IX. CHARGES AND FINDINGS

A. Extermination (count 4) and Wilful Killing (count 5)

In Counts 4 and 5 of the Indictment, the Accused is charged with extermination as a crime against humanity and with wilful killing as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable respectively under Articles 5(b) and 2(a) of the Statute.

1. The law
The Trial Chamber will first define the elements⁹⁰¹ of the crime of wilful killing, before turning to the elements specific to the crime of extermination.⁹⁰²
(a) Wilful killing
It is clear from the Tribunal’s jurisprudence that the elements of the underlying crime of wilful killing under Article 2 of the Statute are identical to those required for murder under Article 3 and Article 5 of the Statute.⁹⁰³
Save for some insignificant variations in expressing the constituent elements of the crime of murder and wilful killing, which are irrelevant for this case, the jurisprudence of this Tribunal has consistently defined the essential elements of these offences as follows:

1. The victim is dead;

2. The death was caused by an act or omission of the accused, or of a person or persons for whose acts or omissions the accused bears criminal responsibility; and

3. The act was done, or the omission was made, by the accused, or a person or persons for whose acts or omissions he bears criminal responsibility, with an intention:

- to kill, or

- to inflict grievous bodily harm or serious injury, in the reasonable knowledge that such act or omission was likely to cause death.⁹⁰⁴
The actus reus consists in the action or omission of the accused resulting in the death of the victim.⁹⁰⁵ The Prosecution need only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused’s conduct contributed substantially to the death of the victim.⁹⁰⁶
The Trial Chamber concurs with the Tadic Trial Chamber that:

Since these were not times of normalcy, it is inappropriate to apply rules of some national systems that require the production of a body as proof to death. However, there must be evidence to link injuries received to a resulting death.⁹⁰⁷
A similar position was taken by a Trial Chamber of the ICTR rejecting a defence motion to have witness testimony struck off the record, on the basis that there was no proof of corpus delictus (proof of death). The Trial Chamber held that the ICTR Statute did not have any

... rule or requirement or practice for the production of the body, or the body of the crime, particularly not in the light of the crimes for which the ICTR was created; particularly genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article Three common to the Geneva Convention.⁹⁰⁸
In Krnojelac, the Trial Chamber held that:

Proof beyond reasonable doubt that a person was murdered does not necessarily require proof that the dead body of that person has been recovered. [T]he fact of a victim’s death can be inferred circumstantially from all of the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber.⁹⁰⁹

The Trial Chamber added that a victim’s death may be established by circumstantial evidence provided that the only reasonable inference is that the victim is dead as a result of the acts or omissions of the accused.⁹¹⁰
With respect to the requisite mens rea of wilful killing under Article 2 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber notes that there has been some debate within the jurisprudence of this Tribunal and the ICTR regarding the question whether the mens rea threshold for murder, and mutatis mutandis wilful killing, requires a mental element of premeditation.⁹¹¹ The Trial Chamber finds that the mens rea for murder and wilful killing does not require premeditation.⁹¹² In this respect it endorses the Stakic Trial Chamber findings that:

[B]oth a dolus directus and a dolus eventualis are sufficient to establish the crime of murder [...] The technical definition of dolus eventualis is the following: if the actor engages in life-endangering behaviour, his killing becomes intentional if he ‘reconciles himself’ or ‘makes peace’ with the likelihood of death. [...]⁹¹³

The threshold of dolus eventualis thus entails the concept of recklessness, but not that of negligence or gross negligence.⁹¹⁴ To satisfy the mens rea for murder and wilful killing, it must be established that the accused had an intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm or serious injury in the reasonable knowledge that it would likely lead to death.⁹¹⁵
In addition, the Trial Chamber notes that the mens rea may also be inferred either directly or circumstantially from the evidence in the case.⁹¹⁶
(b) Extermination
The jurisprudence of this Tribunal and the ICTR has consistently held that, apart from the question of scale, the core elements of wilful killing (Article 2 ) and murder (Article 3 and Article 5) on the one hand and extermination (Article 5) on the other are the same.⁹¹⁷ In addition to the preconditions which must be established for a finding of a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute,⁹¹⁸ the elements of the crime of extermination under Article 5(b) are the following:

1. the killing of persons on a massive scale (actus reus), and

2. the accused’s intention to kill persons on a massive scale or to create conditions of life that lead to the death of a large number of people (mens rea).⁹¹⁹
The actus reus of the crime of extermination consists of any act, omission or combination thereof which contributes directly or indirectly to the killing of a large number of individuals.⁹²⁰ An act amounting to extermination may include the killing of a victim as such as well as conduct which creates conditions provoking the victim’s death and ultimately mass killings, such as the deprivation of food and medicine, calculated to cause the destruction of part of the population.⁹²¹
Criminal responsibility for extermination can also be established in situations where the accused’s participation in mass killings is remote or indirect.⁹²² This Trial Chamber also recalls that, although “the charge of extermination seems to have been restricted to individuals who, by reason of either their position or authority, could decide upon the fate or had control over a large number of individuals”⁹²³, the Prosecution is not required to prove that the accused had de facto control over a large number of individuals because of his position or authority.⁹²⁴ Moreover, it should be noted that extermination “must be collective in nature rather than directed towards singled out individuals. However, in contrast to genocide, the offender need not have intended to destroy the group or part of the group to which the victims belong.”⁹²⁵
The question has often arisen whether the element of killings on a massive scale implies a numerical requirement. The Trial Chamber agrees with the approach adopted by the Krstic Trial Chamber that:

The very term ‘extermination’ strongly suggests the commission of a massive crime, which in turn assumes a substantial degree of preparation and organisation. [...] (W(hile extermination generally involves a large number of victims, it may be constituted even where the number of victims is limited.⁹²⁶

Furthermore, the Trial Chamber recalls that the element of massiveness of the crime allows for the possibility to establish the evidence of the actus reus of extermination on an accumulation of separate and unrelated incidents, meaning on an aggregated basis.⁹²⁷ The Trial Chamber in that respect agrees with the finding of the Stakic Trial Chamber, which clarified that the requirement of massiveness as a constitutive element of the actus reus of extermination has to be determined on a case-by-case analysis of all relevant factors.⁹²⁸
The mens rea of the crime of extermination has not been defined consistently in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal and of the ICTR. In general, three approaches can be differentiated.⁹²⁹ The first approach was articulated by the Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Chamber, which stated that extermination may encompass intentional, reckless or grossly negligent killing.⁹³⁰ The second approach was formulated by the Krstic Trial Judgement in which the mental elements of murder (not necessarily premeditated) and extermination were linked. The Krstic Trial Chamber held that:

The offences of murder and extermination have a similar element in that they both intend the death of the victims. They have the same mens rea, which consists of the intention to kill or the intention to cause serious bodily injury to the victim which the perpetrator must have reasonably foreseen was likely to result in death.⁹³¹

The Stakic Trial Chamber has refined this second approach by finding that, in accordance with the character of the crime of extermination and with the construction of Article 5, the intent required for the crime of extermination should be the same as the mens rea of murder as a crime against humanity, namely dolus directus or dolus eventualis.⁹³²
The third approach was adopted by the Vasiljevic Trial Chamber. The threshold for mens rea of extermination was defined as follows:

The offender must intend to kill, to inflict grievous bodily harm, or to inflict serious injury, in the reasonable knowledge that such an act or omission is likely to cause death, or otherwise intends to participate in the elimination of a number of individuals, in the knowledge that his action is part of a vast murderous enterprise in which a large number of individuals are systematically marked for killing or killed.⁹³³

The question arises whether the mens rea for extermination entails an additional element vis-à-vis the second approach formulated by the Krstic and Staki c Trial Chambers, namely the requirement to prove ‘knowledge of a vast murderous enterprise’.
The Trial Chamber recalls what it had stated in its Rule 98bis decision regarding the elements required for the crime of extermination, namely, that the Vasiljevic approach was being preferred for the sole purpose of the Rule 98bis exercise because it is more beneficial to the accused.⁹³⁴ Since then, the Krstic Appeal Judgement has crystallised the legal position on the matter in stating that for the purpose of extermination, no proof is required of the existence of a plan or policy to commit that crime.⁹³⁵ In its decision, the Appeals Chamber added that the presence of such a plan or policy may be important evidence that the attack against a civilian population was widespread or systematic.⁹³⁶ In view of this pronouncement, the Trial Chamber makes it clear that the Vasiljevic “knowledge that his action is part of a vast murderous enterprise in which a larger number of individuals are systematically marked for killing or killed”⁹³⁷, if proven, will be considered as evidence tending to prove the accused’s knowledge that his act was part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, and not beyond that.
The Trial Chamber thus endorses the mens rea formulation as identified in the Krstic and Stakic Trial Judgements as the correct legal one for the final determination of the factual findings in this case.⁹³⁸ The mens rea standard for extermination is the same as the mens rea required for murder as a crime against humanity with the difference that “extermination can be said to be murder on a massive scale”.⁹³⁹ The Prosecution is thus required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had the intention to kill persons on a massive scale or to create conditions of life that led to the death of a large number of people.⁹⁴⁰ The mens rea standard required for extermination does not include a threshold of negligence or gross negligence: the accused’s act or omission must be done with intention or recklessness (dolus eventualis).⁹⁴¹
It is in the light of the constitutive elements of wilful killing and extermination as described above that the evidence relating to each of the alleged acts of killings is assessed and the appropriate conclusions are reached in the section below.

2. The facts and findings
The Trial Chamber heard testimony from a large number of Prosecution witnesses about killings that occurred in various municipalities of the ARK. As a preliminary matter, the Trial Chamber finds that evidence was adduced with respect to a number of killings which were not charged in the Indictment.⁹⁴² While such evidence may support the proof of the existence of an armed conflict or a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, no finding of guilt for the crimes of wilful murder or extermination may be made in respect of such uncharged incidents.
With respect to those killings that were alleged in the Indictment, the Trial Chamber finds that the following incidents were not proved beyond reasonable doubt :

- The killing of a number of men in Lisnja on or about 1 June 1992 - Prnjavor municipality;⁹⁴³

- The killing of a number of men in the village of Vrbanjci on 25 June 1992 - Kotor Varos municipality;⁹⁴⁴

- The killing of a number of men on the way from Kukavice and surrounding areas in Kotor Varos on or about 25 June 1992 - Kotor Varos municipality;⁹⁴⁵

- The killing of a number of men in Dujo Banovic's house in Kenjari on or about 27 June 1992 - Sanski Most municipality.⁹⁴⁶
The Trial Chamber is, however, satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the killings described below did occur. In the Indictment, the Prosecution chose to divide the killings into two separate categories, depending on whether they related to 1.) a municipality or to 2.) a civilian/military camp or detention facility. The Trial Chamber maintains that distinction for the purpose of the following analysis.
(a) Killings related to municipalities (para. 38 of the Indictment)

(i) Banja Luka

a. The killing of a number of people in the village of Culum-Kostic
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, on 15 August 1992, five members of a Bosnian Muslim family were killed while sitting in front of their house in the village of Culum near Banja Luka.⁹⁴⁷ Three individuals, two of whom were armed with automatic rifles and dressed in camouflage uniforms, approached the house and opened gunfire on the family.⁹⁴⁸ The perpetrators were later identified as the Sugic brothers.⁹⁴⁹

(ii) Prijedor

a. The killing of a number of people in Hambarine⁹⁵⁰
On the evening of 22 May 1992, a shooting incident occurred at a checkpoint of the TO near Hambarine, a village predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims.⁹⁵¹ On that night, a car with six soldiers was stopped. Following a request by the checkpoint personnel to hand over their weapons, shooting broke out. It is unclear exactly what happened: one source states that a Bosnian Serb soldier was shot dead,⁹⁵² while another claims that two of the checkpoint guards were killed.⁹⁵³ Following this incident, Bosnian Serb authorities in Prijedor issued an ultimatum to the residents of Hambarine to surrender the checkpoint commander involved in the incident and to surrender all weapons.⁹⁵⁴ As no action to that effect was taken, on 23 May 1992 at noon, the indiscriminate shelling of Hambarine started.⁹⁵⁵ Tanks fired at the village, and a large number of Bosnian Serb soldiers participated in the attack.⁹⁵⁶ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that during the onslaught on Hambarine, at least three civilians died.⁹⁵⁷

b. The killing of a number of people in Kozarac⁹⁵⁸ and the surrounding areas
After the attack on Hambarine, Bosnian Serb authorities issued a similar ultimatum to the inhabitants of Kozarac, another town with a majority of Bosnian Muslim inhabitants.⁹⁵⁹ Negotiations were held during which the town was completely blocked off.⁹⁶⁰ The attack on Kozarac started on 24 May 1992 with intensive shelling.⁹⁶¹ It lasted for two days.⁹⁶²
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that at least 80 Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed when Bosnian Serb soldiers and police⁹⁶³ entered the villages of the Kozarac area.⁹⁶⁴ Killings occurred randomly,⁹⁶⁵ and the population that had not yet fled was threatened that they would also be killed.⁹⁶⁶ A number of Bosnian Muslim employees of the Kozarac police station were killed.⁹⁶⁷ Patients at the medical centre in Kozarac died as a result of shelling wounds and other injuries when the centre was shelled.⁹⁶⁸ When a doctor tried to negotiate the evacuation of two injured children, one of whom had her legs completely shattered, he was told over the radio "Die, balijas, we're going to kill you anyway".⁹⁶⁹
When the fighting broke out, a group of approximately 100 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the Kevljani area tried to escape on foot across the Kozara mountain range.⁹⁷⁰ After a night in the woods, the group was arrested by armed Bosnian Serbs wearing different kinds of uniforms.⁹⁷¹ One man was shot dead after a Croatian passport was found on him.⁹⁷² The group was brought to the Benkovac training grounds⁹⁷³ which, prior to the conflict, were used for military purposes.⁹⁷⁴ These grounds had been turned into a detention camp run by the military.⁹⁷⁵ The detained group was ordered to line up in front of a building, and a Bosnian Serb soldier with the last name of Romanic singled out four persons. They were taken to one of the rooms inside the building and shot dead, apparently in retaliation for Romanic's brother who had been killed in Croatia.⁹⁷⁶ A religious leader known as the 'Hodza' was beaten to death by the soldiers.⁹⁷⁷ In the course of the day, 60 individuals were taken to the woods in groups, from where one could hear bursts of gunfire.⁹⁷⁸ The Trial Chamber finds that these persons were killed. Those not killed at the Benkovac barracks were put on buses and taken to Omarska camp.⁹⁷⁹

c. The killing of a number of people in Mehmed Sahuric's house in Kamicani⁹⁸⁰
The village of Kamicani was predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims.⁹⁸¹ From 24 to 26 May 1992, the village was attacked by Bosnian Serb military.⁹⁸² At least eight Bosnian Muslims were hiding during that period in the basement of Mehmed Sahuric's house. These persons were shot dead by Bosnian Serb soldiers after their place of refuge was discovered.⁹⁸³ Their bodies have subsequently been retrieved and identified.⁹⁸⁴

d. The killing of a number of men in the village of Jaskici
The Trial Chamber finds that at least eight Bosnian Muslim men were shot and killed⁹⁸⁵ when on 14 June 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers entered the village of Jaskici.⁹⁸⁶ The bodies of those men have been exhumed and identified.⁹⁸⁷

e. The killing of a number of men in the village of Biscani
The village of Biscani comprises the hamlets of Mrkalji, Hegici, Ravine, Sredici and Duratovici.⁹⁸⁸ On 20 July 1992, Bosnian Serb forces conducted an onslaught on the entire Brdo area, of which Bi scani forms part.⁹⁸⁹ They consisted of military and police and were wearing different kinds of uniforms.⁹⁹⁰ The Bosnian Muslim population of Biscani was told to gather at various collection points throughout the village. One collection point was at a coffee bar in Biscani.⁹⁹¹ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that on that location, five unarmed men were shot dead by Bosnian Serb soldiers.⁹⁹²
On the same day, Bosnian Serb soldiers lined up between 30 and 40 Bosnian Muslim residents of Mrkalji at a nearby clay pit.⁹⁹³ There were military vehicles, including an armoured personnel carrier, and more than 20 soldiers in camouflage uniforms with them.⁹⁹⁴ None of the Mrkalji residents at the clay pit wore a uniform.⁹⁹⁵ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that all of them were executed with rifles by the Bosnian Serb soldiers present.⁹⁹⁶
The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that a large number of other killings of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats occurred in the Brdo area around 20 July 1992 as a result of the campaign conducted by Bosnian Serb forces.⁹⁹⁷ In an orchard in Hegici, 12 persons were lined up and shot dead with rifles.⁹⁹⁸ Around 20 individuals were killed at a bus stop between Alagici and Cemernica.⁹⁹⁹ After the end of the massacre, a number of Bosnian Muslim men had to collect the dead bodies from the roads under the supervision of the Bosnian Serb military.¹⁰⁰⁰ Between 300 and 350 bodies were loaded on trucks, almost all Bosnian Muslims, with a few Bosnian Croats.¹⁰⁰¹

f. The killing of a number of people in the village of Carakovo
Prior to 1992, almost the entire population of the village of Carakovo were Bosnian Muslims.¹⁰⁰² On 23 July 1992, Bosnian Serb tanks attacked Carakovo, after several demands that residents should hand in weapons had been issued.¹⁰⁰³ The Trial Chamber finds that during the raid, at least 16 civilians were killed. Three of them were shot dead in front of their houses.¹⁰⁰⁴ Drago Tintar, one of the Bosnian Serb soldiers, killed Hasib Simbegovic with his rifle when the latter was about to board a bus.¹⁰⁰⁵ Bosnian Serb soldiers also took Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians from Carakovo to the Zeger bridge on the Sana River,¹⁰⁰⁶ where a number of them were shot dead. Their bodies were thrown into the river.¹⁰⁰⁷

