1 Day 67 Thursday, 19th March 1998

2 (11.15 am)

4 JUDGE JORDA: Let us have General Blaskic

5 brought in, please. May I have Mr. Mesic brought in,

6 please. We have a very busy day to day. We will try

7 to complete Mr. Mesic's testimony. Then we have another

8 witness. Please be seated. As I said, we will try to

9 finish with Mr. Mesic's testimony. Perhaps even two,

10 Mr. Harmon, but certainly one. That may take quite a

11 while. Then we have an ex parte hearing. We will try

12 to do all of this because Mr. Mesic has to testify in

13 another trial and the Presiding Judge of the other

14 Trial Chamber told me that it would take up some of the

15 afternoon, but experience has shown us that it is not

16 always possible to do what we planned to do. So if

17 necessary, we will sit for part of tomorrow afternoon.

18 Mr. Nobilo, continue with your

19 cross-examination, please.

20 I had forgotten to say good morning to the

21 interpreters, but I think that everybody knows that I

22 would like to say good morning to them.

23 Cross-examined by MR. NOBILO (continued).

24 Q. Thank you Mr. President and good morning

25 Mr. Mesic. Here we are to continue and I hope that I

1 will not be very long. Yesterday we looked at a

2 portion of the article, the interview that you gave to

3 the Hercegovacki Tjednik, the Herzegovinan weekly.

4 For the interpreter, it is no. 10.

5 You said that you did not recall this

6 interview. What we will try to do is try to read you a

7 portion of it and see whether this is your opinion at

8 the time and whether this was what you were talking

9 about.

10 For the interpreters, it is C. (Handed).

11 This is on Nikola Koljevic. He was in Zagreb

12 and I hope that you recall this. Here it goes.

13 Recently Mr. Koljevic came to Sarajevo. As an

14 explanation, he was one of the leaders of the Bosnian

15 Serbs. In the Bosnian press, this was interpreted as

16 an agreement with Franjo Tudjman regarding the dividing

17 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is this the truth?

18 This is your answer: this is what the little

19 Milosevic propaganda would like to use, that is Croatia

20 always was in a position that we should negotiate

21 rather than wage war. We were often criticised for it

22 because we wanted to negotiate even with Milosevic. If

23 Mr. Milosevic comes to Zagreb and asks to talk,

24 obviously we will talk to him. That does not mean that

25 we divide Bosnia with him.

1 Croatia abides by the principle that the

2 borders are respected and that there is no division of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina

4 are going to decide their fate on their own.

5 We are moving on to the next question: every

6 once in a while, Bosnian intellectuals who had recently

7 also been called Croat intellectuals, are

8 criticising Franjo Tudjman on his division of

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. How do you comment on this?

10 Now your answer: it is the ignorance about

11 what Franjo Tudjman really said. He said that in

12 principle, he supported the sovereignty of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and this is why he had big

14 discussions with Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and attempt to

15 give him arguments to win over Mr. Izetbegovic to accept

16 at first federal concept and later, the sovereignty of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina because this is the only way to get

18 rid of Yugoslavia which is no more and which Serbia is

19 using for the realisation of its imperial interests.

20 I believe that Bosnia waited too long, but we

21 cannot change this now. We must solve the problem that

22 we are facing now. That means that Franjo Tudjman

23 never said that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be divided.

24 But he said that he cannot leave the Croat

25 population at anyone's mercy in Bosnia and

1 Herzegovina. The Croat population in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina does not want to join any kind of

3 Serboslavia or any small Yugoslavia. They want to have

4 an opportunity to cooperate with Croatia in one way or

5 another."

6 Mr. Mesic, is this what you were saying at

7 that time at the time when Nicola Koljevic was visiting

8 Zagreb? Do you still say this?

9 A. I believe that this is at variance with what

10 I was saying at that time. As I said, I do not recall

11 the Herzegovinan weekly and I never authorised this. I

12 believe that this was somehow compiled. There are some

13 things that are acceptable here, but there are some

14 that are misconstrued, even the use of certain words

15 which I never use.

16 Q. What would you accept today that you believe

17 is truth in this? Is it true, for instance, that the

18 misunderstanding or ignorance about the views of Franjo

19 Tudjman, that he was in support of the sovereignty of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina but wanted to protect the Croat

21 population there?

22 A. I would not like to comment on this because I

23 really do not think that it is an authentic document.

24 Q. You mentioned Fikret Abdic. Is he Muslim?

25 A. I believe that that is how he identified

1 himself.

2 Q. You mentioned the positive role of Croatia

3 with regard to Bihac. Can you explain this, clarify

4 this. In what way was this positive role?

5 A. Croatia helped with the liberation, that is

6 with the breaking of the blockade of Bihac. When the

7 Fifth Corps was threatened.

8 Q. The Fifth Corps is the Fifth Corps of the

9 Bosnian Army, for the Tribunal's information, and they

10 helped to resist the Serb forces.

11 MR. HARMON: Excuse me. The question and

12 answer is going a little bit fast. I notice that

13 Mr. Nobilo asked a question that was being translated;

14 Mr. Mesic answered before the translation was

15 completed. Mr. Nobilo asked another question. I think

16 for the benefit of everybody in the courtroom, if we

17 could just wait until the interpretation is completed

18 before the questions are asked and answered it would be

19 very helpful. Thank you.

20 JUDGE JORDA: I am sure that Mr. Nobilo

21 agrees with this remark.

22 MR. NOBILO: We will try to take breaks

23 between questions and answers.

24 Regarding the incident when you were

25 misunderstood to have ordered the killing of Kordic,

1 how did you understand that Boban said he could not

2 kill Kordic? Was he autonomous?

3 A. I believe that is very clear, that this is --

4 was taking certain liberties. I could not order the

5 killing of Kordic, nor did I ever order this to

6 anyone. This is a very lax interpretation. What I

7 asked of Mate Boban was to let it pass, but he -- I

8 believe that he was just pretending that he could

9 not -- he could order him anything, so I guess he could

10 have ordered him this as well.

11 Q. Very well, so we are to conclude that this

12 was not real, that he was somehow lying to you?

13 A. It was realistic that he could order Kordic

14 anything.

15 Q. You also mentioned a humane resettlement.

16 When you mentioned it, you said that people started

17 talking about it. I would like to ask you where did

18 you hear this expression? Who mentioned it, in what

19 context? Was this an official meeting? Was this sort

20 of something that was talked about over lunch or

21 dinner?

22 A. I first heard of the humane resettlement

23 during the conversations with the Bosnian leadership.

24 Tudjman used it several times saying that this would

25 lower the casualties and this would limit the

1 destruction and he mentioned this several times in his

2 public statements. Whoever gave you all these media

3 excerpts, he can certainly find excerpts where the

4 humane resettlement is being mentioned.

5 Q. But can you explain us, what does it mean,

6 humane resettlement? Is this something that -- when

7 the state is giving an opportunity to move to another

8 place?

9 A. Sorry, it is going too fast.

10 MR. HARMON: It is a little bit too fast.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Could you slow down,

12 please? Could the witness be asked to repeat his

13 answer, please?

14 MR. NOBILO: My colleague is telling me that

15 we were going too fast, so I am going to repeat it. I

16 said, did Tudjman say -- imply to burn down five

17 villages and people flee the sixth on their own?

18 A. I think you understood me well. I think that

19 the reasons given was to assist people. However, I

20 have common sense. I understand very well what this

21 is, what kind of humane resettlement it is if one has

22 to leave one's own hometown, family, friends, property

23 and say that he is leaving in a humane way? He is

24 leaving because his life is threatened, because certain

25 actions had been taken beforehand so that he had to

1 leave. To me, humane resettlement is a euphemism for

2 ethnic -- for genocide.

3 Q. You said as an example for Croat

4 aspirations that Croat currency was introduced in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the territories controlled by

6 Croats. I would like to ask you what currency was

7 in force in Bosnia at that time? Was it not the

8 Yugoslav dinar through which the financial attack was

9 made on Bosnian Herzegovina and Croatia?

10 A. Yes, that is correct. I did not express an

11 opinion that I criticise this. I just am stating the

12 facts, that the Croat currency was in force there as

13 well as the German Marks. I am not objecting to it. I

14 am just stating the facts about it.

15 Q. Have you ever heard President Tudjman say, or

16 anyone in the Croat leadership, that in the meetings

17 where you were present, with Bosnian representatives,

18 that he was advocating ethnic purity, that members of

19 other nations had to leave the areas controlled by the

20 Croats?

21 A. The only thing I can remember is that Tudjman

22 claimed that after this war, that about 5 per cent of

23 Serbs will remain in Croatia. Whether he meant -- and

24 this is a matter of speculation -- that it is because

25 some -- a part of Serbs would voluntarily leave and go

1 to Serbia or whether the policy would be such -- this

2 was not stated by him, but his view was that some 5 per

3 cent would remain, from 10 to 12 per cent before, that

4 later 5 per cent would remain.

5 However, this could be interpreted in another

6 way. In order to glean what his real view was, I spoke

7 to Bela Tonkovic who came as -- from Serbia from

8 Vojvadina as leader of Croats there. Tudjman proposed

9 that the Croats there swap houses and come to Croatia,

10 that they leave Vojvadina. Tonkovic disagreed with that

11 because he said that for centuries their homes were

12 there, their ancestors were there, they lived in

13 Vojvadina and they wanted to stay there.

14 This conversation was fairly tough and I

15 think for a while Bela Tonkovic stopped coming to

16 Croatia.

17 Q. But my question was directed to Bosnian

18 Herzegovina. In these meetings or any other official

19 meetings or private, did Tudjman tell you that where

20 Croats controlled territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

21 the non-Croat population need to be driven out?

22 A. No. He never openly stated that the

23 non-Croat population needed to be expelled.

