1 Friday, 3 May 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: Call Dr. Rugova, please.

7 JUDGE MAY: His summary?

8 MR. NICE: Yes, indeed, for distribution now. The witness will

9 certainly have a copy somewhere with him. Perhaps the Court will at some

10 stage explain to him what the limitations are as to whether he may refer

11 to it.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. How long is he here for?

13 MR. NICE: It will obviously be preferable to conclude his

14 evidence today, but it is possible for him to stay over the weekend.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have to rise at 4.00 or 4.15 this afternoon

16 because there's an Initial Appearance after this.

17 [The witness entered court]

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Would you take the declaration, please.

19 WITNESS: IBRAHIM RUGOVA

20 [Witness answered through interpreter]

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

22 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

23 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

24 Examined by Mr. Nice:

25 Q. Is your full name Ibrahim Uke Rugova?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. It's Dr. Rugova, is it not?

3 A. Yes. Yes.

4 Q. Dr. Rugova, you are, of course, a Kosovar Albanian; you were born

5 in the village of Cerrce, in the municipality of Istok, in 1944; you had

6 elementary education in Istok and in Peje; you went to Pristina

7 University, where you qualified in literature, and specialising and

8 earning a doctorate in due course in the history of literary criticism and

9 Albanian literature?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. In 1988, you became president of the Kosovo Writers' Association,

12 and in December of 1999, you were founder of a group, the Council for the

13 Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms. Was that group one of Kosovo's

14 first human rights groups?

15 A. Yes, it was.

16 Q. In 1989, was a party, political party, the Democratic League of

17 Kosovo, known as the LDK, formed? What part did you play in its formation

18 and what office did you take?

19 A. I was one of the founders of this party, which we founded on

20 December 23, 1989. At its first meeting, I was elected chairman of the

21 Democratic League of Kosova; that is, I had the role of the chairman of

22 this party, which was the first democratic party set up in Kosova on the

23 eastern part of that then world, I would say.

24 Q. You were elected president then. Have you remained president of

25 the party since?

1 A. Yes. I continue to be the chairman of this party. The last year

2 I was elected -- 1998, re-elected chairman, in February, and recently we

3 are going to hold a fourth congress of this party.

4 Q. I leave a gap from time to time, Dr. Rugova, between questions and

5 answers to accommodate the interpreters, as you will understand.

6 We are going to hear in due course about elections that occurred

7 in the 1990s, as a result of which you were elected to certain offices,

8 but the most recent position is that you have been elected as President of

9 Kosovo, and that is an office you've held since March of this year; is

10 that correct?

11 A. Yes. I was elected President by the parliament of Kosova in March

12 this year, parliament which was formed after the last elections held on

13 September -- on November 17 last year.

14 Q. Thank you. Let's now go back to the relevant history starting, at

15 any event, in 1989. In that year, did the Yugoslav government impose

16 special measures in Kosovo as a result of what was described as political

17 unrest?

18 A. Yes. These violent measures were imposed as early as 1981, when

19 the first student demonstrations took place.

20 Q. Picking the story up in 1989, if we can, tell us --

21 A. In 1989, violent measures, special measures or extraordinary

22 measures they were called at that time. There were protests because

23 Kosova was deprived of its status, that is in March 1989. This was done

24 by the Serbian Assembly on the 28th of March, and this situation

25 continued.

1 Q. Yes. Had there been an election held on the 23rd of March of 1989

2 the in the Kosovo parliament? Can you just tell us a little bit about

3 that but only a sentence or so?

4 A. Yes. The Assembly of Kosova had to discuss the suspension of the

5 federal status of Kosova, that is, autonomous status of Kosova. And a

6 great pressure was brought to bear on the deputies of the parliament to

7 vote in favour of these measures, but the public was against, that is, the

8 citizens, the people at large. Pressure, violence was used. I remember

9 that there were tanks surrounding the parliament building. In the

10 parliament building, there were police, secret police dressed in civilian

11 clothes. And therefore, the members had to vote under pressure. Some

12 members voted --

13 Q. Thank you. How many voted against and what happened to them?

14 A. I remember ten members voting against it. Then these members were

15 sentenced, punished somewhere, sent to prison somewhere, dismissed from

16 jobs. So they feared implications because of that.

17 Q. And in the demonstrations that you've already referred to in this

18 time, 1989, were there any casualties amongst the demonstrators?

19 A. Yes. Some were injured, and about 20 were killed. These

20 demonstrations were staged in several cities of Kosova.

21 Q. Yes. What rule was there in Kosovo in 1988 and 1989 so far as you

22 were concerned?

23 A. After the revocation of the autonomy of Kosova, the Serb rule was

24 established and several institutions were suspended and control, police

25 control, was established over Kosova. The Ministry of Interior of Kosova

1 and Kosova police didn't have any rights thereafter. Therefore, they were

2 placed under the direct orders of Belgrade, and Serb police were stationed

3 in Kosova.

4 Q. Was there any increase in the number of Serb police operating in

5 Kosovo? If so, where did those policemen come from?

6 A. As of 1989, as I said, Serb police came to Kosova, and at that

7 time there were still policemen from other former republics like Croatia,

8 Slovenia, Bosnia, Vojvodina, Macedonia.

9 Q. And what happened to the other police and particularly the

10 Albanian police?

11 A. The Albanian police of Kosova began to be dismissed from their

12 jobs. This came to an end in 1990. In 1991, all of them were dismissed.

13 Q. Let us now turn to a little of the history and the philosophy of

14 your party, the LDK. The initial aims of that party were what,

15 Dr. Rugova?

16 A. The first objective of this party was to establish democracy in

17 Kosova, to start a democratic life for all its citizens. Second, it aimed

18 to have Kosova a republic equal to the other republics in the former

19 Federation, because as I said, Kosova was stripped of its autonomy, and

20 this was our main goal. Then we were striving to build an independent

21 Kosova for rights -- with rights for all its citizens. This was the main

22 and initial goal, but the main thing was to defend the Kosova people who

23 were jeopardised then.

24 The philosophy of our party is very comprehensive. It includes

25 economic, cultural, and general development of Kosova.

1 MR. NICE: Paragraph 8 of the summary for the Court.

2 Q. In July of 1990, was there a declaration made in the Kosovo

3 parliament, and if so, can you explain that to us and explain how to

4 fitted into the laws and structures of Kosovo at that time?

5 A. On July 2nd, a statement was prepared and endorsed by the members

6 of the Kosova Assembly. The members were not allowed to enter the

7 chamber. They were banned from entering it. But they held the meeting

8 outside, in the vicinity of the assembly building, and they endorsed a

9 statement, which we refer to as the Constitutional Statement, or the

10 Statement for Independence, which is asking for Kosova to become an

11 independent republic equal to the other former republics of the former

12 Federation. Likewise, it said that we did not recognise the amendments

13 approved by the Serb Assembly on 28th of March and that we will refer to

14 Kosova as "Kosova." This was a crucial document which was approved that

15 day. After that, all the measures followed.

16 Q. Then other measures. First of all, were steps taken by the

17 Serbian authorities in relation to your parliament?

18 A. We were at that time at the initial phase of building our party.

19 Of course, reprisals were undertaken against its activists. Three days

20 after, that is, on the 5th of July, the television and the radio of

21 Prishtina, in Kosova, were closed, violently closed. We have film footage

22 to show that. The only Albanian-language newspaper, Rilindja, was also

23 suspended. So there were no more programmes in the Albanian language.

24 Then more fierce measures ensued against other institutions of Kosova.

25 Q. Later in that year, was there a meeting in Kacanik?

1 A. Yes. A meeting was held in Kacanik, a meeting of deputies of the

2 Kosova Assembly, who approved the Declaration of Independence, and they

3 approved the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova at that assembly in

4 Kacanik. It was a very important document for Kosova's future

5 development, and also a very democratic document.

6 Q. Moving on one year, to 1991, again to September, in that month of

7 1991, was there a referendum? Can you tell us how that was organised and

8 what was its result?

9 A. In September 1991, Kosova held its own referendum on independence,

10 and this referendum was very well organised and supervised. And the

11 question was: Are you in favour of the independence of Kosova or not?

12 And 98 or 99 per cent of the voters were in favour. So the results of the

13 referendum were positive. And as you know, a lot of referendums were held

14 for independence in other former Yugoslav republics, so Kosova held its

15 own referendum and it was well organised. Of course, there was a lot of

16 repression against many activists, but the referendum was nevertheless

17 held.

18 Q. Before we move on to the attitude of the LDK following this

19 referendum, just back to a detail of what was happening in 1989. Were

20 Albanians losing their jobs as a result of the difficulties between Kosovo

21 and Serbia?

22 A. Yes. That started in 1989 and later intensified in 1990 and

23 continued until the majority were expelled from their jobs in 1993. It

24 kept on continuing. In this period, about 150.000 Albanian workers were

25 expelled from their jobs, and at that time there were about 240.000 people

1 employed in Kosova as a whole. So 150.000 were expelled and about 70.000

2 or 80.000 remained in their jobs, and these were mainly Serbs of Kosova

3 and other nationalities. They were expelled from the economy, public

4 services, the administration, and so forth. Some Albanians in the

5 electricity industry and electrical installations near Prishtina and

6 Obiliq, they were kept, but otherwise not many.

7 Q. From the moment of the referendum, but probably before, was the

8 LDK's party then clearly in favour of and seeking independence?

9 A. After the referendum, yes. And it was the LDK's main option and

10 the choice of the other political parties in Kosova, because various other

11 smaller parties were founded at this time because of the result of the

12 referendum. And as you know, the other republics had declared their

13 independence, and the former Yugoslavia, the former Federation, had de

14 facto begun to collapse. And we were thinking of our own fate, our own

15 destiny in Kosova.

16 Q. How did the LDK approach the possibility, manifest elsewhere, of

17 independence only coming with violence and by war? How did it approach

18 that problem?

19 A. Our position was that independence should be achieved by peaceful,

20 diplomatic, and democratic methods and violence should not be used,

21 because it was a right of the people of Kosova, and we worked in this

22 direction.

23 Q. With that in mind, can you tell us about a document that was

24 prepared on October 11th of 1991?

25 A. Yes. This is a document called the "Statement with Three

1 Options," and it was prepared by the LDK and the other Kosova political

2 parties, by the Albanian parties in Macedonia and southern Serbia and

3 Montenegro, and it's a document that puts forth three options: If the

4 internal borders of the former Yugoslavia are changed, there should be a

5 republic of Albanians, i.e., a Republic of Kosova. The second option was

6 the independence of the Republic of Kosova. And the third option, if the

7 external borders of the former Yugoslavia were changed and if other

8 countries sought to change the borders of the former Federation, then the

9 Albanians of Kosova and other areas in the former Federation had the right

10 to unite, to have their own state in the Balkans. So it was more a matter

11 of a vision and a preparation for what might happen at that time, when the

12 former Federation began to collapse.

