1 Friday, 26 July 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, just three short administrative matters

7 that I ought to have touched on yesterday but they may assist the future

8 conduct of the trial. One perhaps more substantially in one sense than

9 the others. If in the event we do not need the full three weeks in

10 September that you allowed, and that's quite likely if Mr. Lilic's

11 evidence and the problems associated with it won't be ready by then -- I

12 can easily see circumstances arising where that would be the case and

13 where perhaps the Kosovar Albanian witnesses, de la Billiere, Coo and

14 tidying up witnesses won't occupy a fortnight -- will the Chamber advance

15 the start date of the balance of the trial by whatever period might be

16 appropriate, say, another week? If it doesn't do that and if it sticks to

17 its May 2003 close date, then we will have lost a week and we'd obviously

18 be anxious not to lose a week.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. The purpose of the two-week break between the

20 cases is to give the time for preparation to the accused and others. So

21 the start date of the next part will be two weeks after the closure of the

22 first one.

23 MR. NICE: Your Honour, that's extremely helpful.

24 The second two points relate to problems of -- not problems, but

25 issues of publicity and difficulties I know that the press have had. One

1 relates to 92 bis packages, as we call them, that become exhibits, and the

2 other relates to exhibits generally which of course are only ever placed

3 briefly on the overhead projector. I wonder if you would authorise us,

4 with your staff, to negotiate, perhaps with the Registry, to ensure that

5 these materials can be made available to the press at the earliest

6 opportunity. And, of course, so far as 92 bis evidence is concerned, it's

7 much more difficult -- or it's difficult for the press to follow the full

8 significance of this evidence of a 92 bis witness if they don't get the

9 package until a long time after he or she gives evidence. It could

10 obviously assist them if they could have it either contemporaneously with

11 the witness coming into court, or even if they could have it ahead,

12 perhaps subject to some embargo on use until and unless the witness

13 actually gives evidence.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. A suitable arrangement should be made. Clearly,

15 if there is to be any question of material being supplied before the

16 witness gives evidence, that's a matter which will require careful

17 consideration. Normally after the event, it would appear to be there's no

18 difficulty. The statements are part of the evidence in the case. It's

19 important that anyone should be informed of it.

20 MR. NICE: Very well. I'll try and set a system up.

21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

23 MR. NICE: That's all, Your Honour. Thank you very much.

24 JUDGE MAY: May we have the witness, please. Would you get the

25 witness, please.

1 How much longer, Mr. Nice, do you anticipate you will need?

2 MR. NICE: Less than an hour.

3 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

4 JUDGE MAY: I'm told the witness is on his way. He hasn't yet

5 arrived.

6 We'll adjourn. Five minutes.

7 --- Break taken at 9.08 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 9.20 a.m.

9 [The witness entered court]

10 WITNESS: RADOMIR MARKOVIC [Resumed]

11 [Witness answered through interpreter]

12 Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

13 Q. Mr. Markovic, you told us yesterday about the joint command and

14 the political body that supervised it. Was General Pavkovic involved in

15 either of these bodies?

16 A. General Pavkovic, you mean? General Pavkovic, yes, he was in the

17 joint command.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm in the middle of paragraph 15.

19 Q. After NATO bombing started, can you help us with whether there

20 were any paramilitary groups in Kosovo or not?

21 A. No. In Kosovo, there were no paramilitary groups. All the

22 volunteers who wanted to go to Kosovo were duty-bound to go through

23 military treatment, that is to say, the army of Yugoslavia, and they were

24 deployed in the units of the army of Yugoslavia.

25 Q. Does it follow from that that all armed personnel in Kosovo would

1 have been under the control of the army at that time?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So far as the MUP, we've already heard about the subordination of

4 them. But so far as the MUP is concerned, were its special units present

5 in Kosovo after the bombing started?

6 A. Yes. All members of the Ministry of the Interior, sooner or

7 later, went through a period in Kosovo; therefore, the members of the

8 special units as well had to stay in Kosovo for a while.

9 Q. Turning to coordination of operations between the MUP and the VJ

10 there: Prior to NATO bombing, what was the method of coordination of MUP

11 and VJ operations in Kosovo?

12 A. Well, there was this joint command that included members of the

13 political body, the army of Yugoslavia, and Ministry of the Interior.

14 They adopted joint decisions and the coordination between and among them

15 was carried out by this political body.

16 Q. Do you know how regularly the body met?

17 A. I think every day. I think they had meetings every day.

18 Q. By whom was it chaired?

19 A. It was chaired by Mr. Sainovic.

20 Q. And from whom did Sainovic get his instructions?

21 A. I don't know who he got his instructions from, but I assume that

22 it could have been from the president of the state, because such a high

23 political body can only be coordinated from the top echelons of power.

24 Q. Did you have a conversation with the accused at any stage touching

25 on Mr. Sainovic and his role in Kosovo?

1 A. No. I personally never talked to President Milosevic about the

2 role of Sainovic in Kosovo.

3 Q. We've already dealt with many of the close associates of the

4 accused. Who at the time that you were in office were his closest

5 associates? It may just help us if you just give us a list who, in your

6 judgement and experience, were his closest associates.

7 A. At any rate, the top leaders in the country. That was

8 Milutinovic, as president of Serbia; then Mirko Marjanovic, prime

9 minister; Dragan Tomic, president of the assembly; Sainovic; and

10 practically all the federal and republican leaders were in contact with

11 President Milosevic.

12 MR. NICE: I think we can probably turn on now to paragraph 20.

13 Q. I want to ask you about a few individuals who you may be able to

14 help us with and their relationships one to another or with the accused.

15 Was there a man Radovan Stojicic, also known as Badza, and another man, of

16 course, known as Arkan?

17 A. Yes. Radovan Stojicic, nicknamed Badza, he was Deputy Minister of

18 the Interior, head of the public security sector. There was also Zeljko

19 Raznjatovic. There was. He's deceased. Zeljko Raznjatovic, nicknamed

20 Arkan. During part of his life --

21 [Technical difficulty]

22 A. -- actions in Croatia and in Erdut.

23 [Technical difficulty]

24 JUDGE MAY: We're getting the French on the English channel.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English channel now?

1 JUDGE MAY: We're also getting the French channel coming in.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Is it only English now?

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's go on.

4 MR. NICE:

5 Q. How did those two men get on? What was their relationship,

6 please?

7 A. Yes. Stojicic and Raznjatovic were friends. They did get along,

8 because in that period, while Stojicic was staying in Slavonia,

9 Raznjatovic was at the camp in Erdut and they had direct contacts.

10 Q. To what position did Stojicic, Badza, rise?

11 A. He rose to the position of deputy minister. So practically he had

12 two posts: Deputy Minister of the Interior of Serbia and head of the

13 public security sector.

14 Q. How did he get on with -- what was his working relationship with

15 the accused?

16 A. At that time I did not see any of their contacts, but I assume

17 that as Deputy Minister of the Interior he would have had to have contacts

18 with Milosevic.

19 Q. Can you just throw some light on relationships by the experience

20 you had when I think you wanted to remove some weapons from one of Arkan's

21 units? Do you remember that?

22 A. Yes, I remember that. That was in a period when not units, but it

23 was his personal security. They had long arms. They were equipped with

24 long arms. And citizens noticed that, and they reported on this. I was

25 head of the Belgrade Secretariat. My duty was to react to that, and I

1 communicated that to the Minister of the Interior, Zoran Sokolovic, and he

2 instructed me to convey all of this to Radovan Stojicic, that he would

3 take care of that with Arkan, because they are on good terms and it is

4 easier to deal with it that way.

5 Q. What actually happened to the arms?

6 A. They were disarmed.

7 Q. By whom, in the event?

8 A. Well, I think it was an agreement reached between Radovan Stojicic

9 and Zeljko Raznjatovic and that he acted on the orders of Radovan Stojicic

10 that practically they returned these weapons themselves.

11 Q. Just move on, then, to Jovica Stanisic. How did he get on with

12 Arkan, and Badza?

13 A. He got along with Badza extremely well. They were the closest

14 associates and they worked on the same job. As for Arkan, I don't know

15 what kind of contacts -- contact Jovica Stanisic had with him, because I

16 was never present during a single contact of theirs.

17 Q. Do you remember an occasion when the accused gave you an

18 instruction in relation to Arkan, sometime before, of course, Arkan died?

19 A. Yes, I remember.

20 Q. Can you tell us about it and when it was?

21 A. President Milosevic instructed me to call Zeljko Raznjatovic and

22 to draw his attention to the following: That he had to legalise everything

23 he did, that is to say, to bring it all within a legal framework. I was

24 also supposed to talk to him about the wounded that he was supporting, and

25 I had to see what his requests were and to make it possible for him to

1 continue doing that.

2 Q. Two other slightly disconnected points, one relating to Arkan.

3 Was there a group of Arkan's Tigers called the Super-Tigers?

4 A. I don't know about that.

5 Q. Was there any group of Arkan's paramilitaries that became

6 transferred to the RDB, please?

7 A. Yes. After the centre in Erdut was disbanded, one part of the

8 members of those units who were called the Tigers of Arkan were

9 transferred to the JSO special unit. I don't know how many of them.

10 Q. Now, of course, I think -- did you then take some actions in

11 relation to that reserve unit yourself?

12 A. When I came to head the sector for state security, I disbanded

13 that unit and reorganised it. Over two-thirds of the members of these

14 unit were released. Actually, I dismissed them. And then I transformed

15 the unit itself. I'm not sure that it was those who were transferred from

16 Erdut. Those who were on the reserve force, for the most part, and those

17 who did not meet the necessary requirements in terms of quality for being

18 members of a special unit, I mean in terms of psychological and physical

19 ability.

20 Q. In the course of taking this action, did you see a map that

21 indicated whereabouts that unit had been deployed?

22 A. Yes. In the centre in Kulla, there was a memorial room where

23 there is a big map, and on it are charted all the places where the unit

24 was stationed, from its inception until the present day.

25 Q. What did it show about the places where that unit had been

1 deployed, please?

2 A. Bosnia, Krajina, Croatia, Kosovo.

3 Q. Having dealt with those somewhat disconnected matters, I return to

4 the focus of our evidence this morning, Kosovo. How was the accused kept

5 informed of events in Kosovo, please?

6 A. I've already said that. The head of state received information

7 from several channels: The military intelligence, the public security, and

8 the state security.

9 Q. Can you recall any particular meetings where he spoke of his need

10 to be informed about the situation there?

11 A. No. It was a duty to inform the president of the state of all

12 events in Kosovo, and not only in Kosovo; about all important events, in

13 the case of which it went without saying that the head of state had to be

14 informed.

15 Q. At such meetings, was General Pavkovic present?

16 A. Yes. General Pavkovic was present several times at these

17 meetings, and he mostly reported on the activities of the army in Kosovo.