24 Q. You mentioned dual citizenship during

25 examination-in-chief, so my question to you is: was

1 this meant only for Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina or for

2 ethnic Croats from anywhere in the world, whether they

3 lived in the US or Australia -- could they also get

4 dual citizenship?

5 A. Yes, that is correct, according to our law,

6 all ethnic Croats can receive Croat citizenship.

7 Q. Next question: with respect to the dual

8 citizenship and the electoral law, the right to vote

9 and be elected to the Parliament, is this a right of

10 only ethnic Croats or all citizens of Croatia so that

11 the ethnic Croats, let us say in Australia and the US,

12 can vote for the Croat Parliament?

13 A. Yes. That is cheating, because the HDZ was

14 this way to get 10 per cent of Members of Parliament,

15 so this would be just like in a game of chess, if you

16 have a rook, and to give you an example, as to how far

17 this control is going, I think that one piece of

18 information suffices. Out of all Croats who live in

19 Australia and who have acquired Croat citizenship,

20 so that means Melbourne, Sydney, Perth, Adelaide --

21 all Croats will live there and there is quite a few of

22 them. All of them, to the last one, voted. Nobody was

23 on any business trip. Nobody was sick. Nobody did not

24 show up.

25 So that means that 100 per cent of them

1 voted, so how serious this turns out, you conclude. As

2 far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, the moment,

3 this regulation was passed I called the ambassador

4 Trnka and I said: this not only destabilises

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it does huge damage to Croatia,

6 this system of voting, so I told him to convey to the

7 Bosnian leadership to not agree to this, to simply be

8 against the possibility of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina

9 being able to vote for the Croat Parliament, because

10 other serious countries, and I do not consider our own

11 one such country, enable their own citizens who happen

12 to find themselves abroad during election to vote for

13 the Parliament, because they pay taxes.

14 We got citizens who are not in diaspora.

15 They are really authentic Bosnians. Their ancestors

16 are from there. They do not pay any taxes from Croatia

17 and they participate in taking decisions. They affect

18 all of us and we are the taxpayers in our country.

19 This is why I was against it and this is why I believe

20 that this law will be put out of force because I think

21 this is cheating.

22 For instance, today, in the Federation of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you have

24 high officials who are members of the Croat

25 Parliament and I can find no parallel example anywhere

1 in the world.

2 Q. I would just like to sum up. Do you agree

3 with my contention that all Croat diaspora can vote

4 for the Croat Parliament and not only Croats from

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

6 A. Yes, because the entire diaspora is

7 controlled by the HDZ and this is what suits Tudjman

8 and his party.

9 Q. You held really significant positions --

10 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, what I would like

11 to ask you and I think that the judges have not

12 interrupted you often, but when you put a question, you

13 get an answer. If you need to say: I think that this

14 means that or this or that, this prolongs things. You

15 have put a question; you have an answer. If, after

16 four, five, six questions, you say, "if I understood

17 you well", I am being a little cruel, but that is your

18 problem, whether you understood it well or not, I am

19 afraid. All the judges were able to understand, so it

20 is a bit complicated. You have put three, four, five

21 questions regarding the status of members of the ethnic

22 group. If every time you have to say, "if I understood

23 well", then I am afraid it is your problem if you have

24 not understood well. That is what I wanted to say.

25 MR. NOBILO: I understand, Mr. President, but

1 what I am I trying to do, I am posing a direct

2 question: could the Croats outside Bosnia-Herzegovina

3 vote for the Croat Parliament? The answer could

4 have been yes, but Mr. Mesic finds it necessary to

5 elaborate, and I am trying to summarise.

6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, I must say it is

7 perhaps no more objective than any other summary. It

8 is your own summary. You have questions and you can

9 make your own conclusions. We are slowing down

10 things. When you say, "If I understood well", I must

11 say once again, it is up to you whether you understood

12 or did not understand. Even the judge, if they do not

13 understand, it is their problem. You are putting very

14 precise questions. They are within the framework of

15 the examination-in-chief. The witness answers them.

16 You may then pose more precise questions, more detailed

17 ones, but if at the end of this whole discussion we

18 have to see whether Mr. Nobilo has understood well or

19 not, then, I do apologise, but I am not in agreement

20 with that at all.

21 MR. NOBILO: Of course I will stand corrected

22 by you, your Honour.

23 JUDGE JORDA: After all, yesterday you were

24 very well-versed in questions of propaganda and I think

25 we understand one another well.

1 MR. NOBILO: I understand everything that you

2 have said, but I am trying to separate from political

3 propaganda what is essential for this trial. But I

4 will certainly follow your instructions. So let us go

5 on, but please, Mr. Mesic, I would like to ask you, be

6 kind enough in the interest of expediency to answer

7 direct questions very briefly so as to save time.

8 I started by saying that you indeed held very

9 high positions and you are probably familiar with

10 certain details far better than many of us who live

11 there, not to mention those who did not. Could you

12 tell us whether there is any difference within the

13 Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, something that

14 could be called the Herzegovina wing and the Bosnian

15 wing, and do their interests coincide and was their

16 fate the same in the war?

17 A. No, they did not have the same fate, because

18 the majority of Croats in Croatia stayed on and a large

19 proportion of Croats outside of Herzegovina have had,

20 for this or that reason, to abandon their homes.

21 Q. Would you agree -- the translation is wrong.

22 The majority of Croats in Herzegovina stayed behind and

23 the majority of Croats outside Herzegovina abandoned

24 their homes, but there was an error in the translation

25 and I added, "for this or that reason, for whatever

1 reasons". For the benefit of the transcript, do you

2 agree that this was a misinterpretation?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. In the examination-in-chief, you said that,

5 due to the disastrous policies of Franjo Tudjman, and

6 this is a free interpretation, 500,000 Croats have fled

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?

8 A. Not only because of that. Certainly the most

9 important reason was the Serb aggression and the other

10 reason is the policy of Franjo Tudjman.

11 Q. Out of those 500,000, was the largest number

12 from Central Bosnia?

13 A. I do not know all the figures, but if you are

14 asking me about that erroneous policy, I think it is

15 sufficient to say that the Croats inside were finding

16 themselves under siege, and were given the task -- and

17 Miljenko Brkic can testify to this -- that they were

18 given this task by Mate Boban, that all Croats had to

19 resign all their positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even

20 professors, who, considering the population mix, the

21 Croats were few in number, but they had a strong

22 intellectual grouping. There were more than 200

23 university professors, assistant professors and

24 lecturers, so Miljenko Brkic asked Mate Boban, "Well,

25 then, where shall we go from Sarajevo", because,

1 according to him, whoever stayed in Sarajevo was a

2 traitor.

3 Before all the approaches were taken around

4 Sarajevo by the Serbs and Mate said to him, "Come and

5 stay with us at Grude. You will live like we are

6 living." So, you see, this was a policy to withdraw

7 the Croats from a certain area and this was confirmed

8 to me by people from Vares. A member of the Croat

9 People's Council, Josip Jozelic from Vares, he told me

10 that the HVO had evacuated Croat villages due to

11 certain arrangements that he could not go into because

12 he did not know what was happening.

13 So that policy contributed to the exodus and

14 not only the Serb aggression.

15 Q. Would you agree, then, that one could make

16 the conclusion from what you said that the Herzegovina

17 wing wanted to join Croatia at all cost, but as the

18 Croat enclaves were an obstacle to them, they sought

19 to evacuate those enclaves so that they could attach

20 themselves to Croatia more easily; would you agree with

21 such a conclusion?

22 A. There must have been views along those lines,

23 but I cannot enter into the details. Who gave the

24 orders to whom, how a certain policy was implemented.

25 These things are often more subtle than may appear at

1 first glance. Certainly no one will issue orders which

2 may subsequently be exposed to criticism. This is,

3 after all, done in a different way.

4 Q. Well, could you use the example of Vares and

5 the crimes in Stupni Do?

6 A. The people who committed the crimes in Stupni

7 Do obviously wanted to develop fear among the Croats

8 because of the revenge that the Bosnia acts may take,

9 and obviously this was in someone's interest, otherwise

10 I see no reason for a crime of such proportions.

11 Q. And in your view, the enclaves are surrounded

12 by Muslim territories and have no physical links with

13 Herzegovina and Croatia. What did the Herzegovina wing

14 want to do with those enclaves?

15 A. I would not enter into those details. It is

16 our blame, the blame of Croatia, that we entered into a

17 conflict with the greatest victim of the Serb

18 aggression. I am not interested whether a Croat will

19 stay here or move there. The whole concept was wrong

20 and, after all, Mate Boban told me, and only a couple

21 of months before his death, he claimed that Herzegovina

22 would join Croatia whether people liked that or not.

23 We could tell you an anecdote. Two or three

24 months before his death, we met at the Intercontinental

25 in Zagreb. He invited me to have a cup of coffee with

1 him and of course I said certainly we could have a cup

2 of coffee together, because, after all, the two of us

3 are former heads of state. I was the head of State of

4 Yugoslavia and he of Herzegovina and both have

5 disappeared. He said, "Yes, yours has disappeared, but

6 mine is stronger by the day." I said, "Where do you

7 intend to go?" He said, "Where do you think, except

8 with Croatia?" Whether that was policy or whether he

9 was just daydreaming, it is rather difficult to say

10 today.

11 Q. You mentioned an interesting example. The

12 Croats committed a crime in Stupni Do for the Muslim

13 Army to start taking revenge?

14 A. I did not say that. I said that the crime

15 was committed in order to be able to frighten the

16 Croats with the possible revenge of the Bosniaks. You

17 heard very well what I said.