g. The killing of a number of people in the village of Brisevo
Brisevo is a village belonging to the local commune of Ljubija. Prior to the conflict, it was inhabited mainly by Bosnian Croats.¹⁰⁰⁸ On 27 May 1992, the village was shelled with mortars coming from the direction of Rasavci and Ostra Luka, two predominantly Bosnian Serb villages east of Brisevo.¹⁰⁰⁹ Before the shelling, Bosnian Serb authorities in the area had requested that all weapons in the village be surrendered. Weapons were handed over to the Bosnian Serbs in Rasavci, despite there only being legally owned hunting rifles and pistols.¹⁰¹⁰
In the early morning hours of 24 July 1992, Bosnian Serb military launched an attack on Brisevo.¹⁰¹¹ Mortar shells landed on the houses, and the residents hid in cellars.¹⁰¹² The shelling continued throughout the day and, on the next day, infantry fire joined the artillery. On the evening of 25 July 1992, Bosnian Serb infantry entered Bri sevo.¹⁰¹³ The soldiers wore JNA uniforms with red ribbons around their arms or helmets. Some had 'Cetnik' insignia such as 'Subara' hats.¹⁰¹⁴ Pero Dimac, an elderly Bosnian Croat, was forced to take off his clothes, was hit with a bible, and was eventually shot in the head by Bosnian Serb soldiers.¹⁰¹⁵ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that during the attack on Brisevo, at least 68 persons were killed, 14 of whom being women.¹⁰¹⁶

h. The killing of a number of men at the Ljubija football stadium¹⁰¹⁷
In July 1992, Bosnian Muslim civilians detained in Miska Glava were transferred to the Ljubija football stadium, located in Gornja Ljubija.¹⁰¹⁸ Many civilians were already confined inside the stadium, guarded by Bosnian Serb policemen and members of an intervention platoon.¹⁰¹⁹ A police officer known as ‘Stiven’ executed Irfan Nasic with a pistol from a close distance, and another Bosnian Muslim detainee, Muharem Petrovac, was split into two when a guard nicknamed ‘Duca’ fired a gun at him.¹⁰²⁰ Two men were singled out and taken to the other side of the stadium, where they were killed.¹⁰²¹ Detainees then were ordered to remove the dead bodies and put them in a bus.¹⁰²² The Trial Chamber finds that, at a minimum, 15 detainees were killed in the stadium.¹⁰²³

i. The killing of a number of men at the Ljubija iron ore mine
Thereafter on the same day, around 50 detainees from the Ljubija football stadium were put on a bus provided by the local public transport company and taken to an iron ore mine south-west of Ljubija, locally referred to as 'Kipe'.¹⁰²⁴ Persons were called out from the bus and executed by Bosnian Serb soldiers in groups of three.¹⁰²⁵ The bodies were thrown into a depression in the ground.¹⁰²⁶ The Trial Chamber finds that, save Elvedin Nasic and Nermin Karagic, who managed to escape, all persons travelling on that bus were killed.¹⁰²⁷

j. The killing of a number of people in Tomasica
Tomasica is a village south of Prijedor where, prior to the conflict, both Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs lived. The latter formed a majority of the population.¹⁰²⁸ On 2 December 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers took male Bosnian Croat residents from Tomasica to the surrounding forests in order to cut wood.¹⁰²⁹ They stayed out for three consecutive days.¹⁰³⁰ On 5 December 1992, Mile Topalovic, who was returning from the woods, was shot dead at Franjo Salic's house by Bosnian Serb soldiers later identified as Mile Gvozden and Zoran Simcic.¹⁰³¹ The Trial Chamber is persuaded that these men were also responsible for the killing of another six Bosnian Croat civilians on the same day.¹⁰³²

(iii) Sanski Most

a. Killing of a number of men between Begici and Vrhpolje bridge
The hamlet of Begici belongs to the village of Kljevci. Prior to the conflict, it was inhabited by Bosnian Muslims.¹⁰³³ On 31 May 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers entered Begici and rounded up its inhabitants.¹⁰³⁴ Men were separated from women and children. Between 20 and 30 men were taken towards the Vrhpolje bridge¹⁰³⁵ where they were supposed to be put on buses.¹⁰³⁶
Jadranko Palija was in charge of leading the column of men to Vrhpolje bridge, which spans the Sana River.¹⁰³⁷ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that four Bosnian Muslim men were killed by Jadranko Palija on the way to the bridge.¹⁰³⁸ Upon arrival, the other men were ordered to take off their clothes and line up. Many Bosnian Serb soldiers in different uniforms were present.¹⁰³⁹ One of them said that 70 Bosnian Muslims had to be killed in retaliation for the death of seven Bosnian Serb soldiers in the area.¹⁰⁴⁰ Then, the Bosnian Muslim men were ordered to jump off the bridge into the Sana River one by one. Once in the water, the soldiers opened fire upon them.¹⁰⁴¹ Rajif Begic survived as he was swimming under water for about 100 metres downstream. From the place where he was hiding, he was able to observe the executions at the bridge.¹⁰⁴² The Trial Chamber finds that a total of at least 28 persons were killed in this event.¹⁰⁴³

b. The killing of a number of members of Merdanovic's family in the hamlet of Kukavice, Hrustovo village
On 31 May 1992, soldiers in JNA uniforms, who referred to themselves as the 'Serbian Army'¹⁰⁴⁴, came to the village of Hrustovo,¹⁰⁴⁵ which was inhabited by Bosnian Muslims.¹⁰⁴⁶ Prior to their arrival, there had been announcements on the local radio on behalf of the 'Serbian Republic' demanding that Bosnian Muslims surrender their weapons.¹⁰⁴⁷ At the hamlet of Jelecevic, the local population was ordered to leave their homes and to go to another village so the soldiers could search their houses for weapons. In Kukavice, another hamlet of Hrustovo, Bosnian Muslims from various hamlets gathered in a garage adjacent to Ibrahim Merdanovic's house.¹⁰⁴⁸ Out of 30 persons inside the garage, there was only one man, Husein Merdanovic, the rest being women and children.¹⁰⁴⁹
At one point, Bosnian Serb soldiers came to the garage and started shouting. Shots were fired, and the people inside the garage panicked. Husein Merdanovic walked out of the garage and was shot dead immediately.¹⁰⁵⁰ Then, the soldiers started to fire into the garage randomly.¹⁰⁵¹ Some people left the garage and tried to escape, but the soldiers continued to shoot at them as they fled.¹⁰⁵² The Trial Chamber finds that, at a minimum, 15 members of the Merdanovic family were killed.¹⁰⁵³

c. The killing of a number of people near the Partisan cemetery in Sanski Most
Kriva Cesta is the name of an area located near the Partisan cemetery in Sanski Most.¹⁰⁵⁴ On 22 June 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers in olive-grey and camouflage uniforms ordered around 20 Bosnian Muslim men to dig a hole in a stream flowing below Kriva Cesta.¹⁰⁵⁵ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that all but three of these men did not finish with the work because their throats were slit by Simo Simetic, one of the uniformed men.¹⁰⁵⁶ During the operation, the other soldiers pointed their guns at the men to prevent any kind of resistance.¹⁰⁵⁷

d. The killing of a number of members of the Alibegovic family in Budim
The hamlet of Budim belongs to the village of Lukavica. Before 1992, it was nicknamed ‘Alibegovic’ because the majority of its Bosnian Muslim inhabitants shared that surname.¹⁰⁵⁸ The Trial Chamber finds that on 1 August 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers attacked Budim and executed 14 members of the Alibegovic family, all of whom were unarmed civilians.¹⁰⁵⁹ The victims were shot from a close distance with automatic weapons.¹⁰⁶⁰ The survivors were allowed to bury their relatives only in the presence of a Bosnian Serb.¹⁰⁶¹

e. The killing of a number of men near the village of Skrljevita
The village of Skrljevita had a majority Bosnian Croat population.¹⁰⁶² On 2 November 1992, seven Bosnian Croats from Skrljevita were rounded up by Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces at the Glamosnica forest.¹⁰⁶³ The Bosnian Serb paramilitaries claimed to belong to ‘Seselj's Army’.¹⁰⁶⁴ One of them was wearing a military police belt and camouflage uniform, another had Serb insignia carved into his rifle butt.¹⁰⁶⁵ After having body-searched their victims, the Bosnian Serbs, among them a certain Danilusko Kajtez, executed seven Bosnian Croats.¹⁰⁶⁶

(iv) Kljuc

a. The killing of a number of people in Pudin Han¹⁰⁶⁷
Pudin Han is a village in the Kljuc municipality which prior to the conflict had approximately 900 inhabitants, almost all of whom were Bosnian Muslims.¹⁰⁶⁸ When Kljuc was taken over by Bosnian Serbs, the Territorial Defence of Kljuc retreated to Pudin Han.¹⁰⁶⁹ On 28 May 1992, the Kljuc Crisis Staff issued an ultimatum demanding that all citizens in the municipality owning illegally acquired weapons hand them over.¹⁰⁷⁰ During a meeting at the youth centre, the vast majority of inhabitants of Pudin Han were in favour of surrendering their weapons. Those who disagreed left for Bihac.¹⁰⁷¹ Even before the ultimatum expired, the shelling of Pudin Han from locations controlled by Bosnian Serbs started.¹⁰⁷² The Trial Chamber is convinced that, at a minimum, three civilians from Pudin Han died as a consequence of the shelling.¹⁰⁷³

b. The killing of a number of people in Prhovo village and a number of men on the road to Peci¹⁰⁷⁴
On 26 May 1992, a number of masked and armed Bosnian Serbs arrived at the village of Prhovo. They rounded up the local Bosnian Muslim population and ordered them to surrender their weapons, which they did.¹⁰⁷⁵ An attack on Prhovo commenced on 1 June 1992 with heavy shooting.¹⁰⁷⁶ Marko Adamovic, a Bosnian Serb from Humici, was in command of the operation.¹⁰⁷⁷ Some of the Bosnian Serbs wore JNA camouflage uniforms, but there were also masked armed civilians.¹⁰⁷⁸ Residents were ordered to gather in front of Karanfil Osmanovic's house.¹⁰⁷⁹ Four Bosnian Muslim men were called out by name, told to run away, and then shot dead.¹⁰⁸⁰ The Trial Chamber finds that at least seven Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed during the attack on Prhovo, including a man who was dragged to death by a truck,¹⁰⁸¹ as well as two women who died because their hands or legs had been blown off.¹⁰⁸²
Later on, about 30 Bosnian Muslim men from Prhovo were ordered to form a column and walk to the nearby village of Peci.¹⁰⁸³ Bosnian Serb soldiers killed three Bosnian Muslim men after they had failed to drag out from the mud a military vehicle.¹⁰⁸⁴ The Trial Chamber finds that before the column reached Peci, a total of 18 men were killed, reducing the number of those that survived to 12.¹⁰⁸⁵ Sulejman Medanovic, having survived the walk, died during the following night as a result of beatings.¹⁰⁸⁶
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that at least 33 persons died in Prhovo village and on the road to Peci.¹⁰⁸⁷

c. The killing of a number of men in front of the school in Velagici¹⁰⁸⁸
During the evening of 1 June 1992, Bosnian Serb police from the checkpoint at Velagici sent a man to the predominantly Bosnian Muslim hamlets of Vojici, Nezici, Hasici, Castovici and Hadzici. He informed the local population that they were obliged to come to Velagici to obtain a permit in order to be allowed to move around freely.¹⁰⁸⁹ In the old primary school in Velagici, located in the immediate vicinity of the Bosnian Serb checkpoint, around a hundred residents from these hamlets were confined.¹⁰⁹⁰ Both Bosnian Serb policemen and soldiers were present.¹⁰⁹¹ Zoran Dvizac, a man in an olive-grey uniform, took down the names of all present.¹⁰⁹² Shortly before midnight, people were taken out from the school and ordered to line up in front of the building. Then, two Bosnian Serb soldiers armed with automatic rifles opened fire on them.¹⁰⁹³ The soldiers continued firing until every person had fallen down. Thereafter, they shot at those who still appeared to be alive.¹⁰⁹⁴ A witness described that one person survived the massacre.¹⁰⁹⁵ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that at least 77 civilians were killed in this incident.¹⁰⁹⁶

(v) Kotor Varos

a. The killing of a number of men in front of the Medical Centre in Kotor Varos¹⁰⁹⁷
On 25 June 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers and police lined up a group of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in front of the hospital in Kotor Varos.¹⁰⁹⁸ Dusko Vujicic, a police officer, asked Miralem Avdic, one of the detainees, whether he had participated in the founding assembly of the SDA in Sarajevo. Vujicic then killed Miralem Avdic with two shots from his pistol from a close distance.¹⁰⁹⁹ The other men were then ordered to take Avdic’s body to a place where there were already other dead bodies.¹¹⁰⁰ The Trial Chamber is convinced that on that day in front of the hospital in Kotor Varo s, at least two detainees were killed.¹¹⁰¹

b. The killing of a number of men in Dabovci
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that at least three Bosnian Muslim men from Dabovci were killed after Bosnian Serb soldiers had destroyed their village in mid -August of 1992. The men, all civilians, were taken to a nearby place and were summarily executed by the soldiers.¹¹⁰²

c. The killing of a number of men in the mosque in Hanifici¹¹⁰³
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that at least eight Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed in the village of Hanifici in mid-August of 1992. Bosnian Serb forces had rounded up these persons and shot them dead in the local mosque, which was subsequently set on fire.¹¹⁰⁴ Eight bodies have been retrieved and identified from the site of the mosque.¹¹⁰⁵

d. The killing of a number of people in Edhem Cirkic’s house in Cirkino Brdo ¹¹⁰⁶
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, in mid-August of 1992, Bosnian Serb forces set on fire the Bosnian Muslim village of Cirkici, in the course of which six women and one man were killed.¹¹⁰⁷

e. The killing of a number of men in the school in Grabovica¹¹⁰⁸
In November 1992, a group of 200 Bosnian Muslim men, women and children from the Kotor Varos area¹¹⁰⁹ fled from the hostilities. From Vecici, they decided to walk to Travnik during the night because they were afraid of the Bosnian Serbs.¹¹¹⁰ Early in the morning, the group was ambushed by Bosnian Serbs soldiers. The group surrendered, following which they were taken to the school building in Grabovica and confined in classrooms.¹¹¹¹
The following day, women and children were separated from the men and put on buses.¹¹¹² Still today, there is no clue as to the whereabouts of the men that stayed behind at the Grabovica school. The Trial Chamber is however satisfied that they were all killed,¹¹¹³ even though not a single body has been recovered. As to the number of victims, the Trial Chamber can only rely on the evidence before it, which indicates that 40 Bosnian Muslims were killed.¹¹¹⁴

(vi) Bosanski Novi

a. The killing of a number of people during the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from the village of Blagaj Japra and the surrounding areas
Bosnian Serb forces attacked Bosanski Novi at the beginning of June 1992.¹¹¹⁵ The village of Blagaj is within the municipality of Bosanski Novi, and it is divided by the river Sana into Blagaj Japra and Blagaj Rijeka.¹¹¹⁶ On 11 May 1992, the inhabitants of Blagaj Japra, all of them Bosnian Muslims, were requested to surrender all weapons in their possession.¹¹¹⁷ The village was subsequently shelled a number of times.¹¹¹⁸ During the following month, several thousand Bosnian Muslims from other villages fled to Blagaj Japra because their homes had been destroyed by Bosnian Serb artillery.¹¹¹⁹ On 9 June 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers entered Blagaj Japra, rounded up people and killed some of them randomly. The Trial Chamber finds that at least 12 individuals were killed in these events.¹¹²⁰

b. The killing of a number of men in the village of Alici
On 23 June 1992, six Bosnian Serbs drove with a tractor into the village of Alici. Some of these men wore uniforms, but others were also dressed in civilian clothes.¹¹²¹ In the evening, Bosnian Serb forces rounded up local Bosnian Muslims and gathered them at the local orthodox cemetery. Around midnight, a burst of gunfire could be heard, followed by the singing of Serb songs.¹¹²² The Trial Chamber finds that at least 27 persons were killed by armed Bosnian Serbs during this incident.¹¹²³ The Trial Chamber is also convinced that equipment from the public utilities company in Bosanski Novi was used to bury the dead bodies in mass graves.¹¹²⁴
(b) Killings related to camps and detention facilities (para. 41 of the Indictment )

(i) The killing of a number of men in Manjaca¹¹²⁵ between 1 June and 18 December 1992 – Banja Luka municipality
In mid-May 1992, Bosnian Serb authorities set up a camp on the Manjaca mountain outside the city of Banja Luka.¹¹²⁶ The camp held almost exclusively civilians of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat ethnicity, mainly from the areas of Kozarac¹¹²⁷ and the Sana river valley.¹¹²⁸ The camp was run by Bosnian Serb military police under the command of the 1st KK,¹¹²⁹ and Colonel Bozidar Popovic was the camp commander.¹¹³⁰
Inside the camp, some inmates were beaten to death.¹¹³¹ Omer Filipovic, a prominent detainee from Kljuc, was beaten on a daily basis and died on 28 July 1992¹¹³² as a result of the severe beatings.¹¹³³
Upon his arrival at Manjaca camp, Esad Bender was already covered with bruises and other signs of beatings.¹¹³⁴ One night on or around 28 June 1992, he was called out from the stable where the detainees were housed. Shortly after his return in the morning,¹¹³⁵ Esad Bender died as a result of the beatings inflicted on him during that night.¹¹³⁶
A Bosnian Croat soldier from the HVO was taken to the camp's isolation cell, from where the other inmates could hear his screams and the sound of beatings. Then a shot was fired, following which everything was silent. Detainees were ordered to wrap his dead body in a blanket.¹¹³⁷
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that between June and November 1992, at least 10 prisoners died inside Manjaca camp as a result of beatings or of sporadic killings.¹¹³⁸

