

# **The Road to Peacebuilding: You Can't Get There From Here**

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
**New York**

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
Susan is currently the Director of Peacebuilding Programs at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada. She has 30 years of professional experience in international development assistance, technical co-operation, field operations, and financial management. She has held senior positions in conflict emergency response and peacebuilding, as well as in strategic planning and management in a variety of sectors in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. In addition to a 3-year posting in Guyana, South America, Susan spent 3 years in Bangladesh. She has been Project Team Leader on a host of development projects and has had extensive field travel for project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation.

Most recently, she has held the position of Chief of the Peacebuilding Unit at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) from 1997-2003, and was a Canadian representative on the OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development (1997 – 2003) which developed international consensus on policy and guidelines for development assistance. She is outgoing Chair of the Advisory Council of the War Torn Societies Project (WSP International) in Geneva, Switzerland, the Canadian representative on the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Donor Network for peacebuilding coordination, and a past member of the Advisory Council of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Stockholm, Sweden. In collaboration with other donors, Susan has devoted her efforts to documenting lessons learned and good practice and developed operational frameworks for peacebuilding and development assistance, and organised a Compendium of Operational Frameworks for Peacebuilding and Donor Coordination ([www.cprnet.net](http://www.cprnet.net)).



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## **Executive Summary**

It is fair to say that conflict is a normal part of the everyday experience of states, communities, and human existence, and an inevitable part of social change. Over the millennia, traditions, customs, and institutions have developed to regulate human affairs in a non-violent manner, with varying degrees of success. Where once, 'might is right' world views ruled the day, and absolute rulers held the lives of their subjects in their hands without challenge, there is now a web of international principles, protocols, conventions, and laws which set a minimum standard of behaviour for states and individuals. In spite of these developments, however, the resort to armed violence in pursuit of national, strategic, commercial, or individual interests is still a prevalent feature of both domestic and international affairs. Behaviour which is strictly sanctioned in our domestic domain - in our homes and cities - such as racism, hate crimes, torture, and rape, somehow stymie the international community when the same crimes are committed by "sovereign" states.

Much has been written about the changing nature of violent conflict with a shift from wars being fought between states to the vast majority of them being fought within states, or as civil wars.<sup>1</sup> The Cold War balance kept the lid on the geo-political pressure cooker, but since the passing of traditional colonialism, and the end of the Cold War, there have been far-reaching political changes and a rise in the number of civil wars within states. These conflicts were largely identity-based civil wars fought over imbalances in the distribution of economic, political, or social resources.<sup>2</sup> This is partly a reflection of the artificial lines drawn on maps by colonial powers which divided ethnic groups, as well as the failure of the colonisers to develop workable models of self-governance that were relevant to those who were governed. The pressure for clans and tribes to regroup, in spite of lines drawn on the map, was understandable.

This paper examines the progress of the last ten years in the pursuit of world peace, with a focus on official development assistance, the policy and practice for peacebuilding and human security, and the international response. The paper argues that, in spite of the compelling evidence which argues for more commitment to peacebuilding and preventive action, both national and international responses remain unfocussed, short-sighted, under-funded, and half-hearted, and the international regulatory environment is insufficient to deal with rogue states or crimes against humanity. In spite of a growing understanding and capacity to identify early warning signals and to act, there is a persistent willingness to continue paying the humanitarian bill rather than investing in preventive action. International response arrives too late and departs too early.

Violent conflict is the ultimate proof of the failure of governance; therefore, peacebuilding must be the cornerstone of governance and public administration programs. Aid strategies which focus on rewarding good performers and neglect the badly-governed, fragile states will not achieve their poverty reduction goals nor reach the poorest of the poor, who are double victims of poverty and weak governance. As long as the current practice of investing a pittance for prevention persists, the logical conclusion for peacebuilders is that 'You can't get there from here'.

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<sup>1</sup> According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), *Handbook for Negotiators*, of the 101 armed conflicts from 1989 to 1996, 95 of them took place within existing states as opposed to between states.

<sup>2</sup> Harris, Peter and Reilly, Ben, *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Handbook for Negotiators*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 1998.

