1 Wednesday, 17 April 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld. Is there a matter you want to

7 raise before we go on?

8 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour, there is. Very

9 briefly, I believe at the close of business yesterday, the Court ordered

10 that the statement be marked as an exhibit. I'm just wondering, in light

11 of the fact that we did move into closed session for one very brief

12 period, that -- I'm asking if the Court might either seal that exhibit and

13 mark it confidential so that it doesn't go into the public domain, or it

14 will have to be the subject of some redaction in order to ensure that the

15 purpose of going into closed session is not obviated by the exhibit itself

16 being a completely open document.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE MAY: We will seal it.

19 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours.

20 JUDGE MAY: There is one matter, Mr. Ryneveld, while you're on

21 your feet. We've got a new list of 92 bis witnesses. I don't know if

22 you're dealing with this aspect of the case.

23 MR. RYNEVELD: Part of the aspect of the case.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, let me point this out: That as I

25 understand it, some of these witnesses have not yet been ruled on by the

1 Chamber. We ruled, I think, on 23 witnesses, as I recollect. There's now

2 33 on the list which you propose to call. Not all have been specifically

3 ruled on, I think I'm right in saying.

4 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. Thank you for bringing that to my attention.

5 Perhaps during the break -- needless to say, we would be proposing to call

6 those witnesses first that the Chamber has already ruled upon. Otherwise,

7 we'd have to seek an oral application before they would be permitted to

8 give evidence, but thank you for raising that with me; but so as to save

9 time, after this witness has been -- has completed his evidence, we would

10 propose to start the 92 bis proceedings and hopefully the ones we have

11 lined up are ones that are part of the 23 that the Court has already

12 approved. Thank you.

13 JUDGE MAY: I think the first in the original list, the first six

14 were.

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes.

16 JUDGE MAY: But perhaps you could look into that.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: I will certainly during the break. Thank you.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

19 WITNESS: RICHARD CIAGLINSKI [Resumed]

20 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

21 Q. [Interpretation] Yesterday, at the end of your testimony, you

22 explained how an officer gave you a map with precise indications of the

23 places of attack of the Yugoslav forces on the KLA.

24 A. I said an official gave me the information about how the Serbian

25 forces would attack the KLA.

1 Q. And on the map, you drew the exact spots and directions, the

2 routes that you got from him, the axes that the forces of Yugoslavia

3 used. That's what you claimed.

4 A. I said that he pointed out to me on the map what later appeared to

5 be and generally was the way the Serbian forces dealt with the KLA, yes.

6 Q. You marked the direction they took on the map. You indicated it

7 and then marked it on the map.

8 A. I marked the general direction of the main body of the forces.

9 Obviously, there were many more sort of battles going on around Kosovo,

10 but the activity day-to-day by the Serbian forces followed generally that

11 direction that I gave, yes.

12 Q. Since you claim that the map was shown to you by an official

13 officer, are you conscious of the fact that if that were to have been

14 correct and as there are facts in this connection that you are an officer

15 of the enemy side who -- and which prior -- immediately prior to the

16 attack on Yugoslavia, you were an officer, then -- and as the office -- if

17 the officer gave you those facts, then he would have jeopardised the lives

18 of his many comrades, members of the Yugoslav army. Are you aware of

19 that?

20 A. In the first place, Mr. Milosevic, I wasn't aware that, as

21 verifiers, we were your enemy while we were in Kosovo. We were actually

22 working very closely with your forces, being completely impartial and

23 certainly not behaving in any form as an enemy.

24 Secondly, this official was, I believe, so fed up with the whole

25 thing that he was prepared to give me an indication of what was going to

1 happen, knowing that we were going to leave and there would be no internal

2 possibility of anything being able to be done by, as you would say, the

3 enemy forces from outside to your plan.

4 Q. You said that he gave it to you after a meeting at which you

5 discussed the withdrawal of the mission. Is that correct?

6 A. We had been discussing the withdrawal over several sessions, but

7 by this point we had already indicated that we probably would be leaving.

8 Q. And as everyone in Yugoslavia knew, not only the soldiers but the

9 whole population knew that the mission was withdrawing to enable the start

10 of the bombing, the NATO bombing, I assume you would have no doubt as to

11 the fact that your interlocutor knew about this too.

12 JUDGE MAY: There are two questions there, Colonel. The first

13 question is this: Did the mission withdraw to enable the start of the

14 bombing or the bombing to start. The second question is: Did the

15 interlocutor know it? Perhaps you'd like to answer them separately.

16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. The first answer is: There

17 was certainly no intention to withdraw because we were about to start

18 bombing. The reason we withdrew, I already made clear in my evidence, was

19 because (a) our job was becoming too dangerous from the activities of the

20 MUP and the VJ towards us; secondly, the number of your forces had

21 increased dramatically and, therefore, there was general fighting taking

22 place. Access was, therefore, restricted. We couldn't go to the border.

23 We basically couldn't do our work. And this is exactly the reason we gave

24 for why we left Kosovo. For no other reason.

25 And the second -- sorry. I apologise. Your second answer about

1 the -- my interlocutor, whether he knew that we were leaving, he certainly

2 knew but what he thought was going to happen next, I have no idea.

3 Q. But the whole planet knew that the mission had withdrawn so that

4 it should not be subjected to NATO bombing or, rather, that the states

5 which had representatives in the mission withdrew their men and the OSCE

6 made a decision to that effect, that the people should be withdrawn, not

7 to have to be exposed to the NATO bombing, which was completely imminent

8 at that time. Is that so or is it not?

9 A. Of course it's not. As I said, the only reason we withdrew -- we

10 would have happily stayed for whatever time it required to conclude our

11 mission. We left because we could not work. The subsequent action was

12 not connected with our departure.

13 Q. However much you claim that it wasn't connected with your

14 departure, you know full well that at the border towards Yugoslavia,

15 especially in Macedonia, there was an amassment of NATO troops and

16 everywhere - in the information media and everywhere else - the threat of

17 bombing was voiced, and the Yugoslav forces stepped up the border belt,

18 their presence in the border belt, and we sent reinforcements precisely

19 because war was imminent, the threat of war that loomed over Yugoslavia.

20 Are you aware of that?

21 JUDGE MAY: There are a number of assertions there. The first is

22 that there was -- NATO troops were massing on the border towards

23 Yugoslavia. Is that so or not, Colonel?

24 THE WITNESS: We certainly had an extraction force sitting in

25 Trnovo which was intended to help us pull out of Kosovo if our sort of

1 extraction wasn't permitted by Belgrade. And yes, there were forces

2 building up in Macedonia.

3 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let's get this right. And then the

4 next point that's being made is that the threat of bombing was being

5 voiced everywhere, in the information media and elsewhere. Can you assist

6 us as to that? At the time was there that threat?

7 THE WITNESS: I think the media in general were saying that --

8 words to that effect, that a war could start and that there was a threat

9 of bombing, yes. I think that was quite clear in the media.

10 JUDGE MAY: And the final point that's made is that Yugoslav

11 forces were being reinforced near the border. Again, is that the

12 position?

13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the Yugoslav forces were being

14 reinforced throughout Kosovo. All the garrisons were being strengthened.

15 Certainly all the border areas, the bridges, the tunnels were prepared for

16 demolition, which is standard procedure if the country's under threat,

17 yes.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Of course. So in fact, you confirm that Yugoslavia, at that point

20 in time, was on a state of alert with war imminent. Is that true?

21 A. Yes. I think you can say that you were prepared for war, yes.

22 Q. So we were faced with the danger of war in view of everything you

23 said a moment ago, the build-up of forces in Macedonia and the generally

24 known threat that the bombing would start. Is that correct or not?

25 A. I think there was -- what you say is correct that there was a

1 build-up of forces in Macedonia, and the media were speculating that there

2 would be a bombing attack against possibly Kosovo.

3 Q. Was it only the media that was speculating or were there

4 statements quite clear, crisp statements from the top officials of the

5 western countries who said that an intervention would take place, as they

6 called it, an intervention against our country?

7 A. I think in general, Mr. Milosevic, I can't answer this question

8 because I don't really -- can't remember at the time what the press

9 exactly were saying, which officials from which countries, what they were

10 saying, but I think that I will go along with your story that there was

11 speculation that there would be bombing.

12 Q. Well, you can explain this away as being speculation, but I don't

13 think there's a single western leader who did not make statements of that

14 kind publicly. Do you remember that?

15 A. I do not remember that.

16 Q. Very well. Now, is it logical that a country, which is being

17 threatened with the imminent danger of war and which wishes to defend

18 itself, should bring in troops in the area to the terrain which is the

19 forefront of its defence vis-a-vis the enemy, which is concentrating its

20 forces and building up its forces on the other side of the border? Is

21 that logical for you as an officer?

22 A. The build-up of forces began very early on. It began after

23 Christmas. The deployment, of course, in Kosovo started before Christmas,

24 and it continued throughout that period, well before we left. There was

25 certainly a slight increase or an increase just prior to us leaving, but

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1 the -- your major forces were already in place long before the speculation

2 began.

3 Q. You said yesterday on several occasions that there had been an

4 increase in our forces in March, and several times you mentioned the month

5 in March, in actual fact, and as you know, March is quite a long way after

6 Christmas. Do you remember what you were saying yesterday?

7 A. I certainly remember what I was saying, and I was saying that we

8 saw the T72s arrive in March. And as I just said a few seconds ago, there

9 was an acceleration in March, but your forces were arriving from -- from

10 January.

11 Q. All right. So in March, the build-up of forces increased, and as

12 you know, in March the NATO pact aggression took place on Yugoslavia. Is

13 that something that is known to you or not?

14 A. Are you asking me whether I knew that the bombing started in

15 March?

16 Q. Yes. I said the NATO pact aggression began in March against

17 Yugoslavia.

18 A. Yes, I believe the bombing did start in March.

19 Q. Therefore, our forces came in in March. And that was quite

20 obviously the 11th hour for preparing our defence forces for the defence,

21 because the war against Yugoslavia started in March. Is that correct or

22 not?

23 A. You were already preparing your defences at the end of February

24 and the beginning of March.

25 Q. Well, that's up to us. It's our affair to prepare for defence. I

1 assume that a country that is faced with an aggression has the legitimate

2 right to prepare for its defence. Is that so or not?

3 JUDGE MAY: That's a comment.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. All right. But I hope we've cleared up the question that at the

6 time when the discussions were held, the talks were held that you

7 indicated and which you claim had to do with the preparation of the

8 mission's withdrawal from Kosovo and Metohija, that it was quite certain

9 that an aggression, a NATO pact aggression against Yugoslavia was

10 imminent. Is that correct or not?

