INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE – CURRENT AND FUTURE TRENDS

Paweł Kaczmarczyk and Marek Okólski

1 This article borrows heavily from Okólski 2004a, Okólski 2004b and Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2002. The view expressed in the paper do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the United Nations Secretariat.

2 Centre of Migration Research and Faculty of Economic Sciences, Warsaw University.
A. INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of 1990s countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)\textsuperscript{1} experience extraordinary shift from communist regime towards market economy and democratic state. An important part of these changes is transition in migratory behaviour. Prior to 1990 migration was severely limited in all countries of the region. After an initial and rather brief episode of rural-to-urban exodus in the 1950s, spatial mobility was moderate if not meagre. A leading form of the mobility was circulation, especially commuting to major industrial centres for work. International labour migration was principally contained within the CEE region, and tightly controlled by the governments. Only limited-scale settlement migration connected mainly with family reunion or “repatriation” of ethnic minorities and movements of workers (strictly controlled) were recorded.

Since the early 1990s the situation has been changing dramatically. The intensity of population movements increased, especially the intra-regional migration intensified. The region witnessed a huge increase in complexity of migration forms – from labour mobility through transit migration to forced migration of asylum seekers and refugees. In many countries of the region immigrants of different status appeared for the first time in the post-war history. Last but not least, there was a fundamental shift observed from the prevalence of long-term migration to short-term mobility, very often cyclical in nature.

The aim of the paper is to present current trends in migratory behaviour in CEE countries in the context of socio-economic transition and to analyze selected features of nowadays migration in this part of the world. The question will be raised whether CEE still constitute a coherent / uniform region in respect to mobility behaviors and if so, what are the distinct common features of recently observed migration. In the first part of the paper the current trends in migration flows in CEE will be presented and characterized shortly. The emphasis will be put on one striking feature of observed migratory behaviour: despite widely shared expectations expressed by many Western observers at the onset of transition, the bulk of those movements did not spill over the region’s boundaries, especially to the West, but to a large extent were contained within. In the second part the causal side of international mobility will be examined closely. Migration in the region will be seen as a consequence of “interplay” of three kinds of imbalances in particular countries or between countries: demographic, economic and political. In the next part three distinctive features of migration in the region will be analyzed extensively. Firstly, the question will be asked whether CEE should be viewed as a migration system or separate migration entity. Secondly, the issue of irregularity of migration will be discussed. Thirdly, we will discuss potential links between “underurbanization” in the communist time and current migratory behavior / migration types. In the final part, selected estimates of future migration in the CEE will be presented. Especially, an attempt will be made to examine the extent to which a view widely held in the West implying an enormous migratory pressure on Western countries by the population of CEE might come true.

B. MAJOR MIGRATION TRENDS

Before we turn to the analysis of current migratory flows to or from CEE it is necessary to discuss shortly the issue of migration data quality. Considering the quality of data on international migration some problems seem to be characteristic for all countries. The inconsistencies or incompleteness can be a result of different definitions applied, varying reporting mechanisms or other reasons. Just to give one example, according to the international recommendations as expressed by United Nations (UN, 1998) a long-term migrant is defined as a person who moves to a country (other than of his or her usual residence) for a period of at least 12 months. But, in some countries (e.g. the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Romania) the statistics refer to “permanent migrant” definition which seems to be hardly operationalized (Bijak and others, 2004). This example shows that problems with migration data and migration statistics are of relatively bigger importance in the case of CEE countries than in the countries with longer tradition not only with emigration but with immigration as well. As an illustration of
migration data problems, figures I and II were attached. Figure I presents migrant stocks as per cent of total population according to United Nations data. Figure II shows data on foreign population as per cent of total population according to OECD. In case of a few countries, mainly former Soviet Union countries, we observe an immense contrast between immigration data from different sources. In fact, migration statistics and analyses concerning CEECs seem to be currently overwhelmed with confused and often misleading concepts, definitions and data sources. One of the reasons is that the concepts have been inherited from the pre-transition period and reflect rather the reality of very limited and strictly controlled flows than migratory phenomena as observed during the transition period (Okólski, 2004a).

Bijak and others (2004) made an attempt to measure the quality and completeness of data on registered international migration. They examined two sides of the same process, namely the figures provided by the origin and destination countries and calculated two measures which can be treated as indicators of data validity: quality of immigration coverage (QIC), and quality of emigration coverage (QEC). The results show huge difference with regard to migration data quality. Except of countries of very wide coverage of migration data (Germany as perfect example) and countries with relatively good data coverage (countries of Western Europe, Southern Europe and the Czech Republic) there are countries with relatively poor data coverage. In the latter group most of the CEE countries are located. The worst situation refers to Romania (QIC=5%, QEC=3%), Poland (QIC=4%, QEC=16%), the Slovak Republic (QIC=4%, QEC=4%) and Hungary (QEC=5%).

In order to avoid mixing up of specific categories or types of flows Okólski (2004a) proposed seven types of flows which are of relatively importance for CEE countries:

1) Migration for settlement (ethnically motivated, for family reunification and other)
2) Labour migration
3) Other non-settlement migration (flows related to study, professional training, business)
4) Incomplete migration (see part C of this paper)
5) Flows of asylum seekers and refugees
6) Transit migration (including trafficking in human beings)
7) Non-migration mobility (tourism, transit of passengers etc.).

In the following part of the paper we will refer to above presented categories of flows. A statistics based picture of major migratory trends in selected CEE countries prior to and during the transition is presented in table 1. The countries analyzed have been classified according to the relative intensity of given type of movement. The data presented may serve as a point of departure for short overview of past and recent trends in international migration within CEE.

As it follows from table 1 the current migratory processes in the CEE differ significantly from those observed prior to 1990s. In the communist era migration in the region has been characterized by three important features. Firstly, majority of long-term population movements directed to the West. Secondly, only a few returns were recorded. Lastly, apart from the republics of Soviet Union, migration between CEE countries was negligible (Bijak and others, 2004). Doubtlessly, the most important role migration to the West has played. A range of factors of political nature (especially dissident activities) and economic (increasing feeling of the sheer improbability of reforms to the decrepit system, notorious shortages in the supply of basic goods and the dramatically rising value of the dollar due to not realistic economic mechanisms or hyperinflation that made foreign employment exceptionally profitable) were decisive in the formation of the migratory phenomena prior to 1989. Simultaneously, the western European (and North American) labour market easily absorbed migrants, even more so because most of them stood apart with their relatively high qualifications. Poland was usually described as a typical migrant sending country. Due to the peculiar conditions facing would-be migrants, departures from Poland had to fit in with the schema imposed by the regime (and thus such a high frequency of pseudo-tourist trips). On the other hand, the declaring political reasons for migration in destination countries allowed for easier
functioning within host countries. It is estimated that a total of over 4.2 million residents departed from Poland between 1971 and 1980. The total number of long-term emigrants from Poland in the 1980s is estimated to be between 1.1 and 1.3 million people (3 per cent of the population). The more than one million people who spent between more than three but fewer than twelve months outside of Poland should also be taken into account (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2002).

Additionally, a very important component of population movements in a few countries of the region was ethnically determined migration (see table 1). Migration of the so-called ethnic Germans, i.e. people of German descent who after the Second World War lived outside the German territory played the most important role. In the case of Poland, the number of people who left the country on that basis is estimated to be over 1.4 million in years 1950-2002 (Kaczmarczyk, 2005). Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans moved to Germany from Soviet Union and Romania. Additionally, after 1989 a migration of about 370 thousand of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey was recorded. Strong population inflow for ethnic reasons faced also the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). This process altered dramatically the ethnic structure of the Baltic States and had a significant impact on other migration flows (Bijak and others, 2004).

Present migration throughout Europe is, at least to some extent, historically determined. Modern history offers clues for many similarities and contrasts between countries and regions. For instance, many differences in current population movements in Europe are due to differing times of initiation and courses of modernisation; migration trends found in former colonial powers are affected by past political and economic links to their colonies and dependencies and considerably differ from trends observed in European countries with either no colonial history or only brief colonial episodes. By the same token, it is no wonder that current migration in CEE is influenced by a more recent history of political isolation and forcibly repressed spatial mobility.