13 Q. And of these three options, your party was most interested in

14 which one?

15 A. We were more interested in the independence of Kosova, i.e.,

16 Kosova as an independent country, a country with good neighbourly

17 relations with its adjacent countries.

18 Q. Before we pass from this document, or this agreement, what was its

19 approach -- whatever option might be achieved, what was its approach to

20 minority groups that would find themselves living in states of other

21 majority ethnic composition?

22 A. In any event, it had a positive attitude to secure and protect and

23 integrate these rights. This was also in the Kacanik constitution. So

24 they would be equal citizens in the Republic of Kosova or in the

25 territories where the Albanians are a majority.

1 MR. NICE: Paragraph 12 of the summary for the Court.

2 Q. In the 1990s, starting in 1990, apart from people losing their

3 jobs, tell us about Albanian radio and television stations. What happened

4 so far as they were concerned?

5 A. Yes. On 5th of July, 1990, the Kosova television and radio and

6 the Rilindja newspaper were closed by police violence. No doubt there

7 were also military forces. But journalists were thrown out of their

8 offices by force, and there is film of this. I haven't brought it with

9 me, but these offices were closed down and Albanian language radio and

10 television was shut completely.

11 Q. What was the ability of those in Kosovo to receive radio

12 broadcasts from Albania itself?

13 A. There was no longer any Albanian radio in Kosova, and radio Tirana

14 or other Albanian-language channels were jammed with the help of certain

15 military electronic equipment. I saw this myself. There were some

16 vehicles with apparatus that jammed the waves, and this went on all the

17 time.

18 Q. Your party, was it organised just in the major towns of Kosovo or

19 was it organised on a wider basis?

20 A. It had a very widespread organisation throughout Kosova, in all

21 the villages of Kosova and all the neighbourhoods and quarters of the

22 cities. It was not only a party, it was also a movement. It was more

23 than a political party, with a very good organisation and a strong civic

24 will in which the citizens worked and organised themselves and kept life

25 going. It was a very fine, compact organisation.

1 Q. Can you give us some examples of the practical things it did but

2 also tell us what was its political focus, if you can?

3 A. I talked a little bit about its political focus and the

4 democratisation of Kosova, democracy, the independence of Kosova. And in

5 practice this party started solidarity actions to help people who were

6 left without jobs, people who were dismissed from their jobs, and also

7 organising society at large, keeping education and health and other fields

8 of life going, culture, even sport. And at that time, we also started

9 collecting a tax, not a compulsory tax but what we called a solidarity

10 tax, mainly concentrating on helping people with food, clothing and things

11 that they needed, because you can imagine that people who had worked for

12 years were now on the streets and could not make ends meet.

13 So these were the first concrete steps we took.

14 Q. No, education, how important? Was it just a question of practical

15 steps or were there also political actions that you took in relation to

16 education?

17 A. It was also more practical, because at that time, that is after

18 1990, especially 1991, all the schools started to be closed, the

19 elementary schools, the high schools, and the university. So we tried to

20 enable people to continue their education on public premises, but it was

21 very difficult.

22 I remember in 1991, several times school pupils and students went

23 to the public premises of the schools, but they were not allowed to enter

24 because these premises were guarded by police. And in order to avert

25 conflict and for the sake of the children, we stopped going to these

1 public buildings, and we created a system whereby school pupils could

2 study in private houses and various other private buildings from

3 elementary school to high school and to college level, and this continued

4 until 1999.

5 So we were forced to create a system which the world at large

6 later called the parallel system in order not to leave our children

7 without education. Because you can imagine --

8 Q. I think --

9 A. -- entire generations being left without education.

10 Q. Let's now go back to paragraph 11 of the summary to how this

11 parallel institution took some formal shape. In October of 1991, was a

12 government formed that operated both inside and outside Kosovo?

13 A. Yes. In that month there was a government, what we might call a

14 coalition government, including the LDK Prime Minister, and there were

15 various other Ministers from other parties and also civil associations.

16 The government mainly operated abroad because it was very difficult to

17 operate in Kosova, but there were various kinds of councils that operated

18 in Kosova, the finance council, the educational council, the cultural

19 council, the council for sport and others, and they organised the life of

20 society and of the citizens.

21 Q. Insofar as it operated abroad, in which countries was it based

22 principally?

23 A. The government mainly worked in Germany and sometimes in

24 Switzerland, and we had an extensive LDK organisation abroad in many

25 European countries, in America, Canada, and Australia, because the

1 Kosovars had the will to keep their ties with Kosova alive through this

2 party, and they assisted with the solidarity tax of 3 per cent of their

3 earnings.

4 So it was a very widespread party. And this was the first time

5 that the Kosovars abroad, too, had their own party and their own

6 organisation.

7 Q. In 1992, was there an election - I think it was 1992 - to the post

8 of President of what was described as the Republic of Kosovo, the Kosovo

9 Republic? Tell us about that, please.

10 A. These elections were held on 24th of May, 1992, and we -- the

11 political groups in Kosova decided to hold elections and held a democratic

12 procedure and elected a parliament and a president of Kosova. And the LDK

13 won a majority, and I was elected President of the Republic of Kosova by

14 an absolute majority of votes.

15 Of course there was also repression following these elections, but

16 the entire people was behind them. They were held. After the elections,

17 two activists near the city of Peje were killed. But the important thing

18 was that these elections were held to establish a democratic order in

19 Kosova, and they yielded their results.

20 Q. Your election in 1992, was that followed six years later, in March

21 of 1998, by a further election to the same position?

22 A. That's right. On 22nd of March, 1998, even though the situation

23 was very serious in Kosova and military attacks on Kosova had already

24 begun and a kind of confrontation, we decided to hold elections because it

25 was time. And also many political parties took part in these elections.

1 And the LDK won a majority, and then there was the Christian democratic

2 party, and other parties won votes. And once again, I was elected

3 President of the Republic of Kosova by an absolute majority.

4 Q. Thank you. Dr. Rugova, I'm going to try with some of the

5 following topics to deal with them fairly briefly, possibly by answers

6 that are yes or no, and then we'll come back to matters where I'll ask you

7 for more extended answers. But - paragraph 15 - did the LDK get involved

8 in bringing television by satellite from Albania, and did it also

9 establish an information centre of Kosovo? Just yes or no to those,

10 really.

11 A. Yes. The LDK and the government.

12 Q. Were people's satellite dishes ever made to suffer as a result of

13 what you had done to provide information?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What happened to those dishes?

16 A. Unfortunately, there were. We had to provide some information in

17 the Albanian language, and often the police had threatened people to get

18 rid of these dishes, has punished some of them, but people still continued

19 to have those dishes despite the police preventive measures. There are so

20 many dishes even today in Kosova.

21 Q. I think foreign organisations, many of them NGOs, started to work

22 in Kosovo, and amongst the bodies that found themselves working there were

23 the International Red Cross, Medicin sans Frontiere, and other such

24 organisations.

25 A. Yes. In 1992 --

1 Q. Again, we can probably deal with this just briefly. The LDK

2 established relations with governments abroad, primarily perhaps with the

3 Americans, but also having good relations with other European countries,

4 including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So far as you're concerned, what was the attitude of the United

7 States towards what you were doing in Kosovo and to the development of

8 democracy and democratic rights there?

9 A. The United States maintained a positive stand. They supported

10 democracy, human rights, and had sympathy for our peaceful movement. That

11 was the same with the European countries. I might say that the US

12 Congress and the EU Parliament were the first to take a stand on violence

13 and repression in Kosova. They maintained a positive stand and

14 sympathised with us.

15 Q. I think that Washington opened an office in Pristina in 1996, and

16 that was shortly followed by a European Union office, also in Pristina.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. Yes. And this was for us of great importance because we wanted

20 them to be present in Kosova and to establish links with us.

21 Q. The LDK, as you've told us, remained committed to peaceful

22 action. Did you have any fears as to what might nevertheless happen as a

23 result of the political developments that were taking place?

24 A. Yes. As I said, we were for peaceful solutions, for peaceful

25 policy, but we were still intimidated, because if that went on for too

1 long, the citizens might react to that, in face of the growing daily

2 repression against them. So this is what we were afraid of, and tried to

3 find some political solutions to that situation.

4 Q. You speak of daily repression. In a sentence or so, just tell us,

5 as we pass through the 1990s, what sort of repression, and were there any

6 casualties?

7 A. In 1990 there were some demonstrations staged where about 40

8 people got killed. Daily repression consisted of activists, citizens

9 being maltreated, detained, stopped at checkpoints, which were very

10 frequent in Kosova, or might be punished for some minor things. Let's say

11 they were found carrying some letters, documents in Albanian language.

12 They were sentenced to 30 to 60 days. Thousands of people have been

13 suffering from that. They were sentenced on petty offences, I would say.

14 Q. And you yourself, what did you suffer, if anything, by way of

15 inference and restriction? Paragraph 23.

16 A. Yes. I was very careful, didn't move about much, to escape such

17 repression. I was very cautious. However, in 1990, once we had set up

18 the Democratic League, I was told to give up politics: What are you

19 doing, and what does this serve, and so on and so forth. Then in 1993 I

20 was detained in a police station in Prishtina. I was held there for a

21 couple of hours; then some other times, at other periods. But as I said,

22 I tried to be very careful not to move about much, because I was afraid

23 they might arrest me or even fare something worse.

24 Q. When you say you were told not to -- or to give up politics, who

25 told you that?

1 A. Someone from the State Security in 1990. He was working at the

2 Ministry of Interior in Kosova. Then I found out that he had taken orders

3 from someone from Belgrade working in the security service. I never found

4 out his name.

5 Q. There came a time when the KLA came into being. How did the

6 Serbian authorities approach the LDK once the KLA came into being? Did it

7 deal with them similarly or separately, or in a different way?

8 A. If you allow me, I would like to add something to your previous

9 question. When I travelled abroad, mainly on the border with Macedonia, I

10 was often held up by the police for several hours at the border.

11 In answer to your other question, I might say that their stand

12 didn't change when the KLA appeared. I mean, they maintained the same

13 stand on us despite the emergence of the KLA.

14 Q. And that approach to you was what? How would you summarise it?

15 A. They continued their repression against the LDK, its activities,

16 whereas with regard to the KLA members, when there were confrontations,

17 also they kept the same stand. This happened from March 1998, when the

18 attack on Drenica was perpetrated, and that continued. That was the

19 stand: violence and open conflict, which prevailed. So de facto, Belgrade

20 decided to destroy Kosova through violence and war.

21 Q. Did you have any personal contact in the first half of the 1990s

22 with the accused?

23 A. No, I didn't.

24 Q. Did you ever hear directly of his expression of interest or

25 disinterest, support or otherwise, of what you were doing politically in

1 Kosovo in that time?

2 A. No. There was a tendency to establish contacts, but that was

3 refused. I remember from the London conference. In fact, we didn't have

4 any contacts and we didn't see any interest.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, before you move to the next part, I

6 wanted to have something clarified from Dr. Rugova.