(ii) The killing of a number of people at Omarska camp¹¹³⁹ between 28 May and 6 August 1992 – Prijedor municipality
As of late May 1992, a camp was set up at Omarska, where evidence shows that several hundred Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians from the Prijedor area were detained, and where killings occurred on a massive scale.¹¹⁴⁰
A lot of the killings at Omarska camp were committed at the building known as the ‘White House’. Incoming detainees recount that dead bodies were lying around there on various occasions, and the inside of the ‘White House’ was covered with blood.¹¹⁴¹ Killings also occurred at the ‘Red House’.¹¹⁴² Detainees were deprived of their lives in various ways. Many of them were so severely beaten that they died from their injuries.¹¹⁴³ Others were riddled by bullets, jumped on by camp guards, or strangled.¹¹⁴⁴ A large number of detainees were called out from the rooms in which they were detained and never returned.¹¹⁴⁵ If detainees were told that they should take their belongings with them, it meant that they would not return and were, in all likelihood, going to be killed.¹¹⁴⁶
Inmates were unofficially grouped into three categories.¹¹⁴⁷ Category one comprised intellectuals and political leaders from the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities, who were earmarked for elimination. Persons who associated themselves with those from the first category would fall into the second category, and the third category encompassed detainees that were in the view of the Bosnian Serb authorities the least ‘guilty’, and eventually were to be released.¹¹⁴⁸ However, in practice, people from all three categories were kept detained in the camp.¹¹⁴⁹
Around 29 May 1992, detainees from the Benkovac military barracks were transferred to the camp.¹¹⁵⁰ Upon arrival, around 120 persons were crammed into a garage for several days. Two young men suffocated to death as a result of the conditions inside the garage.¹¹⁵¹
Prominent members of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat local communities were imprisoned in Omarska camp,¹¹⁵² such as Professor Muhamed Cehajic, the mayor of Prijedor prior to the Bosnian Serb take-over. He formerly taught literature at Prijedor high school and was a well- liked man. On 27 July 1992, he was called out from the room in which he was detained and taken out of the camp.¹¹⁵³ Muhamed Cehajic did not return and was never seen again.¹¹⁵⁴ Dr. Esad Sadikovic, a physician, had previously worked for the UNHCR and was described as a charismatic and deeply humane person.¹¹⁵⁵ In Omarska, he helped other detainees wherever he could, and was regarded as a ‘ moral and spiritual authority’.¹¹⁵⁶ One night, a camp guard appeared and said: “Dr. Eso Sadikovic, come out and take your stuff with you.” The other detainees knew that this meant he would not return. Everybody stood up and bid him farewell.¹¹⁵⁷ The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that both Muhamed Cehajic and Esad Sadikovic were taken out to be killed and were actually killed.
At the end of July 1992, the killing of inmates with a special professional background started. One night, lawyers were targeted, following which policemen and physicians were marked for killing.¹¹⁵⁸ In one night at the end of July 1992, a large number of detainees from the recently cleansed Brdo area were killed.¹¹⁵⁹
A yellow truck frequently came by to take away the dead bodies. The vehicle returned empty after about 30-45 minutes.¹¹⁶⁰ Detainees were often ordered to help with the loading. Some of the bodies had been mutilated.¹¹⁶¹
Following the visit of foreign journalists in early August 1992, Omarska camp was closed.¹¹⁶² The Trial Chamber is unable to precisely identify all detainees that were killed at Omarska camp. It is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt however that, at a minimum, 94 persons were killed, including those who disappeared.

(iii) The killing of a number of men in Trnopolje camp between 28 May and October 1992 – Prijedor municipality
Following the Bosnian Serb attack on Kozarac at the end of May 1992, residents of that area were brought to the school and community centre in Trnopolje. They were mainly women and children, with only a few military-aged men.¹¹⁶³ The camp commander was Slobodan Kuruzovic, and the guards were Bosnian Serb soldiers from Prijedor.¹¹⁶⁴
The Trial Chamber finds that numerous killings occurred in Trnopolje camp. A number of detainees died as a result of the beatings received by the guards.¹¹⁶⁵ Others were killed by camp guards with rifles.¹¹⁶⁶ The Trial Chamber also finds that at least 20 inmates were taken outside the camp and killed there.¹¹⁶⁷ Trnopolje camp was officially closed down at the end of September 1992, but some of the detainees stayed there longer.¹¹⁶⁸

(iv) The killing of a number of men after their transportation from Hasan Kikic elementary school and from Betonirka detention facility in Sanski Most¹¹⁶⁹ to the Manjaca camp – Sanski Most/Banja Luka municipality
As of early June 1992, Bosnian Muslim civilians from Sanski Most and the surrounding area were brought to Manjaca camp on a large scale. Civilian and military police from both Banja Luka and Sanski Most were in charge of putting together and escorting the convoys.¹¹⁷⁰
On 6 June 1992, several buses with around 150 mainly Bosnian Muslim prisoners left the Hasan Kikic Elementary School in Sanski Most, to arrive at Manjaca camp on the same evening.¹¹⁷¹ On 7 July 1992, a second group of around 64 mainly Bosnian Muslim prisoners arrived at Manjaca camp in locked trailers.¹¹⁷² This transport originated from the Betonirka detention facility in Sanski Most, where those people had been detained since the end of May 1992.¹¹⁷³ Drago Dosenovic ('Maca') and a camp warden called 'Spaga' organised the second transport.¹¹⁷⁴ In both transports, prisoners had to stand in extremely cramped conditions and were not provided with sufficient water to drink during the nine hours of the journey, despite the hot weather.¹¹⁷⁵ The Trial Chamber finds that as a consequence of these conditions, more than 20 prisoners died during the second transportation.¹¹⁷⁶ Upon arrival of the first group at Manjaca camp, at least six prisoners were beaten and subsequently killed by policemen from Sanski Most.¹¹⁷⁷

(v) The killing of a number of men in front of the Manjaca camp after their transportation from Omarska – Banja Luka municipality
When the camp in Omarska was closed down, detainees from that camp were transferred to Manjaca camp.¹¹⁷⁸ One transport of prisoners took place on 6 August 1992. The journey lasted the whole day. After arrival at Manjaca camp, detainees were made to spend the entire night in the locked bus.¹¹⁷⁹ The Trial Chamber finds that during the night, three men were called out from the bus by the Bosnian Serb policemen accompanying the transport. On the next day, the dead bodies of these three men were seen.¹¹⁸⁰ Before the prisoners were allowed to enter the camp, one of them was stabbed by a policeman, and a bystanding man was ordered to beat the dead body with a tractor's wheelcap.¹¹⁸¹

(vi) The killing of a number of men taken from the Keraterm and Omarska Scamps] in the area called Hrastova Glavica – Sanski Most municipality
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that on 5 August 1992, detainees from the Keraterm and Omarska camps were put on buses which headed towards Sanski Most.¹¹⁸² On the way, unidentified Bosnian Serbs shot dead a number of them. Some of their bodies have been found in an area called Hrastova Glavica.¹¹⁸³

(vii) The killing of a number of men in ‘Room 3’ at Keraterm camp¹¹⁸⁴ – Prijedor municipality
On 20 or 21 July 1992, camp inmates from room 3 at the Keraterm camp were relocated to other rooms in the camp. Room 3 was subsequently filled with residents from the recently cleansed Brdo area.¹¹⁸⁵ Approximately 200 persons were crammed into room 3.¹¹⁸⁶ On one of the following days, detainees were ordered to go into their rooms, face the wall, and stay calm. After dark, Bosnian Serb army personnel entered the camp.¹¹⁸⁷ A machine-gun was placed on a table outside room 3.¹¹⁸⁸ At around 11:00 p.m., gun shots from light and heavy weaponry could be heard. There was the sound of breaking metal and shattered glass, and human cries. The turmoil lasted for half an hour.¹¹⁸⁹
The next morning, dead bodies were piled outside room 3, and the entire area was covered with blood.¹¹⁹⁰ A truck arrived to carry away the bodies. When the truck left, blood could be seen dripping from it. Finally, a fire engine cleaned room 3 and the surrounding area from the traces of the massacre.¹¹⁹¹ The exact number of those who died at room 3 has not been, and probably will never be established. Bearing this in mind, the Trial Chamber finds that, on the basis of the number of persons detained in room 3, at a minimum, 190 persons were killed.

(viii) The killing of a large number of men from the Trnopolje camp in the Vlasic mountain, the area of Koricanske stijene¹¹⁹² – Skender Vakuf municipality
On 21 August 1992, four buses comprised only of men set off from Trnopolje camp.¹¹⁹³ By that time, women and children had already left the camp.¹¹⁹⁴ At a junction near Kozarac, the buses from Trnopolje were joined by other buses full of prisoners that came from Tukovi.¹¹⁹⁵ The convoy was accompanied by members of a special police unit of the Prijedor SJB.¹¹⁹⁶ A large amount of money, jewellery and other valuables was taken from the passengers by the Bosnian Serb policemen.¹¹⁹⁷
Two of the buses headed via Banja Luka and Skender Vakuf towards Travnik. There were approximately 100 men in each bus.¹¹⁹⁸ On the way, the convoy passed various checkpoints without delay, obviously because the guards manning the checkpoints had been informed about the transport.¹¹⁹⁹
Towards late afternoon, before reaching the line of separation between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim controlled territory, shortly after Skender Vakuf and nearby Mount Vlasic, the convoy stopped.¹²⁰⁰ On one side of the road, there was a deep gorge, on the other side, a steep face of rock. The area is referred to as Koricanske Stijene.¹²⁰¹ The men from the buses were taken in a column to the edge of the cliff and ordered to kneel down.¹²⁰² The police officer in charge said: "Here we exchange the dead for the dead and the living for the living."¹²⁰³ Before the victims were executed, they cried and pleaded for their lives.¹²⁰⁴ Then the shooting started. The dead bodies fell into the abyss or were pushed over the edge, sometimes by other Bosnian Muslims prior to their own execution. Grenades were thrown into the gorge to make sure no one would survive.¹²⁰⁵ The entire operation lasted not more than half an hour.¹²⁰⁶
The Trial Chamber is convinced that, at a minimum, 200 men were killed on this day at Koricanske Stijene.¹²⁰⁷

(ix) The killing of a number of men in the Petar Kocic elementary school – Bosanska Krupa municipality
On 22 April 1992, fighting between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serb forces broke out in Bosanska Krupa.¹²⁰⁸ Bosnian Muslims from the region were detained at the Petar Kocic school in Bosanska Krupa.¹²⁰⁹ They were guarded by local Bosnian Serbs, who before the outbreak of conflict occupied civilian professions.¹²¹⁰ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that numerous detainees were killed at the Petar Kocic school. One of them was beaten to death.¹²¹¹ At least seven detainees were killed in a school room with an automatic rifle by a Bosnian Serb called Jojo Plavanjac.¹²¹² A Bosnian Serb military squad under the command of Milorad Kotur was responsible for the death of three detainees during trench-digging on a hill above the Petar Kocic school.¹²¹³

(x) The killing of a number of men in Biljani¹²¹⁴ – Kljuc municipality
In the village of Biljani, the hamlets of Brkici, Dzaferagici, Botonici and Jakubovac were exclusively inhabited by Bosnian Muslims.¹²¹⁵ On 10 July 1992, Bosnian Serb special police and soldiers in JNA uniforms rounded up Bosnian Muslim men and women from the Biljani hamlets at the local school building.¹²¹⁶ Between 120 and 150 men were confined in two classrooms, and their names were written down by a Bosnian Serb named Petar Mihic.¹²¹⁷ The men were then called out five by five.¹²¹⁸ Thereafter, bursts of gunfire could be heard.¹²¹⁹ The Trial Chamber finds that at least 144 men were killed in Biljani on that day.¹²²⁰

(xi) The killing of a number of men on the premises of the Public Security Service and the Territorial Defence building in Teslic, and in the Pribinic prison – Teslic municipality
Beginning on 3 June 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers and reserve policemen brought between 100 and 120 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men from the surrounding villages into Teslic.¹²²¹ They were first detained at the SUP building, and subsequently transferred to the warehouse of the TO building.¹²²² The guards at the TO warehouse were Bosnian Serb policemen and members of the ‘Mice’ paramilitary group, amongst them Tomo Mihajlovic and Milorad Panic.¹²²³ Many of the detainees were called out and subsequently killed.¹²²⁴ The Trial Chamber finds that 40 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians were killed by members of the ‘Mice’ paramilitary group.¹²²⁵
At the same time, a prison for Bosnian Muslim men from the region was set up in the ‘Apoteka’ building in Pribinic, which prior to the outbreak of conflict had been used for storage purposes.¹²²⁶ Dragan Babic, a local Bosnian Serb and a military police officer, was in command of the prison facility.¹²²⁷ The number of prisoners varied between 7 and 25 at a given time.¹²²⁸ The Trial Chamber finds that at least five detainees succumbed to their injuries as a result of the beatings received at the ‘Apoteka’ building in Pribinic.¹²²⁹

(c) Conclusion on killings
In sum, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, considering all the incidents described in this section of the judgement, at least 1669 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were killed by Bosnian Serb forces, all of whom were non-combatants. The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that these killings fulfil the element of massiveness for the crime of extermination. It is also proven that the direct perpetrators had an intention to kill or to inflict serious injury, in the reasonable knowledge that their acts or omissions were likely to cause the death of the victim.

3. The Responsibility of the Accused
The Trial Chamber has already dismissed JCE, planning and superior criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute as possible modes of liability to describe the individual criminal responsibility of the Accused.¹²³⁰
There is no evidence to establish that the Accused ordered or instigated the commission of the crimes of extermination and/or wilful killing charged under Counts 4 and 5 of the Indictment.
The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the public utterances of the Accused, in particular his statements with respect to mixed marriages and those suggesting a campaign of retaliatory ethnicity-based murder¹²³¹ prompted the physical perpetrators to commit any of the acts charged under Counts 4 and 5 of the Indictment, because the nexus between the public utterances of the Accused and the commission of the killings in question by the physical perpetrators has not been established. Moreover, neither the public utterances of the Accused nor the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff are specific enough to constitute instructions by the Accused to the physical perpetrators to commit any of the killings charged.
(a) Wilful killing (Count 5)
The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff can be attributed to the Accused.¹²³² It also found that between 9 May 1992 and 18 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff issued a number of decisions demanding the disarmament of “paramilitary formations” and of “individuals who illegally possess weapons”, specifying that “[a]ll formations that are not in the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Banja Luka Security Services Centre and are in the Autonomous Region of Krajina, are considered paramilitary formations and must be disarmed.” Moreover, the Trial Chamber has found that, although these decisions on disarmament were not expressly restricted to non-Serbs, the disarmament operations were selectively enforced against them by the municipal civilian authorities, the CSB and the SJBs, and by the army.¹²³³
The disarmament of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats throughout the ARK created an imbalance of arms and weapons favouring the Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian Krajina, a situation amplified by the fact that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the Bosnian Serb population was arming itself at the same time on a massive scale.¹²³⁴ The ARK Crisis Staff’s decisions on disarmament and their implementation further rendered the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians more vulnerable, preventing or limiting their ability to defend themselves and giving practical assistance to the Bosnian Serb forces attacking non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods. Moreover, at the municipal level, where ARK Crisis Staff decisions with respect to disarmament were implemented, the disarmament deadlines were on occasion used as a pretext to attack non-Serb villages.¹²³⁵
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament constituted practical assistance to the attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods. During and immediately after these attacks members of the Bosnian Serb forces committed a number of killings. Through the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament, the Accused had a substantial effect on the commission of these killings. However, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament had a substantial effect on those killing incidents charged under Count 5 of the Indictment that were not committed in context of the armed attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods.
The Trial Chamber is also not satisfied that any other decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff or the public utterances or acts of the Accused had a substantial effect on the commission of any of the killing incidents charged under Count 5 of the Indictment.
The Trial Chamber has previously found that the Accused espoused the Strategic Plan and that he was aware that it could only be implemented by the use of force and fear.¹²³⁶ Bearing in mind that the attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods constituted an essential part of the implementation of the Strategic Plan in the ARK; that the Accused held the position of President of the ARK Crisis Staff, the highest political authority in the ARK; his direct link with Radovan Karadzic and his close contact with the General Major Momir Talic, the commander of the 1st KK of the VRS, and with Stojan Zupljanin, the head of the CSB, and with other military and political leaders at the level of the ARK and the municipalities of the ARK; the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only reasonable inference that may be drawn is that, when the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament were issued, the Accused was aware that the Bosnian Serb forces were to attack non Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods and that through the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament he rendered practical assistance and a substantial contribution to the Bosnian Serb forces carrying out these attacks.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused was aware that during these armed attacks the Bosnian Serb forces would commit a number of crimes including the crime of wilful killing of a number of non-Serbs and that the members of the Bosnian Serb forces carrying out the killings in question had the required intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm or serious injury, in the reasonable knowledge that it was likely to cause death.
For the above reason, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused aided and abetted in the killing committed by the Bosnian Serb forces in context of the armed attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods after 9 May 1992, the date when the ARK Crisis Staff issued its first decision on disarmament.
The Accused aided and abetted members of the Bosnian Serb forces in the commission of the following crimes amounting to wilful killing: the killing of at least 3 Bosnian Muslim civilians in Hambarine on 23 May 1992;¹²³⁷ the killing of about 140 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians in Kozarac and the surrounding areas around 24 May 1992;¹²³⁸ the killing of at least 8 Bosnian Muslims in Mehmed Sahuric’s house in Kamicani between 24 and 26 May 1992;¹²³⁹ the killing of 8 Bosnian Muslim men in the village of Jaskici on 14 June 1992;¹²⁴⁰ the killing of at least 300 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men in the village of Biscani on 20 July 1992;¹²⁴¹ the killing of at least 16 civilians in the village of Carakovo on 23 July 1992;¹²⁴² the killing of at least 68 persons, 14 of them being women in the village of Bri sevo between 24 and 27 May 1992;¹²⁴³ the killing of at least 28 men from the village of Begici on the way to or at the Vrhpolje bridge on 31 May 1992;¹²⁴⁴ the killing of 15 members of the Merdanovic family in the hamlet of Kukavice on 31 May 1992;¹²⁴⁵ the killing of 14 unarmed Bosnian Muslim civilians in the village of Budim on 1 August 1992;¹²⁴⁶ the killing of at least 3 civilians from Pudin Han on 28 May 1992;¹²⁴⁷ the killing of at least 40 Bosnian Muslim men and women in Prhovo village or on the road from Prhovo to Peci on 1 June 1992;¹²⁴⁸ the killing of at least 2 Bosnian Croats and/or Bosnian Muslims in front of the hospital in Kotor Varos on 25 June 1992;¹²⁴⁹ the killing of at least 3 Bosnian Muslim in the village of Dabovci in mid-August of 1992;¹²⁵⁰ the killing of at least 8 Bosnian Muslim civilians in the village of Hanifici in mid-August of 1992;¹²⁵¹ and the killing of at least 12 Bosnian Muslim civilians in the village of Blagaj Japra on 9 June 1992.¹²⁵²
(b) Extermination (Count 4)
The Trial Chamber has previously found that the crime of extermination was committed in the ARK during the time relevant to the Indictment. The Trial Chamber has also found that the Accused espoused the Strategic Plan. The Trial Chamber notes that the very nature of the Strategic Plan was to create a separate Bosnian Serb state, from which most non-Serbs would be permanently removed. Although it was clear that the Strategic Plan could only be implemented by the use of force and fear, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was clear that the crimes that were intended to be perpetrated with a view to implementing the Strategic Plan in the ARK would necessarily include extermination.
The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was aware that by issuing ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament he would be assisting in the killings on a massive scale such as to amount to the crime of extermination. Nor has it been established beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused knew that the members of the Bosnian Serb forces intended to commit killings on a massive scale such as to amount to the crime of extermination.
Accordingly, the Accused’s responsibility for aiding and abetting the crime of extermination charged under Count 4 of the Indictment has not been established and the Accused is acquitted of the charge of extermination in Count 4 of the Indictment.