Distinct migration trends in CEE are attributable less to political developments of the second half of the 20th century than to historical factors, of which the following four seem to be prominent (Okólski, 2004b):

- relative economic and institutional backwardness (compared to the West);
- a relative abundance of labour;
- relative instability of state boundaries;
- relative instability of a (comparatively diverse) ethnic mix in the population.

In the case of CEE rural-to-urban migration was both greatly delayed and generally low, at least (with the distinct exception of the Czech Republic) until the post-Second World War period. The outflow to the overseas started much later than the respective outflow from western or northern Europe and did not reach the pace of the latter. In contrast to most western European countries, in the early decades of modernisation a large part of the superfluous rural population emigrated to or sought seasonal employment in other European countries (mainly Germany). Finally, the notion of a shift from net emigration to net immigration (pertaining to almost all non-CEE European countries in recent decades) is inapplicable to a majority of CEE countries because the latter were closed to international movements of people for nearly half of the 20th century. When freedom of movement was restored around 1990, some countries instantly experienced strong outflow (and weak inflow), some others went through moderate inflow (and weak outflow), and still other countries saw moderate outflows and inflows. Having this in mind we will present current migration trends within CEE as a continuation of historical processes or new phenomena resulting from the factors associated with socio-economic transition.
CEE countries used to be perceived as net emigration countries with "permanent emigration" to the West as most typical characteristics. As it was already mentioned those movements were practically the only form that counted in the past migration statistics in the region (i.e. 1950-1988). Moreover their volume appeared to be considerably elevated in the early 1990s (see figure III).

Emigration to the West is the only category of flows in the region in case of which a similar set of principal determinants operated in all CEE countries. This is because this outflow was generally most severely constrained, mainly due to absorptive capacity of countries of immigration and the fact that migration phenomena are usually highly politicised. In the pre-transition period (1950-1988) many western countries occasionally opened "side doors" for the immigration from CEE but almost always they did it for specifically defined and exclusive cases (groups) of migrants, and for a specific political purpose (e.g. migration of ethnic Germans). Since 1989 in Western European countries most of political motives for admitting immigrants from CEE have been gradually disappearing, and consequently the West, step by step, has undertaken to close the doors for the people arriving from countries of CEE. The figure III shows that, at least officially registered, migration to the West (and USA) from CEE countries is rather limited. In the case of few countries only, namely Poland, Ukraine and Romania, this kind of flows seems to be of relatively big importance.

Nevertheless, the immigration policy applied by Western European countries, especially drastic tightening of the admission rules, appear to have only moderate impact on willingness to emigrate to the West among the population of CEE. It is mainly due to the fact that in many countries of CEE emigration is no longer a unique mobility opportunity. One of the reasons for this is the adoption of liberal exit rules which enable migrants to go and return at any time, and to do so as many times as they wish, and in reality opens the way for short-term migration strategies. Moreover, for in that period a deep change in the migration-related cost-benefit ratio took place. It might be argued that, with the dramatically rising cost of migration (removal of subsidised air and rail tariffs, removal of institutional protection of migrants, increased risk of deportation, etc.) and the lack of any meaningful rise in benefits (the likely increase in earnings was unlikely to match a sharp decrease in the purchasing power of money remitted by a migrant to a home country), movements involving short distances and a relatively short stay abroad became much more profitable. An in-depth inquiry into the structure of recent migration trends in Poland even suggests that after 1989 the increase in multiple circulations of the same persons contributed much more to the increase in the volume of migration than the increase in the number of persons involved in migration (Frejka, Okólski and Sword, 1998).

However, over the last few years there emerged numerous symptoms of rapidly subsiding emigration from the region to western countries. A visible sign of this is that after a short-lived but abrupt rise which begun in 1989, major western receiving countries recorded declining numbers of migrants from CEE (OECD, 1996). In certain CEECs the outflow, irrespective of how large before the transition, has immediately been brought to a relatively stable and negligible level, and the net migration has become positive (e.g. the Czech Republic), and in certain other countries, including Poland (the by far major sending country of the region before 1990) the outflow has been substantially reduced. As showed on the figure 1, migration to the West is of crucial importance for those countries which did not permit emigration in the past (Romania, Bulgaria). In the past those countries had build up a large pool of people determined to move to the West but not given a chance to do so. A substantial proportion of those people chose to emigrate once the borders were open. In particular, the successor states of the ex-USSR recorded a dramatic rise in emigration to the West in 1990-1991. However, the outflow from these countries shortly levelled off. It seems very unlikely for those movements to boom again in the near future. Summing up, on the regional scale "permanent emigration" to western countries (in the past predominantly regular from the point of view of the receiving countries) is gradually but inevitably
becoming less and less significant, and it is being slowly replaced by temporary migration, in this case to an increasing degree irregular (Garson, Redor and Lemaitre, 1997).

Another category of flows which, if only for their absolute quantity, would deserve a consideration here is labour migration to the West. If, however, the analysis is restricted to the definition-wise labour migration, i.e. regular and involving sufficiently long (e.g. at least three-month) stay in the country of destination, its magnitude would be indeed very small. Only two countries sent large number of migrant workers. In the late 1990s around 300,000 persons from Poland were employed abroad annually of whom 230,000 as seasonal workers in Germany. Another important labour sending area is Ukraine (around 150,000 persons employed abroad in 2000). Ukraine is becoming also a major foreign labour supplier for the most highly developed countries of the region: the Czech Republic (37,200 workers), Hungary (3,700) and Poland (3,200) (Okólski, 2004b). It is worth mentioning that the numbers given in parentheses reflect only regular flows. According to different estimates the overall number of workers from Ukraine employed in above mentioned countries is many times higher. Last but not least, one of crucial feature of contemporary migration within the CEE is their “incomplete” character. Incomplete migration will be a subject of analysis in part C.

2. New trends in migratory behavior

In recent analyses three categories of flows, i.e. transit movements directed towards the West, movements of persons in need of protection and movements between the successor states of the ex-USSR are mentioned as the most characteristic (if not most important) for the CEE migration picture of the 1990’s (e.g. Frejka, 1996b; Garson, Redor and Lamaitre, 1997; Salt, 1996 and UN, 1997). Whilst the third category refers specifically to three Baltic states and 12 countries of the CIS only, the two first are rather popular in all countries of the region. Moreover, all three categories encompass rather new migration phenomena (although deeply rooted in pre-transition past as it is in the case of migration between former Soviet republics).

Doubtlessly, migration between the successor states of the ex-USSR is the most numerous flow of those mentioned above. In last couple of years it embraced millions of people. The dynamics of the process was very strong in the first half of the 1990s. For example, in the peak year, 1994, as many as 1,143 thousand persons from the former Soviet republics immigrated to Russia, 227 thousand emigrated, and the (positive) balance was 916 thousand. The net migration in that year was nearly six times higher than the annual average for 1986-1990. In the following period the flows tended to diminish, and in 1997 the net migration (433 thousand) did not even halved that observed in 1994. Nevertheless, it might be estimated that between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 1997 almost 5.7 million ex-Soviet citizens were involved in migration to or from Russia: the number of immigrants was nearly 4.6 million while the number of emigrants - in excess of 1.1 million. A large majority of immigrants were ethnic Russians. As in certain other ex-Soviet republics for which migration statistics are available (e.g. the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine), the population exchange with Russia in the early 1990s accounted for up to around 50 per cent of all population movements within the former USSR, it might be estimated that altogether more than 11 million documented migrations for settlement took place between the successor states of the former USSR in that period (Okólski, 2004a).

Movements of people in need of protection are much more heterogeneous. They include internally displaced persons in various parts of the ex-USSR (but mainly in non-European successor states), assisted war victims, persons from Bosnia and Herzegovinia and certain former Soviet republics qualifying for temporary protection status, refugees or asylum seekers from within CEE but above all from certain countries of Africa and Asia (in particular, from Indian sub-continent), and, according to some accounts, forcibly displaced members of non-titular nationalities (or ethnic groups) in case of the ex-USSR. In contrast to the regular migratory flows between the former Soviet republics, the magnitude of migration of persons in need of protection on the territory of CEE can be hardly estimated. Due to the very nature
of those migrants' status, it is not only that the records of their movements might not be accurate (e.g. in case of particular individuals, multiple count can go hand in hand with no entry at all) but they often significantly overlap. Moreover some of the flows are registered under other categories of migration.