18 Q. Were his reports detailed or summary in form?

19 A. No. His reports were very detailed and very accurate.

20 Q. Was Milutinovic present from time to time at these meetings?

21 A. Yes, but very seldom.

22 Q. When he was present, how did he and the accused interact? Who

23 took the lead?

24 A. The meetings were always held at President Milosevic's, so he was

25 the one who chaired the meetings.

1 Q. Was Sainovic present from time to time, and was a man called Obrad

2 Stevanovic present?

3 A. I cannot say exactly that both of them were there, but I assume

4 they were because either Vlastimir Djordjevic or Obrad Stevanovic were

5 always present, depending who was in Kosovo and who was in Belgrade.

6 Q. I want to turn to the word "asanation". Was there a meeting where

7 that was discussed?

8 A. Yes, at one of these meetings, where a report was submitted to

9 President Milosevic about the situation in Kosovo and about other matters.

10 Some member of the army of Yugoslavia said that "asanation" should be

11 carried out, "asanation" of the terrain in Kosovo. President Milosevic

12 agreed with that.

13 Q. Did "asanation" include, amongst other things, dealing with

14 corpses and buried bodies?

15 A. As far as I know, "asanation" means the removal of chemicals,

16 mines and explosives that are left behind, as well as killed livestock,

17 and also killed persons. So that meant treating the wounded and the dead.

18 MR. NICE: Another exhibit, please, Your Honour. It was dealt

19 with, forecast, rather, in the evidence of Mr. Karleusa and is to be dealt

20 with by this witness.

21 JUDGE MAY: This word "asanation", what language is it supposed to

22 be? It's been translated into English as asanation.

23 MR. NICE: I'm sorry. I haven't looked it up in an English

24 dictionary and it's my mistake. I picked it up from here. I don't know.

25 Perhaps the witness can help us.

1 Q. Do you know what language "asanation" is?

2 A. I think it's an international term.

3 Q. Very well. Mr. Saxon, with his usual industry, did look it up,

4 with a nil result, couldn't find it. But in any event, I think we can

5 pick it up from the exhibits.

6 Mr. Markovic, again, usual format, please. Usher, if you would be

7 so good. The format is we put the -- when the overhead projector is in

8 operation ... If you get another copy of the exhibit, please, so that the

9 witness can have his own. We lay the original on the overhead projector

10 initially, as it is, so that they can -- so that those viewing can see

11 what the document is. It's a typed document with some handwritten

12 signatures on it. Thank you very much. And we can see the signatures on

13 the front page. And then at the foot of the page, if you'd move down.

14 Thank you very much. And then the document is signed at the next page.

15 Please, would you just turn over. And then at the last page. Thank you

16 very much. Then if you could put the English version on the overhead

17 projector so that those viewing may read it.

18 Mr. Markovic, this is a statement, I think, that you made in

19 respect of this meeting; is that correct?

20 A. Yes. I already spoke about this statement to the investigators of

21 The Hague Tribunal, and I said that this statement does not fully

22 correspond to what I had said. Rather, this is a free interpretation by

23 the officer of the state security sector who conducted an interview with

24 me as we were trying, together, to come to certain facts as to what had

25 happened.

1 Q. Right. We'll get your comments on it at the end. We can see that

2 it's a statement by an authorised officer of the MUP of Serbia pursuant to

3 the articles of the FRY law. It was taken on the 2nd of June of 2001.

4 And it says this:

5 "Regarding the latest developments and articles in the press about

6 a refrigerator lorry containing Albanian civilians' corpses, with explicit

7 suspicions that systematic and, in principle, very well-organised attempts

8 to conceal the scope of crimes and remove the vestiges were made during

9 the war in Kosovo and Metohija. I know that there was a working meeting

10 in Beli Dvor, on the ground floor, in the library, where a long table for

11 working meetings is and where Slobodan Milosevic --

12 [Technical difficulty]

13 MR. NICE: French interruption. I wonder if we're back to

14 English. Shall we try again?

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Try again.

16 MR. NICE: -- meeting in Beli Dvor on the ground floor in the

17 library where a long table for working meetings is and where Slobodan

18 Milosevic most often held meetings in March 1999. Vlajko Stojilkovic, as

19 the Minister of the Interior, Vlastimir Djordjevic, as the public security

20 department head, and I, attended the meeting. Most likely the meeting was

21 dedicated to the Kosovo issue and attended by, besides the above-mentioned

22 people, VJ representatives, although I cannot say that with absolute

23 certainty. In addition to the main topic of the meeting, at the very end

24 of the meeting, Vlastimir Djordjevic raised the issue of the removal of

25 Albanian corpses in order to remove all civilian victims, if there were

1 any, who could become objects of an investigation conducted by The Hague

2 Tribunal. In that respect, Milosevic ordered Vlajko Stojilkovic to take

3 all necessary measures to remove the corpses of the Albanian civilians

4 that had already been buried. I stayed out of the conversation on this

5 topic, since none of the orders had been addressed to me. I know that

6 Stojilkovic assigned General Dragan Ilic to carry out this task and that

7 Ilic went to the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, accompanied by a team

8 of appointed associates. Personally, I would not let the state security

9 department get involved in this morbid affair of the exhumation and

10 transport of corpses. So far as I know, the public security department

11 and VJ members took part in that. Vlajko Stojilkovic gave Dragan Ilic and

12 Vlastimir Djordjevic an order to take these measures

13 directly. Obrad Stevanovic, Dragan Ilic, Branko Djuric, Sreten Lukic,

14 Dragisa Dinic, and probably all other MUP department heads of the time are

15 also familiar with this order. In informal conversations that took place

16 before the conferences of department heads and working meetings, so-called

17 mopping up in combat areas in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija was

18 often mentioned. I know that Dragan Ilic was dissatisfied with the

19 actions taken by the MUP in this region, and that was the reason why, on

20 several occasions, he complained to me how difficult this job was, how

21 unprepared he was to handle such abominations, and he also complained of

22 resistance encountered on the ground and put up by the people who should

23 help in identification of the locations where the Albanian civilians'

24 corpses were. In this context, Ilic told me that he had been greatly

25 helped by MUP Colonel Goran Radosavljevic and his men, who had helped him

1 to carry out the assignment. Dragan Ilic also complained of the

2 uncooperativeness of officials who had not helping in fulfilling the

3 task. Ilic once told me that the cooperation with the VJ had improved

4 after a while, that is, that the coordination of activities had been

5 established. Ilic speak about Vlastimir Djordjevic in especially

6 unfavourable terms, since he handled this problem with extreme

7 superficiality, which displeased Ilic greatly. Looking back, I remember a

8 detail that Ilic also complained of the way and method in which this task

9 had been carried out, mentioning the discovery of a refrigerator lorry

10 containing civilians' corpses in the Danube, which was the result of

11 Djordjevic's bad organisation. I did not want to have conversations on

12 this topic, so I sent Ilic to Stojilkovic as his immediate superior in

13 this assignment. I would like to reiterate resolutely that the state

14 security had nothing to do with these events. I am also familiar only

15 with the fact that corpses were, besides being thrown into the Danube,

16 cremated, but Dragan Ilic has more detailed and intimate information on

17 that. When asked about my potential knowledge regarding the action

18 carried out with regards to this matter, I solemnly declare that the state

19 security department had nothing to do with these tasks and that I do not

20 know whether an action was taken regarding that at all, and I also do not

21 know who ordered and organised the takeover of the corpses."

22 Mr. Markovic, I think, as we can see on the original, there's then

23 three names with signatures, one of which is yours. Is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And indeed, each of the three pages of the original document bears

1 your signature at its foot?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. In the course of the document, you make it clear that you stayed

4 out of conversations on this topic and that the state security department

5 was never involved and that you did not want to have conversations on the

6 topic. Is that still your position today as true?

7 A. I said to investigators of The Hague Tribunal what is true in this

8 statement, and I pointed out to them more than once during our interview

9 that this is a liberal interpretation of the employee, of the officer who

10 made this report. He emphasised certain things that I did not speak

11 about. I spoke about the mopping up and my conversation with Dragan Ilic.

12 Those are the only two things I know about. I know that mopping-up was

13 ordered. I said what mopping-up involved and who was appointed on behalf

14 the Minister of the Interior to carry it out. All the rest are rumours,

15 stories he spread among his colleagues about the problems he encountered

16 and the processing of corpses in Kosovo, which must have been certainly an

17 unpleasant task.

18 Nobody, not he and not I, ever spoke about these corpses and the

19 need to transport them out of Kosovo and treated according to the proper

20 criminal procedure and the law.

21 Q. The meeting that you spoke of there, you speak of Vlastimir

22 Djordjevic being present, and various other people by names. Is that

23 true?

24 A. Yes.

25 MR. NICE: Yes, Your Honour. That's all I, I think, want from

1 this witness. Let me just see if there's anything that Mr. Saxon thinks

2 I've omitted. And I've got some information on the word you were asking

3 about. Perhaps the document we just produced ought to be given an exhibit

4 number.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 283.

6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, Mr. Shin, alert to your concerns about the

7 word that we have been dealing with, or likely dealing with, "asanation,"

8 tells us this much, or alerts me to this much, that we can find it --

9 really, it is a Serbian word. The rest of the explanations he gives me

10 coming from dictionaries of one kind or another I suspect are matters that

11 are better dealt with by either witnesses or experts. But if you're

12 concerned to trace it yourselves through research, the first place to look

13 is a Serbian dictionary. Thank you.

14 You'll be asked some further questions.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

16 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

17 Q. [Interpretation] Radomir, you read countless reports which, along

18 a variety of lines, were submitted by members of the state security sector

19 and which, through respective administrations, were all funneled to the

20 central headquarters; is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Since heads of state security services of every country are

23 usually the best-informed people in that country, and especially in view

24 of all those reports, did you ever get any kind of report or have you ever

25 heard of an order to forcibly expel Albanians from Kosovo?

1 A. I never got such a report, nor I --

2 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you, for this reason: That both

3 you and the accused speak the same language. Everything has got to be

4 interpreted. So would you pause between his question and your answer.

5 And Mr. Milosevic, will you remember to do the same, kindly.

6 Yes. If you'd give your answer.

7 A. No, I never heard of such an order, nor have I seen such an order,

8 nor was it contained in the reports I received. Nobody, therefore, ever

9 ordered for Albanians from Kosovo to be expelled.

10 Q. Did you receive any information which would point to such a thing,

11 to the existence of an order, a plan, a decision, a suggestion, or a de

12 facto influence that Albanians from Kosovo were to be expelled?

13 A. No, I never heard of such a suggestion. I know of no plan or

14 design or instruction to expel Albanians from Kosovo.