11 JUDGE MAY: I think we've been over this as far as we can, and

12 this witness really can't add anything more to what he said.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Therefore, if that is so and as it is obvious, I should hope, is

15 it then clear that an officer giving out information, alleged information,

16 about a possible operation on the part of its own forces and gives it to

17 the enemy's side in that way jeopardises the lives of tens of thousands of

18 his colleagues and friends? Is that clear?

19 JUDGE MAY: Well, this is all comment by you. What you can ask

20 the colonel is this: Did it occur to you that this official was

21 jeopardising lives?

22 THE WITNESS: The action to which this official was referring was

23 an action against the KLA. He wasn't divulging any plans, preparation

24 plans, at all of what might be coming after our departure. Had I passed

25 this information to the KLA, and yes, it would have jeopardised the term.

1 By this time I had a very good working relationship with the Commission

2 for Cooperation and confidentiality was important. I had a respect for

3 the commission and a respect for this person. And therefore, my respect

4 grew from the fact that, as a liaison officer to this commission, I did

5 not divulge anything from this commission back to the KLA. If I saw

6 something on the Serbian side, I did not report this to the opposition as

7 I did not report anything ever that I saw of KLA preparations to the

8 Serbian side.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Well, I suppose it's clear to you, and we can see from what took

11 place, and we also see this from the statements of the so-called

12 commanders of these terrorist KLA groups, that NATO Air Force were the air

13 forces of the KLA because they actually worked in cahoots together. Is

14 that something you're aware of or not?

15 JUDGE MAY: This is getting well away from the witness's evidence,

16 and it's a matter of comment by you. And if you have evidence of it, you

17 can call it in due course.

18 Colonel, can you assist as to this: It's alleged that the KLA and

19 NATO were working together. As far as you were concerned, was there any

20 evidence of that?

21 THE WITNESS: No.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, are you bringing into

23 question the claim that NATO was the enemy's side vis-a-vis Yugoslavia and

24 the KLA was likewise the enemy's side? Are you challenging those

25 assertions?

1 JUDGE MAY: It's not for me to challenge assertions. Now, you are

2 here to question this witness. You can do so. But if you simply continue

3 to make assertions, you'll be stopped. Now, the witness has dealt, as far

4 as he can, with various assertions and questions you've made. Now, have

5 you got anything else you want to ask him?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I want to ask him some

7 more things because I consider the facts to be indisputable, that NATO and

8 the KLA together were --

9 JUDGE MAY: No. No. You can make speeches in due course. Now,

10 confine yourself to questions at this time.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I asked my question on the

12 basis of the fact that -- that is to say, I'm asking that this official

13 who allegedly showed him the map must have realised that by doing so, he

14 would have threatened --

15 JUDGE MAY: We have been over this. It is an abuse of the process

16 for you to make speeches, Mr. Milosevic, at this stage. It's also an

17 abuse to go over the same ground. Now, can we go over something else?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a very important topic,

19 because it is quite obvious that there's another manipulation of this

20 false indictment to compensate and to soften --

21 JUDGE MAY: These are not -- these are not questions. Now, if you

22 want to go on asking -- cross-examining this witness, you must do so

23 properly, Mr. Milosevic. Now, move on to another question.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. May I then just ask

25 questions.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Do you know that in all 78 days of the NATO aggression, NATO

3 succeeded in destroying only eight tanks belonging to the Yugoslav army in

4 the 70 days of its bombing? Are you aware of that fact?

5 A. What I'm aware of is what I was told by your officers when I

6 arrived in June, was that you had destroyed -- you claim to have destroyed

7 13. How many wrecks and damaged tanks you drew, we didn't see, I have no

8 idea.

9 Q. Well, now I'm asking you as a military man, as an expert. If you,

10 your side, had had information from this alleged map that you got

11 concerning the operations of the Yugoslav forces, would those losses have

12 been necessarily much bigger? Because you claim that you got this map

13 which had the deployment of the Yugoslav forces and the places where they

14 would operate, and I believe that this is sufficient information.

15 So had you really had this, wouldn't these losses have had to be

16 bigger or not?

17 A. This is an impossible question to answer for many reasons. In the

18 first place, the activity was throughout Kosovo, even though it might have

19 been concentrated in certain areas. We did not have any time lines, any

20 time scales that we knew where you would be. We had no details, exact

21 details of the operations. We had no people actually in Kosovo who were

22 being able to sort of spot targets or look at targets; therefore,

23 reconnaissance was extremely difficult. And I'm not denying that you have

24 very well-trained and very professional forces who make -- who are

25 probably one of the best armies, best trained armies in Europe, and

1 therefore, they are very skilful at camouflage, at diversion, and giving

2 any enemy, as you would call them, a hard time.

3 Q. Colonel, isn't it clear that had you had this information that you

4 claim you had had, the losses of the Yugoslav forces would have had to be

5 bigger? Because you claim that you had information about the actual

6 places of attack, about the dynamics of the attack involved, and that you

7 had received this kind of map. And we all know what these maps look like.

8 And wouldn't the losses have had to be bigger than eight tanks in 78 days

9 of bombings, bombings day in, day out?

10 JUDGE MAY: That seems to be the same question as you asked

11 before.

12 The map, as I understand it, Colonel, was related to how the KLA

13 were to be dealt with. It had nothing to do with NATO.

14 THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.

15 JUDGE MAY: Was NATO mentioned in your conversation?

16 THE WITNESS: Only in the last part, where the reference was made

17 to the expulsion of the civilians, that it would save NATO a job later.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Doesn't it seem illogical to you that a Yugoslav officer would

20 claim that NATO would have work to do because of civilian expulsions, and

21 NATO was finding a pretext in this way to attack Yugoslavia? Is this

22 officer a moron? I mean, why would he say this?

23 JUDGE MAY: That sounds like a comment. Yes, next question.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Do you know that your superior, also a British general,

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1 Drewienkiewicz, the day before yesterday, in response to two of my direct

2 questions, also under oath, stated that there was no plan against the

3 Albanian population and that there were no indications of the existence of

4 any kind of plan to expel the Albanians?

5 A. I'm sorry, I have no idea what General Drewienkiewicz said

6 yesterday during his evidence.

7 JUDGE MAY: You can ask this witness if he knew of such a plan or

8 if there were any indications.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, he claims that the answer is

10 yes, and I am claiming that he is not telling the truth, because I'm

11 saying that had he known this, Drewienkiewicz, who was his superior, would

12 have had to know this, which doesn't work the other way around, that is,

13 that he had to know everything that Drewienkiewicz knew. So therefore,

14 there is no doubt that his superior had to know what he knew, because it

15 was the witness's job to inform his superior about every important piece

16 of information, and this information --

17 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. One question you can ask out of all of

18 that, which is mainly a comment: Did you tell the general about this

19 conversation? Can you remember?

20 THE WITNESS: I did relate the conversation to General DZ, yes.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. So it is clear that Drewienkiewicz would have had to say that

23 there was at least some indication that what this witness is claiming --

24 JUDGE MAY: This witness can't answer for the other witness. It's

25 a pure comment. You can make it in due course. Meanwhile, you must ask

1 questions which he can deal with.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but the witness confirmed that

3 he did inform Drewienkiewicz about this, and Drewienkiewicz claimed that

4 there were no indications of this kind.

5 JUDGE MAY: You're wasting time.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Do you know that this person you mentioned - don't worry, I'm not

8 going to utter the name itself - the person that you mentioned could not

9 have had any kind of combat-related information, even that concerning a

10 plan of attack against the KLA? Are you aware of that fact?

11 A. As I gave -- said in my evidence, this man was on the commission.

12 He was very aware of what went on throughout Kosovo. He knew of all

13 operations that were taking place. He had a huge amount of experience.

14 And I can't believe for one second that he wouldn't actually know what was

15 -- what was going on from that part of the operation. It's not credible.

16 Q. And do you know -- now, why am I asking you this? Do you know

17 that the Commission for Cooperation with the KVM, that is to say with you,

18 its members and the mission itself, including the head of the mission and

19 the members of the mission were not in the chain of command at all, either

20 in terms of the army or the -- the army or the police?

21 A. We always took the members of the commission to be representatives

22 of the government, the army, and the police, because if we ever wanted

23 access or information from the police, we would speak to the members of

24 the commission. If we wanted to know anything at all about the military

25 dispositions, about future intentions, activities which had taken place,

1 we also spoke to the military on this commission. And therefore, we --

2 what else could we assume is that -- but that these people were actually

3 spokesmen for their services and spokesmen for the government? What was

4 the purpose of the mission otherwise?

5 Q. These people are precisely what you said now. Their purpose was

6 to cooperate with your mission, that is to say, they conveyed your

7 requests, and they asked on your behalf the appropriate commands or

8 authorities for certain things that you had asked for.

9 Do you remember that yesterday you explained that when you came to

10 the mission you no longer commanded your unit or you were not held

11 responsible by any superior command in the British army? Didn't you

12 explain that yesterday?

13 A. I certainly did.

14 Q. Well, the same goes -- can't you assume that the same thing goes

15 for the members of the Commission for Cooperation, whose job is to

16 cooperate with you, not to command units? For example, do you know that

17 General Loncar, who was the head of the mission, did not even participate

18 in meetings of military or police commanders? Or any members of the

19 mission, for that matter. They were members of this commission. They

20 were not persons in the chain of command. Are you aware of that or are

21 you not aware of that?

22 A. I said that the members of the commission were very aware what was

23 happening militarily. They knew what was happening in terms of police

24 operations and military operations because they had an effect upon them.

25 I don't see what commanding military units has got to do with this. All

1 I'm saying is that they knew what was going on in Kosovo and what was

2 planned for Kosovo. They don't have to command anything to have that

3 information.

4 Q. Well, you yourself explained, and I hope that that was obvious

5 from your practice as well, that every day you had meetings with them and

6 that within 24 hours, they received from the appropriate authorities

7 information as to what had happened so that you could exchange this, use

8 it, verify it, et cetera. They were your partner in verification, and

9 they had to obtain this information from some authorities. They didn't

10 gather the information themselves. Doesn't this seem logical to you?

11 A. Yes, it's logical. It means that they had to speak to the

12 military and to the commanders -- and to the police commanders to know

13 what was going on. So they had contacts and knowledge about what was

14 happening, yes.