A broad picture of the phenomenon can be depicted based on selected official statistics. Since 1990 practically all CEECs have had an extensive experience with the inflow of persons in need of protection coming from outside of the region (Salt, 1996). Additionally, flows from within the region were observed:

- in 1988-1995 around 60 thousand refugees from Romania, around 75 thousand temporary protection persons from ex-Yugoslavia and at least 20 thousand refugees from other countries were registered in Hungary (Jungbert, 1996)
- until the end of 1992 the conflicts in the former USSR generated a wave of 700 thousand refugees and 2.3 million internally displaced persons, and that by the beginning of 1996 these numbers went down to 500 thousand and 1.3 million, respectively (UN, 1997);
- the size of by far largest sub-category within this group of movements, i.e. the flows of victims of armed conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union remains greatly obscured. The displaced persons from ex-Yugoslavia who managed to move to other countries (e.g. 442 thousand war refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina found themselves in September 1996 in other former Yugoslav republics and 601 thousand in other countries) were mostly contained by western countries. However, on the list of 25 major host countries compiled by UNHCR Office in Sarajevo, six countries, namely Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, are located in CEE (UN/ECE, 1996).

In general, in almost all countries of the region it was observed an increase in number of people in need of protection. The estimate for Russia alone speaks of a sharply rising number of refugees: from 160 thousand on 1 January 1993 to 970 thousand on 1 January 1996 (Ryvkina, 1996).

One of the important traits of migration in CEE nowadays is its two-tier legal status. Due to institutional underdevelopment of CEE countries, only a relatively little of the inflow can be channeled into the regular sphere of activities and so migrants often fall into irregularity. As a typical case, the transit movements may serve. The quantitative assessment of that phenomenon is very complicated because migrants of this type almost entirely escape registration due to their irregular, semi-legal or purely criminal character. Nevertheless the volume of those flows, similarly to the movements of persons in need of protection, appears to be tremendously high. The term of "transit migrants" is usually used to describe two distinctly different groups of people. The common characteristics is their ineligibility to enter the West (because of the general rules introduced by the countries of destination or due to a specific individual cause), and a desire to execute an ultimate journey to a western country from one of appropriate CEECs (i.e. countries with common border with EU). They differ basically with respect to their geographical origin: one is composed of the citizens of certain CEE countries which do not border with a (preferred by a migrant) western country, and another of the citizens of certain (usually remote) developing countries. This distinction is crucial to understand current migratory flows because while it seems that the amount of transit movements through CEE is on the rise, the number of migrants from the region itself appears to be shrinking (UN/ECE, 1998).

Therefore the rise can solely be attributed to the increased movements of persons originating from far away who as a rule are in illegal or irregular situation on the territory of transit countries, whose migration is multi-stage and frequently takes a long time (involving long breaks in transit countries), who are assisted by a network of highly specialized and efficient smugglers or traffickers, and who, in case of apprehension, cannot easily be expelled. Very vague estimates for 1993 suggest that at least 100 thousand migrants of this kind transited through Poland and some 100-140 thousand through the Czech Republic, i.e. two most popular countries from which the final stage is usually attempted (IOM, 1994). In the same
year tens of thousand persons were believed to be transiting through Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Slovak Republic (Frejka, 1996b). It appears that a large majority of transit migration, and, at the same time, major "routes", lead through the ex-USSR. For instance, it was suggested that in the middle of 1996 an average stock of transit migrants in Belarus alone exceeded 300 thousand (Sipaviciene, 1996), and at any given time many more migrants of this kind might be in Ukraine and Russia; one example illustrating "a tremendous build-up of South Asian transit migrants in Russia" is an estimated 200 thousand illegal foreigners (at any one time) from that region in Moscow alone (IOM, 1997).

Last but not least, a mention should be made of two other categories which after 1989 became a novelty in most of CEECs: settlement immigration and the inflow of migrant workers. The importance of this phenomenon was more in its contrast to the pre-1990 period when the immigration was hardly to record. Officially, even in Hungary, a clear leader as far as the number of immigrants is concerned, it never involved more than 37 thousand persons per annum (in 1990); recently (1995-1996) each of the three countries where the inflow is relatively significant, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, register only 5-7 thousand immigrants annually (Maresova, 1996; Okólski, 1996; Juhasz, 1996). Certain CEE countries have become an area of a large inflow of persons entitled to long-term residence or irregular immigrants. For example, in 1995 the population of foreign residents in the Czech Republic included as many as 159 persons in regular situation and 150-200 thousand persons in irregular situation (Maresova, 1996). In the case of former Soviet Union republics number of immigrant in irregular situation is much higher than officially registered migrants: the number of irregular immigrants in Russia is estimated to over 1.500.000 and in the case of Ukraine to about 1.600.000 (IOM, 2002).

In turn, CEE itself has simultaneously developed into a migrant-receiving area. The Czech Republic, a regional leader, in 2002 hosted as many as 150.000 migrant workers or foreign entrepreneurs, majority of whom came from Slovakia, Ukraine and Vietnam. Apart from that country also Hungary and Slovenia (and to lesser extent Poland and Russia) rank among migration poles in the region. Nearly all countries recorded large inflows of asylum seekers; e.g. between 1996 and 2003 the Czech Republic 63.000, Hungary 45.000, Poland 35.000 and Slovakia 33.000 (Okólski, 2004b).

Recently in some agglomerations of CEE the proportion of foreign residents (of whom a majority is in irregular situation) do not depart from what is generally observed in the West. It is estimated e.g. that in 1995 the foreign nationals accounted for between 9 and 11 per cent of the Prague population and between 4 and 6 per cent of the Budapest population, with a large contribution of immigrants from Asia (especially China and Vietnam) (UN/ECE, 1996). Certain parts of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland already witness a setting up of "strongholds" of the future communities of various foreign populations (e.g. Drbohlav, 1998; Lukowski, 1997; Nyiri, 1997).

A similar story refers to migrant workers coming to CEECs. The numbers of those in regular situation, after an initial increase in 1990-1993, stabilised at relatively low level. The number of foreign citizens with valid work permits in the middle of 1996 in Hungary was around 19,200, in Poland around 13,500 and in the Slovak Republic around 2,800, and practically no change in either country has been noted since 1994 (Juhasz, 1996; Lubyova, 1996; Okólski, 1996). However, not only in all these three countries but also in other countries of CEE, the estimated tens of thousand foreigners were in irregular employment (e.g. Salt, 1996).

To sum up this part, it is worth to emphasize that migratory flows observed in the 1990s (especially in the late 1990s) differed significantly from those observed in the earlier periods. The number of net emigration countries and, particularly, countries encountering high emigration decreased. The volume of ethnicity-based outflow declined as well and fewer countries recorded such outflow. Many more countries became involved in movements of irregular migrants (notably false tourists). With regard to inflow, flows (except ethnicity-based movements in the Baltic States) became much larger and less regular and inter-country diversification emerged. In most countries, the number of asylum seekers increased significantly,
as well as scale of illegal transit movements. Last but not least, migration between CEE countries intensified with Romania, Ukraine and Bulgaria as the main sending countries and the Czech Republic and Hungary as important migrant magnets.

C. CAUSAL FACTORS OF CURRENT MIGRATORY BEHAVIOR WITHIN CEE

To interpret recent principal migration trends which are characteristic to CEE we will use a very simple framework which, in fact, encompasses most of contemporary migration theories. Its tacit assumption is that since 1989 the population movements in the region have reflected, more clearly and evenly than in the pre-1989 period, an "interplay" of three kinds of imbalances in particular countries or between countries: demographic, economic and political. (see Okolski 2004a for more detailed analysis). The interpretation presented later in this paper will be arranged by references to the those groups of factors and can be very useful to judge which of the above presented migration trends are likely to continue into the next few years and which are not.

