1 Monday, 27 January 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the witness has to take the

8 oath.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will -- let the witness take the oath, and

10 let me have a copy of the summary. I don't have one. Yes. Let the

11 witness take the declaration.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

13 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

14 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

15 WITNESS: PETAR KRISTE

16 [Witness answered through interpreter]

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honours.

19 Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

20 Q. Good morning, Witness. Can you hear me?

21 A. Yes, I can.

22 Q. Please state your name and date of birth.

23 A. Petar Kriste, Dubrovnik, on the 5th of January, 1936.

24 Q. You are a Croatian citizen?

25 A. I am.

1 Q. What is your profession?

2 A. I'm an economist.

3 Q. Were you the Minister of Defence of the government of Croatia for

4 several months in 1990; and if so, during which time exactly?

5 A. Yes, I was. From the 30th of May until the 24th of August, 1990.

6 Q. Given your professional background and not being a professional

7 soldier, why were you elected into a position of Minister of Defence?

8 A. Croatia, in those days after the first multi-party elections, was

9 constituted as a democratic republic, and it was generally believed by the

10 leadership of Croatia that it was normal for a civilian to head the

11 ministry.

12 Q. Thus at that time while you were the Minister of Defence, did you

13 expect any violent developments within the former Yugoslavia?

14 A. I personally feared that that could happen. However, Croatia did

15 everything to avoid it. What is more, after the peaceful transition of

16 power in the top leadership, the conviction spread that violence could be

17 avoided.

18 Q. When were you replaced and by whom?

19 A. I was replaced on the 24th of August by General Spegelj.

20 Q. Was there a particular reason for doing this at that time,

21 replacing you as a civilian with a general?

22 A. Yes. On the 17th of August, there were large-scale disturbances

23 or, rather, a rebellion in the area of Knin and a part of Lika. Actually,

24 citizens of Croato-Serbian ethnicity put up barricades, stopped vehicles,

25 searched them, and a larger-scale rebellion was instigated.

1 Q. You continued to be -- did you continue to be a member of the

2 government; and if so, in which period and what function?

3 A. I was a member of the government right up until the 15th of April,

4 1992, and I performed the duties of Trade Minister.

5 Q. What was the situation regarding the TO, in particular TO weapons,

6 when you took up the duty of Minister of Defence? Did you have any

7 control over weapons at that time?

8 A. When I took over duty, the Territorial Defence had already been

9 disarmed. Actually, the Yugoslav army had taken the decision after the

10 first round of the elections that the Territorial Defence in Croatia,

11 Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina should be disarmed. And this was carried

12 out, the formula being that the warehouses were unsafe where the weapons

13 of the TO had been stored until then and that it should be placed in safer

14 warehouses, that is, under the full control of the Yugoslav People's Army.

15 Q. In your time as Minister of Defence, did you make suggestions for

16 changes in the TO; and if so, what kind of changes?

17 A. Yes. The Territorial Defence, according to the constitutional

18 system that was in force, was simultaneously a component part of the armed

19 forces of Yugoslavia, but it was also the territorial army within the

20 jurisdiction of the republic. That territorial component of the armed

21 forces, according to the constitutional provisions that were in force and

22 enshrined in the constitution of Yugoslavia and of Croatia, the republic

23 took care, prepared, organised and commanded the Territorial Defence.

24 However, when the party that won at the multi-party elections took over

25 power, the commander of the republic Territorial Defence Staff refused to

1 cooperate with the new leadership, and my proposal was that he be replaced

2 and that the Territorial Defence be adjusted to the constitutional

3 frameworks that were in force or, rather, that it should be placed under

4 the control of the Republic of Croatia.

5 Q. And was your suggestion followed?

6 A. No, it was not accepted. President Tudjman wanted at all cost to

7 avoid any conflict, and he especially wanted to avoid a conflict with the

8 Yugoslav People's Army. So that was the reason why he did not accept my

9 proposal at that time.

10 Q. Did you try to get control over weapons? Did you do anything in

11 relation to TO weapons?

12 A. We asked the federal minister of -- no, of national defence, that

13 is, Mr. Veljko Kadijevic himself, and also through General Novoselic, who

14 was commander of the republic staff of the TO in Croatia, that the weapons

15 be returned. However, those weapons were never returned.

16 Q. Did you, in your time as the Minister of Defence, did you purchase

17 weapons?

18 A. No.

19 Q. After General Spegelj replaced you, did he purchase weapons; and

20 if so, when and what kind?

21 A. As far as I know, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while I was

22 the minister, had requested from the federal authorities additional

23 weapons to arm the police, the regular and reserve force of the police,

24 which had been increased somewhat. However, the federal authorities

25 rejected that request as they did the request for returning the weapons of

1 the TO. After that, as far as I can know, but I did not take direct part

2 in this and I don't have any precise information, but a certain quantity

3 of light infantry weapons was procured.

4 Q. And do you know when, approximately?

5 A. This was at the end of 1990.

6 Q. Did General Spegelj also make suggestions for preparation of a

7 defence, an effective defence, and if so, how did President Tudjman deal

8 with it?

9 A. I know that General Spegelj drafted three plans for the defence of

10 Croatia. However, those plans were not discussed at cabinet meetings, so

11 I do not have detailed insight into the -- what actually happened with

12 those plans. But judging from what Mr. Spegelj himself told me, as well

13 as some other colleagues, President Tudjman rejected all three defence

14 plans prepared by Spegelj.

15 Q. And why did he do that?

16 A. I think the reasons were the same as when he refused my proposal

17 for changes in the Territorial Defence. He wanted, at all cost, to avoid

18 the war and conflicts primarily with the Yugoslav People's Army.

19 Q. After -- during the time in the government now as the Trade

20 Minister, did you get information that in the course of 1991 Mr. Tudjman

21 and Mr. Milosevic met and negotiated?

22 A. Such information was never received officially by the government.

23 However, in the Croatian press, there was a brief report at the end of

24 March 1991 that Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Milosevic had met in a frontier

25 location between Serbia and Croatia.

1 Q. Is that Karadjordjevo?

2 A. Yes. Yes. Later, it was learnt -- I think that that note itself

3 did not mention Karadjordjevic, but subsequently, it was learnt that it

4 had taken place in Karadjordjevo.

5 Q. Did you have a brief conversation with Mr. Susak that related to

6 this meeting in Karadjordjevo in March 1991?

7 A. No. I did not have a direct conversation with Mr. Susak about

8 that meeting.

9 Q. Did you have -- did you meet Susak or did you come across Susak at

10 that time period, and did he tell you something?

11 A. Shortly after that, ten or 15 days later, I couldn't say exactly

12 when, I met Mr. Susak. He was in a rather good mood. And when I asked

13 him for the reason of his good mood, he told me that a decision had been

14 taken, or wording to that effect, that Herzegovina should be annexed to

15 Croatia.

16 At the emotional level, I could understand that, because Mr. Susak

17 was a native of Herzegovina, and it was natural for me that he should be

18 glad if that part of Croatia were to be part of the Republic of Croatia.

19 But on the other hand, such a report disturbed me.

20 Q. Did he indicate who made such a decision?

21 A. No, he didn't tell me who had taken the decision. He just said,

22 "I'm coming from the leader and such a decision has been taken." This

23 could not have been a formal decision. My understanding was that this was

24 an informal discussion during which such an agreement had been arranged or

25 reached.

1 Q. And this reference to the leader, does that mean President

2 Tudjman? Was he referring to Tudjman?

3 A. Yes, certainly.

4 Q. Mr. Susak, at that time, was he the Minister of Immigration?

5 A. Yes, he was.

6 Q. And was he close to President Tudjman?

7 A. Yes, he was.

8 Q. Did you discuss with colleagues what was the topic of meetings

9 with Milosevic -- between Milosevic and Mr. Tudjman?

10 A. We were all surprised by this news report itself that Mr. Tudjman

11 and Mr. Milosevic had met, and of course it aroused a great deal of

12 interest, and there was a lot of talk as to what could have been the

13 content of that discussion. Though we did not have any confirmation from

14 official sources, we thought that it could have been a kind of bargain

15 struck between Serbia and Croatia taking into account certain divisions

16 within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17 Q. Let's now move on to Dubrovnik. Before and during the war, did

18 you yourself focus on what happened in the region of Dubrovnik?

19 A. I did. During the war, I was in Dubrovnik just before the

20 beginning and during the beginning of the war, then on three other

21 occasions during the blockade and occupation of the region around the

22 town, and once immediately after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's

23 Army from the area of Dubrovnik.

24 Q. By the end of September, beginning October, were you present in

25 Dubrovnik; and if so, which dates?

1 A. I was in Dubrovnik from the 26th of September until the 5th of

2 October. That was the period I spent there and that was when the actual

3 heavy attack on Dubrovnik itself started.

4 Q. Why were you -- why did you go to Dubrovnik on the 26th of

5 September? Was there a particular reason?

6 A. There was. We had received quite reliable information that an

7 attack on Dubrovnik was forthcoming. And also in view of the forces, and

8 we knew exactly how strong they were and what their distribution was, what

9 their deployment was, that they were ready for an attack to Dubrovnik, and

10 our assessment was that our forces were absolutely weak and that they

11 needed to be reinforced, especially with weapons, because there were

12 enough personnel in Dubrovnik itself ready to defend the town and Croatia.

13 Q. Did General Marinovic request weapons or other support from the

14 Croatian government?

15 A. General Marinovic, who was then lieutenant colonel, asked for aid

16 in weapons, and he addressed a fax to that effect to Zagreb, and my

17 colleagues from Dubrovnik advised me to do my best to have the request

18 sent by General Marinovic fulfilled.

19 Q. Was the -- what did General - or Colonel then - Colonel Marinovic

20 request, and did he get what he requested?

21 A. I did not have insight into the actual list, because in his fax he

22 had specified exactly what was essential for the necessary defence. But I

23 do know that I and my colleague Jurica, who also was a deputy in the

24 Assembly and who was also a native of Dubrovnik, like me, we didn't bring

25 even a part of what he had asked for. Actually, we didn't bring any

1 weapons. We brought a truckload of mines and explosive devices, which

2 were certainly useful and necessary, but General Marinovic was concerned

3 and worried because there was a shortage of infantry weapons and

4 especially there was no heavy weapons.

5 Q. Why didn't he get that? Was it not available, or do you know?

6 A. Croatia was not prepared for war. I already said a moment ago

7 that Croatia wanted to avoid the war at all costs. But at one point in

8 time, it even believed that this would be possible. For this reason, and

9 also because every conflict wanted to be avoided with the JNA, the

10 necessary preparations failed to be made, and especially the procurement

11 of certain quantities of weapons or their manufacture in our own

12 facilities.

13 In view of this, when the attack on Dubrovnik started in Croatia,

14 there really were not available the quantities of weapons necessary to

15 meet General Marinovic's request, but my impression was - this may be

16 subjective and a subjective impression - that as much as could have been

17 done was not done probably because the organisation was lacking as the

18 preparations for defence had not been made in time.

