

Creating an Inclusive Society: Evidence from Social Indicators and Trends

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Abstract: In recent years, there has been a proliferation of attempts to account for the role of social factors within broader processes of economic and human development. Among the most important of these is social inclusion, understood as the removal of barriers to the participation of minorities in economic and political institutions. In order to analyse latent barriers to the inclusion of vulnerable minority groups, this paper examines trends in discrimination across the world over the past three decades, using data from comparative public opinion surveys. Using data from comparative social surveys such as the World Values Survey and the Global Barometer surveys, the article examines change across generations and over time in scores of societies around the world, and presents cross-national and longitudinal evidence from an unprecedentedly broad range of countries. Taking four categories of social minority – ethnic minorities, immigrants, lifestyle minorities and the aged – it examines regional and longitudinal variation in ethnic inclusion, and the reasons for the observed changes. While social inclusion has increased in some areas, and in particular in regards to lifestyle tolerance, this paper shows that there is widespread discrimination against migrants and ethnic minorities, in response to tensions arising from international migration and the increasing salience of religious tensions, and persistent discrimination against the elderly in many countries and regions.

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Introduction

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of attempts to account for the role of ‘social’ factors within broader processes of economic and human development. Whether couched in the language of social capital, institutions, or culture, economists, sociologists and political scientists have made strenuous attempts to quantify the presence of certain informal norms and practices, or institutions, and demonstrate their impact upon the development process (Putnam 1993, Knack and Keefer 1997, Helliwell 2001). Within this debate, the term ‘social development’ consolidates a relevant domain of social institutions under a rubric applicable for professionals in the development community, and to go beyond the sometimes limited ‘operational’ definition of human development in terms of health and education (Foa 2011, Fukuda-Parr 2005). Social development is therefore understood as the enabling environment of non-state institutions that make possible the fullest usage of one’s skills and assets, such as the strength of civil society, local community life, norms of non-discrimination against women and minorities, and absence of criminal violence (Foa 2011). A wide range of studies have shown the importance of social institutions for development outcomes such as economic growth, local service provision, and political stability (Knack and Keefer 1997, Putnam et al. 1993, Gurr 1993).

An important aspect of social development is social inclusion, which can be understood as non-discrimination against minority groups such as indigenous peoples, lower castes, immigrants, ethnic minorities, the elderly, sexual minorities, non-conventional households (e.g. single parent families), or the disabled (Silver 2007). A focus on social inclusion is essential for development, as many areas of the developing world contain substantial minority groups that face persistent

discrimination and marginalisation. In Latin America, for example, indigenous peoples constitute between 10 and 40 per cent of the population, according to classification; in the countries of central and south-Eastern Europe, as many as one in 10 belong to the Roma community; in many parts of South and Southeast Asia there are vulnerable minority groups, including lower castes and indigenous peoples. In addition, there are substantial non-ascriptive minorities in many parts of the world, who also face persistent discrimination: in sub-Saharan Africa, sufferers of HIV-AIDS are liable to mistreatment and exclusion, as are men who have sex with men (MSM); migrant and refugee populations are likewise subject to formal and informal harassment by police, local officials, and the receiving population.

Wherever minority groups find themselves excluded from the opportunities and benefits that are enjoyed by others in their society, this is social exclusion, whereas social inclusion exists when all citizens are able to engage in social, political and economic activities, regardless of ethnicity, class or caste. Social exclusion is not an all or nothing process, but a series of mutually reinforcing barriers such that once individuals become excluded from one aspect of social existence, other avenues also close: leaving the individual without the means to re-enter mainstream social and economic life. For example, inability to obtain employment or credit may lead to difficulties in obtaining housing, and this in turn serves as an extreme barrier to future attempts at obtaining either gainful employment or access to public services. Likewise, long term unemployment can lead to loss of income and well-being, which reduces participation in the very social networks and civic associations which for many excluded individuals are the main entry point into a new career. The consequence of social exclusion is often termed the poverty 'trap', that is, a situation whereby lack of skills and opportunities leave individuals stuck in a way of

life from which they are unable to escape. Such a trap is a reality for many people in less-developed countries today, and implicit and explicit discrimination against minority groups is a widespread cause.