1. Demographic factors

One of the arguments raised by proponents of restrictions on migration between the European Union and new accession countries from CEE concerns the so-called demographic pressure. Huge numbers of people who enter productivity age were supposed to additionally inflate the migratory potential of the region. This point seems well taken because, due to the high unemployment rate in many CEECs (e.g. Poland) these people could very well end up in the Western European labour market. A question should be also raised about the demographic vitality within the region and its potential consequences for international mobility because over a long period of time the demographic factor can substantially contribute to high mobility of the population.

The hypothesis of demographic vitality of CEECs seems to be, on closer examination, unfounded. Table 2 presents two synthetic measures which describe demographic situation of selected CEECs countries in the context of EU countries. From the presented data it follows that in the 1980 the demographic characteristics of CEECs differed significantly from those observed in the western part of the continent. Potential support ratios were about 1.5 times higher than in the case of Germany or France. However, the situation changed dramatically during the transition. Many of CEECs are among the world’s leaders in fertility decline, feature stagnant or decreasing population size and population ageing. It is indicated by the data presented in table 2. In 2000 PSR values for presented CEECs were quite comparable with those of “old” EU member countries. The same refers to the old-age dependency ratio. With exception of the Czech Republic and Poland they are about equal to the EU average.

Demographic forecasts indicate rather stabilization than drastic changes in the observed trends. For example, the demographic forecast for Poland over the years 2000-2020 does indicate a stable growth in the numbers of working-age people, but that will be practically exclusively a result of an increase in the numbers of people aged 50 and over. As a consequence, we can expect a very similar development of demographic structure as in the case of Western countries.

Nevertheless, one specific feature of CEE seems to be of relatively greater importance. The specificity of the region is striking with respect to urbanization and internal migration processes. In the case of CEECs rural-to-urban migration was both greatly delayed and generally low. In the post-Second World War period this tendency was additionally strengthen by the policies of communist regimes. In most countries of the region a strong tendency toward industrialization (with emphasis put on the heavy industry) was observed. In contrast to Western European countries in many CEECs the process of industrialization took place with absence of massive urbanization. Due to socio-economic causes the population living in rural areas was kept at their places of origin. Thousands of them took up employment
in the city and commuted on daily or weekly basis. As a consequence of this “underurbanization” process, in the case of many CEECs we still observe a large proportion of populations living in rural areas. Moreover, this phenomenon led to the emergence of masses of unemployed, "loosely employed" or "rootless" people finding no obstacles to travelling. In the transition period, mainly due to changes in socio-economic situation and liberalization of entry policies in receiving countries this potential could be transformed into international labour mobility (Okólski, 1998b). This specific kind mobility is called incomplete migration and will be a subject of analysis in the next part of the paper.

2. Economic factors

Economic factors are usually perceived as basic motives for emigration. The voluntary migrants are above all driven by a desire to improve their standard of living. Such motivation could be particularly strong in peripheral countries (as for example CEECs) where relative economic deprivation is much stronger than in more developed economies. Before we go into details it seems necessary to sketch the economic situation in the region.

Until the late 1980s CEE economies had a lot in common, including overwhelming predominance of public sector (state ownership) in production of goods and services, strong autarkic inclinations and closeness towards the non-socialist world. The whole region constituted an almost perfect unipolar system with the ex-USSR as its main unit. In terms of GDP per capita, all of them qualified (according to the World Bank standards) as “middle-income” economies and their production structures were stigmatised with enormously high contribution of “heavy industry”, relatively high contribution of agriculture and low contribution of services. Compared to western countries, labour force participation rates were very high, whereas the labour productivity (and wages) very low. The unemployment as an economic phenomenon did not exist. Moreover, a structural feature of all CEE economies was a considerable overemployment related to wide practices of labour hoarding by state-owned companies.

The situation has changed dramatically in the 1990s. A general tendency in CEE economies was towards a pretty consistent sub-regional differentiation, with Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) performing the best and the CIS countries performing the worst. The value of the EBRD transition index reflecting a cumulative progress in the transition for the former was 3.4 in 1997 whereas for the latter only 2.4 (the Baltic countries - 3.2 and South East European countries - 2.7) (EBRD, 1997). In 1997 the private sector share of GDP was 68 per cent in the former countries and 45 per cent in the latter countries. While until 1997 the former group has totally made up for the initial loss in GDP, the latter group was still down by more than 50 per cent. Finally, in 1991-1996 an annual inflation rate was 34 per cent in the former and around 800 per cent in the latter. Central European (and Baltic) countries displayed a consistent trend towards steady growth in real GDP and personal incomes, and towards market stability (declining and relatively low inflation and low or moderate fiscal deficit). East and South East European countries experienced market instability and GDP fluctuations. (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2002).

A rapid economic growth in a few countries of the region contributed to closing of the income gap relative to the European Union countries. For example, between 1990 and 1999 GDP per capita in Poland, expressed in (constant) purchasing power parity terms, increased from 31 to 42 percent (39 in 1997) of the European Union average. In the same time it decreased in countries such as Bulgaria (from 33 to 24 per cent) and Romania (from 37 to 28 per cent), not to mention the CIS countries (GA, 2000). In 1997 the GDP per capita in Poland was around 45 per cent of the three low income EU countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain), compared e.g. to 25 per cent in Bulgaria (EIC, 2000).

The transition also brought about a huge unemployment to Poland and other reforming CEE economies. However, the decline in the total number of employed persons was diverse: in Poland it was relatively small, i.e. by 7 per cent in 1989-1997 and sharply contrasted with that observed in many other
countries, such as Estonia (24 per cent), Hungary (29 per cent) or Slovenia (22 per cent) (UNICEF, 1999). Many of CEEC’s became countries with a mass employment in the “hidden economy” (in the case of Poland the employment in the hidden economy amounts to 7.5 per cent of the workforce in 1995), which, in a considerable part, absorbed the unemployed (USES, 1996).

Last but not least, the transition effect of utmost importance was also an intra-regional differentiation of CEE in terms of labour cost. Above all, this resulted from divergent trends in production growth and industrial restructurisation, with necessary the laying off redundant workers, which led to greatly diversifying levels of labour productivity. In 1995 in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland gross annual wages ranged from USD 3,400 to 3,700 per employee, in Bulgaria, the Baltic countries and Romania from USD 1,400 to 2,500, whereas in the CIS countries as a rule fell below USD 1,000 (EIC, 2000). Table 3 presents data on wage ratios between Russia and selected CEE countries. It indicates that the relative situation in the region changed significantly in the 1990s. Since the mid 1990s a new bipolar division of CEE economies is observable. In 1997 the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia recorded average wages 2-4 times higher than the lower ranked countries. Slovenia is the only country who retained its top position. As a consequence, the transition brought about a dramatic shift in the attractiveness of labour markets within CEE.

All in all, in the 90s the previous uniform and unipolar economic arrangement in CEE, with a central part played by the Soviet economy, has ceased to exist. At least three distinctly different groups of countries have emerged in the region: leaders of the transition (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries), countries seriously lagging behind (Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia and Romania, but probably also Albania, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states) and transition marauders (the CIS countries). Whereas the first group tended to close the gap with, and meet the standards of the western economy, particularly the European Union, the third group appeared to be drifting away, and the middle group was struggling to catch up with the leaders. This new division of CEE paved the way for quite new directions and forms of economic exchange and collaboration, both within the region and with the outside world. Undoubtedly, it also has a bearing on internal and international labour mobility, and international migration in general (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2002).