19 Q. And when you arrived in Dubrovnik, what did you find in terms of

20 defenders? How many people were there to defend and what kind of people?

21 A. When I arrived in Dubrovnik, I found some 300 defenders on the

22 outside, and these were the members of the regular police force. There

23 was a small unit of the National Guards Corps, and people who until then

24 had been civilians and who, as soon as the threat of an attack occurred,

25 reported themselves and wanted to take part in the defence. There were

1 quite a number of these people, but there was a shortage of weapons for

2 them.

3 Q. In regard of professional soldiers and policemen, how many

4 policemen, can you say approximately, and how many soldiers, National

5 Guard? If you could say. If you don't know, then --

6 A. I can't give you an exact figure.

7 Q. You spoke about the citizens that -- how many -- did they have

8 uniforms? Those citizens that took up arms, did they have uniforms?

9 A. No. At that time throughout Croatia, very few people actually had

10 uniforms. Those who had uniforms were policemen. They were the only

11 ones. And some of the members of the Croatian National Guards Corps. The

12 young men went around in sneakers and civilian clothing, and that's how

13 they fought, all those who were able to get any weapons. And they, of

14 course, were included into the organised defence.

15 Q. You said that they actually -- did they volunteer to help, to

16 defend the town, or were they compelled to do that? I'm speaking of the

17 young men.

18 A. Yes, I understand. They were volunteers. They came forth quite

19 freely. And let me repeat that far more reported for duty than we could

20 take in because there were just enough -- not enough weapons to go around.

21 Q. And what kind of weapons did these people have?

22 A. Mostly they were infantry weapons; ordinary rifles and a few

23 automatic rifles of the Kalashnikov type.

24 Q. You mentioned that you had information about the other side, of

25 the troops of the other side. What was that information? How many

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1 soldiers were on the opposing side?

2 A. General Marinovic in Dubrovnik, according to a previous agreement,

3 had arrived from Trebinje, where he was the commander of the Trebinje

4 garrison of the JNA, and he had exact facts and figures about the troops

5 that were directed against Dubrovnik. And according to what he told us,

6 in the first squadron there was about 5.000 men with 105 artillery pieces.

7 Q. Did you visit the --

8 A. They had the support of tank units and the air force from Mostar

9 and from some other places. So they were in the first echelon.

10 Q. Did you visit the village of Brgat, together with ECMM observers,

11 on the 27th of September; and if so, why?

12 A. On the 26th of September, when we arrived in Dubrovnik, we

13 received information that at the borderline between Montenegro and

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina there were -- there had been a number incidents taking

15 place and that the attack had in fact already begun, and particular

16 mention was made of Konavle and the boarder with Montenegro and the access

17 towards Trebinje. And it was for this reason that we decided to go to

18 Konavle straight away on the 26th, when we arrived, to see what was going

19 on there, especially Molunat because people said that an invasion was

20 being prepared there. And we arrived there, as I say, on the 26th.

21 First of all, we took the road to near Molunat and we really did

22 see that there were two naval ships belonging to the Yugoslav navy, but

23 they were not anchored there, they were cruising along the coast. When we

24 approached Molunat itself, gunfire was opened -- they opened gunfire and

25 attacked our vehicles and so we withdrew towards Grude. Mortar fire and

1 grenades followed us from the surrounding hills. And it was due to these

2 onslaughts, rather even before we arrived in Dubrovnik, the villagers of

3 Molunat were displaced and were put up in the hotel at the Babin Kuk area.

4 Q. Let me interrupt you. I actually didn't ask you to go into that

5 many details, but just one side question: Did you travel in a civilian

6 car or was it military?

7 A. In a civilian car.

8 Q. And my question was: Did you visit the village of Brgat together

9 with ECMM observers and why?

10 A. Yes, the next day. On the following day, which was the 27th of

11 September, we did visit Brgat, yes, because we had also received

12 information that up there at Brgat several grenades had been fired. So we

13 went there together with the ECMM monitors to visit the village. And we

14 did come across some -- a few houses that were partially damaged. One of

15 them was completely damaged. And according to a soldier, he said that

16 this -- the shell had come from the Bosnia-Herzegovina area, and Brgat --

17 Brgat is right near the border.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

19 show the witness the Exhibit 337. It's -- in the atlas you cannot see the

20 place Brgat. The witness can -- should point it out on the ELMO because

21 on this atlas you can't see it.

22 JUDGE MAY: We seem to be having some trouble with it.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

24 Q. We have actually indicated the place Brgat with a red tab. Is

25 that correct?

1 A. Yes, that is Brgat.

2 Q. Is there a connecting road to Trebinje?

3 A. Yes, there is. Brgat is right on the road running from Dubrovnik

4 to Trebinje. It is just one kilometre away from the BH border.

5 Q. This place Brgat, did you expect -- the defenders and you, did you

6 expect an attack coming through this road?

7 A. Yes, an attack was expected. And as I say, from the eastern side,

8 from the Montenegrin area, it had already begun earlier on. And we

9 expected it to spread along this road too, because in fact that is the

10 only road along the Trebinje-Dubrovnik axis. So we were expecting an

11 attack, and as I have already said, there were certain military operations

12 under way, that is to say, several projectiles had already hit when I

13 arrived.

14 Q. And was there also a Croatian defence in Brgat? Do you know that?

15 A. At that point in time when we were there, we didn't notice

16 anything of that kind, any other military units. We just saw the damage

17 that had been done, and the villagers told us that the damage was done

18 during the shelling.

19 Q. Yes. Thank you. That's enough. We don't need the map any more.

20 At that time, did the Croatian authorities or the Croatian

21 population in Dubrovnik region endanger the Serbs in the region?

22 A. No. There was no threat to the Serbs in the region. And let me

23 also say that there's a relatively small percentage of Serbs living in the

24 region. Approximately 5 per cent. And they lived under normal

25 conditions. There were never any incidents on that basis, ethnic.

1 Q. Did they - I mean the Croatian authorities, Croatian population,

2 Croatian defenders - did they pose a threat to the JNA at that time?

3 A. No, no threat whatsoever, and that for two reasons: First of all,

4 because Croatia did not want a war. It wanted to avoid a war at all cost.

5 And it was would be ludicrous that with the forces it had at its disposal

6 that the Dubrovnik defence should engage in any offensive operation

7 whatsoever.

8 Q. Did the Croats shoot or shell into Montenegro or

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you know that?

10 A. I know quite certainly that there was no shelling of that kind.

11 The situation was quite the reverse, as I have described it; from

12 Montenegro into Konavle and from Bosnia-Herzegovina onto Brgat and the

13 Dubrovacka-Zupa area.

14 Q. Had there been any incidents at the border between Croat and Serb

15 or Montenegrin forces? I mean on the 26th, 27th of September.

16 A. At that time in that border region, there were very few of our own

17 forces there to begin with, a few policemen, and they did not open fire at

18 all, nor did they resist any kind of resistance. And at that point in

19 time, the enemy couldn't be seen. He was across the border and was

20 opening fire onto this area here along the border in Konavle.

21 Q. When this shooting and shelling started, did the Croatian

22 population flee their villages along the border?

23 A. From the village of Vitaljina, which is right along the border

24 with Montenegro, the population fled to Dubrovnik or, rather, they had

25 gone to Dubrovnik before we arrived. And on the 26th, when we were in

1 Konavle, people from the other villages had also withdrawn and gone to

2 Grude in large groups, in Konavle, and they were getting ready to move on,

3 to continue their journey towards Dubrovnik, and there were some ten

4 policemen accompanying them.

5 Q. Did the local authorities try to make contact with the JNA to

6 avoid the war at that time? We don't need many details, just a yes or no

7 answer.

8 A. With representatives of the JNA, no, I don't think there was any

9 contact, but the local authorities did contact the local authorities the

10 other side of the border, in Trebinje and in Herceg-Novi.

11 Q. Did the JNA or political authorities that you just mentioned in

12 Serbia or Montenegro, did they make any demands to the authorities of

13 Dubrovnik that could have avoided the war? Did they make any demands,

14 what the people in Dubrovnik should do?

15 A. As far as I know, there were no explicit demands made of any kind,

16 and I can say that mostly they said that matters would quieten down, that

17 everything would be settled and that an attack would not take place. At

18 least, that's how I understood the people who entered into contacts of

19 that kind say.

20 Q. What about the state level in Croatia? Were any demands made in

21 relation to Dubrovnik at that time? I mean, on the state level; Croatia,

22 Yugoslavia. Were any demands made in relation to Dubrovnik that the

23 government of Croatia did not comply with?

24 A. There were no such demands. Had there been, I would certainly

25 have known about them.

1 Q. Why was Dubrovnik attacked? Do you know about that?

2 A. Dubrovnik was attacked within the complex of a general plan of

3 attack on Croatia, which was an expression of Greater Serbian politics.

4 And according to that plan, Yugoslavia was to be re-centralised, or the

5 second variation, which had been completely accepted at that time, was to

6 change the internal borders within Yugoslavia, rather, to push the borders

7 of Serbia further towards the west so that, as they used to say on the

8 Serb side at that time, that all the Serbs would be living in one state,

9 in a single state. So that, by and large, would be the

10 Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line and in that area or, rather, to the east

11 of that area was Dubrovnik, and so within that general operation,

12 Dubrovnik was therefore attacked.

13 The fact that this was part of the plan was testified by Kadijevic

14 himself in a book, in his book, and he explicitly states the units that

15 were to attack Dubrovnik and from which axes, to join up with the forces

16 on the Neretva River and continue their advance towards Split.

17 JUDGE MAY: Now, Mr. Kriste, beyond what is in the Kadijevic book,

18 what are your other sources of knowledge, would you tell us, as to this

19 attack being part of a broader plan.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know, as a man who was active in

21 the sphere of politics before the democratic changes in Croatia and

22 Slovenia, I paid attention to what was going on on the broader Yugoslav

23 level, and these demands for a change in the constitutional order or,

24 rather, with the overthrow of the constitution dating back to 1974, in

25 Serbia, we had clear-cut views, and it was along this line that the

1 leaderships were toppled in Vojvodina and Kosovo and also in Montenegro.

2 The autonomous state of Vojvodina in Kosovo was rescinded. Everything was

3 organised along the lines of mass meetings, mass rallies of allegedly

4 jeopardised Serbs in Kosovo, and rallies of this kind were being organised

5 in Ljubljana --

6 JUDGE MAY: Forgive me interrupting. These, I take it, are

7 matters of general knowledge and part of your experience and conclusions

8 which you've drawn from what happened. But can you help us more

9 particularly as to any particular source of knowledge - anything anybody

10 said to you or any meetings you had or anything of that sort - in which

11 you gained further knowledge that there was such a plan.

12 Do you follow? We need to have specific evidence, if we can, on

13 that sort of topic.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Specific evidence of that kind I do

15 not have. All I can say is that we discussed it at closed government

16 meetings and that similar arguments were put forward, of the type that I

17 have just stated. But a document testifying to that, I did not see.