7 In 1990, Kosovo had declared itself an independent entity within

8 Yugoslavia, equal to the other republics. That is a status to be

9 distinguished from independence. What was the constitutional

10 relationship, as you understood it then, between Kosovo as an independent

11 entity and the Yugoslav government? What would the Yugoslav government be

12 constitutionally entitled to do in relation to Kosovo as an independent

13 entity?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We proclaimed Kosova -- at that time

15 the former Yugoslavia, the Federation, still existed, and that being the

16 case, Kosova too being either a republic or an independent country, would

17 have relations with the other republics. That was being discussed. But

18 this did not happen, of course. As to the Belgrade authorities, they

19 considered what we did, the expression of the will of the people,

20 unlawful, and never recognised it. That was the background. And we

21 continued our efforts to build up the state and the institutions despite

22 the Serb violence. What we did was recognise outside as a parallel

23 state. That was the beginning of the dismemberment of the Federation, in

24 fact.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: So Belgrade's attitude to you was driven by their

1 non-recognition of the status that you had declared yourself? They did

2 not recognise that status and continued to treat you in the way that they

3 had treated you before?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct. They didn't

5 recognise the Republic of Kosova. I said in March 1989 they suspended

6 even the federal status that Kosova enjoyed then. So they didn't

7 recognise the people's expressed will and continued their repression,

8 violence, and other actions in this way.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. Let me turn, then, to the Ministry of Defence, as it has been

12 described. Very briefly, how did this come into being, of whom or of what

13 was it composed, and what was its purpose?

14 A. In 1992, 1993, we believed that those policemen who were

15 dismissed, they were organising their police trade unions. They took care

16 of their families. And they thought to set up a Ministry of Interior,

17 where Kosovar Albanian unemployed officers or policemen -- they thought to

18 have their own Ministry of Defence. But in fact it did not play any

19 operational, military role, because it was very difficult to do so. It

20 had more of a consultative character, to advise the citizens in case of

21 some attacks or what to do, as the case was in Drenica, for example, in

22 1998, with the Jashari family or other families. In 1993, many military

23 experts were imprisoned and sentenced. About 46 of them have suffered in

24 prison until 1999.

25 Many Kosovar police were killed. Some were maltreated. About 150

1 have been sentenced to gaol. About 200 have been arrested, and they have

2 suffered their sentences until 1988, 1989.

3 So that was the main purpose for setting up this ministry, as a

4 consultative body to provide some security for the citizens.

5 Q. Were these former police officers ever recognisable as members of

6 the Ministry of Defence by uniform or badge or anything like that, and if

7 so, were they ever armed?

8 A. No. No. They didn't have a uniform. It was impossible to have

9 uniforms or some insignia. But as I said, it was more of a consultative

10 body for the citizens of Kosova.

11 Q. Thank you. Can we turn now to the education agreement. But,

12 Dr. Rugova, we've heard quite a lot about this from other witnesses

13 already, so we can deal with it, I hope, pretty swiftly.

14 There were negotiations for an education agreement, and they began

15 in 1996; is that correct?

16 A. Yes, that's correct, in 1996. In the summer of that year they

17 started.

18 Q. The Sant' Egidio organisation helped by engaging in a form of

19 shuttle diplomacy to facilitate this agreement, and at that time there

20 was --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- interest or pressure from other Western governments to wanted

23 to see an improvement in the educational position in Kosovo? I think the

24 agreement was signed in Pristina on September the 1st of 1996.

25 MR. NICE: And, Your Honours, we have a version of the agreement.

1 It comes from a book. It's not the agreement itself, but if we can just

2 produce that as an exhibit through this witness. It ought to be before

3 the Court.

4 While it's being produced, I can just explain that the book from

5 which it's drawn is "The Kosovo Conflict, a Diplomatic History Through

6 Documents," edited by Philip Averswald and David Averswald, published in

7 2000.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Prosecutor's Exhibit

9 number 127.

10 MR. NICE: If you could lay an English version of this on the

11 overhead projector, please. And the witness reads and speaks English

12 sufficiently for me to just deal with this in English.

13 I think the usher has the wrong document. It's the one-page

14 document. I'm sorry. I hadn't checked.

15 JUDGE MAY: You're going to produce this one, are you?

16 MR. NICE: I'm going to produce that one in due course.

17 JUDGE MAY: So we can keep it.

18 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.

19 JUDGE MAY: But we will renumber it in due course. Let's now have

20 the document, the new one.

21 MR. NICE: Sorry. I hadn't been keeping an eye on what was being

22 distributed.

23 THE REGISTRAR: So this document will be Prosecutor's Exhibit

24 number 127.

25 MR. NICE:

1 Q. It's sufficiently short to be read in full. It's dated the 1st of

2 September of 1996. The original is said to have been signed by both

3 yourself and the accused. Did you sign it in the presence of each other

4 or did you sign it separately, Dr. Rugova?

5 A. This document was signed separately. I signed it in Prishtina in

6 the presence of Sant' Egidio, whereas the accused has signed it in

7 Belgrade. I don't know whether he too signed it in the presence of Sant'

8 Egidio.

9 Q. In any event --

10 A. It was, as I said, a shuttle agreement.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: In what capacity did you sign it, Dr. Rugova?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was a very controversial issue,

13 in fact. I had to sign it, of course, as the President of the Republic of

14 Kosova, but the other side didn't accept that. And in order for us to

15 make some positive step ahead, I agreed to sign it only by my name, as

16 Ibrahim Rugova without any other posts or any other capacity, just to show

17 my goodwill to do something.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I see that, and I think I'll come back to

19 this issue of the constitutional relationship, which I'm not entirely

20 clear about, because although the Yugoslav -- the Belgrade authorities did

21 not recognise the status that you had given yourself in 1990, it is clear

22 that they were dealing with you. They were treating with you in many --

23 in many things, including education by way of this agreement. But as you

24 said, there was this issue as to the capacity in which you -- you would

25 sign. So we simply see "Dr. Ibrahim Rugova."

1 Thank you. Proceed on, Mr. Nice.

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. The agreement reads:

4 "For some years now, the educational system in Kosovo - from

5 elementary schooling to university - has not been functioning normally.

6 "By mutual consent, the undersigned, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic,

7 President of the Republic of Serbia, and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, have decided

8 to proceed to the normalisation of the education system for Albanian youth

9 in Kosovo.

10 "The agreement foresees the return of Albanian students and

11 teachers back to schools.

12 "The present agreement, because of its social and humanitarian

13 significance, is beyond political debate. The concern shared by both of

14 the undersigned for the future of Albanian children and youth that has led

15 them to reach this agreement.

16 "Both the undersigned thank their joint friends from the

17 community of Sant' Egidio for the generous commitment, help and support

18 they have given to the dialogue.

19 "Both the undersigned are furthermore certain about the

20 commitment of all those who are in charge to implementing the agreement

21 for the normalisation of the education system. A mixed group (3+3) will

22 be established to make the agreement a reality.

23 "When young people do commit themselves with purpose to their

24 educational and cultural improvement, and in so doing become responsible

25 citizens, we achieve a victory for civilisation itself and not a victory

1 of one side over another."

2 Thus the agreement, Dr. Rugova, was it ever implemented?

3 A. Unfortunately, it was not implemented. And for this reason, we

4 had protest demonstrations by students in October 1997 and again in 1998.

5 Part of this agreement was implemented very late, in March or April 1998

6 when it was very late. And one faculty building was released for

7 Albanians and the Institute for Albanian Studies in the national library,

8 but this was very late and, in fact, it seemed like a farce. So this

9 agreement was not implemented.

10 Q. Had you ever been hopeful that it would be implemented?

11 JUDGE MAY: There is an objection, apparently.

12 Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I consider that

14 this is the right time for me to point something out. By presenting

15 Exhibit 127, this has been introduced into the documents but it has not

16 been translated as it should have been done. You still have not decided

17 about this, that is so say, whether documents which have not been

18 translated can become a part of the evidence.

19 Now, what do I want to say about this? I wish to say that a

20 ruling on the matter should be made, because we discussed the question of

21 whether the accused knew the language well enough to be able to follow the

22 documents. He presented his own views. It is not a question of a general

23 knowledge of the language when we come to legal terminology and witnesses,

24 expert witnesses, professional terms that are used. The accused quite

25 certainly does not know all that legal language. So I think we ought to

1 have a ruling and decision on whether a document which has not been

2 translated can be introduced into evidence.

3 JUDGE MAY: This is a short document which the accused is well

4 able to read. If you want help about it, I'm sure at that Mr. Wladimiroff

5 will assist you.

6 We are not dealing now with matters of principle. You can raise

7 them in due course. The important thing is to get on with the evidence.

8 Now, in this case we can get on perfectly well with this document in

9 English.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I don't think you understood me.

11 Your Honours, it is not me --

12 JUDGE MAY: We have in front of us a document about education, and

13 it is that document which has been produced, and it is that document which

14 I'm referring to. We haven't got on to any other document. When we do,

15 we can discuss it. But we don't want to waste time when the witness is in

16 the middle of giving evidence.

17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I just add one

18 thing? I don't need assistance. I do have this document in the Serbian

19 language, and I know it very well. I read it a long time ago, many years

20 ago. I'm well acquainted with the document itself. So it is not I myself

21 who needs assistance. But we must rule on the request made by the accused

22 that every document which is provided to him in the English language must

23 also be produced in the translation as well.

24 That is all. Thank you.

25 JUDGE MAY: It is a matter for us when we rule upon the matter.

1 At the moment we're dealing with the education agreement. There is no

2 need for any ruling. Now, let us get on with the evidence.

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Of course.

4 MR. NICE:

5 Q. Had you ever had optimism, Dr. Rugova, that this agreement would

6 be implemented?

7 A. I had hoped, but on the basis of the attitude taken in Kosova

8 towards education, there was some goodwill and hope that something would

9 come of this agreement.

10 Q. In the event, what appeared to be the approach of the Serbian side

11 to education and its effect on Kosovo Albanians?

12 A. As I said before, in 1990 and especially 1991, the schools were

13 closed, and the university, so there was no Albanian-language education,

14 and we organised in our own way in private houses. So they had a negative

15 attitude: There should not be Albanian-language education in Kosova. And

16 with this agreement, we thought something better would come about, but

17 nothing happened. And of course there was violence used against school

18 pupils and teachers, and repression.

19 MR. NICE: We can now move to the negotiations that took place

20 involving a group called the G5. We've had a great deal of evidence about

21 this already, and Your Honour, I think the general architecture of these

22 negotiations has not been challenged at all, so that I can lead it.

23 Q. After the Kosovo parliamentary elections that were held on the

24 22nd of March of 1998, was a group formed --

25 A. Yes, a group was formed, which at first was called G15. It had 15

1 members.