Taking into account the transition from state-controlled toward market oriented economy and above presented trends in economic development, it is possible to point to following potential effects on recent migration in CEE (see Garson, Redor and Lemaitre, 1997):

1) the transition to a market economy has revealed (in a striking contrast to the pre-transition period) an excess supply of labour; this in turn has led to a relatively high unemployment and occasionally declining number of the employed; due to a very low probability of moving from unemployment to employment and rather low level of social protection of the unemployed, many unemployed persons (often very young, particularly school leavers and relatively low-skilled) are likely to seek jobs in western countries and in other countries of the region;

2) according to the trade theory, the intensity of the exchange of goods in international trade should be adversely associated with the intensity of migration between the trade partners; consequently, one should expect decrease in outflow to the West in those CEECs where trade has been redirected (from previous emphasis on trade between ex-COMECON countries) towards the West; on the other hand, labour migration within CEE might be rapidly growing due to a substantial decline in the relative importance of intra-regional trade;

3) since the onset of transition we observe massive inflow of western capital (in the form of foreign direct investment) into CEE; the inflow of foreign capital was likely to produce two distinct effects: a decrease in labour outflow to the West insofar as these investments enable better paid jobs to be created in the recipient countries, and a strong differentiation between migratory pressures in the countries of CEE.
that recently absorbed relatively large quantities of western capital and those that enjoyed a relatively small influx of capital;

4) liberalisation of the former centrally planned economies of CEE has revealed comparative advantages and other economic differences among the respective countries, particularly with respect to three areas: the development on labour markets, the structure of international trade, and the quantity and forms of capital inflow, all of which might foster intra-regional labour migration.

The analysis on the macro level alone can not answer the question of factors causing migratory behavior. On the macro-level i.e. structural level we can observe the so-called migratory potential. Such factors like income gap, difference in wages or unemployment rates are very important for potential migrants but do not determine their decisions. There are many examples of countries differing with respect to above mentioned factors and not experiencing massive migration flows (e.g. Puerto Rico and USA). The microeconomic perspective in the analysis of determinants of current migration in CEE assumes that the transition introduces basic changes to the decision-making mechanism of migrants, and enhances the role of collective (household) strategies in migratory processes (Jazwinska and Okólski, 1999; Frejka, Okólski and Sword, 1998). In that sense, an important consequence of the reforms implemented since 1989 has been a growing freedom of choice and the role of independent decision-making (by individuals or households) in terms of behaviour in the labour market or consumer-goods market. On the other hand, those reforms also meant that people are bound to take greater risks, and more competence and responsibility is required from them. This has brought about a deep differentiation in wage levels and career opportunities (almost non-existent on a wider scale in the pre-transition period), usually to the advantage of the younger and better educated (Okólski, 1998a).

These circumstances have been conducive to a polarisation of migration behavior and a formation of two opposite strategies, i.e.:

1) dynamic, risk- and future-oriented, and thus open to all kinds of mobility;
2) conservative, risk-minimising and survival oriented, and thereby rejecting major changes of all kinds.

The latter strategy, reflecting an adaptive process in the face of shocks incurred during the transition, has initially been adopted by a majority of the households (individuals), which i.a. resulted in the decline of overall (internal and international, taken together) population movements (Okólski, 1997). Migrants of the transition period have been primarily recruited from among household following the former strategy. In a close association with this, a majority of them happened to be relatively young and predominantly of urban origin, and if unemployed then often because of own choice. Among a number of objectives behind migrations one seems to be of crucial importance: accumulation of capital necessary to a stable adaptation to the conditions of market economy (Schmidt-Hauer, 1993). In a situation of decreasing real incomes, typical for an early stage of the transition in many CEECs, some households decide to invest in migration by their family members in a hope that by contributing to the diversification of household income sources, remittances (or other benefits) generated by migrants decrease risks inherited in the transition (see e.g. Stark 1990). On the other side, the CEE economies are characterized by significant market failures and, in consequence, a high level of risk. In this context migration is to be perceived as a means to reduce such risks. For many entrepeneurs that are to be, including peasants who make an effort to transform into modern farmers, migration means a strive for initial capital to finance their new productive tasks, whereas for a majority of other migrants it might simply be a strategy of defence against social degradation of their households (Frejka, Okólski and Sword, 1998; Morokvasic, 1996).

In the contemporary migration theory it is emphasized that people are acting in a social context. As suggested by Stark and Taylor (1991) and confirmed by research in Poland and other countries of the region, people rarely base their decisions on an evaluation of absolute income alone but also take into
consideration their relative income, it means income relative to other people in his or her own local community. An individual is relatively deprived if his or her income is lower than average income in a given group or community. Migration can be perceived as a strategy driven by an intention to change position in a reference group or to change the reference group. According to the concept of relative deprivation and having in mind the fact of growing inequality within CEE societies in the transition period, we could easily explain the prevalence of short-term or even circular mobility and high propensity to migrate of CEE population.

On the basis of the above arguments it is rather easy to come to a disappointing conclusion, namely that basic economic factors believed to be operating at present in CEE might exert opposite, mutually contradictory influences on migration. Precisely speaking, while some factors might stimulate migration from certain CEECs to other CEECs or to the West, some other factors, under the same circumstances, might powerfully hinder such tendency or even invite the inflow of foreigners. On the other hand it seems obvious that the economic factor alone, albeit relatively strong, affects more the propensity to move than actual migration. Quoting Wallace (1999): “There is not enough to be poor to become a migrant”. Huge gap between migration propensity (migration intentions) and migration decision was confirmed by many studies for different countries of the region (Jaźwińska and Okólski, 1999; Frejka, Okólski and Sword, 1998; Frejka, 1996a).

3. Political factors

Looking at the migration in CEECs from the perspective of political causal factors, the movements between the successor states of the Soviet Union seem most important. They are not only most sizeable but also most similar with respect to their causes. The general reason for almost all those migration was the dissolution of the former USSR. In addition, there were certain specific direct reasons in case of their four major sub-categories. Refugees and internally displaced persons form a flow generated by "political rivalries and inter-ethnic strife" (Shamshur, 1996) in the newly independent states which reflects internal political turmoil or instability. In turn, persons representing more or less voluntary movements of the past era (mostly persons of Russian nationality) who migrated to their historic/sentimental homelands (mostly to Russia) were frequently driven by a fear of nationalism and consequently socio-cultural and economic discrimination or even persecution in their pre-transition ex-Soviet home republics. Furthermore the reason for repatriation of members of ethnic groups deported from their historical settlements under Stalinism (e.g. Crimean Tartars) was that a majority of them have never put up with their fate, and have consistently awaited the moment when they will be free to return. Finally, some regular and irregular migrants also moved in search of higher quality of life, better job or the opportunities to quickly earn money. It is clear that the first three groups of migrants (of which the third incomparably less numerous than the two other) were almost exclusively motivated by factors strongly determined by political developments in the countries concerned. In only last group of migrants (much smaller than the two first) it is possible to find a considerable effect of economic factors (Shamshur, 1996).

Political reasons of that kind are present in the case of other countries of the region as well. As a perfect example the case of ethnic Germans may serve. After the Second World War few million people of German descent lived outside the boundaries of both German states. In the consecutive years most of them left their countries according to agreements with German government or with help of international organizations (e.g. Red Cross). In the case of Poland the number of ethnic Germans who emigrated over the years 1950-1998 equals about 1.4 million (Münz, Seifert and Ulrich, 1999). Despite the fact that German authorities do not consider people of German descent (Aussiedler) to be migrants but Germans who had been temporarily residing outside their homeland, they should be considered migrants from the perspective of Poland and other countries of the region.

For all countries of CEE the major political factor affecting migration flows since 1989 has been a dramatic (although not entirely coherent in all countries concerned) liberalisation of migration policies in CEE. This process included: the abolition of exit visas, removal of restriction on the issue of passports,
modification of nationality laws, abolition of entry visas (and, generally, where applicable, softening of non-visa barriers) for citizens of almost all European (and a number of non-European) countries, introduction of a legal basis for the contract employment of foreigners, ratification of the Geneva Convention on refugees and setting up of a framework for labour migration to the West (Garson, Redor and Lemaitre, 1997). These reforms have been matched with many changes in migration policies in western countries. Parallel with lifting of visa requirement vis-a-vis citizens of selected CEECs, the readmission agreements have been concluded with those countries, and, generally, more rigorous admission rules have been enforced (Frejka, 1996b). Asylum seekers and members of German ethnic group from certain CEECs have become subject to much tighter scrutiny than before 1990. On the other hand, modified guestworker schemes have been developed in some western countries (e.g. in Germany) which allow for some labour inflow from CEE but at the same time establish regulations that strictly control the access to western labour market and introduce a "rotation principle" (Salt, 1996; UN, 1997).

