1 Thursday, 21 November 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 MR. NICE: Can I return to the question of how much time should be

8 available for the evidence-in-chief of this witness?

9 JUDGE MAY: Well, we've heard submissions on this, if I may say,

10 very adequately presented by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. We've had the

11 opportunity of reflecting on the matter and we've made a decision. I'm

12 not sure there's really anything you can add to it.

13 MR. NICE: Your Honour, first -- two points I'd like to clarify --

14 three, if I may, and I am only doing it because of my role in charge of

15 the case as a whole and there's one thing I want to say.

16 First of all, in case there's any ambiguity, what we're seeking is

17 six days, not four, that is, two additional days. We hope that was clear.

18 Second, the Prosecution's position is that it would be wrong,

19 frankly wrong, given the quality, the integrity, and the detail of this

20 witness to exclude any of his evidence.

21 Third, and I think this was not available in detail last night,

22 there is the statistics of the number of witnesses who would be saved

23 having to give evidence, and some analysis of the material that would be

24 lost if it was other than the full six days available for evidence. And

25 the statistics may help the Court, and I hope they will enable you to

1 review any decision tentatively made or provisionally made other than to

2 grant the two additional days.

3 Originally, we were allowed 71 witnesses for Croatia. We forecast

4 - obviously these things are not capable of the greatest precision - that

5 the fifth day of evidence of this witness would enable us to save eight

6 witnesses who we otherwise had a settled intention to call; some four

7 experts, two low-level insiders, and two verifiers of a document. The

8 sixth day would enable us to save a further five crime-base witnesses and

9 one journalist witness dealing with crime-base matters. Accordingly, the

10 total potential saving for those two additional days would be some 14

11 witnesses, which is in the order of 20 per cent of the allocation.

12 And in our respectful submission, it is entirely right that the

13 witness should be heard in full. If he is not heard in full, material

14 that will be left out would include direct contacts between the witness

15 and other members of the joint criminal enterprise plus evidence simply

16 not available elsewhere of the military structures of the areas of the

17 crimes allegedly committed. In our submission, this is material that the

18 Chamber should have, can have in the most economic form from this witness,

19 and that it would be inappropriate or wrong to exclude.

20 Thank you for allowing me to add to the arguments that were, as I

21 entirely accept, fully expressed -- not fully expressed, but expressed

22 before she had an opportunity with the team to do the research last night

23 by my learned colleague.

24 JUDGE MAY: Well, I must say that I think this part of the case

25 has been going very slowly indeed. In twenty-plus days we've heard about

1 12 witnesses. And of course, it is a matter of concern as to how you're

2 going to get through your case by the dates which we've allocated, with

3 such adjustment as there must be for illness.

4 MR. NICE: May I respond? Or maybe Your Honour hasn't completed

5 what you're going to say. The suggestion that the evidence has been going

6 slowly is one that we couldn't accept. The evidence is entirely different

7 in character because it's so much denser in content and we have taken

8 every available procedure to make matters go swiftly. We are, of course,

9 bound by the decisions of the Chamber in relation to matters of 92 bis and

10 so on, but we forecast that the very character of the evidence that is

11 coming in at the beginning of this phase of the trial will in fact enable

12 us to prove our case in, we hope, and realistically expect, the original

13 overall time allocations made by the Chamber.

14 JUDGE MAY: Well, I think it was the 12th of May. That day stands

15 for the moment. We will make such adjustment as we can and we think

16 proper for illness, but that is the date which you must have in mind, Mr.

17 Nice.

18 MR. NICE: We have. And of course I will do, in respect of

19 remaining witnesses, everything that can be done, as the whole team has

20 been doing so far, to make use of procedural steps to abbreviate evidence.

21 But we are bound by the Rules of the Tribunal and the practices of the

22 Chamber. So we press you to say that it is simply inappropriate to

23 restrict this witness's evidence and economic --

24 JUDGE MAY: Well, it's not the evidence; it's the speed with which

25 it's being taken. It can be taken more expeditiously, in my view.

1 MR. NICE: Well, I respectfully differ from that view, and my

2 learned colleague is, of course, master of the detail, as is the witness,

3 and the evidence is necessarily delivered at a speed that is going to be

4 capable of being understood and assimilated. There are other ways

5 evidence can be given. I'm only too happy for that to be dealt with.

6 Statements can be read, pre-read, and a witness can adopt his statement,

7 but those are not practices that this Chamber is yet in a position to

8 accept, and therefore we have the viva voce system of question and answer,

9 and I would reject entirely any suggestion that my learned colleague has

10 not been proceeding with this matter other than at a good speed.

11 JUDGE MAY: Not my view. Not that -- no criticism, may I say, but

12 -- because counsel, of course, approach things in their own way, and I

13 accept that. And counsel, as we recognise, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff considers

14 the duty which she has to put the matter before us and also the witness on

15 occasion replies at a bit of length.

16 Well, we'll consider the matter and we'll reflect on it.

17 MR. NICE: Thank you.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I think I can see your point, but what was

19 the base then when the Prosecution at the outset had said that it expected

20 to conclude this witness in three days and a half and how was it changed?

21 MR. NICE: You know, until you -- until you do these things, you

22 can never be quite sure, and of course Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff was well aware

23 of the considerable pressure that would be on her from the Chamber to deal

24 with matters at a particular speed. Until you actually do it in court,

25 you can't know.

1 Now, this witness -- and again, this is something that we have to

2 take into account. Witnesses are not as we would like them to be; they

3 are as they are. He's a meticulous man who gives evidence in detail,

4 according to the process of his memory and thought processes, and there is

5 a limit to which you can make one witness into a witness of another type.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice --

7 MR. NICE: Yes. I'm grateful to Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Of course,

8 we have to remind the Chamber, we pressed you to apply the provisions of

9 92 bis, which would have saved many hours or days, but the Chamber took a

10 different view. We would have preferred all the background material to

11 have been pre-read in a way that we respectfully press on the Chamber is

12 entirely appropriate, safe, and preserving of the accused's rights. But

13 the Chamber took a contrary view, which we have, of course, respected.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'm not saying that I would accede to

15 the request, but it would seem to me that if we were to consider it

16 favourably, we would have to hold you very strictly to the 14 witnesses

17 whom you say you will not call. I would like to see the names of those

18 witnesses.

19 MR. NICE: I would always hope my word in court is something that

20 will be accepted. As to holding us to account, if that's expressed in the

21 view that my word is accepted, then of course I have absolutely no problem

22 with that as a proposition. I'm in a position to provide the list of the

23 names of those who we at present regard as witnesses we would no longer

24 seek to call. Yes, I can provide you with a list.

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll consider the matter.

1 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honours.

4 WITNESS: WITNESS MILAN BABIC [Resumed]

5 [Witness answered through interpreter]

6 Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

7 Q. Good morning, Witness.

8 A. Good morning.

9 Q. Can you speak into the microphone? The interpreters couldn't hear

10 you.

11 Witness, yesterday we spoke about the removal of Frenki and

12 Captain Dragan from the region in August, and I would like to ask you in

13 this context about a meeting. I would like to do that in private session.

14 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

15 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, I would be grateful if you would

16 remind us in terms of where we are, in which paragraph, from time to time.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. We are now in paragraph 191.

18 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

20 Q. Witness, after Frenki had left the region, did you meet Mr.

21 Stanisic in Knin?

22 A. Could you repeat that question? Who are you referring to? Who

23 did you say?

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I didn't get any interpretation.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English channel? Can you hear

1 the English? Yes?

2 Could you repeat the question, please? Whom were you referring

3 to?

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

5 Q. Did you meet Mr. Jovica Stanisic, Mr. Martic, and Mr. Orlovic in

6 August 1991 in Knin; and if so, where did you meet and what did you talk

7 about?

8 A. That's right. We did meet. It was after Frenki's removal and

9 Captain Dragan. Jovica Stanisic arrived in Knin. I was called to come.

10 He was there and Martic was there, in a cafe called Vrelo near Knin, and

11 in my presence, Stanisic criticised Orlovic for the events that had

12 occurred before that. Martic just laughed to himself. He didn't feel

13 that the criticism was addressed to him specifically, and Orlovic as well.

14 He accepted the criticisms that were made, but he didn't feel that they

15 were against him.

16 Q. During this conversation, did Mr. Stanisic make any reference to

17 Mr. Milosevic?

18 A. No. Oh, I beg your pardon. Yes. Yes, of course. In the course

19 of that conversation, yes, he did say. He said, "Why are they doing the

20 things the way they're doing?" And he was referring to Knin, what was

21 happening in Knin, so that President Milosevic has to intervene.

22 Q. Witness, what was Stanisic's role and relationship vis-a-vis Mr.

23 Milosevic?

24 A. He was the executive official for Mr. Milosevic, and I saw him as

25 the Number Two man in Slobodan Milosevic's regime. So the Number Two man,

1 second in importance.

2 Q. Did Mr. Stanisic say anything to this effect to you?

3 A. Well, there was lots of information, lots of facts pertaining to

4 his relationship with Milosevic. A case in point, an example from

5 Serbia's internal policy. Stanisic, for example, said at one point that

6 Milosevic, the president, is dealing with foreign affairs and I deal

7 internal affairs and I won the elections for him. Then there was another

8 example with respect to involvement in Bosnia around Gorazde, in 1994, in

9 the month of April or towards the end of April, May perhaps. He said,

10 after Milosevic and Karadzic, with representatives of the international

11 community agreed upon a truce, a cease of hostilities around Gorazde in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jovica commented -- Jovica Stanisic commented on that

13 and he said that their special units, the special police units - I think

14 he mentioned Frenki as being at the head of those units - had made the

15 greatest contribution in the fighting over there but that they did this

16 sidestepping Milosevic's orders. That is to say, there weren't any orders

17 and as the president, he did not know about that. But he said it in such

18 a way as to imply -- he wanted actually to conceal Milosevic's role in

19 those events. He was an executor and a protector of Milosevic, in a way.

20 Q. When did he make this remark of this, or these special units in

21 Gorazde? To which time period did he refer?

22 A. This referred to the period of March/April 1994, thereabouts.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go back into open session.

24 [Open session]

25 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

2 Q. We have mentioned several times Mr. Martic. You have also

3 referred to the support that he received from Serbia. Was Mr. Martic

4 loyal to Mr. Milosevic? Can you say?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did Mr. Martic acknowledge his loyalty publicly during the

7 election campaign that he held in 1993/1994?

8 A. Yes, publicly. During the election campaign and after the

9 campaign as well, he said that he would be the provisional president of

10 Krajina, and once -- that he would be only the provisional president and

11 that he would hand over the baton to Slobodan Milosevic, the relay baton,

12 sort of, hand over the office. And people made jokes about that in Knin,

13 saying that he would hand over his police baton to Milosevic.

