SUMMARY

TRIAL CHAMBER II JUDGEMENT

in

PROSECUTOR v DR. MILOMIR STAKIC

      A. Preliminary Observations

      1. The Chamber will briefly summarise its findings. The summary that follows forms no part of the final Judgement which is delivered. The only authoritative account of the Trial Chamber’s findings, and of its reasons for those findings, is to be found in the written Judgement.
      2. The Trial Chamber wishes to emphasise that this is not a case against "the Serbs" collectively or an individual because of his Serb ethnicity, but rather a case in which the Trial Chamber, based on the charges set out by the Prosecution in the Fourth Amended Indictment, had to decide whether Dr. Stakic is to be held individually criminally responsible for the alleged crimes. This Judgement, especially since it is pronounced under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, should never be misunderstood as directed against one of the warring parties or ethnicities at the relevant time. The Trial Chamber is aware that crimes of a similar gravity were committed in the Municipality of Prijedor and beyond by and against members of all three main ethnicities. Following the principle of equality before the law, this Tribunal and domestic courts will therefore continue to prosecute and try these other perpetrators as well. A judgement should not serve as a pretext for a re-opening of old wounds. Its purpose is to present reliable factual findings and thereby contribute to reconciliation and bringing people back to a state of peaceful co-existence.
      3. The trial of the Accused on the allegations set out in the Indictment began on 16 April 2002 and concluded on 15 April 2003 after 150 days of hearings. Dr. Stakic faced charges of genocide or alternatively complicity in genocide, murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war, and the following crimes against humanity: murder, extermination, persecutions, deportation, and other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), in relation to events that took place in the Municipality of Prijedor between 30 April and 30 September 1992.
      4. Despite the comprehensive pattern of atrocities against Muslims in Prijedor in 1992 which has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and without detracting from its gravity, the Trial Chamber has not found this to be a case of genocide. Rather, it is a serious case of persecutions, extermination and deportation.

      B. Procedural Background

      1. The Trial Chamber heard 37 live Prosecution witnesses and admitted 19 witness statements pursuant to Rule 92 bis. The Prosecution called three expert witnesses. Pursuant to Rule 98, the Chamber called six witnesses and ordered the Prosecution to appoint a forensic handwriting examiner and a forensic document expert. The Trial Chamber heard 38 live Defence witnesses and admitted seven Rule 92 bis statements and one Rule 94 bis report. The Defence called two live expert witnesses and introduced the report of an expert on constitutional issues through Rule 94 bis. A total of 1448 exhibits were admitted into evidence, 796 for the Prosecution ("S"), 594 for the Defence ("D") and 58 Chamber exhibits ("J"). 150 days of hearings are reflected in 15,337 pages of transcript ("T.").