15 JUDGE KWON: Colonel, if you make your answer more simple, we can

16 get on more easily. The question put to you was not whether they were --

17 Mr. Loncar and some other officials were aware of the fact which was

18 happening at the time, rather the question was this: Whether they were in

19 chain of command or not. You can make the answer simpler.

20 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, they were obviously not in the chain of

21 command.

22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. And are you aware that in our army, and I hope in other armies,

25 too, that there is the principle of single seniority, and whoever is not

1 in the chain of command cannot have available any kind of information that

2 has to do with the future activity of any particular unit.

3 A. I do not know about this principle in your army, no.

4 Q. Do you know that there cannot be lateral commanding? There can

5 only be a single chain of command. Are you aware of that or not?

6 A. I'm aware of it, of the existence of a chain of command, yes.

7 Q. And are you aware of the fact that our Commission for Cooperation

8 with you, although it consisted of some officers as well, it was,

9 nevertheless, a civilian commission too?

10 A. I was not aware that it was purely a civilian commission.

11 Q. And do you know that General Loncar was a retired general,

12 therefore a civilian?

13 A. I know that General Loncar was a retired general and a civilian

14 and he was replaced by General Brankovic who was a serving general.

15 Q. We'll get to that later. And do you know how come General Loncar,

16 who was a retiree, came to that position?

17 A. No.

18 Q. And do you know that he came to this position at the request of

19 William Walker, head of the mission, that he addressed to me personally,

20 and that is because he had very good experience from his cooperation with

21 General Loncar in Eastern Slavonia, and he wanted someone whom he knew

22 well, whom he trusted, and whom he appreciated as an honest man and a good

23 person to work with. He wanted to cooperate with him again. So this was

24 an expression of our goodwill that we asked General Loncar to head this

25 commission. Do you know that?

1 A. I did not know that.

2 Q. Otherwise, I see that you do not know about this. However, I have

3 to put this as a question to you because I have been asked to act that

4 way. Do you know that General Brankovic did not replace General Loncar

5 actually?

6 A. You surprise me, Mr. Milosevic, because General Brankovic

7 introduced himself, and I was introduced to the new commission with

8 General Brankovic as the head of this new commission.

9 Q. You probably understood each other that way, just like when you

10 were saying that you were replacing Donna Phelan; it was somebody else.

11 However, General Loncar did not leave the commission. Until the 23rd of

12 May, he was the vice-chairman of this federal commission of ours and he

13 was that all the time and head of the mission in Kosovo. And General

14 Brankovic was not General Loncar's superior. On the contrary, it was

15 General Loncar who was the superior of General Brankovic. Do you know

16 that?

17 A. No. As far as I was concerned, General Brankovic announced

18 himself as the boss of the commission and he was the person we spoke to.

19 And he was present at all the meetings, not General Loncar.

20 Q. General Brankovic replaced Colonel Kotur, not General Loncar. And

21 you were in charge of cooperation on military matters but also within the

22 function of this civilian mission, not within any kind of military

23 function. Are you aware of that or not?

24 JUDGE MAY: It's no good arguing with the witness. You can call

25 your evidence if it's different, but you've heard his evidence. He's said

1 that Brankovic was in charge. That's his evidence. Now, in due course,

2 if you want to rebut it, you can, but there's no point going on arguing.

3 That is the way that time is wasted in cross-examination, why we have to

4 impose these time limits.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The matter is that I want to

6 ascertain here how much this witness actually knows from all the things

7 that he has been claiming to know, and obviously, he doesn't know that

8 much. What I am presenting here are undeniable facts with regard to these

9 appointments.

10 JUDGE MAY: You're not presenting anything. You're asking

11 questions. Now, if you want to test his knowledge of the commission in

12 some other way, do so, but there's no point going on about Brankovic

13 because he's given his answer.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Do you know -- well, this is just an example, it's of no major

16 significance. The matter is that he is ill-informed, and he drew the

17 wrong conclusions. Do you know that this commission had a coordinating

18 role only within the framework of cooperation with the OSCE, to coordinate

19 this cooperation between the OSCE and the Yugoslav authorities in charge?

20 This was a Commission for Cooperation. That was its name. Do you know

21 that?

22 A. Yes, it was a mission for cooperation, not a mission for

23 coordination, as you said.

24 Q. Cooperation. In order to cooperate, you have to have coordination

25 between the organs that are cooperating. Isn't that logical?

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And do you know who the chairman of the commission of the federal

3 government for cooperation with the mission was and how many members this

4 commission had?

5 A. Are you referring to the commission chaired by General Loncar?

6 Q. There was a commission of the federal government. Loncar was its

7 vice-chairman, and the seat of this commission was in Pristina. However,

8 on the whole, the commission that was appointed by the federal government

9 - and this was no secret because decisions of the federal government are

10 published in the Official Gazette and are therefore public - do you know

11 who the president of the commission was?

12 A. The only commission that I knew about was the commission headed by

13 General Loncar in Pristina. That was the level that I worked at.

14 Q. And General Pellnas in Belgrade, who also communicated on behalf

15 of your mission with headquarters in Belgrade, who did he liaise with if

16 there was only what was in Pristina?

17 A. I have no idea who General Pellnas is, and this is the first time

18 I've heard his name.

19 Q. Swedish general who was also your representative in Belgrade, and

20 he communicated with the government in Belgrade.

21 A. Sorry.

22 Q. Bo Pellnas.

23 A. Yes. Sorry. I misunderstand the pronunciation. I did see him.

24 He was working in Belgrade, yes. He was our representative to your

25 government in Belgrade.

1 Q. And he communicated with the commission headquarters in Belgrade,

2 that is to say, this commission that was set up by the federal government.

3 A. You're absolutely right. And he found his work, I believe, so

4 difficult that he eventually resigned and left.

5 Q. And do you know, since I hope that we have explained the civilian

6 nature of this commission that worked with you, and we --

7 JUDGE MAY: You put points when you should be asking questions,

8 which are tendentious, argumentative.

9 Do you agree that it was a civilian commission or not, Colonel?

10 THE WITNESS: This was a joint civilian-military-police

11 commission, sir.

12 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Do you know that this alleged map that you have been referring to,

15 which obviously did not exist after all, or any map, according to the

16 rules of service, could not have been carried out of the operations

17 department of the unit that it belonged to, even if it were a map of a

18 pure exercise only?

19 A. Are you referring to the map that he pointed out, the outline of

20 manoeuvre?

21 Q. Oh. So you are speaking about a map that is actually an outline

22 of manoeuvre?

23 A. The map that I was shown was a blank map, and he pointed out on

24 this map how the operation and the manoeuvre would take place.

25 Q. Oh. Now we've come to a new fact. On a plain map, he showed you

1 with his hand how activities would be carried out against the KLA. So

2 that is what we have asserted.

3 JUDGE MAY: That was his evidence, as I recollect it, yesterday.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right. Very well.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. And did you say yesterday, because obviously my understanding was

7 different because you kept talking about this map and this plan, and now

8 it turns out that there was no plan, that he was showing you on a

9 geography map how the attack against the KLA would take place. Do you

10 still claim that this officer told you that there was a plan to expel the

11 Albanian population?

12 A. He showed me on the military map the plan how to -- how they would

13 deal with the KLA, and then said they would also expel the civilian

14 population, yes. Not part -- not as part of this military operation.

15 That was to come later.

16 Q. Did he say this to you in connection with a plan? Did he say that

17 there was a plan or was this his personal opinion?

18 A. As I said yesterday, the -- the plan of operation, plan of the

19 manoeuvre against the KLA, were not -- could not have been just his

20 personal opinion, and he did not give me that impression. He said, "This

21 is how we would do it; this is how we will do it. And this is -- when

22 this is completed we will expel the Albanians."

23 I have no idea. I cannot tell you what he was thinking, exactly

24 whether -- I can't be inside his head. I just do not know whether it was

25 his personal plan, but I doubt it, because the plan was so detailed and it

1 then took place in that -- the general manoeuvre actually happened that

2 way, well, he must either have been clairvoyant or he knew about it. And

3 why then should he make another comment which is untrue or just his wishes

4 or his hopes? When he's just given me one factual bit of information, I

5 presumed the second piece of information was also factual.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, when he said that, did you follow it up

7 with a request for further information or elaboration or anything of that

8 kind?

9 THE WITNESS: The impression I had, Your Honour, was that he had

10 already told me far too much. What he told me was virtually in hushed

11 tones over the map, and I knew it wasn't the time or the place to actually

12 try and elaborate on that, and I could tell from his manner that he wasn't

13 prepared to elaborate on that. That was all he was prepared to say.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. The elimination of KLA units, at all events, would, regardless of

17 this statement of yours about the talk, be a legitimate task of the army;

18 is that correct?

19 A. Sorry. I don't understand the question.

20 Q. Would the elimination of the KLA be a legitimate task of the

21 Yugoslav forces?

22 A. I suppose if you were at war with the KLA, then yes. I don't

23 know -- I don't --

24 JUDGE MAY: I think it's probably a matter for us. It's a matter

25 of law if it's legitimate or not.

1 Mr. Milosevic, you've been now two hours with this witness, so if

2 there are other topics you want to cover with him, you should do so now.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are very many topics, and I

4 hope that you're not going to interrupt my cross-examination this time

5 too.

6 JUDGE MAY: I'll interrupt it if it's not proper. If you ask

7 proper questions, it won't be interrupted. And one thing you should

8 remember is that the questions should be short, and that way we'll get

9 through more topics.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Let me follow on from my previous question. In the KLA, did the

13 KLA play the role of NATO infantry in the NATO aggression?

14 A. Absolutely not.

15 Q. And did you see the statements made by their commanders such as

16 Thaci, Haradinaj, and the others, who precisely bear out what I said a

17 moment ago?

18 JUDGE MAY: He's given his answer. He said no. If you've got

19 some evidence to the contrary, you can call it.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not to prolong my questions about

21 this quite obviously rigged Prosecution issue with respect to the map, I

22 demand of you that the witness who was mentioned by -- the person that

23 this witness, this lieutenant colonel mentioned, the witness who allegedly

24 talked to him and gave him this information should be heard here and that

25 you will issue all guarantees to him that he will not be detained and so

1 on and so forth. And I am asking for this, for him to be protected,

2 because there is a lot of dirt thrown at an officer of the Yugoslav army

3 that he supplied the enemy, prior to the aggression, with this

4 information. He was smeared. And as you know, what we're talking about

5 here will not be a secret for all times. And the man has children and

6 grandchildren, and his name should not be smeared by a rigged-up thing of

7 this kind. So I am asking that this witness be heard here in the

8 courtroom along with all the protective measures for secrecy that can be

9 accorded him, because all this is a fabrication, a pure fabrication, and

10 that is quite obvious.