Just as the opposite of social exclusion is social inclusion, the inverse of discrimination, meanwhile, is tolerance. In contrast to discrimination, tolerance can be defined as the willingness to accept ethnic, religious, and other forms of diversity, and to treat individuals equally across such group-defined boundaries. This paper therefore seeks to shed new light on patterns of social exclusion by examining variation in patterns of tolerance and discrimination between regions, countries, and over time. In doing so, it examines tolerance on a wider cross-national and longitudinal basis than ever before, using evidence from successive waves of the World Values Surveys and European Values Study, with representative national samples of the publics of over ninety societies throughout the world, covering a period of over thirty years.

DATA, VARIABLES, METHODS

As norms of discrimination are inherently subjective, the comparative study of such norms has traditionally been limited by the lack of available comparative data. However, in the past several decades, the growth of new international survey projects has enabled compilation of cross-country comparative social indicators, covering dimensions of social life such as discrimination, tolerance, trust, and subjective wellbeing, that can assist also in measuring levels of social inclusion across the world. The World Values Survey (WVS), for example, is a global research project that since 1981, has conducted representative national surveys in almost 100 countries,

representing 90 per cent of the world population. Areas covered by WVS items include tolerance of foreigners and ethnic minorities, support for gender equality, the role of religion and changing levels of religiosity, attitudes toward the environment, work, family, politics, national identity, culture, diversity, insecurity, and subjective well-being. The survey has been carried out in six waves, the first in 1981-4, and subsequent waves in 1989-1993, 1995-7, 2000-4, 2006-8, and 2010-14. Surveys included in the World Values Surveys are stratified random samples, in that the sample must be demographically representative by criteria such as age, gender, region, and language, and survey validation is conducted by the WVS Archive in Madrid². Sampling typically in a range of 1,000-1,500 respondents per country, but with larger samples (up to 5,000 respondents) for countries such as China, India, Russia and Germany, so as to enable within-country comparative analysis.

In addition to the WVS, the various survey projects of the Global Barometer series can provide additional items of interest for particular regions, in the analysis of patterns of social exclusion. The Afrobarometer, for example, is a research project that measures public attitudes on economic, political, and social matters in sub-Saharan Africa. It is an independent, non-partisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys have been conducted in more than 30 African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. The first wave of the surveys was conducted in 12 countries from 1999-2001, and successive waves have been completed in 2002-4, 2005-6, 2008-9, 2011-13, and 2014-5. Surveys are stratified samples that seek to attain a demographically representative sample in each

² While it is rare, surveys submitted by country teams for inclusion in the dataset have been rejected by the central WVS Archive when quality-control criteria are not sufficiently met.

country, and typically count 1200 respondents, though can be larger (2400) in some cases. In addition to the Afrobarometer, the Latinobarometer is a survey run by Latinobarómetro, a private non-profit organization, based in Providencia, Chile. It is an annual public opinion survey that involves some 19,000 interviews in 18 Latin American countries, representing more than 400 million people. Latinobarometer was initiated in 1995 and has since been carried out annually in 18 countries. Surveys are stratified random samples of 1000-1200 respondents.

This paper makes use of the latest rounds of comparative international survey data to provide analysis of trends in social exclusion across the world. It does so by considering four major categories of social exclusion – discrimination against migrants, discrimination against ethnic minorities, discrimination against lifestyle minorities, and discrimination against age minorities.


1. Migrant Minorities

Worldwide, the number of migrants has risen from 154 million in the early 1990s to 232 million today - equivalent to 3.25 per cent of the global population, or 1 in 30 people across the world (United Nations Population Division, 2015). However, as migrants move from their home to their host country, they face a wide range of social barriers and obstacles to integration. Legal barriers to integration, the result of restrictions on citizenship and work authorization, frequently lead to problems of labour market exploitation and human trafficking. In addition, the increase in international migration over the second half of the twentieth century has also been accompanied by increasing social tensions and societal resistance to inclusion of migrants, with anti-immigrant

mobilisation and social unrest affecting not only developed countries in Western Europe and North America, but also many developing nations such as South Africa or Hungary.


These trends are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, which shows the levels of outgroup discrimination against migrants, as reflected in the percentage of respondents who state that they would object to having 'immigrants or foreign workers' as a 'neighbour', for both developing and developed regions of the world.