18 JUDGE MAY: When you say discussed it, this was amongst yourselves

19 on the Croatian side, is that right, that you came to that --

20 A. Yes. Yes, that's correct. That's right.

21 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would just like

23 to put page 135 in the B/C/S version to the witness. It's from the book

24 of Veljko Kadijevic entitled "My View of the Break-up --" "My view of the

25 Break-up, an Army without a State."

1 Q. First of all, Mr. Kriste, did you read that book? You referred to

2 the book. Did you read it?

3 A. Yes, I have read it. I have it here with me, actually.

4 Q. You mean the book? You have the book with you?

5 A. Yes. That's right.

6 Q. Would you please put the English version on the ELMO.

7 On this page, there was a paragraph where General Kadijevic speaks

8 about the creation of a new Yugoslavia made of nations -- up of nations

9 which so desire, and he also refers to the -- how the JNA would assist and

10 the principal ideas in relation to the JNA, and I would like to quote to

11 you:

12 "The task of deploying the JNA in this phase of the war in Croatia

13 was: To protect the Serb people in Croatia in such a way that all regions

14 with a majority Serb population would be completely freed from the

15 presence of the Croatian army and the Croatian authorities; to pull the

16 JNA out of Croatia by first ensuring that the above task was completed; to

17 carry out the continued country-wide transformation of the JNA into the

18 army of the future Yugoslavia, focusing on its internal national and

19 organisational structure and its territorial location."

20 And he further on that same page then writes about the principal

21 ideas, the "total defeat of the Croatian army if the situation so allowed,

22 and certainly to the degree that would enable fulfilment of the set goals;

23 full coordination with the Serb insurgents in the Serbian Krajina;

24 completion of the pull-out from Slovenia of remaining JNA forces; full

25 awareness that the role of the Serb nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be

1 instrumental to the future of the Serb nation at large. The location of

2 JNA forces were to be adjusted accordingly.

3 And actually, at the end of the page, there is the mentioning -- a

4 mentioning. It says: "The directions of offences -- offensives of the

5 main forces of the JNA directly connected to the liberation of Serb

6 regions in Croatia and JNA garrisons deep inside Croatian territory. To

7 this end cut Croatia along the following lines: Gradiska-Virovitica;

8 Bihac-Karlovac-Zagreb; Knin-Zadar; Mostar-Split."

9 And in relation to Dubrovnik, it continues: "At the same time,

10 strong forces from the Herceg Novi-Trebinje region would be used to block

11 Dubrovnik from land and break out into the Neretva valley, thus linking up

12 operations with forces working along the Mostar-Split line."

13 Did you see that the JNA did accordingly, or what did you see

14 happen?

15 A. Well, the JNA did act according to this plan.

16 Q. Thank you. That's enough. Thank you.

17 But let's return to the Dubrovnik region. Was it attacked on the

18 1st October -- the 1st of October, 1991?

19 A. Yes, it was. In the early morning, at around 6.00 a.m., was when

20 the area of Dubrovnik proper was attacked.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I have just overlooked -- we

22 would like to put this as the first exhibit for this witness, and we have

23 not yet an exhibit number, and this would be tab 1.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecutor's Exhibit number 370.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

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1 Q. And did the JNA troops subsequently take over the region around

2 Dubrovnik town?

3 A. The forces of the JNA went around Dubrovnik, blocked it off,

4 encircled it, and almost reached the Neretva River. That is to say, the

5 border with Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Bosnia-Herzegovina comes out onto

6 the sea at a place called Neum from the Dubrovnik side. And I can't tell

7 you about the other axes. But the town itself was heavily shelled already

8 on the first day, that is to say the 1st of October, and in the first

9 onslaught, the power station was destroyed, 11035, via which the Dubrovnik

10 area received its electric power. The waterworks, the water pipelines

11 were also destroyed, and there was an air attack on Srdj and the

12 transmission stations there, so that Dubrovnik was left without any

13 electricity, without any water, without any telephone communication and

14 all other communication as well.

15 Q. Witness -- Mr. Kriste, I do not want to go into all the details of

16 the attack because we have other witnesses to come. Therefore, I would

17 like to just ask a few specific questions in relation to what happened.

18 In which place did actual fighting between -- in this time where

19 you were there, in which places did actual fighting take place between

20 Croatian defenders and the opposing army? Do you know?

21 A. In those first moments of the attack, there was no actual combat,

22 no actual fighting, because it was from the border regions that the JNA

23 and other forces working with it launched a heavy shelling attack on the

24 town itself and other areas from their own territory. So there was no

25 defence because our side did not have the necessary artillery pieces.

1 Later on, when I left Dubrovnik, the attacks were mostly launched on the

2 eastern flank, and our forces put up as much resistance as they could

3 along the axes ranging from Herceg-Novi or, rather, the border with

4 Montenegro towards Dubrovnik.

5 Q. Did fighting take place in Brgat in the beginning of the war? Do

6 you know?

7 A. As far as I know, the fighting took place there somewhat later.

8 Q. To your knowledge, did the JNA suffer severe losses in that time

9 period while you were there until the 5th of October? Do you know?

10 A. No, it did not. It did not suffer heavy losses.

11 Q. During the takeover of the region around Dubrovnik, were Croatian

12 settlements or property deliberately destroyed? Do you know?

13 A. Yes, I do know about that. The Croatian settlements were razed to

14 the ground. Houses were set fire. What was left standing was destroyed

15 by grenades, shells, and the whole area was looted extensively. I was

16 able to see that throughout the region, the region that was under the

17 occupation of the Yugoslav army, once it had withdrawn, immediately after

18 its withdrawal, in Konavle, in Ston, and the Dubrovnik-Primorje area. I

19 was able to see that for myself.

20 Q. During your stay in Dubrovnik in beginning October, was the old

21 town targeted? Just this brief period.

22 A. Not at that time, no.

23 Q. Did you visit Dubrovnik at the end of October together with the

24 president of the SFRY, Mesic?

25 A. I did, yes.

1 Q. And to get to Dubrovnik, did you have to request permission of the

2 JNA command in Belgrade to do so?

3 A. We couldn't get to Dubrovnik because in -- we were blocked in the

4 Mljet canal by the Yugoslav navy, by five or six boats, and we spent the

5 whole day there, trying to negotiate with the command in Belgrade that it

6 allow free passage to the convoy.

7 Q. And who finally allowed your proceeding to Dubrovnik?

8 A. No explicit permission was actually granted because Mr. Mesic, who

9 was formally at that time the commander of the Yugoslav navy, did not

10 manage to get in touch with anyone except with, I think, Admiral Brovet.

11 So after spending a whole day there in the Mljet canal, we left during the

12 night quietly, and we travelled slowly, and in the morning we reached

13 Dubrovnik. So I think there must have been some kind of a tacit

14 permission given, because there were no armed attacks against the convoy.

15 Q. I do not want to go into any details of this visit which lasted

16 only for one day, is that right?

17 A. One day. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. Did you, together with two other members of the Croatian

19 government, go to Dubrovnik again at the end of November 1991 to get

20 involved in negotiations?

21 A. Yes, I did.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

23 put to the witness tab 2 of Exhibit 370. And it is, actually, a decision

24 made of the 30th of November 1991 to send you, Minister Cifric, and

25 Minister Rudolf to Dubrovnik, and it gives also your tasking; that is,

1 establishing and keeping contact with the international organisations,

2 negotiations with the JNA command, organising the return of the temporary

3 immigrated population, and some other tasks. Is that a document that

4 relates to your mission?

5 A. Yes, it is.

6 Q. There is also a reference made to the Crisis Staff, the Crisis

7 Staffs in certain villages, including the town of Dubrovnik. What kind of

8 Crisis Staffs were they? Were these civilian organs, military organs?

9 Can you say?

10 A. Crisis Staffs were civilian organs, and their purpose was, in

11 those exceptionally difficult circumstances, to organise the life of the

12 population and to provide logistic support to the defence forces.

13 Q. In order to get access to Dubrovnik, did you get permission by the

14 JNA command to go there? I mean the headquarters in Belgrade.

15 A. Without such permission, we could not legally enter by naval or

16 ground routes.

17 Q. Who gave the permission? Do you know that? Who in person?

18 A. Admiral Brovet.

19 Q. Did you, on your way to Dubrovnik, did you spend a day in Split

20 and got involved in negotiations between the Split authorities and the

21 commander of the JNA military naval district, General Nikola Mladjenevic

22 [phoen]?

23 A. Yes, yes, we did. Mladenic, I think his name was.

24 Q. And these negotiations, were they related to the withdrawal of the

25 JNA from the region, and what was it?

1 A. Yes, they were related to the withdrawal of the navy and the JNA

2 from the Split area, from Lora harbour, of the navy in the immediate

3 vicinity of Split, and on the return of the weapons of the Territorial

4 Defence. So these two issues were linked together in those negotiations.

5 Q. And was an agreement reached?

6 A. Yes, it was.

7 Q. After your arrival in Dubrovnik, did you attend negotiations on

8 the 5th of December in Cavtat?

9 A. I did.

10 Q. Besides you and the other two ministers, Croatian ministers, who

11 was present?

12 A. Admiral Jokic and Captain -- Frigate Captain Sofronije Jeremic.

13 Q. In what capacity did Admiral Jokic take part?

14 A. In the capacity of a representative of the Supreme Command.

15 Q. Did he say that?

16 A. That is how we had prepared the agreement, and also the agreement

17 that we signed, both in the signature and the heading, it says that the

18 negotiations are being conducted between the Croatian government and the

19 Supreme Command, represented by Admiral Jokic.

20 Q. What function did Captain Jeremic have, and did he actually get

21 very much involved?

22 A. Jeremic.

23 Q. Did he actually participate much in the negotiations?

24 A. He did not participate. He was just physically present at the

25 meeting.

1 Q. What did your delegation request? And how -- can you describe how

2 the negotiations went.

3 A. We requested, first of all, that there should be a serious truce.

4 Then we requested the lifting of the blockade of Dubrovnik and the Gruz

5 harbour. Then we also requested that the JNA allow electricity and water

6 supply systems to be repaired so that the population - and there were

7 about 40.000 inhabitants at the time - could receive power and water. And

8 generally, we wanted to supply the population -- to ensure for the

9 population of the city somewhat better conditions of life.

10 Q. How did General Jokic respond to this? What did he say?

11 A. General Jokic said that we could discuss this as well as the

12 possible withdrawal of the JNA to some more distant positions only on

13 condition if Dubrovnik was freed of all our forces. And he said there

14 were 15.000 such forces and described them as Ustashas and mercenaries.

15 Q. How did you respond to this? Can you tell us about the exchange

16 that you had with Jokic.