15 Q. And at the meetings that you attended, not only those where the

16 army and the MUP were represented, but also the senior staff meetings of

17 the ministry, which I suppose were chaired by your minister, and meetings

18 in my office, is it true that completely the opposite was said; we always

19 insisted that civilians should be protected, that civilians should be

20 taken care of, so that they are not hurt in the course of anti-terrorist

21 operations. Do you remember that?

22 A. Certainly. The task was not only to protect Serb civilians, but

23 also the Albanian population and citizenry. Members of the Ministry of

24 the Interior had the task and duty to protect both groups of civilians in

25 Kosovo.

1 Q. Do you remember, Radomir, that in all the reports of the generals

2 who had been on tours in Kosovo - and this is precisely a confirmation of

3 what I'm trying to say - on multiple occasions, many examples were given

4 of members of the KLA being allowed to flee, together with groups of

5 civilians, only because the police never opened fire in situations where

6 some of the civilians could have been in danger, despite the fact that

7 members of the KLA were clearly visible among them? Do you remember those

8 reports?

9 A. I remember that. There had been a number of examples of members

10 of the KLA wearing civilian clothes on top of their uniforms, and in

11 situations when they thought their life was in jeopardy, they took off

12 their uniforms and mingled with the civilians.

13 Q. Now let's go one level below. I don't mean in the sense of

14 hierarchy, in the system of values, I mean. Have you ever received a

15 report during your entire tenure as a civil servant, as a citizen, or head

16 of the state security service, have you ever received a report or heard

17 that I myself, or any of my associates, or any politician, ever encouraged

18 or incited discrimination against or expelling or persecution of ethnic

19 Albanians in Kosovo?

20 A. No, I've never heard or seen anything like that.

21 Q. And did you hear anyone else, either from the police or the army,

22 ordering, inciting, planning, or suggesting in any way that civilians,

23 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo Metohija, should be killed, discriminated

24 against, persecuted, or anything like that?

25 A. No, I've never heard anything of the sort. I said a moment ago

1 already that our task was to preserve lives and the security of civilians

2 in Kosovo, both Albanian and Serbian.

3 Q. During all the time that we are discussing here in this room, did

4 you ever have in front of you a report of any kind to the effect that

5 members of state or public Security Services have committed some sort of

6 war crime as part of a plan carried out by the state security service or

7 the public security service or the army or anyone who was armed?

8 A. No. No crimes. I had no information about crimes. There had

9 been a number of crimes perpetrated by individuals in Kosovo, among both

10 the army and the police. Those perpetrators who were identified were duly

11 prosecuted, and we saw in one of the documents yesterday, in item 8 it

12 says that: "All perpetrators of any criminal offences committed in Kosovo

13 had to be prosecuted duly."

14 Q. Is it true that whenever there was a suspicion or it was obvious

15 that a member of the police or the army had committed any sort of criminal

16 offence, there was no discussion at all? Legal measures were taken

17 immediately, in accordance with the law, criminal reports were filed and

18 went through the due process?

19 A. I believe that over 200 such criminal reports were actually filed

20 against members of the service, and they were prosecuted. It is also

21 known from reports of the army of Yugoslavia that they did the same thing,

22 and the number of their own criminal reports was close to ours, if not

23 higher.

24 Q. Do you remember, conditionally speaking, I can't call them large

25 meetings, but speaking of meetings held in the office of head of state, a

1 meeting of 10 to 15 people is a large meeting. During that at such

2 meetings I always said that it is part of the Serb tradition that a

3 prisoner of war is something sacred, an unarmed man is something sacred,

4 that we should preserve our honour and that that can only be done if war

5 criminals in a state of war try to commit a crime, that every such crime

6 had to be punished immediately?

7 A. Yes, I remember that. You didn't say that just once; you said

8 that on many occasions, and I remember that as well as everyone who

9 attended those meetings.

10 Q. I will read out to you from some of my notes. I don't assume you

11 remember each and every one of these documents, with you do you remember

12 the orders which were then circulated around the Ministry of the Interior?

13 They went down from the general command, downwards, concerning the

14 procedure for treating captured terrorists, and said that even they should

15 be treated in keeping with the rules of international humanitarian law,

16 the laws and customs of war, and the Geneva Conventions. Do you remember

17 that order?

18 A. Yes. Members of the MUP applied all the laws and rules which were

19 mandatory under such circumstances, and they treated even terrorists, in

20 keeping with Geneva Conventions.

21 Q. Do you remember, for instance, a special order from the Supreme

22 Command concerning a ban on torching civilian Albanian houses, seizing

23 property, et cetera?

24 A. This was discussed more than once, and specifically there was this

25 ban on which you insisted, as well as the leadership of the MUP and the

1 army of Yugoslavia, that houses in Kosovo must not be set on fire and

2 nothing must be stolen.

3 Q. There was a special order that everyone should be treated

4 humanely, including any member of the enemy forces who surrendered, and

5 their lives should be spared. I'll read out to you some of these things.

6 Perhaps you don't remember all of them, but there are orders to the effect

7 that perpetrators should immediately be brought between the competent

8 court martial, the order that in the course of combat operations,

9 provisions of the international military law must apply at all times.

10 These summaries were available to everyone and notified to everyone?

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness answer.

12 A. I don't remember these orders individually, but I remember the

13 subject we've just discussed. I remember your general approach and the

14 position of the army of Yugoslavia and the Ministry of the Interior, that

15 is, to respect all provisions of international law on the territory where

16 combat operations were taking place, and concerning the treatment of

17 captured members of terrorist organisations. I don't remember individual

18 orders, because they didn't reach me, for the most part, me personally, I

19 mean. They were directed to the Ministry of the Interior.

20 Q. All right. Let's move on. You submitted your report to the

21 Minister of the Interior and you made them at staff meetings of the

22 ministry, regular meetings, chaired by the Minister of the Interior. Is

23 that the regular procedure followed by the ministry, that is, the top

24 leadership of the ministry?

25 A. Yes, that is the regular procedure. Every Tuesday, at the office

1 of the Ministry of the Interior, in the headquarters of the ministry,

2 senior staff meetings were held, attended by members of the Ministry of

3 the Interior, including the head of the state security sector and his

4 deputy.

5 Q. When you came to my office, Vlajko Stojilkovic, yourself, and

6 others -- or let me speak about you alone. When you came to see me, is it

7 true that most often you were together with your minister; that is, the

8 Minister of the Interior and head of the state security sector, in light

9 of the issues that were discussed, and very rarely, from time to time, you

10 came alone to clarify a certain issue which was within your purview? Is

11 that correct? Is that a fair description?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. In the same way, you also called on the president of the Republic

14 of Serbia, the prime minister of Serbia, providing them with relevant

15 information, not to speak of your contacts with your own minister. I am

16 not going to speak about your in-house matters. Your communication was

17 certainly more frequent. But those were the regular relations; is that

18 correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. As for these reports, last night I saw in the media that it says

21 information, et cetera, et cetera. Of course. I received information,

22 just like the President of the Republic of Serbia, the Prime Minister and

23 before that of course the Minister of the Interior, I received daily

24 information from the service that was then photocopied and sent to us for

25 our own information. Is that correct?

1 A. Yes, that is correct.

2 Q. As for Kosovo, these reports contained information -- you can

3 perhaps add something to this. I am saying what is my own assertion --

4 about the security situation in Kosovo, about weapons coming in, about the

5 information that was being received, about the existence of the KLA, about

6 crimes that they committed. Is that correct?

7 A. For the most part, that is what the information contained.

8 Q. Is it correct that, to the best of your knowledge, and also the

9 knowledge acquired by your service - I'm not referring to your personal

10 knowledge; I'm referring to your knowledge in the capacity of head of this

11 service, and on the basis of the reports received - was there terrorism in

12 Kosovo?

13 A. Yes, there was terrorism in Kosovo.

14 Q. Is it correct that a large number of our policemen and soldiers,

15 and then civilians too, both of Serb, Montenegrin, Albanian, and other

16 ethnicities, got killed in Kosovo during terrorist actions?

17 A. Over 200 members of the Ministry of the Interior were killed in

18 Kosovo. Over 300 of them were wounded. I think that over 300 members of

19 the army of Yugoslavia lost their lives in Kosovo as well. Among them

20 were civilians too.

21 Q. Is it correct that in Kosovo the police defended the citizens and

22 their property from terrorism?

23 A. The police had the task - I already said that - to protect both

24 the Serb and the Albanian population, because terrorists often turned on

25 their own people, and they insisted that they either join the ranks of the

1 KLA or participate in some other way in these terrorist actions. The

2 people did not accept that. And very often it would happen that they

3 would seek protection of the members of the Ministry of the Interior.

4 Q. That is one of the questions that I wanted to put to you, because

5 otherwise both military commanders and police commanders at these meetings

6 reported that entire villages that were purely Albanian sought protection

7 from the police in order to be protected from the terrorists, from the

8 terrorist lootings, kidnappings, et cetera. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes, that is correct. Such reports did come in from the army of

10 Yugoslavia and the Ministry of the Interior. We discussed that, and the

11 instructions were to help such people.

12 Q. To the best of your knowledge, although you, Radomir, were not

13 involved in politics ever in your life, but to the best of your knowledge,

14 in view of the position that you held, do you know that we did everything

15 to find an agreement, to reach an agreement, so that the dispute in Kosovo

16 would be resolved by peaceful means and that all of you were instructed to

17 take particular care of the security and safety of Ibrahim Rugova and

18 others because there were showdowns between them too and even their lives

19 could have been in danger? Is that correct?

20 A. Yes. The representatives of the government of Serbia I think went

21 at least 14 times to negotiate with the Albanians in Kosovo, and they did

22 not come there, and I know that President Milutinovic went at least twice

23 with regard to that particular matter, to Kosovo. And I also know that

24 Rugova's life was protected. It was endangered, precisely by his own

25 people, the Albanians. And after that, after his life was saved,

1 literally, he was brought to Serbia, and after that he was allowed to go

2 wherever he wanted to go, both he and his family. I don't know where he

3 went. And the members of our service even took care of them in Kosovo. I

4 heard that he denied that, but this is correct.

5 Q. All right. Is it correct -- I think that we should clarify a

6 general point. Is it correct that not a single employee of the MUP -- I'm

7 putting this question because constant reference is being made here to

8 some kind of crimes that were committed by the army and the police, and my

9 assertion is being challenged that the army and the police were defending

10 the country, not committing crimes. Is it correct that not a single

11 employee of the MUP, according to the existing laws, and also according to

12 the concrete instructions that they had received, were not supposed to

13 carry out any order that was contrary to the law?

14 A. Members of the Ministry of the Interior act in accordance with

15 laws that are in force. That is to say, what is binding upon them is

16 primarily the Law on Criminal Procedure, and also the law on employment in

17 the interior. These are the most important regulations that regulate how

18 members of the service are supposed to act. They should not carry out a

19 criminal act even if they were issued such an order.