Figure 1. Objection to Neighbour: 'Migrant or Foreign Worker' – Select Developing Regions



Notes: World Values Surveys, waves 2-6 (1990-2014). Country average, by region, of the percentage of all respondents who flag 'migrants or foreign workers' as a group that they would object to having as a neighbour.

Figure 2. Objection to Neighbour: 'Migrant or Foreign Worker' – Developed Regions



Notes: World Values Surveys, waves 1-6 (1981-2014). Country average, by region, of the percentage of all respondents who flag 'migrants or foreign workers' as a group that they would object to having as a neighbour.

Since the 1990s, negative sentiment towards migrants has been rising in many countries and regions, both in developed and developing countries. Steady and small increases can be seen in western countries (Australasia, North America, and Western Europe) and larger increases in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Western Asia, and South Asia. These increases are substantively


large: in Australasia, rejection of immigrants has risen from 5.6 to 7.6 per cent of respondents, and in North America, from 7 to 9.1 per cent of respondents. Eastern Europe has seen the largest increase, from 13.6 per cent of respondents in 1990-2, to 26.3 per cent of respondents in the most recent wave of surveys – a doubling of anti-immigrant sentiment in the space of one generation.

The rise in anti-immigrant tensions runs against a significant body of social research since the 1950s which had argued that the growth of transnationalism – the increasing frequency of cross-border travel, migration flows, contact with foreign cultures via multiculturalism and access to foreign media – would lead to rising tolerance and trust of foreigners and *inter alia* international migrants (Barkan 2003). In particular, Deutsch and colleagues (1957) had argued that because existing (national) communities were held together by a high degree of cohesion generated by social, political and economic transactions on the elite and mass levels, institutionalising increased cross-border transactions in the form of transnational communication and networks among their members would lead to a form of post-national identity (Deutsch et al. 1957; Deutsch 1969). Transactions which embrace multiple aspects of life, such as flow of capital and labour, scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, and inter-marriage, which are consistent and thus predictable over a long-term perspective, and accompanied by compatible values in terms of common decision-making, would be most likely to produce this effect (Deutsch 1969: 102 ff.).

Not only do migrants face the prospect of discrimination by society as a whole, including in their neighbourhoods, the workplace, and among social contacts, but also in many countries and regions migrants face systematic institutional discrimination by the police, courts, and local government. Evidence of such discrimination can be gauged by considering the gap in

confidence in public institutions between survey respondents who are first-generation migrants, and those who are non-migrants. As one of the forms of institutionalised harassment that migrants are most likely to experience is in their interaction with the police, Figure 3 therefore shows the confidence gap between migrants and native residents, by region, in the police forces.

Figure 3. Percentage of Respondents with “Very Little” or “None at All” Confidence in the Police, Migrants and Non-Migrants Compared



Notes: World Values Surveys, wave 6 (2010-2014). Lack of confidence in the police, separated by respondents who report that they are migrants to the country, and those who are non-migrants in the country surveyed.


In most world regions – Northern America, Latin America, South Asia, East Asia, and South-Eastern Asia – migrants report lower confidence in the police. In some regions, notably in South

and East Asia, these differences are substantively large: only half as many respondents in South Asia have confidence in the police among migrants than among the rest of the population, for example, while in East Asia there is a 9 percentage-point gap.

Understanding rising anti-immigrant sentiment

If transactional theories are invalidated by the stable or declining levels of migrant tolerance that have accompanied increases in international migration, how then can we account for this trend? There are several possible hypotheses. Migration scholars often cite the recent rise in migration as a cause of outgroup rejection (e.g. Jandl, 1994). However we need to understand why and in what circumstances migration is identified as a threat. One contender is that the nature of migrant flows have changed; with the falling cost of long distance travel, international migrants may be more ‘culturally distant’ than earlier migration flows (Baker et al. 2009); moreover, this has occurred against a recent backdrop of rising tensions over religious issues, both in western societies and a number of developing countries, notably in East and South Asia (Huntington 1996). This ‘clash of civilizations’ background is also suggested by expert-assessment ratings such as the religious tensions rating published annual by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which since 1995 have shown a steady deterioration across the world, in particular in Asia and across western countries (Figure 4).