18 Q. Of course I agree with what you said, but I

19 want to make a comparison. You mentioned the crime in

20 Ahmici. The Lasva Valley was surrounded by the BiH

21 army. The Croats of Lasva Valley had no contact with

22 Herzegovina. The Croats of Lasva Valley were an

23 obstacle to the secession of Herzegovina from Bosnia

24 and a crime was committed there. Is not that the same

25 model which was intended to be used to intimidate the

1 Croats and to have them leave the Lasva Valley?

2 A. I claim that everyone is capable of

3 committing crimes. No nation, or rather no members of

4 a nation are exempt from that possibility. It is only

5 Milan Vukovic, the judge of the Supreme Court of

6 Croatia, who claims that a Croat cannot commit a

7 crime. I think this statement is indicative of the

8 Supreme Court, of its leader, and the psychosis in

9 Croatia. I am in favour of guilt being individualised

10 on the Serb, on the Muslim and the Croat side

11 without any exception. Therefore, I do not exclude

12 from this anybody, anybody's tactics, anybody's

13 actions, but guilt has to be individualised.

14 Q. But would you allow that this model of Stupni

15 Do and Vares may have been applied in the Lasva Valley

16 and in Ahmici? Would you allow for that possibility?

17 A. I do not exclude any assumption, but this is

18 something that needs to be established. The truth has

19 to be established. I would rather you did not ask me

20 about my assumptions.

21 Q. Do you know at all how the war in the Lasva

22 Valley started? What was the balance of forces between

23 the Croats and the Muslims? Who had the upper hand?

24 Do you have any information about that?

25 A. I do not have the real information but, in

1 fragments, I would receive reports from that area. I

2 have my own opinion about that, but that is not

3 important for the Trial Chamber.

4 Q. You mentioned several senior officers who

5 were in the Croat Army and later in the HVO. Let me

6 mention those names: Petkovic, Roso, Praljak and

7 Tolj. Were they born in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

8 A. I only know that Praljak was. I do not know

9 where Petkovic comes from, but they would appear for a

10 while in one army and for a while in the other. How

11 their status was regulated, I do not know.

12 Q. You told us that you heard rumours to the

13 effect that Croat soldiers had waged war in

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Did you speak to any single

15 Croat soldier who told you that he was forced to go

16 to Bosnia-Herzegovina? That he was not a volunteer?

17 A. You see, many soldiers came to see me who had

18 fought in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who were Croat

19 soldiers. Some volunteers from Bosnia-Herzegovina also

20 came to visit me and before that they were Croat

21 soldiers. The mothers and fathers would come to see

22 me, claiming that their children were not volunteers,

23 but that they were in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24 So I must admit that I requested an official

25 explanation from the Defence Minister and he claimed

1 that there were no Croat units in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whether there were any, I cannot

3 tell. I was not an inspector. Nor was it up to me to

4 establish it. But my nephew, Vladko Mesic, who was a

5 Croat soldier, he was in Bosnia. He came back from

6 there and he was not a volunteer in Bosnia. He was

7 born in Slavonia. He has nothing in common with

8 Bosnia, but he was there. You asked me for a name. I

9 gave you one.

10 Q. As the President of Parliament, the

11 Speaker --

12 JUDGE JORDA: The last sentence was not

13 translated. The witness took the floor again and I did

14 not get the translation. "I gave you a name", said the

15 witness.

16 A. I said, "You asked for a name and I gave you

17 one."

18 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, thank you. I

19 apologise.

20 MR. NOBILO: So you had certain information

21 or certain doubts, certain suspicions. Did you, as the

22 speaker, take any steps for this matter to be

23 investigated, because of course it is the Assembly's

24 responsibility regarding the use of the army outside

25 its borders. Did you form a commission? Did you put

1 this issue on the agenda of any single meeting and all

2 these are your responsibilities according to the rules

3 of procedure of the Assembly?

4 A. I have no possibility to form any such

5 commissions. This is only the possibility of the

6 Assembly. I was the primus inter pares. What I could

7 do I tried. I asked the Gojko Susak whether there were

8 any of our units in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said no. I

9 asked Franjo Tudjman because, after all, people were

10 contacting me, not only in my office, but also when I

11 had talk shows on the radio and a woman would call me

12 by phone; she would introduce herself and say that her

13 son was in the Croat Army and that he was in

14 Bosnia. I could not establish whether this was true or

15 not. I wanted to check on it and both these people

16 claimed that the Croat Army was not present in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18 Then it was up to me to accept that or not,

19 but I had no other powers because nobody had asked

20 Croatia for the Croat Army to go anywhere outside

21 the Croat territory.

22 Q. But, as the Speaker of Parliament, did you

23 propose an investigating commission? Did you propose

24 that this should be put on the Assembly agenda? Did

25 you make any such proposals?

1 A. If the head of state tells me that there are

2 no Croat soldiers there, what possibility do I have

3 to propose any kind of a commission which would be

4 accepted in the Assembly in which the HDZ has a

5 majority? Please, let us be realistic after all.

6 Q. But the proposal itself would mean a great

7 deal.

8 May I ask for the usher's assistance now? I

9 have another document to show. It is the Official

10 Gazette of the Republic of Croatia where all the laws,

11 conclusions and bylaws are published. A copy for the

12 Registry, the Prosecution and Mr. Mesic. (Handed).

13 It is issue no. 14, for the interpreters.

14 We are talking about Narodne Novine, the

15 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, no. 27,

16 dated 6th April 1993:

17 "The House of Representatives of the Assembly

18 of the Republic of Croatia on 26th March 1993 adopted

19 the following conclusion."

20 I draw your attention to conclusion no. 3.

21 No. 3 states:

22 "The House of Representatives applauds the

23 policy of the President of the Republic of Croatia and

24 the Government of the Republic of Croatia which is

25 based also on the fact that it is in the greatest

1 interest for Croatia for the war to be ended and a

2 political solution to the crisis to be found in the

3 sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

4 This document is signed by the President of

5 the House of Representatives, Stjepan Mesic. Do you

6 remember these conclusions and did you sign them?

7 A. I think there is no doubt about that.

8 Q. So you do confirm that. In the light of what

9 you just said, I am asking you, you signed conclusions

10 which were contrary to the alleged information that you

11 were aware of?

12 A. I do not understand where the contradiction

13 is. May I interpret this? It is in Croatia's interest

14 for the war to end and for questions to be resolved

15 politically in the sovereign state of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was always interested in the

17 Sovereign Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18 Q. So this is, in your view, in conformity with

19 your aspirations at the time?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I have another document, please. I ask for

22 the usher's assistance. This is another issue of the

23 Official Gazette of 10th May 1993. (Handed).

24 For the interpreters, it is document no. 15.

25 It is issue no. 43 of the Narodne Novine of

1 10th May 1993 and the text of the conclusions reads:

2 "Pursuant to Article 113 of the Rules of

3 Procedure of the House of Representatives of the

4 Croat Assembly, the House of Representatives of the

5 Republic of Croatia adopted the following conclusions

6 at its session of 30th April 1993:

7 "(1) The Muslims and Croats, the parties to

8 the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are

9 called upon in the interests of protecting human life,

10 the defence of their historical communality and the

11 sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina from greater Serb

12 aggression to immediately cease all armed conflicts in

13 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with

14 the agreement signed by representatives of both

15 peoples.

16 "(2) The parties to the conflict who are

17 still not abiding by the agreement signed, are called

18 upon to deal with all outstanding problems through

19 their civilian and military representatives.

20 "(3) The House of Representatives of the

21 Croat Assembly notes that the historical

22 togetherness of the Muslims and Croats is a

23 precondition for the survival of both peoples in the

24 state territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a foundation

25 for the preservation of the sovereignty and integrity

1 of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its future.

2 "(4) Both peoples are called upon to join

3 forces and resist the Serb imperialist aggression

4 directed at exterminating both peoples and annexing

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina to 'the Greater Serbia'.

6 "(5) In the aim of supporting a peaceful

7 resolution of existing differences and the preservation

8 of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the

9 friendly neighbouring state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

10 House of Representatives of the Croat Parliament

11 will send a multi-party delegation on a mission of peace

12 and goodwill."

13 The number, dated Zagreb, 30th April 1993,

14 the House of Representatives, the Assembly of the

15 Republic of Croatia, the President of the House of

16 Representatives, Stjepan Mesic.

17 Can you verify this document as being

18 authentic?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Next text with the usher's assistance,

21 please.

22 It is a Declaration on the foreign policy of

23 the Republic of Croatia and we will read only one item

24 referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 Document no. 16 for the interpreters.

1 (Handed).

2 Issue 68 of the Narodni Novine, the Official

3 Gazette, dated 14th July 1993. The title is,

4 "Declaration on the Foreign Policy of the Republic of

5 Croatia", and I am reading only chapter 4:

6 "The state integrity of the independent and

7 sovereign internationally-recognised state of the

8 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is supported as well as

9 the constitutional and legal definition of the state's

10 structure in accord with the agreement of the three

11 constituent peoples."

12 Signed by the President of the House of

13 Representatives, Stjepan Mesic. This Declaration was

14 adopted on 30th June 1993.

15 Can you authenticate this Declaration?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. We have examined and reviewed a whole series

18 of documents, including the list of events that

19 occurred between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of

20 Croatia and you confirm that this was the official

21 policy of the Republic of Croatia which was a positive

22 one in favour of the preservation of the integrity of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but you also said there was a

24 secret policy. I am not asking for your opinion or

25 your conclusions, but I am asking you, what are the

1 grounds on which you claim that Croatia had a secret

2 policy designed to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina? What are

3 the facts?

4 A. There are many, but I shall list just a few.

5 If members of the Croat Parliament go to

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, go to Herceg-Bosna, they are

7 photographed there wearing HVO uniforms, while at the

8 same time being members of the Croat Parliament.

9 Those same people in the Croat Parliament are

10 satanising, to the limit of the permissible, the

11 Muslims and their right to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 Take just the statements of Vice Vukojevic in

13 the Croat Assembly. Take the statements of Ivan

14 Tolj, a general of both armies, about the Muslims and

15 about Bosnia-Herzegovina. Take just the statements of

16 my successor, Miljelovic, referring to the Muslims,

17 what he thought about them and how he demonised the

18 Muslims and the very possibility of the survival of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20 Take what was said about the Muslims in the

21 Croat Parliament by Antun Vrdoljak, who was at the

22 time a deputy and director of Croat television who

23 virtually served to the Croat public what was

24 considered to be the official state policy.