20 Q. But they should also not, not, react, even if a crime is committed

21 in their presence, even if an order was issued to that effect?

22 A. Absolutely. This was regulated by law.

23 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Interpreters. Remember the

24 interpreters, Mr. Milosevic.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. A policeman who sees the commission of a crime, even a

2 misdemeanour, the commission of a misdemeanour, a pickpocket doing

3 whatever, not to mention rape or a murder, whatever, he doesn't have to

4 wait for any kind of order. It is by law that he is supposed to react in

5 the case of such a perpetrator. Is that correct or not?

6 A. Yes, that is correct.

7 Q. Reference was made here to the effect that some individuals were

8 outside the borders of Serbia. I'll come to that. But I want to clarify

9 something else before that. Is it correct that there was not a single

10 decision to this effect, or order, that members of the MUP of Serbia be

11 sent anywhere outside the borders of Serbia?

12 A. I am not aware of any such order. At my time, when I was head of

13 the state security sector, there was no such order in existence.

14 Q. I want to clarify something, because with regard to certain

15 matters, when time is disregarded as a factor, then they look different.

16 You talked about Radovan Stojicic, Badza, and you also said that for a

17 while he was in eastern Slavonia. Is it correct that in eastern Slavonia

18 he was a volunteer, not a representative of the Ministry of the Interior?

19 A. As far as I know, he was commander of the Territorial Defence,

20 which constitutes a formation of volunteers.

21 Q. Let us just look into another important matter. At that time --

22 because this is being linked to the fact that he was Deputy Minister of

23 the Interior and head of the public security sector. At that time he did

24 not have any links whatsoever with the position of the head of public

25 security or the position of Deputy Minister of the Interior, at the time

1 when he was there as a volunteer.

2 A. Yes. It was only after that that he was appointed to that

3 position. At that time he was a member of the special units, or he was an

4 advisor to the Minister of the Interior in relation to special units.

5 Q. Something was said here about manning the special terrorist unit

6 and also something that had to do with volunteers and that this was

7 organised by Arkan. Is it correct that that unit, to the best of your

8 knowledge, had its criteria, individual criteria, in terms of employing

9 persons, or rather, that this was no takeover of Arkan's unit? Each

10 individual who was taken into service was looked at on an individual

11 basis?

12 A. Yes. They were not taken over as a unit. All of those who met

13 the criteria, the requirements of the Ministry of the Interior, were taken

14 into the unit, that is to say, only those who met the requirements that

15 were put by the Ministry of the Interior.

16 Q. In response to some questions here, you referred to the following:

17 That you reorganised that unit when you came to your position, that you

18 scaled it down, that you changed its structure, et cetera. Did anybody

19 interfere as far as that was concerned?

20 A. No. I did that in agreement with the Minister of the Interior,

21 and I had permission to do that.

22 Q. So nobody was exerting any influence on you in terms of retaining

23 someone or taking somebody else in or to scale down or not to scale down?

24 You did that in accordance with your own assessment as to the scaling down

25 of that unit? You thought that was necessary, that it should be defined

1 exclusively as an anti-terrorist unit, et cetera, and that is how you

2 carried this out, without anybody's special influence or pressure to do

3 anything?

4 A. No, there was no pressure. This was a conclusion of the senior

5 staff meeting of the state security service. We agreed that that is what

6 we should do. I proposed that to the minister. The minister agreed. And

7 nobody brought any pressure to bear on me.

8 Q. Apart from these regular communications between the minister and

9 you and your deputy, did anybody from the outside interfere in any of the

10 internal matters of the state security section?

11 A. No. This was within the competencies of the Minister of the

12 Interior only. Whatever he observed and whatever he intended to have done

13 with regard to both sectors, he would carry out. But of course when

14 consulting the staff and the head of the state security. So this was an

15 agreement that was pursued without any pressures, simply by way of

16 agreement.

17 Q. You mentioned a map. He was asking -- I mean the other side,

18 Mr. Nice, asked you to explain some map. As far as I understand this,

19 this map shows the places where various members of that unit which was

20 established later, where they fought as volunteers somewhere, and in

21 various places, not where the unit, as a unit of the Ministry of the

22 Interior, was used in these activities. Do you have any idea about that?

23 A. I did tell the gentleman, the investigators of The Hague Tribunal,

24 to have a look at that map for themselves, because I assume that it is

25 there until the present day, because the unit is still in existence. At

1 that time I was not head of the state security sector, and I do not know

2 where, in which places, members of the special unit were at different

3 points in time. It is possible that this was some other unit that was

4 transformed later. It is possible that these were people who, for the

5 most part, came from that part of our country, former country, that is,

6 and that after that they established a unit for special operations.

7 Q. After that, as far as I understand matters, a number of them were

8 taken into the unit for special operations, according to the criteria that

9 met the requirements of the service itself.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Psychologically, physically, and in every other way, in terms of

12 membership in an anti-terrorist unit, I assume.

13 A. Yes. I point out that I am not competent to discuss that period,

14 because this is a period when that unit and the service, the sector, were

15 headed by Jovica Stanisic, and he will certainly be in a better position

16 to speak about that.

17 Q. And now with regard to what Mr. Nice asked you, is it correct that

18 we did have information at our disposal that Raznjatovic, who, as a

19 volunteer, with his comrades, did take part in combat operations,

20 primarily as a patriot, not as a criminal, as it is being ascribed, had

21 certain illegal operations that he was involved in, that is, information

22 that we received, and he justified this by saying that he needed money in

23 order to help the families of his wounded and killed comrades.

24 A. Yes, that is the information that we received.

25 Q. And now, in relation to that information: Did I not give an

1 instruction to you? Before that you were head of the police, of the

2 capital city, and you had the greatest experience and you held such a high

3 position. I asked you to call him in and to tell him that no illegal

4 activity could be tolerated, irrespective of reasons that are humanitarian

5 nature, and that he has to turn to legal operations only? Is that

6 correct?

7 A. That was your instruction.

8 Q. I did not say that he should legalise crime. I said that no crime

9 would be tolerated and that he could be involved in legal matters only; is

10 that correct?

11 A. That is correct, and that is what I said to The Hague Tribunal's

12 investigators.

13 Q. They usually twist things the way in which suits them, so that's

14 why I want this to be quite accurate?

15 JUDGE MAY: A that's not a comment that is proper for you to make.

16 Yes.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Did you get any report on the activity of paramilitary formations

19 in Kosovo before the NATO bombing?

20 A. No. I said that a short while ago, that as far as I know, there

21 were no paramilitary formations in Kosovo.

22 Q. Did you hear, regardless of the fact that of course there was an

23 order to that effect, did you hear me personally insisting that not a

24 single paramilitary formation should be allowed to exist? Because it's

25 usually a band of robbers, that every, each and every one of them had to

1 be arrested, disarmed. And to finish with this topic, because every now

2 and then we hear that they volunteered -- I said that if they volunteered,

3 then they had to be regular members of the army of Yugoslavia, that no

4 gangs may be admitted into the army as a group. If they volunteered in

5 the first place, they had to be deployed in various units, as individual

6 members, to avoid any possibility of abuse. Did I say that?

7 A. Yes, and that's precisely what I told the gentleman from the group

8 of the investigators of the Tribunal. I said that all the volunteers went

9 through the due procedure of admission and became regular members of the

10 army of Yugoslavia.

11 Q. And before you became head of the state security sector, before

12 you assumed that position, did you have any information about any alleged

13 war crimes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in which members of

14 the state security service, the SUP, or the army of Yugoslavia would have

15 been involved?

16 A. No. Since I was a member of the Ministry of the Interior and I

17 had a senior position in that Ministry of the Interior, I would have

18 known, I suppose.

19 Q. Well, even before that, you were head of the public security in

20 the capital, and Deputy Minister of the Interior. You would have known

21 about such things.

22 A. That's correct. As head of the Belgrade Secretariat, I was not

23 Deputy Minister of the Interior, I was below that level. It was only

24 later I became deputy minister. And as head of the Belgrade city

25 Secretariat, I was not informed of the work of members of the Ministry of

1 the Interior, but I would have certainly heard of something like that,

2 something of that order.

3 Q. Let us return to the main issue. To the best of your knowledge, I

4 mean the knowledge available to the service and your personal knowledge as

5 head of that service, did you know that the main reason for migrations

6 during the war was the bombing? Is that correct or not?

7 A. Certainly one of the reasons of migration was the bombing.

8 Q. Is it also true that another reason were the efforts to avoid

9 direct clashes, conflicts, in which the army and the police fight with the

10 KLA, and efforts to remove the citizenry from the area, the theatre of

11 combat operations?

12 A. Yes, certainly that was one more reason.

13 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now. It's time. We'll adjourn

14 for 20 minutes. Would you be back, then, please, Mr. Markovic.

15 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

16 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Radomir, you are talking about the political body that was headed

20 by Nikola Sainovic. My first question is: Is it true that this body, as

21 you said yourself, was a political one?

22 A. I can't think of another term for that, but it was some kind of

23 coordination body and it was made up of people who dealt in politics. So

24 I define it as a political body, and perhaps I was not the only one who

25 defined it that way.

1 Q. Indubitably, a political body is one which has political goals.

2 The staff, the police staff, Sreten Lukic headed it, had police tasks, the

3 army had military tasks, that is, everyone had their own task. I would

4 take, for an example, one of the documents shown by the opposite side

5 yesterday, that is, a report of the Ministry of the Interior of the

6 Republic of Serbia that was quoted yesterday here. They actually said it

7 referred to two days, whereas it says here "Summary of events,

8 occurrences, and information of importance registered in the period for --

9 from 0600 hours on the 27th of March to 0600 hours on 28th March," which

10 means 24 hours. This staff reported up the line to the office of the

11 minister and copied to the head of the public security sector, the head of

12 the state security sector, Radomir Markovic, assistant minister Obrad

13 Stevanovic, another assistant, Minister Misic, the administration of crime

14 investigation police, the administration for analysis and information, the

15 operative centre, and the secretariats of the interior, that is, heads of

16 secretariats, indicating numbers of the secretariats and these are the

17 secretariats of the interior in Kosovo and Metohija? Right? So it's

18 clear that as far as the police is concerned, it operated up the line,

19 along the vertical chain. It is also clear from the military papers

20 presented by the opposite side here that the army also followed its own

21 vertical chain. Is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. In view of the existence of this political body, are you aware

24 that there was also a temporary Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija,

25 or a provisional Executive Council, that is, the government of Kosovo and

1 Metohija, headed by Andjelkovic, who was also there the whole time?

2 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.

3 Q. Do you know that this government of Kosovo and Metohija, this

4 provisional government, was made up of representatives of all ethnic

5 groups: Serbs, Albanians, the Romany, Gorani, Muslims, all the ethnic

6 groups that populated Kosovo?