11 JUDGE MAY: That has nothing to do with this witness at all. If

12 you have an application, you can make it. Now, meanwhile, let us conclude

13 this cross-examination. In my own view, you should have no more than a

14 further hour, which will give you the same as the Prosecution. Yes.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that it would be fair for me

16 to be accorded more time than the Prosecution, because the Prosecution is

17 able to prepare with countless associates and helpers, but I have to go

18 through all this on my own, and this is all new ground for me.

19 JUDGE MAY: That -- that -- that, Mr. Milosevic, we have in mind,

20 that you are on your own and they are many more. We do consider that.

21 But we also consider the time that's wasted in your making speeches and

22 going over the same ground again and again. We balance the two in coming

23 to a decision on how much time you should have.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I hope that we will be

25 able to devote a little more than an hour to this witness. I now have to

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1 see where I left off yesterday in his statement and testimony.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. You said in your statement that it was not envisaged that the KLA

4 should have its representative, but their positions put before the

5 commission were put forward by others. Actually, I'm looking at page 3 of

6 your statement, paragraph 2 from the bottom in the Serbian text, that this

7 was put forward by Major David Wilson or another British officer. That

8 sentence. "The KLA was never meant to have a representative present," et

9 cetera.

10 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have his statement. Thank you. Yes,

11 have you found the passage?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have. I wasn't aware there was a question.

13 So ...

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. What's the question, please?

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. The question was the following: What was the task of these people

17 that had contacts with the KLA? As I can see from Drewienkiewicz's

18 statement, he says that somebody else except for David Wilson worked in

19 that area. Who were those other people?

20 A. David Wilson and then later David Meyer, who was also British,

21 worked directly with the KLA, liaised with the KLA and behalf of General

22 DZ. I believe that other nations might have also had representatives with

23 the KLA who would also try and talk to them and reason with them to

24 prevent any confrontations, which is one of our acquired tasks.

25 Q. Drewienkiewicz says that there were two David Wilsons, both from

1 Britain, and quite by chance, as he says, both were liaison officers with

2 the KLA. One David Wilson worked as a liaison officer with the KLA from

3 Pristina and the other as a liaison officer for the KLA from Prizren.

4 This other one, as representative of KVM, was a representative in

5 Rambouillet. Now, that's what Drewienkiewicz says. Are you aware of

6 that?

7 A. I certainly am. David Wilson, as you say, the taller one who

8 worked at Prizren, was the KLA liaison officer in the Prizren area only,

9 and he was the one we sent to Rambouillet. And David Wilson, the smaller

10 one, was based on DZ's staff and worked directly to General DZ as the --

11 within the headquarters of the OSCE. So he was responsible for liaising

12 with all the OSCE KLA liaison staff.

13 Q. Did he convey information to the KLA and back from the KLA? Was

14 that a two-way feedback, two-way information?

15 A. He would negotiate on behalf of DZ with the KLA and pass

16 information, which was important to prevent any activities, any actions,

17 or any misunderstandings, yes.

18 Q. He did not give out information to the KLA in connection with --

19 that is to say, with respect to the terrorist activities that they were

20 carrying out, he didn't use that?

21 A. He would not pass any information that was sensitive. So, for

22 example, if he heard during a meeting with the Commission for Cooperation

23 at the headquarters that there was a Serbian convoy coming down, that's

24 the sort of information he would not pass. If there was information being

25 sought by the Serbian side, then this information would be passed back and

1 any information that the KLA could give back would be passed back to the

2 Serbian commission, the Commission for Cooperation.

3 Q. And was his role -- give us a yes or no answer to save time,

4 please. Was his role to insist that the KLA adhere to the cease-fire,

5 that is to say, not to launch attacks? Was that his function or was his

6 only purpose to inform?

7 A. No. We also had the function of telling them not to participate

8 in any of these actions. We tried to prevent both sides from any action.

9 Q. You say on that same page, in the following paragraph: "It is my

10 upon that Loncar and his subordinates really saw the OSCE/FRY Commission

11 for Cooperation and the KVM as a means of proving to the world that they

12 were the innocent party, but they were very specific as to what they

13 wanted us to verify."

14 Is it not logical that under a conflict, when you had conflicts

15 with terrorist units and groups, that the government was acting

16 legitimately and is the innocent party when it is exposed to terrorism,

17 terrorism towards the police, the organs of power and authority, and the

18 citizens themselves? Is that so or not?

19 JUDGE MAY: Will you answer that or not?

20 THE WITNESS: I'm just wondering how many questions were in that.

21 JUDGE MAY: Well, pick one and answer it.

22 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, in a conflict, for example, the -- if

23 you are being attacked by terrorist groups, of course a government does

24 have the power and the right to defend itself.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. And what else did the government do but protect civilians and

2 representatives of the government from terrorists?

3 A. One of the things it did, it used disproportionate force on many

4 occasions. And these were the sort of events that they would not wish us

5 to verify, but they were very happy for us to verify if they had been

6 attacked by the KLA.

7 Q. Well, they helped you to verify all the other cases that took

8 place in the field. That was not brought into question, and we saw that

9 from the reports. But answer me this, please: What does it mean what you

10 say at the end of that paragraph, where you say that they really did

11 consider the cooperation to be beneficial because they were the innocent

12 party? And at the end of that paragraph, you state the following: You're

13 talking about Loncar, and you say that it would appear that he never

14 understood the OSCE/KVM, and that quite obviously he found -- he was

15 irritated by the fact that he could not force -- he was irritated by the

16 fact that he could not force the OSCE and the KVM -- he couldn't get them

17 to say bad things about the KLA. He was obviously annoyed that he

18 couldn't get the OSCE and the KVM to say bad things about the KLA. That's

19 what you say.

20 Now, does that -- is that clearly -- does it clearly show your

21 biasness with respect to the KLA, that is to say, to the advantage and on

22 the KLA's side? Yes or no; were you biased or not? So he couldn't get

23 you to say anything bad, any bad things about the KLA.

24 A. I think again, Mr. Milosevic, you've asked me several questions

25 here. When I say that he never seemed to come to grips with the OSCE and

1 he was obviously annoyed he couldn't get us to say bad things about the

2 KLA, you have to expand that to say, that we wrote daily reports, and if

3 there was a KLA terrorist attack which killed innocent people, innocent

4 policemen, soldiers, we made these press releases. We don't have any

5 control over the press. If the press refuse to publish these, for some

6 unknown reason, that was not within our gift. But every action, every

7 activity was passed to the press office, who then passed it to the press

8 authorities.

9 Q. Are you well known of the Glodjani KLA torture sites where tens of

10 people were thrown into Radonjic Lake, and did you know about the mass

11 sites of Serb -- Serb suffering? Are all these crimes things that quite

12 simply have to make oneself ask what it means when you state that he was

13 annoyed that he couldn't get the OSCE and KVM to say bad things about the

14 KLA? Don't you know about all the crimes?

15 JUDGE MAY: This is a speech. You're asked, Colonel, about

16 Glodjani, the site there. Do you know anything about that?

17 THE WITNESS: No.

18 JUDGE MAY: You were asked about Radonjic Lake. Do you know

19 anything about that?

20 THE WITNESS: No.

21 JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered these questions as best he

22 can.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. That's a very good

24 thing.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. On the following page, you talk about the 27th of December and the

2 tension. I don't want to mention for what reasons. You spoke about that

3 yesterday. The KLA took a farmer prisoner, a Serb farmer, and opened fire

4 on the police, seriously wounding several policemen. You state that

5 yourself here: "They were holding a Serb farmer, Dragoslav Zdravkovic. A

6 MUP patrol had gone in to rescue the farmer but had come under fire and

7 sustained heavy injuries." Those are your words, I am reading from your

8 statement.

9 Loncar informed you that the army had ordered tanks to enter and

10 that the MUP would lead the attack and so on and so forth, because he was

11 annoyed -- he was irritated and very angry and keen for the VJ and MUP to

12 carry out the attack, as you state. So he informed you what they were

13 supposed to do. And then you go on to say, "And challenged us to go in

14 ourselves." What does that mean that "he challenged us to go in

15 ourselves"? Wasn't it your business to verify it? So he called upon you

16 and he challenged you. That's what you say.

17 A. What he said was that we should go in there, sort it out, and

18 bring him out. Therefore, he challenged us. It certainly was not our --

19 part of our agreement, according to the agreement, to actually carry out

20 operations and negotiate hostage releases. We were the Kosovo

21 Verification Mission. However, our mission began to change direction like

22 this, and if we could help and if we were prepared to stick our necks out,

23 but as an unarmed force, we were prepared to do it in order to prevent any

24 conflict.

25 Q. My question is the following: Yesterday in your oral testimony,

1 you spoke about this incident on the 27th of December, and you said

2 precisely that it was an incident carried out by the army and police.

3 That's what you said. And then we saw what the incident was about, in

4 actual fact, that it was of a Serb farmer that had been held and that the

5 police had been wounded, and you yourself mentioned yesterday that there

6 were one to two thousand members of the KLA with a whole truckload of

7 ammunition. Is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, is it possible to say, given this situation, that the KLA,

10 with ammunition and thousands, that a Serb farmer was held and wounded?

11 Is it possible to say that the Serb forces caused that particular incident

12 as you said so yesterday? Is it possible for you to say that? Yes or no,

13 please.

14 A. No. Of course they didn't cause it. The Serb forces did not

15 cause the incident, no.

16 Q. But that is precisely what you said yesterday.

17 JUDGE MAY: I don't remember him saying that.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, take a look at the transcript

19 and you'll find it.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's go on.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. And everything ended in a normal fashion, with the understanding

23 of whatever, but we're not going to waste time on that now.

24 Then you go on to talk about the meeting that was held afterwards,

25 and you say that Sainovic hurled a whole load of insults at you and said

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1 that the Serbs had the right to use the force they did. I assume that he

2 could not have said it that way, but he might have said that he had --

3 they had the right to act against terrorists and that he said -- and you

4 said, "We were not doing the verification honourably and accused us of

5 smuggling weapons and include the Americans and Germans, et cetera."