These factors, while greatly facilitating transborder movements of people, have made it much more difficult for persons from CEE to immigrate to the West, or, precisely speaking, to be admitted in the West as settlement (or, generally, long-term) migrants. In connection with above mentioned liberalization tendencies within CEECs it has created, in a fact, a framework for development of intra-regional movements.

D. SELECTED FEATURES OF MIGRATION IN THE CEE

From the data presented in the first part of this paper it follows that in the case of CEE we observe a large dispersion of flows, categories of migrants and country-specific mobility patterns. As a consequence migration trends observed in CEE are rather hardly depictable in general terms. Nevertheless, there are at least three characteristics of current migratory behavior which are common for majority of countries under analysis. Proposed features relate to CEE as potential migration system, specific nature of the flows – their irregularity and to one of the most prominent migration categories, i.e. “incomplete migration”.

1. Central and Eastern Europe as a separate migration entity / migration system

Looking at current migration trends within CEE one may argue the region constitutes a separate migration entity. This kind of view was presented among others by the OECD Secretariat which argues that CEE has became a new migratory pole with growing importance of flows between neighbouring countries sharing common historical, economic and cultural traditions (OECD, 1996). Other authors referred to this phenomena by speaking of “new migration space” (Morokvasic and de Tinguy, 1993) or “new regional migration pole” (Garson, Redor and Lemaitre, 1997).

At least few arguments might be provided to prove that the region appears to have recently acquired a number of attributes of a migration system (in the meaning suggested in Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik, 1992). Firstly, it is sufficiently spacious and self-contained (at least to a large degree). As it was stated in B part of the paper, the political and economic diversity of the region produces a variety of pull and push forces responsible for massive migrant flows. Due to socio-economic or even cultural factors intra-regional movements tend to prevail over the flows between CEE and the third countries – “internal” movements are for most of the migrants more preferable than movements to beyond the CEE boundaries.

In spite of some differences between individual countries and some distinct exceptions, in the pre-transition past, CEE appeared to be a relatively homogeneous region with respect to international migration. Repressive migration policies in the period prior to 1989 almost by necessity made basic migration trends in all countries of the region very similar. Such similarity, however, could not by itself be preserved in the 1990s, even if (what actually was not the case) all countries concerned introduced identical liberal rules.
From the picture of basic migration trends observed in the region in the 1990s, and presented in part A, it follows that this characteristic has been altered radically. A variety of political and socio-economic factors depicted in part B contributed to a deep intra-regional diversification and a mosaic of migratory trends in CEE became more and more complex. In general, the CEE countries are characterized by relatively very high overall mobility but there are also countries with moderate (Estonia and Latvia) or even very weak migration intensity (the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic). With respect to (long-term) migration balance with the West, probably in only one country (the Czech Republic) it is significantly positive, whereas in two or three other (Hungary, the Slovak Republic and maybe Lithuania) its value seems negligible. The rest of CEE has a considerable negative balance, and the CIS countries take the lead here. Poland and Albania, and to much lesser degree Romania seem to be the countries sending significant numbers of migrant workers to the West. The Czech Republic and Russia in turn might be the only countries with a positive (albeit rather tiny) balance (see Knabe, 1996). For other countries, the flows of labour to and from western countries seem to be more or less even (Hungary) and very small at that (the remaining countries). From the view-point of migratory links with Western countries at least three distinct and almost fully detached qualities/sub-regions, characterised by different trends, can be distinguished. First of those qualities comprises countries with very weak outflow but rather strong inflow (a typical representative: the Czech Republic), second - countries with high outflow and high inflow (a typical representative: Poland), and third - countries with strong outflow and weak inflow (a typical representative: Ukraine) (Okólski, 2004a).

As far as the intra-regional long-term flows are concerned, six countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine) appear to be the countries of net emigration, whereas Russia followed by the Czech Republic and Hungary, and then Poland, the Slovak Republic and probably also Belarus are net immigration countries. Similar as in the case of labour migration to the West, Russia and the Czech Republic are net importers of labour also from CEE, and are joined in this by Hungary, Poland and probably the Slovak Republic. On the other hand, Ukraine followed by Belarus, Bulgaria and Romania belong to principal net exporters. Albania and especially the Baltic states seem to be weakly involved in the intra-regional labour exchange.

The situation differs with respect to involuntary migration as well. Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and some CIS countries (notably Chechnya province of Russia) continue to send their asylum seekers either to other countries of the region or to the West, while Russia and Hungary receive largest numbers of people in need of protection.

Last but not least, trends in migratory behaviour varies between countries. Whereas in some countries (Hungary, the Slovak Republic and the Baltic states) the intensity of international flows is recently falling down in other countries those movements continue to be intense and very unstable (Albania and CIS countries, particularly Russia). Bulgaria, Poland and Romania maintain a high plateau of the outflow, and in addition in Poland the inflow shows the signs of both increase and instability (in Bulgaria and Romania the inflow is negligible). The position of Czech Republic seems to be quite unique with slightly growing inflow and the outflow at almost zero level (Okólski, 2004a).

To sum up, the region, even depicted in broadest categories, seems indeed very heterogeneous and diversified. It could hardly be considered as a "migratory space" which would display a reasonable number of common characteristics. A predominance of intra-regional movements might lead to the conclusion that with respect to CEE we should rather speak about “migration system”.

At this point it would be worthy to refer to alarmist predictions announced and widely publicized in early 1990s which expected massive outflow from CEE to the West (see Layard and others, 1992). What we actually observed were sizeable flows of people (estimated to tens of million of persons over the last ten years or so) but most of them became contained in the region itself.
2. Migration characteristics – irregularity

The second feature of current migration within CEE is that a large proportion of migrants arriving in all countries of CEE are, at least at certain point of their migration, in irregular situation. Sources of this phenomenon relate mainly to the political conditions. The region is rather tolerant with regard to visiting/living foreigners, the governments seem reluctant to go ahead with legislation and administrative measures which would cope with the new migratory reality. Last but not least a transitional nature of the legal environment is generally conducive to irregular behaviours.

Around the year 2000, the intensity and volume of regular migration flows in CEE were surprisingly low. A few countries in the region became net immigration areas, in no country did immigration reach a high level. For instance, in 1999 the Czech Republic and Hungary, recorded only 9,900 and 15,000 immigrants, of whom the largest national groups were Slovaks in the Czech Republic (33 %) and ethnic Hungarians, mainly from Romania, in Hungary (51 %). Although emigration was generally higher than immigration in CEE, the outflow from the principal sending countries (Poland and Romania followed by Lithuania) barely exceeded 20,000 (Okólski, 2004b).

Irregularity is quite common feature in the case of transit migrants but within CEE irregularity is also widespread among short-term migrants, particularly migrant workers who as a rule are employed in the shadow economy. Arguably everywhere in the region irregular labour overwhelms regular labour (Salt, 1996). Paradoxically, certain traditionally labour-sending CEECs (e.g. Poland), while continuing to do so, seem to receive about as many foreign workers as the number of exported nationals (Okólski, 1994). However, what might be illustrated by means of the Polish case, in the 1990's a majority of nationals employed abroad, as opposed to foreigners in Poland, are believed to be in regular situation (Kepinska, 2004). This specific situation is a consequence of a fact that in the case of Poland many irregular workers employed in the 1980s in the West have recently been channelled to the regular employment (especially in Germany, according to bilateral agreement concluded in 1990).

Long-term migrants are not an exception to above described tendency. Surveys conducted in certain CEECs (e.g. the Czech Republic and Poland) revealed the existence of communities of recently settled foreign citizens (which include full families) whose nearly all members have not only failed to regularise their stay but their prospects for accomplishing that in near future are rather bleak (Drbohlav, 1997; Lukowski, 1997). This situation did not change even despite regularizations undertaken in last few years².

3. Migration categories – “incomplete migration”

The most striking feature of population movements observed within CEE after 1989 is that a majority of those movements does not only escape registration (which follows from the preceding feature), but also their substantial proportion does not conform to the definition of migration. This is because a new migratory quality, hardly captured by the definitions and typologies in use, has emerged and become ubiquitous in the CEECs (Morokvasic, 1996; Diminescu, 2004; Potot, 2004; Michalon, 2004). Due to its inconsistency with those definitions and typologies, it might be termed incomplete migration as it was proposed by Okólski (2001a, 2001b).