B. Torture (counts 6 and 7)
Torture is charged in counts 6 and 7 pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 5(f) of the Statute.¹²⁵³

1. The law
Both this Tribunal and the ICTR have adopted a definition of the crime of torture along the lines of that contained in the Convention against Torture (“CAT”),¹²⁵⁴ which comprises the following constitutive elements:

1. the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental;¹²⁵⁵

2. the act or omission must be intentional;¹²⁵⁶ and

3. the act or omission must have occurred in order to obtain information or a confession, or to punish, intimidate or coerce the victim or a third person, or to discriminate, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.¹²⁵⁷
The definition of “torture” remains the same regardless of the Article of the Statute under which the Accused has been charged.¹²⁵⁸ The mens rea as set out above is not controversial in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. However, a number of issues regarding the actus reus may usefully be addressed.
(a) Severity of pain or suffering
The seriousness of the pain or suffering sets torture apart from other forms of mistreatment.¹²⁵⁹ The jurisprudence of this Tribunal and of the ICTR has not specifically set the threshold level of suffering or pain required for the crime of torture, and it consequently depends on the individual circumstances of each case.¹²⁶⁰
In assessing the seriousness of any mistreatment, the objective severity of the harm inflicted must be considered, including the nature, purpose and consistency of the acts committed. Subjective criteria, such as the physical or mental condition of the victim, the effect of the treatment and, in some cases, factors such as the victim’s age, sex, state of health and position of inferiority will also be relevant in assessing the gravity of the harm.¹²⁶¹ Permanent injury is not a requirement for torture;¹²⁶² evidence of the suffering need not even be visible after the commission of the crime.¹²⁶³
The criteria mentioned in the previous paragraph will be used by this Trial Chamber in assessing whether the treatment alleged by the Prosecution in counts 6 and 7 amounts to severe pain or suffering. Some acts, like rape, appear by definition to meet the severity threshold. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity and is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation and discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person.¹²⁶⁴ Severe pain or suffering, as required by the definition of the crime of torture, can be said to be established once rape has been proved, since the act of rape necessarily implies such pain or suffering.¹²⁶⁵
(b) Prohibited purpose
Acts of torture aim, through the infliction of severe mental or physical pain, to attain a certain result or purpose.¹²⁶⁶ Thus, in the absence of such purpose or goal, even a very severe infliction of pain would not qualify as torture for the purposes of Article 2 and Article 5 of the Statute.¹²⁶⁷
The prohibited purposes mentioned above¹²⁶⁸ do not constitute an exhaustive list, and there is no requirement that the conduct must solely serve a prohibited purpose.¹²⁶⁹ If one prohibited purpose is fulfilled by the conduct, the fact that such conduct was also intended to achieve a non-listed purpose is immaterial.¹²⁷⁰
(c) Official sanction not required
Even though the CAT envisages that torture be committed “with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”¹²⁷¹, the jurisprudence of this Tribunal does not require that the perpetrator of the crime of torture be a public official, nor does the torture need to have been committed in the presence of such an official.¹²⁷²
In this context, the Trial Chamber notes that the definition of the CAT relies on the notion of human rights, which is largely built on the premises that human rights are violated by States or Governments. For the purposes of international criminal law, which deals with the criminal responsibility of an individual, this Trial Chamber agrees with and follows the approach of the Kunarac Trial Chamber that

the characteristic trait of the offence Sunder the Tribunal’s jurisdiction] is to be found in the nature of the act committed rather than in the status of the person who committed it.¹²⁷³

2. The facts and findings
The Trial Chamber was confronted with an overwhelming amount of evidence regarding ill-treatment of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the relevant municipalities of the ARK. However, the Prosecution has charged the Accused with specific acts of torture only with respect to the incidents listed and summarised in paragraph 55 of the Indictment. The Trial Chamber has accordingly restricted its analysis to the events set out below. It also notes that the Prosecution has withdrawn in its Final Brief all allegations of torture with respect to the municipality of Donji Vakuf.¹²⁷⁴
(a) Bosanska Krupa

(i) Jasenica school
On 21 April 1992, the Bosnian Serb population of Bosanska Krupa left the town, leaving behind its Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat inhabitants.¹²⁷⁵ At Jasenica, a village at a distance of 18 kilometers from Bosanska Krupa, Bosnian Serb policemen detained approximately 60 Bosnian Muslims and a few Bosnian Croats in the local school building¹²⁷⁶ at the orders of the Bosanska Krupa War Presidency.¹²⁷⁷ On 24 April 1992, ten members of a paramilitary group known as ‘Suha Rebra’ entered the school. They asked the detainees "Do you want a state of your own?", pricked them with knives on their legs, beat them with handcuffs, and stamped on them until some of them fainted.¹²⁷⁸ A few days later, Bosnian Serb paramilitaries known as ‘Seselj's men’ entered the school building and beat up the detainees with rifle butts.¹²⁷⁹ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that in these instances, the Bosnian Muslim detainees were singled out for this ill-treatment because the perpetrators wanted to punish them.

(ii) Petar Kocic school
At the beginning of May 1992, detainees from Jasenica school were transferred to the Petar Kocic school on the outskirts of Bosanska Krupa.¹²⁸⁰ At least 50 Bosnian Muslims were detained at the school.¹²⁸¹ In a small room, detainees were given electroshocks. Wires from a car battery were attached through clamps to the fingers and toes of detainees, and the electricity was turned on and off for periods of five minutes.¹²⁸² Bosnian Serb policemen administered this treatment on a number of Bosnian Muslim detainees during interrogations in order "to make them sing".¹²⁸³ At least one of the detainees still suffers from the consequences of this treatment today.¹²⁸⁴ The Trial Chamber finds that ill-treatment was inflicted on the victims in order to obtain information.
(b) Bosanski Novi
On 10 June 1992,¹²⁸⁵ a large group of Bosnian Muslims from Blagaj Japra was detained at a compound in Blagaj Rijeka, on the other bank of the Sana river. One of them, Sulejman Burzic was shot dead in cold blood by Zare Janjetovic, one of the Bosnian Serb guards, in the presence of all the detainees who watched the incident from behind the barbed wire fence.¹²⁸⁶ Thereafter, railway carriages entered the compound, and detainees were ordered to board them.¹²⁸⁷ Mico Dolic and Ranko Gvozden were amongst the two Bosnian Serb soldiers present.¹²⁸⁸ Some of the soldiers wore helmets with the inscription "Guard 92".¹²⁸⁹ While the detainees were boarding the railway carriages, one of the soldiers called out Hasan Merzihic's name, who acknowledged his presence. He took Hasan Merzihic towards a nearby bridge, and shot him dead in cold blood. The killing was seen by other detainees. Some of the persons on one of the carriages closed the doors because they did not want the children to see more killings. Other names were being called out by the soldiers, but no one responded.¹²⁹⁰ This was the atmosphere and state of affairs when the convoy set off.
The railway carriages were tightly packed with people, and there was no space left.¹²⁹¹ The train set out comprised of at least 10 carriages. It stopped outside Doboj, where men were separated from women and children.¹²⁹² The latter group was transferred to territory held by the Bosnian government.¹²⁹³ The men were taken by train to Banja Luka, where they had to spend the night in the carriages. The following day, the train arrived in Bosanski Novi from where the men were transferred to the Mlavke stadium.¹²⁹⁴ No food or water had been given to them during the entire period spent in the carriages.¹²⁹⁵ On board of these railway carriages, there was an absolute lack of any hygienic facilities.
The Trial Chamber finds that the treatment of these detainees, including many children, when they were packed and transported in these railway carriages, including the separation of the male detainees from the women and children, was inflicted to discriminate against them because of their ethnicity.
(c) Bosanski Petrovac

(i) Bosanski Petrovac town
Prior to the conflict, the municipality of Bosanski Petrovac had a majority population of Bosnian Serbs, whereas the town of Bosanski Petrovac was mostly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims.¹²⁹⁶ At the beginning of June 1992, the town of Bosanski Petrovac was shelled and taken over by Bosnian Serb forces.¹²⁹⁷ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that there were many instances of severe beatings of Bosnian Muslim civilians by Bosnian Serb policemen and other armed Bosnian Serbs during and after the takeover.¹²⁹⁸ In one case, a Bosnian Muslim called Sead Husagic was beaten up and wounded so severely that he succumbed to his injuries a few days later.¹²⁹⁹ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this ill-treatment was inflicted on the victim in order to intimidate him and because of his ethnicity.

(ii) Kozila camp
On 1 July 1992, around 30 Bosnian Muslims from the town of Bosanski Petrovac were taken by bus to the working site of the timber company "Kozila", at a distance of approximately 20 km, near the village of Drinic.¹³⁰⁰ At least 80 Bosnian Muslims were detained at Kozila camp at that time.¹³⁰¹ There was barbed wire around the wooden shack where the detainees were housed. Around 20 Bosnian Serbs in camouflage uniform served as camp guards, and at least one machine gun nest with two soldiers was placed right outside the camp.¹³⁰²
Detainees at Kozila were frequently interrogated and ill-treated by the camp commander, who was either Miso Zoric or Milan Kresoje,¹³⁰³ and by the camp guards, including Zeljko Brankovic, Zoran Salasa and Milan Knezevic.¹³⁰⁴ On 6 July 1992, Midho Druzic, one of the detainees, was taken to the camp administration office. Miso Zoric and a few other guards present called him by pejorative names, including 'Balija' and 'Mujahedin'. They asked him where he had hidden his weapons. Then they kicked him in the genitals and beat him all over his body for about an hour.¹³⁰⁵ On another occasion, Midho Druzic was cut under his chin with a bayonet because he had refused to kiss the four Serbian S's on the soldier's bayonet.¹³⁰⁶ On yet another occasion, Midho Druzic was ordered to lick up blood from a table, which came from Saban Spahic, a detainee who had been beaten up before. When he refused, one of the guards grabbed Druzic's head and used his face to wipe the blood off.¹³⁰⁷ Zijad Ramic was beaten during interrogations and a pistol was put against his temple. He was told to write down the names of local SDA leaders.¹³⁰⁸
The Trial Chamber finds that many more instances of beatings and various forms of ill-treatment took place at Kozila camp.¹³⁰⁹ Sometimes Bosnian Muslim detainees were ordered to beat each other.¹³¹⁰ On 14 July 1992, after having been interrogated and beaten at the administration office, a Bosnian Muslim detainee was forced to crawl back to the detention building. The camp guards opened fire on him, but deliberately directed their bullets to miss him.¹³¹¹
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the cruel treatment set out above, when inflicted during interrogations, was aimed at obtaining information. Other ill-treatment was aimed at intimidating and discriminating against the victims because of their ethnicity.
(d) Kotor Varos
Throughout June 1992, Bosnian Muslim civilians from villages in the Kotor Varo s municipality were rounded up by Bosnian Serb forces and taken to various places of detention.¹³¹² On 25 June, in front of the Kotor Varos hospital, Bosnian Serb soldiers in camouflage uniforms let loose a German shepherd on Enez Terzic, one of the detainees. Terzic was injured, but survived the attack.¹³¹³ Also in front of the hospital, a Bosnian Serb soldier from Mahovljani beat a number of detainees with a log until they fell to the ground unconcious.¹³¹⁴ During the beating, he cursed their 'balija mothers'.¹³¹⁵ A Bosnian Serb soldier nicknamed 'Mama' also participated in the beatings and ordered detainees to beat each other.¹³¹⁶
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Bosnian Serbs inflicted this treatment in order to intimidate and discriminate against the detainees, who were all Bosnian Muslims.
(e) Prijedor¹³¹⁷

(i) Executions of Bosnian Muslim non-combatants in front of others
In July 1992, at the Ljubija football stadium, Bosnian Serb policemen asked detained Bosnian Muslims whether they had any weapons. A police officer known as ‘Stiven’ fired a pistol at Irfan Nasic and killed him in front of the group, which included his cousin. One of the Bosnian Serb policemen then severed Irfan Nasic’s head from his body with an automatic rifle. He said: “Look at this. The man even didn’t have any brains.”¹³¹⁸
A Bosnian Serb military unit from Prijedor under the command of Rade Bilbija came to the hamlet of Cermenica near Biscani on 20 July 1992. They lined up 35 to 40 Bosnian Muslims next to the local cemetery. A Bosnian Serb soldier with the last name of Gligic shot dead Muhamed Hadzic, one of the residents of Cermenica, in front of the others.¹³¹⁹
Hasib Simbegovic, a Bosnian Muslim, was killed by a Bosnian Serb soldier, Drago Tintar, when he was about to board a bus in the village of Carakovo on 23 July 1992.¹³²⁰ His killing was witnessed by everyone who was sitting in the bus.¹³²¹
In June or July 1992, at Omarska camp, a Bosnian Serb camp guard in camouflage uniform kicked Rizo Hadzalic with his heavy army boots and struck him with his rifle butt. The guard jumped all over Rizo Hadzalic’s body until he was dead.¹³²² The incident was witnessed by other camp inmates.¹³²³ Another detainee with the last name Sulic was also beaten to death in the daytime in front of the camp restaurant.¹³²⁴
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that many Bosnian Muslim non-combatants were indeed executed while others, of the same ethnicity, were forced to watch. The Trial Chamber finds that all this was aimed at intimidating the victims.

(ii) Those left alive were made to collect the bodies of their neighbours and friends and bury them
After the cleansing of the Brdo area in July 1992, a number of Bosnian Muslim men were ordered to assist the Bosnian Serb forces in collecting the dead bodies. They loaded between 300 and 350 bodies on trucks with their own hands.¹³²⁵ There was an appalling stench coming from the bodies that had been lying around for some time. Some of the bodies were riddled with maggots.¹³²⁶
In July 1992, at the Ljubija football stadium, Bosnian Muslim prisoners were made to carry away the dead bodies of those Bosnian Muslims previously executed. One of them did not have a head, while another body had an eye hanging out and the head had been smashed in.¹³²⁷
At Trnopolje camp, detainees were also forced to dig graves and bury the bodies of those killed in the camp between May and October 1992.¹³²⁸
The Trial Chamber, by majority, finds that the coercing of these Bosnian Muslim non-combatants to collect the bodies of other members of the ethnic group, particularly those of their neighbours and friends, and bury them, in the circumstances in which this took place, could not but cause severe pain and suffering. The Trial Chamber, by majority, also finds that this was done in order to intimidate the victims.

