1 Tuesday, 2 July 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I understand there are some matters you

6 want to raise about the hearing in your absence. There was a transcript.

7 You should have had a copy of it, so you should know what happened.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. First and foremost, I think

9 that sitting in any way in my absence, especially if some rights of mine

10 were discussed, is wrong, because my presence is compulsory during such a

11 sitting. And therefore, I object.

12 Secondly, in relation to the fact that you discussed some kind of

13 examinations and the condition of my health, first and foremost, I want to

14 say that I have no objections whatsoever with regard to the prison doctor.

15 He behaves in a correct, professional manner. I pointed out to him that I

16 am not asking for any kind of sick leave. I'm not asking for anything.

17 I want to tell you that you should not harbour any illusions that

18 I seek anything of you. I am not going to accept any kind of examinations

19 by any kind of commission if my own doctor who treated me over the past

20 few years is not on that same commission.

21 The third thing I wish to say has to do with the proposals of the

22 other side to have nine witnesses that are supposed to testify under Rule

23 92 bis do not be cross-examined. I categorically oppose that, and I

24 remind you that you yourselves have ruled that all witnesses, even those

25 under 92 bis, are supposed to be subjected to cross-examination.

1 On the 11th of March, 2002 - this is in the transcript, on page

2 1964, line 16 - that was precisely your decision, as far as I could see.

3 [In English] "It is right that witnesses should appear for

4 cross-examination." [Interpretation] That is your decision.

5 On the 17th of April, 2002, in the transcript, page 3360 --

6 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you because we decided in that

7 case that we would leave the decision about whether to allow those

8 witnesses to be called until a later date, until we'd heard the evidence

9 of the events about which they give evidence from other witnesses. So

10 what we will do is this: We will hear the other witnesses about those

11 events. We will then make a decision as to whether the evidence should be

12 accepted under Rule 92 bis, and at that stage we will give you the

13 opportunity to address us on the matter. So for the moment, that is not

14 on.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'm not going to present this

16 now. Only in principle, in relation to your decisions concerning 92 bis

17 witnesses, I wish to remind you that on the 17th of April, you said

18 precisely that -- when you were dealing with the question of the

19 cross-examination of 92 bis witnesses, you allotted one hour to me and

20 five minutes to the other side because these are written depositions. In

21 practice, it is the opposite that happens. The other side has unlimited

22 time, and even that hour that you yourselves allotted to me, you shortened

23 that to 45 minutes, although you know that, in principle,

24 cross-examination can last ten minutes or ten hours, for as long as

25 necessary. It shouldn't be shortened. At any rate, you have deviated

1 from your own decisions in this regard.

2 The third thing I wish to say by way of an objection is the fact

3 that reports are not being submitted. For example, expert reports in part

4 have not been discovered at all, and in part they have been disclosed only

5 in the English language. And you know full well that I cross-examine all

6 experts.

7 As for the history expert, we have a report only in English. For

8 the financial expert, only in English. For the military expert, there is

9 no statement whatsoever, no findings whatsoever. As for the demographer,

10 we haven't get a statement or any findings. As for the MUP expert, I

11 haven't got a statement or any findings. As for the constitutional

12 expert, no findings, no statement. For the constitutional and criminal

13 expert Srdja Popovic, as it says here, there is no statement, no findings.

14 In addition to that, I wish to object to disclosing witnesses --

15 witnesses by statements from -- by witnesses from Serbia. I am being

16 given their statements in the English language and I'm sure that they gave

17 statements in Serbian. K33, no statement. K37, no statement. K38, no

18 witness statement, K39, no witness statement. K35, although it is a Serb,

19 again I have the statement only in the English language. Dragan Karleusa,

20 who certainly gave his statement in the Serbian language, I have his

21 statement in English. Radojkovic, also in the English language. Then R3

22 I have no statement whatsoever. R4, R5, R6, R7, no statements.

23 Therefore, I think that with regard to everything I've said to

24 you, no further comment is necessary.

25 In addition to that, the next thing I wish to deal with --

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- is the following: Several times

3 I asked that you decide or, rather, pass a writ of disclosure that will

4 make it incumbent upon the intelligence services of the relevant states to

5 disclose the information that they have available. On the other hand, I

6 see that for a long time now there has been discussion here with regard to

7 the application of your own Rule 70, which is supposed to protect even

8 regular Prosecution witnesses from providing information that these

9 witnesses -- that these witnesses could consider unfavourable to be

10 presented here. Therefore, I think that any court of law anywhere in the

11 world would have to proceed from the fact that they care about the truth.

12 And these requests are contrary to that. I want this information to be

13 disclosed.

14 As for the request of the other side, not only not to have

15 information disclosed but to have certain witnesses freed from the

16 obligation to respond to certain questions related to this kind of

17 information, this is a question of principle, actually.

18 JUDGE MAY: We will -- we will be coming to that on Friday. So

19 there's no need to address us on that now.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then just -- then just one more

21 objection, because I saw that you discussed the punishment of Witness K12

22 because he didn't want to testify. I wish to remind you of the existence

23 of a declaration against torture that was adopted by the United Nations.

24 JUDGE MAY: This is irrelevant to you. Absolutely nothing to do

25 with you. The contempt proceedings -- the contempt proceedings are

1 nothing to do with you and are between the Court and the witness.

2 Mr. Nice, is there any matter you want to raise?

3 No. You have been allowed to go on for a very long time. You are

4 now dealing with irrelevant matter.

5 Yes, Mr. Nice. Yes, Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, only a couple of matters arising from what

7 the accused said. I will revert later today as to the service of material

8 in relation to K33 because we are now two days late in respect of his

9 material, and I'll come and explain why I hope by the end of the day. The

10 Court has the list of witnesses which of course has had to be amended in

11 light of the two weeks that we haven't been able to sit.

12 I'm -- I don't see any problems with keeping the diary full, but

13 looking ahead, not now because it will take time now, but looking ahead, I

14 understand that the travel difficulties to and from Kosovo and getting

15 tickets are such that if I'm going to have to advance witnesses from

16 there, I've got to start making my plans by this Friday. So therefore,

17 admissibility issues for the period between now and the 26th of July are,

18 wherever possible, best addressed by this Friday so that I can make

19 arrangements for filling time with witnesses should that be necessary.

20 JUDGE MAY: Will you let us know what there is that you want ruled

21 on.

22 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes. I should alert the Chamber to two

23 things I haven't told you about before in terms and that don't appear on

24 the list. Merovci has got to come back very briefly to deal with a tape.

25 I think the accused was going to provide a tape. I'm not sure if he has

1 yet. I think I've got a copy myself from another source, but he's got to

2 come back.

3 Hendrie was not cross-examined as to the suggestion that the

4 photographs he took were photographs of something that was a setup. I

5 could deal with that in rebuttal but it's frankly much better to deal with

6 the issue while it's fresh in everybody's memory. So I'm going to ask to

7 slot him in at some stage. He's not on the list.

8 And lastly, the Court recalls that there's a witness named Jemini

9 who gave an account of what he overheard from his building of a

10 radio contact between the neighbours -- not the neighbours, between

11 soldiers in the neighbouring building. He was cross-examined as to the

12 accuracy or honesty of that. The person with whom he was in company in

13 hiding was contacted I think before the witness went back. There are

14 statements from him and there's an application in written form coming to

15 add him. So those are the only three additions.

16 And so far as Sandra Mitchell is concerned, we would be assisted

17 by a ruling on her position. She's scheduled for Thursday but we'd be

18 grateful if we could know about her. She's actually in The Hague at the

19 moment, so were we to fall short of witnesses for any reason, we could

20 perhaps take her evidence in chief if we can, as it were, whistle her up.

21 And I think that de la Billiere, Sir Peter de la Billiere may require some

22 abbreviation of service if he's to give evidence on the day listed, but

23 that's all.

24 And Mr. Ryneveld will be taking the next witness, who is a

25 substantial witness, Mr. Petritsch.

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've heard you. There's no call for

2 comment on what the Prosecution has said. It's merely a matter of

3 informing the Chamber of the current position. There's no need for

4 comment.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is not a comment, this

6 is an objection. Do you allow me to -- I mean, are you going to keep my

7 microphone on?

8 I oppose that. I oppose having material provided to me in a

9 shortened period of time. Within ten days, that's become the rule rather

10 than 30 days. You have proclaimed my alleged right here to defend myself.

11 That can only be a reason to extend deadlines, not shorten them. And what

12 you've allowed here is the shortening of deadlines. Now I've heard that

13 this Sandra Mitchell is supposed to come on Thursday. I haven't got any

14 statement of hers. Nothing has been given to me. And then --

15 JUDGE MAY: Let us look at it. Let us look at it. I'm going to

16 ask the senior legal officer to come up.

17 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to give the Court's rulings

20 on the various matters you raise.

21 The first matter you raise is an objection to our holding a

22 hearing in absence of the accused, yourself. The position is this: That

23 if there comes a time when for some reason or other an accused is for a

24 long time absent, it becomes essential for the Court to deal with

25 administrative matters, even in the absence of the accused. Nothing was

1 done at that hearing, as you know quite well, to prejudice your position,

2 and you've had the opportunity to raise matters now. If again you are ill

3 and it becomes necessary to hold a hearing for administrative and other

4 reasons, then such a hearing will be held, but you will get a transcript,

5 and you will also have the opportunity to raise matters during the next

6 hearing.

7 The next matter is this: Your application that you wish to have a

8 doctor from Belgrade present during the medical examination. We will

9 consider that.

10 Your next point was that cross-examination allowed to you is too

11 short. I have explained many times, and I will explain again. A Court

12 has an inherent power to limit the time available to the parties before it

13 in the interests of justice. It's not right that a Court's time should be

14 wasted on irrelevant matter. We have, therefore, considered your

15 cross-examination of the witnesses, and I note that in at most two or

16 perhaps three cases only out of the 70-odd witnesses that we've heard have

17 you finished within time. We note that you take every minute available,

18 and therefore, we have had to limit the time and come to the conclusions

19 which we have had in the interests of justice and securing a fair and

20 expeditious trial, as we must.

21 We -- just one moment. We turn next -- I turn next to your

22 complaint about disclosure of expert reports and the absence of disclosure

23 of statements in B/C/S. We shall order the Prosecution to address those

24 matters. It would be best if you would deal specifically with the matters

25 raised by the accused, and if you could let us have a schedule of those

1 particular matters dealing with disclosure; what disclosure has taken

2 place and where it falls short of the Rules, what is required in the

3 Rules.

4 The final matter you raise which I'm dealing with is your

5 application for what you call a writ of disclosure. Now, it is a matter

6 which you've raised before, it's true, and what you say today is you want

7 disclosure from the intelligence services, the relevant intelligence

8 services.