7 A. Yes, I know that.

8 Q. Do you know that this government was engaged in resolving

9 day-to-day economic, financial, social, health-related, and a variety of

10 other issues that had to do with taking care and accommodating internally

11 displaced persons and all the normal problems that the government normally

12 deals with, this government in particular was a provisional one, though?

13 A. Yes, I know that.

14 Q. All right. Is it then clear that this political body that existed

15 there, all those civil servants, Sainovic as deputy prime minister,

16 Andjelkovic as president of the provisional Executive Council, and other

17 public officials who had their respective positions, they were not part of

18 the chain of command. Its purpose was to effect exchange of information

19 and consultations, although along the vertical respective chains of

20 command, the police effected command as they were supposed to, according

21 to the law, and so did the army, each one according to their own vertical

22 chains, along their vertical chains of command?

23 A. I said myself that this body had the task of providing

24 coordination between the army and the Ministry of the Interior, but I

25 didn't say that they had the last word in it.

1 Q. All right. Let's translate that into a practical language. Was

2 this political body in charge of you? Did they command you?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Was this political body able to command Vlajko Stojilkovic?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Did they command Ojdanic or Pavkovic?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Do you know that every event, as this report indicates, all events

9 from 0600 hours on one day to 0600 hours on the following day, every event

10 relevant to the army is reported from the level of a unit up the vertical

11 chain to the brigade, the corps, the command? Do you know about that?

12 A. I suppose that subordination and the vertical chain of command

13 exists in the army as well, but I don't know exactly how the reporting

14 goes. I believe it is identical to that of the Ministry of the Interior.

15 Q. All right. But knowing Vlajko Stojilkovic, do you believe that he

16 would have allowed anyone else to take decisions on engagement of the

17 police without his knowledge and explicit consent, approval?

18 A. No. Consent was certainly required, and not only consent of the

19 Minister of the Interior.

20 Q. Did Vlajko Stojilkovic, at your in-house meetings and senior-staff

21 meetings, did he always insist that every single action had to be in

22 strict accordance with the law at all times?

23 A. Absolutely. Vlajko Stojilkovic always strongly insisted on legal

24 action.

25 Q. Did Sreten Lukic, Obrad Stevanovic, Vlastimir Djordjevic, and all

1 his subordinates insist on the same thing? Was it also their duty, their

2 task, and their personal conviction as well?

3 A. Concerning actions of members of the Ministry of the Interior, no

4 action could be illegal. Everything had to be in accordance with the law.

5 Q. You spoke about the fact that Pavkovic reported from the ground.

6 Do you remember that he reported mainly about the deployment of KLA

7 forces, their strength, he reported on problems they were encountering on

8 the ground, on the current situation, using maps, in the presence of a

9 broad circle of leaders?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. From these orders that the opposite side exhibited here and which

12 you had occasion to review because they were shown to you, is it

13 abundantly clear that the subject-matter and the discussion was always the

14 terrorist groups and their actions?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. A moment ago, during your examination-in-chief, you said the

17 activities of that body had to be approved. You "assume" by Belgrade. So

18 is it reasonable to assume is that it was a case of pursuing the policy,

19 which meant eliminating terrorism, protecting the citizenry from

20 terrorism? Do you believe it is a legitimate right of the state and also

21 the duty of the police, the army, and everyone else who is enforcing the

22 law on a certain territory?

23 A. Combatting terrorism is not only the right but also the duty, and

24 falls within the competence of every state and its organs.

25 Q. Mr. Nice also asked you about who my associates were. He asked

1 you to identify them. And from your answers to his questions, I heard you

2 say president of the federal parliament, president of the republican

3 parliament, president of the Republic of Serbia, president of the

4 government, that is, the prime minister, and their top officials of the

5 state. Also when you speak about the coordination in Kosovo and Metohija,

6 you mentioned politicians, the army, the police, public officials. How

7 can we then talk about - how shall I put it? - private policies and

8 private command if meetings are being held of the entire political and

9 military top echelon without any outsiders present, so only people who are

10 in very responsible public positions? The top officials of the state, the

11 police, the state security, leaders who are reviewing certain political

12 and military options. Was that the practice?

13 A. Yes. Those meetings were devoted to precisely those subjects.

14 Q. Is it true that this political coordination and briefing on the

15 estimates of the army addressed to the representatives of the federal and

16 the republican government, the provisional council of Kosovo and Metohija,

17 isn't it right that these bodies cannot be interpreted to have been part

18 of the chain of command? It was just coordination and exchange of

19 information about the situation, whereas command was effected along the

20 proper chain of command, both in the army and the police? Is that

21 correct?

22 A. Well, that's the term I used: "coordination."

23 Q. What was mentioned here in some testimonies was that Sainovic was

24 in charge of operations in Kosovo. Can that seem probable at all that the

25 deputy federal prime minister, in addition to all the professionals in the

1 chain of command in the army and the police, who were trained for that

2 kind of thing, is in charge of some kind of operations, operations in the

3 sense of military and police operations, things like that?

4 A. I don't think that he was an expert who could carry out military

5 and police operations. He could only carry through that which was

6 mentioned at meetings that were held in your office that showed how the

7 state was supposed to function in Kosovo.

8 Q. Is it logical, when there is a crisis in a particular territory,

9 in the territory of a particular province, precisely because of the

10 concerns over everything that is happening there, to delegate the deputy

11 federal prime minister with some other high officials. The president of

12 the federal parliament was there for a while as well as some higher

13 officials to help the local authorities, and generally speaking, in all

14 these developments, as an expression of the concern of the state for the

15 events involved and also ways and means of resolving that?

16 A. I think that is logical.

17 Q. Didn't we try, from the very top down to these authorities, to

18 stop this flow of refugees who were leaving, that we tried to explain to

19 them, to convince them, through good arguments, that the army and the

20 police would protect them, that they should stay where they were? You did

21 that, you from the state security, and also people from the public

22 security section. That was an overall political intention. Is that right

23 or is that not right?

24 A. Yes, that was the instruction, and those were the assignments.

25 Q. And do you know that the KLA carried out propaganda, that as many

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1 civilians as possible should leave Kosovo and thus stage an exodus that

2 was caused by some kind of violent behaviour of the authorities?

3 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.

4 Q. Did it happen to you too, that you intervened in that direction in

5 order to stop the flow of refugees, to make efforts to help them, on the

6 basis of information that you yourself received and insisted, therefore,

7 upon that, that they be helped, in accordance with the policy that we

8 pursued in this connection?

9 A. Yes, I intervened once in Kosovo, here, from Belgrade. When I

10 received this kind of daily information that a large number of refugees

11 appeared who were moving towards the borders with Macedonia and Albania, I

12 called the staff there, General Sreten Lukic, and I asked him for more

13 detailed information. Also I asked him what they would do in order to

14 stop these refugees. He referred me to Sainovic, the head of the staff

15 there, that I should talk to him about it as well. I called Sainovic and

16 I actually abused your name in that conversation. I think you remember

17 that. I said that it is President Milosevic's order that the refugees be

18 stopped.

19 Q. Oh, this abuse I can understand only in - how shall I put it? - in

20 a very relative sense. You knew that that was my position as well. You

21 knew that I wanted the refugees to be stopped. And as far as I can

22 remember that event, when I was asked about that event whether I had

23 issued such an order through you, I said: "Of course I did."

24 A. That's it's way it was.

25 Q. So in your assessment, and according to the experience you had,

1 according to the information you had, were the refugees the result of a

2 war, like any other war, and in all other wars, not some kind of action

3 taken by the army and the police against the civilian population?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. In all these endeavours, in all these attempts, did we manage to

6 slow down the refugee flows?

7 A. Unfortunately, we did not manage to stop them fully, but we

8 certainly reduced them to a degree. We guaranteed them their safety, we

9 guaranteed them medical security, and we explained to them that they were

10 safest in their own homes.

11 Q. Precisely in connection with that: To the best of your knowledge,

12 is it correct that the members of the police were actually explaining to

13 the Kosovar Albanians that they should not leave their homes, that they

14 should go back, that they are being guarded by the army and the police

15 and, and that when they go there, across the border, that they would be

16 recruited by force, and that they would be subjected to the other types of

17 violence that the KLA had been carrying out against them?

18 A. Yes, that is just the way they talked to them.

19 Q. And do you know that this political body that you refer to had

20 contacts with Albanian representatives, for example, Sainovic, on several

21 occasions, with Rugova, and with other Albanian leaders, that likewise,

22 during cooperation with the Verification Mission, he was head of the

23 commission of the federal government for cooperation with the Verification

24 Mission, that he had an assistant, the retired General Loncar, who was in

25 Pristina all the time, also for the purpose of cooperating with the

1 Verification Mission, that this federal commission for cooperation with

2 the Verification Mission consisted of representatives of all the relevant

3 ministries that were necessary for this kind of cooperation, that is to

4 say, the army, the military, the police, the commissioner for refugees,

5 the ministry for social matters, et cetera? Are you aware of that?

6 A. Yes, I know that Sainovic did contact the representatives of the

7 Verification Mission and for missions in Kosovo, and also that he had

8 contacts with Rugova.

9 Q. I have a few concrete questions. Being the best-informed state

10 official in terms of state security, as head of state security, did you

11 ever hear of a plan called Kolubara?

12 A. I already answered that question to the gentleman of the

13 investigation, that is to say that I never heard of such a plan.

14 Q. And did you ever hear of a plan called horseshoe, Potkovica,

15 because that has also been referred to here. Let me not go into all that

16 now. I don't want the question to be a leading question. Have you heard

17 of a plan called Horseshoe?

18 A. I have already said that I hadn't heard of that either.

19 Q. All right. Let me just take a look.

20 In a conversation -- actually, do you remember this conversation

21 that you had with two committees of the federal parliament while you were

22 in prison? During that conversation or interview did you say that the

23 state security was not mine or yours but that it belonged to the state?

24 Is that your position?

25 A. Yes, that is precisely the way I put it, and that is what I assert

1 now as well.

2 Q. So this was not any kind of control over the state security. The

3 state security worked according to their own regulations and according to

4 the law. It could not have been the private affair of you or me or any

5 other individual in the state; is that correct?

6 A. Precisely.

7 Q. Let me just take a look here at my notes.

8 First of all, I would like to continue along the following lines:

9 I mentioned your interview with two committees of the parliament of

10 Yugoslavia, the assembly of Yugoslavia. Is it correct that you were

11 arrested only so that by exerting pressure against you, they could accuse

12 me?

