

**REPUBLIC OF POLAND**  
**PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS**



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Fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly  
of the United Nations  
2005 Review Conference  
of the States Parties to the Treaty  
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

*Check against delivery*

**S T A T E M E N T**

by

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New York, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2005

Mr. President,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the outset let me congratulate you, Mr. President, upon your election to this highly prestigious and demanding post of the President of the NPT Review Conference 2005.

I wish to assure you, Mr. President, of the Polish Delegation's full support and cooperation in the discharge of your important mandate.

I should also like to take this opportunity to extend congratulations to the other members of the Conference Bureau.

Let me also welcome Mr. Jerzy Zaleski as the Secretary General of this Conference.

Mr. President,

Poland fully associates itself with the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, on behalf of the European Union. At the same time I would like to elaborate on some issues which in our view are of particular significance.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been in force for thirty-five years now. Having been among its original signatories, Poland is strongly convinced that the NPT remains the key international instrument for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the mainstay of a global non-proliferation regime, this Treaty is a major factor of peace and security in the world.

In the course of five years since the last NPT Review Conference in 2000, Poland has sought, to the best of its ability, to contribute to the reinforcement of the Treaty, notably through some national measures. A major step in this direction was the adoption by the Polish parliament of the new "Atomic Law" in 2000 and of modified, strengthened provisions in the Law on Export Control of Sensitive Goods and Technologies in 2001.

Having joined the European Union in May 2004, we adhered fully to the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and its Action Plan adopted in 2003.

Prompted by the desire to contribute to the strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime, Poland has become an active party to two new important international initiatives – the Global Partnership of G-8, launched in Kananaskis in 2002, and the Proliferation Security Initiative – also known as the Krakow Initiative of 2003.

We consider the Krakow Initiative an encouraging sign of the growing international resolve for more practical cooperation in forestalling proliferation. This objective was followed up and further elaborated at the First Anniversary Meeting of the PSI organized in Krakow by the Polish Government in 2004, and a number of PSI interdiction exercises in which Poland participated.

Under the G-8 Global Partnership Poland has established an effective framework of cooperation with the Russian Federation aimed at the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons. We have also initiated an intensive dialogue with Libya aimed at assisting that country in developing expert capacity in the field of non-proliferation aspects of chemical industry.

Mr. President,

Since the 2000 NPT Review Conference, notwithstanding some positive steps towards strengthening the Treaty, such as Cuba's adherence thereto and Libya's abandonment of its clandestine nuclear activities, the nuclear threat has been evolving in a dangerous way and the global non-proliferation efforts now face serious challenges. We are confronted with new and more deadly forms of terrorism – with a real danger of its perpetrators tending to reach for nuclear materials. While some states still remain outside the NPT regime another - the DPRK - has openly announced its withdrawal from the Treaty. Moreover, there are still concerns about some State-Parties trying to circumvent the NPT provisions.

Yet another dangerous factor recently revealed is the wide illicit trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Poland believes that in order to face the challenges brought about by these developments, today's security environment requires an even more comprehensive and robust global non-proliferation strategy. We are of the firm view that the viability of the NPT depends on the universal compliance with tighter rules to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, more effective regional security strategies, and - last but not least - renewed progress towards fulfillment of NPT disarmament obligations by nuclear weapons states.

To achieve the above-mentioned demanding goals, as the priority the role of the IAEA must be strengthened. Having had Safeguard Agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in force since 1972 and the Additional Protocol since the year 2000, Poland feels entitled to urge all other State parties to NPT which have not done so to adhere to the Additional Protocol as soon as possible, so that it may become a standard norm for international verification of peaceful nuclear activities. As a member of a Board of Governors of the IAEA Poland also expects a positive outcome of the discussion to establish – within a framework of IAEA - Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification.

We support main objectives of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative announced in September last year in Vienna to strengthen the safety of the nuclear waste stockpiles and to convert research reactors to operating on low-enriched uranium. Poland hopes that the diplomatic conference scheduled to take place in Vienna in July to amend the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials will lead to a successful outcome. Accordingly, Poland welcomes the recent adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism as a long-awaited instrument of utmost importance – necessary in the difficult process of curbing the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and technologies. We urge others to sign the Convention at the planned Treaty Event during the September UN Summit.

I would also like to voice our deep desire for the full implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 and - in this connection - to underline the importance of effective national export control mechanisms that could make use of the experience of the Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as the Zangger Committee of which both Poland is an active member.

Undeclared nuclear activities in violation of the NPT should, in our view, lead to serious consequences. We also welcome discussion on proposals to set up a mechanism that would make withdrawal from the Treaty by State Parties much more difficult and would result in depriving such states of benefits stemming from international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Regarding the field of disarmament, Poland, having signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) considers its early entry into force an urgent priority

and continuously calls other State Parties named in Annex II of the Treaty to bring it into force without delay. We repeated this call at the 2001 and 2003 article XIV Conferences of the CTBT.

Another priority in this field is, in our view, a speedy commencement of the negotiations on Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and its early conclusion. Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Adam D. Rotfeld, speaking at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on March 17 called the absence of FMCT "...the crucial missing link of the chain of non-proliferation..." In this regard, I do reconfirm Poland's flexible position towards the proposals on the program of work of the CD that would enable early start of the FMCT negotiations.

Mr. President,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Experience of the past ten years clearly indicates that the strengthened review process – as elaborated in 1995 - needs an effective implementation by State Parties. Consequently, Poland is submitting its national report on carrying out every respective NPT article over the last five years. We encourage other State Parties to follow this path in order to broaden transparency in the field of nuclear non-proliferation.

It is our belief that during the last five years progress has also been made towards fulfillment of our obligations under the Final Document of 2000 as well as those derived from the Principles and Objectives of 1995.

Poland is firmly convinced that the NPT Review Conference 2005 needs to focus on a positive and realistic program of action that will genuinely reinforce the NPT and – concomitantly - consolidate international peace and security.

It is not an easy task. But we must raise up to the challenge. Proliferation of nuclear weapons occupies a top place on the list of security threats and challenges of today. In many ways this is a moment of truth of the entire non-proliferation regime we have built over the years. We must pass this test successfully with the NPT remaining the foundation and central element of the system. Let us be mobilized by this special responsibility. To be successful we must focus on the strategic target – strengthening the viability of the NPT regime, and avoid our energy being wasted on petty and secondary issues. Let us build a reinforced consensus across and above all possible dividing lines, overcoming the little frustrations we all may have. This plea of mine today is very much inspired by the special date on which I am addressing this Conference – the national day of Poland commemorating the adoption of our Constitution of 1791 – the first European and second after the American. That constitution is a testimony to the power of consensus-building.

The success of this Conference may become an important building block and a catalyst in the process leading to the UN September Summit expected to bring about substantive reform decisions. Adherence to the non-proliferation regime goals must be a basic norm of the code of behavior which international community should foster and adhere to. Likewise, the non-proliferation policies must be firmly embedded in domestic policies and laws. The regime must constitute a harmonious entity, centered around the United Nations system. I am confident we will succeed.

The delegation of Poland stands ready to support you, Mr. President, in your efforts to achieve such an objective.

Thank you Mr. President.