Registrar:
Mr. Hans Holthuis

__________________________________________________

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Mark Harmon
Mr. Peter McCloskey
Mr. Andrew Cayley
Ms. Magda Karagiannakis

Counsel for the Accused:
Mr. Nenad Petrusic
Mr. Tomislav Visnjic

I. INTRODUCTION
1. The events surrounding the Bosnian Serb take-over of the United Nations (“UN ”) “safe area” of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in July 1995, have become well known to the world.¹ Despite a UN Security Council resolution declaring that the enclave was to be “free from armed attack or any other hostile act”, units of the Bosnian Serb Army (“VRS”) launched an attack and captured the town. Within a few days, approximately 25,000 Bosnian Muslims,² most of them women, children and elderly people who were living in the area, were uprooted and, in an atmosphere of terror, loaded onto overcrowded buses by the Bosnian Serb forces and transported across the confrontation lines into Bosnian Muslim-held territory. The military -aged³ Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica , however, were consigned to a separate fate. As thousands of them attempted to flee the area, they were taken prisoner, detained in brutal conditions and then executed. More than 7,000 people were never seen again.

2. The events of the nine days from July 10-19 1995 in Srebrenica defy description in their horror and their implications for humankind’s capacity to revert to acts of brutality under the stresses of conflict. In little over one week, thousands of lives were extinguished, irreparably rent or simply wiped from the pages of history . The Trial Chamber leaves it to historians and social psychologist to plumb the depths of this episode of the Balkan conflict and to probe for deep-seated causes . The task at hand is a more modest one: to find, from the evidence presented during the trial, what happened during that period of about nine days and, ultimately, whether the defendant in this case, General Krstic, was criminally responsible, under the tenets of international law, for his participation in them. The Trial Chamber cannot permit itself the indulgence of expressing how it feels about what happened in Srebrenica, or even how individuals as well as national and international groups not the subject of this case contributed to the tragedy. This defendant, like all others, deserves individualised consideration and can be convicted only if the evidence presented in court shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of acts that constitute crimes covered by the Statute of the Tribunal (“Statute ”). Thus, the Trial Chamber concentrates on setting forth, in detail, the facts surrounding this compacted nine days of hell and avoids expressing rhetorical indignation that these events should ever have occurred at all. In the end, no words of comment can lay bare the saga of Srebrenica more graphically than a plain narrative of the events themselves, or expose more poignantly the waste of war and ethnic hatreds and the long road that must still be travelled to ease their bitter legacy.

3. In July 1995, at the time the atrocities occurred, General Krstic was first the Chief of Staff and, subsequently, the Commander of the Drina Corps, a formation of the Bosnian Serb Army (hereafter “VRS”). All of the crimes committed following the take-over of Srebrenica were committed in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps. The Prosecution has charged General Krstic with genocide (or alternatively , complicity to commit genocide). General Krstic is further charged with crimes against humanity, including extermination, murder, persecution and deportation ( or alternatively, inhumane acts (forcible transfer)) and murder, as a violation of the laws or customs of war. The Indictment charges General Krstic with responsibility for these acts, as a result of his individual participation (pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the Statute). The Prosecution also seeks to attribute criminal responsibility to General Krstic for these acts, pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility (under Article 7(3) of the Statute) because, allegedly, troops under his command were involved in the commission of the crimes.

4. The Trial Chamber draws upon a mosaic of evidence that combines to paint a picture of what happened during those few days in July 1995. In all, the Trial Chamber heard more than 110 witnesses over 98 days of trial and viewed in the vicinity of 1,000 exhibits. A large number of former residents of Srebrenica who survived the events came to The Hague to testify. The Trial Chamber considers that the essence of their testimony was highly credible. The accounts given by the survivors of the execution sites are corroborated by forensic evidence (such as shell casings and explosive and tissue residues) at some of the execution sites, expert analysis of the contents of mass graves and aerial reconnaissance photographs taken in 1995 . The Trial Chamber has also considered the testimony of UN military personnel who were in Srebrenica, records of VRS radio communications that were intercepted by the Army of Bosnia Herzegovina (“ABiH”) in July and August 1995, records seized from the ABiH, records seized from the VRS, the analysis of military experts called by both the Prosecution and the Defence and the testimony of General Krstic himself , as well as other witnesses who testified for the Defence. In addition, the Trial Chamber called two witnesses of its own accord, both of whom formerly held senior positions in the ABiH and were closely monitoring the unfolding events in Srebrenica in July 1995.

5. The Judgement is divided into five Parts, Part I being the Introduction. The factual findings of the Trial Chamber begin in Part II with a narrative overview , the purpose of which is to briefly orient the reader with the events leading up to the take-over of Srebrenica and its aftermath. The Trial Chamber then moves on to consider the aftermath of the take-over of Srebrenica in much greater detail and, in particular, considers the role of the Drina Corps in the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the former enclave, as well as in the capture, detention and execution of the Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica . Finally, the Trial Chamber considers the role played by General Krstic in these events. Part III of the Judgement provides a legal framework for analysing the facts set out in Part II. The Chamber considers the requisite elements of genocide and the other crimes with which General Krstic has been charged, as well as the general principles regulating the attribution of criminal responsibility. Then, based on this legal framework and on the findings of fact in Part II of the Judgement , the Chamber presents its findings about the criminal responsibility of General Krstic. Part IV of the Judgement covers matters relating to sentencing and, finally , Part V sets forth the disposition.
   II. FINDINGS OF FACT
   A. The Take-Over of Srebrenica and its Aftermath
   1. 1991-92: The Break-Up of the Former Yugoslavia

6. The history of the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been described in previous judgements of this Tribunal and will not be repeated in detail here.⁴ However, some minimal background material is necessary to understand the specific case of Srebrenica.

7. From 1945 until 1990, Yugoslavia was composed of six Republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Certain Republics were populated predominantly by one ethnic group: for example, Serbs in Serbia and Croats in Croatia. The region under consideration, in the present case, formed part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Bosnia”), which was the most multi-ethnic of all the Republics, with a pre-war population of 44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croat.⁵

8. The territory of Yugoslavia has been shared for centuries by these and other ethnic groups, with periods of peaceful co-existence interspersed with conflict. The Second World War was a time of particularly bitter strife, with accusations of atrocities emanating from all quarters. Marshal Tito’s post-war government discouraged ethnic division and nationalism with a focus on the unity of the communist state . Thus, relative calm and peaceful inter-ethnic relations marked the period from 1945 until 1990. Nevertheless, the various groups remained conscious of their separate identities.

9. In the late 1980s, economic woes and the end of communist rule set the stage for rising nationalism and ethnic friction. The Republics of Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in June 1991. Slovenia’s status was secured after a mere ten days of fighting with the predominantly Serb forces of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), but the armed conflict in Croatia stretched on for some months. Macedonia broke off successfully in September 1991 .

10. Bosnia began its journey to independence with a parliamentary declaration of sovereignty on 15 October 1991. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised by the European Community on 6 April 1992 and by the United States the following day. International recognition did not end the matter, however, and a fierce struggle for territorial control ensued among the three major groups in Bosnia: Muslim, Serb and Croat. The international community made various attempts to establish peace , but these attempts met with limited success. In the Eastern part of Bosnia, which is close to Serbia, the conflict was particularly fierce between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims.
    2. 1992-1993: Conflict in Srebrenica

11. The town of Srebrenica is nestled in a valley in eastern Bosnia, about fifteen kilometres from the Serbian border. Before the war, many of Srebrenica’s residents worked in the factories at Potocari, a few kilometres north of Srebrenica, or in the zinc and bauxite mines to the south and northeast of the town. In 1991, the population of the municipality was 37,000, of which 73 percent were Muslim and 25 percent were Serb.⁶ Prior to the war , the standard of living was high and members of the different ethnic groups, for the most part, lived comfortably together. ⁷

12. During the conflict the Central Podrinje region, which included Srebrenica,⁸ was an area of significant strategic importance. For the Bosnian Serbs, control of this region was necessary in order to achieve their minimum goal of forming a political entity in Bosnia. As stated by General Radovan Radinovic, the Defence military expert:

    Serbs intended to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a component part of the former state. That was indeed their fundamental, long-term, and political objective in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why? I don’t think it is very difficult to understand that. They wanted to live in the same state with other Serbs, and the only state that could guarantee that was the former Yugoslavia… the Serbs realised that the area of Central Podrinje had a huge strategic importance for them. Without the area of Central Podrinje, there would be no Republika Srpska, there would be no territorial integrity of Serb ethnic territories; instead the Serb population would be forced to accept the so-called enclave status in their ethnic territories. The territory would be split in two, the whole area would be disintegrated, and it would be separated from Serbia proper and from areas which are inhabited almost 100 per cent by Serb populations.⁹

    General Sefer Halilovic (the Commander of the Main Staff of the ABiH from June 1993 until November 1993 and, prior to that, Chief of Staff of the Main Staff of the ABiH) also emphasised the strategic importance of the Central Podrinje region for the Bosnian Serbs. In his view the political agenda of the Serbs was to eliminate the Drina River as a border between “Serb states”.¹⁰

13. Despite Srebrenica’s predominantly Muslim population, Serb paramilitaries from the area and neighbouring parts of eastern Bosnia gained control of the town for several weeks early in 1992. In May 1992, however, a group of Bosnian Muslim fighters under the leadership of Naser Oric managed to recapture Srebrenica. Over the next several months, Oric and his men pressed outward in a series of raids. By September 1992, Bosnian Muslim forces from Srebrenica had linked up with those in Zepa, a Muslim-held town to the south of Srebrenica. By January 1993, the enclave had been further expanded to include the Bosnian Muslim held enclave of Cerska located to the west of Srebrenica. At this time the Srebrenica enclave reached its peak size of 900 square kilometres, although it was never linked to the main area of Bosnian -held land in the west and remained a vulnerable island amid Serb-controlled territory .¹¹

14. In January 1993, Bosnian Muslim forces attacked the Bosnian Serb village of Kravica. Over the next few months, the Bosnian Serbs responded with a counter-offensive , eventually capturing the villages of Konjevic Polje and Cerska, severing the link between Srebrenica and Zepa and reducing the size of the Srebrenica enclave to 150 square kilometres. Bosnian Muslim residents of the outlying areas converged on Srebrenica town and its population swelled to between 50,000 and 60,000 people.¹² During this military activity in the months following January 1993, there were reports of terror inflicted by Muslims on Serb civilians and by Serbs on Muslim civilians .¹³

15. The Commander of the UN Protection Force ‘‘UNPROFOR’’, General Philippe Morillon of France, visited Srebrenica in March 1993. By then the town was overcrowded and siege conditions prevailed. The advancing Bosnian Serb forces had destroyed the town’s water supplies and there was almost no running water. People relied on makeshift generators for electricity. Food, medicine and other essentials were extremely scarce. Before leaving, General Morillon told the panicked residents of Srebrenica at a public gathering that the town was under the protection of the UN and that he would never abandon them.¹⁴

