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Press Release
. Communiqué de presse
(Exclusively for the use of the media. Not an official document)
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OFFICE
OF THE PROSECUTOR
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BUREAU
DU PROCUREUR
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The
Hague, 30 October 2002
JJJ/P.I.S./709-e
ADDRESS
BY THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
AND RWANDA,
MRS. CARLA DEL PONTE, TO
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
Please
find below the full text of the Prosecutor’s address to the UN Security Council
in New York on 29 October 2002.
Mr.
Chairman,
I
am once again most grateful to have the opportunity to address the Council.
I would like to provide an updated report on developments in the work of my
office in both the ICTR and the ICTY.
Starting
with the ICTR, I am pleased to report that the trials of accused persons in
the highest leadership positions are now under way. In parallel with that activity,
our on-going investigations of the crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994 focus
on individuals in top command positions at the governmental, administrative,
military and militia spheres.
However,
three concerns remain: the arrest of fugitives; access to information; and securing
the appearance in court of prosecution witnesses.
On
the first of these, the arrest of fugitives, there have been encouraging developments.
Three arrests have recently taken place: that of Augustin Bizimungu in Angola;
that of Tharcisse Renzaho in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and that of Jean-Baptiste
Gatete in Congo-Brazzaville. However, other fugitives remain at large and we
have good reason to believe that some are receiving protection in various African
countries.
On
the second point, access to information, in particular military information,
I am experiencing difficulties in obtaining from the Rwandan authorities information
relating to their armed forces. My office encounters serious resistance in this
area. I would urge the Council not to become distracted from the only issue
at stake here: the obligation of Rwanda to co-operate with all lawful requests
from the Tribunal, irrespective of the subject matter. No State can place itself
above its international obligations, and co-operation, even on sensitive issues,
must be unconditional.
My
third major concern, now familiar to the Council, lies in securing the appearance
of prosecution witnesses who must travel from Rwanda to the Seat of the Tribunal
in Arusha. Despite short interruptions in the Niyitegeka and Butare trials,
we have been able to continue the ongoing trials without major disruptions,
but the current situation is fragile. I reported to you last July that I was
extremely concerned because Rwanda does not extend its full co-operation in
this regard. President Pillay wrote to you on 26 July 2002, to officially bring
to your attention the preoccupations of the ICTR regarding the non-cooperation
of the Government of Rwanda in recent months. Our worries remain up-to-date.
I
will not allow the ICTR and international justice to become hostage to a State’s
domestic agendas. I do remain vigilant, and will certainly report to you any
difficulty encountered.
Mr.
Chairman, I now turn to the ICTY.
I
believe that we are now at the very peak of our activity in The Hague. My staff
and I are currently undertaking the most serious investigation and prosecution
activity of our mandate. Our legal system is maturing rapidly in its quality
and sophistication. In the courtroom our work is growing in its complexity and
in its strength. Our jurisprudence is expanding at every turn, and we are beginning
to see the Tribunal’s powerful effect on a group of significant individuals,
who at last are prepared to recognise the persistence of the institution and
its ability to bring perpetrators inevitably to justice. We must keep up this
momentum.
The
fact that an accused of the former rank and stature of Biljana Plavsic was prepared
to plead guilty to criminal charges, is an important development. It marks an
acceptance that the judicial process can play a powerful role in the process
of reconciliation.
Moreover,
a growing number of prominent witnesses from the region are prepared to come
forward and testify openly in our proceedings. Others, particularly persons
who were themselves close to the events or the accused, are ready to give their
key evidence in closed sessions of the court.
But
the Council should make no mistake that obstacles and obstruction still confront
us. Delays for us can be deadly, given the driving force of our proceedings
and the pressing demands of the criminal process. There will be no second chance
for our prosecutions. We cannot sit back and wait, or engage in protracted negotiations
with those who have a duty to comply with the Tribunal’s orders or requests.
The
most blatant examples, as always, are failures by domestic authorities to arrest
fugitives.
In
June 2001, for example, as an expression of trust, I gave the Croatian Government
advanced notice of a sealed indictment against General Ante Gotovina, a Commander
of forces who was accused of crimes against humanity. My trust was misplaced
- he was allowed to evade arrest and according to various reliable sources he
is now enjoying a safe haven in the territory of Croatia.