9 Now, there is a regime in the Tribunal for parties to obtain

10 documents or information by application to the relevant Judge or Trial

11 Chamber. The Rule is Rule 54 bis, to which I draw your attention. You

12 will see there the regime set out. It requires you to apply in writing,

13 identifying the possible documents or information which you want,

14 indicating how they're relevant to any matters in issue, and explaining

15 any steps that you may have taken to obtain the assistance required.

16 I'm not going through the rest of the regime. It is set out in

17 the Rule, and you can read it.

18 Yes. Let's have the witness, please.

19 MR. NICE: Your Honour, certainly. And while the witness is

20 coming in, most of the information on disclosure is already in the

21 right-hand column of this document. Insofar as it falls short in respect

22 to matters raised by the accused, I'll deal with it. So far as Sandra

23 Mitchell, number 7, is concerned, I gather that the B/C/S translation

24 that's referred to there as to be provided as soon as possible was in fact

25 provided on the 27th of June.

1 JUDGE MAY: The 20 --

2 MR. NICE: 27th of June. And we'd grateful for a ruling as to

3 whether she'd be subject to Rule 92 bis because we'll make the appropriate

4 arrangements.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we'll consider that.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. The Prosecution then would call Ambassador

7 Wolfgang Petritsch.

8 [The witness entered court]

9 WITNESS: WOLFGANG PETRITSCH

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness takes the declaration.

11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

14 Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

15 Q. Ambassador Petritsch, I understand, sir, that you are presently

16 the permanent representative of Austria to the United Nations and the

17 World Trade Organisation in Geneva; is that correct, sir?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. And is it also right, sir, that between August of 1999 and May of

20 2002, you were the high representative of the international community for

21 Bosnia and Herzegovina?

22 A. That's all correct.

23 Q. And when you stepped down, that position was taken by Lord

24 Ashdown; is that correct?

25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. Now, sir, I understand that you are also the author of a number of

2 books, and one of those books is -- concerns the history of Kosovo up

3 until the 24th of March, 1999, and it's entitled "Kosovo-Kosova Mythen,

4 Daten, Fakten"; is that correct?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Now, Ambassador Petritsch, while you were Austria's ambassador to

7 the former Yugoslavia -- first of all, perhaps you could tell me, were you

8 in fact Austria's ambassador to the former Yugoslavia, the FRY, and if so,

9 what those dates were.

10 A. Yes, I was. Between September of 1997 and July, beginning of

11 August of 1999 formally, officially.

12 Q. And at some time, sir, did you become the European Union's special

13 envoy for Kosovo?

14 A. That's also correct, and the dates are between October of 1998 and

15 July of 1999.

16 Q. While serving in that capacity, sir, did you have occasion to act

17 as the European Union's chief negotiator at the Rambouillet negotiations?

18 A. Well, I was actually appointed by the Contact Group to be one of

19 the three chief negotiators, along with Chris Hill from the United States

20 and Boris Maiorsky from the Russian Federation.

21 Q. Can you tell us, sir, what the Rambouillet negotiations were about

22 and when they took place.

23 A. The Rambouillet negotiations started on the 6th of February, and

24 that was an initiative taken by the Contact Group. These are the six

25 nations; United States, Russian Federation, and four European countries

1 like Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain. And they invited, rather,

2 summoned the two sides, the Yugoslav side and the Kosovo Albanian side, to

3 meet in Rambouillet, outside of Paris in the consul, to find a peaceful

4 solution to the Kosovo conflict.

5 Q. And approximately when -- I think you said it was the 6th of

6 February that it started?

7 A. It started on the 6th of February. Rambouillet ended on the 23rd

8 of February, and then it was -- the negotiations were resumed after a

9 hiatus of about close to three weeks, on the 15th of March in Paris, at

10 Centre Kleber, and they lasted until the 19th of March.

11 Q. And just so that the record is clear, the year was what?

12 A. The year was 1999.

13 Q. I see. All right, sir. Now, we will get back to Rambouillet, but

14 I just want to ask you something. During the course of your tenure, did

15 you have any meetings with the accused in these proceedings?

16 A. I had several meetings during my stay in Belgrade, both in my

17 capacity as the Austrian ambassador and then subsequently as the European

18 Union special envoy. Also at the time of the Kosovo crisis in -- from

19 July 1998 to December 1998, Austria held the European Union presidency as

20 well.

21 Q. I see. And in addition to meeting with Mr. Milosevic, did you

22 also meet with any members of his immediate staff or senior legal advisors

23 or senior political advisors?

24 A. Yes. I had several -- rather, many more meetings with his

25 advisors than the accused. In fact, very frequent meetings with the

1 Deputy Prime Minister, Nikola Sainovic, who was Mr. Milosevic's Kosovo

2 man, so to speak. And Mr. Sainovic was obviously the Vice-Premier of the

3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I also had meetings with Bojan Bugarcic,

4 the foreign policy advisor to the then President Milosevic.

5 Q. Now, sir, during your dealings with both the accused and the

6 others that you have mentioned, did you form any impression with respect

7 to who, if anyone, was in charge?

8 A. Well, let me put it this way: At the time of my arrival, of

9 course I had a lot of information about the situation in the Federal

10 Republic of Yugoslavia, and everything invariably pointed in the direction

11 that there is one person who called the shots, so to speak, and that was

12 Mr. Milosevic, first as the president of Serbia and then as the president

13 of Yugoslavia. I was skeptical at the beginning, but then I started, in

14 the course of my work there, I started to realise that this is indeed the

15 case. For me it was quite significant when Mr. Milosevic became president

16 of Yugoslavia, which is a far less - how should I say? - formerly a far

17 less influential position. He, nevertheless, remained the political

18 figure, number one, the undisputed leader of Yugoslavia, so to speaking,

19 and that became clear in many -- on many occasions in my meetings,

20 particularly with his advisors or Foreign Minister Jovanovic, Mr. Sainovic

21 I've already mentioned, and many others. Everything pointed in the

22 direction that indeed the final say is, in spite of the differences now in

23 the former power, with the then Yugoslav president, Milosevic.

24 Q. Now, I take it, sir -- I asked you initially for an impression.

25 Later on, I'm going to ask you for some examples which may or may not have

1 influenced that impression or reinforced that impression. In particular,

2 I'd like to turn next, if I may, to whether or not there was anything that

3 happened at Rambouillet which may have reinforced that view.

4 A. Well, Rambouillet, first and foremost, I think it is quite

5 remarkable the change of mind in accepting the invitation to come to

6 Rambouillet by the Yugoslav side because Mr. Milosevic invariably stressed

7 that this is a Serb problem so it needs to be dealt with by Serb

8 authorities, not even Yugoslav so much, Serb authorities. This is an

9 internal problem, therefore, it has to be dealt with inside of Serbia.

10 And of course the other side, these were terrorists and they were,

11 therefore, not considered partners in any peace talks, referring to the

12 KLA in particular.

13 Now, by -- by accepting the invitation to deal with this issue

14 first outside of Serbia, secondly with international mediation and,

15 thirdly, accepting the KLA as being part of the other side, so to speak,

16 of the Kosovo Albanian side, that was, of course, a huge departure from a

17 stated policy. And this decision was taken by the then president,

18 Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia, in spite of the fact that it has

19 been a -- or considered a Serb internal issue. So that was, for me, at

20 the time, of course, a hopeful sign that, with this change of mind, we

21 would be able to reach a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo crisis.

22 Q. Yes. Now, was there anything that happened during the course --

23 once Rambouillet actually got under way, was there anything else that you

24 noticed or knew or were told about which reinforced your earlier stated

25 position?

1 A. Well, a second point which I consider very important is the

2 delegation that was sent to Rambouillet. It was basically the delegation

3 that had already in the past many months negotiated with Chris Hill, in

4 particular, and then subsequently also when I joined Chris Hill as the

5 European Union special envoy in the so-called phase of the shuttle

6 diplomacy between Pristina and Belgrade when we were delivering proposals

7 for an agreement back and forth, that these people whom we dealt with in

8 this period of the shuttle diplomacy in the summer and fall and winter of

9 1998, these same people, well-versed, excellent experts on the Yugoslav

10 side, came to Rambouillet. This again was, on the one hand, for me a

11 positive sign inasmuch as we knew that they knew up to the minutest detail

12 all the problems and issues. Also, of course, the unresolved issues in

13 this complex issue, and so that was very good.

14 On the other hand, however, I also realised that, with the absence

15 of Mr. Milosevic, the final political decision will be taken by

16 Mr. Milosevic.

17 Now, it was at the time already criticised that well, without

18 Milosevic, there's not going to be a settlement possible. He has to be

19 there. And it was compared, of course, to Dayton. Dayton, Mr. Milosevic,

20 as you might recall, represented the Serb side in these negotiations, and

21 also the Yugoslav side.

22 At the time already it was clear with the modern means of

23 communication, telephone and so on, mobile telephone which also played a

24 crucial role in Rambouillet, it can be possible at any time to get, at

25 crucial junctures, the go ahead from Belgrade, so to speak. So in this

1 way, I was not so much worried about this. And indeed, there were very

2 intense communications going on between Rambouillet and Belgrade. There

3 was also -- of course, there were also visits. I recall distinctly one

4 visit with Mr. Sainovic. Maybe there were two, I don't recall this

5 exactly, to Belgrade in order to -- and it was -- above all, it was

6 expressed to me by the negotiators on several occasions that this we

7 cannot decide there. We have to -- we have to ask -- it was made

8 reference to asking President Milosevic whether this is possible or not

9 possible. So it evolved a very distinct and clear pattern that the

10 mandate was with the negotiators, the expertise was with the negotiators,

11 but in the end, the political decision to accept any agreement rests with

12 President Milosevic.

13 Q. Thank you. Two comments, sir. The translators have to keep up

14 with us, so I'm going to leave some time between my questions and your

15 answers, and I'm going to ask you as well to just keep the translators in

16 mind in giving your responses, if you would, please.

17 Now, let me just see if I've got this straight. I think you've

18 been very clear about the expertise of the negotiators and the fact that

19 they would have to refer to Mr. Milosevic at some time. Perhaps you could

20 clarify this for me: You said during Rambouillet. Are you talking about

21 while the negotiations were going on, they would pause in the middle of

22 negotiations and go check, either by phone or by trip to Belgrade, to

23 speak to Mr. Milosevic? Is that what you mean by that?

24 A. Yes, basically.

25 Q. And who would do that?

1 A. Well, that is for me difficult to answer, but definitely

2 Mr. Sainovic was the one, and Mr. Sainovic was, so to speak, the political

3 head of the negotiating team, whereas the formal head was Professor Ratko

4 Markovic, the Serbian vice-premier and eminent legal scholar. If I

5 remember correctly, he's the author of the Serbian constitution. So he

6 was, of course, intimately involved in the ins and outs and the

7 intricacies of the subject matter.

8 Who else? I would not know exactly who it would be, but it

9 transpired and it was very clear that there were regular contacts.

