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**Statement by  
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**Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia  
to the United Nations**

**in the General Debate of the 2005 Review Conference  
of States Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

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Mr. President,

On behalf of the Indonesian delegation, let me express my warmest congratulations on your election to preside over this very important Conference of States Parties to the NPT. We are confident that under your vast experience and wise guidance, our deliberations will lead to a successful conclusion. Our felicitations also go to the other members of the Bureau.

Indonesia fully associates itself with the statement delivered by H.E. Mr. Hamid Syed Albar, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and other States Parties to the NPT.

Mr. President,

In recent years, the non-proliferation regime has been facing severe challenges attributable to its contradictions and imbalances. It is important to recognize the seriousness of the problems confronting us and engage in an agonizing reappraisal of the past so that we can move forward into the future.

Basically, the Treaty rests on the essential framework of three pillars: non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for without each one there would not have been a treaty. Accordingly, the implementation of the Treaty by both nuclear and non-nuclear states should emanate from those linkages in a balanced manner.

However, we have witnessed an uneven and selective implementation of its provisions. It was complicated by a lack of political will and determination to abide by prior commitments. Furthermore, non-proliferation has been placed at the expense of the other two, thus creating a crisis of confidence in the NPT.

Despite this bleak picture, we were gratified by the renunciation of the nuclear option by over 180 countries with the vast majority of non-nuclear states having fulfilled their obligations. And with the accession to the Treaty by Cuba and Timor Leste, the NPT has gained the distinction of being the most widely adhered arms control Treaty.

Therefore, this Conference offers a vital opportunity to reiterate NPT's continuing relevance, to uphold the 1995 bargain of "permanence with accountability", to build on the success of the 2000 Review Conference, to respond effectively to the serious challenges that have arisen since then and to chart the Treaty's future course.

Our task here is to ensure the NPT's continuing authority and effectiveness, while maintaining the balance reflected in the "grand bargain" of its three pillars, which are inseparable and mutually reinforcing.

Mr. President,

In the efforts to achieve disarmament, we note that the number of deployed nuclear weapons were reduced, but expect further concrete steps by nuclear-weapon states. While the Moscow Treaty of 2002, containing reductions in deployments and in operational status of such weapons is commendable, it lacked provisions for irreversible cuts and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Although non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are inter-dependent goals, there has been systematic attempts to de-link these two aspects with an unbalanced emphasis on the former. Meanwhile, disarmament is being replaced by an exclusive focus on non-proliferation which has contributed to the further exacerbation of inherent discrimination and double standards.

Further compounding the situation has been the reassertion of discredited strategic doctrines which has created a pervasive sense of global insecurity. Thousands of nuclear weapons are retained, many on alert status. The risk of their accidental or unauthorized use is a frightening possibility. In recent years, the perpetuation and accumulation of these dangers has been heightened by the unilateral assertion of national security interests based on an ever-increasing accumulation of armaments, by the re-legitimization of nuclear weapons in the security strategies of some nuclear weapon states, and by the denial of obligation to disarm.

While the norm of non-proliferation has been observed by an overwhelming majority of non-nuclear weapon states, the right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy has been hampered by undue restrictions which are contrary to the collectively agreed obligations of the non-proliferation regime. Regretably, collective punishment seems to have been in place, thus denying benefits for non-nuclear weapons states that have adhered to the Treaty.

Meanwhile, negotiations for a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) have yet to resume although it constitutes a critical step in the multilateral disarmament agenda. We continue to believe that securing this objective which was set a decade ago has become imperative and that we should proceed without further undue delay.

Security assurances have been widely recognized as critical to strengthening the NPT. Doubts about their credibility can be seen in the conditions attached by some nuclear-weapon states to withdraw their already diluted assurances if they unilaterally determine non-compliance with Treaty obligations. These have triggered further apprehension among states belonging to various nuclear-weapon-free-zones about the commitment of non-use of nuclear weapons contained in their Protocols.

We should also take into account the policies of some states that envision the use of nuclear weapons for deterring, pre-empting and punishing adversaries. Not surprisingly, political declarations of a non-binding nature have failed to inspire confidence due also to ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding their implementation. It is, therefore, time to

acknowledge the legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced their nuclear option against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an international convention without any conditions, stipulations or loopholes. Without such guarantees, the non-nuclear-weapon States would remain potential targets of a nuclear attack.

Mr. President,

With regard to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones, Indonesia has welcomed their acceleration during the past decade which has strengthened the global non-proliferation regime at the regional level. They also diminished the importance of nuclear weapons and limited the geographic scope of their menace through accession to the Protocols by the nuclear weapon states. In this regard, we welcome the outcome of the Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones held last week in Mexico.

As far as the Bangkok Treaty is concerned, much progress has been made in finalizing the institutional framework to implement its provisions. Indonesia attaches great importance to the on-going consultations between the South-East Asian countries and the nuclear-weapon States concerning their accession to its Protocol. These should be pursued with a greater sense of urgency with a view to resolving outstanding problems. In this context, we welcome China's intention to sign the Protocol and remain hopeful that other nuclear weapon states will also accede in the foreseeable future in order to ensure the unfettered effectiveness of the zone.