17 A. Of course we could not accept such a request. First of all, there

18 were no such forces in Dubrovnik. And secondly, the withdrawal of our

19 forces would mean allowing free passage for the JNA into Dubrovnik. That

20 is why we said that in Dubrovnik there really weren't 15.000 armed men but

21 that there were 5.000 well-armed men who were ready for battle, that these

22 certainly were no Ustashas or mercenaries but mostly citizens of Dubrovnik

23 who were prepared to defend their city and Croatia; that we would not pull

24 out those forces because we cannot do that because in that case, the

25 Yugoslav army would immediately enter Dubrovnik. The admiral angrily

1 responded, asking us don't we trust the word of honour of a Yugoslav

2 senior officer. Our answer was no, because a short while ago, we had had

3 a similar case. At previous negotiations, which were attended by

4 representatives of the local authorities in Mocici near Cilipi, the

5 Dubrovnik airport, the JNA had promised that it would not move forward its

6 lines towards Dubrovnik but that it certainly wouldn't enter Cavtat. And

7 as soon as our negotiators had left - they hadn't even left Cavtat to

8 reach Dubrovnik - when the Yugoslav People's Army walked into Cavtat.

9 Jokic stopped for a moment, but then he asked another question:

10 "Do you think that the Yugoslav People's Army doesn't have the strength in

11 spite of the forces you have in town to capture the town and place it

12 fully under its control?" Our answer was: "Yes. Your forces are far

13 superior, and in the final analysis, you could achieve that. But as long

14 as our forces are there, you wouldn't do that, for two reasons: First of

15 all, you would have to destroy the town itself, and you won't do that

16 because, after all, you are afraid of the reaction of international public

17 opinion. And secondly, you would have to count on every street and every

18 destroyed building being turned into a bunker, and you would have very

19 heavy losses in manpower, and you can't do that on account of your own

20 public opinion. And that is why, for as long as the defenders are in

21 town, we can be sure that you won't enter it."

22 After that, he made a short break and then he made various

23 suggestions to us, various options; that our forces should be formally

24 disarmed, that we take -- that this be recorded, that they needed that for

25 their own public, and then that those same forces could return to

1 Dubrovnik via a route that was still operational across the islands of

2 Dubrovnik, and then that we should issue a joint declaration in which we

3 would say that we would disarm and withdraw our forces, which would

4 unpublished in Serbia and Montenegro to appease public opinion there,

5 which of course we couldn't accept because we realised that these were

6 tricks.

7 Finally --

8 Q. Let me interrupt you. You mention -- what you just described, his

9 suggestion, is that more or less a sort of fake withdrawal so that the JNA

10 wouldn't lose its face, or what does it mean?

11 A. Yes, approximately that is what it meant. The JNA, because of its

12 own public opinion - that is what he told us - cannot make concessions to

13 our side without achieving its main goal, and that was the withdrawal and

14 disarming, complete disarming, of our forces and their departure from

15 Dubrovnik. They couldn't do this because of their own public opinion, and

16 that is why he made these propositions which we realised or understood as

17 being a trick, actually a fake withdrawal.

18 Q. And one more question: You mentioned 5.000 people that could

19 fight the JNA in the town. Did you actually have 5.000 people or why did

20 you say it?

21 A. We didn't have that many people. We had a far smaller figure,

22 around 300, maybe 400, up to 500 men perhaps. But we had to mention this

23 figure because if we were to reveal the true state of affairs, the army

24 would have no reason to negotiate with us but would -- could simply enter

25 the town. We were actually negotiators of the Croatian government rather

1 than informers for the JNA, so we didn't provide accurate figures.

2 Q. Was an agreement reached, finally, on that day?

3 A. Yes, an agreement was reached which we considered to be quite

4 favourable, because the regime of the sailing of ships in and out of the

5 Gruz harbour was improved, and also the repair of electricity and water

6 supply systems was envisaged as well as the road to Cavtat, which had been

7 completely closed for the past two months.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

9 put to the witness an exhibit that is already tendered in evidence and was

10 used --

11 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, before removing the previous

12 exhibit, which is tab 2, I wonder if the witness is able to tell us who is

13 Dr. Franjo Greguric who is referred to as president at the end of the

14 document. Second page. Was he the president of the government of the

15 Republic of Croatia?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. He was the president of

17 the government of the Republic of Croatia.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

20 Q. In relation to this document that is now in front of you, this is

21 actually the agreement signed on the 7th of December, 1991. But if you

22 look at the agreement, at the articles in this agreement, was that

23 actually the state of affairs that you had reached on the 5th?

24 A. Yes. Actually, it was the agreement reached on the 5th. All

25 these points had been agreed on the 5th of December. However, at the end

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1 of the discussion on the 5th of December, Mr. Jokic did not wish to sign

2 this document, claiming that he doesn't have the authority to do so from

3 the superior command and that he needed consultations, and that is why he

4 proposed that we meet again the next day to sign the document.

5 Q. Yes. Thank you.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: You can leave the document for a while with

7 the witness.

8 Q. What -- on the -- when you returned, when you returned to

9 Dubrovnik, on your way to Dubrovnik, did you actually think now an

10 agreement is reached and the war would be over in Dubrovnik?

11 A. We were satisfied with the contents of the agreement reached.

12 However, we were concerned that Mr. Jokic had not signed the agreement.

13 Nonetheless, we reckoned that the following day the agreement would indeed

14 be signed and that thereby far more favourable conditions of life would be

15 ensured for the population of Dubrovnik.

16 Q. When you came back to Dubrovnik, did you have a conversation with

17 Colonel Marinovic; and what did he tell you?

18 A. Returning to Dubrovnik, we informed the local leadership and

19 Commander Marinovic as to what we agreed, and we reported to him on the

20 meeting in Cavtat. Mr. Marinovic did not share our optimism, and he

21 informed us that, during the day, movements of the Yugoslav army had been

22 observed at Bosanka and Zarkovica and that he feared that an attack would

23 be launched. This certainly affected us too so that our optimism suddenly

24 declined.

25 Q. On the 6th of December, did an attack on Dubrovnik occur starting

1 with an attack on the Croatian position on Mount Srdj very early in the

2 morning?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did you observe what was going on from the Hotel Argentina?

5 A. From the Hotel Argentina, already around 6.00 when the attack

6 started, we could see that the Srdj fortress overlooking the city, that

7 firing with artillery weapons was being done and that tanks were on the

8 move. A little later, the fire moved towards the town itself, including

9 the hotel that we were in, but especially the fire was targeting the old

10 city nucleus.

11 Q. While this was ongoing, were you in contact with Commander

12 Marinovic, Colonel Marinovic?

13 A. Yes, we were. We had contact with Colonel Marinovic.

14 Q. Did Colonel Marinovic try to assist his men on Mount Srdj by

15 firing from any position within the town and, if so, do you know where the

16 position was?

17 A. Mr. Marinovic informed us that an attack by strong forces of the

18 Yugoslav People's Army was being launched against the Srdj fortress and

19 that the crew could not prevail without support, and he said that he would

20 assist from positions in the still unoccupied part of the Dubrovnik area.

21 The exact deployment of those mortar batteries that our defence had at its

22 disposal I am not familiar with, but I do know that in the old town itself

23 and its immediate vicinity, there were no artillery weapons nor any

24 military installations or facilities.

25 Q. When did the shelling of the old town start and what did he end?

1 Do you know that?

2 A. The shelling of the old town started around 7.00, and it lasted

3 intensively up until 1.00 p.m., and then it resumed early evening but of

4 lesser intensity.

5 Q. Are you in possession of a tape showing this shelling, actually a

6 tape made from the Hotel Argentina?

7 A. Yes, I am. I have this tape, and the shelling of Dubrovnik was

8 filmed by an amateur, a receptionist at the Hotel Argentina, so I was able

9 to see him filming it. Actually, the filming was done from the same

10 position from which we were observing what was going on in town. Of

11 course, what can be seen on film, on tape, is not as impressive as what we

12 saw with our own eyes, because this went on all day and projectiles of

13 various types flew over our heads.

14 Q. How did you receive the tape and what else is on the tape besides

15 this, what the amateur filmer made?

16 A. On this tape, in addition to the shelling of the town on the 6th

17 of December 1991, there is footage also of the town after the shelling,

18 filmed the next day - that is on the 7th of December, 1991 - and also a

19 few clips from Television Belgrade and Television Montenegro's programmes.

20 The shots of the appearance of the town after the shelling were

21 taken by this same amateur, and the footage from Television Belgrade and

22 Montenegro were something that he added on to his own tape, and these were

23 broadcast on the 7th of December on Croatian television, namely, Croatian

24 television received the signals of Belgrade television and Montenegro

25 television and taped some of their programmes and then rebroadcast them in

1 a programme called TV Isbor or TV Selection, and this programme was aired

2 on the 7th of December, 1991.

3 Q. And how did you get the tape? Who gave it to you?

4 A. I was given this tape as a gift by a policeman of ours who was in

5 our escort while we were in Dubrovnik.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the witness has actually

7 provided this tape to us and we have it here as tab 3, and a transcript of

8 parts that we would like to play, the transcripts belong to this tab 3.

9 The tape as such is quite long. It's 45 minutes or even more than that.

10 We only want to use five minutes of it. Not the damage part but about

11 three minutes of the actual shelling observed from the Hotel Argentina and

12 a few clips of what was said on the TV in Belgrade and on the TV in

13 Montenegro. Altogether, it's approximately five minutes, and I wonder

14 whether we should play it before the break or after.

15 JUDGE MAY: If it's ready to be played, we'll play it now. If

16 not, we'll take the break.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It is ready.

18 JUDGE MAY: Very well, we'll play it now.

19 [Videotape played]

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21 Q. Witness --

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, they made small breaks between

23 the sequences that are on the tape.

24 Q. That would be your view? That would have been your view,

25 Mr. Kriste?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you know what is burning there?

3 A. Probably cars that were parked on the corner. And now these are

4 boats burning.

5 Q. Is that actually the boat that you were using for the

6 negotiations?

7 A. One of the two boats was used to go to the negotiations the

8 previous day, to Cavtat.

9 You can hear the explosions.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, you can see here the time.

11 Q. Is that the time actually the tape -- the time that we saw on the

12 tape, was that the time when it was filmed?

13 A. Yes.

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We would now have to hear the voice. You

15 have --

16 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "And you are clearing the way for

17 those who are 20 to 30 kilometres ahead of you. Have you been doing it

18 successfully?

19 "Well, successfully. So far, quite successfully. You can see

20 yourself how fast we have gone through it. We hope that we are going to

21 be even faster. Now we have taken this territory, next week we are maybe

22 going to take some other territory.

23 "At the same time, we have reliable information that Ustasha

24 formations, especially foreign mercenaries who don't care about Dubrovnik,

25 are preparing the scenario of its destruction in order to accuse the JNA

1 of that act of vandalism. It is being reported in a communique from the

2 information service of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence.

3 "Because the needs of both the current and the possible future

4 tasks require stronger concentration of forces, mainly of means of support

5 and artillery means, in order for our soldiers, through the use of

6 artillery, to be exposed as little as possible during the operations

7 regarding the taking over of particular buildings and the breaking of ZNG

8 and MUP forces on the lines used by units.