10 Later on, around 11th of February, the Serbian President, Mr.

11 Milutinovic, arrived. He stayed in Paris and also served as an informal

12 point of contact, obviously, for -- for the Rambouillet delegation, the

13 Yugoslav-Serb delegation, and then later on also occasionally dropped by

14 and became involved more and move engaged and involved, however, more on a

15 political level when it came to contacts with the Contact Group foreign

16 ministers who were chaperoning, so to speak, these negotiations.

17 I forgot to add that -- that the British and French foreign

18 ministers were the two co-hosts, so to speak, of the Rambouillet

19 conference.

20 Q. I see. Now, sir, earlier in your evidence you indicated to the

21 Court that there were some things that you saw as being positive

22 indicators that there was some hope for success at Rambouillet. One of

23 the things you mentioned was the fact that President Milosevic allowed the

24 talks and allowed the participants.

25 Once Rambouillet started initially, can you tell the Court

1 anything about whether or not -- or what your impression was of the

2 attitude at the initial stages of Rambouillet by the Serb FRY delegation?

3 A. Well, just merely by the fact that Yugoslavia accepted this

4 invitation, it was very clear that they were aware that this new phase now

5 will have to be brought to an end along -- basically along the lines of

6 the Dayton negotiations and the Dayton accords. And since quite a few of

7 those who were parts -- were part of this issue now on the Belgrade side

8 were also in Dayton, of course it was clear to us that it must be clear to

9 them that this Rambouillet accords will -- an agreement will consist of

10 two parts; the civilian, rather, political part, and a military part in

11 order to secure the implementation of the civilian part.

12 So this kind of Dayton formula was, in fact, the theme, so to

13 speak, of the negotiations or the talks leading up to Rambouillet, and

14 then also, of course, in Rambouillet itself.

15 Q. What observations, if any, did you make with respect to the FRY

16 Serb negotiating team's mandate in the initial stages?

17 A. Well, we were told that basically they have a mandate to

18 negotiate, so to speak, the political part, that is constitution, the

19 political setup, and so on. And it was also clear from the outset that

20 there has to be a solution which would bring substantive autonomy to

21 Kosovo. That was unanimously declared and supported by the Contact Group.

22 That was basically the framework. And the -- with the invitation, the two

23 sides also got -- received what was called the basic elements, a set of

24 principles, about -- about the agreement that needs to be negotiated.

25 There were general elements in there. There were -- there was about the

1 governance in Kosovo, about the legislative, executive, the judiciary.

2 There was one chapter for -- about human rights, and then also

3 implementation where it was clearly spelled out, these are the principles,

4 and according to the principles, the agreement has to be negotiated.

5 By accepting these principles, and they were non-negotiable, they

6 -- of course, both sides agreed to use this as a basis and to continue

7 where in -- in the era of shuttle diplomacy, the negotiations stopped.

8 And at the time of Rambouillet, we were -- we had sixth and seventh

9 version, revised version, of the proposed agreement already there.

10 So what I want to say with this is it was very clear to both sides

11 what the framework is. No independence, however, substantive autonomy, on

12 the one hand. And on the other hand, the very clear principles spelling

13 out the political, judicial system, human rights, and so on necessary,

14 and also the implementation points. So it was a very transparent and a

15 very systematic approach that was taken. A lot has been learned in Dayton

16 both for the international negotiators as well as for the Yugoslav side in

17 particular, and that was then started and followed through.

18 At the beginning, the Serb Yugoslav side made clear that they have

19 now the power to discuss the political side of the agreement, basically.

20 And that was -- and that was fine with us because we wanted first to have

21 the agreement, so to speak, with all the nuances, how much -- what degree

22 of autonomy, how does it concretely look like in the different bodies of

23 governance and so on, and then the military implementation part which

24 basically is, of course, very restricted in regard to what can be

25 negotiated, because that derives, of course, from the civilian part. What

1 do you need in order -- how many troops and so on do you need in order to

2 secure the implementation of this agreement. This is a technical issue

3 that needs to be decided by those who would provide the international

4 military presence there.

5 So therefore, it was not -- it was not a part and parcel from the

6 beginning, but it was for methodological and systematic reasons at the

7 very end. However, we were confident already from the outset, and there

8 were a lot of discussions, of course, already prior to Rambouillet, that

9 since we're following the Dayton model, all sides know what it basically

10 means. So therefore, again, a lot of negotiations were not necessary and

11 also not called for.

12 Q. Let me stop you there, sir. Rather than get into the detail,

13 shall we say, of the negotiations themselves, my next question is directed

14 more about, given this background, given this backdrop of what you were

15 hoping to accomplish, whether or not, in your view, progress appeared to

16 be made towards reaching some kind of a positive solution during the

17 initial stages. For example, between the 10th and 14th of February, 1999.

18 A. Well, in the beginning it was very, very difficult. On the 7th,

19 8th, 9th of February, because actually both sides -- the Kosovo Albanian

20 side still had to get its act together. They were deeply divided between

21 one side around Rogova and the other side around the KLA, Thaci, and so

22 on. They had to first find and form a negotiating team which was

23 obviously, for them, not very easy.

24 This time, of course, the Yugoslav side realised that the Kosovo

25 side had difficulty, so there was no progress really achievable. We also

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1 had difficulties with the situation on the ground, in Kosovo, where there

2 were several incidents happening which could have derailed the

3 negotiations. So there was a very tense situation.

4 However, once things started to roll on both sides, there was a

5 very constructive phase with the Yugoslav side. Experts taking over, so

6 to speak, from the politicians negotiating, hammering out compromise

7 solutions, proposals that were then in turn passed on to the Albanian

8 side. The Kosovo Albanians dealt with it and it came back, and so on. So

9 it was this kind of negotiating situation which we were hoping for. But

10 that went to a certain degree.

11 And it was clear, of course, that on -- on the Albanian side, they

12 were not interested, really, in a political settlement because they did --

13 they wanted independence and not substantive autonomy. But what they

14 wanted was NATO in Kosovo.

15 On the other hand, you had the Yugoslav side. They did not want

16 NATO in Kosovo, but they wanted substantive autonomy. As little as

17 possible, but nevertheless, they wanted this side.

18 Now, it was very clear and it became very obvious to all sides, to

19 both sides and of course also to the mediators and the wider group of

20 internationals, that only the two together, the civilian side - political

21 side - and the military side would be a viable -- would create a viable

22 agreement and a solution. It was, of course, very clear that the Albanian

23 side was highly concerned about the prospect of demilitarisation, of

24 decommissioning of the KLA. And that was, of course, a precondition in

25 order to create peace in Kosovo. And since -- since the Albanian side was

1 very much dominated by the KLA, it was the toughest, of course, to

2 negotiate with them and to bring them to accept this.

3 That, of course, went only in exchange for NATO which, in their

4 eyes, would provide the necessary security. And on the other hand, of

5 course, and more importantly for us, only an international military could

6 decommission and demilitarise the KLA. Because the VJ and the MUP had

7 already proven that they cannot achieve this goal. So it was actually,

8 objectively speaking, in the very interest of the Yugoslav side to get

9 NATO to do the job that they were unable to accomplish. And it was, of

10 course, also very clear that Albanians would have never agreed to VJ doing

11 the job. Only -- they would have only accepted when an international

12 military detachment would do this.

13 That was a very realistic and a very plausible situation, that

14 basically nobody, including -- including voices from the Yugoslav side,

15 was against.

16 Q. I appreciate, Ambassador Petritsch, that these were very complex

17 negotiations and that there was a certain logic that you were hoping to

18 sell to both sides. Accepting that to be the case, and I think you've

19 done an excellent job of explaining that background, by the 20th of

20 February, sir, did something occur with respect to Mr. Milutinovic about

21 the political aspects of the proposed agreement?

22 A. Well, yes. I must say that Mr. Milutinovic who, as I already

23 pointed out, was dealing more with the political side, dealing with the

24 Contact Group foreign ministers, Albright, Ivanov, Vedrine and so on, and

25 at the time with Vedrine, Cook, even Mr. Milutinovic, who was the fiercest

1 critic, very cynical, very negative in general in this whole negotiations

2 and talks, even he in the meeting with the Contact Group foreign ministers

3 on the 20th of February, indicated that with the political agreement, they

4 can live, so to speak. "They" meaning the Yugoslav side.

5 Q. To follow up on that, did you ever receive any correspondence on

6 the 23rd of February from the person you've mentioned earlier? I believe

7 you mentioned Professor Markovic.

8 A. Yes. The three negotiators, Maiorsky, Hill, and myself, we

9 received on the 23rd of February, a letter --

10 Q. I'm just going to stop you there, sir. I see that you are now

11 referring to the book that you wrote. I take it that contains the letter

12 to which you're about to refer.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Rather than refer to that, sir, I would prefer perhaps if we could

15 show you the originally signed copy that we can then distribute to the

16 Court and the various officials. I understand you've got a copy in your

17 book, but ...

18 Now, while this is being distributed, the copy of this letter, the

19 version that I have here is actually a signed copy. It's in English,

20 signed in English, and there is also a translation into B/C/S.

21 Just for curiosity, sir, you speak B/C/S, do you? You speak

22 Serbian?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And these negotiations that you were involved in, were they

25 conducted in English, or in B/C/S, or --

1 A. They were translated. There was simultaneous translation. But in

2 our informal contacts, they -- we spoke mostly English.

3 Q. You spoke English. All right. And so this letter -- sorry. Have

4 you been provided with --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- a copy of Professor Dr. Ratko Markovic's letter?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. All right. First of all, could you look at that, please, sir, and

9 it's dated the 23rd of February, 1999, at Rambouillet. It indicates that

10 -- it's on the letterhead of the delegation of the government of the

11 Republic of Serbia, and it lists the three of you; Christopher Hill,

12 Wolfgang Petritsch, and Boris Maiorsky. Is that the letter to which you

13 refer?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 Q. And in this letter, sir, are there specific sentences perhaps that

16 you might like to draw to the Court's attention that would indicate to you

17 perhaps the state of or the spirit of negotiation that was --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- reached as of that date?

20 A. Yeah. Well, to the letter part of the question, in the last

21 paragraph there, the delegation expresses its full readiness to continue

22 the work. And what is crucial for me now is -- and they say, "... in line

23 with the positive spirit of this meeting." So at the very last day of

24 Rambouillet, the Yugoslav head of delegation is clearly, in writing,

25 indicating that there was a positive spirit in this meeting in

1 Rambouillet. I think that that is very important, particularly for later

2 accusations that that was all a sham and that this was -- that was not

3 really done in order to reach a peaceful agreement and so on.