6 Now, was that not correct? Was it not so? Was it not true that certain

7 members of the Verification Mission undertook spying tasks, including

8 helping the KLA to smuggle weapons? Is that true or is it not? Just yes

9 or no, please.

10 A. I don't know anything about this smuggling of weapons.

11 Q. And you were an expert in weapons. Do you know where the weapons

12 came from, where the KLA got their weapons from?

13 A. I believe the weapons came across the mountains from Albania, by

14 mule trains and by humans, humans carrying them across the mountains.

15 Q. Then you go on to explain, as an example of Sainovic's capacity to

16 get things done was when, during that meeting, we asked to be permitted to

17 visit about 11 KLA prisoners. Now, can you even assume that Sainovic as

18 president of the Commission for Cooperation would be able to do this?

19 That is to say, in order for him to be able to accomplish this, he would

20 have to ask the Minister of Justice for permission to do that. He

21 wouldn't be able to do it on us own back without permission.

22 A. Yes, I accept that he would have to refer it but he gave us every

23 indication that this would be done and, later that evening, we were given

24 permission to do it.

25 Q. Of course. The commission decided to do what you had asked

1 because it was logical and that's what you did.

2 Then you go on to explain, towards the end of that paragraph, the

3 following: That Sainovic could speak on behalf of Belgrade and Loncar

4 could only affect local matters. What is illogical there? Why should

5 not political issues go via politicians and what is illogical in the fact

6 that the Vice-Premier should see to political issues? Is there any

7 mystery there in that respect?

8 A. No.

9 Q. And then what does this whole description mean about Colonel Kotur

10 having a camouflage uniform, that he was from an elite special unit? He

11 was sent to the commission by the General Staff of the army, who was the

12 sole competent authority to give representatives for civilian matters just

13 as it puts forward people for being military attaches in an embassy, for

14 example. Do you know that they could have taken any uniform? They could

15 have worn a marine uniform, a naval uniform, had you been by the sea, on

16 the sea, and that his uniform did not note any affiliation to any special

17 unit of any kind.

18 A. What I was trying to get at here was actually he was actually

19 wearing a uniform, as was Colonel Mijatovic at meetings and therefore this

20 indicated that this was not a purely civilian mission.

21 Q. Well, he wore what he found comfortable, and he might have worn a

22 civilian -- civilian clothing too, just like Colonel Mijatovic could have

23 worn anything, a police uniform, whereas he was in civilian clothing. For

24 his function and post in the mission, it had no bearing, it was of no

25 importance. And none of them, as a member of the commission, could have

1 commanded anything.

2 We've cleared up this point about your mistaken conclusions as to

3 the structure of the mission.

4 JUDGE MAY: No. That's just a comment.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. All right. I'm just

6 looking at something else.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Now, what is the point of your assertion here that at the football

9 stadium there was a piste for helicopters, helicopter takeoffs and

10 landings. Are you aware of the fact that this stadium in Pristina for

11 helicopters was the only spot near the centre where helicopters were able

12 to land and that helicopters had landed there for decades, 20 years ago,

13 30 years ago? I myself landed there 25 years ago on that runway in that

14 same spot. Where else can you land in Pristina unless you want to land in

15 the middle of the city square with the kiosks selling frankfurters --

16 JUDGE MAY: We don't want to know about the kiosks selling

17 frankfurters. Now, is the point of this that it is the only helicopter

18 landing place in Pristina? Is that the point?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Why then all this

20 mystification and linking it up to the proximity of --

21 JUDGE MAY: Let's put it to the witness. It's what's said is that

22 this was the only helicopter landing place and there was nothing sinister

23 or anything of that sort in it being close to the MUP headquarters. Can

24 you assist us as to that?

25 THE WITNESS: There was an airport not far way where helicopters

1 also landed but this was a convenient place in the middle of town, the

2 only place, adjacent to the MUP headquarters and the VJ headquarters and

3 most of the flights were either government flights or MUP or VJ. It's as

4 straightforward as that.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. All right. That's quite clear. The airport is quite a distance

7 from town.

8 Now, on page 7 of your statement, some observations are made which

9 bring into question your assertion about the impossibility of you going

10 about your business, and I'm going to quote both these points.

11 You say: "Whenever I encountered a problem of going to a certain

12 area, I would call up Mijatovic --" and you're referring to Colonel

13 Mijatovic, member of the commission, Loncar's. "... I would call

14 Mijatovic on the phone and he would then contact the local MUP commander

15 who would then give us permission to pass. Mijatovic also helped us to

16 access certain police stations. On the 17th of March, 1999, at a meeting

17 with Mijatovic, he informed me that he had come into contact with all the

18 command points of MUP and introduced procedure which would ensure us to

19 have access," et cetera.

20 And then several paragraphs after that, you say the following:

21 "Kotur showed me a letter from Major General Lazarevic, that is the

22 commander of the Pristina Corps at that time, which ordered all VJ units

23 to give access to KVM patrols." So even when we're talking about the

24 police force and the army, you had orders enabling you to move around

25 without any impediment. Can you then speak of a refusal to cooperate or

1 efforts to thwart successful cooperation and to make it impossible for you

2 to perform your tasks? From what yourself have written, is that so or

3 not?

4 A. The documents that you refer to and the access was done at that

5 level. However, it was never -- it was never passed down to the units on

6 the ground, and therefore we could stand for as long as we wanted to try

7 to get into certain areas, open areas of ground which the VJ or the MUP

8 were holding, and we could not get in. I was one of the few people with a

9 satellite telephone who could ring Colonel Mijatovic and say, "I am at

10 this location. I have a commander with me, can you please remind him of

11 the agreement that we have, the letter that you -- that General Lazarevic

12 had produced to give us access. And then grudgingly, after a long time,

13 we'd be allowed through. But this access was not general -- the letters

14 were not disseminated, and the access was very, very -- extremely

15 difficult.

16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we're going to -- the time's come for

17 the adjournment, but if you want to make one more point, you can. Ask one

18 more question, rather.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. I was just following on from what the witness said. You said that

21 you had this surprise factor with your patrols in touring and inspecting

22 certain points. How can you surprise somebody if you can move around

23 without anybody's -- if you don't have the permission to move around? You

24 said that you surprised them. You took them by surprise when you

25 conducted your inspections. Now, if you were able to surprise someone,

1 that implies that you have freedom of movement. Now, is that in

2 contradiction to what you said that you were unable to move around and

3 that you didn't have permission and access?

4 A. There's no contradiction whatsoever. The surprise inspection was

5 carried out along the main roads, whereas your units were not positioned,

6 your major units were not positioned on the main roads. They were

7 positioned around villages, in the countryside, and therefore there can be

8 no contradiction. There are two -- they're two separate events.

9 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, just before you rise, in relation to the

11 next witnesses, the Chamber will recall I said a couple of days ago it was

12 possible that we might seek to call not K22 first but the first 92 bis

13 witnesses. All the witness are here, but because K22, who originally made

14 arrangements to come before the Easter break before the timetable changed

15 only arrived last evening, it will not be possible to have helpful and

16 complete summary of his evidence, I think, until tomorrow. He's here, and

17 the summary is in the process of final preparation, but I don't think it

18 will be ready until tomorrow. So if this witness fishes, I would ask that

19 we take one, at least, of the 92 bis witnesses first.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well.

21 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

22 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. On the 15th of January, 1999, you were in the area of Decani

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1 with the representatives of the MUP when it was agreed that the KVM should

2 escort the MUP to that area when there would be a change of shifts at

3 their forward posts. This was done because you wanted to check lest there

4 be any reinforcements at the forward posts. Then the KVM were shot at for

5 a while. The way you had put it then, it was unclear as to who had done

6 the shooting. That was your position, that it was unclear. Wasn't it

7 obvious that it only could have been the KLA, because you were accompanied

8 by the police and it was quite obvious that the police would not shoot at

9 a convoy that they were escorting themselves? Why was it your assessment

10 that it was unclear as to who had done the shooting?

11 A. I don't recall saying that I was unclear. I was very clear that

12 the shooting had taken place by the -- by the KLA, and the -- I believe

13 Ramush admitted later that this was the case. He apologised for wounding

14 two of my people, and put it down to the fact that they thought we were

15 Serb secret police driving around in what appeared to be OSCE vehicles

16 leading the convoy into this forward position, and that's why they had

17 done it. So it was the KLA.

18 Q. Yes. That is only a direct statement of the KLA, something that

19 could have made you give up on your original thought that you did not know

20 who had done the shooting and that suspicion could be cast on both sides.

21 A. In the initial stages for the first 24, 36 hours, we had no idea

22 who'd done the shooting, and we couldn't imagine any reason at the time

23 why the KLA should wish to shoot at orange vehicles. Therefore, it was

24 unclear. We just couldn't work out why the Serb, the MUP, or the VJ would

25 want to shoot at us, and we couldn't figure out why the KLA would to want

1 to shoot at us. It wasn't normal for us to be shot at.

2 Q. It was less clear to you why the KLA would be shooting at you than

3 why the army would be shooting at you. What you are saying now, isn't

4 that the most specific kind of evidence of your partiality as far as the

5 KLA is concerned? Yes or no?

6 A. It is not partiality because we were shot at. Even I was shot at,

7 or shots were fired in my direction, to keep me out of certain areas by

8 your forces.

9 Q. What were our forces doing, shooting at you?

10 A. Absolutely. Even the Podujevo on -- east of Gornja Lapastica,

11 there was an occasion where we were told not to go somewhere because we

12 would be shot at by the KLA and the area was unsafe. We then saw one of

13 your vehicles deliberately move around, and we saw the shots being fired

14 from that vehicle in our general direction to frighten us, to prove to us

15 that it was dangerous and we shouldn't be there. This was one of your

16 control methods to make sure that we did not venture where you didn't want

17 us to go, because most verifiers were civilians and they were afraid of

18 being shot at.

19 Q. Yes. But now you're saying that shooting could have taken place

20 but it didn't. So did this vehicle shoot at you or not?

21 A. Sorry. Can you repeat that question?

22 Q. This MUP vehicle that you mentioned just now, did it shoot at you

23 or did it not shoot at you?

24 A. It did shoot at us, yes. On a previous occasion. Not the 15th of

25 January occasion.

1 Q. Did it hit someone?

2 A. No. The intention was to frighten us.

3 Q. They were shooting into the air to frighten you?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Why is this not mentioned in any one of the Verification Mission

6 reports, this kind of incident, that somebody was shooting in your

7 direction? I mean, from the security forces of Yugoslavia and the army of

8 Yugoslavia.

9 A. I think you will find that it was reported on numerous occasions

10 in the OSCE reports.