(iii) Rapes and sexual assaults
In June or July 1992, at Keraterm camp, a number of other guards raped a female inmate on a table in a dark room until she lost consciousness. The next morning, she found herself lying in a pool of blood.¹³²⁹ Other women in the camp were also raped.¹³³⁰
In August 1992, Slobodan Kuruzovic, the commander of Trnopolje camp, personally arranged for a Bosnian Muslim woman to be detained in the same house in which he had his office.¹³³¹ During the first night, Kuruzovic entered her room with a pistol and a knife. He took his clothes off and told the woman that he wanted to see “how Muslim women fuck”. She replied “You better kill me.” When the woman started screaming, Kuruzovic said “You are screaming in vain. There’s nobody here who can help you.” He started raping her, and when she started screaming, Kuruzovic warned her: “You better keep quiet. Did you see all these soldiers standing outside? They will all take their turns on you.” He left saying “See you tomorrow”. The woman was bleeding and spent the whole night crying, wanting to kill herself.¹³³² Kuruzovic raped that woman nearly every night for about a month. On two occasions, he stabbed her shoulder and her leg with his knife because she resisted against being raped.¹³³³
There were many more incidents of rape at the Trnopolje camp between May and October 1992. Not all of the perpetrators were camp personnel. Some were allowed to visit the camp from the outside.¹³³⁴ Soldiers took out girls aged 16 or 17 from the camp and raped them on the way to Kozarac on a truck.¹³³⁵ In one case, a 13 year old Bosnian Muslim girl was raped.¹³³⁶ One rape victim was told by a member of the camp staff that it was wartime and nothing could be done about these things.¹³³⁷
The Trial Chamber also finds that at Omarska camp, there were frequent incidents of sexual assault and rape.¹³³⁸ Female detainees were often called out by camp guards and the camp commander. When they returned, those women looked absent-minded and kept silent.¹³³⁹
On 26 June 1992, Omarska camp guards tried to force Mehmedalija Sarajlic, an elderly Bosnian Muslim, to rape a female detainee. He begged them “Don’t make me do it. She could be my daughter. I am a man in advanced age.” The guards laughed and said “Well, try to use the finger.” A scream and the sound of beatings could be heard, and then everything was silent. The guards had killed the man.¹³⁴⁰ The Trial Chamber, by majority, finds that the threat of rape constituted a sexual assault vis-à-vis the female detainee.
On an unknown date after May 1992, an armed man entered the Omarska camp restaurant where detainees were eating. He uncovered the breast of a female detainee, took out a knife, and ran it along her breast for several minutes. The other detainees were holding their breath because they thought he might cut off the breast at any second. Bystanding camp guards laughed and obviously enjoyed watching this incident.¹³⁴¹
The Trial Chamber concludes that rapes and sexual assaults were commonplace throughout the camps in the Prijedor area. It is satisfied that in all these incidents, the male perpetrators aimed at discriminating against the women because they were Muslim.
(f) Teslic

(i) Beatings
After 3 June 1992, Bosnian Muslim men detained at the SUP building in Teslic were beaten by policemen with batons, bats and other items.¹³⁴² Severe beatings also occurred at the TO warehouse building, where a large number of Bosnian Muslims were detained by Bosnian Serb police and by members of the “Mice” paramilitary group.¹³⁴³ Detainees were called out at night and ordered to face a wall with their hands up. Then they were beaten with wooden batons, cords, boards, and other objects.¹³⁴⁴ No detainee was exempted from the beatings. Once, detainees were beaten so hard that they could not stand on their feet any more.¹³⁴⁵
A Bosnian Muslim man was arrested by Bosnian Serbs and taken to the village of Gornja Radnja. During interrogation, he was beaten until he bled from his nose and mouth.¹³⁴⁶
A community building in Pribinic, 15 kilometres out of Teslic, was converted into a detention centre for local Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat residents.¹³⁴⁷ Dragan Babic, a military policeman, was in command of the detention facility.¹³⁴⁸ He was later replaced by Aleksa Jovic.¹³⁴⁹ The Trial Chamber finds that, in many instances, detainees were severely beaten.¹³⁵⁰ During an interrogation with the camp commander, a Bosnian Muslim man was kicked until he lost consciousness.¹³⁵¹ Detainees received beatings from the guards every morning when they were called out for breakfast.¹³⁵²
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that beatings occurred during interrogations in order to obtain information. Other ill-treatment was aimed at intimidating the victims, as well as at discriminating against them because of their ethnicity.

(ii) Rapes
Over the period of July to October 1992, a number of Bosnian Muslim women were raped by members of the Bosnian Serb police and the VRS in Teslic municipality.¹³⁵³ The Trial Chamber finds that all this was intrinsically discriminatory against these women.
(g) Conclusion
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the treatment described above constituted severe pain and suffering amounting to torture, inflicted intentionally on the victims, who were all non-combatants.

3. The Responsibility of the Accused
The Trial Chamber has already dismissed JCE, planning and superior criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute as possible modes of liability to describe the individual criminal responsibility of the Accused.¹³⁵⁴
There is no evidence to establish that the Accused ordered or instigated the commission of any of the underlying acts of the crime of torture charged under Counts 6 and 7 of the Indictment.
The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the public utterances of the Accused prompted the physical perpetrators to commit any of underlying acts of torture charged under Counts 6 and 7 of the Indictment, because the nexus between the public utterances of the Accused and the commission of the killings in question by the physical perpetrators has not been established. Moreover, neither the public utterances of the Accused nor the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff are specific enough to constitute instructions by the Accused to the physical perpetrators to commit any of the underlying acts of torture charged.
The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff can be attributed to the Accused.¹³⁵⁵ It also found that between 9 May 1992 and 18 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff issued a number of decisions demanding the disarmament of “paramilitary formations” and of “individuals who illegally possess weapons”, specifying that “[a]ll formations that are not in the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Banja Luka Security Services Centre and are in the Autonomous Region of Krajina, are considered paramilitary formations and must be disarmed.” Moreover, the Trial Chamber has found that, although these decisions on disarmament were not expressly restricted to non-Serbs, the disarmament operations were selectively enforced against them by the municipal civilian authorities, the CSB and the SJBs, and by the army.¹³⁵⁶
The disarmament of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats throughout the ARK created an imbalance of arms and weapons favouring the Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian Krajina, a situation amplified by the fact that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the Bosnian Serb population was arming itself at the same time on a massive scale.¹³⁵⁷ The ARK Crisis Staff’s decisions on disarmament and their implementation further rendered the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians more vulnerable, preventing or limiting their ability to defend themselves and giving practical assistance to the Bosnian Serb forces attacking non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods. Moreover, at the municipal level, where ARK Crisis Staff decisions with respect to disarmament were implemented, the disarmament deadlines were on occasion used as a pretext to attack non-Serb villages.¹³⁵⁸
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament constituted practical assistance to the attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods. During and immediately after these attacks members of the Bosnian Serb forces committed a number of underlying acts of torture. Through the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament, the Accused had a substantial effect on the commission of these acts. However, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament had a substantial effect on those underlying acts of torture charged under Counts 6 and 7 of the Indictment that were not committed in context of the armed attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods.
The Trial Chamber is also not satisfied that any other decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff had a substantial effect on the commission of any of the underlying acts of torture charged under Counts 6 and 7 of the Indictment.
The Trial Chamber has previously found that the Accused espoused the Strategic Plan and that he was aware that it could only be implemented by the use of force and fear.¹³⁵⁹ Bearing in mind that the attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods constituted an essential part of the implementation of the Strategic Plan in the ARK; that the Accused held the position of President of the ARK Crisis Staff, the highest political authority in the ARK; his direct link with Radovan Karadzic and his close contact with the General Major Momir Talic, the commander of the 1st KK of the VRS and with Stojan Zupljanin, the head of the CSB, and with other military and political leaders at the level of the ARK and the municipalities of the ARK; the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only reasonable inference that may be drawn is that, when the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament were issued, the Accused was aware that the Bosnian Serb forces were to attack non Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods and that through the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament he rendered practical assistance and a substantial contribution to the Bosnian Serb forces carrying out these attacks.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused was aware that during these armed attacks the Bosnian Serb forces would commit a number of crimes including the crime of torture of a number of non-Serbs and that the members of the Bosnian Serb forces carrying out the underlying acts of torture in question had the required mens rea for the commission of the crime of torture.
For the above reason, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused aided and abetted in the torture committed by the Bosnian Serb forces in context of the armed attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods after 9 May 1992, the date when the ARK Crisis Staff issued its first decision on disarmament.
The Accused thus aided and abetted members of the Bosnian Serb forces in the commission of the following crimes amounting to torture: the torture of Bosnian Muslim civilians during and after the takeover of Bosanski Petrovac town in early -June 1992;¹³⁶⁰ the torture of a number of Bosnian Muslim civilian during and after the armed attack on Kotor Varo s throughout June 1992;¹³⁶¹ the torture of at least 35 Bosnian Muslims in the hamlet of Cermenica near the village of Biscani on 20 July 1992;¹³⁶² the torture of a number of Bosnian Muslim civilians in the village of Carakovo on 23 July1992;¹³⁶³ the torture of a number of Bosnian Muslim men in the area around the village of Biscani;¹³⁶⁴ and the torture of a Bosnian Muslim woman in Teslic in July 1992.¹³⁶⁵
In addition the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused further aided and abetted the commission of the underlying acts of torture in camps and other detention facilities throughout the ARK by Bosnian Serb forces. It has been established beyond reasonable doubt that, with the exception of the Jasenica Elementary School and the Petar Kocic Elementary School, all the camps and detention facilities mentioned in the evidence came into being once the ARK Crisis Staff had been established. There is ample evidence that the setting up of these camps and detention facilities formed an integral part of the Strategic Plan. The Trial Chamber is convinced that the Accused was fully aware of this and equally knew that such camps and detention facilities were mushrooming everywhere in the ARK for which he was made responsible as President of the ARK Crisis Staff.¹³⁶⁶ The reported appalling conditions in some of these camps and detention facilities, especially those of Manjaca, Omarska and Trnopolje attracted the attention of international agencies and organisations as well as of the international press. The situation in the camps and detention facilities was discussed during ARK Crisis Staff meetings¹³⁶⁷ and the accused visited Omarska camp and also made public statements about these camps and detention facilities.¹³⁶⁸ There is evidence that on one occasion Vojo Kupresanin visited Manjaca camp.¹³⁶⁹ There is evidence that Adil Medic complained with General Talic about the conditions in Manjaca camp.¹³⁷⁰ There are several reports that refer to so-called “collection centres” and which were compiled at the instance of Stojan Zupljanin, the Chief of the CSB.¹³⁷¹ There is conclusive evidence that at least in the case of the atrocities committed in Teslic at the hands of the Mice, the Accused was not only informed of those events but also became involved in the solution finding process.¹³⁷²
The Trial Chamber has not a shadow of doubt in its mind that the only reasonable conclusion that may be drawn is that the Accused was aware of the nature of these camps and detention facilities and that inmates were tortured therein.¹³⁷³ There is also ample evidence that throughout the entire period when the Accused was President of the ARK Crisis Staff, not only did the Accused not take a stand either in public or at the meetings of the ARK Crisis Staff but that he adopted a laissez-faire attitude.¹³⁷⁴ Although the Accused did not actively assist in the commission of any of the crimes committed in these camps and detention facilities, in the light of his position as the President of the ARK Crisis Staff, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that his inactivity as well as his public attitude with respect to the camps and detention facilities constituted encouragement and moral support to the members of the army and the police to continue running these camps and detention facilities in the way described to the Trial Chamber throughout the trial. This complete inactivity combined with the public attitude on the part of the Accused could only serve the purpose of leaving no doubt in the mind of those running the camps and detention facilities that they enjoyed the full support of the ARK Crisis Staff and its President. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that this fact had a substantial effect on the commission of torture in the camps and detention facilities throughout the ARK.
Therefore, the Accused aided and abetted members of the Bosnian Serb forces in the commission of the following crimes amounting to torture in camps and detention facilities:¹³⁷⁵ the torture of a number of Bosnian Muslim civilians in the Kozila camp in early July 1992;¹³⁷⁶ the torture of a number of Bosnian Muslim women in the Keraterm camp in July 1992 ;¹³⁷⁷ the torture of a number of Bosnian Muslim women in the Trnopolje camp between May and October 1992;¹³⁷⁸ the torture of a number of Bosnian Muslim women in the Omarska camp in June 1992 ;¹³⁷⁹ the torture of a number of Bosnian Muslim men in the SUP building in Teslic;¹³⁸⁰ and the torture of a number of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians in the community building in Pribinic in June 1992.¹³⁸¹

C. Deportation (count 8) and Inhumane Acts (forcible transfer) (count 9)

1. The law
Counts 8 and 9 of the Indictment charge the Accused with deportation and inhumane acts (forcible transfer) pursuant to Article 5(d) and (i) of the Statute. As these two crimes are largely defined in relation to each other, the Trial Chamber will address their definitions together.
(a) Actus reus
It is well established in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal that both ‘deportation’ and ‘forcible transfer’ consist of the forced displacement of individuals from the area in which they are lawfully present without grounds permitted under international law.¹³⁸² Traditionally, the distinction between the actus reus of ‘deportation’ and ‘forcible transfer’ is identified with the destination to which individuals are displaced. The Trial Chamber notes that the majority of trial judgements from this Tribunal that have addressed the issue have held that under customary international law, ‘deportation’ consists of the forced displacement of individuals beyond internationally recognised state borders.¹³⁸³ In contrast, ‘forcible transfer’ may consist of forced displacement within state borders.¹³⁸⁴
The Trial Chamber in the Stakic case took a different approach, finding that

... Article 5 (d) of the Statute must be read to encompass forced population displacements both across internationally recognised borders and de facto boundaries, which are not internationally recognised. The crime of deportation in this context is therefore to be defined as the forced displacement of persons by expulsion or other coercive acts for reasons not permitted under international law from an area in which they are lawfully present to an area under the control of another party.¹³⁸⁵
The Trial Chamber by a majority vote is unable to agree with the Stakic approach. Significant evidence has been advanced in previous judgements of this Tribunal to the effect that, under customary international law, ‘deportation’ requires that an internationally recognised border be crossed.¹³⁸⁶ While the Stakic Trial Judgement (and the Prosecution’s Final Brief in the instant case¹³⁸⁷) may advance excellent policy arguments in favour of dispensing with a cross-border element for the crime of deportation, the Trial Chamber is not convinced that this reflects customary international law as it stood at the relevant time. It is customary international law, and not policy, which the Trial Chamber is bound to apply. The Trial Chamber therefore maintains the cross-border element as a criterion in order to distinguish between ‘deportation’ and ‘forcible transfer’.
It is essential for both ‘deportation’ and ‘forcible transfer’ that the displacement takes place under coercion.¹³⁸⁸ The essential element in establishing coercion is that the displacement be involuntary in nature,¹³⁸⁹ where the persons concerned had no real choice.¹³⁹⁰ In addition, the displacement must be unlawful.¹³⁹¹
The Trial Chamber by a majority vote is satisfied that the actus reus of ‘deportation’ under Article 5(d) of the Statute consists of the forcible displacement of individuals across a State border from the area in which they are lawfully present without grounds permitted under international law, whereas such displacement within the boundaries of a State constitutes ‘forcible transfer’, punishable as ‘other inhumane acts’ pursuant to Article 5(i) of the Statute.
(b) Mens rea
With regard both to deportation and forcible transfer as crimes against humanity, the Prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused acted with the intent that the removal of the person or persons be permanent.¹³⁹²

