1 Friday, 14 June 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 WITNESS: KLAUS NAUMANN [Resumed]

8 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

9 Q. [Interpretation] Well, let's continue where we left off

10 yesterday. I was asking you about the goals. Tell me, please: Who

11 approved the bombing of the central television station, central studios of

12 Radio Television Serbia? Because, as you know, it was a completely

13 civilian target; there was no military in the building at all.

14 A. Well, with regard to your last point, Mr. Milosevic, there are

15 some doubts whether it was a completely civilian target, as you

16 intimated. Some people believe that it was also used for communication

17 purposes. The bombing of the TV tower was eventually approved by the

18 Secretary-General of NATO.

19 Q. Here, in this statement, which this institution has prepared and

20 which is called "Final Report," submitted to the Prosecution for a team

21 set up to look into the bombing campaign of NATO into the Federal Republic

22 of Yugoslavia, is that the representatives of NATO in Brussels told

23 Amnesty International that they did not issue any concrete warning because

24 that would jeopardise the pilots. Is that correct?

25 A. What do you mean with "any concrete warning"? To whom? Warning

1 to whom.

2 Q. Concrete warning, which was otherwise envisaged that a warning be

3 issued, according to Article 57 of the Second Protocol of the Geneva

4 Conventions, when you are targeting a target of that nature. And it says

5 here in the Prosecution document, the material supplied by the

6 Prosecution, that you said in Brussels that you did not issue any concrete

7 warning because that would jeopardise the pilot. Is that so?

8 A. I should have said this, Mr. Milosevic? Me? I should have said

9 this?

10 Q. No. No. It doesn't say any name here. It doesn't state

11 anybody's name. All it says is the representatives of NATO, that they

12 said that they didn't issue any specific concrete warning.

13 A. Well, the issue of warning was discussed in the NATO council, that

14 is correct, and it was said that we had issued a clear statement that we

15 would attack targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and it

16 was regarded as sufficient.

17 Q. All right. Yes, that. But as it says here, and I was quoting

18 it: Possibly the casualties among the civilians working in Radio

19 Television Serbia are great because of the lack -- the fact that NATO

20 didn't issue a warning. Now, as you are attacking the whole of

21 Yugoslavia, then, by the same token, you consider that all the targets

22 have in fact been announced. Is that what you want to say, having

23 announced a general warning?

24 A. To some extent, yes. But I also have to add, and you should note,

25 that I was only there until the 6th of May. I do not know, and I never

1 followed that in detail, since there was no longer any need for me to know

2 that in detail and I had no access to classified information any longer,

3 that some changes took place after the unfortunate event on the Chinese

4 embassy on the 7th of May, and I'm not aware of the details of the

5 discussion then. All I could say was what happened until the 6th of May,

6 and there the policy clearly was that we should target targets of a

7 military nature, and that was what we did.

8 Q. As you've already mentioned the Chinese embassy, I should like to

9 ask you to comment on just one paragraph. There is quite a lot about the

10 Chinese Embassy here because allegedly you didn't know where the Chinese

11 embassy was although hundreds of foreign diplomats attended receptions at

12 that same Chinese embassy and knew full well where the building was

13 located and so on and so forth. But let me quote here what it says under

14 point 85 in the material that the Prosecution has provided me.

15 "It is the commission's view that the crew of the plane that

16 attacked -- launched the attack," and I'm talking about the Chinese

17 embassy, "need not be ascribed any responsibility for the fact that they

18 had been given the wrong target to attack. And also that it is

19 unacceptable that higher officials be taken to task because the officials

20 from other agencies got wrong information."

21 Now, may you have your comments to that passage? Is this making

22 fun of the Chinese and the truth at the same time?

23 A. Mr. Milosevic, do I not want to duck your point, but I would like

24 to remind you that I was no longer in NATO when this happened. So I'm --

25 I really do not know much more about this event of the Chinese embassy

1 than what was published in the press. So I'm awfully sorry. I cannot

2 give you any further information.

3 Q. All right. As we don't have much time, I would like to ask you a

4 collective question. How do you explain the attacks on the convoys of

5 Albanian refugees? How do you explain the targeting of the Dr. Dragisa

6 Misovic hospital in Belgrade including the maternity ward of that

7 particular hospital, the casualties that resulted on the -- from that --

8 JUDGE MAY: One question at a time, Mr. Milosevic.

9 The first question concerned the attacks as alleged on the convoys

10 of Albanian refugees. Can you assist as to that?

11 No. You can't put a series of questions to a witness and expect

12 him to answer. It's neither fair nor rational.

13 Now, the first question related to the convoys.

14 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I think it had been clearly stated by

15 NATO that this was a tragic error, a pilot's error which happened, and I

16 think no one regrets more than any of the military in NATO that something

17 like this happened. It's one of those unfortunate events which happened

18 in war operations.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. All right. So that is your explanation, then.

21 Now, tell me this: Who approved the use of cluster bombs, the

22 cluster bombs that were thrown, as you know, throughout Kosovo on towns,

23 including one of the largest towns in Serbia, Nis, in the central urban

24 district of Nis which is where many citizens were wounded, especially

25 children, by these cluster bombs. So who approved the use of cluster

1 bombs, and who approved the use of the depleted uranium devices that were

2 used?

3 A. Okay. Two questions. The first one, the cluster bombs. I'm not

4 aware that cluster bombs were used against cities during the time that I

5 was in the Military Committee. The use of cluster bombs against military

6 targets was included in the approval of the air operation in general, and

7 the final approval on the air operation was given by the NATO council.

8 With regard to depleted uranium munitions, they were part of the

9 equipment of the -- of an American aircraft which was used against tanks,

10 and this ammunition belongs to the equipment of this aircraft. And since

11 the aircraft was accepted in the order of battle, it was also part of the

12 general approval of the air operation.

13 Q. Does that include the fact that as you say that in the fight

14 against tanks that they were not to be used in the bombing of urban

15 centres such as Nis, the town I mentioned, in front of the hospital, the

16 marketplace, the university building in Nis, and various other places?

17 A. Well, if -- if there were no military targets hidden in these

18 buildings or in these areas, then the munitions were not used against

19 civilian targets. If someone used camouflage tactics to hide tanks, let's

20 say, in a hospital surrounding, then the question is: Who violated

21 international law first, those who took advantage of coverage protected by

22 the International Red Cross in bringing military targets into the area of

23 those protected areas or those who then attacked these military targets?

24 I have to state in front of this Court, Your Honours, that I am

25 not -- I do not recall a single event where NATO attacked a hospital. I'm

1 not aware of that.

2 Q. All right. You're not aware of that. That's an answer too.

3 Now, you said that the exercises and training of our army in the

4 winter of 1999 was allegedly a preparation for an action against the

5 Kosovo Albanians. I'm now going to ask you, as a general, in view of the

6 threats made by NATO from the middle of 1998 already and the

7 intensification of those threats towards the end of 1998 and the beginning

8 of 1999, was it logical to you that a country which is being threatened

9 and on whose borders both towards Macedonia and towards Albania there is

10 an amassment, build-up of NATO troops, that that country should undertake

11 nothing with respect to the deployment of its forces in order to protect

12 its own country?

13 A. Well, the defence of a country and of your country in that case, I

14 think, is absolutely legitimate. I would not -- I would not oppose such

15 action being taken from a military point of view if one could clearly see

16 that these exercises were meant to reinforce border protection troops.

17 That, I think, was not as clearly evident as it -- as you just intimated.

18 When we saw as troop movements in these winter exercises seemed to

19 be a preparedness for forces outside Kosovo to deploy into Kosovo. Had

20 the entire thing been done in such a way, Mr. Milosevic, that you had

21 brought up to full wartime strength your 52nd Corps in Pristina and

22 deployed it at the borders of Kosovo and then trained the reinforcement of

23 those border elements, one could have seen a little bit more logic in

24 that. But otherwise, since we did not know much more than what we learned

25 from signal intelligence and satellite imagery, we came to the conclusion

1 that you deployed forces in order to bring them into the Kosovo area, and

2 with that you left ambiguous signals with us. One interpretation is the

3 one you gave. The other one is that you prepared forces for actions

4 against the civilian population in Kosovo. The only one who really knows

5 it, Mr. Milosevic, is either you or the chief of General Staff.

6 Q. Well, all right. Answer me this, then, a professional question:

7 As you mentioned the 3rd Army, within whose area of responsibility was the

8 protection of borders towards Albania and Macedonia, as the 3rd Army, in

9 view of the proclamation of a state of war, once you decided to attack

10 Yugoslavia, and as it numbered over 150.000 men, what would you say the

11 depth of deployment ought to be of an army numbering this many men,

12 150.000 men? Can they make a line along the border or must their in-depth

13 deployment be over a large area? And as you know, the Kosovo area and the

14 southern part of Serbia and generally that part of the country is not very

15 big in order to be able to have a different pattern of deployment. So

16 what would you say the depth of deployment and the area it covers ought to

17 be for a strategic formation of that magnitude?

18 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, I think you would definitely be right in what

19 you presented in these statements a minute ago if there were not the fact

20 that NATO had publicly ruled out the use of ground forces. I should say,

21 from a military point of view, that was not the wisest of all decisions,

22 but it was the decision that was taken. And you also saw, and your

23 intelligence services saw, that there was no deployment of ground forces

24 of NATO which really mattered in either Macedonia or in Albania. The

25 small NATO elements which were there were part of the KVM protection

1 force, and they were so small that there was no need for you to deploy

2 anything but, let's say, a thin wheel of border-protecting forces, since

3 your Pristina Corps, I think, outnumbered the NATO forces which were there

4 in Macedonia and Albania by a large degree.

5 So there was no need for you to deploy army elements, and for that

6 reason I think all these preparations of the 3rd Army are, to some extent,

7 at least, questionable. I cannot see a military justification for that,

8 since no ground forces were there, and you knew exactly that NATO would

9 need a couple of weeks to deploy ground forces in a sufficient number to

10 launch a ground operation against Kosovo, which, by the way, as you know

11 as well as I, is difficult to launch anyway.

12 Q. General Naumann, you're not really going to deny the fact that we

13 had up in the area the threat looming with a ground force invasion as

14 well?

15 A. Mr. Milosevic, that is not correct. The threat of a ground

16 invasion began to emerge with first signals after the Washington Summit,

17 and from that moment on we tried - and I have no difficulties to tell the

18 Court this - we tried to send signals to you which could indicate that a

19 ground operation was about to happen. But before the Washington Summit,

20 nothing like this was under consideration. It was repeatedly stated in

21 public by NATO political leaders that no ground forces were envisaged, and

22 on that ground, Mr. Milosevic, all preparations of the 3rd Army and of the

23 52nd Corps cannot be related to the defence of Kosovo and of Yugoslavia,

24 since there was no threat of a ground invasion.