4 And substantive-wise, the next-to-the-last paragraph is of crucial

5 importance. And there it reads: The FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

6 - agreed to discuss the scope and character of international presence in

7 Kosmet, meaning Kosovo, to implement the agreement to be accepted in

8 Rambouillet.

9 Now, what's important here is -- and this is fully in line with

10 the status of the discussions and negotiations at the time, the scope and

11 character of international presence, the size of the civilian presence,

12 the size of military, and so on and so on. And crucial in this context is

13 that it says "international presence." It is not restricted to

14 international civilian presence. And that was, of course, discussed

15 already prior to this letter because I should add in parentheses that this

16 was the third letter that they sent to the same subject matter which over

17 in the course of the afternoon became more constructive. And the last

18 one, of course, is the one that is valid. That it clearly indicates

19 international presence not restricted to civilian presence, including, of

20 course, in this way what was crucial, that there is the possibility for a

21 military presence. And that was the key, actually, which Professor

22 Markovic and, of course, the whole delegation was very much aware of.

23 I distinctly remember --

24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Petritsch, I must ask you, please, if you would,

25 to try and shorten your answers. We are very, very pressed for time.

1 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ambassador, if you could tell me the reason why

3 Mr. Ratko Markovic wrote this letter. Is it what was requested by the --

4 THE WITNESS: Because he is -- because he was the head of the

5 negotiating team of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, as it's

6 indicated on the top.

7 JUDGE KWON: What was the motive for him to write this letter?

8 THE WITNESS: Well, it was -- they were asked by the Contact Group

9 foreign ministers to state their opinion to the status of the negotiations

10 because that was the end of the negotiations. This was already the second

11 time that the negotiations were prolonged for -- originally, it was one

12 week foreseen for the negotiations. After one week, there was an

13 assessment by the foreign ministers, since this was quite positive, the

14 developments in the negotiations, to prolong this for yet another week.

15 And then on the 20th of February, the second week ended and then it was

16 decided since there was, again, progress to grant yet another three days.

17 And then the 23rd - this is the date on this letter - was the very

18 deadline for the negotiations.

19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

20 MR. RYNEVELD:

21 Q. Now, Ambassador Petritsch, you've told us earlier about their

22 mandate to negotiate what you believe was a political agreement, but did

23 you form any impression about their mandate to negotiate the

24 implementation at this stage of any agreement that would be reached?

25 A. Well, it was very clear that there was -- that they did not --

1 that the negotiating team in Rambouillet did not have the mandate to

2 negotiate the implementation side. And that was the reason why, in the

3 end, the foreign ministers decided to postpone the -- and grant a

4 three-week hiatus to the negotiations, exactly in order to clarify this

5 implementation issue, the military side, so to speak, of this

6 implementation issue, to be more precise.

7 Q. Now, you've just expressed to us the importance of the February

8 23rd letter, which, by the way, I'm just reminded I haven't yet asked to

9 be marked as an exhibit. If I may do that before I forget.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 235.

11 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

12 Q. You've talked about the main objection, if I remember correctly,

13 about an international military presence to ensure compliance with the

14 agreement. Was -- was one of the negotiators a Vladimir Stambuk? Do you

15 recall whether he was present there?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And what, if anything, can you share with the Court about the

18 negotiations as expressed by Mr. Stambuk?

19 A. Well, I had several -- of course, we had many, many - how should I

20 say? - one-on-one meetings, informal meetings in the couloirs, at dinner

21 or breakfast or wherever in Rambouillet, and on one occasion Vladimir

22 Stambuk -- and we were discussing -- and he is a member of JUL. And when

23 we were talking about -- when I was referring to the necessity to ensure

24 the implementation of this agreement and for this we need, in order to

25 demilitarise the KLA, international military presence, and if this is not

1 granted then we will reach the end of our negotiations. And then

2 Mr. Stambuk basically said well -- that if there is bombing of -- then it

3 will -- this will mean a massacre in Kosovo. And of course it was -- I

4 was quite impressed, to say the least, by this. It was very clear to me

5 that he was referring to a massacre on the part of the Yugoslav army or

6 MUP on the Kosovo Albanians.

7 We did not -- I -- since I was taken aback very much and shocked

8 in a way, I did not further elaborate, but it left in me the distinct

9 impression that there was a clear view, at least with Mr. Stambuk, what

10 would happen if there would be a war or bombing happening in Kosovo.

11 Q. Now, sir, you've told us that the Rambouillet portion stopped.

12 And did negotiations continue at another location at a later date?

13 A. Yes. As I already indicated, first of all it was necessary for

14 the Yugoslav side to get its act together in regards to the implementation

15 side, and this is what they also asked for. I remember a one-on-one

16 meeting with Ambassador Branko Brankovic, who -- who was a member of the

17 Yugoslav team, telling me, "Well, of course we know that we need a

18 military component there in order to secure the implementation of the

19 agreement, but we need more time. This cannot be done immediately here in

20 Rambouillet."

21 On the other hand, we had the Kosovo Albanian side, and there the

22 KLA was of course visibly shocked, the representatives, Thaci and so on,

23 that they were asked to demilitarise. So basically to wither away. And

24 he realised -- Thaci at the time realised that if he would sign now in

25 Rambouillet, that would basically mean, or at least potentially, that he

1 would be killed if he returns home and tells his people that he's just

2 given up his own organisation.

3 So it was very clear that both sides needed time to explain this

4 and to come to terms with this difficult issue. The one, the Yugoslav

5 side with military implementation, of course.

6 Therefore, the foreign ministers granted this three-week

7 interruption, and then we resumed the talks in Paris on the 15th of March.

8 Q. All right. And between the talks, between the 23rd of March [sic]

9 and the 15th of March, did you engage in further discussions with Serb

10 officials or any other shuttle diplomacy, I believe is the word you used?

11 A. Yes, that's correct. We immediately went -- I immediately went

12 back to Belgrade, and also Chris Hill joined me there. And either

13 together or separately we had several meetings with Yugoslav and Serb

14 officials, with a delegation, with the negotiators. The same applies to

15 Pristina. And I also accompanied German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer

16 to a meeting with President Milosevic and his closest associates. That

17 was, if I remember correctly, on the 8th of March.

18 Q. All right.

19 A. And so there were others, several other meetings and encounters in

20 order to discuss exactly this issue of military implementation.

21 Q. If you permit me, sir, to shorten what I anticipate could be a

22 detailed answer. Is it fair to say that on this 8th meeting, that there

23 was a sort of a general meeting of a number of you and then at some stage

24 Fischer and Milosevic retired for a separate one-on-one in one room and

25 then you remained behind with Milutinovic? Is that correct?

1 A. Yes. The larger -- the larger party remained in the larger room,

2 and Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Fischer then went to a separate room for a

3 one-on-one talk.

4 Q. Yes. And obviously you remained behind, and were you with Mr.

5 Milutinovic?

6 A. And I used the time to discuss some of the aspects of the

7 agreement with Mr. Milutinovic. But at the time, it became very clear to

8 me that what we already feared and saw somehow dawning on the horizon was

9 a total change in the attitude. Now it was not only the military issue

10 which was so non-acceptable, at least verbally and publicly, it was also

11 the political part that was basically already agreed where the Yugoslav

12 side had, as the letter demonstrates, already indicated, "Okay. We can

13 live with this. We can. There's still a few nuances, but in general we

14 can. We are ready to do the next and crucial step." This kind of

15 attitude was totally gone already prior to the meeting on the 8th of

16 March. There must have -- something happened, so to speak, after the 23rd

17 of February when this letter was written to us. There was a total change

18 of attitude. And as was indicated on several occasions to me, it was Mr.

19 Milosevic who did not like it and who then obviously in the course of the

20 ensuing weeks between the 23rd of February and the 15th of March, decided

21 not to continue the path of negotiation.

22 Q. Now, did you attempt to discuss the details of the Rambouillet

23 agreement with Milutinovic on the 8th of March?

24 A. Yes. Definitely. I tried, but it was basically disregarded. It

25 was not -- Mr. Milutinovic was not interested in the details, and he in a

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1 very polemic manner, actually referred to this as this is all fake and so

2 on. I was already informed about this through an official statement on

3 the Serbian side, I guess this is a written statement of the 5th of March,

4 where it became so to speak official and public. The new line, I would

5 say, of discrediting Rambouillet and undermining it.

6 Q. Now, sir, to your knowledge, had there been a parliamentary

7 sitting between the 23rd of February and the 15th of March?

8 A. Not to my knowledge. I don't know where, who in fact formally

9 decided on this fundamental change of the Yugoslav Serb approach to

10 Rambouillet.

11 Q. Did that change in attitude continue when discussions continued on

12 the -- in mid-March 1999 in Paris?

13 A. Yes, absolutely. From the very first day, it was clear that --

14 that there was no positive spirit on the Yugoslav side left. It was also

15 quite characteristic that it was not Ratko Markovic who was still formally

16 the head of the delegation who spoke, it was basically Milutinovic who

17 took over and who fully dominated the negotiations and which were now not

18 negotiations any longer. It was -- it was just done in a very accusatory

19 verbal way. No constructive approach, no nothing where we could have seen

20 a possibility to still -- to rescue, so to speak, this obviously now

21 failing process of Rambouillet.

22 Q. I see. And when Mr. Milutinovic came to Paris, what, if anything,

23 did -- what impression did you form as a result of what Mr. Milutinovic

24 was saying in light of what had happened before?

25 A. Well, it was basically absolutely negative. It was nothing

1 constructive there. I could not see -- although we were still hoping

2 against hope, but rationally speaking, it was -- became very clear that

3 this -- that the Yugoslav side is not ready to constructively re-engage in

4 these negotiations. They backtracked, in fact. All what was already

5 agreed was then disputed and there were formalities that were criticised

6 and so on. So it was, in my opinion, very clear that the Yugoslav side

7 was instructed not to achieve a positive outcome.

8 Q. Do you know by whom?

9 A. Well, I can -- I can only guess. And what I have said before, in

10 view of who called the shots, it was Mr. Milosevic.

11 Q. Now, sir, I just want to go to a slightly different point in time.

12 You've indicated to us that you had various meetings with Mr. Milosevic.

13 Do you recall your very first meeting with Mr. Milosevic and when that

14 was?

15 A. Well, the very first meeting was an occasion of the presentation

16 of my credentials to President Milosevic when -- as Austrian ambassador.

17 Q. And that was when?

18 A. That was -- I arrived in September. It must have been in October

19 of 1997.

20 Q. And at that time, sir, did you, as part of this -- at the time of

21 this -- presenting your credentials, did you also deliver any kind of a

22 message?

23 A. Yes. It was -- that's usually a rather ceremonial situation,

24 presenting the credentials, but for me it was clear already by then, after

25 a few weeks in Belgrade, that it was, although, as I indicated previously,

1 a Yugoslav president is a more ceremonial post and does not have so much

2 power, in fact, Mr. Milosevic continued to be the number one, so to speak,

3 in Yugoslavia. So I thought this would be one of my rare occasions to

4 talk substance with him, and I, in a way, abused the situation, the formal

5 occasion, and addressed a few substantive issues. Not the least I

6 appealed to President Milosevic to finally start cooperating with ICTY.