25 Without listing other names, these are

1 sufficient, and this brings me to my conclusion. If I

2 say to Franjo Tudjman that the behaviour of Izetbegovic

3 in the Croat Parliament is impermissible, his

4 vulgarities, his fury and rage against the Muslims --

5 and he does not even call them always Muslim, but

6 refers to them as "Balijas", and when I said that

7 this was harmful for the work of the Parliament, that

8 it undermined the integrity of Croat policy, what

9 should I do? He was President of a committee of the

10 Croat Parliament when he went to Herzegovina and his

11 photograph was taken in uniform and Tudjman said to me,

12 "Well, do something. Have him replaced as head of

13 that committee."

14 I called up Ivan Milas, head of the HDZ club

15 of deputies to carry out this proposal and his response

16 was, "Tudjman had nothing to object about the work of

17 Izetbegovic." On the contrary, whenever I speak to

18 him, he supports what Izetbegovic is doing and that

19 same Izetbegovic was elected to the Croat Parliament

20 at the last elections on the HDZ list.

21 So I think there is no need for me to

22 enumerate other factors serving as grounds for me to

23 see that the policy was -- the policy of double

24 standards, one official one and another one that had

25 disastrous consequences for the Croats in

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the prestige of Croatia as a

2 serious nation in the world.

3 Q. Just one or two final questions. You

4 received various kinds of information being in the

5 position that you were. Have you been able to form any

6 opinion about our client, Mr. Blaskic? Do you perceive

7 him as an extremist, as a moderate person? Have you

8 ever met him?

9 A. I met General Blaskic. All the information I

10 ever received of him was always positive. What I can

11 especially stress is that once I stepped out of --

12 stepped down from the position of Speaker of the

13 Parliament and left the HDZ, I met General Blaskic. He

14 approached me. He shook hands with me and I considered

15 that to be a gracious act since at that time I was no

16 longer a member of the ruling team.

17 Q. And many of the people who used to greet you

18 and shake hands with you before did not?

19 A. Yes, that is correct.

20 Q. Very well, just in conclusion, you are no

21 longer a politician of the ruling party. You are now

22 with an opposition party and, as far as I can tell, I

23 think you are somewhere in the centre of the political

24 spectrum. Is one of the goals of your party the

25 removal of all HDZ from power, and Tudjman, and do you

1 believe that such a process would signal

2 democratisation in Croatia?

3 A. If you want my personal opinion, the Croat

4 People's Party believes that we have replaced a single

5 party system, which was the Communist Party system

6 which did not allow any democratic processes to take

7 hold, and if these democratic processes did happen,

8 they were of short breath and it took a very long time

9 for them to happen.

10 But when the HDZ came into power, even though

11 I was part of that, I disagreed with it in a sense that

12 it again assumed control of the legislative executive

13 power, the media, and again established a monopoly of a

14 single part or of a single movement. In order to

15 change that, it is necessary to either create a new

16 movement and then face the same problem which would be

17 retrograde. We believe that we need several parties,

18 regardless of how strong individually they are. I

19 believe that we need to participate in the political

20 process, that they should go to elections and that

21 eventually they should win.

22 We had elections in the Oljeka Jupanja and we

23 went to elections for the municipal bodies in my town

24 of Orahovica, and there were two lists fielded in this

25 election. I was leading one and the other one was led

1 by Franjo Tudjman, and a pro-fascist Croat party of

2 the right led by Mr. Djapic and they are known by such

3 things as -- for instance, about a month ago, they

4 visited Vukovar in about 100 black limousines with

5 black shirts, black flags, and singing songs from World

6 War II with fascist salutes and with black thoughts in

7 their minds.

8 So this is the coalition partner of the HDZ.

9 However, fortunately, we, the united opposition, won

10 and I believe that we will win in the next elections,

11 if you are interested in that.

12 Q. Yes, I am interested in that. You believe in

13 the victory over the HDZ and Franjo Tudjman?

14 A. Do not be fooled by the composition of the

15 Croat Parliament. The next elections will show the

16 foolishness of it and we will meet again and you will

17 be proud that you were once a member of my party.

18 Q. Do you believe that it would be a great

19 watershed, a great cross-roads if this happened?

20 JUDGE JORDA: I am afraid that this

21 discussion, which is certainly interested, does not

22 really concern the Trial Chamber. Have you finished,

23 Mr. Nobilo?

24 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I have concluded,

25 but I believe there is a direct connection there.

1 Thank you, but I have concluded.

2 JUDGE JORDA: I just understand that

3 Mr. Mesic is recruiting members.

4 A. No, I already have members.

5 JUDGE JORDA: Very well.

6 MR. NOBILO: I have completed my

7 cross-examination. I thought it was important to note

8 that Mr. Mesic had certain political aims, he had them

9 in 1992-93. He has them today, but I should now like

10 to tender into evidence the videotape with the French

11 and English translation. That is one exhibit. Then

12 also the Official Gazettes. These are the last three

13 that I referred to. If Mr. Dubuisson could help me with

14 the numbers, the one dated 10th May 1993, the other one

15 of 6th April 1993 and of 14th July 1993. Four exhibits

16 that I should like to tender, three issues of the

17 Official Gazette and one videotape with the transcript

18 translated into French and English. Mr. Prosecutor, you

19 no longer have the same objections?

20 MR. HARMON: No objection.

21 MR. NOBILO: There was a newspaper that was

22 not authenticated.

23 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. I have just been

24 told what has been requested and what has not.

25 Perhaps the Prosecutor has certain additional

1 questions to put to the witness. It is his right to

2 re-examine, after which the judges may have some

3 questions for the witness. Mr. Prosecutor?

4 MR. HARMON: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

5 Mr. Mesic, you were asked questions about

6 various conversations you had with Mr. Boban. Can you

7 tell the Chamber how he referred to Muslims in those

8 conversations?

9 A. I knew Mr. Boban since about 1967, 1968. We

10 were fairly close, which is why I mentioned my

11 discussions with him. However, after the conflict with

12 Muslims -- and I had not noticed this before about him,

13 he never called them Muslims. He always used an ugly

14 expression. He called them Balijus, in a sense that we

15 could not get along with the Balijus and that

16 co-existence with them was impossible and we needed to

17 part ways.

18 Q. Very briefly, can you describe to the judges

19 what the term "Baliju" means? Is it a perjorative

20 term?

21 A. As far as the information that I possess, it

22 is an expression from the Turkish days and it referred

23 to the lowest stratum of -- let us say something that

24 would be akin to the lumpen proletariat.

25 Q. Now I would like to turn your attention to --

1 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, because you know

2 this is being translated. The lowest strata of

3 society? We cannot use "the lumpen proletariat". How

4 would you translate that? The serf proletariat. Thank

5 you.

6 A. Something like that. Something like that.

7 MR. HARMON: How did President Tudjman

8 characterise President Izetbegovic and his political

9 views?

10 A. I believe that President Tudjman did not know

11 Mr. Izetbegovic very well and I -- if you allow me, I

12 believe that I knew him somewhat better because we were

13 represented by the same lawyer, same attorney in the

14 previous regime. When he came out of prison and when I

15 came out of prison, we met and I can tell you that we

16 had friendly relations. I believe that President

17 Tudjman was mistaken by placing President Izetbegovic

18 among the Muslim fundamentalists.

19 I believe that Mr. Izetbegovic is a truly

20 religious man. I think that he is a moral person. I

21 think that he is a wise man. He entered politics

22 without any major previous political experience. He

23 certainly knew what was done in politics and what

24 politicians were doing to one another, and maybe this

25 is why he could -- he was a bit awkward at first, but

1 he was a moral person, an honest person and a wise

2 person, and I think that this is a fitting description

3 of him.

4 Q. Was he a moderate in your view?

5 A. I believe that he was moderate and let me

6 tell you --

7 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I thought of

8 raising an objection earlier on, but I changed my

9 mind. I never asked a single question about Mr. Alija

10 Izetbegovic. I had planned to do it, but I thought it

11 was not important, so I simply did not ask a single

12 question about Alija Izetbegovic, so I think I am

13 entitled to object to these questions.

14 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, but I was going to add

15 that you are asking a question regarding the political

16 opinions of Alija Izetbegovic, so please proceed to

17 your next question.

18 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Mr. President.

19 Mr. Nobilo asked you a question in respect of

20 whether Muslims refugees from Bosnia were housed and

21 fed in Croatia. My question is: did the State of

22 Croatia receive foreign aid and assistance in respect

23 of housing and feeding those refugees and could you

24 describe the types of foreign aid that Croatia

25 received?

1 A. It is true. A large number of refugees were

2 in Croatia and there were a -- they were a great

3 burden. It was both in terms of accommodation and in

4 feeding and organising life for these refugees, for

5 these displaced persons. And Croatia needed the

6 donors' assistance. I do not know what amount of

7 assistance it was. I know that there was never an

8 objection that this food and everything else that was

9 needed for the refugees was not sufficient. That means

10 that, both in terms of money and food, this assistance

11 was actually sufficient in real terms.

12 Q. You also testified yesterday that one high

13 state official from the State of Croatia said, and I

14 quote:

15 "We must make life so unbearable for them

16 that they will want to leave."

17 First of all, who made that statement? Which

18 high state official made that particular statement?