2 Q. Yes. And was its purpose to start the negotiation process because

3 conditions were deteriorating and you were concerned about the violence

4 that was developing?

5 A. Yes. It was our position that we should do something, and also

6 the international community thought the same, because the situation was

7 alarming. So this group of 15 was founded, with representatives of the

8 different political parties, civil societies, human rights organisations.

9 So it was quite an interesting and a rather solid group, ready to talk to

10 Belgrade.

11 Q. But then for practical reasons it was reduced to the G5 group,

12 whose members were yourself, Fehmi Agani, Veton Surroi, Mahmut Bakalli,

13 and Blerim Shala?

14 A. Yes. It was more of an advisory group to look at issues. We also

15 formed a group of five members, as you mentioned, for direct talks, if

16 direct talks were to start. So this was a more practically mounted group,

17 you might say.

18 Q. And also Pajazit Nushi.

19 A. Pajazit Nushi, that's right, from the Human Rights Committee.

20 Q. Now, we know that on the 15th of May, this group met the accused

21 in Belgrade, and I think you were the leader of the group; is that

22 correct?

23 A. Yes, I was.

24 Q. The meeting lasted about an hour. You explained that your

25 interest was in independence of Kosovo; correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And others contributed; the others of your group contributed to

3 the discussion, and the accused spoke of, amongst other things, events in

4 Prekaz. Briefly, please, your recollection of what he said about those

5 events in Prekaz?

6 A. I remember that he knew about the Prekaz case and the Jashari

7 family and what had happened. He called them terrorists. And he also

8 said that the state had to respond to cases like this. We were there to

9 discuss the situation in Kosova and to find a solution, but this is what

10 he said. I remember exactly.

11 Q. Did the meeting -- we've heard about it from other witnesses, so I

12 needn't ask you for your recollection of what others said. Did the

13 meeting having a positive outcome, as you understood it?

14 A. No. No. It didn't have any positive results. We tried to meet

15 at high level, and then at other levels, and we formed two working groups

16 for talks. These were formed later.

17 Q. Was it possible for those working groups to negotiate with

18 representatives of the Serbian side or not?

19 A. Very difficult. We tried. We tried.

20 Q. Very well. When you returned from that meeting with the

21 accused - very briefly - did you come through the border at Medare? If

22 so, what did you see there of vehicles, and what happened to you, and so

23 on?

24 A. As we were returning from Belgrade, we were stopped by the police,

25 and there were also soldiers. There was a checkpoint at the border with

1 Kosova, and the police stopped us for I think about 30, 40 minutes. And

2 they asked for our identity documents and so forth, and this was a sign

3 that they knew where we had been and why. They stopped us there. And of

4 course, there were police and military vehicles. And when we entered

5 Kosova, there were tanks. There was the army on the move throughout

6 Kosova, soldiers, perhaps even paramilitaries, and others.

7 Q. And on the day after, was there a change in the provision of food

8 to Kosovo?

9 A. There wasn't, but in fact Belgrade had decided to stop the trucks

10 that were bringing food from Serbia, and those belonged to various firms

11 that sold groceries. And this was a bad sign. At that time it didn't

12 have any effect, because we had our own production, but it was an ominous

13 sign. And of course, we are also trading with Macedonia. But this was a

14 very negative sign.

15 Q. Shortly after this meeting, was there a particular event around

16 Decani that you recall and can tell us about in a sentence or so?

17 A. After this, I believe in a certain part of Decan, in the village

18 of Gllogjan, on the Gjakova side of Decan, there were confrontations, and

19 as a result, people, also displaced people, left their villages, and

20 people started to cross the border into Albania and Montenegro.

21 Q. I should have asked you, and I'll go back to deal with it: In

22 your meeting with the accused, what, if anything, did you say to him about

23 the violence and oppression that was happening in Kosovo?

24 A. We said that the situation in Kosova was bad. There was violence

25 and repression. And he, of course, justified it by saying that the state

1 must respond, because these were terrorists. And of course, I also

2 mentioned the issue of independence, as you did yourself.

3 Q. Let's move on now to the following year, to Rambouillet, in

4 February 1999. This, of course, followed the incident, massacre, at

5 Racak.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You participated in the Rambouillet negotiations?

8 A. Yes, I took part --

9 Q. In summary --

10 A. -- as part of the LDK.

11 Q. Was the LDK delegation serious in its attempts to negotiate or

12 not?

13 A. Yes, we were serious, and we went in the conviction that an

14 agreement must be achieved. And this was the stand of the international

15 community too, after the massacre at Recak. The situation was

16 deteriorating in Kosova. And of course, the Kosovar delegation consisted

17 mainly of the LDK, including myself, and other political groups. There

18 was the movement for democratic unity, and the KLA, and other civil

19 societies, and there were two other members. So there were about 15

20 members in this team. So the LDK position was that an agreement should be

21 achieved, and the other members of the delegation shared this view.

22 Q. The approach of the Serb side, as you could judge it from your

23 position?

24 A. Most of them were not serious. It appeared to me that they were

25 not there in order to reach some agreement. That was our impression,

1 given the way the talks were being held, or the process, in fact. Because

2 we didn't have many contacts, but these negotiations -- the process

3 continued for three weeks and we didn't see any willingness on their part

4 to reach some agreement.

5 Q. Eventually -- and I'm going to cut out the detail. It's available

6 in paragraphs 46 to 48, if wanted. But eventually, was there a meeting

7 with Madeleine Albright, I think three Albanians and three Serbs together?

8 A. Yes. We held this meeting, about two weeks or so of

9 negotiations. There were three from our side and three from the Serb

10 side. Mrs. Albright was sad at the way the negotiations were going, and

11 she said very openly and explicitly, without much diplomacy, that: If you

12 Albanians - that is, Kosovars - fail to agree with the agreement, we will

13 isolate you and we will have nothing to do with you. And she said

14 likewise very clearly to the Serb side: If you do not accept the

15 agreement, you will be bombed. And that was the end of the meeting.

16 Q. The agreement that was being proposed --

17 MR. NICE: And Your Honour, it was the previous exhibit that was

18 distributed ahead of its time, and perhaps we can give it a number in due

19 course.

20 Q. The agreement that was available, in summary, said what,

21 Dr. Rugova?

22 A. In summary, it said that over a three-year period, the situation

23 in Kosova should be ameliorated; that is, the status of Kosova should be

24 raised after three years, on the basis of the political will of the people

25 and of other factors, that the Serb forces should withdraw, Kosova police

1 should be set up, and KLA should be disarmed, that it be transformed after

2 disarming, and then peace-keeping troops of NATO should be deployed. That

3 was more or less what it was about.

4 Q. On the way to the formulation of this agreement at Rambouillet,

5 were the Serb delegation free to negotiate with real authority or did they

6 have to refer back at any time to anyone, and if so, to whom?

7 A. Certainly they had to ask Belgrade. In this context, the Hill

8 ambassador, who was one of the negotiators, went twice to Belgrade. Once

9 the accused met him, the other time not; he didn't. But the members of

10 the Serb delegation kept constant contacts with Belgrade to get

11 authorisation for what they were going to do. That was our impression.

12 Q. Were you aware of them actually making physical trips, actual

13 trips to Belgrade, in the course of the negotiations?

14 A. It seems to me, yes.

15 Q. Once or more than once, if you know?

16 A. I don't know, but someone went there. This I know. During that

17 three-week period, we stayed in Rambouillet. We stayed there for 21

18 days.

19 MR. NICE: Your Honour - thank you - the agreement, may that be

20 given an exhibit number, if it's going to be given a different one from --

21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. That will be Prosecutor's

22 Exhibit 128.

23 MR. NICE: I don't desire to turn to any part of it in detail at

24 the moment, but it's a document of reference that we may obviously wish to

25 look at from time to time. Again it comes from a book. Of course, if

1 Mr. Tapuskovic has got a version of it in B/C/S, no doubt he'll make it

2 available to us, if he feels that it's necessary.

3 JUDGE MAY: No doubt the accused is familiar with it, but in

4 principle, we should have a copy in B/C/S.

5 MR. NICE: We'll see if we can find one.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. There must be one somewhere.

7 MR. NICE: It's a question of finding it, yes.

8 Q. Tell us about the decision to sign this agreement or not then,

9 please, Dr. Rugova.

10 A. After three weeks, we put up together a text through this shuttle

11 method. It was a definitive text, and the moment came when each of the

12 delegations had to say whether they agreed with the agreement. The Kosova

13 delegation - that is, the Albanian delegation - despite certain

14 reservations of given groups, we decided, within our delegation, we

15 decided to accept the document, whereas the Serb side didn't come up with

16 any stand. We had a time-out of three weeks, to meet again in Paris to

17 sign it. But that was the final document, and the question was whether to

18 accept it or not. That was the end of the -- the conclusion of the

19 Rambouillet talks.

20 Q. The Serb side never signed?

21 A. After three weeks -- we made public the content of this document

22 in Kosova. Then after three weeks we went to Paris. The Serb side again

23 refused to sign it. We did sign it, as a delegation.

24 Q. You then returned to Kosovo, knowing or fearing that what would

25 happen, Dr. Rugova?

1 A. Yes, we returned to Kosova. And we, of course, were afraid of the

2 future, but also were hoping that there would be some intervention by

3 NATO, given the fact that the other side was cautioned against it. But we

4 were frightened that some even worse things might happen. We did our own

5 share of work. We did our bit, so to say. That is, we signed the

6 agreement, and that was of importance to us.

7 Q. As you returned to Kosovo, did you calculate that you may have

8 been at some personal risk?

9 A. Yes. I was afraid that the situation might be dangerous in

10 Kosova, but I had made up my decision to return, because my family was in

11 Prishtina. And on the way from Skopje to Prishtina, I saw the first bad

12 signs, that some cities and villages of Kosova were being emptied of their

13 population.

14 Q. On your return, did you make a press statement?

15 A. Yes. I was very worried at what I saw from the border with

16 Macedonia on the way to Prishtina, and as I told you, I saw many empty,

17 deserted villages and cities. Han i Elezit was on the border of

18 Macedonia. I remember to this day two little puppies wandering in the

19 streets, and nothing else. And so I made a statement in front of my

20 house, in the presence of many journalists, telling them that it's high

21 time that NATO took some action, that something must be done. That

22 happened on the 20th or 21st of March, 1999.

23 Q. Were you in your house when the bombing in fact started?

24 JUDGE MAY: If you're moving on to another topic, it may be

25 convenient to break.

1 Dr. Rugova, we're going to adjourn now for half an hour. Could

2 you remember, please, in this adjournment and any others there may be

3 while you're giving evidence, not to speak to anybody about it until it's

4 over, and that does include the Prosecution. Thank you.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, certainly. I will abide

6 by your Rules.

