|
Press
Release . Communiqué de presse
(Exclusively
for the use of the media. Not an official document)
| APPEALS
CHAMBER |
| CHAMBRE D’APPEL |
The Hague, 11 December 2002
JL / P.I.S / 715-e
THE
PROSECUTOR V. RADOSLAV BRDJANIN & MOMIR TALIC
"RANDAL
CASE"
APPEALS
CHAMBER DEFINES A LEGAL TEST
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS FOR WAR CORRESPONDENTS TO TESTIFY AT THE TRIBUNAL
Subpoena
to Jonathan Randal set aside
Please
find below a summary of the Decision rendered today by the Appeals Chamber consisting
of Judge Claude Jorda (Presiding), Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Judge Mehmet
Guney, Judge Asoka de Zoysa Gunawardana and Judge Theodor Meron. This summary
was read out in court by the Presiding Judge.
The
Appeals Chamber is rendering its Decision today on an interlocutory appeal filed
in the Brdjanin/Talic case by counsel for Mr Jonathan Randal, a
journalist who spent several years working for the daily newspaper The
Washington Post (hereinafter "the Appellant").
The
Appeals Chamber points out that the text read in this hearing is not the authoritative
text of the Decision which will be distributed at the end of the hearing.
Before
presenting the Appeals Chamber Decision, I will recall in brief the background
of the case and set out in short the main stages of the proceedings:
The
case stems from a decision rendered on 29 January 2002 by Trial Chamber II in
the Brdjanin/Talic case.
In
the Decision, at the request of the Prosecution and pursuant to Rule 54 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Trial Chamber issued a confidential "Subpoena"
compelling Mr Randal to testify at trial.
Mr
Randal stated his opposition to the Subpoena in a written motion. The Trial
Chamber then heard the arguments of Mr Randal and the Prosecution regarding
the motion to set aside the Subpoena. On 7 June 2002, in its "Decision
on the Motion to Set Aside the Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence",
the Trial Chamber confirmed the Subpoena issued to Mr Randal.
After
the Trial Chamber certified that Mr Randal’s interlocutory appeal was appropriate,
he filed an appeal on 26 June 2002. On 1 August 2002, pursuant to Rules 74 and
107 of the Rules, the Appeals Chamber granted the request of 34 press companies
and associations of journalists to file a brief as Amici Curiae in support
of the appeal, which was filed on 16 August 2002.
Further
to a request of Mr Randal and the Amici Curiae, the Appeals Chamber heard
the oral arguments of the parties and the Amici Curiae on 3 October 2002.
What
was the decision of the Trial Chamber challenged on appeal by Mr Randal?
To
confirm the appropriateness of the Subpoena, the Trial Chamber acknowledged
that "journalists reporting on conflict areas play a vital role in bringing
to the attention of the international community the horrors and realities of
the conflict" and that they should not be "subpoenaed unnecessarily."
However, given that the testimony sought concerns already published materials
and already identified sources, the Trial Chamber held that compelling the testimony
of journalists poses only a minimal threat to the news gathering and news reporting
functions. Indeed, the Trial Chamber found that a published article is the equivalent
of a public statement by its author and that when such a statement is entered
in evidence in a criminal trial and its credibility challenged, the author,
like anyone else who makes a claim in public, must expect to be called to defend
its accuracy. In determining whether to issue a subpoena to compel the testimony
of a journalist concerning already public materials and sources, the Trial Chamber
thus held that it is sufficient if the testimony sought is "pertinent"
to the case.
What
are the main arguments raised by the parties before the Appeals Chamber?
Mr
Randal seeks the reversal of the Impugned Decision and the setting aside
of the Subpoena. He submits that in this instance the Trial Chamber committed
two errors:
(i) first
error: the Trial Chamber allegedly erred in refusing to recognise a qualified
testimonial privilege for journalists.
Such
a privilege is warranted, the Appellant contends, in order to safeguard the
ability of journalists to investigate and report effectively on events occurring
in areas in which war crimes take place. Without a qualified privilege, journalists
may be put at risk personally, may expose their sources to risk and may be denied
access to important information and sources in the future. The result, in the
Appellant’s view, will be less journalistic exposure of international crimes
and thus the hindering of the very process of international justice that international
criminal tribunals such as this Tribunal are designed to serve. In support of
these contentions, the Appellant submits statements from two journalists, the
general secretary of the International Federation of Journalists, and the publisher
of the Washington Post.