The virtue of incomplete migration is its quasi-migratory character. People involved in mobility of this kind do not strictly or hardly at all fulfil preconditions which are generally set for a migrant but, in fact, they do realise to a high degree economic function of migration, and they might spend a considerable portion of time (e.g. measured on annual scale) outside of the home country.

The following three features seem to aptly depict a migrant of this kind:

1) "loose" social status and/or flexible occupational position in the country of origin,
2) irregularity of stay or work (income raising activity) in the host country,
3) maintaining close and steady contacts with migrant's household (by means of frequent home visits, regular phone communication, remitting money), or, precisely speaking, having one steady residence, namely: in the country of origin.

What also seems characteristic of many persons in CEE engaged in incomplete migration is that their survival to a large degree depends on the related activity, and quite frequently those persons do not have a regular employment nor do they receive any regular incomes or benefits in the home country. This category includes a large part of flows otherwise referred to as tourism (including movements of "false tourists" or "overstaying tourists") or circulatory (shuttle or pendular) travelling, and a relatively small, but by no means negligible, part of (usually irregular) seasonal and other very short-term labour movements as well as flows of the dependants of the migrant workers involved, foreign students and foreigners admitted for humanitarian reasons (see e.g. Aktar and Ogelman, 1994; Iglicka, 1998; Morokvasic, 1996; Sik, 1997; Tinguy de and Withol de Wenden, 1994; Wallace, Bedzir and Chmouliar, 1997).

Migrants involved in that form are usually poorly skilled; they live in the countryside and small towns or belong to marginalised groups in larger towns. They are attracted by higher pay abroad than in home country not just because it is higher but principally because the bulk of earnings is being spent home where the cost of living is much lower. For this reason, as a rule, firstly, the migrants are not accompanied by family members and their households stay in home country, and, secondly, because migrant’s sojourn abroad tends to be short, they are ready to accept relatively harsh working conditions in host country. While barely any demand for this kind of labour exists in sending countries, for receiving countries persons taking part in incomplete migration are a highly valued supplement to their flexible and partly informal labour markets and are employed mainly in the secondary part of Western labour markets.

A typical example of “incomplete” migration behavior was described with the reference to the labour migration from Poland. In many cases we observe a rotation of migrating friends or family members who subsequently substitute each other at a one given job (e.g. in domestic service) in the host country, and whose length of stay remains within the time limits allowed in that country for a tourist (Frejka, Okółski and Sword, 1998).

Incomplete migration can be perceived not only as a specific migration behavior – a product of a given migration strategy, but also as a consequence of long lasting socio-economic processes observed within CEE. The root causes of incomplete migration lay in the “underurbanization” suffered by many CEE societies (characterized shortly in part B). A condition sine qua non for those movements has been political liberalisation and individual freedom of choice. Once it is fulfilled, the incomplete migration feeds on the shifting and transitory character of political and economic realities, the existence of deep structural economic imbalances in one country or a group of countries, the inadequacy of law or its inefficient enforcement, and floating or amorphic social and economic structures. The list of pertinent specific factors would be too long to be quoted here, but two of them deserve a mention if only because they often are overlooked by researchers. One of those factors is the emergence of a powerful incentive to seek additional income abroad, i.e. a determination to protect the standard of living maintained until the transition started, against a background of dramatic decline in real incomes and scarcity of jobs in the home country. Another factor is the emergence of masses of unemployed or “rootless” people finding no obstacles to travelling.

In particular, in case of migrants from ex-Soviet republics, a striking thing is that they have a lot of time to spare, and the price of their time is very cheap. In such circumstances it scarcely matters what profit (if any) is made out of migration. And indeed those persons are often seen carrying from one country to another very small quantities of cash or merchandise. At present this seems especially relevant to a large number of people from Belarus and Ukraine (but also some other countries) involved in
incomplete migration who formally remain in employment in their home countries but, due to the economic slump, their factories are not producing, and no wages (or only a small fraction of the wage) are paid them. For such people migration is often a matter of survival. More sophisticated forms of incomplete migration, including the monopolising of certain seasonal jobs in certain markets, the rotation of migrants from the same household or community to continue irregular employment with the same employers, etc. involve mainly migrants from Poland who travel to the West taking advantage of the experience gathered by other Poles during their pioneering migrations in the 1980s (Frejka, Okólski and Sword, 1998).

Summing up, in its motivational sphere, incomplete migration to a large degree reflects the effects of economic factors, which, with a distinct exception of a part of the movements undertaken by Polish migrants, started operating in the post-1989 period (Polish pendular migrants were predecessors of persons involved in the current incomplete migration in CEE – see Morokvasic, 1992). While the adaptive strategies and related migratory behaviours of the person involved might be deemed perfectly normal, a general economic environment which gave rise to incomplete migration seems not. Various structural imbalances, imperfections of market and loopholes in legislation in which the transition period abound - that is what creates a favorable ground for this kind of international mobility of people.

E. FUTURE TRENDS IN MIGRATION IN CEE

What follows from the above presented analysis is that important migration flows in the 1990s originated mainly from the political developments of the region but their roots lay in very complex set of factors. That makes it very difficult to estimate the stability and possible future developments of mobility within CEE. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to discuss shortly potential changes in few important flow categories, namely ethnic motivated flows between the ex-Soviet republics, transit migrations and incomplete migration.

In the last decade a transformation in the trend of ethnicity related migration within the ex-USSR was observed. Until 1994 a rising trend was recorded but after that the number of ethnic migrants decreased. This situation appears to be relatively stable due to the fact that those movements already reached such a point where the number of potential migrants can only shrink.

As far as transit migration is concerned the trend seems to be rather stable (paradoxically, in spite of the fact that the numbers and composition of transit migrants is changeable in last years). It is a consequence of the specific position of a number of CEECs. When they have become the only land neighbour to the European Union directly accessible form the South automatically they have assumed a role of *cordonne sanitaire* for the “fortress of Europe”. As a consequence they are and will be a temporary target for migrants from less developed parts of the world (mainly Asia and Africa) heading for countries of “old” European Union. Having in mind the growing migratory potential of developing countries we can expect a rise in the scale of transit migration in CEE.

The incomplete migration stems, at least to a high degree, from unstable socio-economic conditions in countries under transition. As a consequence the future trends according to this category of movement are related closely to the success or failure of economic reforms. This postulate relates predominantly to such countries as Ukraine or Romania who aspire to the status of partner or member of the European Union. Macroeconomic stabilization and successful economy restructuring might remove most of the incentives to incomplete migration. Should this happen, the incomplete migration will be reduced to the form of occasional movements of petty traders (described usually as a pre-1989 prototype of incomplete migration – see Morokvasic, 1992). Additional effect would be a substantial influx of migrant workers. Otherwise we can expect a stabilization of current trends.
Two historical events were of crucial importance for shaping of new migration trends in Central and Eastern Europe – the collapse of Soviet Union and communist regimes and accession of selected CEE countries into European Union on May 1st, 2004. There is no way to discuss current situation in the CEE without referring to the European Union enlargement. In the previous parts it was emphasized how crucial for observed migratory trends is growing heterogeneity within the region. European Union enlargement (and planned enlargement in case of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia in 2007) has further divided the countries under analysis with respect to migration. For majority of countries there will be no barriers to international mobility whereas for the other (mainly Russia and Ukraine) movements will be still limited and subject to control. Regardless of alarmist vision of the situation after European Union enlargement the real effects are, so far, not as significant as it was expected. Two of the countries which decided to open their labour markets for migrants from new European Union countries recorded only moderate increase in the inflow of migrants (i.e. Ireland and Sweden). In the case of UK the inflow was larger and exceeded 130,000 migrant workers from new member countries but about one-half of them constituted people who arrived in earlier periods and after May 1st, 2004 regularized their stay (Okólski, 2005). This example shows that the migration trends within CEE are rather stable and it would be hard to expect drastic changes in the near future.