13 A. Yes. That's why they arrested me.

14 Q. Here, when you talked to two committees of the parliament of

15 Yugoslavia, you say: "They asked me to accuse Slobodan Milosevic and to

16 admit to criminal acts and to say that I was instructed by Slobodan

17 Milosevic thereof."

18 Is that correct?

19 A. That's correct. I was told that in that case I would not be the

20 one who would be held accountable but that I could choose a country where

21 I would live and that I could get a new identity and that it was

22 indispensable to accuse you so that you would be tried in the country.

23 Q. So that I could be tried in the country so that they would not

24 have to sustain the shame of extraditing me to The Hague; is that right?

25 A. I assume that that was the reason.

1 Q. All right. Since you're a career policeman in the details that

2 were referred to here, as soon as you finished your university studies,

3 you started working in the police force and you did so all the way up to

4 your arrest. Is it correct that a detainee in an investigating prison can

5 be only under the jurisdiction of a court and is not under the

6 jurisdiction of the police?

7 A. According to our law on criminal procedure, a detainee is

8 exclusively under the jurisdiction of the court. That is to say, that

9 while an individual is under investigation, he is under the authority of

10 an investigative judge and then after that, within the authority of the

11 president of the chamber of the court.

12 Q. Is it true that even prison guards are not members of the Ministry

13 of the Interior but members of the Ministry of Justice, that is to say, a

14 completely separate authority that is within the judiciary system?

15 A. Prison guards are organisationally linked to the Ministry of

16 Justice.

17 Q. Is it correct that without the approval of the court, you were

18 illegally taken out of members of the state security section so that they

19 would exert this kind of pressure that I've been referring to against

20 you?

21 A. Members of the state security sector did not have a document given

22 to them by the investigating judge to have me taken out. They only had

23 permission to talk to me within the prison.

24 Q. Is it correct that a month after you were brought into custody,

25 they took you out to interview you and that there was an interview that

1 was attended inter alia by the Minister of the Interior, Mihajlovic, and

2 others. As for the official record from the trial, I submitted that here

3 while Witness Karleusa was being questioned, and that is stated in that

4 record as well. Is that right?

5 A. The first time they talked to me after I spent a month in prison.

6 Then, during the following months, they spoke to me several times. I

7 literally handed over my position in the service in prison, because they

8 did not carry out this handover when it was supposed to be carried out. I

9 talked about the sector. I referred to things where I thought I could

10 help them, where I could lead them to the right path, so that we could

11 clarify where the state security was used and where it was instructed to

12 do certain things and when it was not. Because very often the state

13 security service was used and abused. It was mentioned in many places,

14 and it had no authority to act in such areas.

15 After having spent four months in detention, I was taken out, and

16 that's when I had this meeting with the head of state security, Goran

17 Petrovic, and Zoran Mijatovic, his deputy, and the Ministry of the

18 Interior of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Mihajlovic. They did say that in

19 court, and you have a record of that. They accepted that we did talk

20 outside the prison premises. They claimed that that was at my request.

21 Q. Was it at your request?

22 A. Had it been at my request, then they certainly would have had a

23 proper order from the investigating judge and then they would not have

24 taken me out for dinner.

25 Q. Is it true that they offered on that occasion to you certain

1 protective measures? They told you you would be in prison for six months

2 and would be tried if you don't agree to charge me falsely, to level false

3 allegations against me? Is that true or not?

4 A. They spoke to me about the difficult position I was in. They

5 warned me against the possible consequences and offered me an option in

6 the form of accusing Milosevic, as the person who issued orders for those

7 criminal offences, which would relieve me of liability before a criminal

8 court.

9 Q. Is it true that they offered you a new identity, money, and

10 sustenance for you and your family only so that you would falsely accuse

11 me? Is that correct?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. Do you know that in 1998 -- sorry. 1988, the General Assembly of

14 the United Nations adopted by consensus a declaration against torture, and

15 that such treatment that you were subjected to is explicitly forbidden by

16 this declaration, as well as forcing --

17 MR. NICE: Your Honour -- [Previous translation continues]

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. -- statements from detainees, extortion and such things?

20 JUDGE MAY: This doesn't appear to have any relevance to the

21 evidence the witness has given here, none at all. He's been agreeing with

22 you, he's been agreeing to the matters you've put to him, and we're not

23 certainly going to litigate here what happened in Yugoslavia when he was

24 arrested. What we're concerned with, as you know, is events in Kosovo.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the conduct of a puppet

1 regime in Belgrade is completely identical to the false indictment --

2 JUDGE MAY: Precisely the sort of point which we're not going to

3 consider. Now, have you got any more relevant questions for this witness?

4 Or we'll move on.

5 Mr. Tapuskovic, have you got any questions of this witness?

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I have more questions. I

8 have many more questions.

9 JUDGE MAY: How long do you think you'll need, Mr. Tapuskovic?

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will try to do

11 what I have to do within 15 minutes.

12 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

13 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Move on to some other topic.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. All right. Is it true that inciting somebody to false testimony

16 and false accusations is a criminal act under our law?

17 JUDGE MAY: That is precisely the point that has been ruled

18 against. Now, you'll have to deal with his evidence. Do you challenge,

19 for instance, the meeting at which it was said you were at and there was

20 talking of the cleaning up of the terrain? If so, you should put that?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I am asking precisely that

22 question: Is it true that this statement that has been presented about

23 the mopping up of the terrain was drafted precisely by the same people and

24 under the sponsorship of those people who exerted pressure on you and who

25 have been torturing you for one year and a half now?

1 A. Yes, it's an interview with the same people.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. From --

4 JUDGE MAY: Exhibit 283.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. I have noted down your words related to this matter. You said it

7 was a liberal interpretation on their part, that you discussed the mopping

8 up in an informal conversation with Ilic, that what was said was mostly

9 gossip, and that nobody, Ilic or you included, ever talked about removing

10 corpses from Kosovo. So could it be said that this statement is a

11 fabrication by the same people who conducted these interviews?

12 A. Unfortunately, I did not read that statement before I signed it,

13 and it is not really in the format of the statement. It was a

14 conversation, an interview, in which we were looking for a way out of the

15 problems that were facing the Ministry of the Interior. After that, an

16 official, officer of the state security service drafted this paper, and

17 later, when it was presented to me by the Office of the Prosecutor of The

18 Hague Tribunal, I pointed out certain details which did not tally with the

19 truth. And after that, I gave my statement to the investigators of the

20 OTP, which I assert is true and correct.

21 Q. Okay. Let's get one thing clear: At this meeting about which

22 they made this statement, did I ever mention in any way removing traces of

23 crimes?

24 A. No. You approved the mopping up, the clean-up.

25 Q. Is it true that the mopping up or clean-up means a lawful

1 procedure consisting of those elements which you mentioned in chief, that

2 is, removal of mines and explosives, removal of chemicals, removal of dead

3 bodies, taking care of the wounded, repairing infrastructure, service

4 lines, et cetera, that is, creating -- restoring life back to normal after

5 combat operations? Is that correct?

6 A. Yes, that is what the clean-up means, what it implies.

7 Q. Did anyone at that meeting mention that clean-up also involves

8 removal of traces of crimes or any sort of cover-up? Did anyone say that

9 crimes needed to be covered up?

10 A. No, nobody talked about crimes or covering them up.

11 Q. And even later, in the Ministry of the Interior, did anyone speak

12 about the need to transfer some bodies from Kosovo to Serbia proper?

13 A. Not that I heard.

14 Q. Is it well known that the actual situation, the reality, was quite

15 the opposite, as far as covering up is concerned? The position of all of

16 us, starting with me, the minister, Milutinovic, and other politicians,

17 yourself and others, namely, that crimes had to be answered for and that

18 any perpetrator of a crime had to be brought to justice?

19 A. That was also written in the orders that we received.

20 Q. So can we derive the conclusion that if anyone wanted to cover up

21 anything, it was concealment from the local authorities and not The Hague

22 Tribunal, because at that time, in March 1999, nobody gave a thought to

23 The Hague Tribunal?

24 A. Yes, it could be interpreted that way.

25 Q. Very well. During your testimony here, some sort of record of

1 interrogation was presented here, your interrogation before an

2 investigating judge, and Mr. Nice quoted, "Jovica Stanisic showed you a

3 paper which was actually an authorisation from then president of Slobodan

4 Milosevic, according to which the head of the SDB was directly answerable

5 to Slobodan Milosevic I don't know exactly was written in it, but it

6 transpired -- the essence was that the minister was bypassed, the Minister

7 of the Interior, Vlajko Stojilkovic, was bypassed, and instead, Jovica

8 Stanisic was directly accountable to Slobodan Milosevic."

9 That is basically the statement that Mr. Nice quoted here

10 yesterday. And then this decision was also presented to you, and you

11 confirmed it was the decision that indeed had been shown to you. Since

12 this decision contains only one sentence, I will read it out:

13 "In the period of preparations for enacting the federal law on

14 conducting law enforcement in the SFRY, the security sector shall work

15 according to the guidelines of the president and the government of the

16 Republic of Serbia from the day of entry into force of this decision until

17 the day of entry into force of the federal law which will govern security

18 affairs from then on."

19 So I've read this decision entirely. It says at the bottom

20 "Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic," and my signature. Can

21 this decision be interpreted or understood as bypassing the law or, as

22 they said here, bypassing the Minister of the Interior, Vlajko

23 Stojilkovic? Can that be the interpretation of this decision?

24 JUDGE MAY: Before you answer, the record should reflect that the

25 accused is referring to Exhibit 277.

1 Yes, Mr. Markovic.

2 A. It is a fact that Jovica Stanisic did not submit reports to the

3 Minister of the Interior, Vlajko Stojilkovic, nor did he or any

4 representative of the state security branch during his tenure attend the

5 senior staff meetings of the ministry while Vlajko Stojilkovic was the

6 minister.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Okay. Let's clear this up. This decision was adopted on the 21st

9 of April, 1997. That's what it says here. But before I ask my second

10 question: Was that the case during all the time while Jovica Stanisic was

11 head of the DB until late autumn 1998, what you just said, that he did not

12 attend?

13 A. No. That was the case only during the time when Vlajko

14 Stojilkovic was appointed Minister of the Interior. Until then, he was a

15 regular attendant of meetings in the office of the minister, Zoran

16 Sokolovic.

17 Q. All right. But beginning with the 21st of April, or around that

18 time, Stojilkovic was appointed before that, was it the case that during

19 all that time he didn't attend these meetings while Vlajko Stojilkovic was

20 the minister?

21 A. I believe he started to attend, and at some point later, when he

22 was enabled in this way to report directly to the government of Serbia, he

23 stopped attending.

24 Q. So that was the case until the end of his term of office?

25 A. Yes, until the end.

1 Q. All right. This was adopted on the 21st of April, 1997. And I

2 ceased to be president of the Republic of Serbia by assuming the functions

3 of the president of the SFRY in the same year, on the 23rd of July. I

4 suppose that these facts are not disputed or disputable. Therefore, in

5 light of this decision - and I assert that it cannot be understood in this

6 way - he was able to report to me from the end of April until the 23rd of

7 July, but not after that date, because this refers to guidelines of the

8 president and the government of the Republic of Serbia, not me personally.