Figure 4. International Country Risk Guide Rating: Change in Religious Tensions, 1995-2010 (Base=1995, Negative = Deterioration)




Stable or falling levels of tolerance against migrants would appear to be the result of contingent factors, rather than indicative of a longer term association. Historical studies have shown that during times of migration, an initial period of outgroup rejection is followed by the reconstitution of a new identity incorporating the migrant group (Putnam 2007). And sociological studies have shown that second generation migrants tend to have values that accommodate between those of the host society and those of their origination culture (Baker et al. 2009). These findings imply that the tensions arising from recent migration flows may only be temporary, and eventually

subside once countries develop civic rather than ethnic conceptions of identity, and migrants adapt to the values of their host societies.

Further, it deserves to be mentioned that the cross-sectional relationship between migration flows and tolerance is significant and positive. Such a positive initial relationship between outgroup tolerance and migration flows would be expected, due to the fact that migrants are more likely to go to countries which are more tolerant, both because of associated attributes (average wages, work availability) and as these countries are likely to offer a more advantageous regulatory environment for gaining asylum, work authorisation, and eventual citizenship. It is true that the causal effect of increasing migration, as indicated by the longitudinal trend, appears to be towards a reduction in this initial tolerance level: and this appears consistent with the observation of political trends in countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, which began with liberal migration regimes and a large initial migration inflow, followed by the sharp growth of anti-migrant politics. In addition, though public opinion has turned against immigration in many OECD countries since the 1990s - with a majority in most cases stating that they would either like to 'ban people from coming here' or have a 'strict' immigration regime that would limit newcomers even when jobs are available - this has had little effect in limiting subsequent migration flows, as shown in Figure 5. This mismatch between public preferences and public policy may also explain the rising tide of anti-foreigner sentiment in such countries.

Figure 5. Initial Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, and Subsequent Migration Flows



Notes: World Values Surveys, wave 3-4 (1995-2000).


2. Ethnic Minorities and Indigenous Peoples

All countries contain ethnic minorities, defined by the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as a group of people within a national state who are: numerically smaller than the rest of population; not in a dominant position; having a culture, language, religion, or race that is distinct from that of the majority; whose members have a will to preserve their specificity; are citizens of the state; and have a long-term presence there. Ethnic minorities can be separated into different categories, depending on how minority status was acquired – some

minorities are the descendants of migrants, others the descendants of groups brought to a country by coercive means, and other minorities are indigenous peoples, who became minorities as a result of settlement and colonisation of their native territories. What all ethnic minorities share are typically identifiable physiological features that make them potential victims of group-based discrimination, and a disadvantaged socioeconomic status that makes such discrimination not only possible but also likely in a range of social, economic, and institutional settings.


It is possible to get a basic measure of conscious ethnic discrimination by considering the proportion of society stating that they would object to having people of a different 'race', 'ethnicity' or 'caste' as a 'neighbour'; this item has been asked consistently as part of the World Values Surveys since the founding of the survey in 1981. These trends are shown for major regions of the world in Figures 6 and 7.

Figure 6. Rejection of Neighbour as Other Race, Ethnicity or Caste – Developing Regions



Notes: World Values Surveys, waves 2-6 (1990-2014). Country average, by region, of the percentage of all respondents who flag 'other race, ethnicity or caste' as a group that they would object to having as a neighbour.

Figure 7. Rejection of Neighbour as Other Race, Ethnicity or Caste – Developed Regions



Notes: World Values Surveys, waves 1-6 (1981-2014). Country average, by region, of the percentage of all respondents who flag 'other race, ethnicity or caste' as a group that they would object to having as a neighbour.


Since the 1990s, one of the most striking trends is that while tolerance of ethnic minorities has been rising in most developed country regions, including Australasia, Western Europe, and the United States, discriminatory attitudes have in fact been rising in most of the developing world, including Eastern Europe, South Asia, and Western Asia. Among developing regions, only in Africa and Latin America have social norms regarding ethnic minorities improved since the 1990s.

Subjective perceptions of racism

As well as looking at overt expression of discriminatory attitudes by survey respondents, another way of comparing levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities is by considering the judgments of ethnic minorities themselves in different countries around the world. By applying the standard criteria above, respondents in the World Values Survey were classified for each country into 'ethnic minorities' or members of the 'majority population'; this would include for example (*inter alia*) Hispanics, Blacks, and Asian-Americans in the United States, or indigenous peoples and Blacks in many countries of Latin America.