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

15 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

16 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

18 Q. Did you have a discussion with Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Martic in

19 August 1991 in relation to the position of the TO commander in the

20 Krajina?

21 A. That's right. I did have that conversation in Mr. Milosevic's

22 offices. I was invited to go to Milosevic's offices and I met Martic

23 there. Martic was already at Milosevic's. And without any great

24 introduction, Milosevic said the following: He said, "Let Mile be the

25 commander of the Territorial Defence," and he was thinking about Mile

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1 Martic, who was present there, and he repeated that. I think that the

2 conversation went on for about two hours. Milosevic kept repeating that

3 sentence. And I think he repeated it countless times; at least, many,

4 many times, just that sentence.

5 Q. Did you object against Martic being the TO commander; and if so,

6 why?

7 A. That's right. I did object, and that is why Milosevic kept

8 repeating that particular sentence, because he felt that I was opposed. I

9 asked for some objective reasons, quite simply. I said, "Well, he's a

10 policeman. He can't -- you can't have a policeman command the Territorial

11 Defence. You would need a general, the rank of general or colonel or

12 somebody who has been trained in the National Defence School and has the

13 rank of general. It's a professional post and he needs to have a staff of

14 at least ten persons." So my objections went along those lines and I

15 objected to his proposal.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again.

17 [Open session]

18 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

20 put to the witness the Exhibit tab 64 in Exhibit 352.

21 Q. Witness, it's an appointment of Milan Martic to the position of

22 deputy commander of the TO of the SAO Krajina. Why was he appointed into

23 this position, and what competence did go along with this position?

24 A. He was appointed because he was the Minister of the Interior, and

25 in that way the police in Krajina were incorporated into the new system

1 and placed under the authority of the government of Krajina.

2 Q. Witness, yesterday we spoke about a report. It was an exhibit,

3 tab 67, a report on the military activities in the region in August 1991.

4 This report that also went to Frenki. And in this report, there was

5 mentioned a ceasefire, an order that Mile Martic gave regarding a

6 ceasefire. Was a ceasefire actually agreed upon on the 6th of August,

7 1991?

8 A. Yes, it was.

9 Q. Despite the ceasefire, was Kijevo attacked in August 1991?

10 A. On the 26th of August, it was attacked, yes. And before that,

11 Milan Martic laid down an ultimatum to the police and inhabitants of

12 Kijevo, telling them to leave Kijevo, on the 18th of August, I believe.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

14 put to the witness tab 68 from Exhibit 352.

15 Q. Is that the ceasefire -- the ultimatum that you just mentioned?

16 A. It is.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session.

18 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

19 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21 Q. When you got information on this ultimatum, what was your reaction

22 to it? What did you do?

23 A. I learnt of this ultimatum from the media, and I issued a denial

24 through the media, saying that the armed forces of SAO Krajina would not

25 violate the ceasefire. I think it was the next day after I had heard

1 about the ultimatum on the media, so it was the 19th or the 20th.

2 Q. And your denial, was it made publicly?

3 A. Yes, publicly. It was in the press. The press carried it.

4 Q. And did this -- did your denial, did it cause a reaction by

5 Martic, the JNA, or the Belgrade authorities?

6 A. No, with the exception of the fact that they were more intolerant

7 towards me personally.

8 Q. Were you called to go to Belgrade on the 25th of August, 1991?

9 A. Yes, that's right. I was invited to go to Belgrade and to report

10 to President Milosevic.

11 Q. What did you talk about on this occasion?

12 A. About two things: First of all, when I arrived, President

13 Milosevic asked me how things were down there in Knin, and I said that

14 there were problems, that the Croatian police from Sinj had gone there to

15 mistreat the population in the village of Otisic and that there was no JNA

16 there to protect them. And he said, "Hasn't that already been settled?"

17 And I said, "I don't know." After the meeting I heard -- it was reported

18 to me, I was informed that that morning that the JNA and all armed

19 formations under its control had attacked Kijevo and the region.

20 And then he asked me about General Spiro Nikolic. I couldn't say

21 anything for or against that man who was the commander of the Knin Corps.

22 Then he said, "Frenki needs to be down there in Krajina. He needs

23 to go back there. He's a good man, Frenki's good." That was his comment.

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go back into open session.

25 [Open session]

1 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

3 Q. While you were away from Knin in this conversation that you just

4 had, was it on that exact day Kijevo attacked?

5 A. That's right. It was attacked on that day, in the morning.

6 Q. Which forces were involved in this attack?

7 A. The JNA corps from Knin, units of the Krajina police, and the

8 local TO.

9 Q. How do you know that? Did you see anything to this effect?

10 A. The next day, I passed through the area and I saw the commander of

11 the Knin brigade, Colonel Djukic, and officers from his group. And he

12 said that the chief of staff of the corps, Ratko Mladic, was in front of

13 him, going towards Otisic. I saw a tank column of which Djukic was in

14 command, and this was in front of Vrljika. I saw a unit of TO of Cetine

15 on the edges of the village of Cetine, towards Vrljika. And they told me

16 that the police had been there too, Martic and Milenko Zelenbaba. And

17 this was shown on Belgrade television as well.

18 Q. Did you see that on Belgrade television, Martic in Kijevo?

19 A. Yes. Belgrade television showed two scenes from Kijevo. One was

20 Martic and Zelenbaba removing the Croatian flag from the police station

21 and embracing each other, and the other was Vesna Jugovic, a reporter of

22 Belgrade television, interviewing a soldier of the JNA on the road through

23 the village of Kijevo. That is, a talk between him and an old man from

24 Kijevo, an old Croat who had stayed behind. And this soldier asked him

25 the following: "Did you kill my grandfather in 1941?" And the man says,

1 "I did not."

2 Q. [Microphone not activated] Let me stop you there. Witness, you

3 said that you came through this region a day later. What did Kijevo look

4 like? Did you see any Croats? Was it intact?

5 A. The place was deserted. The inhabitants could not be seen. It

6 had been destroyed by artillery fire.

7 Q. On that day, did you see Mr. Mladic actually in the field? On

8 this day or the next days?

9 A. In the next day or two, after I was again passing along that road,

10 that is, through Vrljika.

11 Q. What was he doing when you saw him?

12 A. He was returning from Otisic. He was accompanying a group of

13 representatives of the Croatian authorities from Sinj and Split. He was

14 accompanying them to Vrljika, which was under his administration.

15 Q. Mr. Mladic, did he actually participate in fighting activities on

16 the ground? Do you know that?

17 A. Yes. Yes. He participated and he was in command. The reporters

18 even said that he was in the front lines and that he de-mined obstacles

19 and he appeared on all parts of the front suddenly, on his own, with

20 groups. And I remember that when the new Corps Commander arrived, General

21 Vukovic, and Mladic asked him to report to him where the corps units were

22 deployed. Then Mladic showed on the map that there were small groups of

23 units of the corps on various parts of the front in the area of northern

24 Dalmatia. And then the general said, "Where is the corps?" But that is

25 the way Mladic commanded the corps.

1 Q. You said that Mladic commanded the corps. Was he the Corps

2 Commander or what was his position?

3 A. Mladic, from the summer and through the autumn of 1991, he was

4 Chief of Staff of the corps. For a time, that is, in September, when

5 Spiro Nikolic, the previous general, was moved to another position before

6 Vukovic arrived, he was the most senior officer. In 1992, he was for a

7 time the Corps Commander, that is, Mladic.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to go into private session again

9 for the next meeting with Mr. Milosevic.

10 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

11 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13 Q. Did you meet Mr. Milosevic in September 1991 in relation to a TO

14 commander for the Krajina?

15 A. Yes, around the 12th of September, 1991, in connection with the TO

16 staff. Officers for the TO staff of SAO Krajina.

17 Q. Did you have a proposal to make as to the new TO commander?

18 A. I did. Borivoj Rasuo and Zoran Kalicanin, a man from the

19 information service of the JNA. They recommended to me Radosav Maksic, a

20 colonel that I met on that occasion, and who had volunteered to go

21 together with ten other officers and form the Main Staff of the TO SAO

22 Krajina. But Maksic wanted me to seek approval from Milosevic for him to

23 be discharged as he was in active service in Belgrade.

24 Q. And what was Mr. Milosevic's position when you informed him?

25 A. That he would do what is necessary for them to come. And he was

1 in a very good mood then. That is when I met Jovica Stanisic, in his

2 offices; not in the same room, but the room next to his. That was when he

3 was in the best mood, compared to all the other encounters I had with him.

4 He even shared his lunch with me.

5 Q. Does that mean Mr. Milosevic agreed to your proposal to appoint

6 Maksic as the TO commander? What did he say to you?

7 A. "That's right. They will come -- he'll come."

8 Q. And you mentioned Mr. Stanisic, that you saw him also on that day.

9 What was his contact -- what was your contact with him? How did that come

10 about and what did you talk about?

11 A. Before I entered into the study of President Milosevic, the

12 secretary said that the president was having a break, that he was having

13 lunch, and that I should wait in the room next to hers, or the one next to

14 it, towards the corner. And I went inside, and Jovica Stanisic was

15 standing behind the desk, and there was a military map in front of him

16 with the lines drawn in of the deployment of the army. He just showed me

17 with his eyes that I should look at the map. I looked, and then he took

18 me to the next room. This was a semi-oval room on the corner. He closed

19 the door and he said, "This is the room for reporting." And when I went

20 back, the secretary said, "You can go in, the president will receive you."

21 And the president received me, though he hadn't finished his lunch. He

22 shared his lunch with me.

23 Q. Witness, let me stop you here. What did you see on the map that

24 Mr. Stanisic was dealing with? Do you recall what kind of a map or what

25 kind of a region it dealt with?

1 A. It was a military topographical map, and the scale, I think, was

2 about 1:50.000 or 1:100.000. And it had a red line drawn on it in the

3 area of Northern Dalmatia. I am familiar with the area, the topography of

4 the area, and I knew that the army was there. And the line indicated the

5 positions of the army, across the Perucac Lake, the Svilaja mountain,

6 Petrova Polje, Cikova, and the surroundings of Benkovac.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session.

8 [Open session]

9 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

11 Q. Did the -- did Colonel Maksic actually arrive, and his ten

12 officers?

13 A. Some ten days went by and they didn't arrive, and I called

14 President Milosevic's secretary on the phone and I asked for the

15 president, and she said he wasn't there but she would connect me to him.

16 And I asked him, "What about the officers?" And he said, "They're coming

17 tomorrow." They didn't come tomorrow, but they came five or six or seven

18 days later. But not ten officers; Maksic and another two.