7 Q. Now, a year later, October of 1998, did you -- this is soon after

8 your -- I believe you were just recently appointed as EU special envoy.

9 Did you deliver a speech in Luxembourg to the foreign ministers?

10 A. As the European Union special envoy, I used to brief the European

11 Union foreign ministers, either in Brussels or in Luxembourg, depending on

12 where the session took place. The occasion that you're referring to in

13 Luxembourg, there was a discussion when the already escalating situation

14 in Kosovo was well under way, a humanitarian disaster with up to 300.000

15 displaced people inside Kosovo and outside, refugees, the European Union

16 discussed the situation; political situation, humanitarian, human rights

17 situation in Kosovo, and this was the occasion where I took the floor and

18 gave a report on the situation there.

19 And in their communique, the European Union foreign ministers then

20 made very clear reference to this and also asked the Yugoslav authorities

21 to now finally start doing something against it.

22 Q. Now, after your appointment as the EU special envoy, did you meet

23 again with Mr. Milosevic and other of his officials or, perhaps more

24 frequently, his senior officials?

25 A. Yes, that's correct. More so with his immediate officials than

1 with Mr. Milosevic himself, who at the time was more inclined to speak

2 with the US special envoy, Ambassador Hill, whereas the European side did

3 not seem to be so relevant to him, I must say, which was in fact even

4 criticised by his closest advisors who also were of the opinion that in

5 dealing more with the European side, one could find a more constructive

6 solution, but that was not the case. But I was dealing very intensively

7 with his foreign policy advisor, whom I mentioned before, as well as with

8 Mr. Sainovic. These were my two principal contact points.

9 Q. Now, I take it as in most organisations, there is a sort of a

10 hierarchical structure and normally one goes up the hierarchical ladder.

11 Did you, during the course of your discussions and negotiations, choose to

12 go outside of the normal chain of command, as it were?

13 A. Well, I must tell you that it didn't make a lot of sense to speak

14 to -- or to follow this hierarchical ladder. It was far more successful

15 to directly go to the boss, so to speak, or to his people, and this is

16 what I in fact did most of the time.

17 Q. Sir, you intimated earlier -- you've told the Court what your

18 impression was about him being in charge and I indicated we would return

19 to some additional examples which may have reinforced that impression. Is

20 there an incident about an exchange of VJ and KLA soldiers that may have

21 had some influence on that impression you formed?

22 A. Yes. In -- it was in early 1999, early January 1999. A group of

23 VJ soldiers was taken hostage by the KLA, and in turn, a group of KLA

24 people were then taken in by the VJ, and there was a situation where I was

25 asked to help and mediate the release these two groups. And I was dealing

1 with Mr. Sainovic, and we were able to strike a deal and indeed the KLA

2 released these VJ soldiers in exchange for the release of the KLA people

3 by the VJ later on. It was not an exchange on the very same day, it was

4 about ten days in between. And Mr. Sainovic, with whom I dealt in the

5 situation, very clearly indicated that that was a decision of the

6 president to -- to enter into this deal.

7 I could give you another example, in dealing with Mr. Bugarcic.

8 When I was able to impress upon Mr. Bugarcic to invite an international

9 forensic team to look into alleged massacres on both sides committed by

10 Albanians, committed by allegedly the Serb side, that was also managed and

11 in the end decided in a positive way, and Bugarcic clearly indicated it

12 was the president who -- who took this decision in the end, which took me

13 several months to negotiate. But in the end, it didn't look very good,

14 because everything coming into Kosovo from the outside was, of course,

15 unwelcome, and again, in this kind of complex and complicated situation,

16 it was Mr. Milosevic who took this decision.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, I note the time. I'm at the end of

18 paragraph 13.

19 JUDGE MAY: Is it a convenient moment?

20 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes.

21 JUDGE MAY: How long do you anticipate being from now?

22 MR. RYNEVELD: No more than ten, ten minutes, perhaps.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you.

24 Mr. Petritsch, we're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes at the

25 usual time. Could you remember, please - I must give you the standard

1 warning - not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over, and

2 that does include the Prosecution team. Would you be back, please, at ten

3 to.

4 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

5 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.

7 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. Now, Ambassador Petritsch, I'm about to turn to a meeting that I

9 understood you had with the accused Mr. Milosevic on the 22nd of March,

10 1999. And before I do that, you've earlier described to the Court in some

11 detail your impressions of the logic behind the negotiations that were

12 going on at Rambouillet and how it would be advantageous to each side.

13 Without going into the detail of that again, I wonder whether you

14 would tell the Court at this time whether or not you had a meeting on the

15 22nd of March, 1999, who it was with, and the purpose for the discussion.

16 A. Yes, Your Honours. The meeting on the 22nd of March was after the

17 failed Rambouillet and Paris peace talks, and it was a last-ditch effort

18 on the part of the Contact Group which sent three mediators to meet with

19 Mr. Milosevic. And that happened on the 22nd of March, in the afternoon.

20 I was together with my two colleagues, Mr. Hill and Mr. Maiorsky, and on

21 the side of President Milosevic there were several people from the

22 negotiating team; Mr. Milutinovic, Foreign Minister Jovanovic, some others

23 from his -- from Mr. Milosevic's cabinet.

24 Q. Where did the meeting take place?

25 A. The meeting took place in the presidential palace, in Beli Dvor.

1 Q. That's in Belgrade?

2 A. And that's in Belgrade, yes, that's correct.

3 Q. And why did you go there? You said it was a last-ditch effort.

4 What was the message you were trying to deliver?

5 A. Well, our message was, as the negotiators, to impress upon

6 President Milosevic that time is running out, that we need now a positive

7 re-engagement on their side and that otherwise, we would end up in a

8 cul-de-sac where we as the negotiators could not be of help any longer and

9 that others, meaning the military, so to speak, would then take over, we

10 were afraid. It was very clear to everybody that this was the only

11 alternative, given the fact that for many, many months NATO had already

12 put out its warnings, and it was very clear that the alternative to the

13 Rambouillet accord was a military intervention on the part of the

14 international community.

15 Q. What was -- what kind of reception did you receive from Milosevic?

16 A. Well, for me it was actually quite depressing, because I

17 immediately realised that there -- that there was no real interest in

18 identifying a way out of this situation. Mr. Milosevic seemed to me very

19 aloof and not engaged in this issue. My impression in the course of these

20 talks was that he had already made up his mind basically and was not

21 really listening to -- was also very typical and very indicative of the

22 situation that he presented us with a Kosovo Albanian newspaper, Koha

23 Ditore, I don't know, from early February where they had printed one of

24 the last versions of the agreement, of the political agreement, and he

25 claimed that we preferred the Kosovo Albanian side and gave them something

1 that they did not have. Obviously this was incorrect, because we always

2 consistently in the previous months had shared all versions with both

3 sides as mediators. That was, for me, quite interesting and depressing to

4 see that not -- that this was a rather feeble attempt to prove to us that

5 we were dishonest. And you need to imagine that this is not a Western

6 plot, so to speak. That was very clearly, with the inclusion of the

7 Russian negotiator, Boris Maiorsky, who as a real professional tried to

8 find a solution. It was even more important, of course, politically

9 speaking, for the Russian side to find a peaceful solution because the

10 Russians, of course, realised otherwise NATO would call the shots, and

11 that was politically devastating, of course, for the Russian side. So

12 that was also in this situation that Maiorsky made an attempt, a rather

13 hypothetical one, so to speak, by proposing to President Milosevic and

14 addressing him and saying, "Mr. Milosevic, what would you say if we would

15 reopen the whole agreement and start negotiating from the outset?"

16 Q. Yes?

17 A. Of course that was something which was not agreed and well beyond

18 our mandate as negotiators. However, it attests to the fact how desperate

19 the Russian side was in this situation. And even in this situation,

20 Mr. Milosevic did not really react in a positive way. He was rather kind

21 of saying, "Well, if you want, you can," something like this. He did not

22 feel that he had a role in this.

23 So then in the end of -- at the end of our conversation, we said

24 -- Mr. Maiorsky said, "Well, tell your negotiators to come to us. We're

25 now all here in Belgrade, and let's now find a way." And nothing

1 happened. That was the 22nd of March, only a few hours, as we know, prior

2 to the start of the bombing campaign.

3 Q. While you remained in Belgrade, did Milosevic follow up in any way

4 at all on that offer put by Maiorsky?

5 A. Not to my knowledge, and also I do not think anything happened,

6 because Boris Maiorsky the next day called me up who originally had said,

7 "I will stay here even if bombs fall." These were the words of Maiorsky.

8 He then on the 23rd in the afternoon called me up and said, "I've been

9 called back by my authorities to Moscow, and I'm leaving Belgrade the next

10 day," which was the 23rd, the very day of the start of the bombing.

11 Q. Sorry. Just -- did you just say that the next day was the 21st

12 or --

13 A. 3rd.

14 Q. 23rd.

15 A. 23rd, and then in the afternoon, that is when he called me. For

16 me, it was then very clear; once the Russians have given up, then

17 something must have really come to an end on the Yugoslav side.

18 I stayed there, whereas Hill left on the 23rd. With him also

19 Holbrooke, who was in parallel trying to convince Mr. Milosevic to agree

20 to continue and agree to the agreement. I remained there and left a few

21 hours prior to the start of the bombing campaign.

22 Q. Did something happen overnight on the 23rd of March?

23 A. Yes. In -- during the night of 23rd to the 24th, I received at my

24 residence some anonymous calls and threats, obviously based upon the

25 rumours that were spread in Belgrade that I had in secret -- or secretly

1 promised independence to the Kosovo Albanians, which of course was utter

2 nonsense. But it did the trick, obviously. And so I was in a situation

3 where I had to call up presidential advisor Bugarcic and first of all tell

4 him what has happened and ask him for -- to provide security for me; and

5 secondly, to inquire whether there is still an opportunity to go back to

6 the negotiations. And he answered both in the negative and suggested to

7 me to leave the country.

8 Q. And you did that on the 24th of March?

9 A. And on the 24th of March, in the afternoon, I left Belgrade.

10 Q. Thank you, Ambassador Petritsch. I understand, sir -- those are

11 my questions. Before you answer questions of cross-examination, I

12 understand you speak Serbian. Perhaps I could ask you -- I know that you

13 will be able to understand, but could you wait for the translation so that

14 the interpreters don't have the difficulty of trying to have people

15 overlapping. Thank you very much.

16 A. I will, for once, listen to the translation.

17 Q. Thank you very much.

18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it's now for you to cross-examine.