A simple metric of discrimination is to consider the proportion of respondents who are aware of racist behaviour in their area; taking only the sample of respondents who are themselves from ethnic minority groups, we can derive a measure of perceived prevalence of discriminatory behaviour, by region. This is shown below in Figure 8.

Figure 8. “Racist Behaviour” Occurs “Frequently” or “Very Frequently” in the Neighbourhood




Notes: World Values Surveys, wave 6 (2010-2014). Proportion of ethnic minority respondents in each region who report that 'racist behaviour' occurs 'frequently' or 'very frequently' in their neighbourhood.

Perceptions of having witnessed racist behaviour are greatest among ethnic minorities living in Africa, where on average 30 per cent of respondents state that such behaviour occurs frequently or very frequently in their area. The Middle East (Western Asia), Western Europe, and the United States and Canada (Northern America) are next, whereas perceptions of racism are lowest among minorities living in East and Southeast Asia.

A further metric of subjective exclusion among ethnic minorities is the extent to which the national identity of the country in which they live is inclusive. Some countries have 'thick' conceptions of nationality based on ethnicity or descent, whereas others have 'thin' conceptions

based on values, culture, or law; that are capable of encompassing different groups (Putnam 2007, Kymlicka 2001). By looking at subjective perceptions of national belonging among ethnic minority versus non-minority populations, we can therefore gain a sense of the degree to which national identities are inclusive in different countries and regions of the world. This is shown in Figure 9, which compares ethnic minority and non-minority groups with respect to whether they report being 'proud' to be a member of their country ('How proud are you to be [nationality]').

Figure 9. Proud to be Nationality, Ethnic Minorities and Non-Minorities Compared




Notes: World Values Surveys, waves 1-6 (1981-2014). Proportion of respondents stating that they feel 'proud' to be from their nation, ethnic minority and non-minority respondents by region, compared.

In every region of the world, ethnic minorities are excluded from a sense of national identity; there is no region in which national identification is equal among minority and non-minority groups. However, these gaps are particularly large in some regions, in particular in South Asia and in Eastern Europe, where the gap between minority and non-minority populations reaches between 18.5 percentage points (South Asia) and 20.3 percentage points (Eastern Europe).

Such identity exclusion also reflects very real exclusion from public services and institutions, encompassing discrimination by service providers and officials in a variety of contexts; of these, perhaps the most obvious is the discrimination that ethnic minorities in many countries face in the context of treatment by the police and the judiciary. This can be seen from the data in Figure 10, which shows the gap in trust between ethnic minorities and the general population in trust in the police.

Figure 10. Percentage of Respondents with “Very Little” or “None at All” Confidence in the Police, Ethnic Minority and Non-Minority Groups Compared




Notes: World Values Surveys, wave 6 (2010-2014). Country average, by region, of the percentage of all respondents who flag 'other race, ethnicity or caste' as a group that they would object to having as a neighbour.

The data presented in Figure 10 shows that in almost every region, ethnic minorities feel significantly lower confidence in the police. This gap is largest in North America (where there is a 24-percentage point gap between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority population), and also large in the Middle East (where there is a 14-percentage point gap); though, by contrast, the gap is relatively lower in Europe, Latin America, and in Africa.

Just as ethnic minorities have lower confidence in the police, they are more likely to be crime victims; a fact that may result from the institutional underprovision of law and order services in

many minority areas. This can be seen from Figure 11, which compares rates of crime victimisation for minority and non-minority groups in regions around the world.

Figure 11. Victim of Crime, Ethnic Minorities and Non-Minorities Compared



Notes: World Values Surveys, waves 1-6 (1981-2014). Proportion of respondents stating that they or a member of their household has been a victim of crime in the last year.

In North America, members of ethnic minority groups are substantially more likely to be victims of crime, with 38.6 per cent reporting recent crime victimisation, against just 29.8 per cent in the non-minority population. A similarly large gap exists in Africa (56.7 per cent among ethnic minorities, against 44.8 per cent against non-minority groups) and also in South-East Asia (25.6 per cent among minorities, against 18.6 per cent among non-minorities). Only in select regions, however, does the inverse relation hold (for example in Latin America, where rates of crime


victimisation are 10 percentage points higher among whites than among blacks, indigenous peoples, mulattoes and mestizos).