25 Q. Now, as you're talking about the 3rd Army, do you know that the

1 1st Army had been deployed because our side expected a possible ground

2 invasion from the north as well? Do you think that we should have trusted

3 and had confidence in what you were stating, what you were saying as to

4 what you were going to do, or not, in a situation where there was bombing

5 24 hours around the clock? Why did we deploy the 1st Army, for example,

6 towards the northern stretches?

7 A. Well, I do not know what the threat assessment of your General

8 Staff was, but the 1st Army, if I recall it properly, is in the northern

9 part of Yugoslavia. If you deployed them outside of their garrisons, then

10 it was a protective measure, presumably, to protect them against air

11 attacks in the barracks. If you look at NATO forces in the north, you

12 saw, and you may have noticed, that first of all there were no substantial

13 NATO elements in the neighbouring country of Hungary and that the

14 Hungarian armed forces were not in alert status. They were sitting in

15 their garrisons and were doing peacetime training. So there was no reason

16 at all to be afraid of a ground invasion from the north since no forces

17 were there which could invade your country.

18 Q. You, therefore, consider that we, without any reason at all,

19 counted with this possibility of a ground invasion. Now, you, as the

20 Chief of General Staff of an army upon whom an aggression was launched, of

21 a country an aggression was launched against, when you have the world's

22 greatest power before you, would you have excluded the possibility,

23 really, of a ground invasion and given up deploying your troops in

24 readiness for that kind of invasion? As a general, would you have done

25 that?

1 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, again I have to say I'm not aware of the risk

2 assessments of your General Staff. I have always lived in my military

3 life that I should take decisions to deploy forces only if I have a real

4 reason to fear that something may happen in the concerned area. In the

5 case of the northern part of your country, I think your General Staff

6 would have really arrived at an assessment of the situation which is not

7 based on facts if they believed that something could happen from the north

8 without a preparation which may take four to six weeks or more, and there

9 were no indications at all that forces were deployed to Hungary. And you

10 also know from your political background that the country of Hungary has

11 very strict rules with regard to the deployment of foreign forces on

12 Hungarian territory. It requires an approval of the Hungarian parliament

13 and the Hungarian president. Nothing like this was in the making. And

14 all of this is in a democracy, done in the open, in the public, so your

15 General Staff had, I think, every assurance that nothing could happen from

16 the north without a warning time of six to eight weeks.

17 Q. All right. That is customary that there are no war secrets and

18 that everything is public.

19 Now, you said that the plans for the deployment of these troops

20 were probably prepared at least three or four months previously. Do you

21 know that our army has plans, defence plans, plans for the country's

22 defence, planned decades ahead, and that they are always updated,

23 continuously or from time to time, depending on the risk assessment of the

24 situation that prevails, and that every country does this; every country

25 has ready made defence plans. They're not made once the country is

1 actually threatened. Are you aware of that?

2 A. Mr. Milosevic, I'm aware of that, and I did not talk about plans

3 of your General Staff to defend your country. I suggested that the

4 operation, which obviously was prepared to act inside your country, and

5 that is something which is different from the defence of the country, was

6 obviously prepared well before the operation really started in March

7 1999.

8 Q. So you're saying that you consider that a country which has

9 proclaimed a state of war, having been attacked and having become the

10 victim of aggression, should not put into effect its measures and defence

11 plan but should do something quite different regardless of how great the

12 threat from outside is. That in fact it is not threatened from outside,

13 it's just that it's -- hasn't got enough to busy itself with and has

14 decided to undertake these measures to become occupied.

15 A. Well, again I should say the only one who really knows the truth

16 about all this is you, Mr. Milosevic, since you are the commander -- you

17 were the Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav armed forces. We could only

18 come to conclusions based on what we saw on the ground, what we heard by

19 listening to your command channels, as far as we could do this, and

20 whatever information we gained through intelligence. And based on that,

21 we came to the conclusion that preparations were taken for military

22 operations other than the defence of Kosovo, operations which obviously

23 were partially aimed, at least, at the population of Kosovo and operations

24 which were launched before NATO dropped its bomb.

25 Q. That, as you know, is not true, but I can't waste my time on that

1 because my time is limited. Now, could you give me a brief answer if

2 possible, please, to the following questions. My time is very limited.

3 After the beginning of the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, did you

4 make statements for the public at NATO headquarters in Brussels on several

5 occasions? That's a fact, isn't it? You did do so?

6 A. I had to give from time to time some statements in the press, yes.

7 Q. And in those statements were figures such as 100, 500.000

8 allegedly killed Albanians mentioned?

9 A. Five hundred thousand, you said? Five hundred thousand killed

10 Albanians? I never said this.

11 Q. Which were the figures mentioned in your announcements to the

12 effect that Albanians were being killed, hundreds of thousands of

13 Albanians? Is that true or not?

14 A. I do not recall that I said on any occasion that hundreds of

15 thousands of Albanians were killed. The figures which I mentioned were

16 those which I mentioned yesterday in my testimony here, that more than --

17 Q. I'm not saying you personally but your spokesman.

18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you must make it plain. If you say

19 "you" to the witness, he's bound to think that it refers to him.

20 Do you know, General, of a spokesman saying anything of this

21 sort?

22 THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, I cannot recall that a NATO

23 spokesman said -- spoke of one hundreds of thousands of killed Albanians.

24 I'm not aware of any of those statements, and I can only assure the

25 accused and Your Honours that in all the statements for which I had

1 responsibility in the NATO council, we never used figures like this in

2 order to indicate the magnitude of casualties or killed people of the

3 population of Albania, never.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Very well. In point 35 of your statement that I have in front of

6 me, paragraph 35, based on your interview with the investigator, you said

7 that on the 25th of October, 1998, it was established that there were

8 10.000 in peacetime. Let me remind you. Ten thousand and twenty-four was

9 the figure, and that is correct. There's no need to dispute that. But

10 then in paragraph 35 you say that NATO had proof that the Yugoslavs had at

11 least 500 excess police.

12 First of all, that is not true. But even if it were and if the

13 number of 10.000 was increased by 500 policemen, that is 5 per cent, which

14 is statistically considered negligible. So a 5 per cent increase, is that

15 a reason why we should constantly be threatened with airstrikes? Please

16 give me a yes or no answer so we don't waste any more time.

17 A. There's no need to waste any time, Mr. Milosevic, since what I

18 said in this statement is, I think, crystal clear. We discussed not the

19 percentages and whether it is necessary to mention it or not. The fact

20 was that we provided this figure to you in order to indicate that you were

21 not in compliance with the agreement, that's all. And that was what we

22 had as our intelligence at the time. Whether this was the truth or not is

23 again a point which only you can reveal to this Court.

24 Q. My question was whether this number could be a cause for such

25 threats of bombardment regardless of --

1 JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered. He has explained why the

2 figure was given. It's nothing to do with airstrikes.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. We noted yesterday that you were aware that the KLA was abusing

6 the October agreement because it engaged in all the activities that we

7 referred to yesterday. So when you became aware that the KLA was abusing

8 that agreement, why did you continue to threaten Yugoslavia when it was

9 clear that it was the KLA that was engaging in these abuses?

10 A. Mr. Milosevic, I tried to explain this yesterday, and I said that

11 many of the incidents were indeed triggered by the KLA, but your security

12 forces reacted to these incidents with disproportionate force, and then

13 they triggered the next step of escalation. So it's not a one-sided

14 picture which you can portray here. It's both sides which were not

15 behaving as they should, and you cannot one-sidedly accuse the KLA for

16 being responsible for everything. There were also incidents which were

17 triggered by your forces.

18 Q. That question as to what is proportionate and what is

19 disproportionate I hope is a relative issue. I hope we can agree on

20 that.

21 A. I don't think that this is an issue which one can simply put

22 aside. I think you -- you will find a lot of sympathy if you defend your

23 country against terrorist attacks, against subversive attacks with means

24 which everyone regards as legitimate and proportionate.

25 And I tried to explain this yesterday in front of this Court, and,

1 Your Honours, I repeat it today. If they are terrorist incidents, I think

2 it is the normal reaction of a country to defend itself by using the

3 police forces. But it's disproportionate, at least in the view of the

4 countries which I know, to use tanks and artillery to shell villages and

5 cause casualties among the civilians and then go after the terrorists.

6 Q. That, Mr. Naumann, simply is not true, but let us go back to the

7 agreement that you referred to yesterday or, rather, which the other party

8 showed yesterday, and that is this piece of paper, single piece of paper,

9 with a few lines on it. And it is true that this is my signature.

10 There's absolutely no dispute over that. But one can see quite clearly, I

11 hope, that I was not the signatory of the agreement. I accepted your

12 request that by signing an agreement that you signed, Mr. Naumann and

13 Mr. Clark together with Sainovic and General Djordjevic, because they were

14 your partners, I confirmed that I approved such an agreement because that

15 is what you requested of me. And you said to me, "Please confirm that you

16 approve this agreement." And I said, "Okay. I'll put my signature on it

17 as confirmation that I approve this agreement." So there's no mystery

18 about it.

19 But I do draw your attention to the following: Since this

20 agreement was not really an agreement, it just says a record of a meeting

21 indicating who was present. In the second it says that the aim of the

22 meeting is to discuss specific steps. So the first item is a list of

23 attendees. The second is to discuss specific steps that need to be taken

24 for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to fully comply with the request

25 contained in UN Resolution 1199. And the third item is the position of

1 the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the government of

2 Serbia, which is presented in the attached announcement which the military

3 representatives of NATO took note of, and you signed this. So this is a

4 technical document, whereas the substance is contained in the announcement

5 that this document refers to and which was not produced here, but it says,

6 and I will just quote --

7 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish. You've been talking now for

8 three minutes. It's time that we had a question.

9 General, is the final comment correct, that this was merely a

10 technical document and the substance was contained in an announcement?

11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I understood Mr. Milosevic

12 correctly, then he said that the first page, the page which has the

13 signatures on it, is a technical document. And if he refers to this one

14 page, then he is undoubtedly correct. This is a record of a meeting, and

15 I would regard this as a technical document as well.

16 But para 3 of this technical document speaks of an attached

17 statement, and the attached statement is, with that word, I think an

18 integral part of this entire document. And we had asked Mr. Milosevic

19 also to take note and to authorise the actions which were contained in

20 what is then called the statement. And as a matter of fact, I should

21 again state that Mr. Milosevic obviously authorised the actions since

22 we -- we saw the compliance of the Serb security forces with the

23 statement.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Naumann, is it clear to you that that is precisely what I am

1 alleging?

2 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, I think that was already discussed yesterday,

3 and I stated in front of the Court that you were, for a couple of days, in

4 compliance with the statement and that you also asked the withdrawal of

5 the forces, as requested.