19 A. I must give you the context within which this

20 was done and then if you insist, I can tell you who it

21 was who stated it. When the war broke out between

22 Bosnia and Croats, when the armed conflict started and

23 when victims started piling up, there was a great

24 pressure in Croatia and great criticism of the Croat

25 authorities about why they were keeping Bosnian

1 refugees in Croat camps. And the Minister of Social

2 Affairs at that time, Mate Granic, who now is the

3 Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that such an

4 impossible situation would be created for them that

5 they would have to leave, so that other countries would

6 receive them and that they would not be a burden on

7 Croatia.

8 Q. Now, you were asked a series of questions by

9 Mr. Nobilo about whether Croatia was a transit country

10 through which both humanitarian aid and weapons went

11 into Bosnia. You said that, yes, that in fact was the

12 case, but that Croatia itself kept a portion of the

13 arms and the humanitarian aid as the price for

14 permitting the transit to take place. Have I fairly

15 characterised your answer to yesterday's question?

16 A. Since this is a closed session, then maybe we

17 can say certain things that would not go out in public,

18 otherwise I would not dare say so. We were under an

19 embargo, so we were not supposed to receive any arms.

20 However, yes, we had to get arms, both we and Bosnians,

21 because it was an absurd situation. We were victims of

22 an aggression and we had an embargo on import of

23 weapons. In other words, we would be just served on a

24 matter to the Serbs that way. So the assistance did

25 come and there was always agreement on how much of this

1 was to be left to Croatia, both because of the needs

2 and the risks that Croatia was taking because of the

3 embargo.

4 On one occasion -- actually, on more than one

5 occasion, I asked Alija Izetbegovic whether he was

6 satisfied with this kind of arrangement. He said,

7 "I would be satisfied if another portion did not stay

8 behind in Herzegovina." Which portion of that stayed

9 behind, the amount, I too I do not know.

10 Q. Have you any idea and are you able to tell

11 the Trial Chamber what percentage of the arms that

12 transmitted through Croatia were taken by Croatia?

13 A. It is hard for me so say, because there were

14 different arrangements. There were different sources

15 of this material. It would be somewhere between 10 and

16 20 per cent.

17 Q. Do you know what happened to the arms and the

18 humanitarian aid once it transmitted through Croatia

19 and went into Herzegovina-Bosnia? Did the authorities

20 there also extract a share of the arms intended for the

21 Bosnian central Government?

22 A. Yes. Yes, there were such occurrences.

23 Q. I believe you testified that -- to put it

24 into context -- Mr. Izetbegovic's statement to you about

25 how much arms he received, you cited an example in

1 yesterday's testimony that in fact there were occasions

2 that you knew of when arms intended for relief in the

3 siege of Sarajevo did not make it to Sarajevo because

4 they were interdicted in Vukovar by the HDO?

5 JUDGE JORDA: Please limit yourself to the

6 cross-examination, Mr. Harmon. Let us not restart the

7 examination-in-chief. Thank you. Go on to another

8 question, please.

9 MR. HARMON: My last question: in the course

10 of the cross-examination, it has been suggested by the

11 cross-examination that because you are a politician in

12 Croatia and because you oppose President Tudjman in the

13 political arena, that your testimony in The Hague in

14 closed session is politically motivated. Do you care

15 to comment on that?

16 A. Objectively speaking, by this testimony, I am

17 only going to suffer political damage. I do not have

18 any -- I do not benefit from this and since this is a

19 closed session, this is going to be my approach for the

20 public too. I accept the rules of this court and after

21 this testimony I am not -- I am going to observe the

22 rules and I am not going to interpret what the other

23 side or a third side or somebody outside may offer, but

24 if somebody wanted to use my testimony in political

25 ways, it is Mr. Tudjman.

1 When I gave my first statement to the

2 investigators of the Tribunal, and I had to do it

3 because there is a law in Croatia which calls for

4 cooperation with the Tribunal, and as a legalist

5 I abide by that and I testify about what I know.

6 However, Mr. Tudjman somehow got the record of my

7 statement to the investigators. He brought the

8 media -- representatives of the media that he controls

9 and all this was then splashed all over the media and

10 offered to the public, because other witnesses needed

11 to be intimidated by my being accused for high

12 treason.

13 You have to bear in mind that last month,

14 during the Congress of his party, its President said,

15 and this could only have referred to me -- he never

16 named me, my name -- he said, "In the union protests,

17 which was organised by four unions, which was set for

18 the main square in Zagreb, 12,000 policemen came out to

19 suppress this manifestation organised by the unions",

20 and I was in the organising committee of this protest.

21 And his Congress, President Tudjman said, "In the

22 organising committee of this union protest, there are

23 persons who testify and slander Croatia in The Hague.

24 I thank him for addressing me in the plural, because

25 that means that is a sign of respect that he has of me.

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Mesic.

2 Thank you, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Judge Riad.

4 JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, Mr. Mesic. I

5 would like to ask you first a specific question. Do

6 you have any knowledge of the concrete position of

7 Colonel Blaskic in the Lasva Valley? Was he, to your

8 knowledge, the undisputed commander of the area or was

9 it some kind of divided and anarchic region?

10 A. I cannot say unequivocally what position and

11 what chain of command -- where in the chain of command

12 General Blaskic was. I only know that he was a

13 military man, that he was in the HVO, that he was a

14 professional soldier, and people whom I met told me

15 positive things about him. But I do not know his place

16 in the chain of command.

17 Q. You spoke of the HVO. The HVO was

18 disciplined, military division or was there some kind

19 of insubordination and lack of authority throughout the

20 various levels of commanding?

21 A. Since this army was being established in a

22 chaotic situation, it is certain that these lines of

23 communication did not function fully. But, in my view,

24 this army, compared in relation to Croatia and its

25 Ministry of Defence, it was in a subordinate position,

1 so I assumed that the orders on many operations came

2 from there, because oftentimes the operations of the

3 Croat Army were coordinated with those of the HVO.

4 Q. So you think the policy was determined by the

5 high authority in Zagreb and it was executed in the

6 Lasva Valley?

7 A. My views are based on what I know and Mate

8 Boban, as President of the HDZ and President of the

9 Croat community of Herzegovina-Bosnia, always

10 claimed that he was exclusively implementing the Zagreb

11 policy and that he did not have his own policy and

12 Zagreb meant the top of the Croat leadership.

13 Q. You mentioned during your testimony that once

14 in a discussion with Markovic, he mentioned that there

15 was no official decision for cleansing of the Muslims,

16 but he told you in practice they managed to make sure

17 that no Muslim was left. Did you understand how this

18 came to happen? Was it through terrorising the

19 population in order to run away or was it through --

20 not to say genocide, but at least killing and

21 extermination? Do you have any idea how they managed

22 to have no Muslim left, according to Mr. Markovic?

23 A. Pero Markovic?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. This is one example, but it was known that

1 after the conflict between Bosniak Muslims and Croats,

2 many Bosniks who were in the HVO were disarmed and many

3 of them ended up in camps. It is known that in many

4 towns, there were -- pressure was exerted so that

5 people were leaving, but the most important example to

6 me was the one of Mostar when I sent a delegation which

7 was going to find facts about what was going on there

8 and, upon their return, they told me that there were a

9 large number of Muslims from the surrounding villages,

10 villages surrounding Mostar, and that they came into

11 the city, so that the demographic complexion changed,

12 not by their own will.

13 They had to come. They were forced to come

14 to Mostar. So now that this ethnic balance changed,

15 which would have changed after the war because

16 everybody would go back to where they came from, there

17 was additional pressure to expel these people out of

18 Mostar during the war and the television broadcast this

19 and this was clear to everyone. If people were taken

20 away in columns of trucks, they were not doing it

21 because they wanted that. It was because they were

22 pressured into doing so. That is when I asked the

23 mayor of Capljina, Pero Markovic. I asked him what was

24 the relations between Muslims and Croats there. I do

25 not know what the percentages were, but the percentage

1 of Bosniks in Capljina was, I think, maybe 5 or 6 per

2 cent. I may be wrong, but I know that it was a small

3 percentage.

4 He said we have no conflicts because we

5 cleansed them all. Cleansed in what way? It was

6 obvious that people left under pressure. I do not know

7 what the situation is there now.

8 Q. Thank you. Just a more general question.

9 You said that Mr. Tudjman was openly in favour of the

10 frontiers established in Banovina in 1938, if I

11 understood rightly, and this was reiterated in the

12 meeting of Karadordevo between Tudjman and Milosevic.

13 What was the place of the Lasva Valley in this map

14 which was already started in Banovina? Where would the

15 Lasva Valley go and what was the general idea about it?

16 A. Yes, Tudjman believed that this was the

17 greatest achievement the Croats had. That is, the

18 greatest achievement of the Croats were the borders

19 from the Banovina times. Whether that was true or not,

20 but that was what he said after Karadordevo, that

21 Bosnia could survive, that we would get the Banovina

22 borders, plus Cazin, Kladusa and Bihac. As for this

23 part, I think it was also encompassed by the former

24 Banovina. That is, it was within the Banovina borders,

25 the Lasva River valley.

1 Q. So it was supposed to belong to Croatia?

2 A. Yes. That is what I think when I look at the

3 map.

4 Q. And in that case, you would apply the

5 humane -- what you called the -- what was the word?

6 The humane transfer of people?

7 A. Yes. It is called humane transfer or

8 resettlement.

9 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

10 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabuddeen?

11 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Mr. Mesic, would I be

12 right in supposing that in Croatia, there were other

13 Croats who, like you, opposed the use of force by

14 Croats against Muslims in Herceg-Bosna?

15 A. Yes, that is the main difference between the

16 opposition in Serbia and the opposition in Croatia.

17 The Serb opposition, or the relevant part. I must

18 admit, for the sake of truth, there are many honourable

19 people. There are groups that are against the

20 formation of a greater Serbia, against the war, against

21 Milosevic's policy. But the radical, the relevant

22 opposition, the radicals and how else they call

23 themselves, Draskovic's party, they are all reproaching

24 Milosevic for not having achieved his war goals. So

25 there is not any great difference amongst them. They

1 are attacking Milosevic because he failed to achieve a

2 Greater Serbia.

3 On the other hand, in Croatia, the opposition

4 is criticising the Government for allowing the conflict

5 to break out between the Croats and the Bosniaks. The

6 position was, let us not try and pinpoint the culprits,

7 but let us put an end to that conflict as soon as

8 possible and go forward.