3. Lifestyle Minorities

'Lifestyle' minorities individuals who face the prospect of discrimination as a result of choices regarding their preferred way of life, despite that these choices are unlikely to have any direct negative affect on the lives of others. Sexual minorities are the major category of lifestyle minority, though the term also extends to cover those who engage in other lifestyles that risk moral censure by others, including single parenting, cohabitation without marriage, or the use of alcohol and other legal recreational drugs.


In order to assess the degree to which lifestyle minorities are excluded from society, this paper constructs a simple measure of lifestyle tolerance, which takes the percentage of survey respondents who object to having neighbours who correspond to three forms of lifestyle minority, namely those who are 'homosexual', 'unmarried couples', or 'heavy drinkers'. The lowest lifestyle tolerance scores are found in Jordan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Saudi Arabia. The highest scores are found in Scandinavia (Denmark, Sweden and Norway) Argentina, Spain and Luxembourg. Regional averages are displayed below in Figure 12, while changes over time are shown in Figure 13.

Figure 12. Lifestyle Tolerance across the World



Source: World Values Surveys (1981-2014).

Figure 13. Rising Lifestyle Tolerance, 1990-2010



Source: World Values Surveys (1981-2012). Earliest to latest survey for all societies with a span of at least 10 years between 1981 and 2014.

With lifestyle tolerance, we find an overwhelming trend toward rising tolerance. The average change across forty societies is 4 percentage points; that is, on average, 4 per cent fewer respondents say they would reject having neighbours who are homosexual, unmarried couples, or are heavy drinkers. Societies with significant positive changes (of at least 2 percentage points) outnumber those with significant negative changes by 25 to 5. A particularly large change is noticed in South Asia: this is entirely due a large shift in the India survey results, which in the first survey of 1990 has almost universal rejection of social minorities. In more recent surveys, the level of rejection is still high by international comparison, but no longer universal, as

reflected in this large percentage point shift. Thus while the biggest negative change is -16 percentage points (France), the largest positive change is +45 (India). In addition to a rising trend among many Western European nations, the largest increases are found in developing societies with highly socially conservative baselines.

Why has tolerance of alternative lifestyles been rising? A substantial psychological and sociological literature supports the contention that existential security and tolerance are linked. Tolerance means accepting that people differ in their views - and that they should be free to express them, regardless of sex, race, age, class, religion, nationality or other distinctions (Stouffer 1954; Jackman 1978). Almond and Verba (1963) found that tolerance is linked with “civic” orientations such as trust, empathy, and solidarity, which numerous studies have linked intolerance to anti-civic orientations such as authoritarianism, dogmatism, and group hostility (Lipset 1960; Golebiowska 1995; Bobo 1999; Eatwell 2004). Meanwhile, Lasswell’s (1951) theory of the democratic character argues that a tolerant attitude towards human diversity emerges when people grow up under freedom from anxiety because then diversity is perceived as an opportunity rather than a threat; while Adorno et al.’s (1953) theory of the authoritarian personality claims that dogmatism, rigidity, and intolerance become prevalent when people grow up under existential pressures. Similarly, Rokeach’s (1963) theory of the closed-vs.-open mind argues that existential threats make people insecure, paranoid, and intolerant; absence of threats makes them more tolerant. The theory of regulatory focus (Higgins, Foerster et al. 1998) applies this logic to situational changes: exposing people to a threat, makes them adopt a prevention focus in which they are less open to experimentation; but when confronted with opportunities to gain something, people adopt a promotion focus that is more open to experimentation.

A similar principle underlies Maslow's (1983 [1954]) need hierarchy: once basic physiological and social needs are satisfied, the drive for self-actualization gains momentum; people give higher priority to freedom and become more tolerant of diversity. Inglehart (1977; 2008) bases his theory of postmaterialism on a need hierarchy, demonstrating a generational shift towards postmaterialist orientations among birth cohorts whose members grew up under much more secure conditions than their elders. Postmaterialist orientations go together with tolerance of outgroups and different life styles in a broader set of 'self-expression values' (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) or 'emancipative values' (Welzel 2013).

4. Age Minorities


A further category of minority group are age minorities. For example the elderly, while traditionally influential, have in the modern age usually been reduced to the minority role of economically 'non-active' groups, and this has given rise to growing interest in the prevalence of 'ageism', or discrimination against the aged. Many of the concerns around discrimination against the elderly also overlap with concerns regarding discrimination based on related criteria, such as dementia and mental health, dependent status, and disability. In addition to discrimination against the elderly, youth also face discrimination in many areas of society, including access to jobs, credit or housing.