(ii) second
error: the Trial Chamber allegedly erred in not finding, on the facts of
this case, that the Appellant should not be compelled to appear for testimony.
The
Appellant states that his testimony cannot materially assist the Prosecution
or the Defence because, in particular, he cannot vouch for the statements attributed
to the accused in his article since the interview was conducted through another
journalist. Moreover, the Appellant asserts that the Trial Chamber should have
undertaken a careful analysis of the importance of his testimony before issuing
the subpoena, not just after the fact.
The
Amici Curiae make largely the same arguments as the Appellant concerning
the importance of a qualified privilege to ensuring journalists’ ability to
investigate in and report on events occurring in areas where war crimes are
taking place. According to the Amici Curiae, a Trial Chamber should not
issue a subpoena to compel the testimony of a journalist unless it determines
that: (1) the testimony is essential to the determination of the case given
that, for this condition to be satisfied, the testimony must be "critical
to determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant" and (2) the information
cannot be obtained by any other means. The Amici Curiae concludes that
these conditions are not satisfied in this case.
The
Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber: (i) correctly declined the Appellant’s
invitation to create a precise journalistic privilege; and (ii) correctly determined,
on the facts of this case, that the Appellant should be compelled to testify.
The Prosecution argues that, whatever beneficial effects a privilege for the
protection of confidential sources and information may have in promoting reporting
which may serve the cause of international justice, no such benefits accrue
from a privilege protecting testimony concerning published materials and openly
identified sources. The Prosecution stresses that this case fits in the latter
category and consequently that the risks for journalists do not arise from the
possibility of being called to testify. Moreover, the Prosecution contends that
too generous a privilege could compromise the due process rights of accused
persons.
Having
recalled the arguments of the parties, the Appeals Chamber now renders its decision:
At
the outset, the Appeals Chamber notes that, although the parties and the Amici
Curiae frame the issue before the Appeals Chamber as one concerning journalists
in general, the case really concerns a smaller group, namely, war correspondents.
It is the particular character of the work done by those who cover the events
occurring in the conflict zones and the risks they face that it is at stake
in the present case. By "war correspondents," the Appeals Chambers
means individuals who, for any period of time, report (or investigate for the
purposes of reporting) from a conflict zone on issues relating to the conflict.
In
the Appeals Chamber’s view, the basic legal issue presented raises three subsidiary
questions. Is there a public interest in the work of war correspondents? If
so, would compelling war correspondents to testify before a tribunal adversely
affect their ability to carry out their work? If so, what test is appropriate
to balance the public interest in accommodating the work of war correspondents
with the public interest in having all relevant evidence available to the Chamber
and, where it is implicated, the right of the defendant to challenge the evidence
against him? The Appeals Chamber considers each of these questions in turn.
1.
Is there a public interest in the work of war correspondents?
The
Appeals Chamber is of the view that the answer to the first question is clearly
"Yes", as the Trial Chamber expressly recognised.
The
Appeals Chamber is of the view that society’s interest in protecting the integrity
of the newsgathering process is particularly clear and weighty in the case of
war correspondents. Wars necessarily involve death, destruction, and suffering
on a large scale and, too frequently, atrocities of many kinds, as the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia illustrates. The transmission of that information is
essential to keeping the international public informed. It may also be vital
to assisting those who prevent crimes under international humanitarian law,
such as those that fall within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. In this regard,
it may be recalled that the images of the terrible suffering of the detainees
at the Omarska Camp that played an important role in the process of awakening
the international community to the seriousness of the human rights situation
during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina were broadcast by war correspondents.
The Appeals Chamber therefore readily agrees with the Trial Chamber that war
correspondents "play a vital role in bringing to the attention of the international
community the horrors and reality of conflict." The information uncovered
by war correspondents has on more than one occasion provided important leads
for the investigators of this Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber has no hesitation
in finding that war correspondents do serve a public interest.
It
follows that recognition of the important public interest served by the work
of war correspondents does not rest on a perception of war correspondents as
occupying some special professional category.