## **Background**

So much has been written about conflict and peacebuilding, that there is a tendency to believe that it must have all been said before. For many, the evidence is so compelling that it is obvious that peace is preferable to violent conflict and that conflict prevention is better than war; however, current national and international responses indicate that the message has not been heard, or that there are other compelling reasons to pursue or permit armed conflict. Many writers advocate new approaches, and there is a plethora of new models and frameworks being produced on a regular basis. There has been a tendency to develop new conceptual frameworks, and there is little evidence of synergy and consolidation, even less so much evidence of follow-through on lessons learned and good practice. It is apparent that there is still a strong need for continued advocacy and capacity-building for peacebuilding.

The tracking of armed conflicts since the early 1980s shows that the number of wars worldwide peaked in the 1980s, and then remained consistently high during the early 1990s. Since then, the number of wars has steadily declined before rising in 1999 to 40 wars in 36 countries. Project Ploughshares reports that armed conflict is not a consequence of failure in the international system as much as it is due to the failures of national governments and societies to meet the basic human needs of their citizens.<sup>3</sup>

## **Definitions**

*Conflict* – Conflict is considered a multi-dimensional social phenomenon essential to social change. The term violent conflict is used to describe acts of open hostility,<sup>4</sup> or the intentional use of physical force that either result in, or has a high likelihood of injury or death. Collective violence refers to violence committed by larger groups or by states to advance a social agenda,<sup>5</sup> while an armed conflict is defined as a political conflict in which armed combat involves armed forces of at least one state actor in which at least 1000 people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict.<sup>6</sup> A major armed conflict is defined as the use of armed force between two or more organised groups resulting in battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people in a single calendar year, and in which the incompatibility concerns the control of government or territory.<sup>7</sup>

*Peace* – Peace has often been described by what it is not, rather than what it is. Dictionary references describe peace as the absence of war - a political condition other than one of organised armed conflict,<sup>8</sup> or as a condition that exists in the relations between groups, classes or states when there is an absence of violence (direct or indirect) or the threat of violence.<sup>9</sup> The absence of war, while ignoring the causes of conflict is called by peace researchers such as J. Galtung, a

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<sup>3</sup> Project Ploughshares at <http://66.46.139.212/ploughshares/docs/Ppfootnotes.htm>

<sup>4</sup> FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld, et al., *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development: A Resource Pack*, January 2004.

<sup>5</sup> World Health Organisation at [http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/violence/en](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/en)

<sup>6</sup> Project Ploughshares at <http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ACR/ACR00/ACR03-Introduction.html>

<sup>7</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at <http://sipri.org/contents/conflict/MACdefinition.html>

<sup>8</sup> Evans, Graham & Newnham, Jeffrey, *The dictionary of World Politics. A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions*. London: harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.

<sup>9</sup> International Peace Academy

'negative peace' because injustice and structural violence are allowed to continue. Positive peace encompasses the absence of war and direct violence *plus* the presence of social justice.<sup>10</sup>


*Peacebuilding* - When the term "peacebuilding" was popularized by the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, it referred to the post-conflict phase of communal violence. More recently, it has come to refer to all activities, whether before, during or after conflict, that deal directly with conflict and peace issues. Peacebuilding is about intensifying efforts to establish lasting peace and to resolve conflicts peacefully. Peacebuilding refers to conflict prevention, conflict resolution or post-conflict reconciliation activities. The focus is on the political and socio-economic context of conflict rather than on the military or humanitarian aspects. External support to peacebuilding should be an adjunct to local efforts and not a substitute for them. The OECD/DAC Ministers and Heads of Agencies advocate that the primary objective of development cooperation in every phase of conflict is to enhance the rule of law and promote popular participation in the democratic process

### **The Cost of Violent Conflict**

It doesn't get more basic than this: without peace, there can be no lasting development. It is no coincidence that almost half of the countries in the bottom third of Human Development Index have experienced serious conflict in the past decade<sup>11</sup>, and that low income countries are 15 times more likely to face civil war.<sup>12</sup>

The year 2002 ended with 37 active conflicts in 29 countries – all except one were internal. More than 1/4 of the states in Africa and 1/5 in Asia were at war at the end of 2002.<sup>13</sup> In the decade of the 90's, there were 57 conflicts in 45 locations.

**Table 1**



<sup>10</sup> Schmid, Alex. *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms*, Forum for Early Warning and Early Response, London 2000.

<sup>11</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Index, 2002*.

<sup>12</sup> Collier, Paul, *Breaking the Conflict trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003.