16. Between March and April 1993, approximately 8,000 to 9,000 Bosnian Muslims were evacuated from Srebrenica under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”). The evacuations were, however, opposed by the Bosnian Muslim government in Sarajevo as contributing to the “ethnic cleansing” of the territory .¹⁵

17. The Bosnian Serb authorities remained intent on capturing the enclave, which , because of its proximity to the Serbian border and because it was entirely surrounded by Serb-held territory, was both strategically important and vulnerable to capture . On 13 April 1993, the Bosnian Serbs told the UNHCR representatives that they would attack the town within two days unless the Bosnian Muslims surrendered and agreed to be evacuated.¹⁶
    3. April 1993: The Security Council Declares Srebrenica a “Safe Area”

18. On 16 April 1993, the UN Security Council responded by passing a resolution , declaring that “all parties and others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a “ safe area ” that should be free from armed attack or any other hostile act.”¹⁷ At the same time, the Security Council created two other UN protected enclaves, Zepa and Gorazde.¹⁸

19. The UNPROFOR command in the field was sceptical about the value of the Security Council resolution. UNPROFOR commanders therefore negotiated a cease-fire agreement signed by General Halilovic and General Ratko Mladic (the Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS). This agreement called for the enclave to be disarmed under the supervision of UNPROFOR troops.¹⁹ However, there was discord about the precise boundaries of the territory subject to the agreement. General Halilovic testified before the Trial Chamber that the agreement covered only the urban area of Srebrenica.²⁰ This view appears to have been shared by UNPROFOR. The Bosnian Serb authorities , on the other hand, did not consider the agreement to be limited to the urban areas of Srebrenica.²¹

20. On 18 April 1993, the first group of UNPROFOR troops arrived in Srebrenica. Fresh troops were rotated approximately every six months after that. The peacekeepers were lightly armed and at any one time numbered no more than 600 men (a much smaller force than had been originally requested).²² They established a small command centre (the “Bravo Company compound”) in Srebrenica itself and a larger main compound about five kilometres north of the town in Potocari . In addition, the UNPROFOR peacekeepers manned thirteen observation posts (“Ops ) marking the perimeter of the enclave. Most of the time, groups of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim soldiers also maintained shadow positions near these outposts . In January 1995, a new set of UNPROFOR troops (a battalion from the Netherlands , colloquially referred to as “Dutch Bat”) rotated into the enclave.

21. Generally, the Bosnian Serb forces surrounding the enclave were considered well disciplined and well armed.²³ The VRS was organised on a geographic basis and Srebrenica fell within the domain of the Drina Corps. Between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers from three Drina Corps Brigades were deployed around the enclave.²⁴ These Bosnian Serb forces were equipped with tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and mortars. The unit of the ABiH that remained in the enclave – the 28th Division - was not well organised or well equipped. A firm command structure and communications system was lacking,²⁵ some ABiH soldiers carried old hunting rifles or no weapons at all and few had proper uniforms.²⁶ However, the Trial Chamber also heard evidence that the 28th Division was not as weak as they have been portrayed in some quarters.²⁷ Certainly the number of men in the 28th Division outnumbered those in the Drina Corps²⁸ and reconnaissance and sabotage activities were carried out on a regular basis against the VRS forces in the area .²⁹

22. From the outset, both parties to the conflict violated the “safe area” agreement . The Trial Chamber heard evidence of a deliberate Bosnian Serb strategy to limit access by international aid convoys into the enclave.³⁰ Colonel Thomas Karremans (the Dutch Bat Commander) testified that his personnel were prevented from returning to the enclave by Bosnian Serb forces and that equipment and ammunition were also prevented from getting in.³¹ Essentials, like food, medicine and fuel, became increasingly scarce. Some Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica complained of attacks by Bosnian Serb soldiers.³²

23. Insofar as the ABiH is concerned, General Halilovic testified that, immediately after signing the “ safe area ” agreement, he ordered members of the ABiH in Srebrenica to pull all armed personnel and military equipment out of the newly established demilitarised zone.³³ He also ordered that no serviceable weapons or ammunition be handed over to UNPROFOR. He said this was prompted by bad experiences with the international community in the past.³⁴ Accordingly, only old and dysfunctional weapons were handed over and anything that was still in working order was retained.³⁵ In General Halilovic’s view, the agreement on demilitarisation did not oblige the ABiH to surrender anything and the Bosnian Muslims wanted to preserve their weaponry .³⁶

24. The Trial Chamber heard credible and largely uncontested evidence of a consistent refusal by the Bosnian Muslims to abide by the agreement to demilitarise the “safe area”.³⁷ Bosnian Muslim helicopters flew in violation of the no-fly zone;³⁸ the ABiH opened fire toward Bosnian Serb lines and moved through the “safe area”;³⁹ the 28th Division was continuously arming itself⁴⁰ ; and at least some humanitarian aid coming into the enclave was appropriated by the ABiH.⁴¹ To the Bosnian Serbs it appeared that Bosnian Muslim forces in Srebrenica were using the “safe area” as a convenient base from which to launch offensives against the VRS and that UNPROFOR was failing to take any action to prevent it.⁴² General Halilovic admitted that Bosnian Muslim helicopters had flown in violation of the no-fly zone and that he had personally dispatched eight helicopters with ammunition for the 28th Division. In moral terms, he did not see it as a violation of the “safe area” agreement given that the Bosnian Muslims were so poorly armed to begin with.⁴³

25. Despite these violations of the “safe area” agreement by both sides to the conflict, a two-year period of relative stability followed the establishment of the enclave, although the prevailing conditions for the inhabitants of Srebrenica were far from ideal.
    4. Early 1995: The Situation in the Srebrenica “Safe Area” Deteriorates

26. By early 1995, fewer and fewer supply convoys were making it through to the enclave.⁴⁴ The Dutch Bat soldiers who had arrived in January 1995 watched the situation deteriorate rapidly in the months after their arrival. The already meagre resources of the civilian population dwindled further and even the UN forces started running dangerously low on food, medicine, fuel and ammunition. Eventually, the peacekeepers had so little fuel that they were forced to start patrolling the enclave on foot. Dutch Bat soldiers who went out of the area on leave were not allowed to return and their numbers dropped from 600 to 400 men.

27. There were other ominous signals from the VRS. In March and April, the Dutch soldiers noticed a build-up of Bosnian Serb forces near two of the observation posts , OP Romeo and OP Quebec. The new Bosnian Serb soldiers seemed better equipped and more disciplined.⁴⁵ One of the Bosnian Muslim commanders told a Dutch Bat soldier that the Bosnian Serbs had plans to take-over these two OPs.⁴⁶
    5. Spring 1995: The Bosnian Serbs Plan To Attack the Srebrenica “Safe Area ”

28. In March 1995, Radovan KaradZic, President of Republika Srpska (“RS”), reacting to pressure from the international community to end the war and ongoing efforts to negotiate a peace agreement,⁴⁷ issued a directive to the VRS concerning the long-term strategy of the VRS forces in the enclave. The directive, known as “Directive 7”, specified that the VRS was to:

    [C]omplete the physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa as soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two enclaves. By planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica .⁴⁸

    Blocking aid convoys was also a part of the plan:

    The relevant State and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits , reduce and limit the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our good will while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international community and international public opinion.⁴⁹

    Just as envisaged in this decree, by mid 1995, the humanitarian situation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians and military personnel in the enclave was catastrophic. In early July 1995, a series of reports issued by the 28th Division reflected the urgent pleas of the ABiH forces in the enclave for the humanitarian corridor to be deblocked and, when this failed, the tragedy of civilians dying from starvation .⁵⁰

29. On 31 March 1995, the VRS Main Staff issued Directive 7.1, signed by General Mladic. Directive 7.1 was issued “on the basis of Directive No. 7” and directed the Drina Corps to, inter alia, conduct “active combat operations…around the enclaves”⁵¹

30. On 31 May 1995, Bosnian Serb forces captured OP Echo, which lay in the Southeast corner of the enclave. In response to this aggression, a raiding party of Bosniacs attacked the nearby Serb village of Visnjica, in the early morning of 26 June 1995 . Although a relatively low intensity attack, some houses were burned and several people were killed.⁵² Following this, the then-commander of the Drina Corps, General-Major Milenko Zivanovic, signed two orders, on 2 July 1995, laying out the plans for the attack on the enclave and ordering various units of the Drina Corps to ready themselves for combat. The operation was code-named “Krivaja 95”⁵³
    6. 6-11 July 1995: The Take-Over of Srebrenica

31. The VRS offensive on Srebrenica began in earnest on 6 July 1995.⁵⁴ In the following days, the five UNPROFOR observation posts, in the southern part of the enclave, fell one by one in the face of the Bosnian Serb forces advance. Some of the Dutch soldiers retreated into the enclave after their posts were attacked , but the crews of the other observation posts surrendered into Bosnian Serb custody .⁵⁵ Simultaneously, the defending ABiH forces came under heavy fire and were pushed back towards the town.

32. Once the southern perimeter began to collapse, about 4,000 Bosnian Muslim residents , who had been living in a Swedish housing complex for refugees nearby, fled north into Srebrenica town. Dutch Bat soldiers reported that the advancing Bosnian Serbs were “cleansing” the houses in the southern part of the enclave.⁵⁶

33. By the evening of 9 July 1995, the VRS Drina Corps had pressed four kilometres deep into the enclave, halting just one kilometre short of Srebrenica town. Late on 9 July 1995, emboldened by this military success and the surprising lack of resistance from the Bosnian Muslims as well as the absence of any significant reaction from the international community, President KaradZic issued a new order authorising the VRS Drina Corps to capture the town of Srebrenica.⁵⁷

34. On the morning of 10 July 1995, the situation in Srebrenica town was tense. Residents, some armed, crowded the streets. Colonel Karremans sent urgent requests for NATO air support to defend the town, but no assistance was forthcoming until around 1430 hours on 11 July 1995, when NATO bombed VRS tanks advancing towards the town. NATO planes also attempted to bomb VRS artillery positions overlooking the town, but had to abort the operation due to poor visibility. NATO plans to continue the air strikes were abandoned following VRS threats to kill Dutch troops being held in the custody of the VRS, as well as threats to shell the UN Potocari compound on the outside of the town, and surrounding areas, where 20,000 to 30,000 civilians had fled.⁵⁸

35. The Trial Chamber heard that, although the Bosnian military and political authorities in Srebrenica requested help from the ABiH and the President of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic , their pleas went unanswered. In the view of General Halilovic, the ABiH as a whole was capable of preventing the take-over of Srebrenica, but ABiH forces in the area could not defend Srebrenica without outside assistance.⁵⁹ However, military operations in the Sarajevo area were given a higher priority at the critical time.⁶⁰ The Defence presented evidence of a “deal” allegedly made between the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb leaderships whereby Srebrenica was sacrificed by the former in exchange for territory in the Sarajevo area.⁶¹ Undeniably, the enclave was not defended in the manner that would have been anticipated . However, the existence of such a “deal” is hotly contested and does not have a direct bearing on the present case. Any possible territorial exchange agreed upon by the opposing governments neither justifies the atrocities that occurred following the take-over of Srebrenica, nor impacts upon the responsibility of General Krstic for those acts.