2. The facts and findings
The Trial Chamber was confronted with a great deal of evidence regarding the deportation or forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats within or from the relevant municipalities of the ARK. However, the Prosecution has, in paragraph 59 of the Indictment, charged the Accused with acts of deportation or forcible transfer of a large proportion of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat population from the relevant municipalities of the ARK to areas under control of the legitimate government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Travnik) and to Croatia (Karlovac). In view of the specificity ¹³⁹³ with which the charges were pleaded, the Trial Chamber is precluded from making any finding of guilt under Counts 8 and 9 with respect to incidents where the transfer destination was to locations other than to Travnik or Karlovac.¹³⁹⁴ The incidents alleged in relation to Karlovac and Travnik will thus be examined to determine whether they amount to deportation (in the case of transfers to Karlovac ) or to forcible transfer (in the case of transfers to Travnik).
For ease of reference, the Trial Chamber will first address the forcible nature of the population displacements, the permanent nature of the transfers and the unlawfulness of the transfers. The Trial Chamber will then consider the relevant incidents.
(a) Forcible nature of transfers
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was a coherent, consistent strategy of ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats by the Bosnian Serb police and other Bosnian Serb authorities.¹³⁹⁵ This policy to forcibly displace Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the area was carried out throughout the ARK and was implemented by several means.
Military operations were carried out against towns and villages that were not military targets. Bosnian Serb forces carried out attacks in Prijedor, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi, Kljuc, Teslic, and Kotor Varos, among others.¹³⁹⁶ Such military operations were undertaken with the specific purpose to drive Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat residents away.¹³⁹⁷ The evidence shows that the displacement of persons was not simply the consequence of military action, but the aim of it.¹³⁹⁸ Following attacks on towns and villages, Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men, women and children were rounded up and often separated.¹³⁹⁹
Subsequently, most of them were confined to camps and detention centres for varying lengths of time.¹⁴⁰⁰ Most of these were then deported or forcibly transferred, some of them immediately, by Bosnian Serb soldiers. The expulsion of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats was often accompanied by a widespread destruction of their homes¹⁴⁰¹ and institutions dedicated to religion.¹⁴⁰² This process of ethnic cleansing accelerated in October 1992, when in the municipalities of Prijedor, Kljuc and Kotor Varos, there was an active and systematic repression and expulsion of people.¹⁴⁰³ The Trial Chamber notes that in North-Western BiH, and in the municipalities of Kljuc, Sanski Most and Bosanski Petrovac in particular, the situation significantly worsened in November 1992.¹⁴⁰⁴
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt both that the expulsions and forcible removals were systematic throughout the ARK, in which and from where tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were permanently displaced,¹⁴⁰⁵ and that this mass forcible displacement was intended to ensure the ethnic cleansing of the region. These people were left with no option but to escape. Those who were not expelled and did not manage to escape were subjected to intolerable living conditions imposed by the Bosnian Serb authorities,¹⁴⁰⁶ which made it impossible for them to continue living there and forced them to seek permission to leave. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to movement restrictions, as well as to perilous living conditions;¹⁴⁰⁷ they were required to pledge their loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities¹⁴⁰⁸ and, in at least one case, to wear white armbands.¹⁴⁰⁹ They were dismissed from their jobs and stripped of their health insurance.¹⁴¹⁰ Campaigns of intimidation specifically targeting Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were undertaken.¹⁴¹¹
This process of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was sometimes camouflaged as a process of resettlement of populations. In Banja Luka, the Agency for Population Movement and the Exchange of Material Wealth for the ARK (“Agency”), which was established on 12 June 1992 pursuant to a decision of the ARK Crisis Staff, aided in the implementation of both the exchange of flats¹⁴¹² and the resettlement of populations.¹⁴¹³ The Agency was popularly known variously as 'Perka’s Agency' or as 'Br|anin’s Agency'.¹⁴¹⁴ The Trial Chamber is of the view that although this Agency was set up for the exchange of flats and the resettlement of populations, this was nothing else but an integral part of the ethnic cleansing plan.
Even when Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats attempted to leave the area, they had to contend with departure procedures established by Bosnian Serb authorities that restricted one’s right to leave.¹⁴¹⁵ Procedures for leaving included signing statements that the individual left voluntarily and relinquishing their property to Bosnian Serb authorities.¹⁴¹⁶ The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that people did not in fact sign such documents voluntarily,¹⁴¹⁷ but did so in order to escape the intolerable living conditions which were forced upon them. The Trial Chamber notes that permission to leave was not always granted, however, and that in some cases, military-aged Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were, at least initially, prevented by the authorities from leaving.¹⁴¹⁸
On the basis of the evidence before it, the Trial Chamber is thus satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that both the displacements of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats (i.e., deportation and forcible transfers) and the alleged voluntary departure of some of them within and from the ARK were indeed forcible in nature.
(b) Permanent nature of transfers
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that in forcibly displacing the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats within and from the ARK, the Bosnian Serb authorities had no other intention but to ensure that the departure of these populations would be on a permanent basis.¹⁴¹⁹ The fact that their homes, their business premises and their religious buildings were destroyed is indicative of this, as is the confiscation of their property or the relinquishment of it to the SerBiH without compensation.¹⁴²⁰ There is no doubt that in the mind of the Bosnian Serb authorities, the ethnic cleansing campaign could only be successful if the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were to be permanently removed.¹⁴²¹
(c) Unlawfulness of transfers
With the exception of one incident in Celinac,¹⁴²² the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that Bosnian Serb authorities carried out the total or partial evacuation of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats either for the security of these populations¹⁴²³ or for imperative military reasons. All the evidence points to this conclusion without the shadow of a doubt. In addition, the Trial Chamber notes that decisions to either of the said effects would have required that “persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased”¹⁴²⁴, which did not happen in the present case. The Trial Chamber further notes that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats had a right to continue residing in their respective towns and villages. The Trial Chamber is thus satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the unlawful nature of transfers carried out to this end.
(d) Deportations and Forcible Transfers
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a number of deportations to Karlovac and forcible transfers to Travnik originating in the ARK took place during the period relevant to the Indictment. Convoys passed through Banja Luka¹⁴²⁵ in the direction of Travnik;¹⁴²⁶ at least one such convoy contained women, children and elderly Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.¹⁴²⁷ At least 5,000 people a year were transported by the Agency in the direction of Travnik alone.¹⁴²⁸
In October 1992, roughly 158 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees from Manjaca camp were exchanged at Turbe, near Travnik.¹⁴²⁹ Detainees were also transported to Karlovac both prior to¹⁴³⁰ and following the closure of the camp in December 1992.¹⁴³¹
In the Municipality of Prijedor, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were gathered in Trnopolje camp for their further forcible transfer to other locations.¹⁴³² Security was provided by the Commander of the SJB, the Bosnian Serb police and military for a number of convoys that transported people from Trnopolje camp to Travnik¹⁴³³ prior to 21 August 1992.¹⁴³⁴ Following the attack on Carakovo, people from the village were taken to Trnopolje, and then to Travnik by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁴³⁵
In the Municipality of Sanski Most, Bosnian Muslim representatives met with Bosnian Serb municipal authorities and representatives of the SDS on several occasions between June and August 1992, during which they requested that the Bosnian Serb municipal authorities organise convoys so that Bosnian Muslims could safely leave the area.¹⁴³⁶ They organised a convoy of approximately 2,000 Muslim men, women, children and elderly that left for Travnik at the beginning of August 1992.¹⁴³⁷ Bosnian Serb civilian and military police also escorted a Travnik-bound convoy of approximately 2,500 Bosnian Muslim men, women, children and elderly on 2 and 3 September 1992.¹⁴³⁸
In the Municipality of Kljuc, a number of convoys were organised prior to a convoy of approximately 1,000 people, the majority of whom included Bosnian Muslim women and children, that left Kljuc for Travnik in late July 1992.¹⁴³⁹ The Trial Chamber notes that people had to obtain the necessary documentation, and that very few able-bodied men left in this convoy.¹⁴⁴⁰
Convoys for Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats leaving Kljuc for Travnik were organised by the police, who issued the relevant documents.¹⁴⁴¹ On 11 September 1992, approximately 500 Bosnian Muslims were transported to Travnik.¹⁴⁴² At least two other Travnik -bound convoys left in September,¹⁴⁴³ including one in which an over-crowded convoy transported 1,000 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, whose names were called prior to their boarding from a list of people who had paid a fare.¹⁴⁴⁴
Approximately 2,500 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, the majority of whom were women, children and elderly, were also transported from Kljuc towards Travnik on 1 October 1992.¹⁴⁴⁵ Bosnian Serb local police and the Bosnian Serb army were at the departure point with a list of those who had paid what was asked of them and signed over their property.¹⁴⁴⁶ Bosnian Serbs escorted the convoy to a location 25 kilometers away from Travnik, whereupon they demanded money and valuables from the passengers, who then walked to Travnik.¹⁴⁴⁷
In Kotor Varos in June or July 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers expelled Bosnian Muslim men, women, and children from Lihovici to Cejavani, after which soldiers separated the women and children from the men.¹⁴⁴⁸ Bosnian Muslim women and children from the villages of Sipure and Medare were brought by Bosnian Serb soldiers to join the group of women and children already gathered in Cejavani.¹⁴⁴⁹ A truck then took the two groups to a sawmill in Kotor Varos, where they were joined by a third group of Bosnian Muslim women and children from the villages of Hanifici and Cirkino Brdo.¹⁴⁵⁰ There were approximately 150 -200 children gathered in the sawmill,¹⁴⁵¹ and soldiers ordered those whose names had been called out from the whole group to board one of three buses that left towards Travnik.¹⁴⁵²
A number of other convoys left for Travnik, including one that left Kotor Varos Municipality on 25 August 1992¹⁴⁵³ and another that left the town of Kotor Varos at the end of October 1992.¹⁴⁵⁴ A convoy of civilians, mostly Bosnian Muslim women and children, left the village of Grabovica in approximately mid to late October 1992.¹⁴⁵⁵ The convoy first traveled to Vrbanjci, and with thirteen other buses transporting mostly Bosnian Muslim women and children from Vecici and surrounding villages, then left for Travnik.¹⁴⁵⁶
In the Municipality of Bosanski Novi, the Bosnian Serb military told people that the village of Suhaca was about to be attacked, that they could not protect them, and that they had to leave.¹⁴⁵⁷ People were also told by the army to retreat towards Bosanski Novi, where it would be decided where they would then go.¹⁴⁵⁸ On 24 May 1992, there were between approximately 8,000 and 10,000 Muslim men, women and children from Gornji Agici, Donji Agici and Crna Rijeka that left on a convoy of cars, tractors and horse-drawn carts.¹⁴⁵⁹
SDA President and representative of Suhaca, Sifet Barjaktarevic, negotiated with Bosanski Novi municipal authorities the safe passage of this convoy to Croatia.¹⁴⁶⁰ A military police patrol instead sent the convoy towards Bosanski Novi, accompanied by two military trucks with Bosnian Serb soldiers.¹⁴⁶¹ Upon their arrival at Blagaj Japra, however, the convoy was met by soldiers wearing JNA uniforms, who asked them to leave their property and board the rail carriages stationed there.¹⁴⁶² The people refused, and were all forced by the soldiers to return to the village of Blagaj.¹⁴⁶³
Bosnian Serb municipal authorities also organised a convoy of 5,000 Bosnian Muslim men, women and children from Bosanski Novi, who had gathered in Blagaj, and who left in the direction of Croatia at the end of May 1992.¹⁴⁶⁴ A convoy of no less than 11,000 people, including between 600 and 700 detainees from the Mlakve Stadium in Bosanski Novi, and a large number from Prijedor, Bosanska Kostajnica, and Bosanska Dubica, were transported to Karlovac on approximately 23 July 1992.¹⁴⁶⁵ From the approximately 14,000 Muslims in Bosanski Novi prior to the conflict, roughly 1,000 Muslims remained behind following the departure of this convoy.¹⁴⁶⁶
Bosnian Muslim representatives met with Bosnian Serb municipal authorities on several different occasions to discuss the movement of Bosnian Muslim populations from Bosanski Novi for security reasons, including to Karlovac.¹⁴⁶⁷ The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, however, that Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat departures were carried out under duress¹⁴⁶⁸ and were thus involuntary in nature,¹⁴⁶⁹ despite having been carried out with the collaboration or at the insistence of Bosnian Muslim representatives.
In the Municipality of Bosanski Petrovac, a mass departure of Bosnian Muslims from the area occurred on 13 September 1992, including a column of seven buses with a special police patrol escorting them that departed from the village of Bisanci, in the direction of Travnik.¹⁴⁷⁰ A smaller convoy of two buses had also left and gone via Mt. Vlasic to Travnik prior to this particular convoy.¹⁴⁷¹ Over a three-day period, more than 900 Bosnian Muslim men, women and children moved from the Petrovac area in the direction of Bihac and Travnik.¹⁴⁷² Approximately 2,500 Bosnian Muslim men, women and children were also transported to Travnik on 24 September 1992, following a public announcement made by the military police that all Bosnian Muslims would be transferred there.¹⁴⁷³

3. Responsibility of the Accused
The Trial Chamber has already dismissed JCE, planning and superior criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute as possible modes of liability to describe the individual criminal responsibility of the Accused.¹⁴⁷⁴
The Trial Chamber recalls its previous findings that the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff can be attributed to the Accused,¹⁴⁷⁵ and that the ARK Crisis Staff’s decisions of 28 and 29 May 1992, advocating the resettlement of the non-Serb population, were implemented by the municipal authorities and the police.¹⁴⁷⁶
The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the Accused ordered the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer. The wording of the ARK Crisis Staff’s decisions of 28 and 29 May incites to action, but on its face does not order.¹⁴⁷⁷ The public utterances of the Accused are not specific enough to constitute orders to commit deportation and forcible transfer.
The Trial Chamber is however satisfied that the ARK Crisis Staff’s decisions of 28 and 29 May 1992 prompted the municipal authorities and the police, who implemented them, to commit the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer after those dates. Although the two decisions are, not disingenuously, framed in terms of voluntary compliance, to the municipal authorities and the police they could have only meant a direct incitement to deport and forcibly transfer non-Serbs from the territory of the ARK. This is the only reasonable conclusion that may be drawn when the terms of the decisions are considered in the light of the Accused’s unambiguous public statements, made repeatedly from early April 1992 onwards, calling upon the non- Serb population to leave the Bosnian Krajina and stating that only a small percentage of non-Serbs would be allowed to stay.¹⁴⁷⁸
Furthermore, the Accused’s espousal of the Strategic Plan, of which the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer formed an integral part, and the implementation of which he coordinated in his position as President of the ARK Crisis Staff, and his awareness that it could only be implemented through force and fear, demonstrate that he intended to induce the commission of the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer.¹⁴⁷⁹
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that, with the exception of the failed attempt at displacing the Bosnian Muslim population of Gornji Agici, Donji Agici and Crna Rijeka in Bosanski Novi on 24 May 1992, the deportations to Karlovac and forcible transfers to Travnik originating in the ARK and described earlier all took place after the dates of the ARK Crisis Staff’s decisions.¹⁴⁸⁰
The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused instigated these forcible transfers and deportations.
In addition, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused also aided and abetted the execution of these crimes. In the first place, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused’s inflammatory and discriminatory public statements, issued repeatedly from his several positions of authority, could only be and were understood by non-Serbs as direct threats to leave the areas under Bosnian Serb occupation.¹⁴⁸¹ By making non-Serbs want to leave, these statements had a substantial effect in facilitating their subsequent deportation and forcible transfer by the municipal authorities, the police and the army.
In the second place, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused aided and abetted the crimes which rendered the displacement of non-Serbs forcible and permanent. The Trial Chamber has already found that, through the ARK Crisis Staff’s decisions on disarmament mentioned earlier, the Accused aided and abetted the commission of wilful killing, torture, and the destruction of homes and of religious buildings.¹⁴⁸²
Finally, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused aided and abetted the crime of forcible transfer of non-Serbs, by setting up through the ARK Crisis Staff’s decision of 12 June 1992,¹⁴⁸³ the Agency for the Movement of People and Exchange in Banja Luka, which, inter alia, arranged bus travel to Travnik, and about which it has already found that it constituted an integral part of the plan to ethnically cleanse the region.¹⁴⁸⁴
Having said this, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that any other decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff instigated or aided and abetted in the commission of any of the crimes charged under Counts 8 and 9 of the Indictment.
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused was aware that his public statements and the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff on disarmament and on setting up the Agency substantially assisted in the commission of deportation and forcible transfer of non-Serbs. The crimes of deportation and forcible transfer were an integral part of the Strategic Plan, which the Accused espoused throughout in the awareness that it could only be implemented through force and fear, and the implementation of which he coordinated in his position as President of the ARK Crisis Staff.¹⁴⁸⁵ He was also aware of the intent of the municipal authorities, the police and the army to deport and forcibly transfer the non-Serb population.
The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the Accused also aided and abetted the crimes of forcible transfer and deportation.

D. Destructions

1. The Law
(a) Unlawful and wanton extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity
The Prosecution has charged the Accused with the offence of unlawful and wanton extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity under Count 10.¹⁴⁸⁶ The extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity carried out unlawfully and wantonly constitutes a grave breach under Article 2 (d) of the Statute. This single article combines two separate acts: the (i) destruction of property and (ii) appropriation of property.¹⁴⁸⁷
Article 2 (d) is based on Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV, which sanctions as a grave breach the extensive destruction and appropriation of property protected by the Convention, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.¹⁴⁸⁸
Two types of property are protected under Article 2 (d):

1. real or personal property in occupied territory, belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organisations (except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations); ¹⁴⁸⁹

2. property that carries general protection under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 regardless of its location.¹⁴⁹⁰
The destruction and appropriation must be extensive.¹⁴⁹¹ However, a single incident, such as the destruction of a civilian hospital, may exceptionally suffice to constitute the crime.¹⁴⁹²
The prohibition of destruction of property situated in occupied territory is subject to an important reservation. It does not apply in cases “where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”.¹⁴⁹³
With regards to the mens rea requirement for destruction of property the perpetrator must have acted with the intent to destroy the protected property or in reckless disregard of the likelihood of its destruction.¹⁴⁹⁴
With respect to the mens rea requisite of appropriation of property, the perpetrator must have acted intentionally, with knowledge and will of the proscribed result.¹⁴⁹⁵
(b) Wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity
The Prosecution has charged the accused with the offence of wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity under Count 11.¹⁴⁹⁶ Wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity constitutes a violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 (b) of the Statute.¹⁴⁹⁷ Article 3 (b) of the Statute is based on Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations which forbids the unnecessary destruction or seisure of enemy property, unless it is “imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”.¹⁴⁹⁸
Article 3 (b) of the Statute is wide in scope, protecting all property in the territory involved in a war, including that located in enemy territory.¹⁴⁹⁹ The protection afforded under Article 3 (b) of the Statute is however, limited by the military necessity exception. The destruction or devastation of property in the territory involved in a war is prohibited except where it is justified by military necessity.¹⁵⁰⁰
With respect to the mens rea requisite of destruction or devastation of property under Article 3 (b), the jurisprudence of this Tribunal is consistent. The destruction or devastation must have been either perpetrated intentionally, with the knowledge and will of the proscribed result, or in reckless disregard of the likelihood of the destruction or devastation.¹⁵⁰¹
(c) Destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion
The seisure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science constitute a violation of the law or customs of war under Article 3 (d) of the Statute.¹⁵⁰² The Prosecution has charged the accused with the offence of destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion under Count 12.¹⁵⁰³ The Trial Chamber will, therefore, only deal with this part of the offence.
Institutions dedicated to religion are protected under the Statute and under customary international law. Articles 27 and 56 of the Hague Regulations provide for the protection in armed conflict of, among others, buildings or institutions dedicated to religion.¹⁵⁰⁴ The protection is reiterated in both Additional Protocol I and II to the Geneva Conventions, in Articles 53 and 16 respectively.¹⁵⁰⁵
The offence of destruction or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to religion overlaps to a certain extent with the offence of unlawful attacks on civilian objects except that the object of the offence of destruction or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to religion is more specific.¹⁵⁰⁶ Institutions dedicated to religion must be presumed to have a civilian character and to enjoy the general protection to which these objects are entitled to under Article 52 of Additional Protocol I.¹⁵⁰⁷ Pursuant to Article 52 of Additional Protocol I, institutions dedicated to religion as general civilian objects should not be attacked.¹⁵⁰⁸ They may be attacked only when they become a military objective. Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.¹⁵⁰⁹
Further, the exception to the protection of institutions dedicated to religion is set out in Article 27 of the Hague Regulations:

[a]ll necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided that they are not being used at the time for military purposes.¹⁵¹⁰
The “military purpose” exception to the protection of institutions dedicated to religion has been confirmed consistently by this Tribunal.¹⁵¹¹ The Trial Chamber agrees that the protection afforded under Article 3 (d) is lost if the property is used for military purposes.
With respect to the mens rea requisite of destruction or devastation of property under Article 3 (d), the jurisprudence of this Tribunal is consistent by stating that the mens rea requirement is intent (dolus directus ).¹⁵¹² The Trial Chamber holds that as religious institutions enjoy the minimum protection afforded to civilian objects the mens rea requisite for this offence should be equivalent to that required for the destruction or devastation of property under Article 3 (b).¹⁵¹³ The Trial Chamber, therefore, is of the opinion that the destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion must have been either perpetrated intentionally, with the knowledge and will of the proscribed result or in reckless disregard of the substantial likelihood of the destruction or damage.