Items from the sixth (2010-2014) wave of the World Values Surveys directly address the subject of age discrimination, by asking respondents to rate how acceptable they would find it to have a

boss who was either very young (age 30) or old (age 70), to rate the social position accorded to people in their youth (20s), and a series of items on respect accorded to the elderly in society. By taking these items, this section assesses variation in age discrimination across the world.

Figure 14, for example, juxtaposes two items concerning the respect given to both youth and to elderly populations in society: a subjective assessment on whether people over 70 are viewed with respect in society, and an assessment of the social status of those in their 20s. By contrasting the relative status accorded to different age groups, we can assess the degree of age-related discrimination in a society and the groups that are excluded by these norms.

Figure 14. Relative Respect and Social Position for People over 70 and Those in Their 20s



Notes: World Values Surveys, wave 6 (2010-2014). Proportion of respondents stating 6-10 in response to the items (1) Rate the social position of people in their 20s, and (2) whether people over the age of 70 are viewed with respect.

The positioning of regions in Figure 14 allows us to cluster countries into 3 quadrants, depending on the relative status accorded to elderly and youth cohorts in society.


1. *Middle-Age bias*: In North America, Western Europe, Australasia, and East Asia, respondents state that the social position of people in their 20s is relatively low, but at the same time, that people over 70 are viewed with little respect; this implies that ageism exists both with respect to youth and to the aged.

2. *Seniority bias*: In the former communist countries of Central Asia and Eastern Europe, the social position of people in their 20s is rated as low, but respondents state that those over the age of 70 are treated with respect; this implies a seniority bias.

3. *Low Ageism*: In Africa, Western Asia, and Latin America, the social position of people in their 20s is rated as high, though at the same time, people over 70 are also considered to be respected, at least by around half of respondents. Such a relatively high status/respect ratings for both younger and elderly populations implies relative absence of age discrimination, compared to other regions of the world.

Another means of approaching the subject of youth versus age bias is to compare responses to questions on willingness to countenance having a boss who is either particularly young (aged 30), or relatively old (aged 70). These items are displayed in Figure 15.

Figure 15. Willingness to Have a 70-Year Old Boss, Versus Willingness to Have a 30-Year Old Boss.



Notes: World Values Surveys, wave 6 (2010-2014). Proportion of respondents stating 6-10 in response to the items, how acceptable it is to (1) have a 70-year old boss, (2) have a 30-year old boss.

In Latin America, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, respondents are equally willing to countenance having a younger or an older boss; in these regions, age-related discrimination (at least as regards work seniority) is relatively low. However, age-related discrimination exists in Eastern Europe, South Asia, North America and Western Asia; either because of unwillingness to accept an older boss – a feature of the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe – or because of a clear

preference for age seniority in the management role (reported in South Asia, North America and Western Asia).

CONCLUSION

At the heart of the concept of social development is social inclusion, understood as non-discrimination against minority groups such as indigenous peoples, caste minorities, immigrants, ethnic minorities, religious groups, the young and the old, sexual minorities, non-conventional households (e.g. single parent families), and the disabled (Silver 2007). This article has examined data on trends in social inclusion across a range of categories, including ethnic minorities, migrants, lifestyle minorities, and the elderly, in order to critically assess levels of social exclusion globally.

The data presented in this paper show that despite improvement in some areas, social exclusion remains widespread for many groups in the world today. Regarding one specific form of outgroup discrimination, for example – negative attitudes towards migrants and guest workers – this paper finds a substantial deterioration across many countries over the previous quarter century, while attitudes towards ethnic minority groups have deteriorated in many developing regions in the same time. Contrary to Deutsch's (1969) transactionalist theory, moreover, this trend has coincided with a substantial increase in global economic integration, and migration in particular. This paper also finds deep perceptions of discrimination by ethnic minorities in many regions, that are reflected by a sense of exclusion from national identities and by institutionalised discrimination from police and public institutions. Finally, the analysis here also shows that age

discrimination is widespread in many countries, with most people in developed countries, in particular, asserting that both young people and the elderly experience lower social status and respect than those closer to middle-age. While one form of discrimination – against lifestyle minorities – appears to have fallen in recent decades, other forms of discrimination remain persistent.

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