36. Late in the afternoon of 11 July 1995, General Mladic, accompanied by General Zivanovic (then Commander of the Drina Corps), General Krstic (then Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps) and other VRS officers, took a triumphant walk through the empty streets of Srebrenica town. The moment was captured on film by Serbian journalist, Zoran Petrovic. ⁶²
    7. The Bosnian Muslim Civilians of Srebrenica

    (a) The Crowd at Potocari

37. Faced with the reality that Srebrenica had fallen under Bosnian Serb forces control, thousands of Bosnian Muslim residents from Srebrenica fled to Potocari seeking protection within the UN compound. By the evening of 11 July 1995, approximately 20,000 to 25,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees were gathered in Potocari. Several thousand had pressed inside the UN compound itself, while the rest were spread throughout the neighbouring factories and fields. Though the vast majority were women, children , elderly or disabled,⁶³ witnesses estimated that there were at least 300 men inside the perimeter of the UN compound and between 600 and 900 men in the crowd outside.⁶⁴

    (i) The Humanitarian Crisis in Potocari: 11-13 July 1995

38. Conditions in Potocari were deplorable. There was very little food or water available and the July heat was stifling.⁶⁵ One of the Dutch Bat officers described the scene as follows:

    They were panicked, they were scared, and they were pressing each other against the soldiers, my soldiers, the UN soldiers that tried to calm them. People that fell were trampled on. It was a chaotic situation.⁶⁶

39. One of the fleeing Srebrenica residents settled for the night in the area near the Zinc Factory in Potocari:

    I found a cover of a container that they used . . . in that factory, so we used that, covered it, and that was our bed. The baby had its pram, and we left our belongings in the pram or simply lied down on the ground …. As we sat there, snipers would fire every now and then, and all this throng would then move to one side or the other, screaming. Above us was the Pecista village where the Serb soldiers were firing at houses. The sound of that shell, again we would simply dodge to one side or the other with frightened cries, and that is how we spent the night. . . . People were all frightened, people were all hungry, people were scared out of their wits. They didn’t know what would happen next, so that those were people who were terrified.⁶⁷

40. On 12 July 1995, the situation in Potocari grew steadily worse. General Mladic appeared accompanied by television crews who filmed him handing out sweets to children . Other than this one televised gesture,⁶⁸ General Mladic and his men made no attempt to alleviate the suffering of the refugees who were desperate for food and water.

    (ii)12-13 July: Crimes Committed in Potocari

41. On 12 July 1995, as the day wore on, the already miserable physical conditions were compounded by an active campaign of terror, which increased the panic of the residents, making them frantic to leave. The refugees in the compound could see Serb soldiers setting houses and haystacks on fire:⁶⁹

    We could see nearby houses on fire. They also torched the houses in a selective manner, with the purpose of frightening the population and also so as to prevent them from coming back. It was a very clear message, very clear sign that Srebrenica – that is, that there would be no life for Bosniaks in Srebrenica anymore.⁷⁰

42. Throughout the afternoon of 12 July 1995, Serb soldiers mingled in the crowd . One witness recalled hearing the soldiers cursing the Bosnian Muslims and telling them to leave; that they would be slaughtered; that this was a Serb country.⁷¹ Another witness testified that a soldier cut him in the face.⁷²

43. Killings occurred.⁷³ In the late morning of 12 July 1995, a witness saw a pile of 20 to 30 bodies heaped up behind the Transport Building in Potocari, alongside a tractor-like machine.⁷⁴ Another testified that, at around 1200 hours on 12 July, he saw a soldier slay a child with a knife in the middle of a crowd of expellees. He also said that he saw Serb soldiers execute more than a hundred Bosnian Muslim men in the area behind the Zinc Factory and then load their bodies onto a truck, although the number and methodical nature of the murders attested to by this witness stand in contrast to other evidence on the Trial Record that indicates that the killings in Potocari were sporadic in nature.⁷⁵

44. As evening fell, the terror deepened. Screams, gunshots and other frightening noises were audible throughout the night and no one could sleep.⁷⁶ Soldiers were picking people out of the crowd and taking them away: some returned ; others did not.⁷⁷ Witness T recounted how three brothers – one merely a child and the others in their teens – were taken out in the night. When the boys’ mother went looking for them, she found them with their throats slit.⁷⁸

45. That night, a Dutch Bat medical orderly came across two Serb soldiers raping a young woman:

    [W]e saw two Serb soldiers, one of them was standing guard and the other one was lying on the girl, with his pants off. And we saw a girl lying on the ground, on some kind of mattress. There was blood on the mattress, even she was covered with blood. She had bruises on her legs. There was even blood coming down her legs. She was in total shock. She went totally crazy.”⁷⁹

46. Bosnian Muslim refugees nearby could see the rape, but could do nothing about it because of Serb soldiers standing nearby.⁸⁰ Other people heard women screaming, or saw women being dragged away.⁸¹ Several individuals were so terrified that they committed suicide by hanging themselves .⁸² Throughout the night and early the next morning, stories about the rapes and killings spread through the crowd and the terror in the camp escalated.⁸³

47. On the morning of 13 July 1995, refugees searching for water came upon clusters of corpses next to a nearby stream. Finding dead bodies in such a prominent place strengthened their resolve to flee as soon as possible.⁸⁴

    (iii). 12-13 July 1995: The Transport of the Bosnian Muslim Women Children and Elderly from Potocari

48. On 12 and 13 July 1995, the women, children and elderly were bussed out of Potocari, under the control of VRS forces, to Bosnian Muslim held territory near Kladanj. When the first group of buses pulled into Potocari in the early afternoon of 12 July 1995, the Srebrenica refugees rushed to board them.⁸⁵ Most of the residents did not even know where they were headed. One survivor recounted her experience before the Trial Chamber:

    [N]obody asked us . . . . They simply brought the buses. And they knew, because such chaos reigned in Srebrenica, so they knew if they brought those five buses, or any number of vehicles, that people (would) simply set off. Because before that , they had passed such horrible nights . . . . We simply wanted to get away, to get away, only not to stay there. And we didn’t even have any other possibility . . . . We had no say in the matter.”⁸⁶

    Some soldiers were hitting and abusing the refugees as they boarded the buses.⁸⁷

49. Witnesses said the buses were overcrowded and unbearably hot. Along the road , some village residents taunted the passengers with the three-fingered Serb salute . Others threw stones at the passing buses. Most of the women, children, and the elderly, however, arrived safely at TisCa.⁸⁸ After disembarking, they were forced to continue on foot for several kilometres through the “no-man’s land” between the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim lines to Kladanj.⁸⁹

50. Dutch Bat soldiers attempted to escort the buses carrying the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari. They succeeded in accompanying the first convoy of refugees on 12 July 1995,⁹⁰ but thereafter they were stopped along the way and their vehicles were stolen at gunpoint.⁹¹ When Major Robert Franken, the Deputy Commander of Dutch Bat, was asked, during his testimony, why the Serbs were seising the UNPROFOR vehicles, he answered:

    Because they didn’t want anybody to be around; that’s obvious…they didn’t want us to witness whatever would happen.⁹²

51. The removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population from Potocari was completed on the evening of 13 July 1995 by 2000 hours.⁹³ When UN soldiers visited the town of Srebrenica on 14 July 1995, they said they did not find a single Bosnian Muslim alive in the town.⁹⁴

52. The Trial Chamber finds that, following the take-over of Srebrenica, in July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces devised and implemented a plan to transport all of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly out of the enclave.

    (iv) The Separation of the Bosnian Muslim Men in Potocari

53. From the morning of 12 July, Bosnian Serb forces began gathering men from the refugee population in Potocari and holding them in separate locations.⁹⁵ One Dutch Bat witness saw men being taken to a location in front of the Zinc Factory and, subsequently, that evening, driven away in a lorry.⁹⁶ Further, as the Bosnian Muslim refugees began boarding the buses, Bosnian Serb soldiers systematically separated out men of military age who were trying to clamour aboard .⁹⁷ Occasionally, younger and older men were stopped as well. These men were taken to a building in Potocari referred to as the “White House”.⁹⁸

54. The way in which the separations were conducted was traumatic for the Bosnian Muslim families involved. Witness I, for example, testified:

    I was carrying water to have for my children so that on the road they could have some refreshment, because there were people who were passing out. A Serb soldier grabbed me by the shoulder and said, “Here.” I said, “Let me see off my children , at least, to the trucks.” He says “You can’t.” So I gave that canister to a grandchild. And the Serb soldier grabbed me by the shoulder, and I had to go into the house there.⁹⁹

55. Witness DD recalled seeing her young son for the last time as her family tried to board the buses:

    [F]rom the left column one of their soldiers jumped out, and he spoke to my child . He told us to move to the right side, and he told my son, “Young man, you should go to the left side.” . . . I grabbed him by his hand … And then I begged them, I pleaded with them. Why are you taking him? He was born in 1981. But he repeated his order. And I held him so hard, but he grabbed him . . . (A(nd he took my son’s hand, and he dragged him to the left side. And he turned around, and then he told me, “Mommy, please, can you get that bag for me? Could you please get it for me ? … That was the last time I heard his voice.”¹⁰⁰

56. As the buses carrying the women, children and elderly headed north towards Bosnian Muslim-held territory, they were stopped along the way and again screened for men. Witness D, for example, managed to steal aboard a bus in Potocari, but was separated from his family once the bus stopped in TisCa:

    I got off the bus too with my child in my arms. My wife had her backpack on her back, and she was supporting my mother because she was old and very frail. My child was five years old. After we had got off the bus and had made just a few steps, I noticed several Serb soldiers. One of those Serb soldiers pulled me by the shoulder and said, “ Give the child to your wife and you come with us.” I had to do that. So I gave the child to my wife. I tried to turn once again, because I knew that was the last time I would see my child. As a matter of fact, I was about to say something. I wanted to say anything, but then I couldn’t. At that moment, the Serb soldier pushed me with his rifle and said, “Move on.”¹⁰¹

57. As early as the evening of 12 July 1995, Major Franken heard that no men were arriving with the women and children at their destination in Kladanj.¹⁰²

58. On 13 July 1995, the Dutch Bat troops witnessed definite signs that the Bosnian Serbs were executing some of the Bosnian Muslim men who had been separated. For example, Corporal Vaasen saw two soldiers take a man behind the White House. He then heard a shot and the two soldiers reappeared alone.¹⁰³ Another Dutch Bat officer, saw Serb soldiers execute an unarmed man with a single gunshot to the head. He also heard gunshots 20-40 times an hour throughout the afternoon.¹⁰⁴ When the Dutch Bat soldiers told Colonel Joseph Kingori, a United Nations Military Observer¹⁰⁵ (“UNMO”) in the Srebrenica area, that men were being taken behind the White House and not coming back, Colonel Kingori went to investigate. He heard gunshots as he approached, but was stopped by Bosnian Serb soldiers before he could find out what was going on.¹⁰⁶