19 Q. Did they arrive, and what position did they take?

20 A. Colonel Dusan Kasum came as the chief of staff of the TO SAO

21 Krajina; Colonel Vuletic, as the chief of communications; and Colonel

22 Maksic, as the operative chief. They came to Martic's at the Knin

23 fortress, and they called me to come there and I arrived and I saw only

24 three of them, and they just shrugged their shoulders. And I asked, "Is

25 Martic the commander?" And he said, "Call General Simovic." He was the

1 Minister of Defence of Serbia. And I called him and I asked, "Is Maksic

2 the commander of the TO staff of SAO Krajina?" And he said, "We have

3 designated General Djujic." And he gave an explanation for Martic, an

4 excuse why he couldn't hold that position.

5 Q. And what was the reason why General Djujic was supposed to take

6 the position?

7 A. Simovic said that Maksic was an alcoholic.

8 Q. Did --

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher I would like just

10 to put to you the decisions made in this regard. It's tab 69, appointment

11 of General Djujic, Maksic, Kasum and Vuletic; tab 70, appointment Colonel

12 Djujic; tab 71, appointment Maksic; tab 72, order to relieve Djujic; tab

13 46 -- sorry, 49.6 is a decision to appoint Colonel Tabok; and tab 51.1 and

14 50.2, decisions to relieve Dusan Starevic from -- and Velibor Matijasevic

15 from their positions.

16 Q. Are these decisions taken in relation to the TO command and the --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did you actually, in the Krajina, make the substantial decisions,

19 or are these just the official documents confirming decisions taken by

20 others?

21 A. These were formal, legal decisions confirming decisions taken by

22 the competent authorities in Belgrade, in this case, the General Staff and

23 the Secretary of National Defence. These two documents about Matijasevic

24 and Starevic, they are not directly linked to the Main Staff of the TO but

25 rather linked to the obstruction of the Assembly, which was done by a

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1 parallel structure with a view to influencing negotiations in The Hague.

2 Q. Witness, those TO commanders that were then appointed, were they

3 controlled by the politicians in the Krajina? Did they report to the

4 politicians in the Krajina or not?

5 A. No, they did not. They themselves didn't establish control over

6 the unified TO of SAO Krajina, but it remained subordinated to the

7 competent units of the JNA, according to various regions, and they

8 themselves were subordinated to the JNA command.

9 Q. I have to put to you just another document in this context, and

10 it's tab 73 of the Exhibit 352. This is an order -- a certificate,

11 actually, by the SFRY Presidency signed by Vice-President Branko Kostic

12 and Colonel Milo Kostic, in relation to promotion of Colonel Kasum to the

13 Chief of Staff of the TO Defence in April 1992; correct?

14 A. He's promoted to the rank of general, but he was previously

15 appointed to the Chief of Staff of the TO of the Republic of Serbian

16 Krajina.

17 Q. Does that mean afterwards - we are talking now about April 1992 -

18 this relationship between the TO --

19 A. Yes, that's right.

20 Q. This relationship of the TO staff, the officers there, and the

21 JNA, or VJ, as it later was called, remained the same?

22 A. It remained the same until August 1995. Virtually, it was

23 Slobodan Milosevic who appointed the commanders of the Serbian army of the

24 Republic of Serbian Krajina.

25 Q. Witness, in relation to the TO in the Krajina, did you have

1 opportunity to review, during your conversations here in The Hague, a lot

2 of documents that related to appointments, related to organisation of

3 units? Did you review these documents?

4 A. I did.

5 Q. Could you authenticate all these documents? Could you -- did you

6 know them?

7 A. Yes, that's right.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I do not want to put all these

9 documents to the witness. I just want to read to you, and for the record,

10 which documents the witness reviewed and confirmed as being made by the

11 authorities there. And it's actually all from the Exhibit 352, and it is

12 tabs 114, 115, 117 to 119, 121 to 141, 145, 148, 150, 151. These are the

13 documents that I would like to refer to in this regard. It's all

14 appointments and all formations.

15 Q. These decisions taken, were they respected by the JNA and the

16 Martic police?

17 A. Some decisions, yes; some, no. The decisions relating to

18 active-duty officers in their role were respected. A part of the

19 decisions that were passed in July, August, and September of 1991 were not

20 respected.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

22 JUDGE KWON: For the record, 151 was dropped; yes?

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, yes. Yes, Your Honour. I just got the

24 note from my colleague here. Thank you.

25 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

1 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

3 Q. Witness, in relation to the problems that arose between decisions

4 on TO from the local politicians and in relation to the JNA ignoring parts

5 of them, did you have a meeting with General Vukovic and General Djujic in

6 October 1991?

7 A. I did, around the 10th of October, 1991, in Benkovac.

8 Q. What did you talk about, and what was the result of these talks?

9 A. General Djujic initiated the meeting with General Vukovic that we

10 should address the question of competence over the TO; which would be the

11 competent command? Would it be the corps command of the JNA or the staff

12 of the TO by SAO Krajina? General Vukovic said that he was not competent

13 and that, in this connection, General Adzic should be contacted in the

14 General Staff in Belgrade.

15 Q. And did you do that? Did you contact General Adzic?

16 A. Yes. I was received by General Adzic, not in the command of the

17 General Staff but in another military institution.

18 Q. And what did you discuss with him, and what was the result of it?

19 A. This was one of the main topics: The outcome was that nothing

20 would be changed, that the competence of the command of the JNA remained,

21 that that is how it was envisaged in the system and that is how it would

22 remain. Then there were other things discussed, and I took note of them

23 in my notebook that I took with me, as a memo. The issues that Djujic

24 said I should address with Adzic regarding supplies, the status of the

25 people in the TO, et cetera.

1 Q. And what was Mr. Adzic -- General Adzic's position to demands that

2 you made? How did he react to this?

3 A. To the effect that there would be no problems. He wasn't very

4 specific about it. That things would be resolved, words to that effect.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Open session again.

6 [Open session]

7 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

9 put to the witness the document tab 74 of Exhibit 352.

10 Q. Witness, what kind of a document is this and who prepared it?

11 A. This document was compiled in the Main Staff of the TO of SAO

12 Krajina, and it was a report, in fact, on the situation in the SAO TO of

13 the Krajina in 1991, October.

14 Q. Did you --

15 A. 10th of October.

16 Q. For whom was this prepared and to whom was this given?

17 A. Well, it was prepared for the Prime Minister, first and foremost,

18 and then it was drafted for the General Staff of the JNA, to be handed on

19 to them.

20 Q. Was it handed to General Adzic?

21 A. I don't know that exactly, but he did receive information about

22 these issues, as we had discussed them previously.

23 Q. Those matters raised here, the needs of the TO, were these the

24 matters that were discussed with General Adzic on the occasion that you

25 described?

1 A. Yes, they were, briefly.

2 Q. Witness, I would like now to move on to discussions held about the

3 Carrington plan and the future Yugoslavia. What were the proposals for

4 the Krajina? What were the proposals for the Krajina?

5 A. In Lord Carrington's general plan, proposals were made for three

6 types of relationships amongst the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

7 For areas inhabited in individual republics with ethnic communities having

8 certain characteristics, it was provided that they should be granted a

9 special territorial status, and this referred to Krajina as well.

10 Q. What was -- was there stated a certain autonomy within the

11 Croatian context?

12 A. Yes, that's right. Territorial autonomy within Croatia.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Private session, please.

14 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

15 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

17 Q. Did you take part in several -- actually, in three negotiations

18 with Mr. Wijnaendts, the Dutch ambassador, in relation to the Carrington

19 plan?

20 A. That's right. Every time before the plenary meetings would take

21 place.

22 Q. And before you went to these negotiations with Mr. Wijnaendts, did

23 you meet Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade before you went there?

24 A. Always. That's right. Always before that, there would be a

25 meeting with President Milosevic.

1 Q. Did you go there to get instructions, or why did you meet?

2 A. We were invited to go to Belgrade to receive instructions as to

3 what stand to take.

4 Q. When did you go there for the first time?

5 A. Around the 13th of October, 12th or 13th. But anyway, before the

6 14th.

7 Q. And what instruction did you get?

8 A. The instructions were that the plan was a good one for us. Not to

9 accept it directly, but the suggestion was that, in general terms, the

10 plan was a good one for us. That was from President Milosevic and a few

11 people that he had called in to his offices to explain the plan to us.

12 Q. Who explained the plan to you? Were these officials from the

13 Belgrade government?

14 A. One was an advisor to President Milosevic, Mr. Kutlesic. The

15 others were people with whom President Milosevic associated. They were

16 professors, university professors Smilja Avramov, Ratko Markovic, Kosta

17 Mihajlovic, Vasilije Krestic.

18 Q. That first time when you had this meeting in Belgrade, did

19 anything happen? Did anything happen in Knin that alerted you?

20 A. That's right, yes. What happened was that after we started off

21 towards Belgrade -- two things actually happened. Velibor Matijasevic,

22 president of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina, convened an Assembly

23 meeting, asking for a report on the work of the government of SAO Krajina.

24 And the other thing that happened, the second thing - and Ljubica Solaja

25 conveyed this to me - that in the police station in Knin, Frenki was

1 informing or inciting the Serbs present in the police station that Babic

2 was a traitor. So that was before my departure. During the meeting with

3 Milosevic, I was under this pressure that I had to go to The Hague -- I

4 apologise, to Paris for a meeting with Wijnaendts, and that I was required

5 to give a report to the Assembly. And at one point, I said -- and

6 Milosevic was standing there by the table or walking around the table

7 while we were sitting down, I said, "I can't be in Paris and in Knin at

8 the same time, simultaneously." And he said to me, "I know nothing about

9 that." I said, "Well, Jovica does," and I meant Jovica Stanisic. "He

10 knows about it." And Milosevic left the room, and a little while later I

11 was told that the Assembly had been cancelled, that Matijasevic had in

12 fact cancelled the Assembly meeting.

13 Q. So you went to Paris, and what position did you take there? Did

14 you accept the plan or speak in favour of the plan?

15 A. No. I didn't, and neither did the other members of the

16 delegation. They didn't adopt the plan. They didn't come out in favour

17 of the plan. But we expressed our readiness to continue discussing the

18 plan.

19 Q. After you returned to -- from Paris, did you report about the

20 negotiations to Mr. Milosevic?

21 A. Milosevic did receive information about the negotiations because

22 we went to see him once again before we left for the 18th, the second

23 meeting. And on that occasion, I remember that he was very energetic in

24 his reactions towards me. He said, "Accept it and let's get this over

25 with. Serbia has the chance of bringing -- having a state, being a state,

1 and everything else will be engulfed in darkness." But I didn't accept

2 that proposal.

3 Q. What does that mean? What exactly did he say in relation to

4 Serbia has a chance of having a state, or being a state? What does that

5 relate to?

6 A. To survive as a state, and all the rest would become chaotic, one

7 general state of chaos, war or whatever. And that of all the Yugoslav

8 republics on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it had the chance of

9 obtaining status -- the status of a state, that all the rest would be

10 engulfed in darkness and that they would become colonies of the powers

11 that be. Something along those lines, anyway.