7 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 11.30 a.m.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. Paragraph 55. Dr. Rugova, were you in your house when the bombing

12 began, with your wife and three children, later to be joined by your

13 sister-in-law with her husband and their three children?

14 A. Yes. I was at home with my family and with my brother-in-law. I

15 was at home with my family. And meanwhile, my brother-in-law had come

16 there with their children.

17 Q. Thank you. Before the bombing began had the telephone lines

18 ceased to work, and if so, why?

19 A. Yes. All telephone lines were cut in Prishtina, no doubt in

20 Kosova as a whole, no doubt to ensure that nobody could communicate with

21 anybody else. And on the 22nd and 23rd, the city was under blockade and

22 all movement was very difficult.

23 Q. Your own political party's office and, I think, the United States'

24 office in Pristina were both subject to the same fate. Namely, what

25 happened to them?

1 A. On the first night of the bombing, my office was burned. That's

2 the office of the LDK, which also housed other institutions. And then the

3 US office in Prishtina was also burned.

4 Q. Was it burned as a result of the bombing or of some other reason?

5 A. No. No, no. They were burnt by Serbian forces, by different

6 Serbian groups, the army. I don't know who, but they were burnt by groups

7 from the army or the paramilitaries or the police, no doubt in revenge.

8 This was what it was about. And then my office was burnt again because

9 they thought that it wasn't properly burnt.

10 Q. Did you learn of the death, at some stage around this time, of the

11 lawyer Bajram Kelmendi?

12 A. Yes. I learnt about two or three days later, because it was very

13 difficult to communicate. And after two or three days later, I heard the

14 news of his murder with his two sons. He was taken on the first night of

15 the bombing.

16 Q. Did you become aware, difficult though it may have been to

17 communicate or see things, but did you become aware of Serb forces being

18 reinforced by others from outside Kosovo?

19 A. Yes. You could see these. They were present. And the

20 reinforcement of the Serbian forces started during our time-out period,

21 the three-week period. You could see them on the streets. You could see

22 them from my house.

23 Q. Were these uniformed people or were they simply un-uniformed

24 volunteers?

25 A. Some of them were uniformed. There was the military police.

1 There were soldiers. There were police uniforms. But there were also

2 volunteers without uniforms. I heard later that volunteers came from

3 Serbia and stayed for a few days and did what they had to do and went

4 back.

5 Q. And what was it that was being done in this period of time by Serb

6 forces with or without volunteers?

7 A. They were no doubt either working together or in a coordinated

8 manner. They were expelling people and mistreating them, and they also

9 killed people. They -- unfortunately, there were also local Serbs from

10 Kosova, because up until then, the local Serbs had not been involved, but

11 from this point they started to take a part in expelling people from their

12 houses and the like.

13 Q. Your house was in the Velania area of Pristina?

14 A. That's right. That's what it's called. It's in the eastern part

15 of the city.

16 Q. Was there a police presence there? What did you observe?

17 A. There were police throughout Prishtina, but they also moved around

18 in my neighbourhood.

19 Q. Were your neighbours allowed to stay in their homes or were they

20 forced out, and if so, where did they go?

21 A. Two or three days, they stayed in their houses. Nobody went out.

22 But after this time, they were threatened and they were told they had to

23 go out and leave the town. And some neighbourhoods such as Dragodan in

24 the West of Prishtina, they were threatened and they had to leave early.

25 Professor Agani lived there. And then they started in our neighbourhood

1 too, and people began to leave.

2 Q. Where did they go to eventually and how did they travel, these

3 people who were forced out?

4 A. They mainly went to Macedonia by the Hani i Elezit or Gllobocica

5 border crossing points, and also trains were used on the Prishtina-Skopje

6 line. And the military police ordered people to go to the station and

7 board the train and go abroad. And these trains started running crammed

8 with people.

9 Q. Paragraph 59. On the 31st of March, did four armed -- or three or

10 four armed soldiers break into your house and hold you and your family at

11 gunpoint for a time?

12 A. Yes. On that day, three neighbourhoods of the city, including my

13 own, were cleansed, and all the people were expelled from my

14 neighbourhood. And finally, some soldiers, three or four or more - it was

15 a whole group - came to my house, and they entered my house. They didn't

16 wait for me to open the door, but they entered by force.

17 Q. And in your house at that time, there was your family, your

18 sister-in-law with her family, I think, a baby, a journalist from Der

19 Spiegel, and your chief of security, Adnan Merovci; is that right? There

20 may be some others.

21 A. Yes, those people were there.

22 Q. What happened after they had broken into your house, these armed

23 soldiers?

24 A. They were military policemen and soldiers, and they told us to go

25 downstairs. I have an entrance hall. All the people who were in the

1 house, including myself, they held us there for four hours. They were

2 calm and they were careful, but we were scared of what would happen. And

3 they kept us until 4.00.

4 Q. The commander, how was he dressed?

5 A. He was in military clothing and he had a cap. He had a red cap.

6 Q. Could you identify the unit to which the clothing he had related?

7 A. I don't know what unit it was. Later I heard it was some kind of

8 legion. But that's what they looked like. Of course, they also had

9 helmets and weapons, semi-heavy weapons.

10 Q. While the men were there keeping you under guard, did you make

11 requests to leave and to go somewhere?

12 A. When they told us, after four hours, that we could go up to the

13 first floor and use the living room - they told us that this was the only

14 place where we had the right to go - I said, "Let me go to Skopje. I go

15 abroad to Macedonia." And they were throughout the house, but they said

16 they had no authority to let me go to Macedonia.

17 Q. At about 6.00 in the evening, did some journalists, mostly Serbs

18 but also some Greek and Turkish journalists, arrive at your house together

19 with the director of the Serbian press centre in Pristina?

20 A. Yes. Around 6.00 they came and told me that I had to hold a press

21 conference. And I said no, but they insisted. And the state security

22 officer - I think his name was Joksic - was there. And so I held this

23 press conference. There were journalists, mainly Serbs, but there were

24 also some from Turkey and Greece, because the other international

25 journalists had been expelled from Kosova a few days before.

1 Q. Can you remember in detail, or at all, what you said in the course

2 of this press conference?

3 A. Of course, they asked me to say -- well, I said that the Serbian

4 security was in my house. In fact, there was also the military police and

5 others. And of course, there was talk in those days that I had gone into

6 hiding or that I had been killed, but I said, "Here I am." And I said

7 that the situation is serious, and so forth. It was very short. It

8 didn't last long, but it was important that they wished me to appear. And

9 of course, they were there with their military hardware and so forth.

10 Q. A couple of hours later, did other people arrive, this time

11 telling you that you had to go somewhere else?

12 A. A few hours later the Serbian state security chief that I

13 mentioned came, and I think -- and they told me that I had to go to

14 Belgrade on the following day. Of course, at first I said yes, but they

15 insisted, and I went [as interpreted]. And I went. I said I would go the

16 next day.

17 Q. Who was it, do you think, who gave that instruction, precisely?

18 The Serbian state security chief, is that the man Joksic?

19 A. Yes, it was Mr. Joksic. He was the head of the security in

20 Prishtina, I think. Mr. Joksic said that I had been asked to go to

21 Belgrade.

22 Q. The next day, although you didn't want to go, and I think no

23 reason had been given to you why you should go, did you in fact go to

24 Belgrade?

25 A. It was not something I wanted. It was not something that I wanted

1 at all, but the accused had requested it and that was what was conveyed to

2 me. And if I hadn't gone, there would have been consequences and there

3 would have been other steps. So therefore, I agreed to go on the

4 following day.

5 Q. Did you travel in a police vehicle, with military personnel and a

6 driver and the man Joksic present, with some other official cars as well,

7 and did you leave at about 7.00, arriving at the accused's palace, Beli

8 Dvor, about noon, and did you then meet the accused?

9 A. Yes, that's what happened. We set off at 7.00 in the morning.

10 Q. If I've got it right, just say "yes" and we'll move on to the next

11 question.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. When you met the accused, how long did you spend with him? What

14 passed between you?

15 A. It seems that -- to me that it was about 12.00, and we spent 40

16 minutes to an hour together. And of course I told him about what was

17 happening in Kosova and some people I was concerned about such as

18 Professor Agani, and the accused listened to me and suggested that we

19 should issue a statement for the press. I was not very interested in

20 this, but he insisted. And this was a statement for the press which,

21 according to him, had to be signed. I didn't see any reason to sign, but

22 nevertheless, I said we can do this. And then the television was there

23 and made some films.

24 Q. Now, pausing there a minute, a little bit more about what passed

25 between you and the accused. Before we come to that, was Merovci there as

1 well?

2 A. No. At the beginning it was only myself and the accused. Then

3 Merovci came later, joined us later, as well as the chief of cabinet of

4 the accused, I think, or secretary.

5 Q. Can you remember his name?

6 A. No. That I can't remember.

7 Q. First of all, what was the accused's attitude insofar as he

8 expressed it as to what was happening with the NATO bombing and so on?

9 A. He was upset, of course, about the bombing, which was what

10 happened in his view. I said to -- I told him about what happened in

11 Kosova. He accused the international community for that.

12 Q. Well, now, you told him what was happening in Kosovo. In

13 particular, what did you tell him? You've told us about Agani. Did you

14 mention any other people by name? What did you tell him in general about

15 what was happening in Kosovo?

16 A. I mentioned some names like Agani, my associate; Mustafa Gashi,

17 about whom we didn't know what was happening. And I informed him of what

18 was happening in Kosova, that people are leaving the place and so on. I

19 gave him a general picture.

20 Q. You've told us of what was being done by way of crimes committed

21 against the people. Did you make any mention of that to him?

22 A. I made some mention, but he certainly knew. In fact, I didn't go

23 into details, but I mentioned them, what was happening those days.

24 Q. And in particular, because we need to know what it was you told

25 him, what did you tell him of what was being done in Kosovo by Serb forces

1 or those working with them?

2 A. I expressed my concern over my associates first, and told him that

3 people are being driven out of Kosova by military and police forces and

4 other groups. I asked him to find out what was the matter, to do

5 something, and he was listening to me.

6 Q. Yes. You told us, I think, that people were also dying and being

7 killed, is that right, at this time?

8 A. Yes, there were some who were killed. Some left, some injured.

9 Q. Did you explain this to the accused?

10 A. I mentioned them. I didn't go into details.

11 Q. Now, the lawyer Kelmendi, were you aware of anything about him at

12 the time of this meeting with the accused?

13 A. Yes. I knew that he was kidnapped and he was executed. I found

14 that out later. Yes, I knew.

15 Q. Was his name mentioned at all in this meeting?

16 A. It seems to me yes, yes.

17 Q. Insofar as you named people, Agani or your other colleagues or

18 possibly Kelmendi, did the accused give any particular response, saying

19 whether he knew what had happened to them or whether anything had happened

20 to them or whether nothing had happened to them?

