

Innovative Finance for Agricultural R&D

William A. Masters

Professor of Agricultural Economics
Purdue University


wmasters@purdue.edu

www.agecon.purdue.edu/staff/masters

www.agecon.purdue.edu/prizes

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
The problem: Regions vary greatly in ag technology



Source: calculated from FAO data, at <http://faostat.fao.org>.

There are diminishing returns to inputs, e.g. simply adding more fertilizer


Total fertilizer use, N+P+K (kg/ha of arable land)



Source: calculated from FAO data, at <http://faostat.fao.org>.

Sustaining growth requires new technologies, e.g. new varieties

Adoption of new varieties (pct. of cropped area)



Source: Calculated from data in R.E. Evenson and D. Gollin (2003), *Crop Variety Improvement and its Effect on Productivity*. Wallingford: CABI.

New technologies often involve multiple innovations

Genetic improvement



(by researchers, using controlled trials)

Agronomic improvement



(by farmers, using land & labor)

Successful innovations are often surprising

traditional
“flat” planting



labor-intensive
“Zai” microcatchments



For these fields, the workers are:

New finance mechanisms can help

- Agricultural R&D has distinctive characteristics
 - value creation is dispersed among the poor, even with IPRs
 - ...so private investment is limited by value capture
 - research success is difficult to monitor and predict
 - ...so public investment is limited to trusted institutions
- The traditional remedy is a third-party “prize”
 - paid by a public or philanthropic donor
 - to reward success after it is observed

Only a few kinds of technology and R&D are best funded with ex-post, third party prizes

Value capture is feasible:
users can be made to
pay, perhaps with IPRs

Value capture is costly:
benefits spill over to
consumers or imitators

Funders can
observe quality
of RD&D before
results are known

**Funders cannot
observe quality
of RD&D until
results are visible**

*Direct funding
by private firms
(principals, employees,
or research contracts)*

*Direct funding
by government or
philanthropic donors
(public labs, contracts
and competitive grants)*

*Research contests
by private firms
(e.g. Innocentive,
NineSigma)*

***Prize contests
funded by public or
philanthropic donors
(e.g. X Prizes, AMCs)***

**Payment
is ex-ante**



**Payment
is ex-post**


**Funding
is private**



**Funding is public
or philanthropic**

Prizes are an old financing mechanism


A visual history of major prizes, 1700-1930



Prizes are increasingly widespread

A visual history of major prizes, 1930-2007

Net present value
of prizes paid
(2006 US dollars,
not to scale)




Prizes are an increasingly popular but problematic financing mechanism

- Successful prizes are inherently temporary
 - by revealing what works best, they attract other investment in successful strategies:
 - private investment when innovation is marketable
 - public grants and contracts when it is a public service
- The prize contest itself can be very wasteful
 - fixed awards give nothing for *incremental* achievements
 - prespecified criteria give nothing for *other* achievements

A new type of prize can help

- Kremer (2001) pioneered a new economics of prizes
 - payment is an “advance market commitment” (AMC) for a vaccine, so award is proportional to number of doses sold
 - donor defines effectiveness criteria and price per dose
- But agricultural technology is not like medicine
 - more difficult because don’t have “one disease, one cure”
 - instead, we have many localized problems & solutions
 - easier because the value of improvement is measurable
 - product is sold at observable prices
 - gains are measurable using experiments and surveys
- For agriculture, we need royalty-like “prize rewards”
 - donors would pay a lump sum, divided among winners in proportion to value of gains from their innovations

“Prize rewards” could be paid for *any* technology whose gains can be measured



How prize rewards would work to accelerate innovation

- Donors offer a fixed sum (e.g. \$10 m./year), to be divided among all successful new technologies
- Innovators assemble data on their technologies
 - controlled experiments for output/input change
 - farm surveys for extent of adoption
 - input and output prices
- Secretariat audits the data and computes awards
- Donors disburse payments to the winning portfolio of techniques, in proportion to each one's impact
- Investors, innovators and adopters use prize information to scale up spread of winning techniques

Implementing Prizes: *Schematic overview*

Step 1:
donors specify
lines of credit for
target domains
(e.g. \$1 m. for food crops)

Step 2:
innovators submit
data on gains from new
techniques after adoption
(e.g. \$36 m. over 7 submissions)

Prizes would be a small
fraction of total activity,
but a key market-like
signal of value

Impact:
other donors, investors
and innovators
imitate successes

Step 3:
secretariat verifies
data and computes
reward payments
(e.g. $1/36^{\text{th}}$ of measured gains)

Prize rewards can stimulate any kind of innovation whose value is measurable




improved fish-drying
in Senegal



using hermetic bags
to store crops

Implementing Prizes: *Data requirements*

Data needed to compute each year's economic gain from technology adoption



Variables and data sources

Market data

P, Q National ag. stats.

Field data

J Yield change \times adoption rate

I Input change per unit

Economic parameters


K Supply elasticity (=1 to omit)

ΔQ Demand elasticity (=0 to omit)

Implementing Prizes:


Data requirements

**Data needed to estimate
adoption rates across years**



Implementing Prizes: *Data requirements*

Computation of cumulative economic gains



Implementing Prizes:

An example using case study data

Example technology	Measured Social Gains (NPV in US\$)	Measured Social Gains (Pct. of total)	Reward Payment (US\$)
1. Cotton in Senegal	14,109,528	39.2%	392,087
2. Cotton in Chad	6,676,421	18.6%	185,530
3. Rice in Sierra Leone	6,564,255	18.2%	182,413
4. Rice in Guinea Bissau	4,399,644	12.2%	122,261
5. “Zai” in Burkina Faso	2,695,489	7.5%	74,904
6. Cowpea storage in Benin	1,308,558	3.6%	36,363
7. Fish processing in Senegal	231,810	0.6%	6,442
Total	\$35.99 m.	100%	\$1 m.

Note: With payment of \$1 m. for measured gains of about \$36 m., the implied royalty rate is approximately $1/36 = 2.78\%$ of measured gains.

Implementing prize rewards: *What's done, what's next*

- Refinement and endorsement of the initiative
 - 3 journal articles, 20 seminar meetings since 2003
 - 9-member Advisory Board formed October 2004
 - FARA as potential Africa secretariat since Sept. 2005
- Funding for project development
 - Adelson Family Foundation (New York), 2004-06
 - IFPRI (Washington and Addis Ababa), 2006-08
- Funding for prize rewards
 - significant interest from various donors
 - could be funded through FARA or other secretariats

For more information...

wmasters@purdue.edu

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www.fara-africa.org