9 "All information presented to our public regarding the JNA using

10 artillery on Dubrovnik is not true and is pure fabrication. It is being

11 reported in a communique of the information service of the Military-Naval

12 Sector Boka. In its operations carried out so far, the JNA has not fired

13 a single shell on Dubrovnik.

14 "It has been reported that Dubrovnik suffered damages. Is that

15 true?

16 "Reports that Dubrovnik was shelled or damaged or hit are not

17 true.

18 "Are they trying to mine the old town or a part of the old town?

19 "That is part of the scenario they have been preparing since the

20 beginning and which is now being carried out. While they were trying to

21 accuse the JNA of not respecting cultural monuments nor world cultural

22 heritage which the old town of Dubrovnik represents. They were and still

23 are preparing mines in the old town itself which they later activate, and

24 they then give reports that the JNA is hitting the old town.

25 "There are another two kilometres to Dubrovnik from here. That

1 means that we are almost in Dubrovnik.

2 "Behind the hill. From there you can see Dubrovnik. We have

3 stopped here. We won't go further. But if they continue to open fire

4 from their side, then we're going to go further. But they are encircled

5 from the other side and all around Dubrovnik so that their MUP members are

6 surrounded and they have nowhere to go. We are now just waiting for the

7 order to advance towards them in order to disarm them."

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: So that's the tape. Thank you, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE MAY: Very well. That's a convenient moment. We will

10 adjourn now.

11 Mr. Kriste, in this adjournment and any others there may be, could

12 you remember not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over,

13 and that does include the members of the Prosecution team. Could you be

14 back, please, in twenty minutes.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour.

16 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

19 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, let me get back to the question I

20 asked during the first session. I couldn't follow, frankly, the answer of

21 the accused. Was Mr. Greguric another name for Mr. Tudjman? The witness

22 said that Mr. Greguric was the president of Croatia.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, of the government, not --

24 JUDGE KWON: Of the government. At the end of the tab, Greguric

25 is the president of government. It's different from the president of

1 Republic of Croatia. Could you explain, please.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Greguric was the

3 Prime Minister. He wasn't the president of the state. And that is not

4 another name for Mr. Tudjman, no.

5 JUDGE KWON: That seems to tell all. Thank you.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

7 Q. Mr. Kriste, given the limited -- the technical limitations of --

8 in this courtroom, in the original tape that is now also as a copy with

9 Your Honours, could you actually see the shells hitting, coming in, flying

10 in and hitting the buildings on the original tape?

11 A. Yes, you could see them.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, you couldn't see it here in the

13 courtroom, but if you review the tape, it's very visible.

14 Q. And from where did the shells come in? Who was doing it? I mean,

15 land forces, sea forces, air? Who did it?

16 A. On that particular day, the ground forces were taking part as well

17 as the navy, but predominantly it was the ground forces from the land.

18 Q. And we heard, in the comments from the -- from officers, there was

19 one allegation made by one of the officers and he said on the TV that the

20 Dubrovnik representatives would prepare mines that they would activate and

21 then report it as shells from the JNA. Did that happen? Was that done?

22 A. That is a pure fabrication and part of the propaganda which was

23 supposed to justify what the JNA did in Dubrovnik.

24 Q. To your knowledge, were tyres burned to give the impression that

25 the town was burning, or was it actually burning?

1 A. It was actually burning. And on that particular day, nine houses

2 were completely burnt down to the ground, and about 600 projectiles of

3 different sorts fell on the town. Tyres were not burnt, however, tens of

4 cars were on fire, parked behind the city calls, and as the cars were on

5 fire, of course their tyres had to be burning as well. And the cars were

6 set on fire with the shells that fell.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

8 put to the witness tab 4 of the Exhibit 370, and that's actually a map

9 showing the old town.

10 Q. Witness, this kind of map -- are you familiar with this map, and

11 can you tell us who produced the map?

12 A. Yes, I am familiar with this map. I have a copy of it. And it

13 was compiled by the expert services of the municipality of Dubrovnik in

14 cooperation with the corresponding UNESCO services.

15 Q. You mentioned that nine buildings were totally destroyed. Are

16 they indicated with this total black -- could you maybe point, use the

17 pointer and show us how they are indicated on this map.

18 A. These buildings are marked in black on this particular map.

19 Q. And these other little triangles, what does this indicate?

20 A. They are the hits, direct hits with different projectiles. It

21 ranges -- there are dots and triangles. I'm not quite sure what the

22 difference is between the dots and the triangles, but on my copy of the

23 map, all the direct hits are marked with dots. So they were probably

24 direct hits and the damages caused by indirect hits. I don't know. I

25 can't really say.

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1 Q. That's actually --

2 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, why don't ask you the

3 interpreters to translate the legend for us. Show them first.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Could the interpreters just tell us

5 what the dots and the triangles mean. You should -- actually, I just --

6 I'm just told that you have a translation, and I also overlooked it. We

7 have a translation, actually, given --

8 JUDGE KWON: I found it.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Also I overlooked it. We actually have

10 the explanation what the legend means. So, yes. I think that --

11 Q. Witness, I want to ask you one more thing in relation to this map.

12 Could you indicate on this map where the car parks -- where the car parks

13 were that you just mentioned that cars outside were burning. Could you

14 point out where the car parks would be.

15 A. The car parks would be on the northern side of the ramparts, of

16 the wall, in this area here. There are several parking spaces, parking

17 lots, and they're all interconnected, and it's this general area here and

18 here.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The witness is pointing --

20 A. On the outer side of the wall.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The witness was pointing at the top of the

22 map where there are square -- square places behind the walls, on the other

23 side of the walls.

24 Q. Yes. Thank you. In addition --

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's enough. Thank you.

1 Q. How many -- how many people were killed on that day? Do you know

2 that?

3 A. Nineteen civilians were killed and about 60 others were wounded.

4 Q. In addition to the old town, were residential areas also targeted,

5 in particular hotels with refugees?

6 A. Yes, that's right. They were targeted. Actually, the whole of

7 the town was targeted. It was shelled all over, both residential

8 buildings and hotels in which the refugees had been put up. And there

9 were about 15.000 of them altogether in Dubrovnik.

10 Q. Were any military targets or positions in the old town on that

11 day? Did you see any outgoing fire from the old town?

12 A. No, not from the old town. There wasn't a return of fire, any

13 outgoing fire from the old town. And not only the old town but in the

14 immediate vicinity of the ramparts, the walls. And we, from the hotels,

15 were not able to see any point from which they opened fire, from which

16 there was a return of fire. And of course, you can see the old town quite

17 well from the hotel where we were put up.

18 Q. Did the Croatian side provoke the shelling in the first place?

19 A. No. The Croatian side did not provoke any shelling. Quite the

20 reverse; the Croatian side expected a secret truce to be signed and the

21 agreement that we had agreed upon on the previous day in Cavtat.

22 Q. While the shelling took place, did you reach Admiral Jokic on

23 several occasions?

24 A. Yes. As soon as the shelling started, we tried to get into

25 contact with Admiral Jokic. However, we weren't able to reach him to

1 begin with, and then later on, with the help of a satellite telephone, we

2 were able to set up connection with him and able to talk to him on several

3 occasions.

4 Q. When did you speak to him for the first time and what did he say?

5 A. We spoke to him for the first time somewhere after 8.00 and he

6 first said that there was no shelling, that he didn't know about any

7 shelling.

8 On the second occasion, which took place half an hour or an hour

9 later, he said that he did know that there were clashes going on but that

10 it was our side which was to blame because it had attacked the JNA units

11 in the Zarkovica and Bosanka area. We relayed this on, and we, of course,

12 said that that was not true.

13 On the third occasion, he admitted that there had indeed been an

14 unfortunate incident, as he put it, and he apologised for it, claiming

15 that it wasn't his order that led up to it.

16 Q. After that third telephone call, when was it approximately?

17 A. Well, it could have been sometime around 12.00 or a little after

18 12.00. Between 12.00 and 1.00. I can't give you an exact time, but it

19 was after 12.00.

20 Q. Did you believe what he said, that he didn't order it?

21 A. No, we didn't, of course, believe him, because an operation of

22 that sort cannot be conducted by anybody, any subordinate, on their own

23 bat. It could only have come from the Supreme Command, which was embodied

24 in the person of Admiral Jokic.

25 Q. And when -- when he said that he didn't order it, did he promise

1 to stop it or did you talk about how to stop it?

2 A. Yes. And we agreed, first of all, that the cease-fire would take

3 place at 11.00. However, even after 11.00, there was still shooting until

4 dusk, although it is true that, after 1.00 p.m. in the afternoon, it was

5 of lesser intensity.

6 Q. And do you know where Admiral Jokic was when you reached him in

7 the morning on these three occasions?

8 A. We assumed that he was somewhere in the Bay of Kotor, but I don't

9 know the exact location.

10 Q. Did you try to reach him in Kotor? Is that where you tried to

11 find him, or why do you think he was there?

12 A. We tried to reach him in Kumbor, in Herceg-Novi and all these

13 other places, I think in Kotor, the town of Kotor as well. Now, where we

14 actually found him, I can't say, or where he contacted us from, I really

15 don't know.

16 Q. Did you try to reach him another time after the shelling

17 continued? You said on the third occasion you actually expected it to

18 stop. Did you try to reach him another time?

19 A. We received later on, sometime around 2.00, 1400 hours, a

20 radiogram, in fact, in which Jokic informed us about the fact that an

21 attack had taken place contrary to their own will, and he apologises and

22 says that General Kadijevic had ordered an investigation into the whole

23 matter. And he also said that during -- in the course of the afternoon,

24 he would have to travel to Belgrade so that we would not be able to have a

25 meeting, the meeting that had been arranged in the course of the morning

1 for that particular day. But we couldn't bring about the meeting because

2 of the continuous bombardment.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Could the Exhibit 361, tab 45, please be put

4 to the witness. It's already in evidence.

5 Q. Witness, is this the fax message that you were talking about? And

6 it's actually in English language. Do we have a B/C/S? No? Okay. Maybe

7 we put it on the ELMO. It's --

8 Do you recall that it was a message in English?

9 A. I think we received this fax in Croatian. I had the text of this

10 fax in Croatian. I don't know whether the original might have been in

11 English or not and then translated, but I had the Croatian version myself.

12 But I do recognise it. Yes, I recognise the document.

13 Q. Can we put it on the ELMO, and could the translation -- the

14 translation booth just read the first paragraph message, starting with,

15 "Your Excellency," so that the witness can confirm it.

16 THE INTERPRETER: "Your Excellency, I express my sincere regret

17 for the difficult and unfortunate situation that has been created. This

18 was not our order, neither was it close to my sanity to opt -- to act like

19 this. General Kadijevic has sent a message to you and the ECMM in

20 Dubrovnik on undertaking energetic investigation on our responsibility and

21 the guilty ones for this event. At the same time, we expect to find out

22 the responsibilities on your side for the sake of a thorough clarification

23 of all circumstances in regard with the events from last night and this

24 morning. General Kadijevic has invited me to Belgrade at 1400 hours, so

25 today I will not be able to continue the negotiations with you. I suggest

1 the following..."