        C. Factual Findings

      2. The factual findings can be summarised relatively briefly, particularly in the light of the fact that previous judgements of this Tribunal have already described the overall situation in Prijedor and more specifically the Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje camps. What follows is an overview of the scope of all the crimes committed at the relevant time, i.e. from 30 April 1992 to 30 September 1992.
      3. On 7 January 1992, the Serbian members of the Prijedor Municipal Assembly and the presidents of the local Municipal Boards of the SDS proclaimed a parallel Assembly of the Serbian People of the Municipality of Prijedor. Dr. Milomir Stakic, a physician, was elected President of this Assembly. Ten days later, in a decision signed by Dr. Stakic, the Assembly endorsed "joining the Serbian territories of the Municipality of Prijedor to the Autonomous Region of Bosnian Krajina" (ARK). By the end of April 1992, a number of clandestine Serbian police stations had been created in the municipality and more than 1,500 armed men were ready to take power.
      4. During the night of 29-30 April 1992, the SDS led forcible takeover of power took place. Legitimate central authorities were replaced by SDS or SDS-loyal personnel. First and foremost, Dr. Stakic replaced the freely elected President of the Municipal Assembly, Professor Cehajic.
      5. The takeover in the municipality of Prijedor was an illegal coup d’état which had been planned and coordinated for months and which had as its final goal the creation of a pure Serbian municipality. The plans were never hidden and were implemented through coordinated action by the police, army and politicians. One of the main figures was Dr. Stakic who was by then playing the leading role in the political life of the Municipality.
      6. Shortly after the takeover, the municipal People’s (National) Defence Council started meeting in a new composition presided over by Dr. Stakic in his capacity as President of the post-takeover Municipal Assembly.
      7. On 20 May 1992, the Municipal Assembly was replaced by the Crisis Staff of Prijedor municipality, later known as the War Presidency, whose membership was almost identical to that of the People’s Defence Council, including Dr. Stakic as its president. The Crisis Staff met very frequently in the period immediately after the takeover and adopted numerous decisions, orders, and other enactments.
      8. Civilian life in Prijedor was transformed in a myriad ways after the takeover. There was a marked increase in the military presence in the town and a propaganda war against non-Serbs was launched. According to a decision of the Crisis Staff, armed attacks were launched against the non-Serb civilian population throughout the municipality. The creation of an atmosphere of fear in Prijedor culminated in the agreement amongst members of the Prijedor Crisis Staff to establish the Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje camps.
      9. The Trial Chamber has found that killings occurred frequently in the camps. There can be no reasonable doubt that a number of massacres were committed, inter alia, in Room 3 of the Keraterm camp on or about 24 July 1992. In late July 1992 over a hundred people were killed in the Omarska camp and approximately 120 people were taken on buses from Omarska on 5 August 1992 and killed. On 21 August 1992, approximately 200 people on a deportation convoy escorted by members of the Prijedor Intervention Squad were killed on Mount Vlasic by members of this platoon. Many more were killed during the attacks by the Bosnian Serb army on predominantly Bosnian Muslim villages and towns throughout the Municipality of Prijedor - Kozarac, Hambarine, Biscani, Ljubija, to name a few - and several massacres of Muslims took place. The Trial Chamber has found that more than 1,500 killings occurred and has been able to identify by name 486 victims.
      10. Rapes and sexual assaults were committed in the camps and the thousands of persons detained were subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, including routine beatings and torture. Detainees lived in unhygienic conditions and were given little more than a subsistence diet.
      11. Bosnian Muslims who had lived their whole lives in the Municipality of Prijedor were expelled from their homes and deported in huge numbers, often on convoys organised and supervised by the Serb authorities from Prijedor. The Trial Chamber heard evidence from many witnesses who were forced to flee the territory of the Municipality of Prijedor in 1992, mostly to Travnik or Croatia to escape Serb-controlled territory. The exodus of the mainly non-Serb population from Prijedor started as early as 1991 but accelerated considerably in the run-up to the takeover and reached its peak in the months after the takeover. More than 20,000 persons became victims of this campaign of deportation. Most people travelled on one of the daily convoys of buses and trucks leaving the territory.
      12. The houses of non-Serbs were marked for destruction, and in many cases were actually destroyed along with mosques and Catholic churches.
      13. The Trial Chamber does not wish to reduce the victims to mere numbers in statistics. The victims were people - men and women with different backgrounds, histories and personalities. As it is impossible to reconstruct all their fates, the Chamber has selected three of these individuals to highlight the core issues in this case: Professor Muhamed Cehajic, Witness X and Nermin Karagic.