21 A. He did -- he didn't say that he knew about that. I don't know. I

22 believe he knew. He just told me that, "I will see about it." I believe

23 he was already informed.

24 Q. Now, let's come to the agreement that he wanted you to sign. Were

25 you willing to sign --

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice.

2 Dr. Rugova, it's about the general picture you say you gave the

3 accused at the time. You said earlier that you didn't get any information

4 of what was happening then. How did you get that information apart from

5 some specific persons you personally know such as Agani or Kelmendi?

6 Where did you get that general information, and how did you put it to the

7 accused at that time?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. As I said, it was because of

9 lack of communication. There were no telephone lines and no links, but

10 still people came to me. They often came to me, even though with

11 difficulty, and they showed me what was happening. And the radio stations

12 broadcast news. I listened to the radio up to the 31st. Now and again

13 the television, too, was working. So I followed what was saying through

14 the radio-casts and the people, as I said, who came and met me. So this

15 is how I came to know about what was happening in the city.

16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

17 MR. NICE:

18 Q. The agreement that you signed, can we have a look at a report of

19 it in another exhibit? It comes from a newspaper.

20 MR. NICE: Your Honour, this is an example of an exhibit where I

21 would ask the Chamber not to detain the original. It's an open-source

22 information. It's a newspaper. We only need it, for these purposes, for

23 the one article that's on the front. The newspaper itself, which is

24 probably the only version we have in the office at the moment, is not

25 copied, and we need the other pages for continuing reference purpose. So

1 if we can just provide a copy, having provided the original for

2 inspection, that will assist the work of the office rather than lose that

3 source of material.

4 JUDGE MAY: Provided it's available at any time and provided it's

5 available while the witness is giving evidence.

6 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Prosecutor's Exhibit

8 number 129.

9 MR. NICE: If the usher could very kindly lay the photocopy of the

10 newspaper on the overhead projector first so that we can see the

11 photograph of the accused and the witness and the text of the agreement

12 with the signatures.

13 JUDGE MAY: What is the newspaper?

14 MR. NICE: "Politika." A little bit further up. That's perfect.

15 Q. The photograph there, is that a photograph taken on that occasion,

16 Dr. Rugova?

17 A. I don't know. It might have been taken that day, but there was

18 also another photo taken from the previous meeting of 15 May 1998. It may

19 be.

20 MR. NICE: Could we now put the English translation of the Serbian

21 text onto the projector and just read the translation. Thank you very

22 much.

23 Q. The agreement copied on the newspaper is to the following effect:

24 "President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic

25 has received Dr. Ibrahim Rugova in Belgrade. In discussions about

1 problems in Kosovo and Metohija, it has been fully agreed that they are

2 both committed to the political process and that the problems can be

3 successfully and permanently resolved only through political means."

4 Then there are the two signatures, yours and the accused's. Is

5 that correct? I know you haven't had a chance to review this document

6 before coming to give evidence because it's only just been retrieved, but

7 does that appear to be the agreement you told us about?

8 A. I can't say. This is an agreement. It is a press release. This

9 is how it was. I don't know how they have described it. But it is, in

10 fact, only a press statement from that meeting. It is more or less the

11 same text.

12 Q. After that meeting with the accused, did you return with your

13 colleague Merovci to Pristina that evening?

14 A. Yes. We returned in the evening, at about 6.00 or 7.00 in the

15 evening.

16 Q. Had you expected your meeting with the accused to be made public

17 or had you expected it to be kept private?

18 A. I was told that it was -- remained confidential, but the accused

19 insisted that it become public, and then it was publicised, as you saw the

20 statement from that meeting.

21 Q. And also, was it broadcast on television or anything of that sort?

22 A. Probably it was broadcast. I didn't have a chance to see it,

23 because my television set had broken down.

24 Q. Were you informed as to whether it was, and do you know whether

25 they used current or old footage?

1 A. I was informed then through the radio. I had a radio transistor

2 at home, and then I heard there that they had used another photo, but I

3 didn't see it myself on the television.

4 Q. Let's move on. On the 2nd of April, some, you describe them as

5 Serb functionaries, came to your house and said they would provide you

6 with food, but in fact you had your own supplies. Is that correct? Just

7 yes or no.

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

9 Q. And then I think at about this time you were able to fix the

10 satellite dish, so that you could watch CNN; you did have a small radio,

11 so you were able to keep in touch to a degree; and you found yourself

12 occasionally obliged by the local police to go below ground floor because

13 of the risk of NATO bombing. Correct?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 Q. A little later, and I think you place it at about --

16 A. They kept telling us to go down, yes.

17 Q. A little later, and I think you place it at about the 15th of

18 April, the same security officer, Joksic, told you you had to go and meet

19 the then president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic. You initially declined,

20 but in light of the attitude of Joksic, you eventually agreed, and you

21 went to Belgrade about a week later. Correct? And then again --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- you went with your associate and colleague Merovci, under

24 police escort, Joksic being present. You met Milutinovic in his office.

25 Some reporters arrived as well, including members of the international

1 press, and you were photographed?

2 A. Yes. First I said I didn't want to go, but they insisted, and

3 they became very aggressive when I first declined. Then I said, "Okay.

4 We may go tomorrow or some other day." But then we went. There was a

5 team from Serb television, some international media reporters who were

6 allowed then in Belgrade. Yes.

7 Q. What did you tell Milutinovic about what was happening in Kosovo?

8 A. I told him about what was happening, that Kosova was being emptied

9 of people, that there is oppression, violence committed against people.

10 And he said, "This is the outcome of the international community," the

11 same slogan being used by Serb community all the time, that this is being

12 done by the international community. The fact is that they were actually

13 being driven out by Serb police and military forces, paramilitaries, and

14 other voluntary forces that I mentioned earlier.

15 Q. Was this meeting also attended by Nikola Sainovic, the Deputy

16 Prime Minister of Yugoslavia?

17 A. Yes. Yes, he was there present too.

18 Q. We haven't yet heard about this man, although he was a man that

19 you had seen before this particular meeting, I think, in your own house.

20 A. Yes. He came once or twice, I think, to my own house.

21 Q. Tell us: What was Sainovic's position, as you could understand

22 it, in Kosovo at this time?

23 A. He was in the post you mentioned. He was also, I think,

24 responsible for Kosova. He came often and stayed in Kosova. Before the

25 war and during the bombing he was present in Kosova. I can't tell you

1 what exact office he held, but I know that he was responsible for Kosova.

2 Q. Were you aware of anybody in Kosovo having more authority than

3 Sainovic?

4 A. I think he had more authority, along with other Serbs, but he was

5 there and he was the most responsible person, I think.

6 Q. And when he had visited you in your house before your visit to

7 Milutinovic, what had those visits been about? What had he said?

8 A. He used to talk about general things. We didn't discuss any

9 concrete matters, because it was not an easy thing to talk with him. It

10 was a vain conversation, I would say, just to pass the time. It was not a

11 substantial debate or something like that. He used to come in late

12 evening.

13 Q. In any event, Sainovic was present at the meeting with

14 Milutinovic, and as you've already explained, there was a desire that you

15 should make some agreement; is that correct?

16 A. Yes, he was present, but we were discussing issuing a press

17 statement. I think we did give a press statement without signing it. I

18 said that Belgrade has to accept the terms put forward by the

19 international community and NATO. But it was, as I said, a press release,

20 without any signatures.

21 Q. Later did Milutinovic come down to Pristina?

22 A. Yes, he did. It was the end of April.

23 Q. And on this occasion was a document signed?

24 A. Yes. It was a document, and we did that at his request, that is,

25 at the request of Belgrade. We signed that document. I did that also

1 outside my own free will, but I had no choice. I had to do it.

2 MR. NICE: Can we produce this exhibit, please?

3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked Prosecutor's

4 Exhibit number 130.

5 MR. NICE: May the copy of the Serbian be placed on the overhead

6 projector first. When that's been viewed -- Serbian first, please. You

7 can see what it is. Then pass it down so that we -- thank you very much.

8 Now can we see the English text, please.

9 It's sufficiently short, I think, to justify it being read. It

10 sets out that:

11 "The President of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, and

12 Dr. Ibrahim Rugova have agreed on the following Joint Statement.

13 "1. It is necessary to immediately renew and intensify the

14 discussions begun between the government of the Republic of Serbia and the

15 political leaders of Albanian political parties in Kosovo and Metohija on

16 the political agreement which grants Kosmet extensive self-government,

17 along with the full respect for equality of all citizens in national

18 communities, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and

19 Yugoslavia. It was noted that such an approach constitutes a basis for a

20 lasting and just solution to the Kosmet problem."

21 Explain the use of the word "Kosmet," please, can you,

22 Dr. Rugova?

23 A. Yes, I can explain. It was a substitute, if you like, or coinage

24 formed especially after the Second World War for "Kosova," because the

25 name "Kosova" was always used in our history. But after the Second World

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12 Blank pages inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French

13 and English transcripts. Pages 4238 to 4250.

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1 War, this "Kosmet" came into being. It's -- Kosova is composed of two

2 plateaus, Kosova plain where Prishtina is, and Metohija, as the Serbs call

3 it, the western part, whereas we refer to it as Dukagjin plateau. They

4 have deliberately coined this word to lose the name of Kosova that has

5 been used by Albanians. That is how it came into being, politically

6 motivated of course.

7 Q. The statement goes on:

8 "Both sides concluded that the talks should be direct, along with

9 the equal participation of all the national communities which reside in

10 Kosovo and Metohija, which is a precondition for achieving acceptable

11 solutions for all who live in Kosovo and Metohija. Direct talks should be

12 a reaffirmation of the strengthening of mutual trust as an essential

13 condition for finding a way out of the current situation.

14 "On the basis of the agreement of both sides, representatives of

15 the international community may attend the talks as guests.

16 "Agreement was reached on the need to establish soon, under

17 changed conditions, the Provisional Executive Council of Kosovo and

18 Metohija which would perform the function of a provisional government

19 until the constitution of the organ on the basis of the Basic Document on

20 Self-Government in Kosovo and Metohija. The composition of the

21 Provisional Executive Council and its internal organisation, and

22 especially the distribution of new portfolios among the administration

23 organs, must take into account the current problems of Kosovo and

24 Metohija."

25 Well, now, you say you weren't really agreeable to signing that

1 statement. Had you taken any part in any particular parts of the drafting

2 or anything like that?

3 A. No, I wasn't involved. It was given to me. I had the occasional

4 suggestion, but it was no use. So this was nothing to do with my own

5 will. You've mentioned the name Kosmet, and they wanted to change the

6 name. So they put in this old name of Kosova. I believe in the Middle

7 Ages it was called Dadanija. But to return to the text, I had no

8 influence on it at all.

9 Q. Also at the meeting, was there a man present, Zoran Andjelkovic,

10 and if so, what was his role in Kosovo at the time?