Looking at the migration in CEE in longer perspective it is necessary to take into consideration socio-economic as well as demographic causal factors. As it was mentioned in part B, CEE countries have more and more in common with Western countries with respect to the structure of the population. What can be observed is rapid ageing processes and a steady decrease in potential support ratio. There is also a question whether demographic situation within CEE can influence migratory trends in this part of the world. Table 4 presents selected outcomes of a forecast on international migration prepared for 27 European countries (among them CEE countries).

The base scenario of the study has been estimated based on following assumptions:

- stable socio-economic situation in Europe
- sustainable economic growth and a long-term convergence of income levels
- overall increase in mobility expected as a consequence of growing freedom of movement
- on the world-wide scale the scenario assumes improvement in socio-economic situation which in turn should lead to increase in inflow from less developed regions of the world
- migration policies are assumed not to be very restrictive (Bijak and others, 2005).

According to the data presented in table 4 one can expect growing importance of CEE countries as immigration magnets. All of the countries under analysis are likely to experience inflow of migrants. This tendency should play an important role in the case of such countries as Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic which are to be perceived as economic leaders of the transition. As a consequence the number of immigrants in all analyzed countries is expected to grow significantly. In few cases the share of labour force originated from external migration (since 2002 only) will rise to 6% in 2022 and over 20% in 2052. Expected trends do not differ significantly from those foreseen for Western countries. In the case of Germany the share of “new” immigrants in the labour force is expecting to rise to 8% in 2022 and 23% in 2052. From the presented data it follows we should observe further narrowing the gap with respect to demographic features between CEE and Western European countries and more and more important role as migrant receiving countries (at least for the most highly developed CEE countries).

F. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The aim of this paper was to present main migratory trends in CEE and to analyze the most important features of current migration flows. In spite of some differences between individual countries in the pre-transition period, CEE appeared to be a relatively homogenous region with respect to mobility as well as other socio-economic phenomena. Looking at the basic migration trends presented in part A it seems that
these characteristics have been changed significantly in the 1990s. As a consequence of different paces of changes and models of transition applied, at least three groups of countries have emerged in the region – leaders of the transition, countries lagging behind and transition marauders. The new division of CEE with respect to political and economic factors (such as earnings, taxation, labour costs, etc.) created a framework for intensification of intra-regional migration which became an important feature of current migratory behaviour in countries under analysis. Nevertheless, the region could hardly be considered as a migratory space with a number of common characteristics. Trends in migratory behaviour differ between countries to such a degree that, as it was suggested, with respect to CEE we should rather speak about a migration system.

There is no way to understand migratory behaviour within CEE without linking it to socio-economic development. As it was stated by Massey (1999) migration stems not from stagnant isolated places but rather from places undergoing rapid change. CEE can serve as a perfect exemplification of this thesis. One of the most prominent traits of current migration within CEE is a so-called incomplete migration. Incomplete migration is, to a high degree, a product of transition: it originates in various structural imbalances and market failures closely related to socio-economic transition. On the other hand, migration is to be perceived as an important factor of change. It does affect not only income or land distribution but also demographic structure, labour market behaviour, economic culture, etc. For entrepreneurs going abroad migration and remittances are sources of capital to finance their investments or productive activities. For others, a majority of migrants, it might be simply a strategy of defense against social and economic degradation of their households.

Having in mind arguments presented in parts B and C, it can be expected than in the near future, trends in migration within CEE should be rather stable. Large scale movements of population within and from CEE will occur because they will be taking place in freer societies (Salt, 1996). Moreover, along with the European Union enlargement, the number of labour markets open for migrants from CEE should rise which, in turn, creates new migration opportunities (e.g. migration of highly skilled, students). Nevertheless, due to factors mentioned above and to unusual opportunities for migrants generated by the dynamics of transition in individual countries, the intra-regional flows will tend to prevail over the outflow from the region. Along with the transition progress we should expect even better economic performances of at least a few countries of the region. As a consequence they will become (or already became) important immigrant magnets, especially for people from Asia and Africa.


Drbohlav, D. (1997a). Imigranti v Ceske Republice (s durazem na Ukrajinske pracovniki a „zapadni” firmy operujici v Praze) [Immigrants in the Czech Republic (with an emphasis on Ukrainian workers and „western” firms operating in Prague)]. Report to the Research Support Scheme, Prague.


IOM (1994). *A series of five volumes: Transit Migration in Bulgaria; Transit Migration the Czech Republic; Transit Migration in Poland; Transit Migration in Russia and Transit Migration in Ukraine*. Migration Information Programme/International Organization for Migration, Budapest.


Kaczmarczyk, P. and Okólski, M. (2002). From net emigration to net immigration. Socio-economic aspects of


Wallace, C., Bedzir, V. and Chmouliar, O. (1997). Spending, saving or investing social capital: the case of shuttle traders in post-communist Central Europe, East European Series, No. 43, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna,
### TABLE 1. International migration in selected Central and Eastern European (a) countries before the onset of the transition and 10 years afterward – categories and levels (b) of flows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of migration (c)</th>
<th>1985-1989 (d)</th>
<th>1996-2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outflow</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Emigration</td>
<td>E, LA, LI,</td>
<td>B, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inflow</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Employment of foreigners (e)</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inflow of refugees and/or asylum seekers</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Inflow of false tourists and/or illegal migrants (f)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a/ for transit to the West</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b/ for work</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c/ for petty trade</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) 10 countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia)
(b) intensity of migration measured in absolute terms – for the criteria used to estimate a given flow see Okólski 2004b
(c) types from 1 to 5 comprise flows (in the case of type no. 2 – stocks) recognised as regular (legal) ones in the respective host countries
(d) in 1985-89: C denotes the former Czechoslovakia; data for Slovenia not available; migration in the Baltic States includes inter-republic flows within the former USSR
(e) average annual stock
(f) guesses based on police or research reports rather than estimates based on statistical sources
Source: Okólski 2004a: 46-47.
TABLE 2. Potential support ratio* and old-age dependency ratio** of population aged 15-64+ in selected European countries, 1980-2000, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Potential support ratio (PSR) indicates how many people aged 15-64 in a given population can potentially “support” one person aged 65 years or more.

** Old-age dependency ratio (ODR) is defined as the ratio of population aged 65 and more to population in the age group 15-64.

Source: Bijak and others, 2005, pp. 7-10.

TABLE 3. Wage ratio between Russia and selected CEE countries (a) (Russia = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1993/94</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>125.4</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>261.8</td>
<td>215.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>181.8</td>
<td>196.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>265.4</td>
<td>217.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>127.3</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>220.0</td>
<td>172.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>173.7</td>
<td>832.7</td>
<td>558.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>105.4</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) USD equivalent according to official exchange rates

TABLE 4. International migration forecast for selected CEE countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Net external migration (b)</th>
<th>Percent of labour force originating from external immigration since 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5020</td>
<td>7463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>12232</td>
<td>23711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>1823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7060</td>
<td>22800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>-1343</td>
<td>2842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>-1631</td>
<td>4270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-1303</td>
<td>49373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2796</td>
<td>19205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>7098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3022</td>
<td>5584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>203774</td>
<td>205994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27 (a)</td>
<td>1059895</td>
<td>1173122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) EU-25 plus Romania and Bulgaria
(b) yearly averages
Source: Own elaboration based on Bijak and others, 2005.
Figure 1. Migrant stock according to UN
(per cent of total population, 2000, Europe non CEE = 7.3)

Source: Own elaboration based on UN data.
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD (SOPEMI) data.
Figure III. Recorded annual inflow from CEECs to Western European countries 2002

Source: Own elaboration based on OECD and Eurostat data.
ENDNOTES

1 The recognition of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as a distinct socio-economic system and migration space first arose in the 1990s. Despite extensive research and public debate there exists no universal definition of CEE. In this paper the name Central and Eastern Europe principally refers to the former Council of Mutual Economic Assistance countries (COMECON), including the new post-Soviet states but excluding the ex-GDR and to countries of former Yugoslavia.

2 For example in the case of Poland only 3,500 persons submitted relevant application between 1 September 2003 and 31 December 2003 and about 2,400 were granted positive decisions (see Kepinska, 2004).