11 Q. Are you going to assert now that there were occasions when the

12 army and the police shot at the verifiers?

13 JUDGE MAY: Well, that's what he's been saying.

14 THE WITNESS: Exactly. Thank you, Your Honour.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. All right. These are new facts indeed, and I bring them into

17 question, absolutely.

18 There is an assertion among your sources that all evidence was

19 presented to the chief of mission so that he could establish whether some

20 act would be a violation of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. The Head

21 of Mission had the exclusive right to ascertain whether a particular act

22 was a violation of this agreement. Yes or no.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So what purpose did you serve, all of you, all the verifiers, if

25 it was only your chief, William Walker, who could decide whether a

1 particular act was a violation or not?

2 A. We could all easily see whether something was a violation.

3 Therefore, we could report this violation to William Walker, who would

4 then pass it through official channels, through Bo Pellnas or directly to

5 General Loncar or via Keller to Mr. Sainovic.

6 Q. So it was only Walker who could assess what a violation was and

7 what was not a violation. Nobody else from the mission could do that.

8 A. I mean, he was the chief, and therefore any sort of reporting

9 upwards went under his signature, I mean went under his authority. He was

10 our chief. However, if I went to a meeting and I was authorised to say

11 something was a violation, I would say it at the meeting with General

12 Loncar.

13 Q. Was Walker the only person who was authorised to accept or not

14 accept a particular member of the mission to carry out his duties or not?

15 A. I suppose he was ultimately responsible, as the boss, but I

16 shouldn't think for one second that Walker was involved in selecting every

17 member of the mission of 1.400-odd people, plus another 1.500 civilians.

18 He wouldn't be doing anything but vetting people's applications.

19 Q. And are you aware of a particular case when the Deputy Head of

20 Mission was appointed, the one who was in charge of police and judiciary,

21 Giovani Kesler [phoen], an Italian judge, he was?

22 A. I am aware that he was appointed, yes.

23 Q. Yes. But there is an explanation here, that he said that when

24 verifying police standards, the international community should not do

25 anything that should upset the Serb authorities. And Walker refused to

1 accept his appointment so the post remained vacant for a longer amount of

2 time. Are you aware of that?

3 A. No.

4 Q. You were supposed to get 40 verifiers for the police, but then

5 only ten arrived subsequently. Are you aware of that?

6 A. Yes. We had difficulties in recruiting policemen who could be

7 released from their duties in their countries and come to Kosovo. These

8 weren't the only verifiers we had difficulty in recruiting.

9 Q. And the fact that he refused an Italian because he said that the

10 Serbian police should be treated properly, that is what is contained in

11 the statement of your boss Drewienkiewicz.

12 JUDGE MAY: The witness does not know anything about this.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I am making him aware of it

14 because he's not aware of it.

15 JUDGE MAY: No. We're not going to get anywhere with this sort of

16 questioning.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. You said at one place in your statement that you found out later

19 that NATO had intercepted radio communications showing that Serbs were

20 more deeply involved in the alleged slaughter - you're talking about Racak

21 - than they had admitted, and that they had actually issued orders for

22 these people to be killed. You -- what kind of interception is this?

23 Because you say you found out, that you learned about this. What is this

24 that you learned about this interception of some conversation that

25 indicates that somebody had given orders to have these people killed?

1 A. I heard from several sources who commented to me that. Because I

2 myself was interested as to the truthfulness of this whole event, and I

3 was sort of playing devil's advocate at one point, and I was told, you

4 know, "We can assure you that there has been information provided from

5 signals, radio intercepts." I presume these must have been intercepts in

6 Macedonia or somewhere nearby where these conversations had been

7 overheard. This is something I was told. This is something that -- these

8 are not documents that I have actually read or held in my hand.

9 Q. That's the only thing I wish to clarify. In your statement, you

10 also said the MUP and the army of Yugoslavia always called the members of

11 the KLA terrorists. Do you think that they were terrorists or do you

12 think that they were not terrorists?

13 A. I think there were some terrorists, and there were also a great

14 number of people who were village militia, people who were sort of

15 guarding their properties and their families. So, yes, some of the people

16 you referred to as the KLA, I have no doubt that they carry out terrorists

17 activities and behave as terrorists.

18 Q. And why were you bothered then by the fact that the military and

19 the police were calling them terrorists? Because you knew yourself that

20 they were terrorists.

21 A. Because this tag was being applied to virtually all Albanians. It

22 wasn't specific, the number of small terrorist cells.

23 Q. Well, these people who were shooting at the military and at the

24 police, were they terrorists or were they not terrorists? Those who

25 planted bombs underneath buses and marketplaces and shops, were they

1 terrorists or were they not terrorists?

2 A. They were terrorists.

3 Q. You are saying that there was coordination between the army and

4 the police, and you also say that this was organised. And if it were to

5 be organised, the lowest level would have to be the level of major, the

6 rank of major. This is your expert opinion. I'm not challenging it. But

7 my question is: Is it logical if there is both army and police in a

8 certain area, that they should know where they all are and that it's

9 normal for the army to know where the police is and for the police to know

10 where the army is? Isn't this logical for you because they belong to one

11 and the same state?

12 A. Yes. I said major because major is usually a battalion commander

13 in your forces, and yes, it's logical that they should know what each are

14 doing and therefore there is general knowledge of what is happening.

15 Q. So this is something that is quite logical in terms of the

16 behaviour of any police or army. Yes or no.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You described an event after the incident on the Podujevo-Pristina

19 road when an army patrol was ambushed and when a colonel was killed. You

20 say the army of Yugoslavia then brought the tanks in and closed in on the

21 village and then threw up an outer cordon about one or two kilometres away

22 and then an inner cordon with the tanks and then sent the infantry in to

23 search the town for the sniper. There were no retributions, no

24 destruction, and no killings. Do you consider this to be a logical and

25 normal act on the part of the military?

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1 A. The reason I put this statement in was to actually show that when

2 the VJ had carried out an operation, they actually performed this within

3 all the legal frameworks and acted humanely and decently, and also

4 performed well as a military unit, in contrast to what the MUP did.

5 Q. You are talking about the role of the MUP in Kosovo and Metohija,

6 and you are talking about the kind of role it had, on the basis of which

7 you've been saying, it is your assertion that it did not have a police

8 role. You even say that they were not involved in regulating traffic, in

9 combatting crime, et cetera. Did you see any traffic police during all

10 that time, during your stay in Kosovo and Metohija?

11 A. I -- during my time in Pristina, I did see a few ordinary

12 policemen in the streets, carrying out their duties and occasionally

13 controlling traffic as well, yes.

14 Q. Is it clear to you that these policemen who controlled traffic are

15 also members of the MUP?

16 A. Yes, it is very clear.

17 Q. Well, how can you say, then, that the MUP did not perform these

18 functions?

19 A. The majority -- I only saw a few policemen carrying out these

20 functions. All other MUP, 99 per cent of the MUP I saw in Kosovo, were

21 performing a military function.

22 Q. In searching for terrorists, murderers, those who plant bombs, is

23 that a military or a police function?

24 A. It's a function in which the -- the police have primacy, and if

25 they require, for example as in Northern Ireland where now we work against

1 the terrorists, we use the army in support. But they carry out an

2 investigative type of operation, the police.

3 Q. Well, in this case, the police is carrying out investigative

4 operations and looking for the perpetrators of crimes. Is that clear or

5 is that not clear?

6 A. I think the methodology is different, Mr. Milosevic.

7 Q. In addition to traffic, what do you think? Who else but the

8 police could have been searching for perpetrators of crimes, arresting

9 criminals, looking for perpetrators of murders, looting, all other

10 criminal offences? Who else could have been doing that except for the

11 police? Because it is your claim that the police was not carrying out

12 those functions.

13 A. It is the police responsibility to carry out those functions, but

14 all the activities that we observed that MUP carried out were typical

15 military, infantry, armoured, dismounted, infantry type of procedures.

16 Q. You wrote here in your statement that there were local policemen

17 and members of the traffic police who did not belong to the MUP. They

18 wore regular police uniforms with white belts -- that is what traffic

19 policemen wear anyway so they would be more visible for all the

20 participants in traffic -- and they just carried sidearms. The MUP wore

21 combat outfits, et cetera, et cetera.

22 It was your understanding that these were also members of the MUP.

23 Isn't that right or is that not right?

24 A. We believe that the traffic police were a subdivision of -- a

25 small subdivision of the MUP, but we referred to -- generally to the MUP

1 as the people in combat kit with Kalashnikovs and webbing, helmets, et

2 cetera, because they were -- 99 per cent of the MUP in Kosovo appeared to

3 us to be these people.

4 Q. And are you aware of the MUP structure? MUP means Ministry of the

5 Interior, Ministry of the Police. You're aware of that, aren't you? And

6 do you know in that structure there is an administration for the traffic

7 police, there is an administration for the combatting of crime, preventing

8 crime, various other administrations, or departments, rather, for issuing

9 passports, et cetera, et cetera. Are you aware of this entire structure,

10 according to which the MUP caries out its regular duties just like any

11 other police in the world?

12 A. There were the people in the mission whose responsibility was

13 understanding the structure. Mine was working, trying to sort of

14 coordinate the activities, working on the ground and trying to sort of

15 work the verification. Thank you for the explanation.

16 Q. And can you tell me how you explain the fact that there were such

17 great differences in the statement you give with respect to -- compared to

18 the statement of your boss, Drewienkiewicz? For example --

19 JUDGE MAY: It's not a matter for him.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Very well. These are

21 vital differences, Mr. May.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Is it true that in the monthly reports of the OSCE compiled on the

24 basis of your daily and weekly reports about the situation in Kosovo from

25 mid-January to mid-February 1999, that it states that in Kosovo, urban

1 terrorism was on the rise?

2 A. I can't recall exactly, but if that's what it says, then I accept

3 it.

4 Q. And is what you say in the statement also true, that the level of

5 conflict was reduced but the KLA attacked the Serb police? Yes or no.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What did the KLA use to attack the army and MUP units with?

8 Because your verification of weapons was -- also implied recording the

9 types of weaponry, their deployment, and so on. So what did the KLA use

10 to attack the army and MUP units?

11 A. They obviously used Kalashnikov or -- a whole variety of assault

12 rifles, ranging from Kalashnikovs to Armalites [phoen]. We even saw one

13 person, who must have drawn the booby prize, with a British rifle. They

14 obviously explosives, they used rocket-propelled grenades. They used

15 mortars. These were the normal sniper rifles of large calibre, often

16 American. This type of weapon or Russian Draganoff rifle. These were the

17 type of weapons that the KLA would use as their weapon of choice.