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. We can stop here.

3 Q. Is that what you received?

4 A. Yes. Yes. That is the content.

5 Q. Are you -- are you aware whether an investigation actually took

6 place and whether any officers were ever charged or disciplined for any

7 unauthorised actions in Dubrovnik?

8 A. I don't know that anybody was charged or disciplined because of

9 that.

10 Q. And after receiving this fax, I understand from your statement the

11 shelling continued but to a lesser extent?

12 A. That's right, yes. The shelling continued, and you can see that

13 from the footage. It went right on until 1600 hours, when it became dark,

14 and that's when the shelling stopped. But the buildings were still on

15 fire.

16 Q. We have already now seen the document the agreement of the 7th of

17 December, 1991. Were the same persons present, that is you - the three

18 ministers - and Admiral Jokic and Jeremic?

19 A. That's right, yes. The same persons on both sides.

20 Q. And did you protest against the shelling, or anyone else?

21 A. At the beginning of our talks, the representative of the observer

22 -- European observer mission protested. And after that, we launched our

23 protest, too.

24 Q. And what was Admiral Jokic's reply?

25 A. Admiral Jokic repeated what he had said the previous day; that he

1 was sorry that the event had taken place but that it was not pursuant to

2 any order of his. And he also informed us that on the previous day, he

3 had been to Belgrade where he had talks with Mr. Kadijevic and that during

4 the night, the representatives of all the western embassies had lodged

5 their protests with the Supreme Command because of the bombardment of

6 Dubrovnik and that, for that reason, Mr. Kadijevic was very angry himself.

7 Q. And this agreement, then, was signed in the way as it was already

8 agreed upon on the 5th; is that correct?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. Did the JNA film the damage done to the old down the following

11 day? Do you know that?

12 A. I do know about that. At the end of this conversation, the talks

13 we had with -- on the 7th of December, Mr. Jokic asked us to secure a

14 television crew of three or four persons which would come to Dubrovnik to

15 convince themselves of the damage that had been done and that was talked

16 about, so that that could serve as evidence in the investigation to be

17 conducted by General Kadijevic. And indeed, they came the next day. I

18 didn't meet them, but I do know that the crew did come and did film the

19 damages around town.

20 Q. The agreement of the 7th, was it complied with? Did the shelling

21 then stop?

22 A. On the 7th, there was no shelling already on the 7th, and for

23 quite a long time there was relative calm in Dubrovnik. It was only

24 later, in 1992, that there was shelling on several occasions once again.

25 Q. When did the JNA, or then the VJ, withdraw from the region?

1 A. I think it was in June or July that the JNA withdrew, but I'd have

2 to check that out. But they withdrew from the western part of the

3 municipality and reached Cavtat, the vicinity of Cavtat, and they stayed

4 there until the middle of October 1992. They finally left the entire

5 Dubrovnik region in October 1992.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, these are the questions that

7 the Prosecution has.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

10 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kriste, at the beginning of your

11 examination-in-chief, you explained how you became the Defence Minister of

12 the Republic of Croatia after the elections in 1990, and you said that

13 because of the development of democracy, it was decided that the Minister

14 of Defence should be a civilian. How was that possible that the

15 development of democracy lasted for such a brief period of time, just

16 several months, and then General Spegelj was appointed to that post

17 nonetheless later on?

18 A. I have already said that in August 1990, there was a rebellion on

19 the part of the Serbs in Croatia and that it was a large rebellion, and

20 then it was assessed that it wouldn't progress as smoothly as we thought

21 without clashes and conflict as we had expected at the beginning, right

22 after the democratic elections had taken place. So the rebellion had --

23 was on such a broad scale that already at the beginning over 25 per cent

24 of Croatian territory was outside the control of the Croatian authorities,

25 and we expected that the rebellion would spread, of course with the

1 support of the JNA and Serbia.

2 Q. And what was the reason for that rebellion? You mentioned the

3 events in Knin and the barricades that had been set up. So what came

4 prior to those events? What happened before that?

5 A. What happened before that were rallies that were held in Knin in

6 1989, as early on as that, and then at the beginning of 1990 as well. And

7 they followed the pattern of the same types of rallies that were held in

8 Vojvodina and Montenegro at which slogans were being shouted out, saying,

9 "This is Serbia," and, "Give us arms."

10 Q. All right. And tell me, if that is so, if the rallies were of

11 this nature, for example, in that area, Lika, Banja, Kordun, in that

12 general region and so forth, the region -- and you considered them to be

13 nationalistic, did you not?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. How, then, was it possible in that region with very few examples

16 of four municipalities, the Serb population had a majority vote for

17 Racan's party, the SK of Croatia, the League of Communists of Croatia, and

18 it later on changed it name. You know the election results, you're aware

19 of them. And in Western and Eastern Slavonia, the vast majority voted for

20 that particular party and 21 Serbs became members of the Croatian Sabor or

21 parliament?

22 A. Well, this was a well thought out, organised activity, directed

23 from Serbia and which endeavoured in every possible way to turn the

24 Croatian Serbs against the newly established authorities that were

25 proclaimed -- they proclaimed it to be Ustasha authorities without any

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1 reason at all.

2 Q. All right. Was there any reason for the Serbs to be upset in view

3 to the -- with regard to the events that took place, the log revolution

4 that came before? Do you know anything about how the Serbs were excluded

5 from the constitution of Croatia as a constituent peoples? I'm sure you

6 know about this, you're aware of that; you were a minister in the

7 government. So do you happen to know that an order was issued to disarm

8 the police stations, the majority of which were Serbs? Because the

9 majority population in those areas were indeed Serb so it was quite

10 logical for the policemen in those places to be Serb policemen too. Was

11 there good reason for them to be upset and afraid?

12 A. Well, there weren't any serious reasons for them to be upset. The

13 truth is that there were changes to the constitution, in the formulations

14 of the constitution, but the Serbs did not substantially lose anything.

15 In fact, according to the new constitution, they were treated first and

16 foremost as a national minority, which -- or, rather, just like all the

17 other parts of the population living in Croatia, as is defined in the

18 legal systems of other countries as well. And they were also guaranteed a

19 high level of autonomy in the local community.

20 Now, as far as disarmament is concerned, the disarmament of the

21 police stations, what I can say on that score is the following: The

22 police stations in those municipalities were not disarmed. The surplus

23 weaponry was taken away from those police stations and was taken over by

24 the Ministry of the Interior. And the police -- the Serbs in the police

25 were not in the majority in those particular municipalities, and in the

1 Internal Affairs Ministry too there were far more Serbs. That is to say

2 the ratio of Serbs was greater than the ratio of Serbs in the population

3 of Croatia. And I can also say that the same situation was reflected in

4 the Ministry of Defence. In the Ministry of Defence itself, when I

5 arrived, I found 48 per cent Croats there, working there, and out of the

6 total population the Croats make up 79 per cent. At that time, they made

7 up 79 per cent of the total number of inhabitants. There were 32 Serbs,

8 and the other 12 per cent were declared as Yugoslavs, and nothing happened

9 to any of these people.

10 Q. And do you know anything about the dismissal of Serbs from the

11 police, from the public administration, even health institutions, en

12 masse? Do you know anything about that?

13 A. Serbs in Croatia, while Yugoslavia lasted, was over-represented,

14 as I have just illustrated with this example from the Ministry of Defence.

15 And the situation was similar in the Ministry of Interior. However -- so

16 some changes were necessary. And I personally believed that the balancing

17 of the national composition of the employed with the composition of the

18 population should be done gradually. The ministry should have been

19 expanded with the employment of new staff and then things would be brought

20 into harmony. But in some cases, different measures were taken and there

21 were some rhetorical remarks that were not acceptable. But all of this

22 could not have been a reason for the Serb rebellion. It was just a

23 mitigating circumstance that helped the Serbian police to win over as many

24 Serbs as possible for the uprising.

25 Q. And did the Republic of Serbia have any influence over the

1 structure of the police, the public administration, the Defence Ministry

2 that you inherited from your predecessor after the change of government?

3 Did Serbia have any influence over that situation or was that the normal

4 order of things in the Republic of Croatia up until then?

5 A. Serbia did not have any direct influence, but the overall

6 situation in Yugoslavia was such that the Serbs were preferred and that

7 via facti they were over-represented everywhere; in the economy, in the

8 health service, in the administration, and especially in the sensitive

9 areas such as the defence and the police.

10 Q. Who preferred them, as you put it?

11 A. The overall climate that prevailed in Yugoslavia at the time in

12 which Serbia dominated.

13 Q. And so you're claiming that Serbia dominated in Yugoslavia up

14 until 1990.

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. And do you know that for several decades since the war there was

17 only one president of the federal government or the federal executive

18 council who was from Serbia, whereas throughout the rest of the period

19 they were mostly from Croatia and also some from Bosnia?

20 A. Key positions in the army, the police, in financial institutions

21 that were all concentrated in Belgrade were nevertheless held by Serbs.

22 Now, whether there were more Prime Ministers from one or other republic, I

23 would not be able to say.

24 Q. And these key institutions that you are referring to were located

25 in Belgrade, I assume, because Belgrade was the capital of Yugoslavia and

1 that's where the federal government was based, the central bank was based

2 there, and all the other ministries were based there. And do you know

3 that the structure of the federal government, the composition, and of the

4 central bank and other key institutions mostly reflected the structure --

5 the ethnic structure of the population of Yugoslavia at the time?

6 A. The top leadership mostly, yes, but the key operational positions

7 were held by people from Serbia. And even the Presidency of Yugoslavia,

8 which consisted of eight members representing the republics and the

9 provinces, it operated in that way only briefly. And after you took over

10 power in Serbia, then something very strange happened. You revised the

11 constitution, abolishing in fact the autonomy of the provinces of

12 Vojvodina and Kosovo but you retained the representatives of those

13 provinces in the Presidency and in other federal bodies. Similarly, by

14 overthrowing the legally elected government in Montenegro, you acquired a

15 fourth representative. So out of the total of eight members of the

16 Presidency, Serbia actually controlled four.

17 Q. And did Serbia take part in the changes of government in

18 Montenegro at the time?

19 A. It must have.

20 Q. Well, who, for instance?

21 A. It is well known how the change of government occurred in

22 Montenegro. The so-called endangered Serbs from Kosovo travelled like a

23 circus around Yugoslavia, organised rallies, street demonstrations, and

24 provoked dissatisfaction; and in doing so, they were undermining the

25 government. Obviously, they couldn't do that on their own, that this was

1 organised by the secret services, because tens of thousands of people

2 cannot be moved by one person, nor can they do it spontaneously. And

3 behind all that was Serbia's policy.