11 A. He was present, yes. I think he was chairman of the Executive

12 Council of the Serbian government in Kosova. He was a kind of governor or

13 something like that, but he -- there was a Serbian government that

14 operated at that time in Kosova, and he was present.

15 Q. We see that the fourth paragraph of the signed joint statement

16 speaks of the establishment of a provisional Executive Council and indeed

17 of allocation of portfolios, as it were. Did that ever come about as

18 something which you were seriously expecting to be involved? Tell us

19 about it.

20 A. These points were included and it was signed but without any talks

21 at all. Yes. That was the entire declaration. Excuse me.

22 Q. Throughout that -- that meeting with Milutinovic, what was your

23 expressed view as to your own position? Did you say what you wanted to

24 do, where you wanted to be, whether you wanted to leave?

25 A. At this meeting and at other meetings, I asked them to allow me to

1 go abroad via Skopje or Macedonia, and I repeated this question on this

2 day too. I repeated it continually.

3 Q. Why were you prepared now to leave or why were you anxious now to

4 leave Kosovo?

5 A. Because at that time, Kosova was emptied. A lot of people had

6 gone, mainly to Macedonia and to Albania. The statistics say 700.000 to

7 800.000. Prishtina was empty. My colleagues were gone. I wanted to go

8 abroad and continue my work and do something for Kosova from abroad, and

9 also to be with my family.

10 Q. Apart from being the person who was taken to meetings and

11 requested or required to sign document, were you able to do anything

12 politically in Kosovo at this time or not?

13 A. No. This was impossible. It was impossible to do anything in

14 Kosova. And this statement was more on paper than anything practical,

15 because the government, the institutions, were not working. The situation

16 was -- there were no people.

17 Q. Apart from that, were you free yourself to move about or were you

18 under some kind of constraint?

19 A. No, please. I was -- I was in house arrest. It wasn't said to

20 me, but I was unable to move without permission. And it was only when

21 these people took me and sent me where they wished. In de facto, I was

22 under house arrest. I was a prisoner of war. I don't know about these

23 legal definitions, but I was under a kind of house arrest.

24 Q. I think at about the same time as the preparation of this signed

25 document, your colleague Merovci had gone to or managed to go to Macedonia

1 where he met with some diplomats. I think you understand that -- you may

2 hear more of this from elsewhere, but he was trying to put some pressure

3 on the authorities in Belgrade to effect your release. Did that help at

4 all?

5 A. Yes. He was in Skopje and met diplomats to put pressure on

6 Belgrade to allow me to go, and two or three days later, he returned to

7 Prishtina. This no doubt had some kind of effect, because there were

8 demands from abroad, from the EU and the United States and other countries

9 of the world. There were a lot of demands that I should be released.

10 Q. Were you obliged to go on a further visit to Belgrade, this time

11 to see the Russian Patriarch Aleksey?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Again was Joksic involved and did you travel in police vehicles

14 with police escorts?

15 A. Yes. It was in the same way.

16 Q. Did you tell the Patriarch of your desire to leave Kosovo?

17 A. Yes. I told him too about my wish to leave. He agreed, but he

18 had no power to make decisions. But I did express my wish.

19 Q. And then finally, Dr. Rugova, we can come to the meeting on the

20 4th of May, again in Belgrade, again taken there by police with an escort,

21 where you met the accused. What was the accused's proposal to you at this

22 time?

23 A. On the 4th of May, he said that I had to be there, and I asked to

24 go abroad. So I repeated my demands at the first meeting of 2nd of April

25 with the accused. And he said I could go, but that my family should stay

1 in Kosova, that I could go and come back. But I didn't agree to this.

2 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...explanation as to why your

3 family should be detained in Kosovo as a condition for your being allowed

4 elsewhere?

5 A. He no doubt wished to place a condition that my family should

6 remain in Kosova, and so I didn't agree. And then the accused changed his

7 mind and said that my family could come with me to Italy.

8 Q. And were arrangements made that your family came first to

9 Belgrade, for onward travel to Italy on the 5th of May?

10 A. Yes. They said that my family should come on the next day, and

11 they came. And on the 5th of May, in the afternoon, we flew to Italy.

12 Q. Had you learned at about this time of the death of your colleague,

13 Fehmi Agani?

14 A. Yes. It was on the 6th of May that I heard, in Rome, that he had

15 been executed by Serbian soldiers or paramilitaries, and that was

16 when -- then we heard that some kind of group of Djiletovic [phoen] or

17 something had executed him. And this was very bad news for me, and we

18 heard that on the following day.

19 Q. Just a couple more questions, Dr. Rugova --

20 JUDGE KWON: Dr. Rugova, at the meeting, apart from your departure

21 problem, what did you talk with the accused, at the last meeting?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Besides these problems, we didn't

23 say anything important about Kosova. A few matters of history and things

24 like that. But there was nothing of substance.

25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. Dr. Rugova, what would have been or might have been the effect on

3 your political standing of the documents that you had been asked to sign?

4 A. Of course, they thought that they could compromise me politically

5 and discredit me in the eyes of the Kosovar public, the Albanian public,

6 and they also wanted to foment conflicts on the Albanian political stage

7 among Albanians. This was no doubt the purpose of this exercise, the

8 purpose of what they were doing to me.

9 Q. If those were the purposes, were they effective? Did these things

10 happen? Were you discredited or not?

11 A. No, it didn't happen like that. This was shown in the local

12 elections held in 2000 in Kosova, and also the general elections held last

13 year, when my party won a majority of the votes. So it didn't have an

14 effect. Of course, it was a serious matter, but it didn't have an effect,

15 because the people decided by their votes.

16 Q. I think we can conclude in this way, Dr. Rugova: You continued

17 your political work in Italy and in other European countries. On the 5th

18 or the 6th of June you met Madeleine Albright, on the 10th of June you

19 signed the NATO agreement, and on the 28th of July you returned to

20 Kosovo. Correct?

21 A. Yes, that's quite correct. Thank you.

22 Q. Thank you. You will be asked some further questions.

23 A. Thank you.

24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now it's on.

2 As I was saying, before I start my cross-examination, I would like

3 you to give me a clarification, please. A short while ago, Mr. Nice

4 explained, when providing this document, that this is a public source of

5 information, and therefore there is no problem of making it accessible,

6 regardless of whether it's an exhibit or not. The agreement of

7 Rambouillet is also a public source of information, and I cannot know

8 whether this document that is given, on so many pages, is actually the

9 agreement from Rambouillet. See how many pages there are. The

10 Rambouillet agreement is in archives of Serbia, of Yugoslavia, and of the

11 Provisional Council of Kosovo and the Assembly of Serbia, et cetera,

12 et cetera, and --

13 JUDGE MAY: Let us get a copy in due course of the original, but

14 for the purposes of this examination, we can go along with what we've

15 got.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course. I just wanted to put in

17 this objection so that some day somebody would not come up and say that

18 this is an authentic document.

19 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Rugova, do you think that you personally and

21 the Kosovar Albanians were used as a means of implementing the interests

22 of the great powers? Yes or no.

23 A. No, we were not used. The great powers and the international

24 community came out in our defence, in the defence of human rights, the

25 rights of a people, like that of Kosova, and to save them from the

1 massacre that was being perpetrated by Belgrade and by you against them.

2 No people can be used by someone else. That is the truth.

3 Q. Well, history gives many examples to the contrary. But when you

4 say "the people of Kosovo," in all these statements of yours, including

5 your examination-in-chief today, you are referring to Albanians only,

6 aren't you?

7 A. No. No. I'm sorry. I did not refer only to Albanians. I

8 referred to all the citizens of Kosova. Even in the constitution of

9 Kacanik, that of 1990, that is also stipulated, that the others too who

10 live in Kosova, the other ethnic groups - the Serbs, the Bosnians, the

11 Turks, the Romas, and others - will have equal rights. This is mandatory

12 in the constitution, as well as in the other documents. The same can be

13 said of the elections of 1992, where Albanians mostly turned out, but the

14 Bosnians, others, maybe some Serbs, also took part in those elections. I

15 can't rule that out. There it was said -- and we even left 14 seats in

16 the Albanian parliament, which numbered 114, which means -- 140. So we

17 had also the seats for Serbs, for them to be integrated, to enjoy equal

18 rights, to be citizens of Kosova. And we are going to uphold their

19 rights. And we are saying the same today, three years after the war, when

20 Kosova is free. And they are taking part in all the institutions of

21 Kosova. They have taken part in the election. And this is progress, I

22 think.

23 Q. All right. We'll move on to that later. I'm going to prove that

24 it was the opposite. But since you said a while ago that NATO had come to

25 defend the Albanian people, and now you define the Albanian people as

1 Serbs, Turks, and all the rest who live in Kosovo, are you claiming that

2 NATO came to Kosovo to defend the Serbs and the Gorani and the Roma and

3 the Turks and everybody else? Is that your claim, that NATO came to

4 Kosovo to protect the Serbs as well? Just say yes or no. Let's not waste

5 any time, because we only have Monday left, and I have a great many things

6 to ask you.

7 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

8 A. NATO came to defend all, but the Albanians were, of course, being

9 the majority, most in danger. So NATO came to defend all. This is what

10 it is doing today, NATO and the other peace-keeping troops, and also we,

11 with our new institutions of Kosova.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. So this defence that you are now carrying out, and all the other

14 peace-keeping troops, 360.000 Serbs and other non-Albanians were expelled

15 from Kosovo, several thousands were killed, several thousands were

16 abducted, precisely under this defence that you have been talking about.

17 Is that right or is that not right?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I kindly ask you, Your Honours, this

19 is not very much the focus of my testimony.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, I quite agree. Let's concentrate on events

21 before 1999. That is the time we're talking about.

22 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do you think that he should not

24 answer my question, the witness?

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's get on with events before 1999 and the

1 events of 1999. You can ask about that, of course.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this witness is testifying

3 about the entirety of the political circumstances involved, and he has

4 provided assessments of the most complex issues that are relevant to the

5 region of Kosovo, and my cross-examination cannot be limited to a

6 particular period or particular questions that he can or cannot answer. I

7 think there's no point in you trying to defend him from such questions, or

8 rather, giving such answers. You can do whatever you want to do, as you

9 most certainly will, but I want to object.

10 Q. So you think --

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE MAY: You will not be limited in asking questions about the

13 evidence which he gave, and it's right he did cover a lot of ground. You

14 can ask about that. What you can't do is to take the evidence way beyond

15 anything which is relevant, and on that you'll be stopped.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At any rate, in his statement he

17 mentioned the role of NATO and the role of what he calls the international

18 community. So in relation to the role of NATO and the role of what he

19 calls the international community, I can ask him without any

20 restrictions.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, but don't harp on events now. What we're

22 concerned about is events before and during 1999.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please. Did the witness say that

24 NATO was there to protect all citizens? That is precisely what I'm

25 questioning, that position of his, because under this alleged protection,

1 the most horrible crimes have been committed against Serbs and other

2 non-Albanian people. The thousands of persons were killed --

3 JUDGE MAY: What is the relevance to this indictment? It's no

4 good shouting. What is the relevance to this indictment?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance is that this is an act

6 of aggression against a sovereign country, an act of terrorism, internal

7 terrorism which was supported by this aggression. This is an act of

8 support to illegal decisions.