59. Beginning on the afternoon of 12 July 1995 and continuing throughout 13 July 1995, men detained in the White House were placed on separate buses to the women , children and elderly and were taken out of the Potocari compound to detention sites in Bratunac.¹⁰⁷

    (b) The Column of Bosnian Muslim Men

60. As the situation in Potocari escalated towards crisis on the evening of 11 July 1995, word spread through the Bosnian Muslim community that the able-bodied men should take to the woods, form a column together with members of the 28th Division of the ABiH and attempt a breakthrough towards Bosnian Muslim-held territory in the north. At around 2200 hours on the evening of 11 July 1995, the “division command ”, together with the Bosnian Muslim municipal authorities of Srebrenica, made the decision to form the column.¹⁰⁸ The young men were afraid they would be killed if they fell into Bosnian Serb hands in Potocari and believed that they stood a better chance of surviving by trying to escape through the woods to Tuzla.¹⁰⁹

61. The column gathered near the villages of Jaglici and Susnjari and began to trek north. Witnesses estimated that there were between 10,000 and 15,000 men in the retreating column.¹¹⁰ Around one third of the men in the column were Bosnian Muslim soldiers from the 28th Division , although not all of the soldiers were armed.¹¹¹ The head of the column was comprised of units of the 28th Division, then came civilians mixed with soldiers and the last section of the column was the Independent Battalion of the 28th Division.¹¹² A small number of women, children and elderly travelled with the column in the woods. When subsequently captured by Bosnian Serb forces, they were put on passing buses from Potocari heading towards Kladanj.¹¹³

62. At around midnight on 11 July 1995, the column started moving along the axis between Konjevic Polje and Bratunac. On 12 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces launched an artillery attack against the column that was crossing an asphalt road between the area of Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba en route to Tuzla. Only about one third of the men successfully made it across the asphalt road and the column was split in two parts.¹¹⁴ Heavy shooting and shelling continued against the remainder of the column throughout the day and during the night. Men from the rear of the column who survived this ordeal described it as a “ man hunt ”.¹¹⁵

63. By the afternoon of 12 July 1995, or the early evening hours at the latest, the Bosnian Serb forces were capturing large numbers of these men in the rear.¹¹⁶ Witnesses reported a variety of techniques used to trap prisoners. In some places , ambushes were set up¹¹⁷ and, in others, the Bosnian Serbs shouted into the forest, urging the men to surrender and promising that the Geneva Conventions would be complied with.¹¹⁸ In some places, Bosnian Serb forces fired into the woods with anti-aircraft guns and other weapons¹¹⁹ or used stolen UN equipment to deceive the Bosnian Muslim men into believing that the UN or the Red Cross were present to monitor the treatment accorded to them upon capture.¹²⁰ In fact, Bosnian Serb forces stripped the captured Muslim men of their personal belongings¹²¹ and, in some cases, carried out random summary executions.¹²²

64. The largest groups of Bosnian Muslim men from the column were captured on 13 July 1995; several thousand were collected in or near the Sandici Meadow and on the Nova Kasaba football field. The Trial Chamber heard from men held captive on these fields¹²³ and from witnesses who passed by them on the buses heading to Kladanj.¹²⁴ Aerial reconnaissance photos tendered into evidence by the Prosecution confirm the presence of masses of people in these locations on 13 July 1995.¹²⁵

65. The head of the column waited to see what would happen to the second part of the column. Heavy shooting and shelling continued throughout the day of 12 July 1995 and into the night, and ultimately the head of the column abandoned hope. On 13 July 1995, they continued their journey up along the Kalesija-Zvornik road , where they too were caught in ambushes and suffered further casualties.¹²⁶ After one unsuccessful attempt to move forward to the Bosnian Muslim front lines on 15 July 1995, the head of the column finally managed to break through to Bosnian Muslim-held territory on 16 July 1995. ABiH forces attacking from the direction of Tuzla assisted by piercing a line of about one-and-a-half kilometres for the emerging column.¹²⁷
    8. The Execution of the Bosnian Muslim Men from Srebrenica

66. The Bosnian Muslim men who had been separated from the women, children and elderly in Potocari (numbering approximately 1,000) were transported to Bratunac and subsequently joined by Bosnian Muslim men captured from the column. No discernible effort was made to keep the prisoners from Potocari and the men captured from the column in woods separate. These men were held in various locations, such as an abandoned warehouse,¹²⁸ an old school ¹²⁹ and even in the buses and trucks that had brought them there.¹³⁰ During the nights, individual prisoners in Bratunac were called out, and cries of pain and gunfire could be heard.¹³¹ After being detained in Bratunac for between one and three days, the prisoners were transported elsewhere, as the buses used to evacuate the women, children and elderly from Potocari became available.

67. Almost to a man, the thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners captured, following the take-over of Srebrenica, were executed. Some were killed individually or in small groups by the soldiers who captured them and some were killed in the places where they were temporarily detained. Most, however, were slaughtered in carefully orchestrated mass executions, commencing on 13 July 1995, in the region just north of Srebrenica. Prisoners not killed on 13 July 1995 were subsequently bussed to execution sites further north of Bratunac, within the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade. The large-scale executions in the north took place between 14 and 17 July 1995.

68. Most of the mass executions followed a well-established pattern. The men were first taken to empty schools or warehouses. After being detained there for some hours, they were loaded onto buses or trucks and taken to another site for execution . Usually, the execution fields were in isolated locations. The prisoners were unarmed and, in many cases, steps had been taken to minimise resistance, such as blindfolding them, binding their wrists behind their backs with ligatures or removing their shoes. Once at the killing fields, the men were taken off the trucks in small groups, lined up and shot. Those who survived the initial round of gunfire were individually shot with an extra round, though sometimes only after they had been left to suffer for a time.¹³² Immediately afterwards, and sometimes even during the executions, earth moving equipment arrived and the bodies were buried, either in the spot where they were killed or in another nearby location.

69. At several of the sites, a few wounded people survived by pretending to be dead and then crawled away. The Trial Chamber heard from some of these survivors about their ordeals. It also heard from a member of the VRS who participated in one of the largest executions, which took place on 16 July 1995.¹³³

70. In addition to being an unspeakable human evil, the decision to execute these Bosnian Muslim men is unfathomable in military terms. As Mr. Richard Butler (Chief Warrant Officer Three All Source Intelligence Technician with the United States Army), the Prosecution’s military expert, pointed out:

    …it is hard to envision a better bargaining chip in dealing with the political authorities of certainly the BiH government and of the International Community than having 10,000 to 15000 Muslim men in the middle of Potocari in a legitimate prisoner of war facility under the control or under the supervision of certainly the UN troops that were there and the ICRC at a point in time. That is the ultimate bargaining chip, to be able to get significant political leverage from people, one would think , and this chip was thrown away for another reason.

    9.Forensic Evidence of the Executions

71. The extensive forensic evidence presented by the Prosecution strongly corroborates important aspects of the testimony of survivors from the various execution sites . Commencing in 1996, the Office of the Prosecutor (hereafter “OTP”) conducted exhumations of 21 gravesites associated with the take-over of Srebrenica: four in 1996 (at Cerska, Nova Kasaba, Orahovac (also known as Lazete 2) and Branjevo Military Farm (Pilica)); eight in 1998 (Petkovci Dam, Cancari Road 12, Cancari Road 3, Hodzici Road 3, Hodzici Road 4, Hodzici Road 5, Lipje 2, Zeleni Jadar 5); five in 1999 ( Kozluk, Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje 1, Konjevic Polje 2, and Glogova 2); ¹³⁴ and four in 2000 (Lazete 1, Lazete 2C,¹³⁵ Ravnice and Glogova 1). Of the 21 gravesites exhumed, 14 were primary gravesites , where bodies had been put directly after the individuals were killed. Of these , eight were subsequently disturbed and bodies were removed and reburied elsewhere , often in secondary gravesites located in more remote regions.¹³⁶ Seven of the exhumed gravesites were secondary burial sites.¹³⁷ The OTP retained ballistics, soil analysis and materials analysis, experts to comparatively examine materials and residues found in the primary and secondary gravesites.¹³⁸ As a result of these analyses, links were discovered between certain primary gravesites and certain secondary gravesites and these are considered in further detail below .

72. The Prosecution called eight witnesses to give evidence before the Trial Chamber about the exhumations and the resulting forensic findings.¹³⁹ In addition, the Trial Chamber received volumes of written reports prepared by the experts who conducted the OTP investigations. In response, the Defence filed two reports by a forensic expert, Dr. Zoran Stankovic.¹⁴⁰

73. The forensic evidence supports the Prosecution’s claim that, following the take-over of Srebrenica, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were summarily executed and consigned to mass graves. Although forensic experts were not able to conclude with certainty how many bodies were in the mass-graves, due to the level of decomposition that had occurred and the fact that many bodies were mutilated in the process of being moved from primary to secondary graves by mechanical equipment, the experts were able to conservatively estimate that a minimum of 2,028 separate bodies were exhumed from the mass-graves.¹⁴¹

74. Identity documents and belongings, found in most of the exhumed graves, suggest that the victims were linked with Srebrenica. Among the items found were license cards and other papers with references to Srebrenica.¹⁴² In some cases, investigators were able to positively identify bodies in the graves as former Srebrenica residents on the basis of distinctive personal items found with the bodies such as jewellery,¹⁴³ artificial limbs¹⁴⁴ and photographs .¹⁴⁵ Other artefacts found at the majority of the gravesites, such as verses from the Koran, suggest the presence of victims with Muslim religious affiliation.¹⁴⁶ It is also of note that the sex distribution of the persons listed as missing from Srebrenica, on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) list (cross-referenced with other sources), correlates with the sex distribution of the bodies exhumed from the graves.¹⁴⁷ Professor Helge Brunborg, a Prosecution demographics expert, testified that the overwhelming majority of people registered as missing from Srebrenica are men.¹⁴⁸ The forensic examinations of the gravesites associated with Srebrenica reveal that only one of the 1,843 bodies for which sex could be determined was female.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, there is a correlation between the age distribution of persons listed as missing and the bodies exhumed from the Srebrenica graves: 26.4 percent of persons listed as missing were between 13-24 years and 17.5 percent of bodies exhumed fell within this age group; 73.6 percent of persons listed as missing were over 25 years of age and 82.8 percent of bodies exhumed fell within this age group.¹⁵⁰

75. The results of the forensic investigations suggest that the majority of bodies exhumed were not killed in combat; they were killed in mass executions. Investigators discovered at least 448 blindfolds on or with the bodies uncovered during the exhumations at ten separate sites.¹⁵¹ At least 423 ligatures were located during exhumations at 13 separate sites.¹⁵² Some of the ligatures were made of cloth and string, but predominately they were made of wire.¹⁵³ These ligatures and blindfolds are inconsistent with combat casualties. The Prosecution also relied on forensic evidence that the overwhelming majority of victims located in the graves , for who a cause of death could be determined, were killed by gunshot wounds.¹⁵⁴ The exhumations also revealed that some of the victims were severely handicapped and, for that reason, unlikely to have been combatants.¹⁵⁵