        D. Individual Criminal Responsibility of Dr. Stakic

      14. As regards the central question of this case, whether Dr. Stakic is to be held responsible for the crimes described in the factual findings, the Trial Chamber has answered this question in the affirmative.
      15. The Trial Chamber finds that the mode of liability described as "co-perpetratorship", a form of "committing" under Article 7(1) of the Statute, best characterises Dr. Stakic’s participation in offences committed in Prijedor Municipality in 1992. It has not been found necessary to resort to the judicial formula of "joint criminal enterprise". For co-perpetration, it is essential to prove the existence of an agreement or silent consent to reach a common goal by coordinated co-operation with joint control over the criminal conduct. The co-perpetrator must have acted in the awareness of the substantial likelihood that crimes would occur and must have been aware that his role was essential for the achievement of the common goal.
      16. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that between January 1991 and September 1992, Dr. Stakic held the following superior positions and was the leading political figure in the Municipality of Prijedor in 1992.
      1. Dr. Stakic’s associates included the authorities of the self-proclaimed Assembly of the Serbian people of the Municipality of Prijedor, the SDS, the Prijedor Crisis Staff, the Territorial Defence and the police and military. In particular, Dr. Stakic acted together with the Chief of Police, Simo Drljaca, prominent members of the military such as Colonel Vladimir Arsic and Major Zeljaja, the President of the Executive Committee of Prijedor Municipality, Dr. Milan Kovacevic, and the Commander both of the Municipal Territorial Defence Staff and Trnopolje camp, Slobodan Kuruzovic.
      2. With the establishment of the self-proclaimed Assembly of the Serbian People on 7 January 1992, the common goal of creating a Serbian municipality took tangible form.
      3. The common goal on the Prijedor level found its vibrant expression in Radovan Karadzic’s six strategic goals of the Bosnian Serb leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina which included as the first goal the separation of Serbs from "the other two national communities". By the time Karadzic had set out these objectives, preparations were already underway for the fulfillment of the first goal in Prijedor Municipality.
      4. On 29 April 1992, at a meeting convened by Dr. Stakic, the final agreement was made amongst those willing to participate, in particular the police and armed Serbs, that power would be taken over in Prijedor municipality that night. This was the trigger and the first in a series of agreements necessary to achieve the common goal. No formal agreement was necessary and all participants were aware of where the decision to take over power would lead.
      5. The takeover on 30 April 1992 was the culmination of months of planning by the SDS which, at that time, was already co-operating with the police to boost security forces in the municipality in anticipation of the coup d’etat. After the takeover, Dr. Stakic and other SDS leaders assumed the central positions in the municipal government, and Muslim and Croat politicians, who had been legally elected, were forcibly removed. Other leading SDS members were installed in strategic positions throughout the municipality. Simo Drljaca became Chief of Police.
      6. After the takeover, the Serb leadership sought to achieve a state of readiness for war in the municipality of Prijedor. The Prijedor Crisis Staff started to impose restrictions on the non-Serb residents of Prijedor. The creation of a coercive environment for the non-Serb residents of Prijedor municipality is consistent with the co-perpetrators’ objective of consolidating Serb power in the municipality by forcing non-Serbs to flee or be deported, thereby forcibly changing fundamentally the ethnic balance in the municipality.
      7. A propaganda campaign helped to polarise the Prijedor population along ethnic lines and created an atmosphere of fear. Dr. Stakic made a number of media appearances during the summer of 1992 instilling inter-ethnic suspicion. The media became a propaganda tool of the Serb authorities. In a speech reported in "Kozarski Vjesnik", a newspaper serving as a voice of the Serb authorities at the time, Dr. Stakic proclaimed: "Now we have reached a state in which the Serbs alone are drawing the borders of their new state." This is also demonstrated by the fact that the Official Gazette of Prijedor Municipality of 20 May 1992 started explicitly with a "Year 1" edition. Apparently, from the point of view of the new self-proclaimed authorities, a new Serbian age had dawned in the Municipality of Prijedor.
      8. The order to set up the Omarska camp on 31 May 1992, signed by Simo Drljaca, was issued "in accordance with the Decision of the Crisis Staff" presided over by Dr. Stakic. As Dr. Stakic stated in a television interview, the camps of Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje were "a necessity in the given moment". He confirmed that these camps "were formed according to a decision of [ his] civilian authorities in Prijedor".
      9. Throughout the period immediately after the takeover, Dr. Stakic, in co-operation with the Chief of Police, Simo Drljaca, and the most senior military figure in Prijedor, Colonel Vladimir Arsic, worked to strengthen and unify the military forces under Serb control. The disproportionate armed response to the minor incidents at Hambarine and Kozarac in late May 1992 was directed against the civilian non-Serb population. It heralded the first in a series of measures taken by the Crisis Staff, in co-operation with the military and the police, to rid the municipality of non-Serbs.
      10. Simo Drljaca represented the police forces in the Crisis Staff. Dr. Stakic suggested that the Crisis Staff should also have a military representative but this proposal was rejected. Nevertheless, either Arsic or Zeljaja attended meetings of the Prijedor Crisis Staff and National Defence Council on behalf of the military. Just after the takeover, military uniforms were ordered by the civilian authorities for the use of civilian leaders, including Dr. Stakic, who wore a military uniform and carried a weapon.