2.
Would compelling war correspondents to testify in a war crimes tribunal adversely
affect their ability to carry out their work?
The
Appeals Chamber acknowledges that it is impossible to determine with certainty
whether and to what extent compelling war correspondents to testify before the
International Tribunal could hamper their ability to work. However, in the opinion
of the Appeals Chamber, it is not a possibility that can be discarded, as the
Trial Chamber found, simply because the evidence sought supposedly concerned
published information and not confidential sources. The potential impact upon
the newsgathering function and safety of war correspondents as submitted by
the Appellant and the Amici Curiae is great.
For
the Appeals Chamber, what really matters is the perception that war correspondents
can be forced to become witnesses against their interviewees. Indeed, the legal
differences between confidential sources and other forms of evidence are likely
to be lost on the average person in a war zone who must decide whether to trust
a war correspondent with information. To publish the information obtained from
the interviewee is one thing - it is indeed often the very purpose for which
the interviewee gave the interview - but to testify against the interviewed
person on the basis of that interview is quite another. The consequences for
the interviewed person are much worse in the latter case, as they may be found
guilty of war crimes and deprived of their liberty. If war correspondents were
to be perceived as potential witnesses for the Prosecution, two consequences
may follow. First, they may have difficulties in gathering significant information
because the interviewed persons may talk less freely with them and may deny
access to conflict zones. Second, war correspondents may shift from being observers
of those committing human rights violations to being their targets, thereby
putting their own lives at risk.
As
such, the Appeals Chamber is of the view that compelling war correspondents
to testify before the International Tribunal on a routine basis may have a significant
impact upon their ability to obtain information and thus their ability to inform
the public.
3.
What test is appropriate to balance the public interest in accommodating the
work of war correspondents with the public interest in having all relevant evidence
available to the court?
The
Appeals Chamber considers that in order to decide whether or not to compel a
war correspondent to testify before the International Tribunal a Trial Chamber
must conduct a balancing exercise between the differing interests involved in
the case. On the one hand, there is the interest of justice in having all relevant
evidence put before the Trial Chambers for a proper assessment of the culpability
of the individual on trial. On the other hand, there is the public interest
in the work of war correspondents.
The
test of "pertinence" applied by the Trial Chamber appears insufficient
to protect the public interest in the work of war correspondents. The word "pertinent"
is so general that the test could not grant war correspondents any more protection
than that enjoyed by other witnesses. Thus, the Trial Chamber’s test, while
supposedly accounting for the public interest in the work of war correspondents,
would actually leave that interest unprotected. On the other hand, the test
proposed by the Appellant, as noted above, would amount to a virtually absolute
privilege and even the criteria proposed by Amici Curiae may be too stringent
in that they may lead to significant evidence being left out.
In
the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, it is only when the Trial Chamber finds
that the evidence sought by the party seeking the subpoena is direct and important
to the core issues of the case that it may compel a war correspondent to testify
before the International Tribunal. The adoption of this criterion should ensure
that all evidence that is really significant to a case is available to Trial
Chambers. Moreover, it should prevent war correspondents from being subpoenaed
unnecessarily.
Let
us clarify this criterion.
The
Appeals Chamber holds that in order for a Trial Chamber to issue a subpoena
to a war correspondent a two-pronged test must be satisfied. First, the petitioning
party must demonstrate that the evidence sought is of direct and important value
in determining a core issue in the case. Second, it must demonstrate that the
evidence sought cannot reasonably be obtained elsewhere.
Finally,
beyond a number of observations in the Decision, the Appeals Chamber will not
address the submissions of the parties on the second ground of the appeal, that
is, the application of the proper legal test to the facts. Having actually determined
the principles governing the testimony of war correspondents before the International
Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber considers that it is the role of the Trial Chamber
to apply those principles in the particular circumstances of the case should
the court be seized of the matter again.
For the foregoing
reasons, the Appeals Chamber:
(1) allows the
Appeal;
(2) reverses the
Impugned Decision; and
(3)
consequently, sets aside the Subpoena.
*****
The
full text of the Decision is available upon request from the Public Information
Services of the ICTY. It is also available on the ICTY Internet site: www.un.org/icty
|