12 Q. Does that refer to Croatia and Slovenia and Bosnia? Did he say

13 anything?

14 A. He said all that, except Serbia.

15 Q. And on this second meeting with Wijnaendts, what position did you

16 take there? Did you accept the plan?

17 JUDGE MAY: I'm not following this story. He's told by Mr.

18 Milosevic to accept the plan. But it now seems he doesn't accept the

19 plan. And I just don't follow what's being said here at all. Perhaps he

20 could explain his position and how this all comes about.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

22 Q. Witness, can you explain Mr. Milosevic's position when you came

23 there for the second time to, as you say, get directives? What was Mr.

24 Milosevic's position in relation to the Carrington plan, and what did you

25 afterwards then do?

1 A. The position of President Milosevic was that we should accept the

2 plan, the portion relating to us, which means special status within

3 Croatia.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. And were you prepared to do that or not?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were not prepared at that point

6 in time to accept that. We understood that President Milosevic wanted to

7 pull himself out of the war and leave us to the Croats to take their

8 revenge on us.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

11 Q. While you were in Paris after this second meeting with Wijnaendts,

12 did you make a public statement as to your position?

13 A. The second meeting took place in The Hague, at the Foreign

14 Ministry in The Hague, and I did make several statements. One was to the

15 effect that I was representing the SAO Krajina and the Autonomous Region

16 of Bosnian Krajina there, which was not quite proper and was not what had

17 been agreed upon at the meeting itself. And we did not accept the plan on

18 that occasion either. The proposal at that time was in fact - that is to

19 say, Ambassador Wijnaendts' - that we look into the status of the Tyrol in

20 Italy and in that way to see whether that could be a possible model for

21 Krajina within Croatia, to follow the Tyrolean model.

22 Q. And did you meet Mr. Milosevic afterwards, after this second

23 meeting with Wijnaendts? Did you have a conversation with him then again,

24 in October 1991?

25 A. That's right, yes. On the 20th of October and on the 23rd, I

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1 think it was, October. The first time was in his offices and the second

2 time in the Palace of the Federation in New Belgrade.

3 Q. Let's speak about the meeting on the 20th of October. What was

4 the purpose of the meeting, and what was said?

5 A. The purpose of the meeting was for him to tell me that I was

6 supposed to go to Banja Luka, to a meeting there with Radovan Karadzic -

7 Karadzic had organised a meeting there - to reject Carrington's plan.

8 That means that the representatives of the Serbs from Bosnia and SAO

9 Krajina, Western Slavonia, should reject the plan, and at the same time --

10 I don't know whether this was his intention previously, but he did tell

11 me, he swore, Momir Bulatovic, in very explicit terms, said he was a

12 traitor and said he had his people there, a party there, who would replace

13 him and bring him to order, Momir Bulatovic, that is, in Montenegro.

14 Q. What had Momir Bulatovic done that Mr. Milosevic was angry about?

15 A. At the second plenary conference in The Hague, Bulatovic accepted

16 Carrington's plan.

17 Q. Witness, you just told us that Mr. Milosevic had given you,

18 actually, the directive to accept the Carrington plan. Can you explain

19 that?

20 A. Well, this was quite a different reaction from the previous two

21 times. Whether the cause of that was that the plan looked at the status

22 of Kosovo, as it had in 1974, or whether it was what was criticised, that

23 Milosevic criticised and everybody around him, and that Yugoslavia and the

24 concept of Yugoslavia was being denied in that way, and the preservation

25 of that part of Yugoslavia that he came out in favour of. So these were

1 two things that they put forward in public, publicly, as reasons for

2 rejecting the Carrington plan.

3 Q. So the proposal at that time was different from the proposal that

4 Mr. Milosevic had asked you to accept?

5 A. That's right, and that was the same thing on the 23rd, when he

6 proposed that for the upcoming meeting with Wijnaendts this be done, when

7 he put forward four points for our position in the Palace of the

8 Federation, the meeting that we attended together at the Federation Palace

9 building in the New Belgrade district of Belgrade.

10 Q. This is now the meeting -- you're referring to the meeting on the

11 23rd of October?

12 A. That's right, yes.

13 Q. And who was present during this meeting?

14 A. Present were many people; representatives of Serbia, Montenegro,

15 and the Serb people from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the SAO Krajina, Western

16 and Eastern Slavonia. Which means Slobodan Milosevic, the president of

17 the Assembly of Serbia; academician Kanazir, president of the Serbian

18 Academy of Arts and Sciences; members of the Presidency, Branko Kostic,

19 Jovic and the rest, Karadzic, his people from Bosnia --

20 JUDGE MAY: And what was the outcome of that meeting on the 23rd?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The outcome of the meeting was that

22 Branko Kostic, who chaired the meeting, counted that there were more

23 people in Yugoslavia in favour of Yugoslavia. He calculated 10 per cent

24 more and that it was noted that as the majority were in favour of

25 Yugoslavia, that Yugoslavia should remain and that that was the position

1 that should be put forward at The Hague conference with respect to Lord

2 Carrington's plan.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

4 Q. Did Mr. Milosevic give you a special instruction on that occasion?

5 A. Yes, he did. He said that Wijnaendts was expecting me in Paris --

6 I beg your pardon? Yes, in Paris, that's right, for the third time, and

7 he gave me four items, four points to discuss, my positions to be

8 advocated there by me. The first was a special status for the SAO Krajina

9 and the other three points I can't remember now. I wasn't -- I was a bit

10 wary and I asked where special status, and he said on Yugoslav territory,

11 and he gave me this piece of paper. And the paper is -- remained with

12 Borivoje Rasuo, I think. I took the paper from him.

13 And at the conference in Paris, in fact, Ambassador Wijnaendts --

14 as soon as we began, I didn't expound my position, but he said, "Mr.

15 Babic, we can accept everything." That's what he said, "And we can accept

16 point 1, item 1," and I assumed that Milosevic had already informed them

17 of our so-called positions. Actually, he instructed us in those

18 positions.

19 Q. This paper that you got from Mr. Milosevic, was it made by him?

20 Was it in handwriting? What kind of a paper was it?

21 A. It was typed out. Four items typed out, and in hand he had added,

22 "On Yugoslav territory."

23 Q. Does that mean special status on Yugoslav territory? Is that what

24 he suggested?

25 A. That's what it meant, although it could have been interpreted

1 otherwise as well. I wasn't quite clear on what it actually meant, and I

2 couldn't take it, and I didn't want to go to Paris. I went to Knin and I

3 said I was ill.

4 Q. Did you nevertheless go to Paris, and why?

5 A. He called me up on the telephone again several days later. That

6 was around the 28th or 29th of October. And he said, "What's happening to

7 you? What's up with you?" And I said I was ill and he said, "I don't

8 believe doctors who are ill themselves. Go on, Wijnaendts is waiting for

9 you," he said. And I went.

10 Q. How did you get there?

11 A. I went by plane. We flew there. Small planes, first and second

12 occasion, once owned by the federal government, and the second time it was

13 a small military plane and the pilots were soldiers and it left from the

14 military airport of Batajnica.

15 Q. Witness, did you meet Mr. Milosevic end of November/beginning of

16 December 1991 regarding the Vance plan?

17 A. That's right, around the 23rd of November, that was.

18 Q. At that time, was the Vance plan already accepted by

19 Mr. Milosevic, Kadijevic, and Tudjman? Do you know?

20 A. That's right, yes. It had already been accepted.

21 Q. What did you talk with Mr. Milosevic about it then?

22 A. Milosevic set out the basic concepts of the plan that had been

23 accepted and he showed a map and indicated the territories. He showed me

24 a map, and in yellow -- yellow marked the municipalities in Croatia and

25 the territories of the municipalities to which the plan referred. These

1 areas were marked in in yellow. But parts of the municipalities were not

2 highlighted in yellow. The municipalities, or one of the municipalities

3 which had -- was joined to SAO Krajina in Banija, Lika, and Kordun. And I

4 said that, but he didn't want to discuss this issue, this point, with me.

5 He just said, "Go down there and talk to the international delegation of

6 the United Nations" which was there in the salon adjoined to his offices

7 one floor below, and I found Ratko Jovanovic there and he interpreted for

8 me. He interpreted the conversation I had with the representatives of the

9 Security Council of the United Nations. And they put forward this same

10 concept for the plan that I had heard earlier on from him. And already at

11 that time, I began making some remarks of my own, and the positions that I

12 stood by, and I did this over the next two months or more.

13 Q. Did Mr. Milosevic ask you to accept the Vance plan when you met

14 him on that day?

15 A. Yes, he did. He wanted us to say that we accepted it.

16 Q. And you did -- did you do that?

17 A. No, I did not.

18 Q. Did you request amendments; and if so, which?

19 A. That's right. I did request amendments. I asked that the JNA

20 remain in Krajina, that the peace forces be deployed along the line of

21 conflict between the two warring sides, the Serbian and Croatian side. It

22 was called the green line, modelled upon the Cyprus model. And I asked

23 that the laws of Croatia not be applied to the SAO Krajina territory and

24 that the Territorial Defence of SAO Krajina not be disbanded.

25 JUDGE MAY: Just remind us, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Perhaps you can

1 do this through the witness shortly -- the basis of the plan, and then we

2 can find out why the witness took the view which he did.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

4 Q. Witness, what was the main point in relation to the Vance plan?

5 You have already mentioned the territories that were specially marked in a

6 map. What was supposed to become out of these territories?

7 A. It was a provisional plan through which demilitarisation of those

8 areas was to be conducted, and this was marked as Krajina Sector West and

9 Sector East, and later on they were referred to as Sector East, Sector

10 North, Sector South and Sector West; and the JNA was to withdraw from

11 those areas and that all the units remaining, the armed forces remaining

12 in the area, should be disbanded, including the Territorial Defence units;

13 and that all volunteer units should be withdrawn outside the territory of

14 Krajina, those who had come in from outside into the territory; and that

15 all that should remain of the armed formations in the area in all three,

16 or rather, four areas, sectors, should be the police, with their arms at

17 their waists, that is to say, without any long-barrelled weapons, and that

18 it should be proportionate to the population structure before the conflict

19 - police with sidearms - until a political solution for the area was

20 found. And in item 1, point 1, it was stated that there were nine regions

21 to which the plan referred. They were different areas within Croatia.

22 Q. Witness --

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm sorry to have to

1 interrupt you once again, but I have become very tired reading from the

2 transcript. I was saying, it's very tiring for me to have to read from

3 the transcript what this witness is saying, because I cannot hear the

4 witness at all. He has turned towards that side over there and is

5 speaking into his beard. The interpreters can hear him because he has a

6 special microphone for the interpreters, but he has no microphone for the

7 Serbian language because he has been granted voice distortion. I

8 understand that. But could he please be asked to speak louder? And I

9 believe that Mr. Tapuskovic probably can't hear him either, but he doesn't

10 dare complain. He is reluctant to complain.