6 Q. Of course. But let me just remind you, because I was interrupted

7 by Mr. May in my explanation, because as you yourself say, this was an

8 integral part of this note. And it says, proceeding from the fact that

9 organised terrorism in Kosmet has been defeated, that:

10 "Since the 29th of September, 1998, no further operations are

11 being undertaken against the terrorists. The authorities of the Federal

12 Republic of Yugoslavia have decided, among other things, to take a series

13 of measures which will contribute to the further confidence building among

14 citizens, members of all national communities living in Kosmet, as well as

15 to the resolution of all outstanding humanitarian problems, and especially

16 the problem of the earliest possible return of all displaced persons to

17 their homes. These measures are being taken with the clear objective to

18 normalise life as soon as possible throughout Kosmet, ensuring security

19 and well-being of all citizens and innocent civilians of Kosmet, and

20 guaranteeing the rights of all citizens, members of all national

21 communities inhabiting Kosovo and Metohija, to continue their everyday

22 life without any restrictions, which complies freedom of movement of all

23 citizens and representatives of state authorities, as well as the normal

24 operation of all state bodies."

25 And then it goes on to say that these forces should be reduced to

1 the normal strength, that is, the strength prior to the outbreak of

2 terrorist activities. And then it goes into the detail. So there's no

3 dispute over that.

4 And now I wish to draw your attention to paragraph III. I will

5 not read it out in its entirety either, but it says, among other things,

6 that:

7 "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia calls on all other parties to

8 unconditionally abide by Resolution 1199. The Federal Republic of

9 Yugoslavia will continue, by peaceful means and in cooperation with the

10 OSCE, to find solutions to all outstanding problems."

11 And then at the end it says:

12 "However, the state authorities, as an extreme measure, and in

13 accordance with the right to self-protection, retain the right adequately

14 and proportionately to reply to all forms of terrorist activity and

15 violations of the law threatening the lives and security of citizens and

16 representatives of state bodies."

17 Is that correct, Mr. Naumann?

18 A. Mr. Milosevic, you just read out the statement which is in front

19 of the Court, which is part of the evidence which this Court has, and I

20 have nothing to add to that.

21 Q. Therefore, we did retain the right to respond to terrorism if it

22 rears its head again, and that is precisely what we did when terrorism

23 escalated, as it did, as you yourself stated. So is it not the legitimate

24 right of a state to defend itself from terrorism?

25 A. May I draw your attention, Mr. Milosevic, to two words which are

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1 included in this statement, and that is "adequately" and

2 "proportionately," and that is obviously the point where we have a

3 different point of view. No one challenges your right to defend your

4 country. The question is whether you were in compliance with the

5 obligation you took in this para III to respond adequately and

6 proportionately, and there, as I have stated yesterday and repeat it

7 today, I have every evidence that you were not in compliance with this

8 obligation.

9 Q. Yes, but the withdrawal of the army, as you yourself noted,

10 created a vacuum, and the KLA filled in that vacuum, constantly killing

11 civilians and members of the police and the army. Are you aware of that?

12 A. I'm aware of that. I stated this yesterday. But there is also

13 another side of the coin which has to be considered, and that is that your

14 police forces took much more action than they were entitled to in the

15 agreement on the police, since they increased mobile patrols and

16 established, soon after the withdrawal of the excess police forces,

17 additional checkpoints, which was monitored by the KDOM and by the KVM.

18 So it's not only the KLA which took action; it is also to some extent your

19 police, which was not in full compliance with this agreement.

20 Q. Isn't an increase of strength at checkpoints the result of the

21 terrorist presence and, as we see from this document, in compliance with

22 our right that we retain to react adequately in response to that? A

23 checkpoint is no offensive unit or phenomenon; it's just a checkpoint,

24 which needs to be strengthened if somebody shoots at it. Two policemen

25 cannot man it and get killed. There need to be 10 or 15 to be able to

1 defend themselves if a terrorist group appears. Isn't that logical,

2 Mr. Naumann?

3 A. If everything had happened in that way you just described,

4 Mr. Milosevic, one could find a lot of sympathy for that point and it

5 would be legitimate. But there was also -- there were actions where your

6 police established checkpoints in areas where nothing had happened. They

7 simply wanted to keep tight control of every movement of citizens, unarmed

8 citizens, often absolutely innocent people who did nothing but peasants'

9 work or things like this and were arrested by the police. So I think we

10 would end in an endless discussion on who triggered which incident at

11 which time. I think the fair statement is, as I said it yesterday and

12 repeated it today: Many of these incidents were triggered by the KLA, but

13 some of them were also caused by your police forces, and we saw an

14 unfortunate tit for tat and an escalation.

15 Q. Very well, Mr. Naumann. Whether a checkpoint was placed were

16 unarmed citizens were moving implies that you would know where the armed

17 ones were moving around, but even the police couldn't know where the armed

18 citizens were moving, and you certainly couldn't know, to be able to claim

19 that the checkpoint was a place where unarmed citizens were passing

20 through. Isn't that right?

21 A. That's not correct, Mr. Milosevic. Of course we did not know

22 where the armed civilians were and were the unarmed civilians were. What

23 I just reflected was a statement of fact, that there were incidents where

24 police people arrested peasants who were just doing their normal work on

25 the fields, and there was no evidence at all of any terrorist attack.

1 Q. Very well. Let us be as efficient as possible, please. Do you

2 know that Zivorad Jovanovic, the then foreign minister of Yugoslavia, at

3 the end of December 1998, addressed a letter to Kofi Annan, informing him

4 that in the course of 1998, 1.854 terrorist attacks had been carried out

5 in Kosovo, involving the death of 244 persons and the wounding of 566?

6 Are you aware of this letter addressed to Kofi Annan containing these data

7 linked to the UN resolution and all the efforts being invested and

8 everything else? Quite impressive figures, I would say, of course in the

9 negative sense. Just tell me whether you're aware of it or not, please.

10 Yes or no.

11 A. Yes, I was aware of this letter, but you may forgive me that I

12 don't recall the details at this moment.

13 Q. Very well. And do you know that out of that, 470 terrorist

14 attacks were carried out after the signing of the October agreement,

15 together with 22 violations of the frontiers of the Federal Republic of

16 Yugoslavia?

17 A. Mr. Milosevic, that may be correct. I do not know the precise

18 figures. We monitored the events as good as we could. And the only thing

19 which I would add as a comment is I would have hoped that Mr. Jovanovic

20 had included in his letter as well the incidents in early spring 1998,

21 which were not triggered by terrorist attacks, as you said, but which

22 obviously were triggered by actions of your security forces.

23 Q. The early spring in Prekaz and Jasar, these were events that we

24 have discussed here, and it is quite clear how many people were killed

25 prior to that by them, so I won't dwell on that.

1 Tell me, please: In your opinion, how many soldiers, policemen,

2 and civilians did the KLA need to kill for the state to have the

3 legitimate right to fight against it?

4 A. Mr. Milosevic, I think it would be -- it really would be ludicrous

5 to establish a figure which triggers the right of a state to respond. A

6 state has the right to respond to every violation of the internal order.

7 The question is again and again, and there's a point where we really

8 differ --

9 Q. Thank you.

10 A. -- the proportionality or not.

11 Q. Very well. You think Blair, in Ulster, in mid-1998 --

12 JUDGE MAY: Irrelevant. Let's move on.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Everything is irrelevant.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. The OSCE verifiers, or anyone else, did they inform you about the

16 influx of weapons for the KLA from Albania?

17 A. The OSCE informed NATO regularly on evidence they had, and as you

18 may know, NATO considered actions to stop the flow of weapons through

19 Albania into Yugoslavia, and some of these actions were indeed taken and

20 were implemented with the consent of the government of Albania.

21 Q. Did NATO succeed in stopping the flow of weapons from Albania into

22 Yugoslavia?

23 A. Mr. Milosevic, you know better the conditions on the Balkan

24 state. Ever in history anyone succeed in stopping all smuggling on the

25 Balkans?

1 Q. That is absolutely an exaggeration. But you will agree with me

2 that NATO was not powerless to stop the inflow of weapons from Albania,

3 and in that connection I have the following question: Paddy Ashdown

4 stated here, sitting in your place, that he informed his government about

5 this, which did nothing in that connection, and Klaus Kinkel, in August

6 1998, declared that Germany did nothing either to stop the flow of weapons

7 for the KLA. So did you, I mean NATO - Clark, you, NATO - do something of

8 substance to stop the flow of weapons from Albania?

9 A. Mr. Milosevic, I think we did something of substance. We

10 discussed all possible steps how to stop the flow of weapons. We proposed

11 a couple of measures which the NATO council should consider. We were then

12 not given the authority to stop -- to take measures to stop the flow of

13 weapons there, where it all started, and that is there where the money is

14 collected to get the weapon -- to get the money to buy the weapons. We

15 were more or less given the task to stop the flow of weapons to the best

16 of our ability at the final end, and this was the most difficult task,

17 since we had only the means to stop the routes across the Adriatic and, to

18 some extent, as far as the Albanian government gave us the opportunity, on

19 the routes leading into Kosovo. And there we took some action. I think

20 we achieved some partial successes, but we did not achieve 100 per cent

21 success.

22 Q. Thank you for stating that, that you were not allowed to stop it

23 where it was possible to stop it.

24 Do you know that the Helsinki Final Act explicitly authorises

25 states to combat terrorism within its territory and that no other state

1 has any right to prevent it from doing that or interfering? Please just

2 tell me whether you're aware of that. Yes or no.

3 A. Mr. Milosevic, there we come back again to the old question. You

4 state correctly what the Helsinki Final Act says, and I'm pleased to note

5 that you refer to the Helsinki agreement. Also, you have chosen not to be

6 part of the OSCE. And the other point which one I think has to consider

7 is to which extent national sovereignty - and you refer to that by this

8 statement - really means that a country can do inside its territory

9 whatever it wishes to do to its citizens. I think that is an

10 understanding of national sovereignty which emerged from the Westphalian

11 peace in 1648, but it seems to me that the modern understanding of

12 sovereignty means that the head of state has the responsibility to make

13 sure that its citizens are protected, that they can live in freedom, and

14 that human rights prevail. And that limits the acts of a state, in my

15 view. But I think this legal question, this legal interpretation, may be

16 considered by this Court at a different point in time.

17 Q. Let us not waste more time. You said that we chose not to be

18 members of OSCE, whereas you know that we were illegally expelled from

19 OSCE. The decision was taken by consensus minus one, though the rule is

20 that such decisions should be taken by consensus. So we were expelled,

21 and we, of course, protested. So how can you say that we chose not to be

22 members of the OSCE?