9 The reference is made here to institutions, not an individual?

10 JUDGE MAY: You're making your point.

11 Mr. Markovic, help us with this: Can you see any point in this

12 document? What would you understand the purpose of it to be?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, we'll come to the purpose

14 of this document. Let me continue my examination.

15 JUDGE MAY: You've been making speeches. Let the witness answer.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understood that the head of the

17 state security sector at that time, Jovica Stanisic, did not wish to

18 communicate with the Minister of the Interior. The reason was probably

19 that his past experience until then was much richer than the experience of

20 the Minister of the Interior. It was at his personal request - and that's

21 what he told me himself - that he received this document, enabling him to

22 communicate directly with the head of the Republic of Serbia, the

23 president of the Republic, and the government of Serbia.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Let us now go to the essence of this document and the essence of

1 what you testified yesterday, I believe it was during the

2 examination-in-chief. It might have been even the day before yesterday,

3 because there were constant interruptions. The subject was the

4 preparations for enacting the federal law governing security affairs on

5 the territory of Yugoslavia. Is it true that the procedure for enacting a

6 federal law starts with a certain expert body preparing a draft law, or a

7 bill, after which the competent ministry proposes that bill to the

8 government; if it is a federal law, then to the federal government; the

9 federal government first approves the draft, then reviews it, and only

10 then it is reviewed at a session of the federal government, whereupon a

11 proposal is made to refer it to the federal parliament for enactment.

12 Does this describe roughly the procedure for enacting a federal law?

13 A. Yes, that is the procedure for adopting a law.

14 Q. Could you then assume -- let me break this question down again.

15 Do you think that Jovica Stanisic was -- perhaps I should put it this

16 way -- to a great extent, the person who was the greatest expert in

17 national security affairs that we had at that time? Is that right or is

18 that not right?

19 A. Yes, that's right.

20 Q. So do you assume that he headed the team that worked on the

21 professional preparation of that law?

22 A. Yes. That was his idea originally, to adopt this law.

23 Q. Do you know that it was considered, in many developed countries,

24 that these state security affairs should not be carried out within the

25 Ministry of the Interior, but that there are agencies that the state

1 establishes for carrying out such work?

2 A. According to that model, that proposal was made, and I see that

3 such a law has been adopted now.

4 Q. Do you know that at that time, when work was being done on

5 regulating the state affairs in the area of state security, there was a

6 state security service of Serbia, a state security service of Montenegro,

7 there was an administration for intelligence and the General Staff, then

8 also an administration in the General Staff that also dealt with security,

9 and then also in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a special service that

10 also dealt in such matters? Are you aware of all of that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So the objective was to create a community of security services,

13 to regulate it by federal law, and in this way to make it possible to do

14 away with mutual rivalries, mistrust, jealousies, et cetera, that usually

15 exist between such communities and they jealously guard the information

16 they have, rarely give it to other agencies, et cetera? Is that correct?

17 A. Yes, that was the objective.

18 Q. And then is it quite clear that Stanisic wished - how should I put

19 this? - to protect himself from lateral influences with regard to the

20 professional preparation of that law, and once he drafts it with his team,

21 it could not have a different fate by what we established a few minutes

22 ago, that it be presented to the government then, that then it be

23 presented as a bill to the federal parliament, and so on? So there was no

24 other question involved.

25 A. I can only assume that that was his wish.

1 Q. All right. But isn't it logical that someone who believes and --

2 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... amount of --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

4 MR. NICE: There must be a limit to the amount of self-serving

5 benefit that can be got by assumptions and so on through this witness, but

6 it is a matter for the Court.

7 JUDGE MAY: It's a matter for the Trial Chamber to decide what

8 value this evidence has, given largely by the accused.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. There's not much point. This is

10 the point that's being made: Going on to the witness about matters which

11 he really doesn't know about and asking him what his assumptions are.

12 Now, if you want to call or give evidence about these matters from

13 somebody who knows about them, you can, but it's of little benefit to the

14 Trial Chamber. As you know, your time is limited, so you'll want to use

15 it as usefully as you can.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I am using it, Mr. May, but

17 precisely from this paper that was submitted by Mr. Nice, this paper shows

18 what I have been claiming. It shows that the most expert team possible

19 that was preparing a draft law was headed by the greatest expert of all,

20 and it was logical to make it possible for that man that until he prepares

21 this bill for consideration for the government, that he should not be

22 subjected to pressure from any other sides until he actually prepares

23 this. So then it was not up to me or anyone else; it was up to the

24 government and parliament what kind of bill would be presented and what

25 the parliament would ultimately adopt.

1 JUDGE MAY: We hear your argument. It is a matter of argument.

2 The witness can only give evidence about what he knows himself or saw or

3 heard. Now, unless there's anything else you want to ask about this which

4 is relevant, I suggest we move on and don't waste further time on it.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, you did not caution the

6 other side that they were wasting time when they were putting questions

7 about licence plates on a truck for ten minutes, and you are cautioning me

8 when you speak about a decision that is quite legitimate and that pertains

9 to the internal regulation of a sovereign state. And you cannot even --

10 JUDGE MAY: Your points are totally false. There was no question

11 of ten minutes on that matter. Anyway, it's irrelevant. If you want to

12 ask, if you've got questions that this witness can deal with, of course

13 this is an important document. If you've got some questions that the

14 witness can deal with in relation to it, why, then, ask him, but asking

15 him about a series of assumptions is not going to assist anybody.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The assumption is -- or rather, the

17 construction that somebody planted to this witness on purpose is that

18 through this document, the Minister of the Interior was bypassed. That's

19 not what it says in this document. And that the law was bypassed. And

20 that's not what this document says either.

21 JUDGE MAY: It will be a matter for the Trial Chamber to decide

22 what construction to give to the document. Now, let's move on.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Please, were there any changes at all in the method of your work

25 and in the work of the state security -- I'm comparing the time when I was

1 president and the time after I stopped being president, that is to say,

2 after the coup of the 5th of October. Did you work the same way before

3 that and after that?

4 A. The public security functioned the same way. I cannot speak about

5 state security because I do not know how it functioned at that time.

6 Q. All right. But I'm referring to the following. For a while you

7 did head state security after the 5th of October too, for a few months. I

8 cannot say exactly how many months. Did you change anything in the method

9 of your work? Did you work differently while I was president and after I

10 stopped being president?

11 A. No. Nothing was changed in the method of work. That is to say

12 that the sector worked for the state, and the state had its duties that

13 are precisely regulated by law and other regulations.

14 Q. Now let us digress in relation to this mystification of

15 resubordination of the forces of the Ministry of the Interior to the army.

16 Actually, in a situation of war, precisely because of the existence of the

17 principle of one command, the police is subordinated to the army. Is that

18 correct or is that not correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Is it correct that by proclaiming a state of war, the General

21 Staff of the army of Yugoslavia becomes the staff of the Supreme Command?

22 Is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Is it correct, therefore, that the staff of the Supreme Command

25 and the Supreme Command, in a state of war, includes all armed forces, not

1 only the army? That is to say, the army and the police and everybody else

2 who carries a weapon.

3 A. That's right.

4 Q. I am not going to give you now this instruction of the staff of

5 the Supreme Command, Mr. May, because I need it for other reasons, more

6 important ones, but I should just like to recall that it bears the

7 signature of the head of the staff of the Supreme Command.

8 Lest there be any misunderstanding, the fact that it was signed by

9 the chief of staff of the Supreme Command does not mean that I am not

10 considered to be the authority -- the order giving authority in this

11 respect as well.

12 MR. NICE: I'm not sure if the accused is saying that he's

13 cross-examining on a different document from any that we have and that

14 he's not prepared to disclose, but if that's what he's saying, he should

15 perhaps be corrected, because if he has a document, it ought to be

16 revealed to the Court.

17 JUDGE MAY: Let's see what the point is.

18 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is what I'm trying to say: In

20 the order -- actually, yesterday Mr. Nice presented a document here that

21 refers to General Pavkovic's order in respect of resubordinating the

22 police to certain structures of the army in the field, but I'm just

23 mentioning that General Pavkovic's order is based on the order issued by

24 the staff of the Supreme Command, and in it the command of the 3rd Army,

25 headed by General Pavkovic, are told that forces of the civil defence are

1 being put under the command of the 3rd Army and are being used exclusively

2 on the basis of your decision. So we clarified this a short while ago,

3 that this is a legal --

4 JUDGE MAY: What is the date of this document?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The date of this document is the 9th

6 of April, 1999.

7 JUDGE MAY: You're going to produce it in due course; is that

8 right.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I will. But I need it for

10 cross-examining another witness. According to the list provided by the

11 OTP, or rather, those who aspire to be the Office of the Prosecutor, I

12 will needed this for another witness that I will be cross-examining, and

13 after all, I have that right, not to disclose it now. After all, I have

14 the right not to disclose anything I don't want to disclose, so there.

15 JUDGE MAY: But in order that there's some order in this, you must

16 disclose that before we break from the Kosovo part of the case. Or you

17 can give a copy to the Prosecution. Either way will do.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am going to tender it before we

19 finish the Kosovo segment of the case, Mr. May. Don't you worry. But

20 before that, I want to discuss certain allegations made by a witness who

21 is supposed to appear here. I hope so, at least, unless the Prosecution

22 does not call him again.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Furthermore, please, let's just look at the question of financing

25 for a moment. You were asked -- or rather, you personally have been asked

1 here by the representatives of this indictment -- this is the way I wrote

2 it down -- whether the state security was financed by the state, from

3 state sources, or in some other way. And then there was an explanation

4 given by you that the budget was approved, et cetera, et cetera, and that

5 the funds that were lacking for that were given from the funds that were

6 collected by way of the Federal Customs Administration. Is it contested

7 that resources that are collected by way of the Federal Customs

8 Administration are also state funds, not funds that are apart from the

9 state?

10 A. These are state funds.

11 Q. Is it contested that every time, for such funds, there was an

12 appropriate relationship between the customs and an appropriate service of

13 the Ministry of the Interior that then used these resources according to a

14 plan that had it explained and elaborated before that? Is that right or

15 is that not right?

16 A. That's what I said.

17 Q. Yes, but, for example, the Prosecution said that there was some

18 kind of mediation in terms of the purchase of helicopters and equipment

19 for helicopters, that there was some kind of mediation on the part of my

20 brother. Did he do this as my brother or because he was required to do so

21 by the service?

22 A. He did that within the context of his own service, and this was

23 required from him by the service.

24 Q. And do you know that already in the early 1970s my brother was

25 counsellor of the embassy in Moscow?