      11. Dr. Stakic’s influence over the military and the police was strongly contested by the Defence. The Trial Chamber, however, has found that there was strong co-operation between Dr. Stakic and both police and military. Through his positions as President of both the Crisis Staff and the National Defence Council, Dr. Stakic facilitated coordination by the police and military with each other and with the civilian authorities. The various bodies headed by Dr. Stakic also provided logistical and financial assistance to the military. The National Defence Council required competent municipal organs to secure priority communications and essential supplies such as food and oil and to report to the Prijedor Executive Committee about these matters. Documentary evidence proves that the Crisis Staff set up the Logistics Base at Cirken Polje which provided meals for police at checkpoints and guards at the camps, fuel for transporting detainees to and between camps, and equipment for the police and army.
      12. Furthermore, the Crisis Staff ordered the Prijedor Public Security Station and the Prijedor Regional Command (i.e. the police and the army) "to form a joint intervention platoon" or "squad".
      13. A document dated 4 August 1992 from Simo Drljaca, Chief of the Prijedor SJB, credits the "synchronised activities of the Serbian army and police" with having, in large part, destroyed any paramilitary formations. Simo Drljaca, as Chief of the Public Security Station, is reported to have said in a closed session of the Municipal Assembly, that due to efficient army and police action, Muslim paramilitary formations had been smashed and the situation was stable in this respect.
      14. There was coordinated co-operation between the Crisis Staff, later the War Presidency, and members of the police and army in operating the camps. The Crisis Staff participated through its oversight of security in the camps, taking decisions on the continuing detention of Prijedor citizens, providing transport and the necessary fuel for the transfer of prisoners between the various camps and from the camps to territory not controlled by Serbs, as well as co-ordinating the provision of the limited food for detainees.
      15. With the arrival of the first detainees at Omarska, permanent guard posts were established and anti-personnel landmines were set up around the camp. The military encircled the camp compound while, according to witnesses, the police were located "inside, where the detainees were". An Order from the Prijedor SJB confirms that the Omarska camp compound was enclosed and that a mine field lay around the perimeter of the camp.
      16. The common goal could not be achieved without joint control over the final outcome and this element of interdependency characterises the criminal conduct. No participant could have achieved the common goal on his own. However, each participant could individually have frustrated the plan by refusing to play his part or by reporting crimes. If, for example, the political authorities led by Dr. Stakic had not participated, it would have frustrated the common plan. Dr. Stakic was aware of this. Otherwise it would not have been necessary to oust Professor Cehajic.
      17. The atmosphere of impunity for all those involved in the coup d’état led by Dr. Stakic and the general lawlessness which prevailed in Prijedor ensured that the common goal could be pursued.
      18. To quote one witness, in Prijedor "there was neither de facto nor de jure authority or individual who would be above Dr. Stakic". In "Kozarski Vjesnik" on 13 January 1993, Dr. Stakic was described as "the top official in the municipality". Dr. Stakic was identified as the "mayor" of Prijedor, a title that usually denotes a position of great political authority, in contemporaneous articles and reports and he even introduced himself this way. However, the titles themselves are immaterial as it is clear that Dr. Stakic had a special responsibility for all events which took place in Prijedor municipality and also the power to change their course.
      19. In relation to all offences, the Trial Chamber is convinced that Dr. Stakic and his co-perpetrators acted in the awareness that crimes would occur as a direct consequence of their pursuit of the common goal. The co-perpetrators consented to the removal of Muslims from Prijedor by whatever means necessary and either accepted the foreseeable consequence that crimes would occur or actively participated in their commission. The fact that Dr. Stakic felt it necessary to replace Professor Cehajic and others who clearly would not have participated in the implementation of the common goal demonstrates Dr. Stakic’s awareness that without his acts and the acts of the other co-perpetrators the ultimate goal of the creation of a Serbian municipality and eventually a Serbian state could not be realised.
      20. In an interview in his position as President of the Crisis Staff on 24 May 1992, Dr. Stakic stated that the whole territory of the Municipality of Prijedor had been under Serb control since the "liberation of Kozarac" and that "cleansing" (in his own language "čišćenje") or "mopping up" was still ongoing in Kozarac "because those remaining are the most extreme and the professionals". It is the Trial Chamber’s firm opinion that Dr. Stakic was fully aware that these so-called extreme citizens were none other than innocent Muslim and Croat civilians, some of whom were armed but who could not be considered a professional armed force. In fact, the evidence shows that even though Dr. Stakic spoke of fighting only the Muslim extremists who were carrying out armed operations against the Serb forces, he acted as if the Muslim population was composed entirely of extremists. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Dr. Stakic did not differentiate between the civilian Muslim and Croat population, which he claimed he wanted to protect against evil and harm, and the extremists whom he wanted more than anything else to defeat.
      21. The Trial Chamber is convinced that Dr. Stakic knew that his role and authority as the leading politician in Prijedor was essential for the accomplishment of the common goal. He was aware that he could frustrate the objective of achieving a Serbian municipality by using his powers to hold to account those responsible for crimes, by protecting or assisting non-Serbs or by stepping down from his superior positions.