23 A. Well, this decision by the OSCE was triggered by your behaviour.

24 So I think it goes back to what your country was responsible for.

25 Q. All right. Let's just speed this up. Yesterday, we observed that

1 the NATO intervention, the aggression against Yugoslavia, was contrary to

2 the United Nations Charter. And I'm not going to go back to that now, but

3 was the NATO aggression also contrary to your pact, the North Atlantic

4 Alliance, in which it precisely states that it should not touch upon the

5 system of security established by the United Nations Charter and that the

6 decisive role should be played by the Security Council of the United

7 Nations in that regard? So did you violate your own agreement and pact?

8 And I quoted the point.

9 A. Mr. Milosevic, the NATO council took a decision based on the

10 consent of all member countries in -- and the NATO council was fully aware

11 of its own charter. It nevertheless came to the conclusion that the

12 action was necessary and legitimate.

13 Q. All right. And Germany, according to its constitution, could it

14 have undertaken operations outside its own territory?

15 A. I'm not aware of any part of our constitution which bans Germany

16 from taking military actions outside its own territory. We -- the only

17 thing which is clearly banned in our constitution is the preparation of a

18 war of aggression. That is clearly stated in Article 26 of the German

19 constitution.

20 Q. Are you aware of the fact that the KLA burnt Serbs, Serb

21 civilians, in the Klecka crematorium? Did you receive that piece of

22 information amongst all the other information that you received about

23 their operations? Were you aware of that?

24 A. At least I do not recall it, and I think if some atrocity of that

25 nature had happened, I think I would recall it. But I don't recall it,

1 Mr. Milosevic.

2 Q. Well, why was it important for Clark and Solana to exclude

3 terrorist units from the territory of Kosovo when it was clear that we

4 were dealing with top-ranking terrorism in Kosovo?

5 A. Could you please elaborate on that? I didn't understand what

6 you're referring to since I'm not aware of that anyone excluded any -- any

7 terrorist or something like that from Kosovo territory. Could you please

8 explain to me what you mean?

9 Q. Not terrorists but anti-terrorist units, our anti-terrorist units

10 in Kosovo.

11 A. I think we achieved an agreement that some additional special

12 police units which you had deployed into Kosovo were to be withdrawn. And

13 that is part of the 25 October agreement.

14 Q. All right. You described three meetings. I don't want to repeat

15 who attended the meetings, when they were held, et cetera, because all

16 that was already quoted and I don't wish to waste time. But you did

17 introduce a new factor, which at least for me, and I hope for the Yugoslav

18 public as well, is very important, and that is the fact that your

19 competent authorities in NATO took the decision to activate the famous

20 activation order that you mentioned and that this was done at the request

21 of Holbrooke. Isn't that right?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. It is a very good thing that we should look at his two-faced role

24 here, because he came allegedly to help --

25 JUDGE MAY: No. Stop the comments. If you have a question for

1 the witness, ask it.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. When you came to me for a meeting, I stated loud and clear that

4 your information was not correct with respect to this overly strong use of

5 force, and at the same time, we were conducting negotiations with

6 Holbrooke. Isn't that right? Yes or no?

7 A. I believe, Mr. Milosevic, that your negotiations with

8 Mr. Holbrooke had come to an end, I think on the 13th of October. That is

9 two days before I had the first opportunity to meet with you.

10 Q. I'm talking about - how shall I put this? - within the same time

11 framework. And I said that NATO did not have the right to threaten to use

12 force against a sovereign country; isn't that right?

13 A. You stated this when Mr. Solana came to see you on the 15th of

14 October.

15 Q. And I told Holbrooke that too, and that was something that the

16 press published as well, that the threats made to Yugoslavia were also --

17 also constituted a criminal act. And the press informed the population

18 about that. So there was nothing covert or secret for this to be heard

19 after three years.

20 A. Your Honours, I'm not aware that there's any need for me to

21 comment on that.

22 JUDGE MAY: No. It's not a comment.

23 Yes, next question.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. And do you remember very well that I told you and Clark, when you

1 threatened that you would bomb us, that I told you, "Yes, you are a super

2 power and you can bomb us, but then you will be war criminals." Do you

3 remember me saying that to you?

4 A. I remember very well, Mr. Milosevic, that you called us two

5 potential war criminals, and I have also stated this when I was asked by

6 the Prosecutor. So I'm glad that you confirmed that. We rejected this at

7 the time, and we told you that we would act if ordered so on behalf of the

8 NATO council, on behalf of 16 democratic countries who also tried to find

9 a peaceful solution and to try to avoid hostilities, hoping that you would

10 cooperate, but unfortunately, we failed.

11 Q. Well, isn't it true that with this illegal aggression against

12 Yugoslavia you in fact perpetrated war crimes, Mr. Naumann?

13 JUDGE MAY: No need to answer that.

14 It's just a comment by you.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Did I not tell you loud and clear that the army and police were

17 not using excessive force and that they were acting completely within

18 conformity of the laws of Serbia and Yugoslavia? Didn't I say that

19 clearly to you?

20 A. Mr. Milosevic, you stated this. I repeated that in my evidence

21 which I gave to this Court. And we also mentioned to you that our view is

22 different from what you call as legal actions. And again, we are

23 returning to that like this famous cat which is walking on a pot of hot

24 soup. It is again and again the question of the proportionality, and

25 there is our basic disagreement. You regard, obviously, the use of tanks

1 and artillery, and that has been repeatedly been reported by, I should

2 say, neutral observers like the KVM observers, against villages of your

3 own country, used by your own forces as legal and proportionate, and I

4 disagree with that.

5 Q. And did you look through all the reports of the OSCE which were

6 compiled at that time, during that period, and is what you're saying about

7 our violations, does that emerge from those reports or was that some

8 subsequent explanation, from some subsequent explanations fabricated later

9 on? Because we received those Verification Mission reports too. Our side

10 received them too, and you received them, as did everybody else.

11 Now, are you basing what you're saying on those reports which were

12 officially circulated by the Verification Mission?

13 A. I base my statement on the reports which indicated that villages

14 were shelled by artillery, were surrounded by tanks. And that was written

15 in those reports.

16 Q. All right. Now, is it true -- is it true that I, in front of you,

17 asked the chief of the General Staff whether your assertion was correct

18 and that before your very eyes he said, "No, that is not what is

19 happening"? Was that how it was or not?

20 A. He denied, that's correct. And that's also included in my

21 statement.

22 Q. All right. When he -- you say that he perhaps had not been

23 informed about that at the time. Do you consider that I could have been

24 informed about the alleged incidents for which the chief of the army

25 didn't know what was going on? Is that what you're saying?

1 A. Mr. Milosevic, if the chief of the General Staff, Perisic, was not

2 informed at the time, I also take it that you were not informed at the

3 time, which doesn't rule out that the incident took place.

4 Q. All right. Did I state to you loud and clear that the officials

5 of NATO relied on unsubstantiated records by the KLA and that nothing that

6 they said was correct and that I even suggested that your delegation hold

7 technical reports with the -- negotiations and talks with the commanders

8 of the police and army? Was that how it was, Mr. Naumann, or not?

9 A. Mr. Milosevic, I can assure you and you, Your Honours, that NATO

10 never got any reports by the KLA. There was no information channel

11 between NATO and the KLA.

12 Q. Well, what about contacts between Ambassador Hill and others? If

13 they were not official, under the official cap of NATO, then I'm sure they

14 do belong to the realm of information which NATO logically receives as

15 well. Yes or no?

16 A. Mr. Milosevic, what ambassadors of individual NATO countries get

17 as information I simply do not know. I do not rule out that

18 Ambassador Hill may have got some information. You should also not

19 forget, and you know that pretty well, that the KLA tried to inform the

20 media on all incidents and that they gave their view of the picture as

21 your people gave their view of the incidents.

22 Q. You're talking about -- that is to say, in point 17, para 17, and

23 you devoted a lot of time to that, you say and claim that part of the

24 conversation was focused on reducing tensions in the area around Malisevo

25 and that the focus of attention on that day was Malisevo, in fact. Now,

1 do you know what Malisevo was, that the KLA had its main headquarters in

2 Malisevo, for example? And do you know why Malisevo was so important for

3 your own side?

4 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, with that you allege that we were taking

5 sides with the KLA, which we did not do. And as I repeatedly stated, Your

6 Honours, we did not have any contacts with the KLA.

7 JUDGE MAY: What -- Mr. Milosevic, what do you mean by "your own

8 side" in relation to the general? Do you mean NATO? That's what one

9 would take it to mean. Or do you mean something else?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not insinuating anything and

11 saying that General Naumann fought against the KLA, but -- on the side of

12 the KLA. I'm sorry. But I do say that persistently and for a long time

13 talks were conducted about Malisevo and that that is indicative because

14 that is where the headquarters of the KLA were. Now --

15 JUDGE MAY: It's suggested because there were talks which

16 mentioned Malisevo, that shows that NATO, as I understand it, was in some

17 way in contact with the KLA. Is there any possible comment?

18 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think Mr. Milosevic is talking about

19 discussions in which he did not take part. These were the discussions

20 which started in the -- in the General Staff headquarters. And what I

21 stated was that based on the requests of the Yugoslav side, we started to

22 negotiate on the situation around Malisevo in order to find an agreement

23 there. And then we learned, after two or more hours, that we would not

24 come to an end of finding a solution for the entire region of Kosovo if we

25 continued in that way.

1 So it was not us who started with Malisevo. It was the done on

2 the request of the Yugoslav side. And it was obviously done since at the

3 time when we came to Belgrade, Malisevo was the centre of tensions.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. The centre of what?

6 A. Of tensions.

7 Q. Tensions. Yes. Now, I'm asking you now, General Naumann, whether

8 at the time or perhaps later on it -- you became aware of and came to know

9 that Malisevo was also one of the camps of Al Qaeda at that time.

10 A. I'm not aware, Mr. Milosevic, that the word "Al Qaeda" was ever

11 mentioned in any of the discussions I participated in on the Kosovo

12 situation.

13 Q. Please. May I just have your comments to several facts which I'm

14 going to read out to you. Just a few of them. I have to save time, the

15 time I have, so I'm going to be brief [In English] "[Previous translation

16 continues] ...1994, major Balkan terrorist training camps included Zenica

17 and Malisevo and Mitrovica in Kosovo. Number of Mujahedins operating

18 before that time in Bosnia alone continued to grow from a few hundred to

19 around 6.000 in 1995. So where was the US in all this? It was not until

20 1995 that Clinton Administration was forced to start pursuing the Islamic

21 network in Balkans. Not quite a month after the Dayton Accord had been

22 signed in November 1999, an influx of Iranian arms came into Bosnia with

23 the apparent tacit approval of the administration in violation of US

24 sanctions. Islamic infiltration --"

25 JUDGE MAY: It's time -- it's time we came to a question. What

1 you describe -- what you describe as facts are clearly some report which

2 you have, which is the opinion, I suspect, of some journalist. Would you

3 tell us what you are quoting from?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll tell you in just a moment, but

5 may I finish? I have just a few lines to read out to you.

