would not be

23 immediate, would that be right, when you and your ECMM team arrive in

24 Zagreb?

25 A. That would be correct, yes.

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1 Q. It takes time to work out what the realities are.

2 A. That is correct, but I think pragmatically one would expect the

3 reporting of one particular side or another to be of a rather subjective

4 nature.

5 Q. Yes. Just one other matter. You referred to one of these tabs,

6 it may even have been this one, as going to The Hague. I didn't quite

7 understand the context of that.

8 A. At that particular time, the Dutch had the presidency of the EU,

9 and the Dutch presidency then received the reports and circulated them to

10 all of the other participating countries at that time. They had that

11 responsibility.

12 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I have a few questions.

14 Re-examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

15 Q. General, in relation to your information on the imminent attack on

16 Dubrovnik, the accused put to you whether this was in fact preparation for

17 a future provocation against the JNA. Did you see anything in Dubrovnik

18 when you were there that could justify such a conclusion?

19 A. No, I did not.

20 Q. The accused also spoke with you about the amount of fire from the

21 Croatian side in Dubrovnik, and you yourself spoke about what you saw and

22 heard. Would that what you saw and heard coming from the Croatian side,

23 would it justify the bombardment from the JNA that you saw?

24 A. No, it would not.

25 Q. The accused also spoke with you about the agreement of the -- of

1 the 13th of July, 1991, and mentioned is here - and he pointed this out in

2 particular - the lifting of the blockade of the JNA units and facilities,

3 but it also says here "the unconditional return of the JNA units to their

4 barracks."

5 Did the JNA, to your information -- to your knowledge, did they

6 return unconditionally to their barracks?

7 A. No, they did not.

8