        E. Legal Findings

      22. Before turning to the concrete legal findings, the Trial Chamber wishes to make some general observations on the applicable law to facilitate an understanding of this Judgement by the parties and also by the peoples of the states of the former Yugoslavia.
      23. The Trial Chamber is restricted by the Indictment and cannot make a legal assessment of the facts that does not conform to the Indictment as it would be possible in other legal systems where judges themselves assess the entire legal characterisation of acts and are not bound by the charges in an indictment.
      24. The Trial Chamber does not wish to go into all the details of its legal assessment except to point out the following:
      25. Following a careful analysis of the facts and the state of mind of the actors, the Trial Chamber was unable to infer the necessary dolus specialis for genocide, this dolus specialis - or specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group as such - being the core element of the crime. Thus, the Trial Chamber could not come to the conclusion that Dr. Stakic or other actors had the necessary specific intent to characterise his conduct as genocide or complicity in genocide. The primary aim was to displace the non-Serb population in order to achieve the vision of a pure Serbian state. This intent to displace a population cannot be equated with an intent to destroy it as such.
      26. However, the Chamber wishes to stress that it has reached the conclusion that a genocidal intent on a higher level has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt only on the basis of the evidence in this concrete case. This does not mean that another Trial Chamber in another case, basing its findings on different evidence, could not come to a different conclusion. It must be emphasised, especially in this context and in order to allow a better understanding of this result in the former Yugoslavia, that, in principle, it is the parties who tender the evidence. The judges do not play an active investigatory role under this Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
      27. It is, in general, not necessary in the interests of justice and of providing an exhaustive description of individual responsibility to make findings under Article 7(3) of the Statute if the Chamber is already satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that both responsibility under 7(1) and the superior positions of the accused have been established. The Accused’s superior positions constitute only an aggravating factor in sentencing, the seriousness of which depends on the concrete superior status of the accused over his subordinates.
      28. The Trial Chamber has used a definition of deportation that covers different forms of forcible transfer. It has concluded that the vast majority of the forms of forcible transfer that the Prosecution argues should be covered by Article 5(i) of the Statute under the heading "other inhumane acts" fall under the definition of deportation in Article 5(d). These include forcible transfers not only across internationally recognised borders but also across de facto borders dividing areas controlled by different belligerent parties. The Trial Chamber is not convinced that other examples provided by the Prosecution, such as the removal of individuals to detention facilities, fulfil the requirement of reaching the same level of gravity as other crimes listed under Article 5. Moreover, these examples do not necessitate a conviction based cumulatively on Article 5(i) and such a conviction might amount to an infringement of the principle nullum crimen sine lege certa (no crime without a precise law).
      29. The Trial Chamber has found that the crimes of persecutions and extermination constitute the core element of the criminal conduct of Dr. Stakic as alleged in the Indictment. The Trial Chamber has set out in the Judgement the legal preconditions for the crime of persecution and elaborated on the discriminatory intent required for this crime. The Trial Chamber is convinced that there was a persecutorial campaign based on the intent to discriminate against all non-Serbs or those who did not share the plan to consolidate Serbian control and domination of the Municipality of Prijedor. Dr. Stakic was one of the main actors in this persecutorial campaign and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that he had the requisite intent to discriminate against non-Serbs and those affiliated or sympathising with them, because of their political and religious affiliations.