2. The Facts and Findings
(a) Unlawful and Wanton Extensive Destruction and Appropriation of Property & Wanton Destruction of Cities, Towns and Villages or Devastation not justified by Military Necessity
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that in the period relevant to the Indictment, Bosnian Serb forces shelled towns and villages predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, causing extensive damage to houses and business premises. After the shelling, the Bosnian Serb forces entered the towns and villages, looting and setting on fire apartments, houses and business premises belonging to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The Trial Chamber finds that the purpose of such attacks was to create terror, destroy these properties, cities, towns and villages and prompt non-Serbs to abandon their houses, viallges or towns and leave permanently.
As a preliminary matter, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the destruction and appropriation of property which is alleged in the Indictment in the following towns and villages were proved beyond reasonable doubt as there is insufficient evidence: Ramici; Humici; Vrhpolje; Trnova; Sasina; Komusina; Rajseva; Kamenica and the town of Sipovo.¹⁵¹⁴
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that in the following municipalities, Bosnian Serb forces extensively destroyed and appropriated non-Serb property located in villages and towns predominately inhabited by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.

(i) Banja Luka
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that attacks on private houses and business premises belonging to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the city of Banja Luka took place in mid 1992.¹⁵¹⁵ Explosions were frequent and occurred mostly at night.¹⁵¹⁶ Houses were attacked with hand grenades, rocket launchers and rifle launched grenades.¹⁵¹⁷ The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that although the houses and business premises targeted were primarily owned by non-Serbs,¹⁵¹⁸ Bosnian Serb-owned shops were also subject to attack on occasion.¹⁵¹⁹ Such attacks appear to have been the result of a factional conflict between the Bosnian Serbs or criminal groups.¹⁵²⁰
On the basis of the evidence before it, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the police failed to investigate the bombing of private houses and business premises.¹⁵²¹ Adequate attention was not given to these cases.¹⁵²² There is some evidence that the destruction was carried out by criminals at the service of the SDS.¹⁵²³
The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that, during the period relevant to the Indictment, there were many incidents in Banja Luka of non-Serbs being forced to either sign over their property¹⁵²⁴ or exchange their property for property in Croatia.¹⁵²⁵ An agency was set up by the authorities of Banja Luka specifically to facilitate these exchanges.¹⁵²⁶ The SDS publicly announced that non-Serb owned shops and businesses would be transferred to returning Bosnian Serb soldiers as a reward.¹⁵²⁷ Bosnian Serb families moved into apartments belonging to non-Serbs who had left Banja Luka.¹⁵²⁸ Some people applied to exchange their apartments for apartments in Zagreb or Rijeka.¹⁵²⁹ In one example, a non-Serb was forced to exchange his house for just 100 German marks.¹⁵³⁰
The exchange of property for a simple certificate was also common. In one instance, a man handed over his Mercedes to the police in exchange for a certificate. Among the men that came to seise his car was a member of the 4th Light Infantry Brigade.¹⁵³¹ The man was told that they needed a vehicle for the new director of Blik, a retail company that produced the uniforms for the VRS army.¹⁵³² The confiscation of cars could be avoided by paying a “Bosnian Serb protector”.¹⁵³³ Another non-Serb received a certificate saying that all his property had been expropriated by the National Red Cross on behalf of Republika Srpska. The certificate was signed by the policeman who took the goods.¹⁵³⁴
People were not permitted to leave Banja Luka with more than three hundred German Marks.¹⁵³⁵ They were also warned not to take their belongings with them.¹⁵³⁶ However, when leaving Banja Luka, non-Serbs tried to hide valuables, for example, in coats and in pots of cosmetics.¹⁵³⁷ Restrictions were enforced at checkpoints where people were stripped and searched.¹⁵³⁸

(ii) Bosanska Krupa
The Trial Chamber finds that the town of Bosanka Krupa was shelled by Bosnian Serb forces on 22 April 1992. Houses predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims were set on fire and destroyed.¹⁵³⁹ At the end of May 1992, men wearing army uniforms with an insignia of a white eagle looted a couple of houses in the village of Arapusa.¹⁵⁴⁰

(iii) Bosanski Novi
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that in June 1992, areas of Bosanski Novi town predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims were set on fire by armed men.¹⁵⁴¹ Units of the regular army were not involved.¹⁵⁴²
The villages of Blagaj Japra and Blagaj Japra were shelled in May 1992. After the shelling, military tanks carrying flags with the symbol of the SerBiH entered the villages.¹⁵⁴³ Bosnian Serb soldiers took valuables and money from the villagers of Blagaj Rijeka and Blagaj Japra.¹⁵⁴⁴ Houses in the village of Blagaj Rijeka were set on fire.¹⁵⁴⁵
The village of Suhaca was also shelled by the Bosnian Serb army. After the shelling, Bosnian Serb soldiers entered the village and looted the houses.¹⁵⁴⁶ On 11 May 1992, Bosnian Serb forces shelled the Bosnian Muslim village of Gornji Agici, targeting civilian houses.¹⁵⁴⁷ In the village of Donji Agici, Bosnian Muslim property was looted and set on fire by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁵⁴⁸

(iv) Bosanski Petrovac
In June 1992, Bosnian Muslim shops and business premises in the town of Bosanski Petrovac and the surrounding area were destroyed by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁵⁴⁹ Organised groups looted Bosnian Muslim property, including cars, money and other valuables.¹⁵⁵⁰ On occasion, when Bosnian Muslims refused to hand over their money, a family member would be killed or a child abducted. The municipal Crisis Staff ordered the arrest of the men perpetrating these acts on 26 May 1992.¹⁵⁵¹
Non-Serbs were forced to hand over their property, either by exchanging it with Bosnian Serbs who were coming to Bosanski Petrovac or by leaving it to the SerBiH.¹⁵⁵² In fact, actual exchanges seldom took place: non-Serbs transferred their property in exchange for nothing.¹⁵⁵³ However, some families that left for Bihac acquired Bosnian Serb property in exchange.¹⁵⁵⁴ The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that documents showing the sale of property belonging to non-Serbs are reliable, as the evidence shows that such transfers were always occasioned by force.¹⁵⁵⁵

(v) Celinac
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that houses and shops belonging to Bosnian Muslims in the town of Celinac were shelled and set on fire by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁵⁵⁶ Bosnian Muslim homes were also broken into and appliances and other valuables were taken away.¹⁵⁵⁷ The minutes of the 17th session of the Municipal Assembly held 5 August 1992 summarise what occurred in Celinac:

[...] shops owned by non-Serbs are being destroyed, crime is on the rise, almost all weekend homes have been looted or destroyed. Sadly, these things are usually done by people wearing police or LPBC uniforms [...]¹⁵⁵⁸
Some inhabitants reported the events to the police and asked for protection. The police replied they could not do anything as they were not responsible and suggested instead that the people reporting the crimes leave the city.¹⁵⁵⁹
As soon as the Bosnian Muslim inhabitants of Basici left in August 1992, Bosnian Serbs looted their property and set their houses on fire. The only houses that weren’t burned down were those inhabited by Bosnian Serbs.¹⁵⁶⁰

(vi) Donji Vakuf
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that villages in the municipality of Donji Vakuf were regularly shelled by the Bosnian Serb military.¹⁵⁶¹ Bosnian Serb military shelled the village of Prusac in August 1992.¹⁵⁶²
In mid 1992, Bosnian Serb soldiers broke into houses inhabited by Bosnian Muslims in the town of Donji Vakuf and in the surrounding villages, looting their belongings and valuables.¹⁵⁶³ Bosnian Serb soldiers used garbage trucks and cars to carry away the booty.¹⁵⁶⁴ The Trial Chamber is further satisfied that Bosnian Serb civilians also participated in the looting¹⁵⁶⁵ and that the civilian police did nothing to prevent the looting.¹⁵⁶⁶

(vii) Kljuc
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that houses belonging to Bosnian Muslims in the town of Kljuc were destroyed by Bosnian Serb soldiers.¹⁵⁶⁷ The houses were first looted and then set on fire.¹⁵⁶⁸ The Trial Chamber also finds that with respect to non-Serbs who were forced out of their houses and resettled elsewhere, their houses were allotted to Bosnian Serbs if they did not return after a certain amount of time.¹⁵⁶⁹
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that in mid 1992, many villages in the municipality of Klju c predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims and by Bosnian Croats were shelled, and houses and cars were set on fire and destroyed by Bosnian Serb forces. The nature of the attacks is reflected by the statement of Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms to some of the villagers of Prhovo: “it takes years to build a house and it takes very little time to burn it”.¹⁵⁷⁰ In the same period, villages attacked by Bosnian Serb forces included Krasulje, Gornja and Donja Sanica, Crljeni¹⁵⁷¹ the hamlet of Dragonvici,¹⁵⁷² Pudin Han,¹⁵⁷³ Velagici,¹⁵⁷⁴ Biljani and its surrounding Bosnian Muslim hamlets,¹⁵⁷⁵ and Prhovo.¹⁵⁷⁶
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Bosnian Serb attacks upon Pudin Han, Prhovo, and Crljeni were also accompanied with the looting of valuables, including electronic devices, vehicles, furniture, money and jewelry.¹⁵⁷⁷ During the looting, the perpetrators would intentionally damage the houses by tearing drapes and breaking the windows.¹⁵⁷⁸ Bosnian Serb soldiers, Bosnian Serb civilians and the Bosnian Serb police participated in the looting.¹⁵⁷⁹ The looting of houses in the municipality of Kljuc “were not isolated acts. These were acts by obedients who plundered, and making a certain gain they distributed the booty to the leaders [...] There [wasn’t] a house from which they didn't steal something ranging from furniture [to] cars.”¹⁵⁸⁰ No measures were taken to prevent the looting.¹⁵⁸¹

(viii) Kotor Varos
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that towns and villages in the municipality of Kotor Varos were shelled by Bosnian Serb forces. When entering the villages, the Bosnian Serb forces looted and set the houses on fire. The town of Kotor Varo s and the village of Vrbanci was attacked by the Bosnian Serb army in June 1992.¹⁵⁸² During the attack on Hrvacani, houses were either shelled or burned down.¹⁵⁸³ Furniture and other valuables inside the houses were looted by the Bosnian Serb forces. They also took the cattle from the surrounding villages.¹⁵⁸⁴ In the village of Dabovci, Bosnian Serb forces frequently looted Bosnian Muslim homes.¹⁵⁸⁵
Bosnian Serb forces destroyed the village of Vecici by heavy artillery shelling and an air raid.¹⁵⁸⁶ In mid 1992, the villages of Hanifici, Plitska and Kotor were attacked and set on fire by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁵⁸⁷

(ix) Prijedor
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that in the town of Prijedor, only non-Serb houses were targeted by Bosnian Serbs forces.¹⁵⁸⁸ Stari Grad, the old town of Prijedor, predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims, was damaged in May 1992 by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁵⁸⁹ Many houses were destroyed during the night with explosives. The day following such destruction the rubble would be collected.¹⁵⁹⁰ A group of men marked the non-Serb houses that had to be destroyed. One of the members of the group claimed to act pursuant to orders of the Crisis Staff.¹⁵⁹¹
The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that, in mid 1992, the Bosnian Muslim villages in Prijedor municipality of Biscani, Kozarusa, Kamicani, Kevljani, Rakovcani, Carakovo, and Rizvanovici were also destroyed by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁵⁹² The houses were set on fire and looted. The VRS loaded their trucks with goods belonging to non-Serbs.¹⁵⁹³
In some villages, attacks were preceded by an ultimatum: for example in the Hambarine area in late May 1992, an ultimatum was given for the surrender of a particular individual.¹⁵⁹⁴ Following the expiration of the ultimatum, the Bosnian Muslim village of Hambarine was shelled by Bosnian Serb forces for the entire day.¹⁵⁹⁵ Houses were targeted indiscriminately. Tanks passed through the village and shelled the houses causing civilian casualties. Houses were looted and set on fire.¹⁵⁹⁶
The Trial Chamber finds that after Hambarine, the Bosnian Muslim village of Kozarac was attacked by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁵⁹⁷ The attack occurred at the end of May 1992, after an ultimatum was given to the Bosnian Muslim villagers to surrender their weapons. The Bosnian Muslim villagers decided not to surrender their weapons but to defend their village and families.¹⁵⁹⁸ No mortars or artillery were fired from Kozarac to Bosnian Serb positions.¹⁵⁹⁹ The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the houses of Kozarac were shelled by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶⁰⁰ The shelling lasted for about two days.¹⁶⁰¹ The hospital was also shelled. Windows of the hospital were shattered and the building was damaged.¹⁶⁰² One of the Bosnian Serb villagers attached a sign on his house stating: “This is Serbian house, do not touch’.¹⁶⁰³ When the tanks entered into the town, Bosnian Serb soldiers broke into non-Serb houses to loot and then set them on fire.¹⁶⁰⁴
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Brisevo, a town predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Croats,¹⁶⁰⁵ was attacked in May 1992.¹⁶⁰⁶ The shelling came from nearby Bosnian Serb villages. Brisevo did not respond to the attack.¹⁶⁰⁷ Numerous houses were burnt down, the rest were damaged by the attack.¹⁶⁰⁸ Both the 6th Krajina Brigade and the 5th Kozara Brigade were involved in the attack.¹⁶⁰⁹ The Trial Chamber also finds that houses in Brisevo were looted by soldiers.¹⁶¹⁰
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the looting of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat villages in the area of Prijedor was organised.¹⁶¹¹ In fact, villagers forced to leave the area had to sign over their property to either to the ARK or to the SerBiH.¹⁶¹² The unlawful appropriation of real property began after the attack on Prijedor, Kozarac and Hambarine. At first, real property certificates were issued in order to justify the confiscation. Later on certificates were no longer issued. In contrast, Bosnian Serb residents did not have their property confiscated.¹⁶¹³
The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that in the municipality of Prijedor Bosnian Serb soldiers conducted searches in the houses inhabited by Bosnian Muslims on the pretext of looking for weapons. They would then loot the valuables and food from the houses. Bosnian Serb homes were not searched.¹⁶¹⁴ Bosnian Serb soldiers in uniform and armed with automatic rifles came to the village of Carkovo and forcefully appropriated fuel, vehicles, animals, money and other valuables.¹⁶¹⁵Houses in Ljubija and Rakovcani were also looted.¹⁶¹⁶

(x) Prnjavor
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that at the beginning of 1992 many privately owned businesses of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the town of Prnjavor were damaged by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶¹⁷ Houses in the village of Lisnja were looted and set on fire by Bosnian Serb forces, while others were shelled. Around 100 houses were destroyed in Lisnja.¹⁶¹⁸

(xi) Sanski Most
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that in May 1992, the 6th Sana Brigade attacked Mahala, the Bosnian Muslim neighbourhood of Sanski Most town.¹⁶¹⁹ After shelling the town of Sanski Most, Bosnian Serb military and police began looting the houses and business premises of Bosnian Muslims and in some cases of Bosnian Croats.¹⁶²⁰ Houses and business premises were also damaged with rockets launched from hand-held launchers called “zoljas”.¹⁶²¹ The 6th Sana Brigade was responsible for blowing up Bosnian Muslim business premises in Sanski Most.¹⁶²² No efforts were made to prevent or stop the violence.¹⁶²³
The surrounding villages of Sanski Most municipality, including Hrustovo, Begi ci and Lukavice were also shelled by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶²⁴ On 31 May 1992, soldiers arrived in the village of Begici, looting homes and setting houses and barns on fire.¹⁶²⁵