<sup>13</sup> Project Ploughshares, *Armed Conflict Report 2003*, Waterloo, 2003 ([www.ploughshares.ca](http://www.ploughshares.ca))

When one looks at the refugee situation, one sees that in 1978 the UNHCR was involved with approximately 4 million people. In 2002, the number of 'people of concern' to the UNHCR was over 20 million, or 1 out of every 300 persons on earth.<sup>14</sup> The vast majority of refugees are women and children. When the UNHCR opened for business on January 1, 1951 it had a staff of only 34 people based mainly in Geneva with a budget of \$300,000 US. In more than five decades, the refugee agency has grown into a global operation with 277 offices in 120 countries, a staff of more than 5,000 people, and a budget of US\$1.2 Billion. It currently helps around 20 million people.<sup>15</sup>

Since 1990, conflict has killed 3.6 million people. In today's wars, the vast majority of those who die or are injured are civilians, primarily women and children. According to the UNDP, children account for at least half of the civilian casualties,<sup>16</sup> and in current conflicts, civilian casualties are often specific targets of State policy.

**Table 2**

The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children reports that, in the past decade, over 1 million children were made orphans; over 6 million have been seriously injured or permanently disabled; and over 10 million have been left with grave psychological trauma as a result of conflict. There are an estimated 300,000 child soldiers - many are less than 10 years old, and girls soldiers often serve as sex slaves. In Rwanda, there are 45,000 households that are headed by children – 90% of them are headed by girls.<sup>17</sup> The participation of child soldiers has been reported in 33 ongoing or recent armed conflicts in almost every region of the world.<sup>18</sup>



There is no question that conflict, peace and development are intricately linked. Recent studies show that continuous economic decline contributes significantly to state collapse and conflict,

<sup>14</sup> UNHCR, *Refugees by Numbers 2003*, p. 4, available online at <http://unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/taxis/vtx/home/pendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=3d075d374&page=statistics>

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 2003*, New York, p. 45 - estimates civilian casualties at up to 90% though most sources suggest that the number is lower.

<sup>17</sup> Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children.


<sup>18</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Facts About Child Soldiers*, 2003, accessed at <http://hrw.org/campaigns/crp/facts.htm>

and that economic shocks add extra impetus to the destabilization.<sup>19</sup> Saferworld and International Alert carried out studies in 40 sub-Saharan countries and found that a five percent drop in annual economic growth increases the likelihood of civil war by more than half or 50%.<sup>20</sup>

The above references indicate some of the impacts that the economy has on conflict. The reverse impact is also true. The UNDP records in its 2003 Human Development Report that more than 14 million people faced hunger due to present or recent conflicts, and Paul Collier of the World Bank, in the publication called *The Conflict Trap*,<sup>21</sup> documents that by the end of the typical civil war, incomes are around 15 percent lower than they would otherwise have been, implying that about 30 percent more people are living in absolute poverty. The same publication estimates that the September 11 attacks, alone, may have increase global poverty by 10 million people.

According to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, in case studies of 9 countries in conflict in the 1990's, the post-conflict relief and peacekeeping costs were US\$216B. If preventive measures had been taken, there would have been a savings of US\$164B (76%).<sup>22</sup> The message is clearly that the cost of inaction is high.

**Table 3**



In a recent Queen Elizabeth House Study of countries at war during 1960-95, it was found that “the main human costs are not the result of direct violence, but arise from hunger, forced migration and the collapse of public services stemming from the wider effects of the prolonged conflict on the economic and administrative structure of the country as a whole.”<sup>23</sup>

It is interesting to note where humanitarian assistance is allocated and to identify what drives the allocation decisions. Donor assistance patterns for 1999 show that the international community contributed 59 cents/person/day for relief efforts in Europe with an estimated 3.5M victims compared to 13 cents per person per day for Africa with 12M victims.

<sup>19</sup> *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2001.

<sup>20</sup> International Alert, & Saferworld, *Priorities for the Irish and Dutch Presidencies*, February 2004.

<sup>21</sup> Collier, Paul et al. *Breaking the Conflict Trap – Civil War and Development Policy*, World Bank & Oxford University Press., Washington, 2003.