18 Q. And in addition to the mortars, did they also use hand-held

19 launchers when attacking armoured vehicles, fortified positions and so

20 on?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What calibre of mortar did they use?

23 A. They used -- at the beginning, they used a smaller calibre mortar,

24 and towards the end, they had acquired a much larger calibre. So it

25 ranged from 60 millimetres right up to 120.

1 Q. How did they come by those mortars? How did they procure them?

2 Because they're heavy ones, 120 millimetres. How were they able to get

3 them?

4 JUDGE MAY: Do you know anything about that?

5 THE WITNESS: All I know, sir, is that some of this equipment came

6 over the border, over the mountains from the direction of Albania, but

7 more than that, I do not know.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. And how did they get American weapons that you mentioned a moment

10 ago? How did they come by those?

11 A. I can only assume the same way.

12 Q. Do you know that in the course of 1998 and 1999, that is to say

13 during the time your mission was there, the KLA effected a much larger

14 number of terrorist attacks on the members of the army and the MUP and

15 civilians, both Serbs and Albanians and Muslims as well, Romanies, Gorani,

16 and all the others, than throughout the period of time that had gone

17 before in the several years before that period? Are you aware of that?

18 A. I am aware that a great many attacks were carried out but I cannot

19 give a qualitative assessment -- quantitative assessment. Sorry.

20 Q. Now this fact, the precipitous increase in the number of attacks

21 while your mission was there, was that the subject of your attention and

22 your analysis at the meetings you had with Walker, Drewienkiewicz, and

23 so on?

24 A. Yes. These were topics that were discussed to see how we could

25 persuade both sides to cease the hostilities and to reduce the number of

1 deaths and attacks.

2 Q. And were you successful at all with the -- with the KLA in that

3 respect?

4 A. I believe on occasion we were successful, and we managed to get

5 the KLA to withdraw from certain forward positions after we had

6 discussions with the Commission of Cooperation who asked us to remove, for

7 example, near Podujevo, the whole line of hills. We did actually have the

8 KLA agreement to pull away their snipers from the positions overlooking

9 the road for quite a considerable time.

10 Q. As there was this drastic increase in terrorist attacks, how then

11 were you able to report on the violation of agreement by the MUP when it

12 was quite obvious that it was the KLA that did the violation in the first

13 place?

14 A. We reported the violations as they came. So if -- if it was an

15 attack launched by the KLA, we would clearly state this, that the KLA had

16 shot, attacked, destroyed, and then we would also report the -- the

17 subsequent Serbian action.

18 Q. And the checkpoints, do you consider those to be a preventive or

19 repressive operation?

20 A. Well, the reason that Burns tried to keep the number of

21 checkpoints down to a minimum was because a large number of checkpoints

22 just prevented everyone from moving around Kosovo. And obviously I agree

23 with you entirely that if the level of activity increases, then you can

24 then be able to increase the number of control points and checkpoints.

25 The number of checkpoints was always very large since our arrival.

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1 Q. You yourself noted that you found and assessed as being a

2 violation some 30-odd or 40 up to control points. Now, what does 40

3 control points mean on the whole territory of Kosovo and Metohija with 26

4 municipalities and several thousand settlements? Do you consider that to

5 be an overly large number?

6 A. When they control the movement of around -- the whole of Kosovo.

7 Kosovo, as you know, Mr. Milosevic, has only a small number of main access

8 roads that can be used throughout the year, and with 40 patrols, you can

9 effectively close off and totally control and stop virtually the traffic

10 moving in Kosovo. It's easily done with 40.

11 Q. But was that not a necessity if it was -- if we had to uncover

12 terrorists and their activities?

13 A. If this is what you were doing and not just preventing movement,

14 which it appeared you were doing.

15 Q. And did your mission endeavour to see that weapons are taken away

16 from the terrorists in order to reduce the level of crime that was

17 permanently high?

18 A. (A) this was not a mandate, neither was it for us to take away

19 your weapons as neither -- as it wasn't to take away their weapons. And

20 we also weren't in any position, as an unarmed verification force, to

21 carry this activity out.

22 Q. You had an overview of all the positions of the army of Yugoslavia

23 and the MUP of Yugoslavia and all the weaponry. You had a complete

24 overall picture of the positions and weaponry of the army of Yugoslavia.

25 Is that true or not?

1 A. That's not true.

2 Q. But you did have regular meetings with members of the Yugoslav

3 commission, and you discussed these issues with them, did you not?

4 A. We discussed this and the -- as I mentioned before several times,

5 access to actually inspect or verify anything was rarely given.

6 Q. Well, you told us all the types of weapons yesterday that the army

7 disposed of, and identified them. So you had an insight into everything

8 that you presented here.

9 A. This was because we observed, very carefully, weapons coming in.

10 For example, you did not declare that you had brought in new types of

11 weapons, and when this was questioned, you said, "Well, they are much the

12 same. A tank is a tank," I think the quotation was. "Like a woman is a

13 woman," I believe the entire phrase went.

14 Q. And did you personally have meetings with the KLA?

15 A. I met them in the early stages. I -- because I was working near

16 Podujevo and tried to negotiate with David Wilson, I met Remi, for

17 example. And then later, the only meetings I had with the KLA would have

18 been when I was given that authority by your government to visit the 11

19 prisoners in Nis. But my activity with the KLA virtually came to a

20 standstill for the last couple of months. My main activity was

21 cooperating and liaising with the VJ and the commission.

22 Q. And when you visited those 11 that you just mentioned, did you --

23 were you able to see that conduct towards them was proper, that there were

24 no problems with regard to their treatment in view of the fact that they

25 were in prison?

1 A. When I saw them, I had seen that they were now living in

2 reasonable conditions and were well-dressed, but they recounted to me that

3 they had all been given fairly unpleasant treatment in the period before

4 my visit.

5 Q. Were there any traces on them of any kind of treatment of that

6 kind, the treatment that you say they had experienced?

7 A. I did not ask them to undress and -- so I could inspect them. A

8 lot of the ill-treatment was psychological, where, for example, prisoners

9 were made to stand the entire day in their cells. They were not allowed

10 to sit down or to lie down.

11 Q. That's what they told you, is it?

12 A. That's what they told me.

13 Q. And on the other hand, when they were set free, the soldiers, did

14 they have any traces of beatings on them that were obvious? They didn't

15 have to take their clothes off for it to become evident?

16 A. Are you referring to the KLA or are you referring to the nine

17 soldiers that were captured by the KLA?

18 Q. I'm talking about the Serb soldiers, when they were set free. Did

19 they have any traces of beatings on their person?

20 A. Well, when I saw the soldiers shortly after they'd been captured,

21 one or two -- I videoed them and I passed the tapes to your commission,

22 and yes, one or two of them did have marks about their faces where they

23 had been beaten up, assaulted.

24 Q. So the difference between what you saw when you saw the Albanians

25 and what you saw with the Serb prisoners, there was a difference there.

1 Now, have you ever been to Albania? Did you ever go to Albania

2 during the duration of your mission?

3 A. No.

4 Q. And did the leaders of the KLA inform you of any of their intended

5 activities? Did they make their plans known to you or anything of that

6 kind?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Haradinaj, in his interview, speaks about many meetings with

9 English, American, German and other military representatives --

10 JUDGE MAY: This witness says he didn't see them.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Now, all the reports that you sent out, did you send them out to

14 the organs of Yugoslavia as well? To the Yugoslav authorities as well?

15 A. We had a system whereby our reports were passed to the Commission

16 for Cooperation.

17 Q. So all the reports that you sent out were sent out to the Yugoslav

18 authorities as well; is that right? That was your duty provided for by

19 the agreement, because it says so, as you know.

20 A. As far as I know, we endeavoured to send as many reports as we

21 could across to the commission. Certainly the reports were also sent to

22 Bo Pellnas in Belgrade.

23 Q. Who had the duty to send them on further to the Yugoslav

24 authorities. Yes or no.

25 A. Either he or the commission in Pristina, yes. Both. Either or.

1 Q. And that, to all practical intents and purposes, means that if

2 somebody wasn't sent to the Yugoslav authorities, could not be treated as

3 being an event, an incident.

4 JUDGE MAY: I don't think the witness can deal with that.

5 Mr. Milosevic, you've now had over three hours, well over three

6 hours with this witness. Another 20 minutes.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's difficult for me to find

8 my way in all these questions in only 20 minutes, but I'll do my best and

9 skip over some things.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Is it true that the detained members of the KLA whom you visited

12 in prison told you in actual fact that they involuntarily joined the KLA

13 or, rather, that they were forced to enter the KLA?

14 A. Some did, yes.

15 Q. So they were forced to join the KLA; is that it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And did you happen to ask them how they were forced to join the

18 KLA?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And what did they tell you?

21 A. Well, one man told me that the KLA came to his house, and they

22 told him that the following morning he had to have his suitcase -- a small

23 pack ready because he was going to Albania to be trained as a terrorist,

24 and he refused, and they said, "Well, if you refuse, we will kill you."

25 Q. Is it true that in the monthly reports of the OSCE for the period

1 from mid-January to mid-February 1999, it is stated that the KLA

2 controlled the Albanian community through the police? It policed it and

3 took reprisal measures towards those who had been accused of collaborating

4 with the Serbs? Yes or no.

5 A. That's probably true, yes. As we understand it, that's true.

6 Q. And is it also true that in that report of yours, that same

7 report, that mention was made in Pec of several Albanians who were denoted

8 as being loyal to the Serbs and that they were killed in separate

9 incidents? Do you recall that?

10 A. I don't exactly, but if it's in the report, then it will be true.

11 Q. And do you remember whether it is true that all the Albanians were

12 killed by bullets, shot in the head, bullet shots in the head?

13 A. I can't remember in this particular incident how they were

14 killed.

15 Q. And do you happen to know or did you know at the time how many

16 abducted Serb civilians, members of the army or the Ministry of the

17 Interior, at the beginning of 1999, were in the hands of the KLA?

18 A. I believe we had different numbers. I think at one point I heard

19 numbers of greater than 20. The Albanians denied ever having such large

20 numbers of police in captivity.

21 Q. And how many did your mission succeed in freeing of those

22 individuals, apart from the several soldiers that we mentioned earlier

23 on?