9 People like me, who were against such a

10 conflict, are quite numerous, in my opinion.

11 Q. Now let us pass to this question as to

12 whether you personally witnessed the making of any

13 official decision for the use of force by Croats

14 against Muslims in Herzeg-Bosna.

15 Would I be understanding your position to be

16 this, that, no, you did not personally witness the

17 making of any such decision, but that you held

18 important positions and you were in touch with

19 important persons within the leadership, in that your

20 understanding was that they collectively understood it

21 to be the policy of Croatia to sanction the use of

22 force by Croats against Muslims in Herzeg-Bosna?

23 A. I must explicitly say that I was never

24 present when a decision was taken on the use of force

25 by Croatia against the Bosniaks, but I must also add,

1 that when the crime in Ahmici was committed, because I

2 was in touch with Mate Boban, I said to him, "Tell me,

3 because the crime is great. Have you conducted an

4 investigation to find out who did it?" He said, "Yes,

5 we did, and we established that the people who did it

6 wore black uniforms".

7 I then asked, "I did not ask you what colour

8 uniforms they wore, but who wore those uniforms?" And

9 he said, "They could have even been Serbs." As far as

10 I am familiar with that part of the country, he either

11 does not know or he did not conduct an investigation or

12 he was lying.

13 Q. Could I revert to one little aspect of my

14 question? That is, whether the impression you

15 collected from other members within the leadership was

16 that it was in fact the policy of Croatia to use force

17 against Muslims in Herzeg-Bosna.

18 A. One could have come to such a conclusion, at

19 least I did, on the basis of a number of events, but

20 one is particularly impressive. There was a military

21 formation in Bosnia-Herzegovina called HOS, H-O-S,

22 which included both Bosniaks and Croats and they fought

23 together against the aggressor.

24 At one point in time, an assassination was

25 organised of General Blaz Kraljevic, who was the

1 commander of those forces. His escort consisted of

2 almost half Muslims, half Croats. I do not know the

3 exact number. They were killed on a road. They were

4 ambushed and liquidated. I never heard who accounted

5 for that crime.

6 Q. Could I go to this other aspect? Defence

7 counsel -- and I am sure you appreciate this -- as was

8 his duty, examined you as to the relationship between

9 the statements you are now making in court and various

10 statements which you made while the conflict was in

11 progress. Now, would I be correct that in your

12 political experience, there is such an idea as not

13 rocking the boat. That is to say, that a senior

14 political figure would have to hold the balance very

15 prudently between allegiance to the policy officially

16 set and his private convictions. Have you encountered

17 that sort of feeling in the course of your political

18 life?

19 A. One thing is certainly true, that I

20 persistently advocated the Defence of Bosnia. Not only

21 by the Bosniaks, but by the Serbs and the Croats who

22 wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina, because that was the only

23 chance for it to survive. Because I was convinced that

24 if Milosevic succeeded in breaking up Bosnia, that

25 would be tragic for Croatia, because regardless of all

1 agreements, it is highly questionable whether Croatia

2 could have survived or whether Greater Serbia would

3 have been formed, even at the expense of our own

4 territories.

5 So that when I held a high position in the

6 HDZ and in the Government, I always apparently accepted

7 the official policies which were in favour of the

8 survival of Bosnia, but I also always underlined that

9 there has to be cooperation, that there must not be

10 anymore war, that we should have a joint command

11 between the HVO and the BiH army, which I think has

12 still not been fully realised, because only such a

13 single command can ensure a victory in a war with

14 minimum casualties, because if there are several

15 commands, the consequences are always tragic.

16 Finally, let me try and summarise. I was an

17 advocate of a united resistance against the aggressor.

18 I was for a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, but as a senior

19 official, I could not directly clash, though it could

20 have been seen from my interviews so that President

21 Tudjman, in December 1993, proposed that I should

22 resign my post as Speaker of Parliament, that I should

23 go to Grenoble or to Spa for a couple of months, Spa in

24 Belgium, for additional study of the French language,

25 and to choose whatever ambassadorial post I wanted,

1 because he could not come to any kind of agreement with

2 Milosevic while I was at the head of Parliament,

3 because I had said that he had to hang.

4 Namely, this was something I told Milosevic

5 in his face, that the Serbs would hang him at the main

6 square in Belgrade at Terazije when they failed to

7 achieve their wartime goals, which he had advocated

8 because he had planned the war.

9 I also asked him, when hanging, to think of

10 me and that I would think of him. I stated that in

11 public, but obviously this bothered him so much that he

12 must have pressurised Tudjman to remove me from this

13 high position and after some time, I actually did

14 leave.

15 Q. Let me put it this way and as simply as I

16 can. In this closed session and before this court, do

17 you feel freer to speak your mind than during the

18 troubled years when there was conflict between Croats

19 and Muslims in Herzeg-Bosna?

20 A. Yes, certainly I feel freer here, but life in

21 Croatia in those days did not have a very high price.

22 Q. May I ask you this question, which may seem

23 redundant to you, but which is important to the court:

24 are you saying to the court that your testimony today

25 is the truth?

1 A. It is the truth.

2 Q. May I ask you a little question about what I

3 shall call the dual track policy of Croatia, which you

4 have described. That is, on the one hand, there would

5 be formal proclamations by the Croat authorities

6 respecting the territorial integrity of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8 On the other hand, there would be a policy of

9 seeking to divide that country. Should I understand

10 you this way, that in the judgement of the Croat

11 authorities, the successful implementation of the

12 policy of division depended on continued assertion of

13 the policy respecting the territorial integrity of the

14 country?

15 A. True. In that way, the Croat official

16 policy managed to side-step criticism of the

17 international community because it publicly supported

18 the survival of a sovereign state, whereas the other

19 track was in the opposite direction.

20 To take just one example, Fikret Abdic, who

21 was also trying to break up Bosnia-Herzegovina because

22 he proclaimed Western Bosnia as an autonomous region

23 without this having any grounds in the constitution of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He spent most of his time in

25 Zagreb, but at the same time, he had contacts with

1 Milosevic and his regime. He would purchase vast

2 quantities of gas, allegedly for his own needs, from

3 firms in Zagreb, and it was clear that he was selling

4 that same oil to our common aggressor. So if we look

5 at this mosaic, then the whole picture appears quite

6 different from what it may appear and what it is

7 proclaimed to be in public.

8 Q. Let me ask you this other question which

9 concerns the transit of arms through Croatia and

10 Herceg-Bosna to Sarajevo.

11 Would I be understanding you correctly to

12 mean this, that from the perception of the Croat

13 governmental authorities, it was to the advantage of

14 Croatia that Bosnia-Herzegovina should continue to

15 resist the Serbs militarily?

16 A. Yes, this is a matter which has several

17 layers to it. It was impossible to stop assisting

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina because it would have been accused

19 by everyone who supported Croatia's independence, on

20 the grounds that it was not supporting another

21 sovereign state, and thereby its policies would be

22 compromised. But now that that aid was being given, it

23 had to be reduced to such a level that it would not

24 hinder the fulfilment of Croat political goals, so,

25 you see, a balance had to be struck and the aid came

1 from various quarters.

2 Q. Would I be correct in understanding you to

3 mean this, that to the extent that Croatia permitted

4 the transit of arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the transit

5 of arms so effected, accorded with the interests of the

6 Government of Croatia?

7 A. Yes. I would not say the Government. I

8 would rather say that part of the policy which had

9 double tracks, because it was possible to measure how

10 much aid should be given without damaging Croatia,

11 while at the same time being in contact with the

12 international factors which wanted the survival of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and which pinpointed the main

14 problems in those areas.

15 Q. You are quite correct in qualifying my

16 question by limiting it to the second of the two

17 tracks.

18 Here is my last question. It concerns your

19 position as Speaker. You remember Defence counsel was

20 asking you whether, as Speaker, it was not your duty to

21 put on the agenda of the House of Representatives an

22 item concerning the service rendered by Croat

23 soldiers within the Croat community across the

24 border.

25 I am a little unclear. You would understand

1 why I am unclear as to what exactly were the rules of

2 procedure in the House of Representatives. Would I be

3 right in supposing -- I may well be wrong -- that where

4 a substantive item was concerned, that item could only

5 be discussed on a motion made from the floor and not on

6 the initiative of the Speaker. As I said, I may be

7 wrong, but I do not know.

8 A. The actual procedure for putting an item on

9 the agenda was such that the initiative would come from

10 the Government, through the parliamentary commissions,

11 to the President of the Assembly, the Speaker. And,

12 after a certain time period, it was up to him to put it

13 on the agenda.

14 The other possibility would be for committees

15 of the Parliament to reach the conclusion to have an

16 item placed on the agenda and then again, with a

17 certain time period, if this is approved, that item

18 would appear on the agenda.

19 A deputy himself could propose something to

20 be put on the agenda, but then again, he had to go

21 through this procedure, either to go through the

22 Government and hear its opinion, or through the

23 parliamentary committees, who would then put it on the

24 agenda. But since in the parliamentary committees and

25 in the Government, the majority was held by the party

1 in power, they would halt such a procedure or such an

2 item if it were not quite in accord with the official

3 policy. Therefore, no matter how much we might insist

4 in Parliament that foreign affairs be placed on the

5 agenda, Croatia's policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina,

6 events there, et cetera, things would not pass this

7 filter and it was simply not possible to put such items

8 on the agenda in this way because this filter, that is

9 the monopoly of power, prevented a public debate.

10 So, you see, to this day, the issue of the

11 state audit of financial expenditures of a number of

12 ministries has not been put on the agenda. It is

13 simply not possible. So the ministries have no control

14 over them and their spending.