6 JUDGE MAY: No. You will tell us now what it is you're reading

7 from so we may understand it and then you may continue.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm reading from a report

9 based on -- I'll tell you in just a moment. Based on information by

10 Joseph Podansky, who was the Director of the US House of Representatives

11 Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. And it was written

12 by -- it was written by Christoph Corp, editor of the Washington-based

13 weekly newspaper Defence News, Defence News. And it was published in its

14 entirety by the Wall Street Journal in November -- on November the 1st,

15 2001.

16 So there you have it, please. And may I read out just a few more

17 lines which are remaining?

18 [In English] "[Previous translation continues] ...of the Kosovo

19 Liberation Army advanced meanwhile. Bin Laden is said to have visited

20 Albania in 1996 and 1997, according to the murder trial testimony of an

21 Algerian born French national Claude Kader, himself an Afghanistan-trained

22 Mujahedin fronting at the Albania Agro-Islamic Bank. He recruited some

23 Albanians to fight with the KLA in Kosovo."

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please slow down for the

25 interpreters.

1 JUDGE MAY: Could you slow down, please.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. [In English] "[Previous translation continues] ...meanwhile,

4 Albanian separatism in Kosovo and Metohija was formally characterised as a

5 Jihad in October 1998 at an annual international Islamic conference in

6 Pakistan. Nonetheless, the 25.000-strong KLA continued to receive

7 official NATO-US arms and training support. And at the talks in

8 Rambouillet, France, the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, shook

9 hands with the `freedom fighter' Hashim Thaci a KLA leader. As this was

10 taking place --"

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I think we've had enough -- we've had enough

12 reading. Now, the witness is here to give evidence, not you read out

13 these documents. No. You're abusing the process again.

14 Now, General, you've heard what's been read out. You may be able

15 to see at least some of it on the screen while it's there. Can you help

16 at all about this? First of all, do you know anything about this article,

17 this report?

18 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I haven't seen this article. And I

19 should also mention: As far as I saw Mr. Milosevic -- heard Mr. Milosevic

20 read out, that the article was published in 2001, so I couldn't have been

21 aware of the article at the time when the Kosovo conflict was all about.

22 I'm not aware -- as I have stated, the word "Al Qaeda" was never mentioned

23 in any of the Kosovo-related discussions I had with anyone. I should also

24 add that I did not know, and it was never in any NATO intelligence, that

25 Osama bin Laden allegedly had been in Albania. That is something I heard

1 today the first time. So I think that is all what I can add to

2 Mr. Milosevic's read-out. We knew -- but I take it that Bosnia is

3 something which is going to be dealt separately in this Court

4 proceedings. We knew that Islamic Mujahedin were in Bosnia. We took

5 action with the NATO SFOR forces against some of these Mujahedin. But

6 this has nothing to do, I believe, with Kosovo, and that's all I can

7 contribute to Mr. Milosevic's read-out here in front of this Court, Your

8 Honour.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. From what I've read out, you can see that their presence was

11 recorded from 1994 and 1995, let alone 1998, the supply of arms and so

12 on. That's why I'm asking.

13 JUDGE MAY: He has answered that question and says that they knew

14 nothing about it, Mr. Milosevic, so it's really pointless going on. If

15 it's true.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, when we bear this in mind, I'm

17 asking the following question: Who is being told tales here about human

18 rights? Isn't it quite clear that what is being attempted here is to help

19 the former allies from this aborted Clinton Administration which --

20 JUDGE MAY: You're not going to ask that question. Now, you have

21 theoretically half an hour more. Have you any other questions you want to

22 ask which are proper questions and relevant? You raised the question of

23 relevance before. By now you should know in this trial what is relevant

24 and what isn't. That which is connected with the indictment is relevant,

25 and that which isn't is irrelevant. Now, do you want to ask the general

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1 any more questions? You've exhausted this topic.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have many more questions, and

3 since the witness is giving rather lengthy answers, I hope that you will

4 increase the time that you say I have left, which is half an hour, because

5 I do have a number of questions for which I would need a little more time.

6 JUDGE MAY: No, there will be no more time. Half an hour. At

7 least, you've got five minutes more and then you've got half an hour after

8 the break.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

10 Q. Now, you knew that young Serb policemen were being killed and

11 tortured by the KLA and that incidents of this kind led to violence and

12 counterviolence. That is what is stated in paragraph 8 of your

13 statement. So you did have knowledge about that.

14 Now, where do you get the idea from that a decision was made at

15 the time to expel the Albanian population? Because you say -- let me

16 explain and clarify my question. You speak about the fact that there was

17 talk of national equilibrium. Now, haven't you mixed some concepts up?

18 Because what was talked about was the equality of national communities,

19 ethnic communities in Kosovo, and not the numerical balance and

20 equilibrium thereof, because that is physically impossible. So are you

21 aware of the fact that the key positions of our policy was the equality of

22 citizens and the equality of ethnic communities, so that there was no

23 majorisation, that national communities, ethnic communities, should be

24 equal? Did you mix up equality with striking a balance when you speak

25 about this balance and equilibrium?

1 A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I did not mix it up. I remember very well that

2 you repeatedly stated that you wished to see a solution in which all

3 ethnicities and all nationalities in Kosovo would have the same rights. I

4 think you did never live up to that claim in reality. And I remember also

5 very well that you and Mr. Sainovic talked about the need that, in terms

6 of quantity, a better balance should be there, and otherwise the same

7 problem would return in a couple of years again.

8 Q. Well, better balance, Mr. Naumann. How can you strike a better

9 balance either by expelling or killing? Is that the substance of your

10 testimony, that by trying to justify the NATO aggression, you are accusing

11 us of wanting to either kill or expel Albanians from Kosovo? How can the

12 number be reduced otherwise but by expelling someone? And then you speak

13 again of our political positions, which are quite contrary to that. Can't

14 you see the contradictions in what you're saying?

15 A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I don't see the contradiction, since the facts

16 speak against you. In spring 1999, I think hundreds of thousands -- at

17 least a hundred thousand or so were expelled from Kosovo, and they were

18 forced to leave the country, and this was done by your security forces.

19 Q. Mr. Naumann, in 1999, at the beginning of the year, I think that

20 at least several hundred thousand Albanians lived in different cities of

21 Europe, where they worked and where they had been living for a whole

22 decade, et cetera, et cetera. So that is not something that is

23 challenged, just as several hundred thousand Serbs have been living -- I

24 don't know if they are tens of thousands in Vienna alone perhaps, or

25 several tens of thousands in Paris, living in Paris, who have been working

1 as guest workers throughout Europe for decades now. Hundreds of thousands

2 of Albanians from Kosovo have for decades been living in Germany,

3 Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and many other European countries.

4 JUDGE MAY: You're here to ask questions. What is the question?

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Therefore, how many of them there are outside Kosovo, that's not a

7 question at all, it's not an issue, just as it isn't an issue how many

8 Serbs there are outside Yugoslavia. There are a million Serbs in America

9 alone.

10 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

11 A. Mr. Milosevic, we do not talk about those people who left

12 Yugoslavia to be guest workers elsewhere. I referred to those people who

13 were driven out of their homes in spring 1999 and were forced to leave the

14 country, and entered, forced by your forces, Macedonia and Albania, where

15 we established refugee camps to house them and to shelter them.

16 Q. Mr. Naumann --

17 JUDGE MAY: The time is now half past 10.00. It's time for an

18 adjournment, and we'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

19 Would you be back, please, at 10 minutes to 11.00, General.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

21 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

22 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. In your statement, in paragraph 24, you said that I described the

1 Kosovar Albanians as criminals, killers, and rapists. Is that how I

2 called the Kosovar Albanians or the terrorists?

3 A. As far as I recall, Mr. Milosevic, you referred with these words

4 to the Kosovar Albanians who did not comply with your way of keeping them

5 under control.

6 Q. That means that I said to you that all Kosovar Albanians are

7 criminals, murderers, and rapists; is that what you are claiming?

8 A. You left us with that impression. That's not only my impression;

9 that's also the impression of General Clark.

10 Q. What you and General Clark are claiming now, three years later, is

11 quite transparent. But let me ask you: Since you mentioned Drenica, do

12 you know that between the two world wars, in Drenica, there were bandits

13 called Kacaks, and that the Royal Army had to intervene on several

14 occasions because they plundered and murdered, in most cases, wealthy

15 Albanians, as they were those who were the most numerous there? Are you

16 aware of that?

17 A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I'm not aware of that detail of the history of

18 that part of former Yugoslavia.

19 Q. That is the point, that Drenica could only have been mentioned as

20 a cradle of terrorism and banditism, and in no other way, in view of these

21 historical facts. Is that logical to you or not?

22 JUDGE MAY: That's not a question. The witness can only deal with

23 what he saw and heard, which he has dealt with.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

25 Q. Yesterday you declared that Clark wrote in his book that I said to

1 you that I would find a solution in the spring of 1999 similar to the one

2 in Drenica. But if you look closely at the book, you will see that Clark

3 makes no mention of the spring, though it is quite clear that you have the

4 same attitude towards me as Clark. So do you know that he doesn't mention

5 the word "spring" anywhere?

6 A. Mr. Milosevic, first of all, I did not mention General Clark's

7 book yesterday. I said he published this remark in publications which he

8 made in the United States of America. Secondly, I'm not aware of any

9 attitude of General Clark towards you. I can only tell you that I have no

10 specific attitude towards you. That's all I can say.

11 Q. Even in his statement given to the journal "Parameters," a

12 quarterly, he makes no mention of any spring. So my question is: Did you

13 perhaps misquote my words, especially in view of the fact that such a

14 cardinal statement was not used by you or Clark until 2001 by Clark and

15 2002 by you? Doesn't that seem too transparent to you?

16 A. Mr. Milosevic, again I may correct you. I believe that the fact

17 of spring 1999 was mentioned by General Clark in one or the other of his

18 publications; and secondly, I'm not using this statement as late as 2002.

19 I have used this before, in discussions with people, in the public, when

20 we discussed the Kosovo events.

21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, the witness's evidence was that during

22 the talk you said -- this was his evidence, as I took it down: You said

23 that you would try to find a solution of the Kosovo problem in spring

24 1999. Do you challenge that you said that?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I challenge it. Of course

1 I do. Isn't it quite logical, Mr. May, that just when we had signed an

2 agreement, when everyone felt relieved, when we were talking about

3 improving relations between ethnic communities, and everything else that I

4 have quoted, that I should then say, "I won't observe any of that, but I'm

5 going to execute them all in the spring"? Can anyone believe any such

6 thing?

7 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter what you say is logical, according

8 to you. This is what the witness's evidence is that you said, that you

9 would find a solution to the Kosovo problem in spring 1999.

10 Since it's challenged, General, do you have any doubt that that

11 was what was said by this accused?

12 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I had had any doubts, I would not

13 have stated this in front of this Court.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Naumann, you didn't even tell the truth when you said what we

16 drank. You said that we were drinking slivovitz. We were not drinking

17 slivovitz, because I don't drink slivovitz. We were drinking pear

18 brandy. So even regarding that detail, you were wrong, not to mention

19 other things.