4 Q. How do you know all that? On what ground are you claiming that?

5 Do you have any data, any information?

6 A. You never certified a statement to that effect but that was quite

7 obvious. You didn't do anything to stop this wave of rallies across

8 Yugoslavia, but instead you supported it. And when such a rally was

9 scheduled in Ljubljana and on the way back it was due to be held in

10 Zagreb, and when the Slovenian government prohibited such a rally, the

11 Serbian government broke off all economic relations with Slovenia and

12 Croatia. Actually, it started a merciless economic war in which it

13 completely destroyed the unified Yugoslav market, the monetary system, the

14 customs system. So all this happened even before the outbreak of the war

15 in response merely to this decision to prohibit the rally. It caused real

16 chaos in the Yugoslav economy.

17 Q. Don't you remember to what extent the Serbs were endangered in

18 those days? Do you know that 40.000 left Kosovo under pressure and threat

19 and murders and torchings only in the period between 1980 and 1990, and

20 that they were protesting why no one was protecting -- protesting why no

21 one was protecting them. And they appealed for understanding from all the

22 other Yugoslav peoples for the suffering they were exposed to and for the

23 pressure and terror that they were suffering. Don't you remember that?

24 A. I do remember how all that looked in Yugoslavia in those years. I

25 know what I have said, that you say 40.000 were expelled. Forty thousand

1 people cannot be spontaneously organised. And what were they to do in

2 Novi Sad, Titograd, Ljubljana, Zagreb? Nothing else than what they did

3 do, that is, to cause disorder which was meant to undermine the existing

4 authorities and bring to power your supporters.

5 Q. Don't you know that there were only a hundred, couple of hundred

6 of them who went to other parts of the country to inform the people and

7 the authorities of the terrible conditions under which they were living

8 and to appeal for them -- to them for solidarity. There was no violence,

9 as you know. No one was hurt. Even the newspapers reported that not a

10 single flower was trampled upon in those demonstrations and rallies.

11 These were rallies of solidarity with those who were suffering in Kosovo.

12 Don't you remember that?

13 A. I remember that as part of Serbian propaganda.

14 Q. Very well, Mr. Kriste. I see that you have your stereotype

15 opinion in that respect, which is not really customary for an intellectual

16 who I see has published two books here.

17 JUDGE MAY: Now, Mr. Milosevic, let us refrain from these sort of

18 comments. It's not going to take us any further. Yes.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Tell me, please -- we'll come to that. You quoted here from

21 Kadijevic's book. You said that you have it. True enough, it wasn't you

22 that quoted from it, it was the lady opposite who quoted from it.

23 A. I have the book here on me.

24 Q. And what's the name of the book, please?

25 A. "My View of the Break-up," if I'm not mistaken.

1 Q. Tell me, please, as far as I know from those days --

2 A. "My Understanding of the Break-up," yes.

3 Q. In those days, the JNA spoke about only two goals that it had in

4 those days; to protect those endangered, regardless of their ethnicity;

5 and secondly, to protect its own units that were blocked all over Croatia.

6 So answer my question now, please, since you are talking about this axis,

7 Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag, then the Neretva River valley that Kadijevic

8 refers to, were these movements of forces to enable the pull-out of the

9 units that were blocked, as you know well, in a large number of towns

10 where they had been stationed for decades - that is the garrisons in

11 Croatia - or was this some kind of conquest of territory in favour of some

12 sort of a Greater Serbia?

13 A. In Kadijevic's book, there is reference to an aggressive strategic

14 operation which clearly determines its goals; to cut Croatia along the

15 mentioned axes, including this breakthrough from the south, this advance

16 from the area of Trebinje and Herceg-Novi which was to have linked up with

17 the forces on the Neretva, and to continue towards Split. I don't know

18 who they were liberating and who they were protecting, that is, the

19 soldiers of the JNA in the territory of Dubrovnik, Dalmatia, and in all

20 these other areas. Do not forget, Mr. Milosevic, in that area which the

21 JNA was liberating or protecting the Serbian population, in 1991, there

22 were about 2.200.000 people, out of which 1.600.000 were Croats and about

23 400.000 Serbs. Who were they protecting?

24 Q. We'll come to this area around Dubrovnik later, because there's a

25 great deal of confusion there, Mr. Kriste. I don't know whether you're

1 aware of that fact, but you were explaining that you didn't talk to

2 representatives of the JNA, but you spoke to local leaders on the other

3 side of the border in Montenegro and Herzegovina. And then the lady

4 opposite asked you, And what was the outcome of those talks with the

5 authorities in Montenegro and Serbia? and you then explained that these

6 were normal discussions. You failed to hear that she mentioned whether

7 you spoke to anyone in Serbia.

8 Did you speak to anyone in Serbia?

9 A. I didn't say that I had talked to representatives of the local

10 authorities in the neighbourhood of Dubrovnik, in Bosnia and Montenegro.

11 I said that such discussions were conducted by representatives of

12 Dubrovnik municipality. And I also said that no direct requests to the

13 effect, "You do this, otherwise we will attack Dubrovnik," that no such

14 statements were made as far as I know.

15 Q. Yes. But will you answer my question: Did you ever in those

16 conversations have occasion to talk to any representative of Serbia?

17 A. I personally did not.

18 Q. Did any delegation of Dubrovnik talk to any representative of

19 Serbia? Does it appear to you rather logical -- logical for anyone in

20 Serbia or Serbia to have aspirations to take control of Dubrovnik?

21 A. It doesn't seem to be as illogical and senseless as you would want

22 it to appear. It is well known that Serbia always had aspirations towards

23 Dubrovnik, that in Serbian cultural circles Dubrovnik was referred to as

24 the Serbian Athens; and the attack on Dubrovnik was certainly part of a

25 broader plan, as I have said, the ultimate aim of which was to move

1 forward the borders of Serbia to the west.

2 Q. Are you claiming that Serbia had aspirations to capture

3 territories such as Dubrovnik and so on over there?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. On what grounds?

6 A. On the grounds of everything that happened. Because the Yugoslav

7 army, especially after the war in Slovenia, acted fully in cooperation

8 with the Serbian leadership, in fact under the direct leadership of you

9 and Boro Jovanovic -- no, Jovic. His surname is Jovic but that doesn't

10 matter.

11 Q. But where did you get this idea that Serbia and I personally could

12 have given orders to the Yugoslav People's Army? There was a conflict

13 between your paramilitary formations and the JNA and not between Serbia

14 and Croatia. Are you aware of that? You were the Minister of Defence.

15 A. On your behalf, the work was done by the Yugoslav People's Army,

16 which was fictitiously used as a pretext to protect the Serbs, or even a

17 more neutral wording, the separation of the parties to the conflict, but

18 actually always upheld the positions of the rebellious Serbs in Croatia.

19 It armed them, gave them the command personnel, and whenever there were

20 difficulties or dangers of war, it would stand up to the Croatian forces

21 and prevent them from restoring the situation as it was before.

22 Q. Very well, Mr. Kriste. You said it had even more neutral

23 explanations. And this neutral explanation, as you call it, was it not

24 correct that the army was trying to separate the parties to the conflict,

25 the warring parties, and at the same time to preserve and save its own

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1 units? Because Kadijevic talks about the pulling out of units from that

2 territory. If somebody wants to occupy a territory, he doesn't plan how

3 to pull them out but, rather, how to deploy them in that territory.

4 A. Kadijevic says that once Croatia is completely broken, then he

5 would pull out his units, but not from the whole of Croatia. That is what

6 can be inferred from the context. He would withdraw it from the part of

7 Croatia that would be west of the mentioned line, which would have been

8 the western border of Serbia.

9 Q. You really have no factual evidence to corroborate this, but I

10 will not dwell on Kadijevic's book. You can believe me that I haven't

11 read it. I just heard what you quoted, and you misquoted from it.

12 Tell me, please, to save time, you say that for political reasons

13 you were not allowed to get a doctorate, a Ph.D. Who were the political

14 reasons?

15 A. That has nothing to do with the war in 1990. Actually, I was a

16 member of the Croatian Spring, if that is what you're interested in. And

17 after that, I was persecuted by the police in various other ways for 18

18 years. Among other things, I was prevented from getting a doctorate, a

19 doctoral degree which was already about to be granted.

20 Q. As a representative of the Croatian Spring -- I'm sorry. I'm

21 hearing the French interpretation. I don't know why. Oh, fine.

22 Who persecuted you as a representative of the Croatian Spring; the

23 Croatian police or was it perhaps the Serbs?

24 A. I was persecuted by the Croatian police. Of course within the

25 composition that it was in. But I must say there was no difference there

1 between the Serbs and the Croats. But within the frameworks of the

2 Yugoslav policy that was adopted at the well-known Presidency in that

3 fateful Karadjordjevo in the year 1971 in conformity with that policy.

4 Q. All right. Karadjordjevo was the residence of president Tito at

5 that time, and that is where the Central Committee plenary session was

6 held. It could have been held anywhere else.

7 A. Yes, it could have.

8 Q. So Karadjordjevo hasn't any importance in that context. There was

9 the Brioni Island Congress as well, and we don't consider them to be

10 fateful or any geographic point, for that matter.

11 Now, do you agree, as you say that you were a participant in the

12 Croatian Spring movement, it was a mass movement, that it was in fact an

13 anti-Yugoslav nationalist movement in Croatia at the time and that to all

14 intents and purposes its objective was for Croatia to secede from

15 Yugoslavia? And actually, what happened later on in continuity, a full 20

16 years later. Is that right or isn't it?

17 A. No, it's not. That's not right. The Croatian mass movement, or

18 the Croatian Spring movement, had quite different goals which,

19 unfortunately, proved to be an illusion. The two basic goals that the

20 Croatian Spring movement had are the following: First, the realisation of

21 socialism, as we used to call it, with a human face. That's how we

22 referred to it. And secondly, to turn Yugoslavia into an equitable part

23 of all the republics and ethnic groups within it.

24 Q. Do you wish to say that Croatia was not on a footing of equality

25 with all the other republics in Yugoslavia?

1 A. Well, less equal than Serbia, although Serbia, especially after

2 the death of President Tito, kept saying that it was in jeopardy most in

3 Yugoslavia.

4 Q. Wasn't it divided into three parts under tutorship of some sort

5 all the time? Was Croatia divided? Was Macedonia? Was Slovenia divided?

6 Was any other republic divided except Serbia?

7 A. Serbia had, with its history, with its historical background, it

8 had two separate provinces, and it was logical to ensure a certain amount

9 of autonomy for those provinces. It had the province of Vojvodina and the

10 province of Kosovo.

11 Q. And do you know that according to the new constitution of Serbia

12 for which you say rescinded autonomy of these, that pursuant to that

13 constitution it says that two autonomous provinces exist, the autonomous

14 province of Vojvodina and the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija.

15 Before, it just said Kosovo, now it's referred to as Kosovo and Metohija.

16 And because it was Kosovo and Metohija from the very beginning, that was

17 the original name of the province. Somebody found fault with that, I

18 assume, in the course of things.