76. Upon reviewing the Prosecution’s forensic evidence, the Defence forensic expert , Dr. Zoran Stankovic, argued that “some mass graves originated from the bodies of the persons who lost their lives in mutual armed conflicts of the warring sides , and that in some graves, where the cases of sure execution were registered, there were also…bodies killed in combat…”.¹⁵⁶ He particularly criticised the methodology employed during some of the Prosecution’s forensic investigations into cause of death.¹⁵⁷ Certainly, at those sites where no blindfolds or ligatures were found during exhumations , the evidence that the victims were not killed in combat was less compelling.¹⁵⁸ Significantly, some of the gravesites located in the Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje area, where intense fighting took place between the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim forces, on 12 and 13 July 1995, were amongst those where very few blindfolds and ligatures were uncovered.¹⁵⁹ The Defence expert, Dr. Stankovic did not however, fundamentally challenge the substantive findings of the Prosecution experts and accepted that the exhumations were conducted by experts with “substantial professional experience and adequate technical, scientific and moral integrity.”¹⁶⁰

77. The Trial Chamber cannot rule out the possibility that a percentage of the bodies in the gravesites examined may have been of men killed in combat. Overall , however, the forensic evidence presented by the Prosecution is consistent with the testimony of witnesses who appeared before the Trial Chamber and recounted the mass execution of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men at Cerska Valley, Kravica Warehouse , Orahovac, Branjevo Farm, Petkovci Dam and Kozluk.¹⁶¹ .

78. Most significantly, the forensic evidence presented by the Prosecution also demonstrates that, during a period of several weeks in September and early October 1995, Bosnian Serb forces dug up many of the primary mass gravesites and reburied the bodies in still more remote locations.¹⁶² Forensic tests have linked certain primary gravesites and certain secondary gravesites , namely: Branjevo Military Farm and Cancari Road 12; Petkovci Dam and Liplje 2; Orahovac (Lazete 2) and Hodzici Road 5; Orahovac (Lazete 1) and Hodzici Road 3 and 4; Glogova and Zeleni Jadar 5; and Kozluk and Cancari Road 3. ¹⁶³ The reburial evidence demonstrates a concerted campaign to conceal the bodies of the men in these primary gravesites, which was undoubtedly prompted by increasing international scrutiny of the events following the take-over of Srebrenica. Such extreme measures would not have been necessary had the majority of the bodies in these primary graves been combat victims. The Trial Chamber also notes that General Krstic himself did not contest the exhumation evidence presented by the Prosecution about the existence of the mass graves containing the bodies of “victims of Srebrenica ”.¹⁶⁴

79. Overall the Trial Chamber finds that the forensic evidence presented by the Prosecution provides corroboration of survivor testimony that, following the take -over of Srebrenica in July 1995, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica were killed in careful and methodical mass executions.
    10.The Number of Men Executed by the Bosnian Serb Forces Following the Take -over of Srebrenica in July 1995

80. It is impossible to determine with precision the number of Bosnian Muslim men killed by Bosnian Serb forces following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995 . During the course of the exhumations conducted by the OTP, the process of identifying the number of bodies was complicated by the fact that, in the course of being removed from primary gravesites to secondary gravesites, the corpses were broken up and body parts became intermingled. However, as already noted, experts were able to conservatively determine that the minimum number of bodies in the graves exhumed was 2028.¹⁶⁵ Although the Trial Chamber cannot dismiss the possibility that some of the exhumed bodies were killed in combat, it accepts that the majority of the victims were executed. Eighteen additional graves linked with Srebrenica have been located but not yet exhumed. Based on preliminary examinations conducted by the OTP, all of these sites contain human remains and it is expected that the total number of bodies found and linked with Srebrenica will significantly increase as these sites are exhumed.¹⁶⁶

81. The number of people still listed as missing from Srebrenica in July 1995 provides further guidance as to the likely number of men executed. Professor Brunborg testified that, conservatively estimated, a minimum of 7,475 persons from Srebrenica are still listed as missing, based on the cross-referencing of ICRC lists and other sources and that it is likely that the vast majority of these missing people are deceased .¹⁶⁷ In determining the number of people missing following the take-over of Srebrenica, checks were made to ensure that people who were listed as missing prior to July 1995 were excluded. In particular , steps were taken to exclude ABiH soldiers who were reported as killed, wounded , captured or missing in action prior to July 1995 to the extent that was possible . In over 180 cases, however, this could not be done with certainty due to a lack of adequate personal data about the missing persons.¹⁶⁸

82. Nonetheless, the evidence given by witnesses, as corroborated by the forensic and demographics evidence presented by the OTP, strongly suggests that well in excess of 7,000 people went missing following the take-over of Srebrenica. The correlation between the age and sex of the bodies exhumed from the Srebrenica graves and that of the missing persons support the proposition that the majority of missing people were, in fact, executed and buried in the mass graves.

83. There are other indications on the Trial Record that Bosnian Serb forces executed thousands of Bosnian Muslim men following the take-over of Srebrenica. Estimates of the number of prisoners detained and killed at diverse locations throughout the Drina Corps zone of responsibility between 13 and 16 July 1995 will be considered in Part II B. There are also fragments of information from VRS communications about the possible magnitude of the executions. An intercepted conversation, at 1730 hours on 13 July 1995, indicates that about 6,000 men had been captured from the Bosnian Muslim column by that time.¹⁶⁹ Consistent with this, around 14 July, Colonel Radislav Jankovic (from the VRS Main Staff), during a conversation with a Dutch Bat officer about the attempted breakthrough by the 28th Division, stated that the VRS had already taken 6,000 prisoners of war .¹⁷⁰ Other intercepted VRS conversations reveal that, on 15 July 1995, midway through the executions, at least 3,000-4,000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being detained by the VRS.¹⁷¹ Further, on 18 July 1995, two unidentified Bosnian Serbs were heard in an intercepted conversation reflecting on the recent events in Eastern Bosnia, including matters relating to the Bosnian Muslim column.¹⁷² One participant said that of the 10,000 military aged men who were in Srebrenica , “4,000-5,000 have certainly kicked the bucket”. Mr. Butler pointed out that this number was too high to refer only to combat casualties and concluded that this figure must include the men who were executed in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade.¹⁷³

84. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, in July 1995, following the take-over of Srebrenica, Bosnian Serb forces executed several thousand Bosnian Muslim men. The total number is likely to be within the range of 7,000 -8,000 men.
    11.A Plan to Execute the Bosnian Muslim Men of Srebrenica

85. A concerted effort was made to capture all Muslim men of military age. In fact, those captured included many boys well below that age and elderly men several years above that age that remained in the enclave following the take-over of Srebrenica . These men and boys were targeted regardless of whether they chose to flee to Potocari or to join the Bosnian Muslim column. The operation to capture and detain the Bosnian Muslim men was well organised and comprehensive. The Trial Chamber did, however, hear evidence of some exceptions to this general plan. In particular , on 15 and 16 July 1995, during intensive combat between the Bosnian Muslim column and the Zvornik Brigade, the Commander of that Brigade, Colonel Pandurevic, without consultation with his superiors, made a decision to let a portion of the men in the armed head of the Bosnian Muslim column through to Tuzla.¹⁷⁴ However, this decision was apparently made out of desperation and in light of the Zvornik Brigade’s inability to contain the column.

86. There is also evidence that some wounded Bosnian Muslim men were accorded proper treatment and evacuated under medical supervision.¹⁷⁵ This, argued the Defence, was evidence that the Bosnian Serb forces did not intend to kill all of the military aged Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, but rather only those who posed a potential military threat.¹⁷⁶ The treatment accorded to these men stands out as an anomaly in the treatment of the Bosnian Muslim men following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995. It may perhaps be explained, to some degree, as a strategy on the part of the Bosnian Serbs to avoid attracting international suspicion, especially given that UN personnel were present in the enclave watching the treatment accorded to some of these wounded men in the first few days after the take-over of Srebrenica. For example, on 13 July, a report prepared by Colonel Jankovic of the Main Staff noted that over 50 wounded Bosnian Muslims had been placed in the Bratunac hospital and that an UNPROFOR officer had stayed at the hospital to ensure the men were accorded proper treatment . Colonel Jankovic, however, was determined to “ send him away tomorrow, under the pretext that his help is not necessary.”¹⁷⁷ The evidence that a small number of wounded Bosnian Muslims were accorded proper treatment does not diminish the overwhelming evidence showing that the Bosnian Serb forces went to great lengths to seize Bosnian Muslim men at virtually every opportunity , whether or not they posed a military threat,¹⁷⁸ collected them together in detention centres and subsequently executed them.

87. The Trial Chamber finds that, following the take over of Srebrenica in July 1995, the Bosnian Serbs devised and implemented a plan to execute as many as possible of the military aged Bosnian Muslim men present in the enclave.
    12.Widespread Knowledge of the Crimes

88. As early as 14 July 1995, reports of missing Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica began to surface in the international media.¹⁷⁹ Around 15 July 1995, Witness DE, a Drina Corps officer, saw a television film clip showing captured men on a football pitch, presumably Nova Kasaba, while visiting Belgrade.¹⁸⁰ By 18 July 1995, news of the missing Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica had become so widespread that the UN Secretariat wrote to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Bosnia stating:

    You will, no doubt, have read and heard the extensive reports of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serbs during their recent take-over of Srebrenica. While many of these reports emerge from refugees, they are widespread and consistent, and have been given credence by a variety of international observers, including UNHCR. ¹⁸¹

89. Shortly thereafter, the missing Bosnian Muslim men became a factor in the negotiations between the VRS and the ABiH at Zepa, the other UN “safe area” that had come under attack by the VRS on 14 July 1995, following the take-over of Srebrenica. During the course of negotiations between the opposing parties at Zepa, Bosnian Muslim representatives wanted guarantees that the men who were evacuated would be transported in safety and specifically cited the missing men of Srebrenica as an example of why the Bosnian Serb authorities could not be trusted.¹⁸² The Bosnian Muslim representatives refused Bosnian Serb demands for an “ all for all ” prisoner-exchange until the Bosnian Serbs accounted for the 6,800 men they believed were missing from Srebrenica at that time.¹⁸³
    13.The Impact of the Crimes on the Bosnian Muslim Community of Srebrenica

90. The impact of these events on the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica has been catastrophic. Most families were dismembered and irreparably rent. In the words of one former Srebrenica resident:

    With the fall of Srebrenica . . . from the face of the earth were wiped off three generations of men in the cruellest way possible. I can corroborate it by a fresh example from my family. My father-in-law, Omer Malagic, born in 1926, his three sons, one of whom was my husband, Salko Malagic, born in 1948. His two brothers , Osman Malagic, born in 1953 ; Dzafer Malagic born in 1957. His three grandsons , that is my two sons Elvir Malagic born in 1973 ; Admir Malagic born in 1979; and my brother-in-law’s son, Samir Malagic’s son, born in 1975. There are hundreds of such families in Srebrenica...¹⁸⁴