20 A. Mr. Milosevic, you may forgive me that I'm not an expert on

21 alcohol. Perhaps I confused that. But this does not mean that I did not

22 tell the truth on other things.

23 Q. Very well, Mr. Naumann. In view of the fact that reference is

24 made to Drenica, the only parallel is with terrorism. It cannot refer to

25 anything else but terrorism.

1 JUDGE MAY: We have been over this point.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, I'm showing you a document

3 of the Prosecution, page 16, second paragraph, of the report by the

4 historical expert of the Prosecution, Audrey Budding, which, although it

5 is not objective or competent, nevertheless recognises that the partisans

6 in the Drenica region --

7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I pointed out to you yesterday that as

8 far as this witness's evidence is concerned, it doesn't matter what the

9 history was. Whether you're telling the truth about it or not, it doesn't

10 matter. The witness doesn't know what the history was, but it's what he

11 said you said that matters. His evidence is that that is what you said.

12 Now, whether it's a background for it or whether it's historically

13 accurate, it doesn't matter.

14 Now, there's no point going over it again with this witness.

15 You've been over it several times.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Surely if there's a historical

17 explanation, it becomes clear that I couldn't have said something that has

18 nothing to do with the historical explanation.

19 JUDGE MAY: There may have been a hundred reasons why you've said

20 it. It doesn't matter what the reasons are. It's the fact of your saying

21 it which is of significance as far as this witness's evidence is concern.

22 Now, we have exhausted this topic.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Please. Is it clear that the mention of Drenica has nothing to do

25 with the civilian population?

1 JUDGE MAY: I think you're being asked how you interpreted the

2 remark.

3 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, to the best of my recollection, there

4 was no differentiation between bandits or civilian population. It was

5 mentioned in a rather general way what Mr. Milosevic had in mind when he

6 mentioned it, and I -- I don't know.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. First of all, I didn't say that. And secondly, are you claiming

9 that I made no distinction between civilians and terrorists? Even the

10 birds know that there was even an order that units of the army and the

11 police may not open fire where civilians may be in danger. How, then,

12 could someone say that no distinction was made between civilians and

13 terrorists? Those orders exist, and they were complied with.

14 A. Do I not challenge, Mr. Milosevic, that such orders may have

15 existed. The facts of the events which took place on the ground then

16 indicate that some of your forces were not in compliance with the orders

17 you had issued.

18 Q. Do you know, Mr. Naumann, that that very police and that very

19 army, the army I had the honour to command, during the war arrested more

20 than 500 persons who had committed crimes?

21 A. I do not know that, Mr. Milosevic, but if they did so, well done.

22 Q. You spoke to me about Racak. Is it clear -- is it true that I

23 clearly told you that there was no massacre?

24 A. This is exactly what you said. You rejected all our claims that

25 the crime had committed -- had been committed there.

1 Q. You said yesterday that you had previously talked to Walker. In

2 that conversation, did Walker tell you that Racak was a stronghold of the

3 KLA where there was a KLA unit?

4 A. Mr. Walker told us during that conversation that initially there

5 had been some KLA activity in that area and that your forces had taken

6 action against that KLA area. And I referred to the fact yesterday that

7 to the best of my knowledge, I think some seven KLA members had been

8 killed by your forces there.

9 Q. Did Walker tell you -- I'm asking you about what Walker told you.

10 The area is rather broad. I'm talking specifically about the village of

11 Racak. Did he tell you that it was a KLA stronghold? Did Walker tell you

12 that?

13 A. He did -- he did not call Racak a KLA stronghold. As I just

14 stated a minute ago, Mr. Milosevic, he spoke about the fact that at Racak,

15 some KLA activity had --

16 Q. Please. Could you please answer my questions with a yes and no,

17 out of fairness, because my time is limited. Did he tell you that the

18 fighting between the KLA and the police lasted from the morning until

19 4.00 p.m. in Racak?

20 A. That may have been. I do not know whether he told us exactly the

21 amount of time.

22 Q. And did he tell you that there was a report of his Verification

23 Mission about the killed members of the KLA?

24 A. That is what I just referred to.

25 Q. Well, how, then, can you explain that in his statements he did not

1 mention the killed members of the KLA but he only spoke of civilians in --

2 JUDGE MAY: The witness can't answer that.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Did Walker tell you that on that day, that critical day when the

5 conflict between the police and the KLA took place in Racak, that OSCE

6 observers were present? Did he inform you of that?

7 A. He mentioned that the unarmed OSCE observers had been in the

8 vicinity and that they withdrew as soon as the fighting started in order

9 not to be in between the crossing lines of fire.

10 Q. That's very good that you said that and quoted Walker to that

11 effect. But linked to this Prosecution of crime within the territory of

12 Yugoslavia that I mentioned an moment ago, how many people the army and

13 the police had arrested as perpetrators of crimes, were you aware that in

14 Serbia, already in 1992, several people were tried for war crimes

15 committed in Bosnia, even before this institution was set up, before

16 anyone spoke about it? As long ago as 1992, we tried individuals for war

17 crimes committed in Bosnia. Are you aware of that?

18 A. I'm not aware of that, Mr. Milosevic, since it did never belong to

19 my obligations to follow legal proceedings in your country.

20 Q. And in that conversation when you referred to Racak, did I tell

21 you explicitly that a conflict had occurred and that people had been

22 killed in combat and that not a single Serb policeman would have committed

23 such a crime?

24 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, you said this, and I stated this in my

25 evidence which is in written form in front of you. But I think we still

1 have to make a difference between those KLA members which were killed in

2 action and those -- I think there were 23 or so people who were not

3 members of the KLA and who, according to the findings of the Finnish

4 doctor, did not show the slightest signs of any involvement in combat

5 operation at all.

6 Q. And do you know that the findings of the Finnish, Belorussian, and

7 Yugoslav pathologists do not differ, with the exception of one single

8 case, to the effect that all had been killed by firearms fired from a

9 distance and in movement? Are you aware of that?

10 A. I'm not aware of that, and I'm not aware of the fact that the

11 findings of the Yugoslav and Belarus doctors do not -- do not differ from

12 the findings of the Finnish. I am aware of the fact that the Finnish

13 doctor stated that you and the Belarus doctors applied techniques which

14 are outdated and not very accurate.

15 Q. That was said in respect to the paraffin glove, which is a legal

16 technique and which showed that 37 out of the 40 killed had used firearms

17 to shoot with. And a paraffin glove --

18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, these are all matters which the Trial

19 Chamber is going to have to determine. There's no point arguing with the

20 witness about them.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. You said, because of the lies conveyed to you by Walker, "I got

24 very angry and started shouting." That's what you said, isn't it?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did I repeat several times that the police and the army would

2 never do something contrary to the law?

3 A. You stated that repeatedly, Mr. Milosevic.

4 Q. And did I then draw attention to the fact that I felt that Clark

5 and Naumann, as well as Walker, had fallen into a trap by making such

6 statements?

7 A. That is what you said, and that is in my written evidence. And

8 you know that we rejected that claim that we had fallen into a trap but

9 that we simply had looked at the facts which were given to us by

10 Ambassador Walker.

11 Q. And did I inform you at the time that a Finnish team had been

12 invited to do the abductions, post-mortems?

13 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, and that's also part of my statement.

14 Q. Did I tell you that Walker had insulted the Yugoslav government?

15 A. That is also part of my statement, yes.

16 Q. And was it logical for Yugoslav authorities, judicial, crime, and

17 other institutions, to carry out the investigation? I mean the courts,

18 the prosecution, the investigating magistrates, the crime department, the

19 police, that they should do the abductions and pathological investigations

20 on their territory when an instance of this kind occurs?

21 A. Mr. Milosevic, when you're talking about logic, I wonder why you

22 did not accept the offer which both Clark and I presented to you to invite

23 Judge Arbour and her team to come to your countries. If you're talking

24 about logic, nothing would be more logical than to have an objective, and

25 that is a hypothetically impartial check of the events that took place.

1 And the best instrument to that is an United Nations appointed Judge.

2 Q. Were you aware of our position? Because you say that that was

3 absolutely unbiased. But I am claiming that this court is an instrument

4 of war against my country. Were you aware of our position --

5 JUDGE MAY: We've heard all this. Now, what is the question for

6 the witness?

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Talking about Louise Arbour, are you aware of our position that we

9 considered this to be an illegal institution that was founded contrary to

10 the United Nations Charter and that it was politically motivated?

11 JUDGE MAY: We've heard all this several times. Now, let's go on

12 to something else.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Are you aware of the indirect connection between Louise Arbour and

15 terrorist KLA groups, as was evidenced?

16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you're going to make these kind of

17 allegations, you're going to have to support them. Now, you've got five

18 minutes, five minutes more.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Why five? We started at five to --

20 five to eleven. If you gave me half an hour, then I have at least another

21 ten minutes.

22 JUDGE MAY: Well, make use of it sensibly. Yes.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Please. Do you know that Mrs. Arbour is a member of the board of

25 management of the so-called international crisis group together with

1 Thaci's advisor Abrahams and Wesley Clark?

2 JUDGE MAY: There's no point going on in this vein. If you have

3 any other questions on any other topic so well and good. The witness has

4 told you what he suggested, the fact that you rejected the suggestion.

5 There seems to be little further point going on with it. You can produce

6 your evidence in due course.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is a point to ask a witness

8 when he doesn't know why I said that the political position of that group

9 that I have listed the members of was bombing the independence of Kosovo

10 and Montenegro, the abolition of Republika Srpska, the centralisation of

11 Bosnia and so on. Is he aware of the positions of that group?

12 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, shall I answer to that question? It I

13 think --

14 JUDGE MAY: No. There's no need to trouble.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Very well. You said in your statement that at the time, you gave

17 me some ten examples of violations of the agreement; isn't that so? And

18 that I took this from you and said that we would investigate it. Do you

19 think that I could have said anything else, that I could have given you

20 any other reply when faced with this from you?

21 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, in my view you could have given us another

22 reply since many of the events which were on this list took place well

23 before the 19th of January, but you preferred to say, "We'll look into

24 that and we'll come back to you." The fact is that we never got an

25 answer.

1 Q. When you use the term "many," I remind you that you said that you

2 gave information for some ten or so alleged violations of the agreement in

3 total. So "many" can only mean a limited number. And do you know what

4 kind of reports I received after looking into that information?

5 A. No, I can't know it since we never got an answer.

6 Q. Mr. Naumann, I was informed that you were not telling the truth.

7 A. Would you kindly elaborate on that? I can only tell you that I

8 got never an answer. And I think the same is true for General Clark.

9 Q. Did I tell you, in respect to Solana's observation, that the

10 Assembly of Serbia automatically approves Milosevic's decision that they,

11 meaning the Assembly, has the last word? Is that so or not?