19 JUDGE MAY: Now, Mr. Milosevic, let's try and deal, if we can,

20 with something to do with the witness's evidence. You can, of course, ask

21 him about the time that he was Minister of Defence, and we allow you some

22 latitude, but I think we're getting some way from the point.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. You're quite

24 right. I do wish to be rational and to use my time rationally.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. Mr. Kriste, you cooperated very well with Tudjman from the 1960s,

2 from the latter years of the 1960s, revolving around the Matica Hrvatska.

3 You attended meetings of the Matica, for example, in Metkovic in 1971 when

4 a rally was held when a monument to Radic was unveiled. You were the

5 principal guests there, you yourself and Tudjman; isn't that right?

6 A. That's right.

7 Q. However, that's not the point either. It was a sort of regular

8 activity, political activity of yours. You knew Tudjman very well. You

9 cooperated with him very well. You became the first Defence Minister in

10 the government formed by him after his advent to power in 1990, et cetera.

11 Isn't that right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Later on, you spoke about how Tudjman in 1989 already, way back in

14 1989 -- so nothing was happening in Yugoslavia then, there were no upsets,

15 no disruptions, especially not Serbo-Croatian tensions. That already in

16 1989, he had planned the borders of Croatia along the Drina River. That

17 is to say, within the borders that Croatia existed as a quisling creation

18 during World War II, that is to say incorporating Bosnia-Herzegovina as

19 well. So it is within these fascist borders of the fascist NDH,

20 Independent State of Croatia; isn't that right?

21 A. I didn't say nor did I write that Tudjman had planned the borders

22 of Croatia along the Drina River. All I said was that, in a conversation

23 we had and when discussing -- we discussed the issue and that at that time

24 Mr. Tudjman considered that the Muslims were Croats and that in view of

25 this fact and in view of the historical circumstances, it would be logical

1 for that border to be drawn in that way. However, Mr. Tudjman,

2 operationally or in any other political sense, ever undertook anything in

3 order to put that idea of his into practice. It was a sort of historical,

4 philosophical thinking on the subject.

5 Q. So what you were doing was in fact a philosophical, historical

6 thinking on your part; right? And the upshot of the historical political

7 thinking was that you disarmed the Serbs, you dismissed them from their

8 jobs, and they had recollections of World War II, what happened to them;

9 and of the Independent State of Croatia, they did not have any historical

10 political thought, but they were criminals, looters, and so on and so

11 forth.

12 A. That's what you say.

13 Q. Mr. Kriste, I have here your own interview. I assume you

14 recognise it. Here it is. It is in your magazine the Nacional. It is

15 printed in Zagreb. I can't see the exact date of this particular issue

16 but we'll find it easily. This is the title page. I'm sure you recognise

17 the interview and know about it.

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. The title of the interview -- first of all, you have your

20 photograph here and then your book entitled "Shadows Over Freedom," and

21 then a quotation by you. Here it is. It says: "Tudjman already in 1989

22 planned the borders along the Drina River." That's what you claim, and

23 that appeared in the title of this magazine. Now you're claiming

24 differently.

25 Now, I'm going to read this because this is a quotation and in

1 fact your answer to questions put to you by a journalist from your own

2 Zagreb paper, and this is what you say. You say the following:

3 "Somewhat earlier on, the HDZ sent a proclamation to the Croatian

4 people in which I didn't like the portion --" so you were critical towards

5 this proclamation. I'm not quoting you in a negative light here. You

6 say, critically: "I was bothered by a portion speaking about Croatia in

7 its historical and natural boundaries, borders. It was quite clear to me

8 at the very start that it was -- implied borders along the River Drina

9 which had existed only during the time of the Independent State of

10 Croatia. I asked Tudjman that very morning --" and then you have a colon

11 and inverted commas -- "Do you think that the eastern borders of Croatia

12 should be along the Drina River? His answer to me was briefly --" once

13 again under quotations -- "Yes."

14 "I warned him that this was impossible, because in BiH - that is

15 to say Bosnia-Herzegovina - there are only 17 to 18 per cent of Croats

16 living there. His answer was that all the Muslims were Croats, in fact,

17 which was sufficient reason for the entire neighbouring state to be

18 annexed to Croatia. I was surprised because I knew Tudjman very well, and

19 I knew his impassioned idea and affiliation to the Banovina of Croatia."

20 The interpreters have asked me to read a little more slowly, so I

21 shall do so. I will read the last sentence: "I was surprised because I

22 knew Tudjman very well and his impassioned idea and affiliation to the

23 idea of the Banovina of Croatia."

24 Therefore, what kind of Serb militancy, Mr. Kriste, are you

25 talking about when already way back in 1989 --

1 JUDGE MAY: Let us deal with this in a logical way.

2 First of all about the quotation, Mr. Kriste. Do you remember

3 roughly when that was printed?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll tell you. The interview was

5 conducted about two or three months ago.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says the 3rd of December, 2002 is

7 the date. The 3rd of December, 2002. That is the date on every page of

8 this magazine.

9 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Now, then, since a lengthy excerpt has

10 been played to you -- or read to you, rather, if you want to comment on

11 that, you can. Then the accused can ask you some questions about it.

12 First of all, does it represent what you said?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14 JUDGE MAY: Is there anything you want to say about it before

15 you're asked any questions?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I can say is this: It wasn't

17 an official body or official meeting of any kind. It was a conversation

18 in which I put forward somewhat different views and assessments than those

19 of Mr. Tudjman, and so our opinions diverged there.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. What is it you want to ask?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Well, I was precisely asking him this: Because these aspirations

24 are quite clear - and we'll get to the other point later on, the other

25 area and its functions according to yourself - what kind of Serb militism

1 are you talking about when you bear in mind the fact that it was precisely

2 this new Croatian power and authority that had the aspirations of

3 reconstructing the former NDH, the Independent State of Croatia, and to

4 annex Bosnia-Herzegovina?

5 A. I think this has been completely erroneously interpreted to the

6 effect that the new authorities aspired to reconstruct the NDH. This was

7 only a discussion about one particular element related to a border issue.

8 The second point that I wish to stress is that it was not the new

9 Croatian authorities at that time, because the League of Communists of

10 Croatia was still in power at the time in Croatia, and the new Croatian

11 authorities did not take any practical steps along the lines of

12 implementing this kind of idea, nor did it ever become part of the

13 programme.

14 Q. All right. Tell me this, Mr. Kriste, and we're going to digress

15 here a little way: You said that the new Croatian authorities never had

16 any aggressive actions towards -- or ideas towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do

17 you know, are you aware that the first instance of violence, the first

18 shooting that took place, the first killings of civilians, unfortunately

19 Serbs, which took place were perpetrated by the Croatian National Guard

20 Corps who had crossed from Croatian territory onto the territory of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina into the territory quite specifically of the Bosanski

22 Brod municipality and slaughtered the entire civilian population in the

23 village of Sijekovac, and up until that time there was complete peace in

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, complete peace reigned there. So do you know about

25 the presence of those formations, of those Croatian National Guard units,

1 the way in which they stormed Bosnia-Herzegovina territory and killed in

2 their masses or, rather, perpetrated the whole -- the liquidation of an

3 entire Serbian village in the Bosanski Brod municipality where there had

4 been no conflicts or clashes or national tensions up until then and

5 nothing that had been going on before that. That was the first armed

6 conflict on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was caused by your

7 own army, the Croatian National Guard Corps, on the territory of a

8 neighbouring republic. Are you aware of that? Do you know about that?

9 A. Well, this is the first time I'm hearing of that here and now.

10 That that actually happened -- that had that actually happened, I would

11 probably have known of that beforehand. That is why I consider that to be

12 untrue.

13 Q. All right. Fine. There are a lot of documents about that, a lot

14 of documents, and a lot of witnesses to testify to it. I haven't got them

15 all here with me, although I did present them during one of the

16 testimonies here. I think it was the 108th Brigade of the Croatian

17 National Guard Corps, and even some of their certificates and

18 confirmations when they opened brothels and arrested Serb women who were

19 going home during the day and so on.

20 Now, tell me, it is true - because you were a close associate of

21 President Tudjman yourself - that he relied on right-hand political

22 parties which based their entire political programmes on the past, on

23 history?

24 A. Right-wing parties. Ah. I wanted to clarify what is meant by

25 right-wing political parties, what I imply, what I mean by them, because

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13 English transcripts.

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1 in our areas where we live, right-hand or left-wing and right wing has not

2 been precisely defined.

3 So I mentioned that in part that they relied on forces, that is to

4 say those forces which were more based on the past, rather than having a

5 clear-cut vision of a modern, democratic Croatia. And that was just one

6 segment of the factors, just some of the factors which represented the

7 real life of the people and trends at that time.

8 Q. All right. But, Mr. Kriste, in this interview, the one that I've

9 been quoting from, you say that one of his mistakes was the following:

10 That he made a number major mistakes. And then I go in to quote you in

11 this interview, and you say: "First and foremost, it was his reliance on

12 right-wing political parties, political forces, whose political programmes

13 and platforms were based on the past." Those are your words. That's what

14 you said. I assume that you're not challenging that.

15 A. That is a free interpretation. I didn't dictate the interview.

16 The formulation that I used and that I consider to be correct is what I

17 explained and said a moment ago, that they were forces which were turned

18 towards the past rather than being forward-looking and having a clear

19 vision of a modern, democratic Croatia. And they were not exclusively the

20 forces that were there, that found themselves there, they were just a

21 segment of the overall forces that existed on the Croatian political

22 arena.

23 Q. You also criticised him --

24 A. Well, it would have been better had that not happened.

25 Q. Ah. You say it would have been better had that not happened.

1 Well, then I assume that none of this would have happened had that not

2 happened.

3 A. Ah, no, Mr. Milosevic. Had there had not been your policies and

4 your politics --

5 Q. Well, that's the thesis being put forward here by the opposite

6 side, and it's going to fall through, but tell me this: Is it true that

7 he tried to divide up, to carve up Bosnia and that was something that you

8 criticised him for?

9 A. Yes. We did have information, pieces of information that were

10 never official, and they said that you and Mr. Tudjman had had talks about

11 the structuring of Serbo-Croatian relations in order to find a middle way

12 to satisfy each of your interests on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 However, I was not present, I did not attend your talks, the talks you two

14 had, nor was I there when an official piece of information was published

15 which I myself could see, which would be accessible to me.

16 Q. Mr. Kriste, if you had had access to it, then all that Tudjman

17 could have said to you was that my position had always been that I see the

18 future between Serbs and Croats as relations of friendship and not as

19 relations of conflict and that it was the key relationship in the Balkans,

20 and he knew very well that I had even rejected offers for any kind of

21 alliance to be formed between the Muslims and the Serbs against the

22 Croats, explaining to them the same point; that we do not want to wish to

23 be enemies with the Croats but quite the opposite, friends in the

24 historical and every other sense and in the future.

25 But let me go back. You say here the next major error was the war

1 with the Muslims, the Bosniaks, and the attempt to divide

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that what