91. In a patriarchal society, such as the one in which the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica lived,¹⁸⁵ the elimination of virtually all the men has made it almost impossible for the Bosnain Muslim women who survived the take-over of Srebrenica to successfully re-establish their lives. Often, as in the case of Witness DD, the women have been forced to live in collective and makeshift accommodations for many years, with a dramatically reduced standard of living.¹⁸⁶ The pain and fear associated with having so many loved ones torn away makes it very difficult for those who survived to think of returning home (even if that were possible in practical terms) or even to exist as a cohesive family unit. In Witness DD’s words:

    …sometimes I also think it would be better if none of us had survived. I would prefer it. ¹⁸⁷

    The director of Vive Zene, a non-governmental organisation that provides psychosocial support for many women and children who survived the take-over of Srebrenica, testified that the vast majority of Bosnian Muslim women refugees have been unable to find employment.¹⁸⁸ Further, women forced to become the head of their households following the take-over of Srebrenica have great difficulties with the unfamiliar tasks of conducting official family business in the public sphere.¹⁸⁹

92. Similarly, the adolescent survivors from Srebrenica face significant hurdles as they enter adult-hood. Few are employed¹⁹⁰ and returning to Srebrenica is not something these young people even talk about. As the Director of Vive Zene explained:

    …their dream is just to go outside, far away from Bosnia. Just that. ¹⁹¹

    Younger children who survived the take-over of Srebrenica have also developed adjustment problems, such as low levels of concentration, nightmares and flashbacks.¹⁹² The absence of male role models is another factor that will inevitably have significant implications for Bosnian Muslim children from Srebrenica in years to come.¹⁹³

93. The Trial Chamber heard that the survivors of Srebrenica have unique impediments to their recovery and staff members at Vive Zene speak of the “Srebrenica Syndrome’’ as a new pathology category.¹⁹⁴ One of the primary factors giving rise to the syndrome is that, with few exceptions , the fate of the survivor’s loved ones is not officially known: the majority of men of Srebrenica are still listed as missing. For Bosnian Muslim women it is essential to have a clear marital status, whether widowed, divorced or married: a woman whose husband is missing does not fit within any of these categories.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, on a psychological level, these women are unable to move forward with the process of recovery without the closure that comes from knowing with certainty what has happened to their family members and properly grieving for them.¹⁹⁶ The Trial Chamber also heard of the collective guilt experienced by women because they survived the events in Potocari and their husbands, brothers and fathers did not.¹⁹⁷ The level of trauma experienced by the women and children who were transported out of Srebrenica was assessed by Vive Zene as being “exceptionally high” and this, in large part, was attributed to the fact that the women and men had been separated following the take-over of Srebrenica.¹⁹⁸ This heartbreak and anguish is no better reflected than in the words of Witness DD whose young son was torn away from her in Potocari:

    …I keep dreaming about him. I dream of him bringing flowers and saying, “Mother , I’ve come” I hug him and say, “Where have you been, my son?” and he says, “I’ve been in Vlasenica all this time”.¹⁹⁹

94. When asked why he thought the mass executions of Bosnian Muslim men took place following the take-over of Srebrenica, General Halilovic suggested that:

    Methodologically speaking, Srebrenica is no different from some other parts of Bosnia -Herzegovina. It is true that it is significantly different in terms of the numbers of people that were executed. As to why it took place in the Drina River valley , I think the reasons can be found in the decisions issued by the Serbian Assembly in Banja Luka…I think that today there are more than 60 settlements of Bosniak population mainly who wish to go back to their homes, but those who were executed no longer have any chance of going back home, and that area was removed from the face of the earth. It was cleansed… and Sit wasC an area which was between two Serb states.²⁰⁰

    14.Conclusions

95. Almost without exception, the witnesses who appeared before the Trial Chamber did not seriously contest that, following the take-over of Srebrenica, the mass killings described above actually occurred outside of combat activities and on the basis of orders given by high level Bosnian Serb officers or officials.²⁰¹ Nonetheless, in the words of Nuremberg Prosecutor Telford Taylor, it is “important that these incredible events be established by clear and public proof, so that no one can ever doubt that they were fact and not fable…”.²⁰² It is therefore imperative to document these “incredible events” in detail.

96. However, the central issue in this case is the role that one man, General Krstic , played in the criminal acts and whether he is legally responsible for conduct that amounts to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. The Trial Chamber now turns to the evidence linking, first, the Drina Corps as a whole to the criminal acts committed following the take-over of Srebrenica and, then, to the precise role that General Krstic played in these events.
    B.The Role of the Drina Corps in the Srebrenica Crimes
    1.Preliminary Matters

97. Prior to examining the role the Drina Corps played in the events following the take-over of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber will first address preliminary matters relating to the formation and operation of the Drina Corps, as well as the nature of the evidence presented by the Prosecution linking the Drina Corps to the crimes in this case. This analysis will provide an important backdrop to the remainder of the Judgement, which addresses the central issue in this case: the criminal responsibility of General Krstic, both individually and as a senior officer of the Drina Corps, for the Srebrenica crimes.

    (a) Background to the Drina Corps

98. The Drina Corps of the VRS was formed in November 1992, with the specific objective of “improving” the situation of Bosnian Serb people living in the Middle Podrinje region, of which Srebrenica was an important part.²⁰³ It was organised along the lines of the former JNA Corps²⁰⁴ and, as was the case with the VRS generally, JNA operating methodologies were almost completely adopted.²⁰⁵ The Drina Corps Headquarters was established first in Han Pijesak and later moved to Vlasenica .²⁰⁶ A map depicting the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps is annexed to this Judgement.

99. General Zivanovic assumed the role of Drina Corps Commander at the time of its formation. In addition to the Commander, the Drina Corps also had a Chief of Staff and three Assistant Commanders. As will be discussed further below, in July 1995, General Krstic was the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps until his appointment as Corps Commander. Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic was Assistant Commander for Security; Colonel Slobodan Cerovic was Assistant Commander for Moral, Legal and Religious Affairs; and Colonel Lazar Acamovic was Assistant Commander for Rear Services (or Logistics).²⁰⁷ A chart showing relevant Drina Corps personnel as of July 1995 is annexed to this Judgement .

100. In July 1995, the Drina Corps was composed of the following subordinate Brigades : Zvornik Brigade; 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade (“Bratunac Brigade”); 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade (“Vlasenica Brigade”); 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade (“2nd Romanija Brigade”) 1st Birac Infantry Brigade (“Birac Brigade”); 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade (“Milici Brigade”); 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade (“ 1st Podrinje Brigade”); 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade (“5th Podrinje Brigade ”) and the 1st Skelani Separate Infantry Battalion (“Skelani Battalion”).²⁰⁸ These Brigades had combat capabilities and were supported by the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment, the 5th Engineers Battalion, 5th Communications Battalion and the 5th Military Police battalion.²⁰⁹

101. The Drina Corps came under the Command of the Main Staff of the VRS, along with the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the East Bosnia Corps, the Hercegovina Corps and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Two units were also directly subordinated to the Main Staff: the 10th Sabotage Detachment (a unit primarily used for wartime sabotage activities) and the 65th Protective Regiment (a unit created to provide protection and combat services for the Main Staff.)²¹⁰ In July 1995, the Commander of the Main Staff was General Mladic. In turn, the Main Staff was subordinate to President Karadzic, the Supreme Commander of the VRS .²¹¹

     (b) Codes and Numbers Used by the Drina Corps in July 1995

102. Much of the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber took the form of military orders and reports issued by the VRS during July and August 1995, as well as conversations between Drina Corps and other VRS personnel that were intercepted by members of the ABiH during that period. Code-names and numbers were frequently employed throughout this documentary and intercept evidence. Some explanation of these codes is necessary before proceeding to analyse the evidence.

103. There was no dispute between the parties about the code names used to refer to relevant Drina Corps subordinate Brigades, as well as the Drina Corps Headquarters . Specifically:“Palma” was the Zvornik Brigade;²¹² “Badem” was the Bratunac Brigade;²¹³ and “Zlatar” was the Command of the Drina Corps.²¹⁴

104. Examination of the evidence as a whole reveals that “Zlatar 385” was a telephone number associated with General Krstic during July 1995. In an intercepted telephone conversation at 0954 hours on 14 July 1995, General Zivanovic advised Colonel Ljubisa Beara, the head of Security of the VRS Main Staff, to contact Zlatar 385 about some assistance that Colonel Beara was seeking.²¹⁵ A few minutes later, a conversation was intercepted between Colonel Beara and General Krstic in which Colonel Beara raised the same request with General Krstic.²¹⁶ In addition, on 18 July 1995 at 0716 hours, General Krstic called and asked for Colonel Cerovic to be connected to extension 385. This was done and General Krstic and Colonel Cerovic subsequently conversed,²¹⁷ further confirming that “385” was General Krstic’s telephone extension during July 1995.

     (c) Reliability of Intercepted Communications

105. Prominently featured in the evidence presented by the Prosecution in this case , were transcriptions of conversations between VRS personnel in July and August 1995 that were intercepted by intelligence officers from the ABiH. These documents were handed over to the OTP by the Bosnian government. Monitoring enemy communications was a standard military practice, employed by both parties to the conflict, the objective being to discover the plans and movements of the opposing side in order to take pre-emptory action.²¹⁸ Although the VRS did have secure means of sending communications, the Trial Chamber heard evidence that these systems were not always functional and that often unsecured lines were used for expediency; secured communications took much longer to prepare and send.²¹⁹ The Prosecution relied upon intercept evidence as proof of key elements of its case. The reliability of these intercepted conversations, however, was the subject of strenuous debate between the parties.

106. A former employee from the OTP, who worked on compiling the intercept database , testified about the procedures established to test the accuracy of the intercept evidence received by the OTP from the Bosnian Government.²²⁰ The “intercept project”, as it became known, was handled by a team of analysts, investigators, translators and others with language skills, who collected, assembled , analysed and translated the material that had been provided to the OTP in its original Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (hereafter “B/C/S”) form. Both the ABiH and the State Security Services of Bosnia provided intercept material to the OTP.²²¹

107. Additionally, a number of Bosnian Muslim witnesses, who were involved in intercepting and transcribing the VRS conversations, testified before the Trial Chamber about the methods employed.²²² The contents of the conversations were first recorded on tape by Bosnian Muslim interceptors, then transcribed onto a piece of paper or into a notebook and finally typed out on a computer and sent to Headquarters.²²³ Although the transcribers generally made a note of the time at which the conversation commenced, the date was not always recorded for each conversation. However, dates could usually be ascertained by looking back through the notebooks to find the last recorded date and then tracking the times at which the subsequent conversations occurred, to determine when a new day had begun.²²⁴ The Trial Chamber viewed several of the original notebooks in which intercepted conversations were transcribed.