12 A. That is what you told us and that's also part of my written

13 evidence.

14 Q. Is it clear that the ultimatum given to Yugoslavia was to accept

15 an occupation that was contained in the Rambouillet agreement? Is that so

16 or not?

17 A. That's -- Mr. Milosevic, that is not true and you know that. I

18 think that is part of really flawed information which you and others are

19 promulgating.

20 Q. Is the following true that I'm going to read out to you: [In

21 English] "[Previous translation continues] ...appointed rulers of the

22 planet issue an ultimatum to another country. It is surrender or die. To

23 maintain our`credibility,'" that is under quotation, "`credibility', we

24 must crush any semblance of resistance to our dictates to that country."

25 JUDGE MAY: Who is saying that? Who are you quoting,

1 Mr. Milosevic?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm quoting Walter J. Rockler,

3 former prosecutor of the Nuremberg war crimes trials. I'm quoting him.

4 JUDGE MAY: That is simply the opinion of Mr. Rockler. No point

5 putting it to the witness.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, if there's no point.

7 Q. I wish to ask the witness something in connection with his

8 statement to the PBS Frontline, which I shall quote to refresh your memory

9 [In English] "[Previous translation continues] ...which was fought for a

10 principle, and the principle was that human rights have to be protected,

11 and from that point of view, I think the Kosovo war is perhaps the first

12 war in the European history which was fought for this principle, and by

13 that we denied, we denied the continuing validity of the principle

14 territorial integrity which dominated and still dominates international

15 law since the Westphalian peace of 1648."

16 [Interpretation] Does that mean that NATO decided to abolish the

17 basic principle of international law, the principle of territorial

18 integrity and sovereignty of states?

19 A. Mr. Milosevic, I referred to that earlier on. I think you quoted

20 me correctly. And that's again part of the conviction at which I

21 personally arrive, but others as well, that we have to find to -- a more

22 modern understanding of what the sovereignty of states means. It cannot

23 be seen exclusively as the right of a ruler to do to his citizens whatever

24 he wishes to do, but it has to be seen as the responsibility of that ruler

25 to protect human rights of his citizens.

1 Q. And do you know that those whose human rights you say were in

2 jeopardy and they were terrorists and murderers, that they killed an

3 enormous number of Albanians, and that the current leaders - and this was

4 even shown and demonstrated even in this courtroom - committed murders of

5 wealthy Albanians and others that they considered to be loyal to the

6 authorities of Serbia? Are you aware of that?

7 A. Mr. Milosevic, I have repeatedly stated in public that I do not

8 consider the KLA or UCK as an aggregation of angels, and that many of them

9 misbehaved, grossly misbehaved. But you should not mix up the KLA

10 activists who did not behave properly and the many thousands of innocent

11 Kosovo Albanians who fell victim to the suppression executed by your

12 security forces.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in my view, this is ground that

14 we've already gone over. You're now repeating yourself. And in my view,

15 your cross-examination is coming close to being abuse of the process of

16 the Court. If you have no further questions that are germane to the

17 issues, we should stop.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do have questions, Mr. Robinson.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. In that same interview that I quoted from a moment ago, in answer

21 to a question whether you consider such humanitarian intervention to be

22 justified, you declared that in political practice you doubt their

23 justification because of cases such as the hesitation of the international

24 community in Eastern Timor and looking the other way when the Russians

25 were violating human rights in Chechnya; is that right?

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1 A. That is correct, Mr. Milosevic, but the hesitation of the

2 international community does not rule out that on one occasion the

3 international community acted in legitimacy.

4 JUDGE MAY: This must be your last question. This must be your

5 last question. It's now 11.25.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Does that mean that you agree with the former German defence

8 minister, Rupert Schultz, who said -- who spoke at a meeting of the

9 Bundeswehr, and I quote:

10 [In English] "We are concerned with dealing with the consequences

11 of World War I."

12 He was referring to the destruction of Yugoslavia when he said:

13 "Yugoslavia, being a consequence of World War I, is a very

14 artificial construct which has never been compatible with the idea of

15 self-determination."

16 [Interpretation] Is that in the background of such selective

17 interpretations of policies and pressures under which Yugoslavia was

18 broken up? Is that the ideology? Is it the same ideology as from the

19 First and Second World Wars?

20 A. Mr. Milosevic, I am not here to comment on statements of German

21 politicians. I can only assure you that these historical connotations did

22 not play a role when NATO took its decision. The decision was based on

23 severe violations of human rights and on the necessity to restore the

24 stability of an entire region which was endangered.

25 Q. Are you claiming --

1 JUDGE MAY: No. No more questions.

2 Mr. Tapuskovic, have you any questions you wish to ask the

3 witness? Although time is rather limited.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. In view

5 of the sensitivity of the moment, I should like to ask you how much time I

6 can reckon with, so that I can make a selection of my questions, and I

7 will do my best to be as brief as possible.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. The general has to leave by midday. Twenty

10 minutes, Mr. Tapuskovic, should be more than enough. We've been

11 cross-examining for two hours or more.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I hope it will be enough, yes.

13 Thank you, Your Honours.

14 In order to assist the Court -- this is not a question for the

15 general, but in order to assist you, Your Honours, I should like to draw

16 your attention to the fact that in view of the questions that were asked

17 yesterday, in the draft of the expert finding of Budding, on page 16, you

18 have sufficient data from which you are able to see what happened in

19 Drenica between 1945 and 1949. And I just wanted to draw your attention

20 to that. You have the information there, how many Yugoslav soldiers were

21 engaged there in a war that lasted four years.

22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, as I've said quite plainly, it doesn't

23 matter what happened in Drenica it's in 1940s, as far as this evidence is

24 concerned. The witness has said this is what the accused told him. Now,

25 that's an end of it. Whatever happened in Drenica is irrelevant.

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I didn't wish to

2 ask the general this. I just wanted to assist the Trial Chamber and draw

3 your attention to those facts in that report which you have

4 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Now, the first question I have for the general is

6 the following, and it has to do with one particular matter. You said that

7 you had decided to do what you did in the interests that you stipulated,

8 the UN General Assembly; is that right?

9 A. I did not speak of the UN General Assembly. I think when you

10 refer to the justification for the intervention --

11 Q. Security Council, I meant.

12 A. I mentioned the Security Council on one occasion. I said that the

13 Security Council in the Kosovo crisis was not able to do its duty since it

14 did not achieve agreement, and in that exceptional situation, the NATO

15 nations decided to take actions which they believed was legitimate,

16 although the authorisation by the Security Council was lacking.

17 Q. But I'm interested in something else. Perhaps that might be more

18 important. Did the parliaments of all the countries, the member states of

19 NATO, did all those parliaments, the parliaments of all those countries,

20 approve that action of yours; and if not, which of them did not? Did, for

21 instance, the parliament of your country approve the action?

22 A. Yes. The German parliament approved the participation of German

23 armed forces in this operation, with a majority which would be sufficient

24 to alter the German constitution. With regard to the other countries, all

25 those countries where there is a necessity, a legal necessity to ask for

1 parliamentary approval of such operations, approved the operation. But

2 it's not necessary in all NATO countries.

3 Q. Did all the parliaments approve?

4 A. No. As I just said, it's not necessary in all NATO countries that

5 the parliaments approve. It depends on the national legislation, which

6 differs from country to country.

7 Q. Thank you. General, you know that when this decision was taken by

8 NATO, the activation order that you yourself mentioned, that via the

9 Yugoslav Albanian border, for a considerable period of time, arms were

10 carried illegally, in substantial quantities, and brought into the

11 territory of Kosovo. You've already said that. Is that correct?

12 A. Yes, that is correct. We saw that smuggling took place, and as I

13 said, we tried to take action to stop it.

14 Q. Thank you. You also said that before the 15th of October, on the

15 territory of Kosovo, that armed groups of Albanians existed, and they

16 carried out a number of violent actions against the army and the police,

17 and I think that is proper what you said. Is that right?

18 A. That is correct. But again, I should remind you that one should

19 not look at this in isolation. The armed resistance of Kosovar Albanians

20 against Yugoslav suppression is also the result of actions which took

21 place long before the armed resistance began.

22 Q. Thank you. General, my question is the following: Does that mean

23 that in addition to the existence of this constant illegal smuggling and

24 introduction of weapons to Kosovo, and the facts as to the violence on the

25 part of the armed Albanians - I'm not saying whether they're terrorists or

1 rebels or whatever but that they were armed - what that justified that you

2 should ask from that state in which this was happening to reduce the

3 number of soldiers and policemen to the number that was there in

4 peacetime, despite these two facts? So were these peace conditions, the

5 same conditions that existed as they did in peacetime? And that was the

6 condition made, that these numbers should be reduced to what they were in

7 peacetime. Now, tell me, please: Were these peacetime conditions?

8 A. Well, as you may remember, in summer 1998, the Yugoslav security

9 forces undertook really quite extensive operations to crush the KLA and

10 the armed resistance. And what we intended to achieve is a return to

11 normalcy which would allow both sides to return to a peaceful living

12 together, as it, by the way, is clearly expressed in this statement which

13 we signed.

14 Q. Yes. But in view of the fact that the conditions were not

15 peaceful ones, the position that you took in the negotiations and that you

16 expounded yesterday, could it have been -- could you have used the

17 argumentation you used, that is to say that you came and said that you had

18 authority to attack unless the conditions stipulated were complied with?

19 A. Mr. Tapuskovic, we wanted to achieve conditions under which a

20 cessation of hostilities could take place, and one precondition to that

21 was to reduce the number of forces in the country and to limit the

22 disproportionate response to incidents.

23 Q. Can you tell me this, General: Had the army withdrew, to your

24 surprise, and the police, and had this taken you by surprise, and had they

25 withdrawn from these areas and regions, but had the KLA taken control of

1 these regions, could that have been a reason for that police force and

2 that state to gain back control of the territory that had been left in

3 order to achieve these peaceful conditions?

4 A. Well, it was not entirely so that the KLA more or less filled the

5 vacuum completely. They tried, on one or the other occasion, and in other

6 incidents it was action taken by the security forces which triggered the

7 incidents. I think I have explained that repeatedly in my statements

8 yesterday and today.

9 Q. Thank you. No. What I'm saying is when the army actually

10 withdrew, this area was taken over by the others. That's what I'm talking

11 about. Once the police had withdrawn, the KLA took control of these

12 areas, and the police and army withdrew in order to abide by these

13 peaceful circumstances and conditions. That's what I'm talking about.

14 A. Well, Mr. Tapuskovic, as far as I know, this is not entirely the

15 case, not 100 per cent. This happened occasionally. And in other areas

16 nothing happened; it remained as it was.

17 Q. Thank you. General, the NATO council, did it know about the

18 estimated number of armed Albanians who performed and perpetrated the acts

19 that you talked about? Did you have information of that kind?