<sup>22</sup> Brown, Michael and Rosencrance, Richard, *The Costs of Conflict – Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena*, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York \*\*


<sup>23</sup> Stewart, Francis, *The Costs of War, Oxford Today*, Michael Issue, 2001

The humanitarian budget in Canada is a case in point, where at least 70% of the budget is dedicated to “man-made” disasters (conflict). If one includes the annual, core contributions to the UNHCR, the Red Cross, and the International Federation of Red Cross Societies, the relief budget actually absorbs up to 90% of the emergency budget.<sup>24</sup>

Experience shows that it is relatively easy to mobilise a response to a disaster when many people have died or when large numbers of refugees are on the move; it is much more difficult to obtain decisions to engage in preventive measures prior to the conflict, even when the impending disaster is clear. One often hears of the UN being left to deal with the “forgotten conflicts” when, in fact, they are simply “ignored conflicts” that do not inspire the international community to react. Jane Holl, the Executive-Director of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, stated that “It is not that we do not know – it is that we do not act.”

Another challenge is how one should address the fact that over 80% of the world’s weapons are produced by the five permanent members of the Security Council, though most frameworks dealing with small arms reduction programs focus on the demand side (taking arms from those who have bought them) rather than on the supply side (who is manufacturing and selling them arms). According to the Small Arms Survey of 2003, 1134 companies in at least 98 countries are involved in small arms production. The United States and the Russian Federation account for more than 70% of total worldwide production of civilian firearms. Along with France, the UK, and China, they supply 88 % of the world’s conventional arms exports.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, peacebuilding funds in donor countries are asked to contribute to small arms reduction programs in Western Africa and Sudan while foreign arms production plants are operating in neighbouring countries.

**Table 4**




<sup>24</sup> The remainder of the budget is allocated to natural disasters, disaster preparedness, and peacebuilding

<sup>25</sup> Oxfam International & Amnesty International, *Shattered Lives – The Case for Tough International Arms Control*, London, 2003.

The performance of the international community is no better when one looks at where financial resources are invested. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, world military expenditure in 2002 was US\$784 Billion<sup>26</sup> which was 15 times more than on the global aid budget of US \$52 Billion. Currently there are over 62,000 blue helmets in 16 peacekeeping operations around the world. If the donor target of meeting the 0.7% of GNP were reached, there would be an additional US\$100 B available to Official Development Assistance.

**Table 5**



One often hears criticism about the failure of the UN system to act. José Manuel Durao Barossa, the former Prime Minister of Portugal, and the President-designate of the European Commission, writes "...But does this giant collective effort not hide a relative failure of the United Nations system? To be constantly – and increasingly – running to extinguish the fires of war underscores the fact that we are not doing enough to prevent conflict. Many of the conflicts that we are now facing were foreseen, and some could have been prevented by appropriate and timely intervention."<sup>27</sup> In fact, the Charter of the United Nations was designed at a time when world attention was focussed on inter-state wars, and the guarantee of state sovereignty was a prerequisite for nation-states to join the organisation. With the shift in armed conflict from wars between states to wars within states, gross violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide have moved from the international to the domestic domain, and further from the reach of the United Nations, international law and scrutiny. Even within its mandate, however, the Secretary General of the UN noted that the Security Council still responds to violence in a way that is "tardy and hesitant".<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*. Stockholm, 2004.

<sup>27</sup> Barossa, Jose Manuel Durao and Chissano, Joaquim, *International Herald Tribune*, May 8, 2004

<sup>28</sup> Annan, Kofi. September, 2003

## **The Development Response**

**The OECD/DAC** - The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris brings together the industrialized countries for collaboration and consensus-building on a range of economic and development issues. An international consensus on development cooperation has developed over the last 50 years moving through the reconstruction emphasis of the 1950s (Marshall Plan) to a focus on state planning in the 1960s. In July 1961, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was created with a mandate for “assisting countries ...in the process of economic development and for expanding and improving the flow of long-term funds and other development assistance to them”.<sup>29</sup> In 1969, the DAC adopted a concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA) separating it from “Other Official Flows” (OOF), and identifying ODA as “those official transactions which are made with the main objective of promoting the economic and social development of developing countries”, the financial terms of which are “intended to be concessional in character”.<sup>30</sup>

**ODA as Protected Space** - While it is understood that the investment of industrialised countries in developing countries is a part of a country's outward face in the international community, the subtext of the debate in the DAC was that development assistance was intended to be protected space, and not a vehicle for achieving political or strategic objectives. The example of two CARE-Australia humanitarian workers being taken into Serbian custody and held incommunicado for weeks during the peace operations in Kosovo (because they were not deemed to be conducting humanitarian duties) is an example of why this protected space is so critical.