9 Judge Robinson asked the witness about the relations involved

10 within the framework of the constitution of Yugoslavia under which this

11 illegal Republic of Kosovo was establish. He is going to get answers to

12 that question. The witness will have an opportunity to answer all of

13 this.

14 So all of these questions were indeed raised during his

15 statement. They were raised. They were mentioned. And I'm sure --

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. What was mentioned, of course, is relevant, and

17 you can ask questions about it. But don't ask questions about what is

18 happening now. That's irrelevant. Now, do let's get on with this.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please let us make things quite

20 clear. What is happening now shows the true intentions related to the

21 events that were taking place then. That is the core of the matter.

22 Because in politics, things are measured by their consequences. The

23 consequence of the policy of aggression against Yugoslavia is what is

24 happening now, not what was happening then, especially not what was being

25 stated then.

1 JUDGE MAY: We will consider your argument. Meanwhile, you're

2 confined to what happened before and during 1999. We'll consider the rest

3 of the argument.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Do you believe that Serbs are going to give up on Kosovo and

6 Metohija altogether, Mr. Rugova?

7 A. I believe they will, and they should give up and Kosova.

8 And I apologise to this distinguished Chamber, because we are

9 going rather into dry political debates and phrases.

10 Kosova belongs to the Kosovars. That is the Albanian majority,

11 the Serbs of Kosova, the Bosnians of Kosova, the Turks and others who live

12 there, because Kosova used to be an entity, a former member of the

13 Federation. So I don't know what Serbs are you talking about about giving

14 up Kosova. But if you mean Belgrade, it should give it up because Kosova

15 belongs to the Kosovars. And the sooner you do that, the better we'll

16 be.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. This again is going a long way from the

18 indictment.

19 Mr. Wladimiroff, perhaps you can give us some assistance on this

20 matter. Now, if you would consider during the adjournment the argument

21 raised by the accused as to how wide his cross-examination should be

22 allowed to go, we'll hear you after the adjournment. And if the

23 Prosecution want to add anything, we'll hear it. Clearly it's a matter of

24 principle as to how extensive the relevance should be and what is relevant

25 to this indictment.

1 Meanwhile, Mr. Milosevic, you're confined to events before and

2 during 1999.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since I have received this answer

4 now, I cannot be limited in putting my questions in terms of the answers.

5 JUDGE MAY: It is you who introduced these potentially irrelevant

6 topics. Now, would you go on to what matters which are relevant if you

7 want to continue with this examination.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I certainly intend to show

9 through this examination that things are actually quite the opposite,

10 Mr. May. Now I'm going to move on to those years.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Well, is it correct -- is it correct that the so-called KLA, in

13 1998, was primarily a group of unrelated groups without a unified

14 command?

15 A. The KLA, as I said, came into existence as a response to the

16 violence exercised in Kosova over long year period. Initially they

17 started up as individual groups, but then they got together, were unified,

18 had their command, joint command, during 1998, especially by the end of

19 1998 and early 1999.

20 Q. Oh. So before that, you -- do you think that what I said, rather,

21 is correct or not?

22 A. I already stated that. What I'm saying is what the truth is.

23 JUDGE MAY: The question was -- the question was: Was the KLA

24 primarily a group of unrelated groups without a unified command? Can you

25 assist us on that, Dr. Rugova, or not?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Initially they were unrelated

2 groups, that is, groups that wanted to protect the people and to provide

3 security. And it was very difficult for them to have a unified command

4 right at the beginning. But as the time passed, they united and had a

5 joint command. This is what I know about that. They were more organised

6 afterwards.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. All right. Is it correct -- is it correct that these were

9 criminals who were financed, trained, and supported by foreign services,

10 primarily the German Secret Service?

11 A. No. No, that's not correct.

12 Q. Was the KLA a terrorist organisation?

13 A. No, it was not a terrorist organisation. It was an organisation

14 composed of people who responded to violence and repression exercised over

15 a long time with the purpose of winning freedom for the people. That was

16 their objective.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, since you keep telling me

18 not to make speeches, please try to make sure that the witness doesn't

19 make speeches either, that he answers my questions, rather.

20 JUDGE MAY: He hasn't been. He hasn't been making speeches. If

21 you keep the questions short, no doubt we can get short answers too.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He could have given just a yes or no

23 answer to this question. So he is saying no, it was not a terrorist

24 organisation. This speech about them being liberators and whatever was

25 completely unnecessary.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Now I'm going to read a quotation to you and now you're going to

3 tell me whether it's correct or not.

4 [In English] "The KLA was an odd assortment of grouplets,

5 including gangsters, mercenaries, brothel-owners, fascists, and even some

6 who claim to be followers of Albanians' former Marxist leader, Enver

7 Hoxha."

8 JUDGE MAY: What's the source of the quotation?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The source is the Wall Street

10 Journal, 1998, entitled: [In English] "Soldiers of Misfortune."

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Is this definition correct?

13 A. No.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, who is the author of the article?

15 JUDGE MAY: What year?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The name is here. The 28th of April

17 is the date, and now I'm going to tell you -- now I'm going to tell you

18 the year as well. The 28th of April, 1999, Gary Wilson.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: And in future, you are reminded that you must

20 provide the source for all material that you seek to quote. It's only

21 fair to the witness, and, in fact, it's a requirement.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not understand that it is fair

23 to the witness to tell him in advance what I'm going to cross-examine him

24 about. The point of cross-examination is to show -- I'm not going to

25 define what I meant. You know what I mean.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. So did you not answer my question. Is this statement correct or

3 not? Just say yes or no.

4 A. No. That's newspaper stuff.

5 Q. All right. Now I'm going to quote something that is not from the

6 newspapers, but it was in the newspapers too, of course, because you told

7 me that the KLA was not a terrorist organisation. [In English] "We condemn

8 very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The UCK, KLA, is without any

9 question a terrorist group."

10 [Interpretation] Is that definition correct or not?

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is that from?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was all over the press. This

13 is the statement of Robert Gelbard, the American envoy to the Balkans at

14 that time in 1998. I could have used any of the media, but I am

15 particularly using the AFP, Agence France-Presse, which quoted part of

16 this. And after all, this was quoted by all newspapers. I can have it

17 sent to you if you wish.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: You must identify the source.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked whether this statement is

20 correct, and that is the statement made by Robert Gelbard, the US envoy to

21 the Balkans at that time. In all fairness, I quoted it, and I gave the

22 source in my introductory statement after this false indictment that was

23 served upon me here. So I hope you will be able to find it in the

24 transcript as well.

25 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

1 Dr. Rugova, do you remember what it was you were asked, what

2 Mr. Gelbard was reported as saying?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think like this. Perhaps he

4 made a statement of this kind, perhaps not.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. All right. Now I'm going to read just a small excerpt precisely

7 related to this particular question, because you have denied that the KLA

8 was a terrorist organisation.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you're interested in

10 this. I see that. The source is a book of Michael Parenta [phoen],

11 entitled "To Kill a Nation." It is in the Library of Congress catalogue

12 in Washington and also in the British library, and it came out in 2000 in

13 London and New York. These are the sources that I'm quoting:

14 [In English] "[Previous translation continues] ...from US Drug

15 Enforcement Administration stated: `Certain members of the ethnic

16 Albanian community ..." I must wait for translation. "... in the Serbian

17 region of Kosovo have turned to drug trafficking in order to finance their

18 separatist activities."

19 [Interpretation] This is a quotation, Frank Vivano [phoen], "KLA

20 Linked to Enormous Heroin Trade," San Francisco Chronicle, May 5, 1999.

21 And then Roger Boyce.

22 [In English] "[Previous translation continues] ...drug money

23 linked to the Kosovo rebels."

24 Times London, March 24, 1999. [Interpretation] Further on, [In

25 English] "[Previous translation continues] ... KLA finance war with heroin

1 sales."

2 Washington Times, May 3rd 1999 --

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness -- let the witness answer if

4 you're putting these matters to him.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Is that true or not?

7 A. It's not true. I have information that people helped the KLA, and

8 other people came out to protect it. And people fought against violence.

9 There can be different views about this issue, but they have always

10 accused Albanians of going in for this kind of traffic, and you can't say

11 this about the KLA in general. So I see these things more as -- these

12 things as gestures made by the accused in order not to go into the truth

13 that we are facing.

14 Q. Have you finished your answer to this question?

15 A. Excuse me. I have finished, and I have answered it, Your Honour.

16 Q. All right. Now I'm going to quote another passage from the same

17 source. What I wish to present here is precisely an attempt to have the

18 public reach the truth, and you know the truth as well as I do.

19 JUDGE MAY: No need to make a speech. Now, what's the question?

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. All right. I'm going to read yet another quotation:

22 [In English] "[Previous translation continues] ... in Kosovo

23 resembles CIA covert operation in Indo-China, Central America, Haiti, and

24 Afghanistan, where rightists, assassins, and mercenaries were financed in

25 part by drug trade. Within a year, KLA rebels were magically transmuted

1 by western officials from terrorists and drug dealers into freedom

2 fighters who supposedly represented the broad interests of all Kosovar

3 Albanians. In 1999, the KLA experienced what the New York Times called a

4 rapid and startling growth, which included considerable numbers of

5 mercenaries from Germany and the United States who sometimes assumed

6 leadership positions."

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's now enough, if the witness is to answer

8 properly these allegations.

9 You've dealt with the allegations in relation to the drug trade.

10 It's said that in 1999 the KLA experienced a rapid growth, including

11 considerable numbers of mercenaries from Germany and the United States.

12 Can you assist, Dr. Rugova, with that allegation?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Your Honour. In fact, I

14 have no comments on these things. He may read these things all day.

15 These are speculations of various kinds. The fact is that the majority of

16 people in the KLA were people who had come out to defend themselves and

17 their homes. And I can tell you an episode in the attack on Prekaz, in

18 Drenica. This was the first. And then there were many other attacks.

19 JUDGE MAY: Let him finish. You make these allegations,

20 Mr. Milosevic. He must have the opportunity of answering.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He should answer rather than tell us

23 about episodes.

24 JUDGE MAY: He is entitled to give us an example, which he's about

25 to do.

1 Yes. You were going to tell us about Drenica and Prekaz.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this context, they were not

3 mercenaries or people of the kind the accused imagines; they were people

4 who had come out to defend themselves. I'm talking -- they were ordinary

5 villagers, 200 people, 300 people, who would come out to defend themselves

6 with old guns, which were really useless against such huge attacks.

7 People tr