19 We've considered the time, the time that you should have available, and

20 we'll give you an hour and a half to cross-examine the witness. It will

21 be 20 minutes longer than the Prosecution had of one hour and ten minutes

22 or thereabouts.

23 I will ask the witness if he would be good enough to keep the

24 answers as short as possible because time is limited. It will be taking

25 up time for cross-examination. Of course, you should have the opportunity

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1 of explaining things, and you must feel to do so, but if you can keep,

2 wherever possible, the answers short, it will enable more to be done.

3 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I first of all know why you're

5 limiting the time for my cross-examination at all?

6 JUDGE MAY: We have been through that. You know full well why the

7 time limits are being applied. It's right you should know before you

8 begin how long you've got rather than at the end.

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

10 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Petritsch, is it true that several years ago

11 in an interview to the Vienna Courier you said that your dog was of Serb

12 ethnicity?

13 A. Do I answer immediately?

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if you can.

15 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I explain? When I became

16 ambassador to Belgrade, a street dog joined our household from the streets

17 of Dedinje, by the name of Malena, and this dog is still with us.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. You didn't answer my question.

20 JUDGE MAY: He has. Yes, what's the next one?

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. My question was as follows: My question was: Did you, in an

23 interview to the Vienna Courier, say that your dog was of Serb ethnicity?

24 A. I have tried to answer the question. I think this is not a

25 serious question because when a dog -- because a dog does not have an

1 ethnicity.

2 Q. All right, then. Did you say that to the Vienna Courier or not?

3 Let's put it that way.

4 A. To the best of my knowledge, I was never referring in these terms

5 to my dog, but since my dog is from Belgrade and from Serbia, so to speak,

6 it is, of course, a dog from Serbia or a Serbian dog in this broad sense,

7 in this broad geographic and not in an ethnic sense.

8 Q. In your numerous statements, not only the one that you gave to

9 this but to the media and your other statements, you said that you

10 invested a great deal of effort for a peaceful solution of the Yugoslav

11 crisis or, rather, a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo; is that

12 correct?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. On the basis of that, can we say that without exception you were

15 friendly disposed to all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia?

16 A. I think one of the key issues for -- as a foreigner for being of

17 help in former Yugoslavia is to stick to the principle of equality, and

18 that was, of course, also my guiding principle in Yugoslavia while I was

19 there as a mediator, as well as the last three years in Bosnia-Herzegovina

20 where the three ethnic communities - Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs - are

21 trying to form and trying to live a peaceful life.

22 Q. And why do you think, for example, a million and a half Serbs in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina does not share that assessment of yours as to the

24 impartiality point?

25 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter what they think. You must ask the

1 witness questions with which he can deal. He's given you his answer.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. How long were you ambassador to Yugoslavia?

5 A. It was from September 1997 to July -- I guess my date, formal date

6 of the end of my ambassadorship in Belgrade is early August, July/August

7 of 1999.

8 Q. I assume that you consider that that appointment of yours implies

9 an above-average knowledge not only of the political situation in

10 Yugoslavia but the history of its peoples as well, their relationships,

11 the problems that they together had to face, et cetera; isn't that so?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. So you consider yourself to be well-informed. And then you wrote

14 the book "Kosovo-Kosova," which you published in 1999; that's right, isn't

15 it?

16 A. I published the book as a co-author with two scholars from the

17 University of Gradska, Professor Kaser and Mr. Pichler.

18 Q. In your book, it says: "During the funeral of a village teacher

19 that was killed on the 28th of November, 1997, for the first time in

20 public three KLA fighters appeared in public in order to hold a speech

21 with respect to that tragic event, and thereby, the KLA became the sole

22 force fighting for the national interests and liberation of Kosovo and

23 which will continue to fight along those lines and that the bloodshed of

24 the victims will not have been in vain."

25 Are those your words, Mr. Petritsch?

1 A. These are not my words.

2 Q. That's on page 205 and 206 of your book.

3 Is it true that on that same page, you said: "On the 4th of

4 December, 1997, the KLA took over the responsibility for a series of

5 attacks; among other things, the assassination on collaborationists and

6 activists of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Dali Podgoli [phoen], around

7 Stimlje on the 29th of November, and Qamil Gashi, an envoy, a deputy in

8 the federal parliament and president of the organisation of the Socialist

9 Party in Glogovac. In one of their demands, the KLA asked the premier of

10 the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, Paja Koposi [phoen], to hand over

11 the money that had been collected from Kosovo Albanians living abroad."

12 My question is as follows: Do you consider that these killings

13 and these assassinations, like all the others that the members of the KLA

14 perpetrated over the Albanian Serbs and others, were in the function of

15 peace?

16 A. First I would like to say that of course I cannot now corroborate

17 the correctness of the translation of the text that you have quoted from

18 my book, but secondly, I would say unambiguously that no terrorist act is

19 warranted and justified, no matter which side it perpetrates.

20 Q. As a former Yugoslavia -- ambassador to Yugoslavia, do you know

21 how many requests for asylum were submitted to the Austrian authorities on

22 the part of Albanians from Kosovo?

23 A. I don't know.

24 Q. All right. But I'm sure you know what the conditions are for

25 giving asylum, granting asylum; right?

1 A. I'm not familiar with the details of granting asylum in Austria.

2 Q. And your country, via its embassy in Belgrade, did it check out

3 the authenticity of the documents that the Albanians used to allegedly

4 prove their political -- that they were being politically persecuted?

5 A. We have provided, if I remember correctly, at one stage, the

6 Ministry of the Interior in Austria with a political assessment of the

7 situation for the Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia.

8 Q. And are you aware, once again as a former ambassador, that of the

9 hundreds of requests for asylum in Austria, 98 were submitted on the basis

10 of falsified judgements and sentences issued by the court in Kosovo? Just

11 say yes or no. Did you know that or not?

12 A. I did not know that, and I do not know whether this is correct or

13 not. That has to be checked with the appropriate authorities in Austria.

14 Q. And do you know at all whether your authorities persecuted

15 Albanians from the territory of your own country for the crime of forgery?

16 Do you know anything about that?

17 A. I do not know anything about this. This is not and never was in

18 my professional realm.

19 JUDGE MAY: The transcript says persecuted. No doubt what it --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Prosecuted. Interpreter's mistake.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. You claim that you had a meeting with me between seven and ten

23 times and that at those meetings you were able to learn a lot about me and

24 as you said, the control that I had, as you say, over all aspects in the

25 SFRY. That's what it says on page 2 of your statement.

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. Do you know at all how many times you did actually have a meeting

3 with me?

4 A. I do not know the exact number. I had at least, I can recall,

5 four substantive meetings, and of course on several other occasions, maybe

6 more formal protocol occasions, we had other meetings, so that this is the

7 reason why the figure is not so precise.

8 Q. All right. Then I'll skip over a few questions linked to that

9 point. And tell me this, please: On page 3 of your statement, you claim

10 that the Serbian delegation in Rambouillet had a mandate to achieve a

11 political agreement but that it did not have the mandate to negotiate the

12 implementation of that agreement. How do you find that to be logical,

13 that it has the mandate to negotiate about the main issue and does not

14 have the mandate to negotiate a subordinate issue? Is that your way of

15 thinking, your mental construction, or is it based on a fact?

16 A. Well, that transpired in the course of the very intense --

17 intensive meetings in Rambouillet. It was very clear and clearly

18 expressed on several occasions by the negotiators.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ambassador, could you give us an example of that,

20 the lack of capacity to negotiate implementation.

21 THE WITNESS: Well, under concrete circumstances when we were

22 approaching the issue of implementation, it was expressed very clearly

23 that we cannot do this now, we have to finish the political negotiations

24 and only then we would have to go back, so to speak - literally or via

25 other means of communication - to the president and then ask for the next

1 step to be -- to get agreement to -- for the next step.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. And tell me this: The implementation of the political agreement,

5 did that imply the presence of NATO forces on the territory of the FRY?

6 Yes or no.

7 A. Well, it was very clear that without an international military

8 force, there is not going to be a possibility, a remote possibility to

9 enforce this agreement. And I think, Mr. Milosevic, you know from the

10 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that without the military side, this

11 would not have happened there either. So it was, in my opinion, clear to

12 everybody that a military component in this overall agreement is indeed

13 necessary.

14 Q. How can you identify Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which there was a

15 civil war as a whole throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

16 the conflict between the forces of the government and terrorists in a

17 sovereign state, in one of the provinces of a sovereign state? How can

18 you equate that? Don't you see any difference between the two?

19 A. First of all, I -- it is very clear by now that the war in

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina was, first and foremost, an aggression on a sovereign

21 country, and it indeed had aspects of a civil war inside.

22 And the second point which I would like to make, I think that

23 those whom you consider terrorists, the Albanians, are citizens of your

24 country, and in this way, they also -- this also has aspects of a civil

25 war.

1 Q. But in the territory of a province of that sovereign state and not

2 throughout that sovereign state.

3 A. The civil war aspects in Bosnia-Herzegovina were confined and were

4 not throughout the territory of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 Q. I'm talking about Yugoslavia.

6 A. And the same applies to Yugoslavia. It was in a certain part of

7 Yugoslavia; that's correct.

8 Q. And do you know about the statement made by Christopher Hill, whom

9 you mentioned several times today, given to the BBC, An Untold Story was

10 the name of the programme, in which he claims that the aim of Rambouillet

11 was to bring in NATO troops into Serbia?

12 A. I am unaware of this statement, and knowing Mr. Hill, I do not

13 believe that this was the only statement that he gave there.

14 JUDGE MAY: Before you go on, Mr. Milosevic, when was that

15 programme broadcast?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as I know, the witness has

17 answered and said he was acquainted with that, but I can inform you in due

18 course. I don't know exactly now. It was a BBC programme, it's easy to

19 establish.

20 JUDGE MAY: You know if you're putting these allegations, you have

21 to give us the chapter and verse of when it was that these were said.

22 Yes, go on.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. May, I will indeed inform

24 you.

25 MR. RYNEVELD: Excuse me.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. In your book on page 29 --

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.

4 MR. RYNEVELD: I got the witness's answer to the effect that he

5 was unaware of the statement whereas the accused then summarised to the

6 effect that he said he was acquainted. I just wanted to point that out.

7 If they're at cross-purposes on the issue, I don't want the accused to be

8 suffering under the misapprehension that the witness actually agreed that

9 he was acquainted with it.

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. In your book "Kosovo-Kosova" on page 296, you claim that 2, 5 and

13 7, sections 2, 5, and 7 of the Rambouillet agreement were given to the

14 Serbian delegation only at a later stage; is that right?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. However, you do not refer to that in your statement, not in a

17 single part, as a matter of fact. Why not?