11 JUDGE MAY: If Mr. Tapuskovic wanted to complain, he would. No

12 doubt about that.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I did complain on

14 one occasion, but I didn't want to tire you with my complaints. If you

15 remember, the day before yesterday I said that I cannot hear the witness

16 at all, and I complained on the first day. When he is going into

17 explanations in private session, he speaks louder, but when he's

18 explaining matters in open session, it is very difficult to understand

19 what he's saying.

20 JUDGE KWON: I note Mr. Mueller is on his feet. Yes.

21 MR. MUELLER: Thank you, Your Honours. I just wanted to inform

22 you that my headphones are absolutely impeccable, means to say that I hear

23 the voice of the witness very clearly, as I do the English translation.

24 Thank you.

25 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We've got comments all around. I think

1 we're going to adjourn now.

2 JUDGE KWON: Are we in closed session?

3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. --

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

5 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. I'm going to speak to the witness.

6 You hear what's said, Mr. Witness MILAN BABIC. One of the problems is

7 that you're giving a great deal of evidence, and it's important that

8 everybody follows it and understands it and takes it in, and it's rather

9 difficult to do that if there's so much of it, and some of it, as you've

10 been asked, is in some detail. It would help, it may help, if you would

11 speak into the microphone, as you've been doing, keep your voice louder,

12 and also if you would kindly, when you're giving your answers, perhaps

13 face us, the Bench, so that your voice may be heard elsewhere, yes, rather

14 than the Prosecutor.

15 JUDGE KWON: And I have a comment to make.

16 Mr. Milosevic --

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand, yes.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, if you can hear the witness saying in

19 Serbian, why don't you use the headphone? I'm saying this once again.

20 You can follow very easily.

21 And the second point is that we are going into private session so

22 often, and if you have -- find some difficulty in following the witnesses,

23 why don't you let your associate come in the courtroom and assist you in

24 that aspect? I'm raising these issues while we are in private session,

25 and consider this matter later on.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not understand, Mr. Kwon, how

2 somebody could help me hear better. My associate can't help me hear

3 better if I don't hear something. For example, I just had a technical

4 remark, saying that I can't hear what the witness is saying. Otherwise,

5 let me say that I never mentioned at all that Mr. Mueller couldn't hear,

6 so I do believe that Mr. Mueller can hear very well. I never said that.

7 I was just making the remark that I myself could not hear properly.

8 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn. Twenty minutes.

9 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

10 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

11 JUDGE MAY: Let's go into open session for one matter.

12 [Open session]

13 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE MAY: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, we've considered the application

15 which you and Mr. Nice make. We will grant it. You will have the six

16 days. But we will expect the list of 14 witnesses within seven days.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We actually have

18 identified the 14 witnesses, and we can provide it, actually, in one day.

19 Tomorrow you will have your list.

20 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you very much.

21 Yes. Do we need to go back into private session?

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour. We can stay in open

23 session, and I would like to clarify a few points in relation to the Vance

24 plan, to make it perfectly clear what the provisions were, the suggestions

25 were.

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1 Q. First of all, Witness, did the Vance plan foresee the

2 re-integration of the three SAOs into the Republic of Croatia within

3 certain time periods?

4 A. The plan didn't address that directly, except in the introduction,

5 which referred to areas that were in Croatia. That is all that it said.

6 The plan did not address the political solution. It explicitly said that

7 a political solution would be found later. "Until a political solution is

8 found." So the plan refers to a period until a political solution is

9 found, except in the first paragraph, which said what I said.

10 Q. And the provision was demilitarisation of the -- all three SAOs,

11 with only a police force remaining, with the weapons that a police force

12 usually have. Was that what you referred to?

13 A. That's right. That was the substance of the plan; the

14 demilitarisation of those regions.

15 Q. Did the plan foresee the arrival of UN troops, and where would the

16 UN troops be?

17 A. Yes. The plan did envisage, after the demilitarisation, the

18 deployment of peace forces of the United Nations across the territory

19 within the territory of those regions, and those forces would control

20 roads, checkpoints, the entries and exits from the regions. They would

21 check that no weapons were being introduced or carried within those areas.

22 Q. And --

23 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do we have the document among our

24 binders, the Carrington plans and Vance plans? If you assist us later on.

25 Thank you.

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I'm not aware of this. I think we

2 don't.

3 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps we can get a copy. If we can, it would be

4 helpful.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

6 Q. And if I understood you, your concerns, some of the

7 Serb-controlled areas were not included in this zone that UN troops would

8 supervise.

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. And was there a provision also in the Vance plan regarding the

11 return of displaced persons into this territory?

12 A. Yes. That was one of the objectives of the international mission.

13 Q. Was there also a provision in the Vance plan regarding joint

14 police forces of Croats and Serbs within that territory?

15 A. Yes. As I said, it would be in proportion to the ethnic

16 composition of the population prior to the conflict.

17 Q. Witness, at that time when the Vance plan was discussed, and you

18 said it took almost two months to discuss this, the pros and the cons, did

19 the -- was the RSK, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, established?

20 A. Yes, on the 19th of December, 1991.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

22 put to the witness tab 68 of Exhibit 351, just to have a look at it, sir,

23 not to discuss the details.

24 Q. Is this the constitution and constitutional law on implementation

25 of the RSK of 19 December 1991?

1 A. Yes, that's right.

2 Q. Why was the RSK formed at that time? What was the purpose?

3 A. The international conference in The Hague had stated that it would

4 recognise all the republics of the former Yugoslavia that requested

5 recognition. That virtually meant that the former Yugoslavia had

6 disintegrated, as was stated by the Badinter Commission named by the

7 conference. That was one of the reasons why a part of the territory of

8 the former Yugoslavia, that is, the SAO Krajina, proclaimed itself a

9 republic.

10 Q. Did the Republic of Serbian Krajina actually request international

11 recognition?

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And in this context I would like to put to

13 the witness tab 71.1 and 71.2 of the binder --

14 A. Yes, it did.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- Exhibit 351.

16 Q. Are these the two letters to the international officials?

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. And were you recognised?

19 A. No.

20 Q. The territory of the RSK, was that identical with the SAO Krajina

21 territory, or did that include all three SAOs at that time, on the 19th of

22 December?

23 A. On the 19th of December, the SAO Krajina became the Republic of

24 Serbian Krajina. On that day, the Assembly of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja,

25 and Western Srem proclaimed unification with the Republic of Serbian

1 Krajina, and two days later, the Assembly of SAO Western Slavonia also

2 proclaimed its unification with Krajina. But until the 26th of February,

3 1992, they were not united. All three regions on that date united, and

4 that was when the unified Republic of Serbian Krajina was constituted,

5 covering all three regions.

6 Q. We have talked about the Vance plan and what the provisions were,

7 and in relation to demilitarisation of this region, did you in the Krajina

8 oppose that? I do not mean you personally, but the politicians in the

9 Krajina. Did you oppose the demilitarisation?

10 A. That's right.

11 Q. Why did you do that?

12 A. Because the Vance plan covered a period of six months, upon which

13 there would be a discussion as to whether it should be extended or not,

14 and under those conditions, Krajina would be demilitarised, Croatia would

15 not, and Krajina would have to face the Republic of Croatia imposing a

16 political solution to Krajina by force of arms.

17 Q. Did you have any -- did you object also against the arrival of the

18 UN troops?

19 A. To the concept of their arrival. We didn't oppose their coming

20 but the way in which they were to come. The deployment was envisaged

21 according to the so-called green line, based on the Cypriot model.

22 Q. What does that mean?

23 A. It meant separation of the warring parties, that is, the Croatian

24 and the Serbian side, and not demilitarisation of the area as a whole.

25 And that is the amendment to the Vance plan that was requested. It was

1 accepted in principle, but this modification was requested regarding

2 certain elements of the plan.

3 Q. Was there an option? Was that an option, to get a modification of

4 the Vance plan, or was that out of question?

5 A. As far as I know, there was an option, and some provisions were

6 modified. Regarding the initial deployment for a period of six months,

7 and then it was extended to one year by the Security Council, the

8 Secretary-General of the UN, in his report to the Security Council, made

9 such a proposal, and that was accepted, and that is that Croatian laws

10 should not apply to those territories but the laws in force at the time.

11 There was also a discussion that the Territorial Defence should remain,

12 that the possibility should be given that it should be incorporated into

13 the police without long weapons, long barrels, but this was not resolved.

14 There was just the discussion about it. So some elements were modified.

15 Q. You mentioned that for about two months the Krajina Serbs opposed

16 the Vance plan, and did all of them oppose the Vance plan, or was there a

17 split within the Krajina politicians?

18 A. At first they were all opposed, and gradually, more and more

19 politicians accepted the plan fully and unconditionally in the way that

20 President Milosevic had accepted it. And finally, the president of the

21 Republic and the government and part of the Assembly continued to oppose

22 it, requesting modifications of the plan, and a part of the Assembly and

23 the politicians in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem and part of the

24 Assembly of SAO Krajina and some politicians accepted the plan. And the

25 Assembly, which met in Glina on the 9th of February, 1992, approved the

1 plan after the pressure that came from President Milosevic, the Presidency

2 of Yugoslavia, the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia, the media

3 campaign, and the like.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to request private session to go

5 into some details on the meetings in relation to the Vance plan.

6 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

7 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

9 Q. Witness, did you attend a meeting with Mr. Milosevic, Mr.

10 Karadzic, and Mr. Koljevic on this issue on the 23rd of December, 1991?

11 A. Yes, that's right. On that date, when there was an election of

12 the government of Serbia, in the office of President Milosevic.

13 Q. Without going into many details of this discussion, what was the

14 position taken by you and by Milosevic, Karadzic, and Koljevic?

15 A. I upheld the same position. That meant the plan, with

16 modifications. Milosevic requested that I accept it fully and

17 unconditionally and that -- make a statement to that effect for the

18 public. Karadzic also emphatically requested that I accept the plan

19 without any changes, as did Koljevic. Finally, Milosevic gave me a piece

20 of paper and a pen and said, "Go to the next room and write out an

21 announcement." I went there and wrote an announcement on one page,

22 presenting all my positions. He took the pen and said, "I won't cross

23 anything out, but I will underline what you need to leave out." And he

24 underlined all the things regarding modifications of the plan, which I

25 should leave out. I expressed my opposition, and he said, "This must go

1 to the Assembly meeting. Radovan Bojovic [as interpreted] will be the

2 Prime Minister of the new government, and let him help you." And when he

3 left, Karadzic again started persuading me to accept it. I said, "Come on

4 Radovan, let's talk about Bosnia for a moment." He went silent, and I

5 left and made a public announcement in the way that I had drafted it.