15 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I am obliged to you,

16 Mr. Mesic. Thank you.

17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Mesic, I am going to keep

18 you for a few more moments, not ask questions which

19 were already asked, but to make sure that you might be

20 able to leave before lunch time. So if you could answer

21 me relatively quickly. Of course, answer as you feel

22 you have to.

23 The Vance-Owen Plan was not ratified by the

24 Assembly. What was your opinion? What was your

25 influence over Mr. Tudjman? How do you see this? Could

1 you tell us this quickly?

2 A. The Vance-Owen Plan was not adopted by the

3 Serb side. They signed it, but the Serb Assembly

4 did not adopt it. There was a deadline by which they

5 had to sign it and they did not and the Croat and

6 the Bosnian side accepted it, but I think that it was

7 lucky for Bosnia-Herzegovina that it was not accepted,

8 because it had contributed to the grouping of

9 populations and their movement from one part to

10 another.

11 Q. What was your opinion? Did you think it was

12 a good thing? The plan, I mean.

13 A. I must say that I personally was against the

14 plan, because I forecast how it would end. Even though

15 I had hoped that the people would dilute the plan, in

16 the sense that all three peoples would remain

17 constituent peoples in all the cantons. That would be

18 a kind of control mechanism, because if in each of the

19 entities, all three were constituent, then this would

20 be salvation for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 Q. Thank you. In another area, you said that

22 there was no official budgetary envelope for any

23 assistance that could be given to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24 Do you have any idea what the actual budgetary circuits

25 were, the parallel circuits were -- I suppose they were

1 parallel.

2 A. Since I personally was always very well

3 informed regarding the budget, because, after all, the

4 most important act of any state is the law and the

5 budget, because it determines how funds are spent. But

6 I can claim to this day that there is not a single item

7 in the Croat budget. At least I am not aware of it.

8 Q. I understood that. I was asking you

9 something else.

10 A. There was no evidence of any sums being spent

11 in Herceg-Bosna or anywhere else. The only possibility

12 was for the Defence Ministry to spend funds out of its

13 own budget, but that ministry was not under our

14 control. The Ministry of the Interior could be

15 financing the police. The Ministry of Health, the

16 health. The Ministry of Education, the education in

17 another state.

18 Q. You do not have to say anything else. I

19 would just like to say that in the position that you

20 occupied, that you should have known that the Ministry

21 of Defence would have to also vote the budget, like in

22 all budgets of ministries throughout the world. Well,

23 it does not really matter.

24 As regards the leaders of the Bosnia

25 Croats -- perhaps they worked with General Blaskic or

1 perhaps he was one of them. What did they come to do

2 and if they were coming for orders, was there an idea

3 of a joint command that was ever mentioned at the time

4 of the war?

5 A. They certainly came for orders, because that

6 was the only way to explain it.

7 Q. Was the question of a more official command

8 ever raised?

9 A. The command could only have been in Zagreb,

10 because we know that when joint operations were

11 conducted, everything was done within the framework of

12 the Croat leadership.

13 Q. In other words, are you now saying that

14 General Blaskic was getting his orders from the

15 Croat military command?

16 A. I do not know who General Blaskic received

17 orders from, but Mate Boban certainly received his

18 orders from Zagreb.

19 Q. You also said about an article in Globus that

20 at no point did we plan for a war against the Muslims.

21 When you say "we", it was when you were part of the

22 most official structures. You said at least officially

23 we never planned for war. Was it ever planned

24 unofficially? Do you know something about that?

25 A. What I had meant was that the state

1 leadership consisting of the legislative and executive

2 power and also the political leadership, never had such

3 a topic on which we could officially voice an opinion,

4 but the only possibility was that talks and agreements

5 may have been made that I did not participate in,

6 because the people who came to Zagreb did not always go

7 to those addresses where it would have been logical for

8 them to go.

9 To be more concrete, if in 1992 I was

10 President of the executive board of HDZ and a

11 delegation of the HDZ is coming from --

12 Q. What month in 1992? What month was it?

13 A. The whole of 1992 until the very end. And a

14 delegation comes to Zagreb, they never came to see me

15 in the party, because I was there professionally. As

16 of January 1st 1992, I was physically on the premises

17 of the HDZ, but they never came to see me. They always

18 went to see President Tudjman. So I had this same

19 complaint when I was in Belgrade, when Jovic met with

20 representatives of Serbs in Croatia, especially with

21 Milan Babic, the President of the so-called Krajina.

22 He never came to see me. He always went to see Bora

23 Jovic.

24 Q. Exactly at what point do you situate your

25 change of political position? I am not talking about

1 Mr. Tudjman who in December of 1993 said that you would

2 be a wonderful ambassador in a country somewhere far

3 from Croatia. But at what point? You said, "All of a

4 sudden, I could no longer keep my position. I was not

5 in the official spheres. I was against the positions

6 there." At what point do you situate this profound

7 internal change?

8 A. It is a time that cannot be actually

9 pinpointed as a date. It is a period in which a

10 decision matures. Most people in other parties were my

11 friends even before the democratic changes. With some

12 of them, I had been in gaol. I had socialised with

13 some of them within opposition circles during the

14 former regime and they now belonged to different

15 parties, but I continued to be friends with them

16 regardless. However, such a structuring of the HDZ

17 developed as if those who were not members were not

18 good Croats, as if they were not patriots.

19 The HDZ started to become sufficient for

20 its. Everyone else was no longer just in opposition to

21 the HDZ, but they were enemies of the state. This is

22 something that I could not stand. I was also bothered

23 by the excessive centralisation. The Minister of

24 Police, for instance, would decide where the sheriff in

25 any outlandish municipality -- who would be there.

1 When the Minister of Health decides who the director of

2 a health centre will be; when the Minister of Education

3 decides who will be the principal in every school. All

4 of this bothered me, but the dot on the "i" was, after

5 all, the policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. I thought

6 that this was disastrous for Croatia.

7 That, in my view, was the line when I split

8 from the official policy.

9 Q. I have the feeling you always divided between

10 the official position. Mr. Nobilo showed this in all

11 the articles that he cited. Then this other position

12 which you yourself said was a kind of slow evolution.

13 Finally, what was your real contribution to

14 this underground position, the influence that became

15 less and less important. But do you have any specific

16 concrete facts or concrete things that can show us that

17 while you may have said to Globus that you supported

18 the official position, that actually you did not. Did

19 you have any concrete facts? It is important for the

20 Tribunal to know what is the profound credibility of a

21 testimony which is so difficult to perceive.

22 I am not trying to criticise you at all. I

23 understand that in this tragic situation it is easy to

24 make analysis after the fact than before or during, but

25 the Tribunal would like to know what you concretely

1 did, even for the Muslims. What did you do

2 concretely? Did you say at any point in private

3 discussions with Mr. Tudjman, "This is not acceptable.

4 It cannot go on like this. I am going to resign

5 publicly." Did you do something like that or was it a

6 kind of lofty influence that you might have had? If

7 you do not want to answer, you do not have to.

8 A. Not only subtle influence. There were many

9 debates with President Tudjman when he tried -- or,

10 actually, I was very popular, which I must say that I

11 personally did not like. And Tudjman wanted to have

12 him on his side, and that is why he kept persuading me

13 to stay on in politics, that politics needed me, but I

14 was parting ways with those policies. I had several

15 talks with him and he kept saying to me, how come I do

16 not understand the Bosnian situation? How come I

17 cannot understand what it is he wants in

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

19 In these debates of ours, each one of us had

20 his own threshold as to how far he could go. That I

21 did not stand by and watch is proven by the fact that

22 23 deputies promised to resign from the Parliament, but

23 only 11 actually did, which means that I tried to win

24 support from within to change the attitude towards

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1 This policy of mine was understood by

2 representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They would meet

3 with me, both Silajdzic and Alija Izetbegovic, and many

4 representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina, when they came

5 to, Zagreb, they would always come to visit me because

6 they realised that I was struggling for a different

7 kind of policy, for a different relationship towards

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9 To be even more specific, before leaving for

10 his visit with the Pope, Alija Izetbegovic sent me a

11 message by telephone that he would like to meet with me

12 and that he would like me to organise a meeting with

13 President Tudjman for him. I said I would be glad to

14 do that, but President Tudjman is on a visit to China

15 and he is coming back tomorrow.

16 He said, "Fine, I will come with the Prime

17 Minister, Silajdzic, tomorrow to Zagreb and, please,

18 when you meet Tudjman, tell him I want to talk to him,

19 because you usually go and meet him." We ended that

20 telephone conversation. The two of them came to Zagreb

21 and together with my deputies, we sat down in my office

22 and he said the following: "I have three proposals for

23 Franjo Tudjman. One is that the Bosnian side replace

24 all those commanders in the Bosnian Army which is

25 requested by the Croat side in Bosnia, on condition

1 that the Croat side also replace the commanders who

2 have compromised themselves in Bosnia as requested by

3 the Bosnian side".

4 The second proposal was for Croatia to sign

5 an agreement and to do everything it can through the

6 preliminary proceedings for a confederation between

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. A third proposal was

8 that the Croat General, Martin Spegelj, should take

9 over command over the Bosnian Army to show that they

10 were not fundamentalists, but that they were struggling

11 for the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina and they trusted

12 him as a professional.

13 So I am telling you this because these were

14 the kind of topics they came to discuss with me because

15 they recognised this double track policy.

16 Q. Thank you. I have a last question which

17 refers back to some of the questions that Judge

18 Shahabuddeen asked, but looking at things from a

19 different angle.

20 If you were to give an interview after this

21 testimony, once you have returned home, would you

22 consider that you failed in your obligations toward the

23 Tribunal? In other words, would you say, "I simply

24 will not give any interviews once I get back", having

25 to do with this testimony, of course.