In May this year
I again provided the Croatian authorities with advanced notice of an imminent
indictment against General Bobetko, former Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army.
My purpose in doing so was, once more, to give the authorities every opportunity
to prepare themselves to take action upon the arrest warrant. Instead of compliance
with the Tribunal’s order, the Croatian Government has taken upon itself to
seek to challenge the warrant and the indictment itself. We next heard that
the General’s health does not permit his travel to The Hague. More delay and
obstruction. The attitude of Croatia is unacceptable. We have procedures for
resolving any genuine medical issues. We have used them before, and they are
a matter for the court, once the basic obligation to transfer has been accepted
in principle by the Croatian authorities. There can be no exceptions or conditions.
As
for the authorities in Belgrade, they claim that they have made substantial
progress in their co-operation with the Tribunal. But make no mistake: I have
said it, and I repeat it now. Belgrade’s co-operation is at best selective;
it is slow; and it is insufficient.
They
stress that 14 indictees have been handed-over to the ICTY and that a substantial
percentage of our requests have been implemented. But the Yugoslav Government
omits to say that most of those indictees had individually decided to surrender
to the Tribunal. As for the very few actually arrested and transferred by the
FRY since 1994, they were all Bosnian Serbs of no political or military significance
whatsoever in Yugoslavia. Belgrade’s record on arrests speaks for itself, with
the notable exception of the transfer of Slobodan Milosevic. But, as you all
know, that courageous move is the sole credit of the Serbian Government and
was carried out despite the opposition of the Federal authorities.
As
for the statistics put forward by Belgrade to stress their rate of reply to
our requests, they are misleading to say the least. The majority of the replies
received so far were either not substantive or partial when not reduced to bland
statements that the requested files or documents "had not been found, or
were destroyed during NATO bombings", etc. Needless to say that sensitive
information, archives and military sources of evidence remain beyond the reach
of justice. Indeed, the FRY does not show the slightest inclination to comply
with any requests relating to the Yugoslav army. Indicted military personnel
are untouched. Notorious figures such as Ratko Mladic are protected. You will
undoubtedly have heard and continue to hear the strongest assurances that Ratko
Mladic is not in the FRY. While constantly denying that Mladic is in Serbia,
the authorities have always conceded, in private meetings, that he had been
in Serbia, "until recently". In July, authorities in Belgrade admitted
he had been there in June, but was no longer in Serbia. In June, they admitted
that, yes, he had been spotted in April, but was now in Republika Srpska. We
have had enough of this, and at my request President Jorda has now formally
seized the Council of the failure of the FRY to meet its obligations under the
Tribunal’s Statute.
Military
archives are closed to us, even in investigations where Serbs are the victims.
The pattern is clear, and it may well be explained by an admission, made at
one time but not since repeated, that nothing would be provided to the Tribunal
if it might compromise the position of the FRY before the International Court
of Justice, where Bosnia and Croatia seek the payment of war reparations. A
quite improper consideration.
Another
revealing remark was made recently by the President of the FRY that "co-operation
with the ICTY has already gone too far". Yet another by the Federal Minister
of Justice, who insisted that the Law on Co-operation would not be changed,
although its Article 39 excludes the arrest and transfer to The Hague of persons
indicted after the entry into force of the law. To make matters worse, having
been told many times in the past that access to certain military documents would
not be possible before the enactment of the Law on Co-operation, we have recently
been informed that some requested documents have now been destroyed under a
provision of the domestic law requiring the automatic destruction of documents
after 10 years. If the consequences were not so serious, this kind of blatant
defiance of international obligations would be almost comical. It cannot be
allowed to continue.
This
behaviour is calculated. It cannot merely be explained away by saying that the
political situation is difficult at the moment. Of course it is difficult. That
is to be expected in any country in the aftermath of armed conflict and political
upheaval. The situation is difficult by definition. There will never be a "good"
time to execute warrants and arrest notorious public figures. There is always
some short term political consideration at work, some local power struggle or
regional election. There will also be unresolved strategic issues of genuine
concern to the international community – the future status of Kosovo, is an
example. Broad concerns of this kind will always occupy the minds of those who
have to struggle with the reconstruction of divided societies, and such issues
will, of course, be uppermost in their minds. An ideal moment will never arise
for the arrest of war criminals. But no system of justice anywhere in the world
is expected to work that way. The right time to arrest a murderer is always
"now, today".