24 A. Very few.

25 Q. And do you know that several days ago, in Kosovo, at different

1 locations mass graves were found of Serb victims and that their

2 identification -- the process of their identification is underway? Have

3 you heard about that? Do you know that?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Did you ever go to the village of Dragobilje?

6 A. I can't recall.

7 Q. I didn't hear your answer.

8 A. I can't -- I'm not aware of having been in this visit -- in this

9 village. The name doesn't jump out.

10 Q. Well, that's where the KLA headquarters were, and that's also

11 where a forward point of the Kosovo Verification Mission was, as well as a

12 forward post of KDOM for links and liaison with the KLA headquarters. I

13 assume that --

14 JUDGE MAY: This is what you assert. Do you know anything about

15 this?

16 THE WITNESS: One of the reasons why I would not know anything

17 about this is because I was the liaison officer with the -- to the Serbian

18 commission, and therefore this type of information would have actually

19 been kept from me in case I accidentally gave it away, or I got tempted to

20 go there, or whatever. So I did not go anywhere near this village, or

21 know that the headquarters was there, or what presence there was from the

22 OSCE, or what KDOM did there. And I presume that Mr. Milosevic is

23 referring to the US-KDOM.

24 JUDGE MAY: The witness can't help as to this.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

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1 Q. And do you happen to know -- that is to say, you mentioned

2 yesterday on one occasion with respect to Ramush Haradinaj, their chief,

3 in connection to that, do you know of his statement after the war when he

4 said that meetings with the KVM were mutually significant in view of

5 preparations for the NATO aggression?

6 A. I was not aware of this statement.

7 Q. Then I'll skip the next few questions, because quite obviously you

8 don't know that.

9 And do you happen to know his opinion and the opinion of other

10 chiefs, KLA chiefs, that they were practically saved with the arrival of

11 your mission and that the presence of your mission enabled them to revive

12 themselves, to become revitalised?

13 A. The only comment I ever heard them making was that obviously the

14 KVM allowed them to feel safer in Kosovo, and they did talk about that

15 their eventual aim was to achieve -- that what they were trying to achieve

16 was even greater stability in the country by having a Western force, a

17 NATO force, a UN force actually coming -- an armed force coming into

18 Kosovo in order to keep the peace. These were the type of comments that

19 were being made shortly after our arrival.

20 Q. And did you know about or did you discuss in your mission at all

21 the links and connections between the KLA in Kosovo and the Al Qaeda of

22 Osama bin Laden?

23 A. To my knowledge, never.

24 Q. And do you know that in November 2001 - and this is information

25 that was published in the Wall Street Journal - that there was talk of the

1 presence in Kosovo and in Bosnia --

2 JUDGE MAY: We seem to be getting well away from the witness's

3 evidence. Deal with the matters which he gave evidence about.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will ask him -- I will

5 deal with the matters which he talked about.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Since the agreement on the establishment of a mission stresses in

8 principle the KVM's positions and option for cooperation and verification

9 and a respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

10 Yugoslavia -- I assume you know that. That's right, isn't it? That is

11 what it says. On the other hand, I'm sure you know what the goals of the

12 KLA terrorist organisation were, directed precisely against what was

13 contained in your agreement with the Yugoslav government. Is that correct

14 or not?

15 A. We know that they didn't sign the agreement, and they were not

16 party to the agreement.

17 Q. Yes, but you cooperated with that side, with that party.

18 JUDGE MAY: We've been round and round this point, Mr. Milosevic,

19 about the KVM and any relations they may have had with the KLA, and it's

20 not going to assist us to go into it yet again.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. So within all these restrictions and limitations, I shall try on

24 abridge what I have here as far as possible.

25 You know that against the detained KLA members, legal proceedings,

1 court proceedings were undertaken. I'm sure you know that.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And do you know that in the report of the OSCE, it is stated, it

4 is also the mid-January, mid-February report 1999, they say that the

5 verifiers of the -- for human rights notice that the recent trials in the

6 district court in Pristina and Pec were conducted in conformity with

7 international standards on legal procedure and that no violation of human

8 rights was noted in these proceedings. Are you aware of that or not?

9 A. I don't remember that report, no.

10 Q. You don't know about the report.

11 A. No.

12 Q. It is your own report, January, February. So if it is not

13 correct, then what I'm asking you isn't important. But as it is correct,

14 or let us assume that it is correct without any responsibility on your

15 part for saying that, why did Keller do this in relation to the KLA when

16 legal proceedings were being conducted against them?

17 A. Sorry, what did Keller do?

18 Q. I said -- Keller is not important here, but the Verification

19 Mission and its leaders - and Keller was a function of this - why did he

20 insist that members of the KLA be released when legal court proceedings

21 were being undertaken against them? Do you have an explanation for that?

22 A. I do.

23 JUDGE MAY: You do. Yes.

24 THE WITNESS: It's quite simple: There was an agreement made when

25 we released the nine Serbian prisoners that the 11 Albanian prisoners

1 would be released at some date subsequent, not too close to try to link

2 the two, because we didn't -- the Serbian side, this was your insistence,

3 of your people, we didn't want this to appear to look as if it was a

4 we-will-release-them-if-you-release-ours, but that is in fact exactly what

5 it was. It was a quid pro quo.

6 Q. And what about this principle quid pro quo? How is it being

7 applied now when persons who are terrorists who are serving prison

8 sentences in Serbian are being pardoned and released?

9 JUDGE MAY: It has nothing to do with the witness.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. You attended the funeral in Racak?

13 A. I was not actually in the village of Racak. I was not far away.

14 Q. Yes. The KVM provided for additional patrols for this particular

15 event. That's my understanding.

16 A. It did.

17 Q. Is it correct that, during the funeral, the KLA arrested between

18 40 and 60 Albanians because, as they had said, they were known as unfit

19 for cooperation?

20 A. I was not aware of that.

21 Q. But in the OSCE report for the period of January and February, it

22 is mentioned that, during the funeral in Racak, the KLA arrested Albanians

23 with whom they did not have cooperation, and later on, members of the KVM

24 were setting them free. In all fairness, it is not said whether they

25 managed to release all of them, but do you know anything about this?

1 A. The only thing I know about it is that your forces arrested a

2 number of suspects in and around the Racak area during the funeral. And I

3 know nothing about the OSCE releasing -- I can't imagine why we would be

4 releasing because the OSCE did not actually hold anybody. We had no

5 facilities to hold anyone.

6 Q. Maybe the interpretation was not right. The point was, in your

7 report it says that the KLA was arresting Albanians and that the KVM made

8 an effort to have them released. It's not that the KVM was arresting

9 these Albanians. That's what I talked about. And I asked you whether you

10 knew anything about that.

11 A. No.

12 Q. Do you know how many reports of yours during the mission were sent

13 further on to NATO?

14 A. I wasn't aware of any of our reports being sent to NATO.

15 Q. Is it your assertion that you did not exchange information with

16 NATO and that you did not sent information to NATO from the ground?

17 A. It is not my assertion at all. You asked me if we sent reports to

18 NATO. I was not aware of any reports being sent. However, at one stage

19 during the Rambouillet talks, when we thought that NATO would be the force

20 coming into Kosovo, we did in fact have contact with NATO and we sort of

21 briefed them as to what they could expect when they arrived in Kosovo -

22 where they could be located, the types of roads, et cetera - which would

23 allow the force to move in quickly and easily into Kosovo, as a result of

24 Rambouillet talks.

25 Q. Since you were involved in armaments and technical equipment, can

1 you say anything about the following: Is it correct that the members of

2 the KVM, after going from Kosovo to Macedonia, maintained contacts with

3 the KLA by way of satellite telephones and other means?

4 A. I believe a number of Albanians who were there and maybe asked

5 some of our interpreters, did try to establish communications by satellite

6 telephone.

7 Q. It was even established and even the press in the West wrote about

8 this, that they had direct contacts, by way of these telephones, with the

9 officials of NATO and even directly with General Clark. Do you know

10 anything about that?

11 A. I would say that probably is untrue because one of my jobs when I

12 arrived in Macedonia and in Skopje, after a number of weeks, I was

13 seconded -- I was not seconded, I was made the liaison officer to NATO,

14 between NATO and OSCE. And of course, there were other liaison officers

15 there from the UNHCR and other NGOs. So I was one of many who attended

16 some of the briefings, but I never -- never, in all of my time that I

17 visited the NATO headquarters, I never heard anyone say anything about

18 NATO having direct contact with the KLA.

19 Q. During the mission, did you have positioning devices, equipment?

20 A. You mean did we have global positioning systems? Yes, so that we

21 knew where we were.

22 Q. Did you only establish where you were or did you also establish

23 the positions of certain points of interest in terms of the ensuing NATO

24 aggression?

25 A. We -- we obviously had maps of the whole of Kosovo, so we would

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1 not need to establish any positions of anything on the ground. We were

2 interested to know where we were and where the -- the VJ, MUP, and KLA

3 were on the ground so that we could make accurate assessments of what was

4 happening in Kosovo.

5 Q. And how do you explain the fact that the largest number of

6 facilities that were at any point visited by the verifiers was very

7 precisely hit during the NATO bombings?

8 JUDGE MAY: It's not for the witness, I don't think. It depends

9 upon the basis of the assertion.

10 Can you help, Colonel, as to whether there's any truth in that

11 suggestion?

12 THE WITNESS: I can't because I wasn't involved in any of this

13 targeting and the bombing. I was merely sort of sitting in Macedonia as a

14 -- as an observer. But if the targets were barracks, then obviously, you

15 know, everyone knew where these barracks were. We had an agreement with

16 your government that overflight by various types of aircraft had been

17 agreed, and therefore we knew -- everyone knew the location. Especially

18 NATO, these were NATO aircraft that were flying over Kosovo, with your

19 permission. So they would have known where the barracks were, and these

20 are the targets, and yes, you know, the two coincided.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I'm not talking about barracks, I'm talking about other facilities

23 and buildings, but I have yet another question. You returned to Kosovo as

24 a NATO officer. How many of your colleagues also returned in that

25 capacity, now in the capacity of NATO officer? How many of your

1 colleagues from the Verification Mission?

2 A. In the first two days, it was just General DZ and myself, and then

3 after I was there for a few weeks, I didn't see any other colleagues,

4 British colleagues, and I can't remember seeing any of the colleagues from

5 the OSCE there. It's possible that later, as a part of a natural

6 roulement, units would have had personnel within them who had previously

7 served in Kosovo with the OSCE.

8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, the time w