1 A. My opinion is that my obligation to cooperate

2 with The Hague Tribunal should not have been

3 politicised. This was done by others, I must say at my

4 expense, but also at the expense of the convincingness

5 of Croatia. Since we have here agreed that I should

6 testify in closed session, it is my obligation not to

7 comment on what was said at this closed session. As

8 for what happens in open session, that I am free to

9 comment on.

10 JUDGE JORDA: I have no further questions,

11 but I believe that Judge Riad wanted to ask a

12 question. I would like to apologise to the

13 interpreters, but at the suggestion of my -- that is to

14 say we will begin again at 2.45.

15 I would like to thank you, Mr. Mesic. It was

16 important and historical testimony. You occupied very

17 important positions and the Tribunal must have as

18 complete as vision as possible about what happened in

19 respect of General Blaskic's responsibilities. These

20 are command responsibilities. You did this and the

21 Tribunal is appreciative to you for your cooperation

22 and hopes it will not turn against you, but that, on

23 your side, you will not provoke any possibilities that

24 this would turn against you. Each side has to do its

25 best. The Tribunal has assured you the best protection

1 as possible. You must do the same. Having said this,

2 the judges would like to thank you for your

3 contribution.

4 We will now suspend the hearing and resume at

5 2.45.

6 (1.30 pm)

7 (A short adjournment)

8 (Open session)

9 (2.52pm)

10 (The accused entered court)

11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, who is the next

12 witness, please?

13 MR. HARMON: Good afternoon, Mr. President,

14 your Honours, and counsel. Our next witness is

15 Mr. Paddy Ashdown.

16 JUDGE JORDA: In accordance with what we

17 always do, please tell the Trial Chamber what the main

18 points of this testimony are, and how this testimony

19 fits into the principal counts in the indictment

20 against General Blaskic.

21 MR. HARMON: Mr. Ashdown will first of all at

22 my request testify about his professional background.

23 Mr. Ashdown is a Member of Parliament in the UK and he

24 is the Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in that

25 country. He will first summarise his experiences in

1 the Former Yugoslavia and then he will testify about a

2 conversation that he had with President Franjo Tudjman

3 on 6 May 1995. The Prosecutor will present as evidence

4 a copy of a map that was drawn by President Tudjman and

5 annotations that were made by Mr. Ashdown.

6 Mr. President and your Honours, his testimony

7 is relevant to paragraphs 5.0 and 5.1 of the

8 indictment, which allege the existence of an

9 international armed conflict, and it is relevant to all

10 grave breaches counts in the indictment, that is counts

11 5, 8, 11, 15, 17 and 19.

12 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. If I understood

13 what you have just said, the testimony will deal more

14 specifically with the conversations that the witness

15 had with Mr. Franjo Tudjman; is that right?

16 MR. HARMON: That is correct, Mr. President.

17 JUDGE JORDA: And that you will focus on

18 whether or not there was an international armed

19 conflict.

20 MR. HARMON: Correct, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. If there are no

22 further questions from my colleagues, thank you, we can

23 have the usher introduce Mr. Paddy Ashdown, who, if I am

24 correct, has not requested any specific type of

25 protective measures; is that true?

1 MR. HARMON: That is true.

2 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

3 (The witness entered court)

4 JEREMY JOHN DURHAM (PADDY) ASHDOWN

5 JUDGE JORDA: Do you hear me?

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.

7 JUDGE JORDA: Please, could you tell the

8 Tribunal what your name and your given name is?

9 THE WITNESS: My name is Jeremy John Durham

10 Ashdown. My -- I go by the nickname of Paddy Ashdown

11 normally; it is a pseudonym.

12 JUDGE JORDA: I am not going to call you by

13 your nickname right away. Please remain standing. If

14 you read your declaration, which will be given to you

15 by the usher.

16 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

17 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the

18 truth.

19 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Please be seated.

20 Mr. Ashdown, you have agreed to testify at the

21 request of the Prosecution as part of the trial before

22 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

23 Yugoslavia against General Blaskic, who is in this

24 courtroom. The Prosecutor has given us a summary of

25 the main points of your testimony. You are very well

1 familiar with the type of procedures that are in effect

2 at this Tribunal, which to a large extent come from

3 proceedings which you are familiar with, so you will

4 not be surprised that you will be asked to answer the

5 Prosecutor's questions. However, the Tribunal would

6 very much like this testimony to be as spontaneous as

7 possible, and that of course the Prosecutor can ask you

8 for clarifications about this or that point.

9 This is the scope and context, and I suppose

10 that the Prosecutor will want to ask you a few

11 questions first.

12 Examination by MR. HARMON.

13 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Mr. President. Good

14 afternoon, Mr. Ashdown?

15 A. Good afternoon.

16 Q. Mr. Ashdown, could you first of all begin by

17 telling the judges about your background?

18 A. I was educated -- I am an Irishman by birth.

19 I was educated in the UK at what is known as a public

20 school, in fact a private school. I finished my

21 education at 18. I joined the Royal Marines as an

22 officer. I served in commando units and in the special

23 boat section, which was the waterborne equivalent of

24 the Special Air Service over a period of 13 years,

25 started off at a lieutenant and ending as a captain.

1 I saw active service in the Far East in the

2 Borneo campaign in the early 1960s, in the Middle East

3 in Aden, and in my own home town of Belfast in Northern

4 Ireland. During that period I studied Chinese and took

5 the equivalent to the first-class degree in Chinese and

6 so left and joined the Foreign Office in 1972, and was

7 posted as a First Secretary to the United Kingdom

8 Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva in

9 1974.

10 I stayed there until 1976, when I resigned

11 from the Foreign Service and went into politics. After

12 a period of eight years seeking to get elected and

13 working in local industry in my community, I was

14 elected in 1983 to Parliament, representing the

15 constituency of Yeovil in the south-west of England.

16 I was then elected, in due course, Leader of my Party

17 in 1988 and appointed a Privy Councillor to Her Majesty

18 the Queen in 1989 and have served as both Member of

19 Parliament for Yeovil and the Leader of my Party, the

20 Liberal Democrats, for the last 10 years.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ashdown. Could you tell the

22 judges if, as a member of Parliament, you took an

23 interest in the affairs of the Former Yugoslavia and

24 whether you visited the Former Yugoslavia?

25 A. I did not, Mr. Harmon -- I began to take an

1 interest in, I suspect, July or early August 1992 when

2 this began to be a major crisis which was appearing in

3 British newspapers and indeed elsewhere as well.

4 Between 1992 and the end of the conflict, I paid, in

5 all, 10 visits.

6 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, if you could speak

7 a little bit more slowly, so that the interpreters

8 would have less trouble following you?

9 A. Between 1992 and the end of the Bosnian

10 conflict, I paid, in all, 10 visits to Bosnia,

11 particularly to Sarajevo, during the siege, my first

12 visit being in August 1992, my second visit being

13 shortly afterwards, when I was invited to go to Bosnia

14 by the Serbs, by Dr Karadzic, and at that stage

15 I travelled throughout the Serb -- what is now known as

16 Republika Srpska from Sarajevo through the Posavina

17 corridor through to Banja Luka.

18 At that time I was the first person to go

19 into the Manjaca camp, despite some threats we received

20 at the time from Serbs that we would be shot if we did

21 so and, on the following day, visited Prijedor,

22 Trnopolje. Over the subsequent eight visits,

23 culminating in a visit right at the end of the conflict

24 when the battle of Igman was going on, I paid in all 10

25 visits there, usually one during the summer and one

1 during the winter.

2 In December 1992, I visited the Vitez area

3 and saw a good deal of what was going on there at that

4 time and passed through Kiseljak, Visoko, Busovaca and

5 Vitez, so, all in all, I paid 10 visits there. I have

6 subsequently been back once to assist in the elections.

7 MR. HARMON: On 6 May 1995, did you have a

8 conversation with Franjo Tudjman?

9 A. I did, Mr. Harmon. I was invited to attend

10 the VE day celebrations in the Guildhall in London on

11 6th May 1995. It was a very large gathering --

12 I suppose there were of the order of 300 or 400 people

13 there, including many Heads of State, and I was placed,

14 presumably by somebody in the Foreign Office, because

15 they thought I knew something about Yugoslavia, next

16 door to President Tudjman at that time and I had an

17 extensive conversation with him.

18 Q. Could you relate that conversation to the

19 judges, please?

20 A. Well, I made a diary note of it at the time

21 -- it was made that night. I keep a regular diary,

22 and, if I may, I would like to rely rather on that, but

23 I sat next door to Mr. Tudjman. It would be fair, I

24 think, to say that a good deal of wine was flowing at

25 the time, and President Tudjman consumed a certain

1 amount of that. I entered pretty swiftly into a

2 conversation with him, and I asked him fairly early in

3 the conversation how he believed ex Yugoslavia might

4 look in 10 years' time, and I drew for him, on the back

5 of the menu, which I have here, some brief lines,

6 asking him to fill in the rest of the map as to what he

7 believed it would look like.

8 As I recall, I drew the --

9 Q. Let me interrupt you right there. I will

10 show you a copy of the map that you are referring to.

11 With the assistance of the usher, if I could have

12 Prosecutor's exhibit 275A and 275B placed next to the

13 witness, Mr. Usher, if you could place, first,

14 Prosecutor's exhibit, the 75A, on the ELMO. (Handed).

15 JUDGE JORDA: Does the Defence have this,

16 Mr. Harmon?

17 MR. HARMON: I was going to explain this is a

18 copy of an original document. Mr. Ashdown has the

19 originals of both documents in front of him and, prior

20 to the commencement of these proceedings, counsel for

21 the Defence had the opportunity to inspect the original

22 documents.

23 I would request, Mr. President, that the

24 originals be kept by Mr. Ashdown and that these copies,

25 which Mr. Ashdown will authenticate as genuine and true

1 copies, be entered into the record. The originals will

2 be available for the Defence at any time for further

3 inspection. I can explain, Mr. President, that 275A,

4 and I will pre-empt the witness a litt