108. Very often the participants in the conversations identified themselves by name , or their identities could be ascertained from the context of the conversation. In addition, the Bosnian Muslim interceptors became familiar with the voices of the VRS participants in the conversations over the course of time. Witness U said that he had been monitoring conversations for almost two years prior to July 1995 and was very familiar with the voices of the participants in the conversations he was intercepting.²²⁵ When participants could not be identified, they were referred to as “X” and “Y”.²²⁶ On some occasions a single conversation was monitored by different intercept operators working in different locations which, in the Trial Chamber’s view, is a factor supporting the authenticity of these communications.²²⁷

109. The Trial Chamber was told that all possible measures were taken to ensure the accuracy of the transcribed conversations. According to Witness W:

     It was essential that every word, literally every word be recorded and that it should be audible, properly heard. You couldn’t guess because these were serious matters , and anything that was not sufficiently clear … any word not heard well enough was not recorded.²²⁸

     Nonetheless, Witness Z conceded:

     We did our best to be as precise as possible. However, there are many, many reasons why that was very difficult to achieve.²²⁹

110. In the event that a particular word could not be understood, the transcriber rewound the tape until it became clear and, if necessary, sought assistance from a colleague. If this was unsuccessful, the missing words were indicated with three dots or a question mark.²³⁰ These gaps in conversation reflected the fact that, usually, one of the participants in the conversation could be heard more clearly than the other one.²³¹ On some occasions the version of a conversation recorded in the notebook differed from the typewritten text. Witness Z explained that the person doing the typing may have requested clarification of some portion of the conversation and, accordingly , the tape would be replayed.²³² The typist could only change the contents of a conversation with the approval of the original transcriber or after personally listening to the tape.²³³

111. The Defence objected that the Bosnian Muslim interceptors were not properly trained for the work that they were doing and had inadequate technology at their disposal. As a result, it was argued, the intercepts were filled with assumptions as to what had been said during the course of the conversation.²³⁴ Prosecution Witness Y conceded that some of the soldiers intercepting conversations for the ABiH were better trained than others.²³⁵

112. General Radinovic testified that, although the VRS used intercepted radio communications in their intelligence work, he did not consider them to have a high degree of reliability .²³⁶ There was, however, evidence to the contrary. A VRS document dating back to 1993 indicates that radio reconnaissance platoons, or intercepting groups, had provided the VRS command structure with about 70 percent of all intelligence data gathered, which shows how heavily they relied upon the interception procedure.²³⁷ Indeed the Trial Chamber heard evidence that the VRS was relying on information obtained from intercepted ABiH communications during the events in Srebrenica. For example, a Daily Combat Report of the Zvornik Brigade on 14 July 1995 refers to information about the Bosnian Muslim column (which at that time was fleeing the enclave towards Tuzla) obtained from intercepted conversations between the military leaders of the column and personnel from the 2nd Corps located in Tuzla.²³⁸

113. The Trial Chamber also heard evidence that the VRS was constantly concerned about the possibility of their communications being overheard. In 1992, the VRS noted:

     So far we have registered nine enemy interception groups, exceptionally well manned and equipped.²³⁹

     Defence Witness DB (who in July 1995 was a communications officer in the Drina Corps ) agreed that the lack of attention paid to securing communications in the VRS was a problem and he did not dispute that the ABiH did intercept communications being made during the Srebrenica and Zepa operations.²⁴⁰ Defence Witness DC, who was also an officer in the Drina Corps in July 1995, agreed that intercepted communications, although not always trustworthy and reliable, could be useful sources of information.²⁴¹

114. General Radinovic argued that, in order to be considered a reliable source of information, the intercepts would have to be collated, cross-checks made between the tapes and the notebooks, and military experts, linguists and so on called in to assess them.²⁴² The Trial Chamber accepts that the OTP did in fact diligently check and cross-reference the intercept material as part of the “intercept project”. In order to determine whether the material was reliable and genuine, the OTP looked at the internal consistency between the notebooks and the printouts of each conversation. Transcripts of a single conversation , which was recorded by two or more interceptors, were also compared. The OTP also embarked on a process of corroborating the intercepts with information obtained from other sources, such as documents acquired from the VRS, the RS Ministry of Defence and UNPROFOR, as well as aerial images.²⁴³ A former OTP employee assigned to the “intercept project” testified that, as a result of this corroboration process, she became convinced that the intercepts were “absolutely reliable”.²⁴⁴ Although, at times , the OTP was unable to determine the significance of some aspects of the conversations , there was no information in the intercepted conversations that was completely at odds with the other evidence uncovered by the OTP.²⁴⁵ Meticulous procedures were used by the OTP for tracking the dates of the intercepted conversations and the former OTP employee who appeared before the Trial Chamber testified with “absolute certainty” that the dates ascribed to the individual conversations were accurate.²⁴⁶

115. The testimony of Mr. Butler provided corroboration of the careful consideration given to the intercept evidence during the course of the OTP’s investigation. Initially , in the course of preparing his expert military report, Mr. Butler viewed the intercepts with some scepticism.²⁴⁷ However , after detailed examination of the complete body of intercept evidence, he was convinced that they were reliable and, to the extent that he was able to draw firm conclusions from the individual conversations, he incorporated them into his military analysis.

116. On the whole, the Trial Chamber considers the intercepted communications to be a reliable source of evidence. All possible measures were taken by the Bosnian Muslim interceptors to ensure the accuracy of the recorded conversations, as would be expected in any prudent army. This fact was reinforced by the measures taken by the OTP to verify the reliability of the intercepted evidence as part of the “intercept project”. The Trial Chamber accepts that, often, aspects of the intercepted conversations can be corroborated by other evidence of events occurring at the time and it is impossible for the Chamber to imagine that this level of documentable detail could have been completely manufactured by the Bosnian Muslim interceptors . For example, on 16 July 1995 a conversation was recorded regarding a request made by Colonel Popovic for 500 litres of diesel fuel.²⁴⁸ Written records obtained from the Zvornik Brigade confirm that 500 litres of diesel fuel were in fact released to Colonel Popovic on 16 July 1995.²⁴⁹ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the intercept evidence is a reliable source of information. The weight and meaning attributable to each intercepted conversation will be considered on a case by case basis and in light of the wider context in which the conversation took place. Certainly, several of the intercepts tendered by the Prosecution were extremely fragmented, with numerous gaps where transcribers were unable to determine what was being said with precision. In those specific cases, the Trial Chamber has obviously not been able to draw any firm conclusions from the intercepts.

117. Having considered preliminary matters relating to the establishment and formation of the Drina Corps, as well as the nature of the evidence presented in this case , the Trial Chamber now considers the Drina Corps’ role in the commission of the crimes that occurred following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995.
     2. Krivaja 95

118. The Drina Corps was the VRS military formation tasked with planning and carrying out operation Krivaja 95, which culminated in the capture of Srebrenica town on 11 July 1995. However, the Indictment against General Krstic does not allege that the military invasion of the Srebrenica “safe area” was itself a violation of international law. Rather, it is the events that followed the military assault, namely the bussing of the women, children and elderly out of the Srebrenica enclave and the wholesale slaughter of the military aged men from Srebrenica that are the focus of this case . Nonetheless, the role of the Drina Corps in Krivaja 95 provides an important backdrop to the Trial Chamber’s consideration of the acts that followed.

     (a) The Objective of Krivaja 95

119. The precise objective of Krivaja 95 was the subject of argument between the parties during the course of the trial. There was no dispute that the initial plan did not include taking the town of Srebrenica.²⁵⁰ Despite the fact that Srebrenica was a “to be or not to be” issue for the VRS, an assessment had been made by the VRS command that conditions were not right at that moment for capturing Srebrenica town.²⁵¹ The Defence, however, argued that the plan for Krivaja 95 was limited to effectively separating the two enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa (with no significant modification of the “safe area” boundaries) and represented a direct response to the military offensives being conducted by the ABiH in the area of the enclave.²⁵² The Prosecution disputed this, claiming that the objective of Krivaja 95 was not only to split Zepa and Srebrenica, but also to reduce each enclave to its urban core. Shrinking the enclaves, the Prosecution contended, would undoubtedly trigger a humanitarian crisis and force the UN to abandon the “ safe area ” concept, which had proved such a thorn in the side of the Bosnian Serbs.²⁵³

120. The Prosecution’s argument is supported by reference to the documentation prepared by the Drina Corps Command for Krivaja 95.²⁵⁴ The plan specifically directed the Drina Corps to “split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica and to reduce them to their urban areas”. The plan also refers to “reducing the enclaves in size” and specified that the Drina Corps was to “improve the tactical positions of the forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves”.²⁵⁵ The Defence argued that the reference to eliminating the enclaves was directed to a separate and future operation and not to the immediate campaign.²⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber is persuaded that, although the initial aim of Krivaja 95 was limited, it was an important step towards ultimately establishing Bosnian Serb control over Srebrenica. The Trial Chamber has no doubt that, consistent with the March 1995 directive issued by President Karadzic mandating the blocking of aid convoys into the enclave,²⁵⁷ plunging the Bosnian Muslim residents into a humanitarian crisis was an integral component of the long-term VRS strategy for Srebrenica. On its face, however, the plan for Krivaja 95 certainly did not include a VRS scheme to bus the Bosnian Muslim civilian population out of the enclave, nor to execute all the military aged Bosnian Muslim men, as ultimately happened following the take-over of Srebrenica.

121. The Trial Chamber finds that the plan for Krivaja 95 was aimed at reducing the “safe area” of Srebrenica to its urban core and was a step towards the larger VRS goal of plunging the Bosnian Muslim population into humanitarian crisis and, ultimately, eliminating the enclave.