1 A. No. I met him as ambassador.

2 Q. And do you know that later in the 1970s he was minister counsellor

3 in the embassy in Moscow? Just say yes or no. It's not important.

4 A. No.

5 Q. And do you know that towards the end of the 1980s he was

6 ambassador of the former SFRY in Algeria and he also served a term?

7 A. No. I only know about the period when he was ambassador to

8 Russia.

9 Q. And before that period he lived in Moscow, and before that in

10 Paris, et cetera. Was it through me that the service communicated with

11 our ambassador to Moscow, or did the service officially address him? For

12 example, did you communicate with him through me when you had some contact

13 with him, or did you have contacts of your own with him?

14 A. No. The communication was direct, because it was inherited, so to

15 speak. That is the way it worked before me. And Borislav Milosevic was

16 engaged in other matters in addition to being ambassador, before that, and

17 he was a man who knew very well what the possibilities were of obtaining

18 what we needed.

19 Q. Actually, did he help the service to meet their needs in terms of

20 purchasing some equipment?

21 A. Yes, he did help the service.

22 Q. Because of what can be interpreted between the lines, did anyone

23 ever have any information to the effect that he had taken some money for

24 helping the service?

25 A. No. He only enabled contacts based on which the service of the

1 Ministry of the Interior, the relevant service, managed to conduct these

2 transactions.

3 Q. So he used his own reputation, connections, to enable members of

4 your ministry to get this done?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And do you have any information to the effect that he himself, or

7 any of his subordinates, collected any money for this service, so to

8 speak?

9 A. No. The state security sector did not conclude any contracts. It

10 was the job of the financial department of the Ministry of the Interior,

11 and I have no such information.

12 Q. You mentioned yesterday Borka Vucic. I don't want to object to

13 this or hold it against you, but the opposite side seems to represent this

14 person as some sort of shadowy figure through which such -- shady figure

15 through which such transactions were conducted. Do you know that she was

16 actually the director of one of the major financial institutions, major

17 banking institutions called Beogradska Bank?

18 A. I spoke of Mrs. Borka Vucic precisely as an expert in the area of

19 finance and banking, and that was the reason why we were directed to

20 conduct our affairs through that bank, because they were experts in that

21 field.

22 Q. Do you know that Mrs. Borka Vucic has been engaged for many

23 decades in this area and that she is well known to the top-notch bankers

24 in the world?

25 A. I have heard a lot about the expertise of Mrs. Borka Vucic. I'm

1 not competent to qualify her or to assess her qualifications, but I know

2 that she is a well-known banker internationally.

3 Q. But do you know that every transaction had to be legally effected

4 through a bank precisely because rules had to be abided by in every

5 respect, rules governing banking, financial affairs, et cetera?

6 A. Since it was the Ministry of the Interior, I'm certain that all

7 transactions had to be effected legally and lawfully.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Let me just look through this.

9 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now. It's 12.15. It's time

10 for the break. Twenty minutes. Would you be back then, please,

11 Mr. Markovic.

12 MR. NICE: Your Honour, just before we leave, in setting the

13 timetable for the balance of the day, with a witness of this kind, he's

14 already been in cross-examination longer than in chief, there will be a

15 significant number of questions to ask in re-examination. It's not a case

16 where, of course, the cross-examination has been regarded as hostile by

17 the accused. The re-examination may be quite important.

18 JUDGE MAY: How long are you asking for?

19 MR. NICE: At least 15 minutes, but it could be longer.

20 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

21 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

22 --- Upon commencing at 12.39 p.m.

23 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you can have half an hour more, if you

24 require it.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was just going to tell you,

1 Mr. May: Since I heard that the amici want to use up 15 minutes and that

2 Mr. Nice too wants 15 minutes, I was going to tell you that I will shorten

3 my cross-examination so that they can have this opportunity in full, and I

4 wanted to say that at the end of the previous session, when you told me I

5 may continue after the break.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. I have just a few more questions, mainly related to what the

8 opposite side put forth in this courtroom. Radomir, yesterday, or the day

9 before yesterday - I can't remember exactly - the opposite side quoted

10 some alleged statement of yours to the effect that my wife wanted to

11 influence have over the service, and that is associated with the

12 appointment of Uros Suvakovic on one of the positions in the service.

13 Just a few questions about that.

14 Is it true that Uros Suvakovic was not a member of the Yugoslav

15 left wing, but a member of the socialist party of Serbia?

16 A. Suvakovic was a member of the socialist party of Serbia, yes.

17 Q. Was he appointed by a decision of the Minister of the Interior to

18 his position?

19 A. He was appointed by a decision of the Minister of the Interior,

20 yes.

21 Q. Is it true that in that position to which he was appointed to,

22 Uros Suvakovic did not deal in either intelligence or counter-intelligence

23 affairs, but as a young scientist in the field of sociology, he dealt in

24 general issues of sociopolitical nature, of political and security nature,

25 rather?

1 A. His job had to do with analytical work in the state security

2 branch.

3 Q. Very well. Yesterday, the opposite side produced a document here

4 titled "Order by Lieutenant General Nebojsa Pavkovic," dated 8th May,

5 1999. It is an order concerning resubordination of the MUP to the army of

6 Yugoslavia, and it was adopted almost a month earlier, as I said before.

7 Is it true that the command of the 3rd Army of the VJ -- is it true that

8 this order relies completely on this previous order, since it is dated the

9 8th of May, 1999?

10 A. Yes. I said yesterday that I assume that this order of his is

11 based on the order of the staff of the Supreme Command.

12 Q. And it is implied - and I don't contest it in any way - that an

13 order of the chief of staff of the Supreme Command must have an approval

14 from me.

15 A. That's understood too.

16 Q. Are you aware of any -- I quoted here only a certain number of

17 orders, but are you aware of any order of the staff of the Supreme Command

18 which would be contrary to the laws and customs of war, the Geneva

19 Conventions, and all the legislation governing proper treatment of

20 civilians and proper conduct of the army or the armed forces in general?

21 A. No, I don't know of any such order. I am certain that none

22 existed.

23 Q. Some training centres for volunteers have been mentioned here. Is

24 it true that neither you nor your service could have had no information

25 about the role of the leadership of Serbia or my personal role in the

1 fostering or maintenance of such training centres? Is that true or not?

2 A. I had no such knowledge, and during my tenure as head of the state

3 security sector, there were no such camps.

4 Q. I omitted to ask you something about that notorious mopping up.

5 Is it true that there was an official instruction on mopping up that

6 included all those elements that you enumerated, plus some more elements

7 which were prescribed by the same instruction?

8 A. I don't know about the official instruction, but it was prescribed

9 by the army of Yugoslavia. They issued an order to that effect, and I

10 suppose it was signed by General Lazarevic.

11 Q. When was the first time that you heard about some transport of

12 corpses to Serbia proper?

13 A. I heard about it and I read about it in the papers while I was in

14 prison.

15 Q. So you didn't, and you couldn't have known anything about it while

16 you were heading the state security sector, and if anything of the sort

17 existed, I suppose, you would have had to know?

18 A. I knew absolutely nothing about it.

19 Q. Since you occupied high positions in the police, have you ever

20 heard of any plan designed by me or anyone else in the top echelons of

21 Serbia or Yugoslavia to create a Serbian army outside the territory of

22 Yugoslavia or a Serbian army within the boundaries of Yugoslavia? Have

23 you ever heard of such a plan?

24 A. No, I haven't.

25 Q. References are made here often on the importance of the Ministry

1 of the Defence of Serbia, especially in relation to Croatia. Since you

2 worked in the Ministry of the Interior and you had access to the most

3 confidential documents, did the Ministry of Defence of Serbia ever have a

4 role with regard to Croatia or the war in Croatia?

5 A. I know nothing about that.

6 Q. One more question: Did the KLA -- or rather, is the KLA just a

7 name for a terrorist organisation which assumed that name in order to make

8 the international community treat them as some sort of liberation movement

9 rather than a terrorist organisation?

10 A. Yes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No further questions, Mr. May.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

13 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Markovic, I would just like to ask you to

15 give a few explanations with regard to Exhibit 283. It has to do with

16 your statement, as it says here, dated the 2nd of June, 2002.

17 A. Could you please repeat what this is? I can't know this way.

18 Q. That is a statement where it is said that you spoke of the

19 possible civilian casualties that could become the object of the interest

20 of The Hague Tribunal, as Mr. Nice read out to you. It is your statement

21 dated the 2nd of June, 2002. There it is. You don't have to read it?

22 JUDGE KWON: 2001.

23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. It says -- I mean, that's

24 what I want to ask.

25 Q. In this printed text of your statement, it says that it was given

1 on the 2nd of June, 2001. That's what it says. And in -- on the bottom

2 of the page, you put your signature and you said the 2nd of June, 2002.

3 Usually a date is not put underneath a signature if it is already

4 contained in the statement. Can you explain this? Was this statement

5 brought to you as it was written here?

6 A. It was brought as it was written here.

7 Q. When was it written? On the 2nd of June, 2001?

8 A. You know what? I have lost an idea about this. Now, I was

9 arrested in 2001.

10 Q. When?

11 A. In February. So this is the year 2001.

12 Q. So when was this statement written? It was brought written as it

13 is to you, wasn't it?

14 A. Yes, it was brought to me written as it is in 2001, because --

15 Q. Then why did you put this date here, the 2nd of June, 2002?

16 A. That's only on the middle page. But look at the first one. That

17 is 2001 --

18 Q. No. On the second page it is 2001, and then the third page is

19 2002. As far as I can see it is 2002 in all three places. But all right.

20 What interests me is the following: It was brought to you written the way

21 it stands; right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So they did not put questions to you and then compose this

24 statement?

25 A. We had several conversations. That is to say that at some

1 conversations, we compiled a report after the interview, and others, due

2 to the limited time that could be spent in conversation with me, on the

3 basis of notes of employees of the state security sector, statements were

4 compiled later and brought to me to sign.

5 Q. Was this for the purposes that Mr. Milosevic referred to? Were

6 some promises made to you?

7 A. When I signed this, nothing was promised to me. These were

8 interviews with an employee of the state security service. This was

9 purely an exchange of information. It was not a statement that was being

10 taken as under the Law on Criminal Procedure. This was an interview in

11 which they insisted that I should help them in respect of the knowledge

12 they already had, that I could help them enhance the knowledge they

13 already had. I told them what I knew and referred them to people who knew

14 far more about this. That is to say that I said what I had heard. And I

15 referred them to people who actually did that.

16 Q. Thank you, but I don't have much time. I'm interested in the

17 following: Could this statement have been taken to you under the

18 circumstances under which it was taken in the spirit of Yugoslav

19 legislation and could it have been taken in this way according to Yugoslav

20 law?

21 A. It could have been taken this way in the spirit of Yugoslav law.

22 Q. Thank y