18 A. Let me explain this. I do not want to go too much into the

19 details and technicalities of this, but the 2, 5, 7, these are the

20 so-called implementation chapters of the Rambouillet accords. Police

21 implementation -- civilian implementation, police implementation, and

22 military implementation. And these were, as I tried to explain

23 previously, the technical side which for this reason first you need a

24 political part of the agreement and then, based upon these -- the text and

25 the concreteness of the political agreement, you then in turn put the

1 technical, the implementation paragraphs and chapters.

2 Q. All right. As for what technical matters are or are not, we will

3 get to that later. But tell me, do you know about the fact that some

4 parts of this so-called agreement were never approved by the Contact

5 Group?

6 A. Again I have to explain that the military implementation, not the

7 police, not the civilian implementation but the military part, there the

8 Russian position was as follows in the Contact Group which you are

9 referring to: As long as there is no agreement, no positive signal,

10 rather, from Belgrade, we, the Russian Federation, are not support -- or

11 actively engaging in the negotiations and supporting the -- this part.

12 But it was made clear at the same time that the Russian side, of course,

13 is aware of it and that it is also aware of the necessity of a military

14 component in the agreement, again following the Dayton example where the

15 Russian side, only after the end of the negotiations, agreed to the

16 military side of the Dayton Agreement.

17 Q. You mentioned a meeting with me, and you said that I showed you

18 Koha Ditore, an Albanian newspaper, from the month of February, and that

19 before Rambouillet it carried the entire Rambouillet agreement, and in two

20 instalments at that; very extensively. Tell me, these 83 pages of the

21 military section of the draft, why were they handed over to the Yugoslav

22 side over after the last day of the negotiations in Rambouillet?

23 A. Because that was the point in time where the necessary

24 prerequisites on the part of the political agreement were negotiated and

25 therefore this was the time to hand over the military part of the

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1 agreement.

2 Q. And do you claim that you handed it to all the parties then or was

3 it only to the Serb party? Did you give it to the other party earlier or

4 did you draft it together with them?

5 A. That was only given to the Yugoslav side because of the fact that

6 the military agreement, of course, can only -- can only be concluded with

7 a government and not with a group like in the case of the Kosovo

8 Albanians. So for formal reasons, your government or your negotiating

9 team was, in this case, the only interlocutor in concluding this agreement

10 because you have your party, your VJ, your army has to leave and so on and

11 so on. So you were the partner in this and not the Albanian side. That

12 was the reason why it was officially handed over to you, to your

13 negotiators, rather.

14 Q. Are you trying to say that the Albanians did not even know about

15 this?

16 A. The Albanian side who protested and wanted to get the text was

17 informed that, yes, there is a military agreement but this needs to be

18 concluded with the Yugoslav side only. And they were informed about the

19 content but were not formally considered a negotiating partner in this.

20 Q. Well, how come, then, before the Yugoslav side was informed and

21 before the negotiations even started in Rambouillet, how did they manage

22 to publish this in Koha Ditore?

23 A. Koha Ditore, to the best of my knowledge, published a political

24 agreement and not the military.

25 Q. All right. You quoted here the letter of the head of the

1 delegation, Ratko Markovic, and you yourself interpreted it. The

2 penultimate paragraph, it says very specifically: [In English] "Agreed to

3 discuss the scope and character of international presence in Kosmet to

4 implement the agreement to be accepted in Rambouillet." "... to discuss

5 scope and character of international presence..." "Scope and character."

6 [Interpretation] When saying "scope and character of international

7 presence," how could you infer on that basis that the Yugoslav side agreed

8 to a military presence? On the basis of what did you infer that?

9 A. On the basis of the phrase "international presence."

10 Q. "International presence." That was a fact during Rambouillet

11 itself. There was a delegation, rather, a Verification Mission of 1.400

12 people in Kosovo. Isn't that an international presence?

13 A. That's correct. But this is a civilian one, and you did not, in

14 this letter - or Mr. Markovic, rather - did not define this or restrict

15 this to civilian presence, which would have been possible, of course. On

16 purpose it was left open in order to have this negotiating room for the

17 next step, for the military implementation aspects to be discussed.

18 Q. My question was only on the basis of what did you infer -- from

19 the words that are here in this letter, on the basis of what did you infer

20 that there was consent to a military presence?

21 JUDGE MAY: I think the witness has already answered that.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. And the representatives of the Russian delegation, Maiorsky

25 himself included, did they see these parts of the draft agreement, those

1 related to the military aspect, before the last day of the negotiations?

2 A. Formally not; de facto, yes.

3 Q. All right. Thank you. And is it correct that the representative

4 of the Russian Federation, precisely this Ambassador Maiorsky, refused to

5 sign precisely for that reason?

6 A. No, that's not correct.

7 Q. Did he sign?

8 A. No, he did not sign, the reason being that he wanted to see both

9 sides to sign at the same time. Because as he put it in public there, it

10 needs two to tango.

11 Q. And are two required for an agreement, Mr. Petritsch, in your

12 opinion?

13 A. That's correct. This was the reason -- if I may, Your Honours,

14 this was the reason why the Contact Group foreign Ministers appealed to

15 the Yugoslav side, then to use the next hours after the 18th of March to

16 reconsider and to sign. That was the reason why we came on the 22nd of

17 March to Belgrade.

18 Q. I'm going to remind you what it says here in section 8. [In

19 English] "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles,

20 vessels, aircraft, and equipment free and unrestricted passage and

21 unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including

22 associated air space and territorial waters. This shall include but not

23 be limited to the right of bivouacs, manouevres, and utilisation of any

24 areas or facilities as required," [Interpretation] et cetera, et cetera.

25 [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... use of airports,

1 roads, rails, and ports," et cetera.

2 [Interpretation] Et cetera. That is to say that the entire

3 territory of Yugoslavia, the territorial waters, the air space, and under

4 item 15, even a whole spectre of electromagnetic frequencies,

5 communications, et cetera.

6 So is all of that correct, all of what I read out to you?

7 A. If -- to my best knowledge, it is correct what you have read out

8 to me, if I remember correctly. However, in order to understand this, one

9 has to explain that this text was basically taken from the Dayton Accords,

10 which is, of course, well known to you since you signed it, and already in

11 the Dayton Accords, you signed the same, also applying to the Federal

12 Republic of Yugoslavia.

13 SFOR, which is the stabilisation international force NATO, plus in

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina has even today and since the Dayton Accords the right

15 to use exactly what you have described here in the Federal Republic of

16 Yugoslavia. By the way, also Croatia, because that was the agreement.

17 And what has happened is for this military agreement, basically the text

18 and the rest was taken from the Dayton Accords and then transferred and

19 applied and made more concrete in regard to the Rambouillet accord.

20 Q. That means, according to the Dayton Accords, the occupation of all

21 of Yugoslavia was supposed to be carried out in order to implement some

22 kind of an agreement about Kosovo which had not ultimately even be

23 reached.

24 A. This is your interpretation. I consider this not correct. It is

25 not to talk about an occupation. It is a mutual agreement, the Dayton

1 Accords, which you signed up on your free will. And of course it is not

2 about occupation, it is about using, in case it is necessary for

3 transport reasons, logistical reasons, also the territory air space, sea,

4 and so on from the neighbouring countries in order to get into

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina or, in the case of Kosovo, in order to get into Kosovo

6 which, as you know, is a landlocked country or part of your country.

7 Q. And who actually negotiated with whom in Rambouillet? The

8 Yugoslav delegation with the Albanian delegation or with somebody else?

9 A. That was, in the case of the military agreement, as I tried to

10 point out, this is the sole responsibility between a sovereign country,

11 your country, and the international community. In this respect, the

12 Kosovo Albanians did not play a formal role. Did not have a formal role.

13 Q. I am not talking about this aspect. I am talking about the

14 so-called or, rather, purported negotiations in Rambouillet, where the

15 negotiating party, that is to say the Serb party and the Albanian party,

16 never met. They never had a single meeting. Is that right or is that not

17 right?

18 A. That's not correct. There was one single meeting under the

19 auspices of Secretary of State Albright between the heads of the two

20 delegations. But in substance, you are right. There was never a formal

21 meeting. Therefore -- therefore, these negotiations were conducted by

22 mediators to mediate between the two delegations who were not able and,

23 above all, not ready to sit down together and to negotiate. This is part

24 of the problem there. This is why, the very reason why the international

25 community had to assume a mediating role in this conflict.

1 Q. My question was: Did the delegations negotiate, Mr. Petritsch?

2 Did they have mutual negotiations?

3 JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered the question, he's explained

4 how it came about.

5 THE WITNESS: May I add, Your Honours, if you permit, that at the

6 outset it was even difficult to arrange the opening session with president

7 Chirac at Rambouillet where the Yugoslav side protested that terrorists

8 are in the same room and they would not be -- want to be in the same room.

9 This position was, however, changed on the part of the Yugoslav side and

10 so the opening ceremony took place in the presence of both delegations in

11 the same room. And later on, the Yugoslav delegation tried to initiate

12 direct talks with the Kosovo Albanian side. However, the Kosovo Albanian

13 side refused to -- to agree to direct talks, with the exception that I

14 just mentioned before, and insisted on the continuation of the mediation

15 role of the international community.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. All right, you've explained. There were no direct meetings

18 because the Kosovo Albanians would not accept them. Did I understand you

19 properly?

20 A. This is the -- these are the well-known facts.

21 Q. Do you know that Professor Ratko Markovic, as head of the

22 delegation, three times at various meetings of the working group asked

23 Hill whether in addition to the documents or, rather, proposals there were

24 some others that were not tabled at all? Do you know about that?

25 A. No, I don't.

1 Q. Do you know anything about why Hill evaded giving an answer to

2 these questions?

3 A. I don't know about this. I cannot testify to the fact that he --

4 that he evaded this. But I know from my contacts with your delegation

5 that of course from the outset everybody was aware of the whole realm of

6 the -- of the proposed agreement, including the military side.

7 Q. On page 3, paragraph 8 of your statement, you claim that the Serb

8 delegation did not only disagree to a military presence, but they also

9 opposed the presence of foreign military and police forces. Is that

10 correct?

11 A. I'm sorry. Could you again refer to what -- to what you just

12 quoted? Could you repeat this, please?

13 Q. I'm quoting from your statement.

14 JUDGE MAY: Have you got the statement, Mr. Petritsch?

15 THE WITNESS: Which statement are you referring to now?

16 JUDGE MAY: You're referring to the witness statement; is that

17 right?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes. And, Mr. Milosevic, you said paragraph 3?

20 JUDGE MAY: Page 3, paragraph 8, he said.

21 THE WITNESS: Page 3.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Paragraph 8.

24 A. Unfortunately, I have to count the paragraphs because there's

25 no --

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in the English

2 version, it's on page 4, actually. It's on page 4 in the English version,

3 the actual section that's being referred to.

4 MR. RYNEVELD: I don't want to disagree, but in my copy it's at

5 the bottom of page 3.

6 JUDGE MAY: And we don't have a copy. Yes. Let's try and get on

7 with this as best we can.