(xii) Sipovo
The Trial Chamber is satisfied that in the municipality of Sipovo, houses in villages predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims, such as Besnjevo, were set on fire by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶²⁶

(xiii) Teslic
In May 1992, Bosnian Muslim business premises were damaged in the town of Tesli c.¹⁶²⁷ After the attack on Stenjak in June 1992, houses were set on fire by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶²⁸ The crime situation in Teslic from June to September 1992 is summarised in a report from the public prosecutor in Teslic which states:

[...] Most criminal acts remain undiscovered, and many crimes are tolerated by the authorities for various reasons. The Prosecutor's Office has knowledge of the day -to-day looting of property, houses and business premises being set on fire and destroyed, armed robbery and murder being committed for base motives, socially owned flats and private houses being occupied unlawfully, the stealing of forest timbers, and other forms of willful acts. There is no criminal prosecution for most of these cases.¹⁶²⁹

(xiv) Conclusions
The Trial Chamber finds that in the period relevant to the Indictment, Bosnian Serb forces extensively destroyed and appropriated property belonging to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the municipalities mentioned above.
In relation to the offence of destruction and appropriation of property under Article 2 (d) of the Statute, one of two alternative legal requirements needs to be fulfilled. The property destroyed or appropriated must either have been accorded general protection under the Geneva Conventions or the property must have been situated in occupied territory. The evidence shows that the property destroyed or appropriated consisted mostly of houses, business premises, vehicles, money and other valuables. Such property is not generally protected by the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, the Trial Chamber must establish whether the property destroyed or appropriated was situated in occupied territory.
Pursuant to the definition provided by Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, reflecting customary law, “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”¹⁶³⁰ Occupation is defined as a transitional period following invasion and preceding the agreement on the cessation of the hostilities.¹⁶³¹ The question is therefore whether the relevant municipalities in the ARK were occupied by the FRY when the destruction and appropriation of property took place. In order to determine whether the FRY had established authority over the territory in question, the Trial Chamber has considered the guidelines set out in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.¹⁶³² Using these guidelines, the Trial Chamber finds that the evidence brought forward by the Prosecution is not enough to satisfy the actual authority test required to establish the existence of a state of occupation. The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the evidence adduced is enough to prove that at the time of the destruction and appropriation of the relevant property the stage arrived at was already a transitional period following invasion and preceding the agreement on the cessation of the hostilities. The evidence on the degree of authority exercised by the Bosnian armed forces over the Bosnian Krajina is, in the view of the Trial Chamber insufficient to lead it to the conclusion that a state of occupation had already been reached at the time the destruction and appropriation mentioned came to being. The Trial Chamber, therefore, cannot come to the conclusion that the property destroyed and appropriated was located in occupied territory. Consequently, there cannot be a violation of Article 2 (d ) of the Statute.
Unlike Article 2 (d) of the Statute, Article 3(b) of the Statute is not restricted by either the requirement of the existence of a state of occupation or of the accordance of general protection under the Geneva Conventions. The protection to civilian property in Article 3(b) of the Statute is only limited by the military necessity exception. In most instances there is abundant evidence that there was no resistance at all and in the few cases where there is evidence of some resistance, the Trial Chamber comes to the conclusion that the evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that it was minimal and certainly not such as to justify the destruction that occurred. The evidence therefore shows that the destruction of civilian property in villages, towns and cities predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats was not justified by military necessity and that the Bosnian Serb forces deliberately destroyed property belonging to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that this destruction and devastation was perpetrated intentionally, that is within the knowledge of and wanting the promised result or in reckless disregard of the substantial likelihood of the destruction or devastation. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the destruction of property in the relevant municipalities were in violation of Article 3(b) of the Statute.
(b) Destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was willful damage done to both Muslim and Roman Catholic religious buildings and institutions in the relevant municipalities by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶³³
As a preliminary matter, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the destruction or willful damage to the following institutions dedicated to religion alleged in the Indictment, has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, as there is insufficient evidence: Donji Budelj Mosque; Humici Mosque; Krasulje Mosque; Sanica Mosque;¹⁶³⁴ Dzamija Mosque; Alic Mosque; and the Roman Catholic Churches in the towns of Bosanski Novi and Sanski Most.
Although the campaign of devastation of institutions dedicated to religion took place throughout the conflict, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that it intensified in the summer of 1992. The Trial Chamber finds that this concentrated period of significant damage to Muslim and Roman Catholic institutions dedicated to religion within the summer months of 1992, across the municipalities concerned, is indicative that the devastation was targeted, controlled and deliberate. These findings are based on the following incidents.

(i) Banja Luka
On 9 April 1992, the Franciscan Monastery in Petricevac was damaged. The investigations carried out established that the Monastery was hit by a missile from a hand held rocket launcher.¹⁶³⁵

(ii) Bosanska Krupa
The Bosanska Krupa town mosque was mined by Bosnian Serb forces in April 1992. As a result of ensuing explosion, the minaret fell.¹⁶³⁶ The Roman Catholic Church in town was also destroyed.¹⁶³⁷ The mosque in the village of Arapusa was also destroyed by explosives.¹⁶³⁸

(iii) Bosanski Novi
In early May or June 1992, the town mosque in Bosanski Novi was shelled and set on fire by Bosnian Serb soldiers.¹⁶³⁹ The walls were badly damaged but the minaret remained standing. Heavy machinery was brought from Prijedor in order to knock down the minaret. When the mosque was destroyed, trucks arrived to remove the rubble from the mosque. The site was then flattened and used as a parking lot. The tombs of the cemetery were also removed.¹⁶⁴⁰
Other Muslim institutions dedicated to religion in the municipality of Bosanski Novi were targeted by Bosnian Serb forces. The Vidorije mosque was burned down in May 1992.¹⁶⁴¹ The mosques in Prekosanje, Urije and Gornji Agici were also destroyed.¹⁶⁴² During an attack by Bosnian Serb forces on Suhaca, the two mosques in the village were badly damaged by the shelling.¹⁶⁴³ The old wooden mosque in Blagaj Rijeka and its minaret was set on fire.¹⁶⁴⁴ The mosque in Blagaj Japra was also damaged.¹⁶⁴⁵ The minaret on the roof of the mosque in Donji Agici was blown off by an explosion and the roof structure collapsed.¹⁶⁴⁶

(iv) Bosanski Petrovac
The mosques in the centre of Bosanski Petrovac town, named Donji Biscani and Srednji Biscani were damaged by Bosnian Serb forces in July 1992.¹⁶⁴⁷ Following explosions, the minarets of the Donji Biscani and Srednji Biscani mosques fell to the ground. The following days the rubble was cleared away by trucks.¹⁶⁴⁸ The minaret of the Rasinovac mosque was also blown up by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶⁴⁹

(v) Celinac
The old wooden mosque in the town of Celinac was mined.¹⁶⁵⁰ After the explosion, trucks cleared away what was left.¹⁶⁵¹ The smaller mosque in town and the little Catholic Chapel at the exit from town were also destroyed by Bosnian Serb forces. The latter was destroyed in mid 1992.¹⁶⁵²

(vi) Donji Vakuf
The three mosques in the town of Donji Vakuf were targeted by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶⁵³ The main mosque called Basdzamija was mined and as a result was completely destroyed.¹⁶⁵⁴ The rubble of this mosque was loaded on trucks and thrown in the river Vrbas and on its banks. The location of the mosque was subsequently turned into a parking lot.¹⁶⁵⁵ The other two mosques in town were set on fire.¹⁶⁵⁶ A number of mosques were also destroyed by Bosnian Serb forces in the municipality. Three of the four mosques in the village of Prusac were damaged in August or September 1992. The mosques were riddled with bullets and some of the minarets were destroyed.¹⁶⁵⁷ The mosque in the hamlet of Seherdzik was destroyed by men wearing JNA uniforms on 9 August 1992. Due to the explosion, the walls of the mosque collapsed but part of the minaret was left standing.¹⁶⁵⁸ The mosque in the village of Sokolina was set on fire by men wearing olive grey uniforms in June 1992.¹⁶⁵⁹

(vii) Kljuc
Mosques and other institutions dedicated to religion were destroyed in Klju c by Bosnian Serb forces. The Kljuc town mosque and its minaret was destroyed in August 1992, during the night.¹⁶⁶⁰ The Biljani Mosque was set on fire in the morning of 10 July 1992 when the village was attacked by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶⁶¹

(viii) Kotor Varos
During attacks on villages in Kotor Varos by Bosnian Serb forces in June and July 1992, the mosques in the villages of Vrbanjci and Hanifici were set on fire and mined.¹⁶⁶² The Roman Catholic Church in the town of Kotor Varos was also set on fire.¹⁶⁶³

(ix) Prijedor
The most systematic and brutal infliction of damage to both Muslim and Catholic institutions dedicated to religion occurred in Prijedor. In late August 1992 Bosnian Serb soldiers broke into the Roman Catholic Church in Prijedor to plant explosives in it. At 0100 hours the explosives detonated and destroyed the church.¹⁶⁶⁴ The police appeared indifferent to the reports on the events.¹⁶⁶⁵
In areas surrounding Prijedor town, institutions dedicated to religion were targeted by Bosnian Serb forces. In Brisevo, the Bosnian Serb military burned down the Roman Catholic church.¹⁶⁶⁶ In Kamicani, the mosque was set on fire.¹⁶⁶⁷ The Mutnik mosque in Kozarac was destroyed in mid 1992.¹⁶⁶⁸ The minaret of the mosque in Kozarusa was badly damaged.¹⁶⁶⁹ The mosque in Gornji Puharska was razed to the ground.¹⁶⁷⁰ The new mosque in Kevljani was completely destroyed by mines. The minaret and the mosque were blown up with explosives.¹⁶⁷¹ The Gornji Jakupovici mosque’s minaret was badly damaged by mines.¹⁶⁷²

(x) Prnjavor
The town mosque in Prnjavor was targeted twice. On the first occasion it was damaged, and on the second it was razed to the ground.¹⁶⁷³ Attacks by Bosnian Serb forces also took place in Prnjavor municipality. The mosque in Lisnja was damaged by shelling and set on fire in 1992, by Bosnian Serb forces. ¹⁶⁷⁴ The mosque in Puraci was blown up.¹⁶⁷⁵

(xi) Sanski Most
Mosques in Sanski Most were also subject to major damage by Bosnian Serb forces. The mosques in the villages of Capalj, Hrustovo, Lukavice, Kamengrad and Tomina were destroyed in 1992 by the Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶⁷⁶

(xii) Sipovo
In Sipovo, the Staro Sipovo, Besnjevo and Pljeva mosques were bombed during the night on 7 August 1992 by Bosnian Serb forces. The mosques and their minarets were completely destroyed and the tombstones in the vicinity were also damaged.¹⁶⁷⁷

(xiii) Teslic
In the town of Teslic, the Roman Catholic Church was demolished during an attack by the Serb forces in mid 1992.¹⁶⁷⁸ The mosques in the surrounding villages of Barici and Ruzevici were also destroyed by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁶⁷⁹

(xiv) Conclusions
The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that during the period covered in the Indictment, Bosnian Serb forces deliberately targeted the Muslim and Roman Catholic religious institutions mentioned above. The evidence has shown that such religious institutions were not used for military purposes. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the damage to Muslim and Roman Catholic religious institutions in the above municipalities were in violation of Article 3(d) of the Statute.

3. The Responsibility of the Accused
The Trial Chamber has already dismissed JCE, planning and superior criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute as possible modes of liability to describe the individual criminal responsibility of the Accused.¹⁶⁸⁰
(a) Unlawful and wanton extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity (Count 10)
The Trial Chamber has previously found that the requirements for the crime of unlawful and wanton extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity, punishable under Articles 2(d) of the Statute, have not been met and therefore the Accused is acquitted of the charges in Count 10 of the Indictment.
(b) Wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity (Count 11)
There is no evidence to establish that the Accused ordered or instigated the wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity, charged under Count 11 of the Indictment.
The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the public utterances of the Accused prompted the physical perpetrators to commit any of the underlying acts charged under Count 11 of the Indictment, because the nexus between the public utterances of the Accused and the commission of the wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity by the physical perpetrators has not been established. Moreover, neither the public utterances of the Accused nor the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff are specific enough to constitute instructions by the Accused to the physical perpetrators to commit any of the underlying acts in question.
The Trial Chamber recalls its previous finding that the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff can be attributed to the Accused.¹⁶⁸¹ It also found that between 9 May 1992 and 18 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff issued a number of decisions demanding the disarmament of “paramilitary formations” and of “individuals who illegally possess weapons”, specifying that “[a]ll formations that are not in the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Banja Luka Security Services Centre and are in the Autonomous Region of Krajina, are considered paramilitary formations and must be disarmed.” Moreover, the Trial Chamber has found that, although these decisions on disarmament were not expressly restricted to non-Serbs, the disarmament operations were selectively enforced against them by the municipal civilian authorities, the CSB and the SJBs, and by the army.¹⁶⁸²
The disarmament of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats throughout the ARK created an imbalance of arms and weapons favouring the Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian Krajina, a situation amplified by the fact that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the Bosnian Serb population was arming itself at the same time on a massive scale.¹⁶⁸³ The ARK Crisis Staff’s decisions on disarmament and their implementation further rendered the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians more vulnerable, preventing or limiting their ability to defend themselves and giving practical assistance to the Bosnian Serb forces attacking non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods. Moreover, at the municipal level, where ARK Crisis Staff’s decisions with respect to disarmament were implemented, the disarmament deadlines were on occasion used as a pretext to attack non-Serb villages.¹⁶⁸⁴
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament constituted practical assistance to the attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods. During and immediately after these attacks members of the Bosnian Serb forces committed a number of underlying acts of wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. Through the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament, the Accused had a substantial effect on the commission of these acts. However, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament had a substantial effect on those underlying acts of wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity charged under Count 11 of the Indictment that were not committed in context of the armed attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods.
The Trial Chamber is also not satisfied that any other decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff or the public utterances of the Accused had a substantial effect on the commission of any of the underlying acts of wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity charged under Count 11 of the Indictment.
The Trial Chamber has previously found that the Accused espoused the Strategic Plan and that he was aware that it could only be implemented by the use of force and fear.¹⁶⁸⁵ Bearing in mind that the attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods constituted an essential part of the implementation of the Strategic Plan in the ARK; that the Accused held the position of President of the ARK Crisis Staff, the highest political authority in the ARK; his direct link with Radovan Karadzic and his close contact with the General Major Momir Talic, the commander of the 1st KK of the VRS and with Stojan Zupljanin, the head of the CSB, and with other military and political leaders at the level of the ARK and the municipalities of the ARK; the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only reasonable inference that may be drawn is that, when the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament were issued, the Accused was aware that the Bosnian Serb forces were to attack non Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods and that through the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament he rendered practical assistance and a substantial contribution to the Bosnian Serb forces carrying out these attacks.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused was aware that during these armed attacks the Bosnian Serb forces would commit a number of crimes including the crime of wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity and that the members of the Bosnian Serb forces carrying out the crimes in question had the required mens rea.
For the above reason, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused aided and abetted in the wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity committed by the Bosnian Serb forces in context of the armed attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods after 9 May 1992, the date when the ARK Crisis Staff issued its first decision on disarmament.
The Accused aided and abetted members of the Bosnian Serb forces in the wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity in the municipalities of Banja Luka, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Celinac, Donji Vakuf, Kljuc, Kotor Varos, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Teslic.¹⁶⁸⁶
(c) Destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion (Count 12)
There is no evidence to establish that the Accused ordered or instigated the destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charged under Count 12 of the Indictment.
The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the public utterances of the Accused prompted the physical perpetrators to commit any of the underlying acts charged under Count 12 of the Indictment, because the nexus between the public utterances of the Accused and the commission of the wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity by the physical perpetrators has not been established. Moreover, neither the public utterances of the Accused nor the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff are specific enough to constitute instructions by the Accused to the physical perpetrators to commit any of the underlying acts in question.
The Trial Chamber reiterates its finding made in the previous section that the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament, which can be attributed to the Accused, constituted practical assistance to the attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods. During and immediately after these attacks members of the Bosnian Serb forces committed a number of underlying acts of destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion. Through the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament, the Accused had a substantial effect on the commission of these acts. However, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament had a substantial effect on those underlying acts of destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion charged under Count 12 of the Indictment that were not committed in context of the armed attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods.
The Trial Chamber is also not satisfied that any other decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff or the public utterances of the Accused had a substantial effect on the commission of any of the underlying acts of destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion charged under Count 11 of the Indictment.
The Trial Chamber further reiterates its finding made in the previous section that the Accused was aware that the Bosnian Serb forces were to attack non Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods and that through the ARK Crisis Staff decisions on disarmament he rendered practical assistance and a substantial contribution to the Bosnian Serb forces carrying out these attacks.
Moreover, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused was aware that during these armed attacks the Bosnian Serb forces would commit a number of crimes including the crime of destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion and that the members of the Bosnian Serb forces carrying out the crimes in question had the required mens rea.
For the above reason, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused aided and abetted in the destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion committed by the Bosnian Serb forces in context of the armed attacks of the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods after 9 May 1992, the date when the ARK Crisis Staff issued its first decision on disarmament.
The Accused aided and abetted members of the Bosnian Serb forces in the destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion in the municipalities of Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Celinac, Donji Vakuf, Kljuc, Kotor Varos, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Sipovo and Teslic.¹⁶⁸⁷