20 A. We had some information. Whether we had the full information or

21 not, I simply dare not to say, since, as you know, intelligence is always

22 based on the availability of sources, and we definitely did not have 100

23 per cent information.

24 Q. And the Verification Mission had begun its work. Now, I'm

25 interested in the following: During your first conversation, and then

1 with respect to your second conversation, and especially when, on the 19th

2 of January, you talked again, were there any facts and figures or

3 information as to the number? A high-ranking official, officer,

4 Mr. Ciaglinski, of the Verification Mission, said that there was knowledge

5 about 10.000 KLA members at a given moment. Now, did you have the same

6 information that the OSCE had at its disposal?

7 A. The OSCE shared its information with us, and I can only tell Your

8 Honours that the figures varied again and again, and we never had a

9 clear-cut, agreed-by-everyone figure which indicated the full strengths of

10 the KLA.

11 Q. Now, here's why I'm asking you this, General. As you are an

12 officer, and as you are well acquainted with military doctrine - I'm a

13 layman in that area myself - can you agree with the following observation,

14 bearing in mind military doctrine: What could the ratio of state forces

15 be against armed people in any state, in any country? What ratio would

16 this be? We keep speaking about what is proportionate and what is

17 disproportionate. What would a ratio be? Now, I have read some things.

18 Would the ratio be, say, 3:1? And it even goes as high as 6:1, that

19 ratio. That is to say the state, a state, can, under certain

20 circumstances, use three men, three of its men, against one armed

21 individual, whether terrorist or otherwise. Do you have any knowledge as

22 to that, linked to military doctrine, and how important that was for your

23 assessments?

24 A. Mr. Tapuskovic, this is not a question of military doctrine, since

25 we are talking about internal security, and that's normally the

1 responsibility of police forces. But in order to arrive at a balanced

2 judgement of what the strengths of police forces should be, we did some

3 comparative calculations in NATO to compare, I should say, the police

4 density in Kosovo under peacetime conditions, the 10.024 individuals

5 Mr. Milosevic mentioned, to other areas, where we have, let's say, a high

6 rate of criminality, and we came to the conclusion that the 10.000-or-so

7 figure is approximately commensurate to the security challenges in this

8 part of former Yugoslavia.

9 Q. Well, I would -- that would be that. Now, I would like to move on

10 to Racak, the topic of Racak. Ambassador Walker, before the meeting with

11 Milosevic on the 19th of January, informed you of the events in Racak. He

12 presented the view and the position that the victims were civilians and

13 gave his reasons for doing so, didn't he?

14 A. He did so, yes.

15 Q. And you accepted that evaluation of his, that assessment?

16 A. Well, he had the unique advantage, compared to the two of us,

17 General Clark and myself, that he had been on the site and that he had

18 seen what had happened, at least with regard to the victims.

19 Q. Thank you. On page -- that is to say, in paragraph 31 of your

20 statement, in your last sentence, you said that they also told him that

21 one of the victims was a 14-year-old boy. Did Walker tell you that or

22 somebody else, or was it Walker who told you that?

23 A. That was Mr. Walker.

24 Q. Did you ever come to learn whether this was true among the people

25 who were in the ditch? Was there, in fact, a 14-year-old boy among them?

1 Did you ever learn whether that was true or not?

2 A. I saw other publications which indicated that there was a

3 youngster among them. Whether he was 14 years old or perhaps 13 or 12, I

4 don't know. But it was indicated that there were among these I think 23

5 people women, as well as one youngster.

6 Q. But that was later on. I'm interested in what you came to learn

7 before the 19th of January, before you were to meet with Mr. Slobodan

8 Milosevic.

9 A. There the main evidence was the information we got from Ambassador

10 Walker, and he also told us that there were women among them and there was

11 a boy, a young boy, among them.

12 Q. Thank you. And you said - we won't repeat it, but could you

13 please confirm it - that there were also victims; that is to say, some

14 members of the KLA were also killed. Right?

15 A. That was also a piece of information which Ambassador Walker

16 shared with us.

17 Q. Now I'm interested in this: Did anybody tell you that - it was

18 exactly on the 15th of January, before you were to meet

19 Mr. Milosevic - did anybody tell you then that on the 15th of January, in

20 that circle, that two policemen were killed as well?

21 A. I think that was mentioned also by Mr. Walker.

22 Q. And did Mr. Walker tell you, or anybody else, did they tell you

23 that on the 18th of January, that is to say, the day when the bodies were

24 taken over, the bodies which the Serb investigating authorities wished to

25 take for their expert findings, that according to the OSCE reports on

1 those days, 17 Serb policemen were killed in front of the mosque in which

2 those bodies were placed? Did you know about that when you went to talk

3 to Mr. Milosevic?

4 A. I recall that Mr. Walker mentioned that there had been an

5 incident, but I do not recall the number of police officers being killed.

6 Q. So you didn't know about the 17 policemen killed. So you were

7 told about the two policemen who were killed on the 15th. You were also

8 told about the 17 policemen killed in front of the mosque. Did anybody

9 tell you that one day prior to that, that is to say, on the 18th, in the

10 period between the 15th and the 19th, when you were to see Slobodan

11 Milosevic, that a further number of Serb policemen had been killed and

12 that the total number killed between the 15th and 19th was 47 policemen?

13 Did you know that at the time or not?

14 A. I did not know the figure of 47 police officers, and I'm not

15 aware -- and I do not know whether this was taking place in the area of

16 Racak or whether the 47 are related to incidents elsewhere in Kosovo.

17 Q. Thank you. Can we conclude that prior to your conversation with

18 Slobodan Milosevic, that you did not know what the injuries and wounds to

19 the victims from Racak were except for what Walker told you? And that's

20 what you said yesterday, that they were all hit in the neck, or that most

21 of them were hit in the neck.

22 A. I would like to emphasise what you last said, that most of them

23 were hit in the neck. He told us that, and he showed us, I think, one or

24 two photographs which he had taken.

25 Q. But General, all those forensic findings have been dovetailed, and

1 we are faced with a situation in which there are no further dilemmas on

2 that score. Now, the injuries, the wounds, were predominantly in the

3 chest and the head, in the region of the chest and head --

4 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, we've been over this, you know, a

5 great deal. It's not helpful to go over it again. The witness can only

6 deal with what he was told at the time. It's for us to determine what

7 happened and to look at all the forensic results. It's not helpful for

8 further examination.

9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I do know that, Your

10 Honours. I'm aware of that. But the General said yesterday that if the

11 injuries are gained in combat, that they are usually injuries to the

12 chest --

13 JUDGE MAY: We know. We know. And you're going to say, "But they

14 weren't in the neck." Very well. You can make the point. It's no good

15 arguing with the witness about it. He just made a point on what he was

16 told.

17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have no need to

18 argue, and I will skip over that question. But may I now address the

19 issue of deportation?

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If you would be fairly brief, because the

21 witness has a plane to catch and he must leave by 12.00, and it's right

22 there should be some re-examination, and you've been nearly 20 minutes.

23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. I have to ask him about

24 deportation and NATO bombing and that will complete my questions.

25 Q. You said the operation, the deportation operation and the

1 expulsion was very well planned and that it began after the NATO bombing.

2 That's what you said. Now, my question to you is the following: Were the

3 plans for exportation of the Albanian population outside the territory of

4 Kosovo, could they have been made if NATO bombing was not a known fact?

5 Because the people did start leaving at the very point when the NATO

6 bombing started.

7 A. Well, Mr. Tapuskovic, there is something which I think you

8 misquoted when you referred to me. I stated yesterday that based on the

9 information we had got, the expulsion, if I may say so, of Kosovo

10 Albanians started before NATO had bombed, and it was then accelerated. So

11 I think we have to correct your impression in that respect and bring it

12 back to the line which I took yesterday and today.

13 Q. And what about the members of the Verification Mission? Did they

14 leave Kosovo first and foremost because the NATO bombing was due to start

15 and so they left for their own security and safety, or was it what you

16 said yesterday, so that they would not remain as hostages and become

17 hostages?

18 A. Well, we were concerned about the security of the OSCE observers

19 and invited the OSCE to consider NATO's recommendation to withdraw them

20 since we saw that the bombing was imminent. And the OSCE then took the

21 decision to withdraw them, I think on the 20th of March.

22 Q. We have been speaking over these days and months that the

23 Albanians were fleeing Kosovo for certain reasons. I don't want to go

24 back to that now.

25 Do you have any information as to the number, how many from the

1 territory of Serbia and the rest of Serbia, so Serbia proper, Vojvodina,

2 et cetera, how many Hungarians from Subotica went to Hungary, how many

3 Serbs fled to Serb Krajina, how many Romanians escaped to Romania, and in

4 general terms how many people from Belgrade, for instance, who had the

5 ability -- the possibility of leaving Serbia left because of the danger of

6 NATO bombing? Did you have any information as to the problems these

7 neighbouring states had because of the people from Serbia who were leaving

8 en masse, who were fleeing from their country en masse? Did you have any

9 information of that kind? Because half of Budapest was, for example, was

10 inhabited by Serbs who had fled. Or didn't you have information of that

11 kind?

12 A. We had information that people left their homes, also people of

13 another nationalities, and that this number, of course, increased when the

14 air operation started.

15 Q. Thank you, General. And just one -- several more points with

16 respect to the NATO bombing. You say in your statement, in paragraph 39

17 to be exact, towards the end, with respect to the NATO report from the

18 meeting, and it says Naumann's decoded notes from the meeting, and then

19 under an asterisk here it says: "One should be clear if we undertake

20 military action, we will end up in the field, in the terrain."

21 Does that mean when you undertook this action you had decided to

22 go on the ground, action then end up on the ground, that you decided to

23 use ground troops, the infantry, and go on the ground? That's what it

24 says. "Need to be clear: should we take mil action then end up on the

25 ground." That's what you said in your statement.

1 A. Well, Mr. Tapuskovic, that was my statement, that was my

2 assessment, and that was my statement to the NATO council telling them

3 that if they take the decision to intervene by air operations, that they,

4 at the end of the day, may end up with a necessity to include and involve

5 ground forces. I wanted to make them aware of the necessity to be

6 prepared to see it through, since you should never start an intervention

7 if you're not prepared to escalate as appropriate and also if you're not

8 prepared to stay in the country in which you acted in order to restore

9 peace and stability.

10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, you've had -- you've had nearly half

11 an hour.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Two more questions, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE MAY: One more question and then we must give a chance for

14 re-examination.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Two more questions, please.

16 JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Tapuskovic, please don't argue. We cannot go

17 on in this way. This is ground which is all covered. And speaking for

18 myself, I do not find it helpful for the amicus to be taking these sort of

19 points.

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Judge, this is the point of what

21 I wish to ask: What --

22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Ask it.

23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. What quantity of uranium bombs were called when