8 THE WITNESS: Well, what that basically means is of course what

9 you referred to prior with 2, 5, and 7. All the implementation aspects

10 were something that the delegation felt not to have the mandate to

11 negotiate. But on the other hand, that was of course also a clear

12 distinction between the political part and the implementation part, as I

13 have referred previously to.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. All right. So an agreement was about to be reached regarding the

16 political part of the agreement but not the presence of NATO forces on the

17 territory of a sovereign state. Is that right or is that not right?

18 A. That's not correct. The first part of the negotiations was

19 dedicated to the political agreement, to the political system, to clearly

20 define the Contact Group framework, which means what is substantive

21 autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was the political part, so to

22 speak. How to implement once this political part is agreed upon, as it

23 appeared to be at the end, on the 23rd of February, that is the

24 implementation part.

25 Q. On page 4, paragraph 4, you say: "The Serbian delegation really

1 worked, and we made considerable progress and reached a compromise

2 regarding the political and legal system in Kosovo." Is that correct?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. Now, after this compromise, the Serb party was supposed to agree

5 to the occupation of Kosovo as well, and the occupation of Yugoslavia by

6 NATO forces. My question is: Wasn't this the core of the matter? Wasn't

7 this the core of the matter, the core of the demands put forth in

8 Rambouillet?

9 A. No. There was no occupation envisioned. There was an agreement

10 envisioned between the international community, between the Contact Group,

11 to be more precise, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in regard to

12 the implementation of the Rambouillet accords, more specifically, the

13 international military presence.

14 Q. Well, I wouldn't quote other parts of the agreement to you now.

15 As you know, since you've read it properly, you know that this agreement

16 envisages the commander of the forces to be the main arbiter. You know

17 that he is the only one who decides about everything regarding the

18 agreement. You know, therefore, that they have the right to use the land,

19 the air, the water, the frequencies, and every conceivable thing in

20 Yugoslavia. So you do not consider that to be occupation.

21 Do you consider the occupation of Kosovo, at least, to be an

22 occupation, with the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, et cetera, and also

23 with the full occupation of the territory by NATO forces? Do you consider

24 that to be occupation at least?

25 A. No. It's not an occupation either, and it was never envisioned an

1 occupation in Rambouillet as this was not the case in Dayton which you

2 signed up to. It was the Dayton model that -- what the -- where the

3 Contact Group - United States, European countries, and the Russian

4 Federation - agreed upon, to follow, basically, the Dayton model. And

5 that, of course, was not an occupation, but there was a mutual agreement

6 signed by you on behalf of Yugoslavia, by Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Izetbegovic for

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this is not an occupation. And this was the same

8 -- the same model and the same idea was behind Rambouillet.

9 Q. Mr. Petritsch, what does Dayton have to do with Rambouillet?

10 Isn't it clear to you that as far as the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

11 is concerned, this took place through the abuse of Dayton, not in

12 accordance with the letter of Dayton?

13 A. I disagree with you.

14 Q. All right. Do you agree with a quotation that I'm going to read

15 out to you? Agreement is quoted. [In English] "Not negotiated settlement

16 but an ultimatum for unconditional surrender, a dictate that spelled death

17 of Yugoslavia and could not be accepted by Belgrade."

18 JUDGE MAY: Who are you quoting from?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm quoting John Pichler from the

20 New Statesman, May 1999. This is how it reads: [In English] "Anyone

21 scrutinising the Rambouillet document is left in little doubt that the

22 excuses given for the subsequent bombing were fabricated."

23 JUDGE MAY: You know, Mr. Milosevic, this is of limited use to us

24 in the Tribunal. This is the view of a journalist writing in a British

25 paper in 1999. Now, we are going to have to determine these facts, not

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1 the views of journalists.

2 However, since you've put to the witness that this wasn't a

3 negotiated settlement, we'll take it as a question which is being put, but

4 an ultimatum for unconditional surrender.

5 THE WITNESS: That was not --

6 JUDGE MAY: You hear that that suggestion is made. Would you

7 characterise the agreement in that way?

8 THE WITNESS: The agreement was -- or let me put it this way:

9 Rambouillet was the attempt to find a peaceful agreement. It was

10 conducted in the most transparent way. It was based upon month-long

11 negotiations on the ground, the so-called period of the shuttle diplomacy.

12 There were clear principles established and fully supported on the part of

13 the Contact Group. So to talk about an ultimatum, to talk about a

14 dictate, is utterly wrong.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. All right. Since you won't let me quote here and since you won't

17 let me treat this as a question of mine, you can treat them as questions

18 that I am putting myself. I am given the direct quotation out of respect

19 for the person who originally said this, but this is my own view as well.

20 Do you agree with this: [In English] "[Previous translation

21 continues]... stage managed and the Serbs were told, 'Surrender and be

22 occupied or don't surrender and be destroyed.'"

23 A. I can attest to it that this was not the case in Rambouillet and

24 Paris.

25 Q. [Interpretation] All right. And is it correct that -- this was

1 John Pichler in the New Statesman. What about Ronald Hashman [phoen],

2 what he writes in his book "War to War"? He says the following: [In

3 English] [Previous translation continues]... "an ambush. Ronald Hashman

4 sums it up well. It was a declaration of war disguised as a peace

5 agreement." [Interpretation] Is that right or not? It is --

6 A. This is not.

7 Q. And do you know, Mr. Petritsch, that George Kenney, an American

8 diplomat who, in the State Department, was the Yugoslav desk officer,

9 wrote in the Nation on the 14th of June 1999 - that is to say an authentic

10 piece of writing - that the United States, and I quote him literally [In

11 English] "set the bar higher than the Serbs could accept."

12 JUDGE MAY: That's just the opinion of that writer. And if you

13 want, Mr. Milosevic, you can call him as part of your case. But it's of

14 no assistance to us what his views are.

15 Yes. Did you set the bar higher than they could possibly reach?

16 THE WITNESS: That's not correct and can be proven by the simple

17 fact that definitely the Russian Federation would have never agreed to

18 this in the Contact Group. I want to stress the fact that all the

19 preparations for Rambouillet and throughout Rambouillet, the Russian side

20 was fully engaged and fully informed about this. It would not have been

21 possible otherwise. And this in itself is, in my opinion, ample proof

22 that there was no scam, no dictate, no ultimatum, but difficult

23 negotiations which went for quite some time, quite positive, and

24 unfortunately, after the 23rd of February collapsed, to the dismay and

25 disappointment of many, including some in the Yugoslav delegation.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Well, I suppose it's clear to you that the Yugoslav delegation

3 went there with the best intentions in the world and the conviction that a

4 peaceful solution would be reached. Yes or no.

5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. --

6 THE WITNESS: I would assume so.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. And can that clearly be seen from the letter from Ratko Markovic

9 that you quoted and which is very precise and says: "We would especially

10 like to emphasise the fact, as the Contact Group has indeed done, that

11 there can be no independence of Kosovo and Metohija or a third republic."

12 And before that, he says: "Definition of self-determination for

13 Kosovo and Metohija respectful of sovereignty and territorial integrity of

14 the Republic of Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia." So those are the limits

15 within which the Yugoslav delegation -- the frameworks, within these

16 frameworks was sovereignty and territorial integrity and substantial

17 self-government, that those were the frameworks for the negotiations. Is

18 that clear? Yes or no.

19 A. That is correct, and I would like to reiterate that the Contact

20 Group and the negotiators took specific care of this sensitivity in regard

21 to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. And it was

22 stressed, to the best of my knowledge, or written into the Rambouillet

23 accords on three different occasions, so to speak, in order to make sure

24 that this is clear beyond any doubt.

25 Q. Well, now I'd like to draw your attention to the third paragraph

1 of Ratko Markovic's letter, which in establishing all that, says:

2 "Therefore, all elements of self-government --" "All elements of

3 self-government at the time of defining the agreement have to be known and

4 clearly defined."

5 That means the agreement must be such that all elements be known

6 and clearly defined. And in further work, this should be adequately

7 addressed and consistently resolved. In that sense, we're ready to

8 participate in the next meeting, et cetera, et cetera. And then he

9 proposes another meeting of the two delegations, but all that was, of

10 course, in vain.

11 Now, in view of that position, does this position seem to you to

12 be logical, that the delegation of the Republic of Serbia should ask that

13 all elements of that self-government should be known and regulated when

14 the agreement was drawn up? Is that an unrealistic demand?

15 A. Absolutely not. And all elements of self-government, of course,

16 and I'm referring to what I was quoting in regard to the political side of

17 the agreement, that was, of course, on the table at the time and they were

18 clearly defined and known to the Yugoslav delegation. However, I also see

19 the point that it is from the Yugoslav viewpoint and the delegation's

20 viewpoint clear such an important point to underline in such a letter in

21 order to make it sure beyond any doubt, and that, of course, was the case.

22 I repeat, all elements of the self-government were defined and known, well

23 known, to both sides.

24 Q. Right. Now, as you yourself have said that we don't exist --

25 agree with respect to the occupation, let's not enter into a discussion

1 and debate about occupation which is obvious from the agreement and also

2 from reactions throughout the world, but let's get back to what we've just

3 been discussing. I'm going to quote point 3. It is part of the amendment

4 of comprehensive assessments and final clauses, and it is point 3 of that

5 document.

6 [In English] "After the entry into force of this agreement, an

7 international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a

8 final settlement for Kosovo on the basis of the will of the people,

9 opinions of relevant authorities, each party's effort regarding

10 implementation of this agreement, and the Helsinki final act to undertake

11 a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this agreement and to

12 consider proposal by any party for additional measures."

13 [Interpretation] Do you think that with this, when it says three

14 years afterwards that the will of the people should be tested, as it says

15 here, and that a final ultimate agreement be reached, do you not think

16 that this is such a transparent schematic, first of all with respect to

17 occupation and then the Albanian national minority, let's proclaim that a

18 nation with the right to self-determination, and then let's go on to

19 legalising this with Yugoslavia's signature, with the signature of Serbia,

20 the legalisation of snatching away Kosovo which represents otherwise an

21 integral part of Serbia. And is that in keeping with what you said a

22 moment ago, that it is very pertinent, the delegation's request, to

23 pertinently ask for clearly defined elements and known elements of each

24 particular part of the agreement?

25 A. I believe that you have touched upon a very relevant and very

1 important point now in this agreement, and you have read this out, and I

2 think by reading this out you have proven to the contrary what you have

3 actually -- what you are insinuating. This is a clear, albeit rather long

4 language, where this -- where it is spelled out that a final settlement

5 has to be based on the will of the people, which is of course democracy,

6 with all the elements of democracy, not just the Albanian, of course,

7 Albanian community as well, the Serb community as well. Secondly, that

8 each party, therefore, is being taken into consideration, which is how

9 much are both sides contributing to building a peaceful Kosovo.