This debate is continuing today in the discussions on the 3D (Diplomacy, Defence and Development) whole-of-government approaches to foreign policy. It is notable, though not surprising, that the whole-of-government discussions do not include trade and commercial activities, or arms production and sales. Another area where the ODA eligibility discussions are playing out is on the role that humanitarian and development actors and NGOs wish (or do not wish) to play in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. The rationale for the PRT is that it mobilises security forces to create a portable, protected “bubble” or safe zone for government, humanitarian and development organisations to move into the outer regions of the country in order to deliver central government services. Its objective is to provide access by the central government to areas of the country it has been unable to reach due to the presence of independent regional war lords. NGOs and humanitarian actors have expressed their serious concern that participation in PRTs will jeopardise their appearance of neutrality and, thereby, their security.

**Rising Emergency Relief Budgets** - In the 1980s, development assistance programs moved towards structural adjustment and market-based solutions. In the face of significant reductions in aid budgets of OECD members, the 1990s saw aid programs increase their investments in Social Infrastructure and Services<sup>31</sup> and decrease assistance to Production Sectors<sup>32</sup>, and Economic

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<sup>29</sup> Fuhrer, Helmut, *OECD, The Story of Development Assistance: A History of the Development Assistance Committee and the Development Cooperation Directorate in Dates, Names and Figures*. Paris: OECD, 1996.


<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p.21.

<sup>31</sup> Includes education, health, population, water & sanitation, government & civil society, and other social programs

<sup>32</sup> Includes agriculture, forestry fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade & tourism

Infrastructure & Services.<sup>33</sup> Within the Social Sector, education received the largest investment, and starting in 1998, investments in governance and civil society were on a steady incline relative to the other sectors – all good news for those interested in good governance, democratic development, and peacebuilding. While aid budgets were being cut in the 1990s, the only other spending to increase was the Emergency Assistance budget line, which in 1999 actually surpassed ODA investments in the Production Sectors. Surely, this begs us to question the logic of our resource allocations when emergency response and humanitarian relief outspend development dollars in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and industry, etc.

**Table 6**



**DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace, and Development** - In 1995, the DAC established a Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation (CPDC) which produced policies and guidelines for development assistance when dealing with conflict. The issuance of these Guidelines in 1997 was the first time that conflict and peacebuilding had been put on the development agenda. These Guidelines were followed in 2001 with a Supplement which dealt with the need to move development assistance programs upstream and more directly into conflict prevention activities, and encouraged donors to move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.

Though there was evidence in the 1990s of increasing development assistance in the governance sector, aid programmes have traditionally avoided areas that were considered politically “sensitive”. This was partly a result of the generally-accepted principle that development was not

<sup>33</sup> Includes transport, communications, energy, banking business

intended to be 'political', though Peter Uvin<sup>34</sup> has demonstrated that all aid at all times has an impact on the conflict dynamics of a community whether intended or unintended. In this sense, all aid has a political impact whether intended or unintended. The first round of the Task Force consensus concluded that it was evident that development cannot take place without understanding the political context and addressing the root causes of conflict.

In 2001, OECD Development Assistance Committee members signalled a major shift in development thinking when they agreed that security for individuals and states are complementary and necessary components of sustainable, poverty-reducing development. They further agreed on "the need [on the part of donors and their governments] to help partner countries build legitimate and accountable systems of security to prevent conflict. This is an integral aspect of good governance and public sector management".<sup>35</sup>

"Security" is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. Underpinning this broader understanding is recognition that the security of people and the security of states are mutually-reinforcing.

While the international donor community has been working on sustainable development for decades, and significant progress has been made in many areas, poverty and underdevelopment remain a persistent challenge. Substantial research and field studies have concluded that solutions for poverty reduction and sustainable development are not just to be found in income-generation projects, and socio-economic development, but in addressing the root causes of conflict that tear communities apart. "It is now broadly recognised that stability and peace are prerequisites for poverty alleviation and a successful development process – and that sustainable development, when successfully pursued, reinforces human security, stability, and peace."<sup>36</sup>

The DAC members of the CPDC Task Force found that the prevailing eligibility criteria for ODA limited the creative, risk-taking activities advocated for development assistance to tackle the root causes of conflict and post-conflict transition. Discussions began on the need to expand the definition of ODA eligibility to encompass aspects of the security sector as a critical part of the peacebuilding agenda. Consensus developed on a number of areas for action in the security sector which was considered by some to be a public administration and governance issue (including civilian control over the security apparatus), but the principle of ODA as a protected space for development remained foremost in the debate.