     (b)The Shelling of Srebrenica: Terrorisation of the Civilian Population

122. Numerous witnesses gave evidence that, during Operation Krivaja 95, the VRS shelled the Srebrenica enclave intensively with the apparent intent to terrify the populace.²⁵⁸ Evidence suggests that shelling commenced on 6 July 1995, as Krivaja 95 got under way.²⁵⁹ On 8 July 1995, an eyewitness saw columns of refugees coming under VRS (Drina Corps ) artillery fire.²⁶⁰ On 9 July 1995 , a Dutch Bat platoon commander saw VRS tanks firing in the direction of Srebrenica town, even though there were only refugees and a UN base in the vicinity.²⁶¹ Again on 10 July 1995, despite the military success that had already been achieved by the VRS, shelling continued all that day and the next. Shells fired by the VRS hit a hospital where 2,000 civilians had gathered for refuge and six of them were killed.²⁶² An UNMO who witnessed the unfolding events that day remarked upon the intensity of the shelling:

     [a]t times we could count over a hundred shells landing in the same place. You know , a continuous shelling of up to a hundred shells in the same area, and this is quite high intensity, considering the size of those villages.²⁶³

123. Thousands of residents, desperate for protection, crowded around the UNPROFOR Bravo Company compound in Srebrenica, eventually forcing their way inside. The chaotic scene was exacerbated when mortar shells landed inside the compound around noon, wounding several people.²⁶⁴ Following the shelling of Bravo Company and with the encouragement of the Dutch Bat troops, Bosnian Muslim residents from Srebrenica began to move north towards Potocari. Shells fell alongside the road and VRS forces were seen bringing up the rear of the crowd. Many witnesses believed this was a deliberate attempt to “herd ” the crowd out of Srebrenica.²⁶⁵ The VRS also embarked upon a campaign of burning Bosnian Muslim houses to ensure there would be no possibility of their former occupants returning.²⁶⁶ Further evidence that Srebrenica town was extensively shelled and that civilians came under fire was provided in combat reports filed by the 28th Division of the ABiH in the days immediately following the commencement of Krivaja 95.²⁶⁷

124. General Krstic²⁶⁸ and several other Defence witnesses who took part in Krivaja 95,²⁶⁹ denied that Srebrenica was shelled, or that civilians were deliberately targeted by the Drina Corps during Krivaja 95. One Defence witness stated that:

     The town of Srebrenica was not shelled at all. Not a single shell fell on the urban part of town, not a single building was damaged when we entered the town on the 11th of July.²⁷⁰

     Mr. Richard Butler, the Prosecution’s military expert, expressed the view that shells did not target the civilians of Srebrenica.²⁷¹ However, he subsequently clarified his position, stating there was no evidence that shells were fired directly at civilians by the VRS, and he did not dispute the testimony of the Dutch Bat soldiers and other witnesses about the impact of the shelling upon the civilians.²⁷² Mr. Butler did , however, say that there is little evidence of the calibre of shells fired or the extent of the damage caused.²⁷³

125. While the Prosecution may not have conclusively established the precise number of shells fired, or the type of artillery used, the Trial Chamber finds that the shelling of Srebrenica carried out by the Drina Corps, on 10 and 11 July 1995, by which time the original objectives of Krivaja 95 had already been achieved, was calculated to terrify the Bosnian Muslim population and to drive them out of Srebrenica town.
     3.Involvement of Drina Corps Personnel in the Events at Potocari: 11-13 July 1995

     (a) Transport of the Bosnian Muslim Civilians out of Potocari

     (i) Meeting at Hotel Fontana on 11 July 1995 at 2000 Hours

126. As the humanitarian crisis in Potocari escalated, at around 2000 hours on 11 July 1995, General Mladic summoned UNPROFOR leaders for the first of three meetings with VRS officials at the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac.²⁷⁴ General Mladic led the meeting, which lasted approximately one hour. General Zivanovic , then-Commander of the Drina Corps, was present along with other Drina Corps officers , including Lieutenant Colonel Svetozar Kosoric, the Drina Corps Chief of Intelligence , and Captain First Class Momir Nikolic, the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security of the Bratunac Brigade.²⁷⁵ Colonel Karremans stated that there were about 10,000 women and children within the Potocari compound and sought assurances that Dutch Bat and the Bosnian Muslim population would be allowed to withdraw from the area. General Mladic stated that the Bosnian Muslim civilian population was not the target of his actions and, subsequently , asked whether UNPROFOR would be able to provide any buses for their transportation out. Colonel Karremans replied that he thought that could be arranged.²⁷⁶

127. During the meeting, General Mladic asked the UNPROFOR leaders to put him in contact with a representative of the ABiH, as well as Bosnian Muslim civilian representatives . At this point, the VRS appeared to have no idea where the ABiH was. The 28th Division had disengaged from the VRS in the southern part of the enclave and the VRS had not yet realised that ABiH troops were rallying in the column to make a push towards Tuzla. Like General Mladic, however, Colonel Karremans had no idea how to get in contact with military or civilian leaders of Srebrenica. The meeting concluded with General Mladic telling Colonel Karremans to return later that same evening at 2300 hours for a second meeting.

     (ii)Meeting at the Hotel Fontana on 11 July 1995 at 2300 Hours

128. As General Mladic had directed, the second meeting convened at the Hotel Fontana took place around 2300 hours that same evening. General Mladic again presided at the meeting. This time General Zivanovic was not present but General Krstic was .²⁷⁷ Colonel Kosoric and Major Nikolic from the Drina Corps were also in attendance at this meeting. The Dutch Bat representatives arrived with a schoolteacher named Nesib Mandzic, an unofficial Bosnian Muslim representative who was plucked from the crowd in Potocari.²⁷⁸ The consensus of the UN and Bosnian Muslim participants in the meeting was that General Mladic was putting on a show calculated to intimidate them. As the meeting began, the death cries of a pig being slaughtered just outside the window could be heard in the meeting room. The Prosecution witnesses all thought this grisly interruption was deliberately designed to frighten them.²⁷⁹ General Mladic then placed the broken signboard from the Srebrenica Town Hall on the table. Mr. Mandzic thought this too was meant to symbolise the fact that the Bosnian Serbs had taken Srebrenica and the Bosnian Muslims could no longer stay there.²⁸⁰

129. Plans to transport the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of the enclave crystallised at this second meeting. The Dutch Bat officer present stated that between 15,000 and 20,000 refugees, mostly women, children and elderly, had gathered in and around Potocari by that time and recounted the developing humanitarian crisis.²⁸¹ General Mladic stated that he would provide the vehicles to transport the Srebrenica refugees out of Potocari.²⁸²

130. Although General Mladic said that the population had to choose whether to stay or, if they were not staying, where to go, he used threatening language. He demanded that all ABiH troops within the area of the former enclave lay down their arms and made it clear that, if this did not happen, the survival of the Bosnian Muslim population would be in danger. General Mladic said he wanted a clear position on whether the Bosnian Muslims wanted to “survive, stay, or disappear”. Turning to Mr. Mandzic , General Mladic said:

     Do you understand me Nesib…And the future of your people is in your hands…not only in this territory.²⁸³

     Mr. Mandzic was in an untenable position. He pleaded with General Mladic that he did not know where the 28th Division was and, in any event, had no power to commit the ABiH to any course of action. Nor did he have the authority to negotiate on behalf of the civilian population. His explanations, however, fell on deaf ears . General Mladic concluded the meeting, saying:

     That is your problem, bring people who can secure the surrender of weapons and save your people from destruction. ²⁸⁴

     To those present at the meeting that night it seemed clear that staying would not be an option for the Bosnian Muslim civilians of Srebrenica.²⁸⁵ General Mladic scheduled a follow-up meeting for the next morning.

     (iii)Meeting at the Hotel Fontana on 12 July 1995 at 1000 Hours

131. On 12 July 1995 at about 1000 hours, General Mladic convened the third and final meeting to discuss the fate of the Srebrenica Muslims. Once again, General Mladic dominated the meeting, with General Krstic sitting at his side.²⁸⁶ In addition, Colonel Popovic joined Colonel Kosoric as a representative of the Drina Corps at the meeting. By this time, the VRS had obtained information about the existence of the Bosnian Muslim column attempting to break out of the former enclave .²⁸⁷ The Dutch Bat representatives , still unable to contact the official Bosnian Muslim military or civilian leaders of Srebrenica, had again brought Mr. Mandzic, along with two more unofficial representatives from the Potocari refugees: Ms. Camila Omanovic, an economist; and Mr. Ibro Nuhanovic , a businessman.

132. General Mladic again made it clear that survival of the Srebrenica Muslims was conditional upon a military surrender. He said:

     …you can either survive or disappear…For your survival, I request: that all your armed men who attacked and committed crimes-and many did-- against our people, hand over their weapons to the Army of the Republika Srpska…on handing over weapons you may…choose to stay in the territory….or, if it suits you, go where you want. The wish of every individual will be observed, no matter how many of you there are.²⁸⁸

     General Mladic stated that he would provide the vehicles, but that the fuel would have to be provided by someone else and suggested that UNPROFOR assume responsibility for this.²⁸⁹

133. Mr. Mandzic and Ms. Omanovic both testified before the Trial Chamber that the clear message conveyed by General Mladic in this meeting was that the Bosnian Muslim refugees could only survive by leaving Srebrenica.²⁹⁰

134. General Mladic also informed those present that all men between the ages of about 17 and 70 would have to be separated and screened to separate out possible “war criminals”.²⁹¹

     (iv)Organisation of the Buses

135. After the meeting at the Hotel Fontana on the morning of 12 July 1995, two of the Dutch Bat soldiers went back to Bratunac to meet with VRS officials to work out an evacuation plan. As it turned out there was no need for such a meeting. By around noon on 12 July 1995, dozens of buses and trucks were arriving in Potocari to collect the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly. The VRS had already made all the necessary arrangements.²⁹²

136. The Defence argued that Drina Corps personnel were not involved in the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Potocari following the take-over of Srebrenica . However, there is abundant evidence showing the participation of the Drina Corps in this operation.

137. Early in the morning of 12 July 1995, General Zivanovic signed an order addressed to all the subordinate units of the Drina Corps directing that “all buses and mini -buses belonging to the VRS be secured for use by the Drina Corps,” arrive at the Bratunac stadium by 16.30 hours and follow instructions about locations for fuel distribution.²⁹³ The order further stated that the Drina Corps Command had sent a message to the RS Ministry of Defence asking for private buses to be mobilised. The same morning, the RS Ministry of Defence sent three orders to its local secretariats directing them to procure buses and send them to Bratunac.²⁹⁴

138. Intercepted conversations throughout 12 and 13 July 1995 reveal that other Drina Corps officers were also working on matters relating to the transportation . These include the Drina Corps Chief of Transportation, Lieutenant Colonel Rajko Krsmanovic,²⁹⁵ and Major Momir Nikolic , the Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security Affairs of the Drina Corps Bratunac Brigade.²⁹⁶ The specific involvement of General Krstic in the organisation of the buses is considered below in Part II C.

139. Logs seized from the Bratunac Brigade show that this Brigade was monitoring fuel disbursements to buses and trucks on 12 and 13 July 1995.²⁹⁷ The Trial Chamber accepts that the Drina Corps command must have been informed about the enormous quantities of fuel being disbursed given the scarcity of this precious commodity in Eastern Bosnia at the time.

140. Although the Drina Corps ultimately managed to find enough buses it was a scramble . Up until the evening of 11 July 1995, General Mladic had appeared to be working on the assumption that the buses to move the civilians out of Potocari would be provided by the UN. This was logical given the limited resources of the VRS and particularly the scarcity of buses and fuel in Eastern Bosnia at the time. The Drina Corps, after requesting buses from the Ministry of Defence in the early morning hours of 12 July 1995, succeeded in gathering the number of vehicles required for the transport of the entire population of women, children and elderly within a 48 hour period. The Prosecution expert, Mr. Butler, testified that an operation of this size –moving in the vicinity of 25,000 people – would normally have to be planned days in advance.²⁹⁸

141. On the evening of 13 July 1995, Colonel Jankovic, a VRS Main Staff officer, prepared a “wrap-up” report about the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari, which was sent to the Drina Corps Intelligence Department, further confirming that the Drina Corps was an interested party in the transportation operation .