        F. Sentencing

      30. In determining the appropriate sentence the Trial Chamber has taken into account the International Tribunal’s Statute and Rules, the general sentencing practice in the former Yugoslavia, the individual circumstances of the case, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the personality of the Accused. The sentence must reflect the gravity of the criminal conduct of the accused and this has required a consideration of the underlying crimes as well as the form and degree of the participation of the Accused.
      31. The Trial Chamber wishes to emphasise that the individual guilt of an accused limits the range of the sentence. Other goals and functions of a sentence can influence only the range within the limits defined by the individual guilt.
      32. The Trial Chamber recalls that the International Tribunal was set up to counteract impunity and to ensure a fair trial for the alleged perpetrators of crimes falling within its jurisdiction. The Tribunal was established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter on the basis of the understanding that the search for the truth is an inalienable pre-requisite for peace. The Tribunal is mandated to determine the appropriate penalty, often in respect of persons who never expected to stand trial. While one goal of sentencing is the implementation of the principle of equality before the law, another is to prevent persons in similar situations in the future from committing crimes.
      33. When Dr. Stakic acted, he almost certainly never believed he would one day stand trial, be convicted and sentenced. In cases such as this one dealing with the head of a municipality, general deterrence becomes substantially relevant. In the context of combating serious international crimes, deterrence refers to the attempt to integrate or to reintegrate those persons who believe themselves to be beyond the reach of international criminal law. Such persons must be warned that they must respect the fundamental global norms of substantive criminal law or face not only prosecution but also sanctions imposed by international tribunals. In modern criminal law this approach to general deterrence is more accurately described as deterrence aiming at integrating potential perpetrators into a peaceful global society, compelling them to obey the rule of law.
      34. Apart from the gravity of the crimes, the superior positions held by the Accused constitute a serious aggravating factor, as does his proven responsibility for also planning and ordering the crime of deportation. As mitigating factors, the Trial Chamber has considered Dr. Stakic’s consent on 1 October 2002 that a new judge be appointed which allowed proceedings to continue, his proper behaviour towards witnesses, and his personal situation.
      35. Article 24 of the Statute reflects the reasonable and humane policy of the United Nations aiming at the global abolition of the death penalty and fixes life imprisonment as the maximum sanction to be imposed. The Trial Chamber wishes to stress in this context that on both the international and national levels the imposition of the maximum sanction is not restricted to the most serious imaginable criminal conduct.
      36. Finally, the Trial Chamber wishes to emphasise that Rules 123-125 of the Rules, and the Practice Direction on Pardon, Commutation of Sentence and Early Release (IT/146, 7 April 1999) remain unaffected by, and have priority over, the Disposition that follows.

      G. Disposition

       

    We, Judges of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, elected by the General Assembly and mandated to hear this case against Dr. Milomir Stakic and find the appropriate sentence,

    HEREBY DECIDE:

    The Accused, Dr. Milomir Stakic, is NOT GUILTY of:

    Count 1: Genocide

    Count 2: Complicity in Genocide

    Count 8: Other Inhumane Acts (forcible transfer), a Crime against Humanity

    The Accused, Dr. Milomir Stakic, is GUILTY of:

    Count 4: Extermination, a Crime against Humanity

    Count 5: Murder, a Violation of the Laws and Customs of War

    Count 6: Persecutions, Crimes against Humanity, incorporating Count 3: Murder, a Crime against Humanity, and Count 7: Deportation, a Crime against Humanity

    Dr. Milomir Stakić is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment.

     

    The then competent court (Rule 104 of the Rules) shall review this sentence and if appropriate suspend the execution of the remainder of the punishment of imprisonment for life and grant early release, if necessary on probation, if:

    (1) 20 years have been served calculated in accordance with Rule 101(C) from the date of Dr. Stakic’s deprivation of liberty for the purposes of these proceedings, this being the "date of review".

    (2) In reaching a decision to suspend the sentence, the following considerations, inter alia, shall be taken into account:

    (3) Dr. Stakic’s consent to the suspension of his sentence is required.

    (4) The competent court may determine the term of probation, if any.

    In case of early release, pursuant to Rule 101(C) of the Rules, Dr. Milomir Stakic is entitled to credit for 2 years, 4 months and 8 days, as of the date of this Judgement, calculated from the date of his deprivation of liberty for the purposes of these proceedings.

    Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, Dr. Milomir Stakic shall remain in the custody of the International Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for his transfer to the State where he shall serve his sentence.