6 Q. Witness, let me clarify. I find in the transcript a remark that

7 you said Radovan Bojovic will be the Prime Minister of the government. I

8 don't understand the context.

9 A. Radoman Bozovic, Radoman Bozovic.

10 Q. What does it have to do with the Vance plan and the discussion

11 that you had with Mr. Milosevic and Karadzic and Koljevic? I don't

12 understand the context. Can you explain?

13 A. Radoman Bozovic and the members of the new government of Serbia

14 were to be sworn in at the Assembly meeting, and that was the reason why

15 he had to leave his room and cross over to the building of the Serbian

16 Assembly. And as he was leaving --

17 JUDGE MAY: It's difficult for us to understand the context. What

18 was the point of this remark?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The point -- Your Honour, are you

20 asking me?

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The context was the following:

23 After Milosevic having underlined in my statement what I should leave out,

24 he left the meeting because of the reason I just gave. He left the

25 meeting, with me, Karadzic, and Koljevic, to go to the building across the

1 road. And he said I should continue discussing it with Karadzic and

2 Koljevic. And the words he uttered were, "Let Radovan help you to draft

3 another statement."

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you. That's understood now.

5 Q. Did you also discuss the Vance plan with General Adzic, in

6 particular, your concerns for the safety of the Serbs in the Krajina?

7 A. Yes. I went to see General Adzic, and I asked that the JNA remain

8 in Krajina. He said that the JNA would withdraw but that we shouldn't

9 worry, because it would be deployed on the borders of Bosnia, towards

10 Krajina; that he would professionally employ 10.000 men from Krajina in

11 the JNA, in the territory of Bosnia; and if Croatia were to attack us,

12 they would reach Knin sooner than the Croatian army could reach it. And I

13 said, "General, do you think that Bosnia will remain in Yugoslavia when

14 Bulgaria and Turkey have already declared that they would recognise the

15 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina?" He looked at me with

16 astonishment as to what I was saying, that that was nonsense, so that the

17 army would remain in Bosnia. He felt that the army would certainly remain

18 in Bosnia, although Bulgaria and Turkey had announced that it would

19 recognise the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and even though the

20 Assembly of Bosnia had issued a declaration speaking about the

21 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. If the audiovisual

23 section could turn the -- turn down the volume of Serbian language in the

24 English channel. It's very difficult for me to follow.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, may I be of assistance? That's

1 what's happened to me in another day. You can regulate it yourself on

2 your board.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

5 Q. In relation to this dispute about the Vance plan, did you have an

6 exchange of letters? That is, Mr. Milosevic and you. Did you, in January

7 1992, exchange public letters?

8 A. Yes, we did exchange public letters, but we also exchanged private

9 letters. On the 8th of January, a letter was sent by President Milosevic

10 to me, and it arrived a couple of days later, by mail as well. And it was

11 also published in the media, in the Politika and other daily newspapers,

12 and on television.

13 Several days later, I wrote my reply and made it public by fax for

14 the office of President Milosevic, and a copy was made available to the

15 public.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

17 put the Exhibits 79, 80, and 81 to the witness, referring to these

18 letters. And as they're very particular letters, they have to be under

19 seal and we have to discuss it in private session, as we are now. The

20 Exhibit -- the Exhibit 79 is the letter.

21 JUDGE MAY: Which binder?

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's Exhibit 352.

23 [Prosecution counsel confer]

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

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1 Q. The Exhibit 79, is this the letter that Mr. Milosevic wrote, and

2 the exhibit tab 80, is it the letter that you -- your answering letter?

3 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry. 78, 79, seems to be the Politika article.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes, Your Honour. It's actually the

5 complete -- in this Politika article, the letter is completely published.

6 It's a complete publication of the letter.

7 JUDGE MAY: 80 seems to be the correspondence between the two, and

8 79, at least in mine, appears to be the Politika articles.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. 79 is an open letter to this witness from

10 Mr. Milosevic.

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The witness actually has -- the problem is I

12 have, for some reason, only the B/C/S version and it's Cyrillic and I

13 can't read it, therefore I could only guess what it was. I'm sorry. This

14 is -- Your Honour, you are correct. 79 is the original letter from

15 Mr. Milosevic.

16 Q. Witness, do you have the original letters actually with you?

17 A. I do. They are with my attorney, who is here present.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I wonder whether we would need

19 the original letters. If you would like to have a look at it or if we

20 could deal with these copies as they are.

21 JUDGE MAY: Unless there's any dispute about it, it seems to me

22 for the moment we can go on with the copies which we have.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I think so too. Actually, I don't want

24 to go into the details of these letters because they speak for themselves.

25 Q. What I only would like to know from you, Witness: Did you

1 understand these letters to be a threat, or include any threats for your

2 dismissal from your position you had at that time?

3 A. Yes. It is stated in the letter of Slobodan Milosevic that I

4 should be replaced, and others elected, or rather, it is stated in a

5 particular manner.

6 Q. Yes. And what was your --

7 A. In the last sentence, it is stated.

8 Q. And the last -- where do you find this remark? Can you please

9 read it.

10 A. Last sentence in the letter.

11 Q. Yes. Please read the sentence that you understand to be a request

12 for your dismissal.

13 A. It says in the letter: "The assistance of Serbia to the people of

14 Krajina will not be called in question in peace even, but the citizens of

15 Krajina need to know that, by their actions, they have lost all our

16 confidence and that in the future, for relations with the authorities in

17 the republics of Serbia, they must delegate people for whom the national

18 interests will be above personal political prestige."

19 Q. And what was your response to this in your own letter?

20 A. In my letter, I said that I considered that to be a call for my

21 replacement or dismissal.

22 Q. We do not need to go into more details because the letters

23 actually speak for themselves.

24 Witness, did you also then take part in the extended Presidency

25 session on the 31st of January, 1992?

1 A. Yes, for three days, and on the 1st and 2nd of February.

2 Q. We have already heard from another witness details on this

3 meeting, but I still would like to speak about a few points with you as

4 well. You said it lasted for three days. Were you able to leave the

5 meeting as you wished, or were you not allowed to do so?

6 A. No. Everyone could leave it except me. I had to stay at the

7 meeting until I stated that I favoured the complete and unconditional

8 acceptance of the Vance plan.

9 Q. Who said that to you, or in which way were you forced to stay on

10 until you changed your mind?

11 A. Branko Kostic and Borisav Jovic were chairing the meeting that was

12 attended by the members of the Presidency, the General Staff, and other

13 participants. The meeting was conducted in such a way that the session

14 continued, and it was telecast directly with two cameras, and the public

15 was aware of the session going on. During the meeting, somebody said to

16 me that Milosevic had ordered that I shouldn't leave the meeting, that I

17 may not leave the meeting until I agree to the Vance plan.

18 And it was conducted in such a way that it went on and on. There

19 were just two breaks for members of the government to come, the presidents

20 of municipalities. The second break -- in the second break, I was allowed

21 to go and call in presidents of the municipalities, and actually, I didn't

22 come back. That is when I walked out. In fact, I fled from the meeting

23 on the third day.

24 Q. Witness, you mentioned that someone told you that Mr. Milosevic

25 had said you are not supposed to leave. Who said that to you?

1 A. I think it was either Radoman Bozovic, the Prime Minister of

2 Serbia, or somebody said that Radoman Bozovic had said that. Anyway, the

3 information came through Radoman Bozovic. Jovica Stanisic told me later

4 on, when we met in 1993, that Milosevic had given him orders to arrest me

5 if I left.

6 Q. What was the occasion that Mr. Stanisic told you that?

7 A. In 1993, at a celebration of the day of the police, in a

8 restaurant.

9 Q. During the meeting, or during the breaks of the meeting, were you

10 intimidated, pressured, or threatened in any way?

11 A. Borislav Jovic said that they could replace me and that they could

12 do all kinds of things to me. And I said, "You can, but I have my

13 position and I'm going to abide by it." General Adzic even wanted

14 physically to attack a member of the government, calling him nasty names.

15 This also applied to other people from Krajina, giving them names. And I

16 was told this by participants, because I was outside the meeting hall,

17 making an announcement for the public. Adzic was very angry. He couldn't

18 wait for me. He asked that the meeting continue without me. However,

19 Jovic and Kostic didn't want to do that. He was so irritated that he

20 wanted to physically attack people from Krajina.

21 Q. Did you oppose the Vance plan throughout or did you change your

22 mind at any point in time?

23 A. I abided by my position up to the end, but in February I amended

24 my suggestion and asked that we introduce complete protectorate of the

25 United Nations, that is, that Krajina should be given provisional

1 protection by the United Nations until its status was settled. I'm sorry;

2 at the beginning of March, in 1992.

3 Q. The Vance plan meeting that you discussed, you said you left it,

4 you finally fled it. When you were gone, did someone from the Krajina

5 government agree to the Vance plan instead of you?

6 A. Yes. Mile Paspalj, president of the Assembly of Krajina, agreed,

7 and he made a statement to the effect that in the absence of the president

8 of the Republic, he had the authority to take over the function of

9 president of the Republic, and in that capacity he said yes, the plan had

10 been accepted.

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again, Your

12 Honours.

13 [Open session]

14 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

16 Q. While Mr. Paspalj authorised -- accepted the Vance plan in the

17 Krajina, the politicians in the Krajina who opposed it, did they continue

18 to oppose it and even call for a referendum on the matter within the

19 Krajina?

20 A. Yes, that's right. Part of the Assembly and the politicians who

21 were opposed called a referendum for the people to state their views about

22 the plan. And the two questions of the referendum were: Were they in

23 favour of the plan completely and unconditionally as the plan had been

24 accepted by Kadijevic, Milosevic and Jovic -- no, I beg your pardon,

25 Tudjman was the third one -- or whether they were in favour of a modified

1 plan, following the lines of the Krajina government draft.

2 Q. Witness, you have already mentioned the Assembly session in Glina

3 on the 9th. And this Assembly session, was it an official Assembly

4 session called by the president of the Assembly? Did all Assembly members

5 take part in it?

6 A. No, not all of them did. My information told me that it was a

7 minority, in fact, which participated. But the delegation from Belgrade

8 did take part.

9 Q. You mentioned the delegation from Belgrade did take part. Who

10 took part from Belgrade in this meeting?

11 A. The members of the Presidency of the SFRY, Branko Kostic and

12 Yugoslav Kostic; the head of the General Staff, Adzic; and several other

13 generals and their escorts and the people who accompanied them; the

14 ministers and people from Serbia. Actually, it was a very numerous

15 delegation.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, we have prepared tab 88 of the

17 Exhibit 352, and it is a video. A part, a small speech given on this

18 Glina session by the president of the Presidency, Kostic, or rather,

19 vice-president, and the translation of what is said you actually have

20 under this tab. It will only be -- you have actually the speech, the

21 entire speech, but we will only play the section page 35, the last

22 paragraph, to page 36, the middle of the page.