My delegation is gratified to note the agreement reached among the Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in their region. It will pave the way for first such zone in the Northern Hemisphere. We hope that the on-going efforts will garner renewed support from the States concerned and culminate in the establishment of such a zone in that region.

In the Middle East, however, we regret to note that no progress has been achieved in realizing this objective. In a region characterized by instability and tension, the creation of such a zone is particularly urgent in mitigating the situation. Yet, Israel's nuclear capabilities and its steadfast refusal to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards continue to be the main stumbling block.

We also have to deal with a myriad other issues including, inter alia, the possibility of nuclear terrorism and preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons including fissile materials and means of delivery. The recent adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism is an important first step towards eliminating this danger which affects all nations. It will add substantively to the existing legal norms such as the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

As regards the IAEA, Indonesia gratefully acknowledges that the Agency has done much over the years in stemming proliferation by effectively fulfilling its role of gathering

information about compliance or non-compliance by states. Considerable improvements have been made regarding its comprehensive safeguards and verification systems in the NPT context, while the Additional Protocol and its stricter standards are being more widely accepted.

We recognize the need to plug the loopholes in the Treaty through the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and mechanisms to ensure non-diversion of nuclear materials and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. In this context, my delegation supports the proposal by the IAEA for the creation of multilateral or international facilities which along with its broader rights of inspection over all countries will enhance transparency in export controls decision-making and thereby ensure the exercise of the inalienable right of all states to unimpeded and assured access to nuclear technology.

The IAEA's technical assistance programs for the developing countries contribute in important ways to combating poverty, improving health, developing agriculture, protecting the environment and optimizing the industrial processes. Yet, these activities have been curtailed due to lack of sufficient funds.

For a number of years, we have witnessed a chronic imbalance between resources allocated for safeguards and technical assistance. We stress the importance of augmenting the resources of the IAEA for these activities on a predictable basis to meet the objectives mandated by Article IV while ensuring their relevance to the changing circumstances and needs of its recipients.

It is also vital to finally overcome the deadlock that has for so long stymied the negotiating responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament which led to a corresponding decline in the integrity of the NPT. Its side-lining has undermined sustained and coordinated efforts of the international community to deal with nuclear and related issues. We believe that renewed commitment to its role as the single negotiating body on disarmament issues has become imperative.

Mr. President,

Bearing in mind of the triangular linkage of the three pillars, we believe that a thorough review of the Treaty's functioning over the past decade calls attention to the numerous challenges facing the non-proliferation regime that threaten its integrity and authority.

At this Review Conference, we should reaffirm and revitalize the Treaty as a linchpin for the non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for nuclear disarmament. Our aim should be to achieve compliance with the norms, rules and commitments by all States Parties. The non-proliferation regime must be adapted to changed conditions by making its fundamental bargain meaningfully enforceable and irreversible. At the heart of this process must be the sacrosanct principles of balance between obligations and reciprocity, accountability and non-discrimination rather than a small group of powerful nations being the sole beneficiaries of the non-proliferation regime.

The proliferation challenges can not be wished away and calls for a much deeper understanding and appreciation of the vital interests and motives that drive some states to seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons. As states deal with their own security dilemmas posed by the global reach of these weapons, they are unlikely to surrender their military options if they are deemed antithetical to their national interests. These concerns can not be dealt with by any State or group of states but only in concert with the global community which can define and decide on the most effective strategies. Without such broad international support, the pursuit of unilateral policies will be doomed to failure.

The fairness of non-proliferation must be self-evident if the majority of countries were to support its implementation. This objective is the obverse side of nuclear disarmament and remains indivisible. It is unrealistic and unsustainable for the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States to indefinitely renounce nuclear weapons in the absence of verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament. Hence, adhering to both ends of this central bargain is vital for the survival of the NPT. In this regard, the 13 practical steps agreed in 2000 represent a blue-print and an action program for the disarmament process. Its implementation in accordance with a time-frame, and what could be achieved by the year 2010 will be critical.

It would be patently unfair to demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States to comply with their obligations while the nuclear-weapon States have failed to live up to their commitments. While non-proliferation objectives are backed by stringent enforcement and verification measures, so should the Treaty's disarmament commitments. A failure to deal with this issue through the creation of appropriate mechanisms runs the risk of NPT becoming irrelevant.

Mr. President,

One can not overestimate the importance of successful results of this Conference. It can provide a new and a decisive momentum with a view to achieving forward-looking policies by all States Parties who will have to work constructively to regain confidence in the Treaty. It will be an unprecedented opportunity to render Treaty's obligations and commitments in a multilateral setting credible as we hopefully begin a new phase in the history of the NPT.

Since becoming a party to the NPT, Indonesia has shown its commitment both to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and has been in the forefront of concerted international efforts for non-proliferation in all its aspects. We will continue to work with other States Parties and make our contributions to place the non-proliferation regime on a more secure basis. It is only through collective endeavors based on cooperation and compromise that we can create a stable international security environment for all of humanity.

I thank you, Mr. President.