I
have yet another serious concern, and that is that the obstruction of the judicial
process itself, however subtle or blunt the methods employed, strikes at the
Tribunals’ ability to discharge their mandates in any meaningful way at all.
We are beginning to be able to present what I might call crucial "insider"
witnesses or "sensitive sources". But fresh hurdles are being erected
and placed in the way of such people: they are being told that talking to my
staff brings with it the risk of prosecution under domestic law protecting official
and military secrets.
Formal waivers
must therefore be granted by the Yugoslav authorities before these witnesses
can be allowed to give their statements. Because certain waivers for key witnesses
are incomplete, they do not provide the necessary reassurance to the individuals
concerned. Worse, a very important witness in the Milosevic trial has recently
been threatened with actual prosecution by the Federal authorities, merely for
having spoken with our investigators. The signal sent to others similarly minded
to co-operate with the Tribunal is most sinister. But this, I’m afraid, does
not deter the FRY to claim that it co-operates with us in providing all needed
assistance to our witnesses. If these practices are allowed to continue unchecked,
a great deal of critical evidence will be lost to the Tribunal.
The
indictment of a top leader will always provoke short-term political difficulties.
But if the Tribunals are to meet the completion strategy targets and the deadlines
that are expected of us, these other problems have to be tackled by the international
community. You have heard President Jorda outline the steps he is taking to
focus the resources of the Tribunal on the most serious cases. For my part,
as Prosecutor I have drastically prioritised our investigative objectives, for
both Tribunals, and further focused our efforts on "the main civilian,
military and paramilitary leaders" so that we can now reasonably expect
to fulfil the essence of our prosecution missions for both Tribunals by the
end of 2004. But one thing must be clear: We cannot be asked to complete soon
our indictments and trials of top leaders and, at the same time, be told to
be patient and not to rock the boat. This is an obvious contradiction.
I must therefore
stress the need for both Tribunals to maintain the momentum. Achieving our completion
strategy, of course, depends upon it, for without timely arrests and timely
access to the evidence, we cannot control the pace of our activities.
The
Council itself has stressed that States may not invoke provisions of their domestic
laws as a means of avoiding their international obligations. That principle
must be driven home to the FRY by the Council and by the international community
at every possible opportunity, in words and by actions.
Mr.
Chairman it is obvious to me, as an interested observer of the political and
security situation in the Balkans and in the Great Lakes Region, that there
is an enormous danger in allowing the rule of law to be undermined. Prosecutions
before the International Criminal Tribunals have highlighted the dangers for
peace and security when the dividing lines become blurred between regular military
forces, army commanders, paramilitary leaders and their organisations, armed
police, political parties, organised crime and individual thugs. We saw that
happen only too clearly as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda descended into conflicts.
Impunity fosters political intrigue, profiteering and corruption, widespread
criminality, and a culture of violence and terror.
War
criminals and those who commit genocide interact closely with all other promoters
of criminal activities. This is especially so when lack of political will and
appropriate means of enforcement have allowed persons accused of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes to remain at large over a long period of time.
The Republika Srpska is a case in point. Those who finance the security of Karadzic
and other top-level indictees work closely with the authorities, and are also
deeply involved, at a local and regional scale, in human trafficking, drugs
and the weapons trade, racketeering and other activities. They have corrupted
the officialdom, which turns a blind eye to their broad-scale activities, the
revenues of which sustain and allow the close protection of war criminals. These
are dangerous developments, and they are thwarting the costly efforts by the
international community to restore peace in the Balkans. The same holds true
for progress in the Great Lakes Region, particularly in the Democratic Republic
of Congo.
We are poised
to ensure that the ICTY and the ICTR succeed. Much, however, depends on breaking
down the remaining obstacles in our path.
Mr.
Chairman, I turn to you to provide in the wider international political arena,
the support for our work that only the Security Council of the United Nations
can provide.
Thank
you.
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