23 And when you are ready in the technical booth, we could do that

24 now. Thank you.

25 [Videotape played]

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

2 Q. Is this the Belgrade delegation arriving, sir?

3 A. Yes, it is; Branko Kostic, Adzic, and his escorts.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters apologise but they do not have the

5 text of this tape.

6 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Mr. Kostic, good day to you. Welcome

7 to Glina. You have come here to attend the Krajina Assembly. What do you

8 expect of the meeting?

9 Well, we have come and there are quite a lot of us here, and after

10 a rather extensive discussion held in the Yugoslav state Presidency to

11 take part in the work of the Assembly of Srpska Krajina and on the one

12 hand to reject all the accusations, refute all the accusations that have

13 been unfoundedly spread among these people, that we are leaving those

14 people in the lunch. Also to tell the Assemblymen of the Serbian Krajina

15 Assembly, as well as to all the people, that that is a crude lie, flagrant

16 lies, that we have been and are remaining by the side of these people. In

17 addition, to help inasmuch as we can, for reason to prevail, and that

18 these people, as well as the Assemblymen, realise that that which has been

19 gained through war until now can be defended by peace in the best possible

20 way from now on, with the assurances of the Security Council, a world

21 organisation, and the engagement of the Blue Helmets.

22 Thank you very much on behalf of the Novi Sad television.

23 Thank you too.

24 Mr. Kostic, what is your message to the people of Glina and

25 Krajina?

1 That we have stood by and are going to stand by these people.

2 However, choosing between the peace option and the war option, the time

3 has come to defend peace, what these people have gained by war, not by

4 continuation of a long and precarious war that might be spread out to the

5 hinterland and Bosnia and sweep over the entire Yugoslavia or even wider

6 in the Balkans. That can obviously finally result in the loss of

7 everything that these people have gained by war so far.

8 Thank you.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can stop here. We can stop here. Thank

10 you.

11 Your Honours, as you can see from the transcript, there is

12 following a speaker of the RSK Assembly on the conference giving a small

13 speech, listing all the people that are present there from Belgrade.

14 That's actually following in that next chapter on page 36, and I don't

15 think we need to play it on the video. You can read it and Mr. Milosevic

16 can read it also, and the amici.

17 Q. You already mentioned another Assembly session in Glina. Was

18 there an Assembly session in Glina on the 16th of February, 1992, and was

19 the then Prime Minister dismissed?

20 A. That's right. The Prime Minister of Srpska Krajina was dismissed.

21 THE INTERPRETER: The president of the Republic of Srpska Krajina.

22 Interpreter's correction.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

24 Q. And in the subsequent meeting on the 26th of February, 1992, was

25 Goran Hadzic elected the next president of the RSK?

1 A. That's right, yes.

2 Q. Did any officials from Belgrade attend this session? Do you know?

3 A. I heard that will Budimir Kosutic was there. I don't know about

4 anybody else. They said that some people were there, but as I wasn't

5 there myself, I can't say.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

7 put to the witness tab 74 of the binder Exhibit 351, and it is actually

8 the decision of the RSK Assembly, dated the 26th of February, 1992, in

9 which the SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and the SAO

10 Western Slavonia join the RSK officially.

11 Q. Is that correct?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. We do not need to go into details of this decision.

14 A. Rather, note is taken that they have united into the territory of

15 Serbian Krajina.

16 Q. Thank you. Goran Hadzic, what was his position before the war?

17 A. Goran Hadzic, from the summer of 1990, was the president of the

18 municipal board of the SDS in Vukovar. Later on, he was elected as

19 president of the Serbian National Council of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja,

20 and Western Srem. And then, subsequently, at the beginning of the autumn

21 or at the end of summer of 1991, he was elected Prime Minister of the

22 government of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.

23 Q. What was his profession before the war?

24 A. I didn't hear that from him personally, but everybody said that he

25 was a warehouse clerk, or rather, an official, a clerk, a worker, in some

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1 warehouse, something to that effect.

2 Q. Did you have opportunity to see him during meetings?

3 A. Yes, quite a few times.

4 Q. Did he have the political skills and intellectual level to fulfil

5 the position of the President of the RSK? You observed him. Can you

6 comment on this?

7 A. It's a little difficult for me to speak about somebody's

8 qualifications for a particular job, the job that he did anyway, but what

9 I can say is that he wasn't particularly eloquent, and his political

10 appearances did not correspond to the model we have, the image we have, of

11 a politician. But people from Eastern Slavonia told me that he had been

12 elected to these posts because he was brave and courageous in standing up

13 to the Croatian police in Vukovar and that he first jumped up onto a

14 tractor and thus became a well-known personality.

15 Q. Was he actually the dominant political authority in the RSK, or

16 someone else?

17 A. Well, in the RSK, no. The authority, the power -- he had power

18 and authority. Milan Martic and his structures had power and authority,

19 parallel structures, in fact, and they were the powers that be in that

20 part of Krajina. Goran Hadzic, for the most part, spent his time living

21 in Novi Sad. I don't know how far he was influential in Eastern Slavonia.

22 He would come to Knin from time to time.

23 Q. And when you speak about the parallel structure around Milan

24 Martic, is that the same parallel structure with Frenki that you mentioned

25 before, during the year 1991?

1 A. That's right, except at that time it was the official, formal

2 authorities in power in the RSK.

3 Q. Do you know -- you have already mentioned the person Stojicic

4 Badza. What was his relationship or position in the SAO Eastern Slavonia,

5 Baranja, and Western Srem?

6 A. He was the commander of Territorial Defence in the area.

7 Q. Did he have an influence on Mr. Hadzic? Do you know?

8 A. As far as I know, Hadzic made frequent mention of him, Badza, and

9 a certain man named Jajo, as the main people that he cooperated with.

10 Q. What was Mr. Hadzic's relationship with Mr. Milosevic? Can you --

11 did you make any observations to this effect?

12 A. Complete obeyance. Hadzic completely obeyed Milosevic. He was in

13 -- he completely obeyed Milosevic.

14 Q. What was Mr. Hadzic's relationship, if any, to Mr. Stanisic?

15 A. Very close. I know that Stanisic would accompany him sometimes to

16 the Presidency of Serbia, and people even said that he stayed in

17 Stanisic's apartment, that he slept there when he came to Belgrade and

18 that he was under Stanisic's complete control. At one time he was even

19 said to wear a camouflage uniform in Belgrade when he went to meetings

20 with Milosevic.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

22 put to the witness the exhibit -- tab number 84 of Exhibit 352. It's a

23 photo. Can we put it on the ELMO, please.

24 Q. And looking at it, can you say where these photos were made and

25 can you point out to us Mr. Hadzic, if he is on these photos, of course.

1 A. This photograph was taken on the 31st of January, 1992. It is the

2 expanded meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY.

3 Q. And is Mr. Hadzic on any of these photos; and if so, can you point

4 him out to us?

5 A. These are members of his government.

6 Q. Can you move it?

7 A. Members of his government here. You can't see him on the

8 photograph. But he looked like this man here, although this is Rado

9 Leskovac, I believe, but they looked similar.

10 Q. Thank you very much, then. He's not on the photos. Thank you.

11 A. No, he isn't; at least, I can't see him.

12 Q. Witness, we can --

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Usher, we can put that away. Thank you.

14 Q. Witness, you have told us the provisions of the Vance plan, and I

15 would like to know from you now whether this Vance plan was actually -- if

16 it was actually executed within the Krajina or the RSK. Was it

17 implemented?

18 A. No, it was not.

19 Q. Were the territories demilitarised?

20 A. No, they were not.

21 Q. Why not?

22 A. Because the weapons and military equipment and materiel was not

23 taken away from the area completely, and most of the equipment was hidden,

24 and through the Krajina police force, which was in possession of those

25 weapons still, the military units and formations remained armed in the

1 area. And also, later on, from the beginning of 1993, in fact, the heavy

2 weapons were taken from the warehouses which were held by the peace

3 forces, and from the beginning of 1993 onwards, the armed formation

4 existed under the name of the Serb army of the RSK, although it existed

5 from May 1992 in actual fact, this Serbian army with part of the weaponry.

6 Q. Were multi-ethnic police forces, police units, established? That

7 is, Croats and Serbs?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Was the return of Croats to their villages implemented?

10 A. No, it was not.

11 Q. Why not?

12 A. They were not allowed to return, by the authorities in Krajina.

13 Q. When you say "the authorities in Krajina," whom do you mean? In

14 which way were they prevented to return?

15 A. The police prevented them, Martic did, and the political position

16 taken was that they shouldn't return. This position was taken up by the

17 government.

18 Q. Was Mr. Milosevic in any way involved in these reactions to the

19 Vance plan?

20 A. Could you explain what you mean, please, and repeat the question?

21 Q. You mentioned that the Krajina authorities did not implement the

22 Vance plan, and I was asking you whether Mr. Milosevic did in any way get

23 involved in this action or influence the authorities in Krajina not to do

24 that.

25 A. Yes, Milosevic did perform militarisation, or rather, he held the

1 position that demilitarisation shouldn't be put into effect. Then he

2 supported militarisation, or rather, the creation of military formations

3 and the creation of an army, another army in Krajina, the Serbian army of

4 the RSK. He appointed commanders, financed them, gave logistics support,

5 right up until 1995, August 1995, in fact.

6 Q. You mentioned that the JNA left the RSK. When did they start

7 leaving the RSK, and when was the withdrawal completed?

8 A. The withdrawal from Croatia across Krajina began in the month of

9 October 1991. Garrisons, Zagreb, Zadar, Sibenik, Sinj, and other parts

10 through the maritime coastal route, which I didn't see, but I heard about

11 them, and the withdrawal from Krajina itself, or that portion of Krajina,

12 was completed in May 1992.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

14 put to the witness now two exhibits: Tab 75 and tab 76 of Exhibit 351.

15 Q. Tab 75 is a decision of the RSK Assembly dated the 18th May 1992,

16 amending the RSK constitution and law on defence to establish a Serbian

17 army of the RSK; and the other one is from 1993, a decision of the RSK

18 Assembly, dated the 20th of April, 1993, amending the RSK constitution to

19 change the structure of the Serbian army of the RSK and its command.

20 Is this the army that you referred to just a minute ago?

21 A. Yes, that's it.

22 Q. Yes. Thank you. I only want to refer to the document from 1992,

23 and there is the Article 1, where it says: "The Republic of Serbian

24 Krajina shall have a Serbian army in peacetime. The Serbian army shall

25 comprise TO units in the event of the imminent threat of war, and during

1 wartime, special purpose police units shall join the Serbian army."

2 Which special police forces are referred to in this article? What

3 does that mean?

4 A. They were the special police forces that existed since -- were in

5 existence since 1991, and we've already discussed that issue here, talked

6 about them. The ones that began to be established in April 1991.

7 Q. Yes. Witness, this Serbian army of the Krajina, did they take

8 over the property of the JNA and the weapons that were left behind?

9 A. Yes, that's right. Part of the weapons were hidden when the JNA

10 withdrew, and in 1993 it was taken from the warehouses which were guarded

11 by the UN peace keepers.

12 Q. Was it an independent army? We have already spoken about

13 financial dependence. Was it an independent army?

14 A. No. It was part of the military structures of Yugoslavia.

15 Q. What was the basis of -- in which way were they dependent, a

16 dependent part of the structure of Yugoslavia?

17 A. Well, most of the commanding cadre, commanding staff, were active

18 officers of the JNA who were on the JNA payroll. They were paid by the

19 General Staff of the Yugoslav army and appointed to those positions by the

20 personnel department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army.

21 The commanders of the army were appointed by the president of Serbia and

22 later the president of Yugoslavia - president of Serbia up until 1995,

23 Slobodan Milosevic - and it was financed, logistics support was given from

24 Yugoslavia. As far as personnel were concerned, Krajina supplied the men

25 for the army and the regulations and provisions for it to be able to

1 function.

2 Q. Witness, I would like to move now a little bit further in relation

3 to meetings with Mr. Milosevic, and I would like to know if, in 1994, RSK

4 officials took part in negotiations with the Croatian authorities. Do you

5 know that?

6 A. Yes, they did.

7 Q. When they went to meetings with the Croatian authorities, did they

8 have contacts with Mr. Milosevic beforehand?

9 A. That's right, yes. His approval was sought, and the contents of

10 the conversations, the discussions themselves, were determined by him. He

11 would also follow the discussions as they proceeded and was informed of

12 the process.

13 Q. Did you have to ask approval before committing to any agreements?

14 A. That's right, yes. It was a form of consultation. But actually,

15 he determined whether something would be accepted or not, and what would

16 be accepted.

17 Q. What would happen if anyone would not -- would take an isolated

18 action without consulting Mr. Milosevic first? Do you know?

19 A. Well, it couldn't have been done, because those people would have

20 been sanctioned and borne the consequences. There were even instances of

21 physical jeopardy. People were put in prison who had independently made

22 agreements with Croatia. The Daruvar agreement is a case in point, where

23 people from Western Slavonia drew up an agrement with Croatia, and the

24 Dzakula example as well.

25 Q. Did the officials from the Krajina ever make an agreement with the

1 Croats without an approval, beforehand consultation?

2 A. I think that the Daruvar one could have been a case in point, but

3 I'm not quite sure. What I do know is that the plan Z-4 was accepted

4 through Ambassador Albright. Not directly, without Milosevic's approval

5 beforehand, or prior to asking approval from Milosevic.

6 Q. Which negotiations took place in 1994? What kind of negotiations

7 were held with the Croats? Were they related to a political solution or

8 were they just on economical issues?

9 A. From mid-1994 until the beginning of 1995, there were -- they were

10 agreements about economic relations with Croatia: The oil pipeline, supply

11 of electricity, the water supply, the opening of the highway, the railway

12 transport system.

13 Q. And did Mr. Milosevic allow you to agree to such economical

14 relations?

15 A. Yes. Yes. And he took a very active part in the drafting of the

16 agreement itself, even with regard to the name of a mixed oil company that

17 had been established.

18 Q. Witness, I would like to go now to a meeting on the 5th of

19 September, 1994.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I have to ask for private session for

21 this meeting.

22 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

23 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

25 Q. Witness, did you participate in a meeting in September 1994,

1 together with Milan Martic and Mr. Mikelic; and if so, what was discussed

2 on that day?

3 A. I was at that meeting. Jovica Stanisic, I think, was there. We

4 were in Milosevic's offices, and he offered a luncheon in the same

5 building, in a room adjoining his offices. In a strange, dark room. At

6 the meeting, he criticised Martic because Martic had declared his support

7 for Radovan Karadzic regarding the plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8 Q. Let me clarify a matter. Who criticised Mr. Martic; Mr. Stanisic

9 or Mr. Milosevic?

10 A. Mr. Milosevic. He said to Martic, "I don't want to make a second

11 Karadzic out of you." And he smiled. He smiled timidly. And he says --

12 he said, "Well, Babic is in cohorts [as interpreted] with the clergy,"

13 meaning in the political sense. And to that I retorted, "That is the

14 spiritual dimension. That is my personal choice." I've just been

15 reminded of that.

16 Q. Witness, you said that Mr. Milosevic criticised Martic because he

17 had declared his support to Radovan -- for Radovan Karadzic. Report in

18 relation to what -- support in relation to what?

19 A. Milosevic was exerting pressure on Karadzic and the Assembly of

20 Republika Srpska to accept the international plan for a peaceful

21 settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in August, since Karadzic and the

22 Assembly of Republika Srpska rejected the plan, he imposed a blockade,

23 formally, on Republika Srpska. Milosevic did this.

24 Q. And in which way had Martic supported Mr. Karadzic? What had he

25 said or done publicly?

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1 A. He publicly supported Karadzic in rejecting the plan. He even

2 went to vote, because there was a referendum after that. He went to

3 Drvar, within the territory of Republika Srpska, though he was not a voter

4 from the area.

5 Q. You said that formally Milosevic did not support -- or impose,

6 sorry. Sorry. He imposed a blockade formally, you said. And did

7 anything happen informally?

8 A. I do know that informally there was supply of oil derivatives and

9 that the army of Republika Srpska was assisted by Milosevic.

10 Q. And how do you know that?

11 A. I know on the basis of a meeting at Bijeljina that I've already

12 referred to, when Stanisic and Karadzic asked me to make the payments.

13 Q. Sir, let me stop you. You do not need to repeat anything. Do you

14 have anything in addition to that? Do you have any information in

15 addition to that, that he continued to support?

16 A. I heard, after arriving in Belgrade in 1995, that around

17 Srebrenica, the army of Yugoslavia had been involved in the wartime events

18 around Srebrenica. The army of Yugoslavia from the territory of

19 Yugoslavia, across the Drina River.

20 Q. Who told you that?

21 A. People from Perucac, along the Drina, in Serbia, a place on the

22 opposite bank.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We can go into open session again, Your

24 Honour.

25 [Open session]

1 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

3 Q. Witness, you mentioned the Z-4 plan. What were the main points of

4 the Z-4 plan?

5 A. The main point, or the gist of the plan, was that the territory of

6 the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which had earlier been known as the

7 Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and which was now known as Sector

8 North and Sector South under the protection of the United Nations, should

9 be given political, territorial autonomy within the Republic of Croatia.

10 It would have a parliament, a government, institutions, a currency that

11 would be special in appearance but it would be printed by the National

12 Bank of Croatia, competence over the regional police and the courts, which

13 would imply a high level of autonomy.

14 Q. Who made this suggestion of the Z-4 plan? Was it an international

15 proposal?

16 A. The Z-4 was given that name because it was proposed by four

17 ambassadors in Zagreb, that is, by the international community.

18 Q. In the transcript earlier on, it was said that -- it is actually

19 on page 61 of the transcript, line 14, it says that Ambassador Albright

20 accepted the Z-4 plan. Is that correct, Ambassador Albright?

21 A. Ambassador Galbraith, the ambassador of the United States in

22 Croatia, Peter Galbraith. He was the main creator and proponent of that

23 plan.

24 Q. This plan, did that actually mean the reintegration of the three

25 regions of the RSK, that is, Krajina, Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia,

1 into the Croatian Republic?

2 A. That's right. Only the Western Slavonia would be settled

3 immediately, whereas Eastern Slavonia, within a period of five years, and

4 the territory of SAO Krajina would have a high degree of political and

5 territorial autonomy in Croatia.

6 Q. Were the politicians of the Krajina in a position -- did they

7 accept this Z-4 plan, you in the RSK?

8 A. At the beginning of March/end of February, the politicians in

9 Krajina rejected the plan. The plan was accepted only by the last Prime

10 Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in August 1995.

11 Q. And when you said March and February, which year? Is it also

12 1995?

13 A. That's right, 1995.

14 Q. Who opposed the Z-4 plan?

15 A. The President of the Republic of Serbia, according to what Milan

16 Martic said, the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and he said

17 half an hour prior to the beginning of the meeting with the international

18 community that President Milosevic had said that the plan should not be

19 even considered.

20 Q. When did Mr. Milan Martic consult with Mr. Milosevic, and of what

21 time period are you speaking when you say -- when you refer to a meeting

22 with the international community?

23 A. It was that week. I think it was the end of February/beginning of

24 March. So the beginning of the week, Martic went to Belgrade for

25 consultations. Whether it was Monday or Tuesday. And then on Thursday,

1 an announcement was issued of the supreme defence council of the Republic

2 of Serbian Krajina, in negative terms, about the plan, and then I think it

3 was the following Monday when there was the meeting with representatives

4 of the international community at which Martic said half an hour prior to

5 the meeting that Milosevic had said that the plan should not even be taken

6 into consideration. And at the meeting with representatives of the

7 international community, Ambassador Farista Djijan [phoen] handed it to

8 him. He wouldn't even take it into his hands.

9 Q. On that occasion, then, did the Krajina authorities reject the

10 plan, in that meeting then with the internationals?

11 A. Actually, it was not even taken into consideration, so it was not

12 accepted.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We would need to go into private session for

14 a meeting of the witness.

15 [Private session ordered for public release,18 December 2002 (D18520-D18519)]

16 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

18 Q. Did you speak with Mr. Milosevic yourself about the Z-4 plan?

19 A. I did, at the beginning of April 1995.

20 Q. What did you discuss?

21 A. He was the first to mention the fact that the plan Z-4 was a good

22 one but that the territory of the municipality of Slunj should have been

23 divided lengthwise. He didn't give any explanations for this. And then

24 we actually discussed the events in Livanjsko Polje and the hinterland of

25 Knin, the aggression of the HVO towards Knin. I've already spoken about

1 that. And then he also said that there weren't 300.000 people of Krajina

2 towards 4 million Croats but that there was the whole logistics of Serbia

3 behind us, and that was that meeting.

4 Q. Witness, you said that Mr. Milosevic was in favour of the Z-4 plan

5 when you spoke to him; is that understood? He had only some remark in

6 relation to Slunj.

7 A. It appeared that way, yes. However, one never knew with him for

8 certain whether he really stood behind what he said; at least, I was not

9 always sure.

10 Q. You have already mentioned this meeting in relation to the

11 fighting that took place at the same time in Bosnia with participation of

12 Milan Martic and his forces, and you mentioned the region of Livno and

13 this gash and the line that Mr. Milosevic showed you to this effect. Was

14 there also fighting at that time