The Guidelines of the DAC Task Force argued forcefully that:

1. there is an irrefutable link between conflict, peace and development,
2. certain peacebuilding efforts can best be met by development assistance programs,

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<sup>34</sup> Uvin, Peter, *The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict*, OECD/DAC, Paris, 1999.

<sup>35</sup> OECD/DAC, *Ministerial Statement on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners in Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, p. 15 to be found at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance/conflict>

<sup>36</sup> Berman, Mark and Brown, Susan, *Conflict, Peace and Development – A Canadian Way Forward*, Liu Center for Global Studies, University of British Columbia, 2002.

3. when political tensions arise and the security situation in a country deteriorates, that is the time to engage – not withdraw,
4. humanitarian relief should not be used as a substitute for political will,
5. development assistance should not be used to deliver political messages,
6. without peace, there can be no development – but without sound socio-economic development, there can be no sustainable peace, and
7. the best peacebuilding is conflict prevention, and the best conflict prevention is sustainable development which addresses the root causes of conflict.

**The Gap Issue** - The Guidelines broke new ground, since a review of traditional development assistance performance showed that aid programmes normally did NOT address direct conflict factors. In fact, development assistance programs usually withdraw when the security situation deteriorates, or it becomes politically unstable. There are many countries where bilateral assistance programs do NOT exist precisely BECAUSE the country has been in a prolonged conflict. Humanitarian assistance and relief programs may (or may not) engage when the effects of conflict are being felt (i.e. refugees on the move, large displaced populations, etc.), and they disengage when the immediate emergency has passed. There are seldom sufficient resources to stay involved into the rehabilitation or recovery stage. Development assistance usually will not return until long after the violence has ended, if at all. This produces a scenario where international responders arrive too late and leave too soon.

The military peacekeeping side of the response is much more disciplined, though in insufficient numbers to respond to the needs. Several countries have adopted a Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHRIBRIG) for peacekeepers, an early in – early out brigade which commits to arriving early in a peacekeeping operation but will exit after 6 months. This would normally allow sufficient time for other troop contributing countries to mobilize for deployment to a mission.


This “GAP” represents the gulf between the end of humanitarian relief and the return of long-term development assistance. It is the gulf between despair and hope - the window of opportunity for external actors to seize. The failure of the international community to address the transition from war to sustainable peace perpetuates the fragility and poverty of weakened states, increases the likelihood of their return to violence, and keeps international assistance programs on the treadmill of endless peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.

Peacebuilding, as it is carried out today, occupies a very little footprint in this “GAP” and the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace, and Development is actively debating a redefinition of how resources should be allocated to deal with the unanswered needs of countries experiencing violent conflict. Options include moving relief programs further forward into the rehabilitation stage, while at the same time trying to get development programs to move back into the less stable recovery stage. Throughout this whole process, the roles of the UN (UNHCR and UNOCHA, UNDP, UNDESA) and bilateral donors need to be refitted to prepare for, and implement, proper transition and handover strategies as they transit from the relief phase to the transformation stage of the crisis.

**Fragile States** - It is also understood that the very best peacebuilding is conflict prevention. So the real question is: how can we get more programs involved in a preventive way with the conflict dynamics that tear communities apart? There is a clear relationship between poverty and

poor governance. From a development perspective, the occurrence of violent conflict should be seen as the ultimate proof of the failure of governance. Conflicts flourish in weak or failed states, yet the tendency of the development assistance community is to withdraw from countries where the security situation is deteriorating. The frequent lament is that one cannot do development in such communities because of the evolving tensions and impending conflict; however, the fact that the incidence of civil war is significantly higher in the poorest countries should make engagement with fragile states a top priority.

**Table 7**



As the DAC Network on Governance deliberated, their discussions resulted in the production of a Guidance Note on *Working with Difficult Partners* which advocated the need for donors to find creative ways to engage with poor performers.<sup>37</sup> This reflected recognition on the part of traditional development actors that ODA would have to deal with the more politically-sensitive issues of development. It is no coincidence that the poorest of the poor, the intended recipients of development assistance programs, most commonly reside in countries affected by conflict which are also poorly-governed. Fragile states house 342 million people living on less than \$1 a day or 1/3 of the world's poor. They contain 40% of all child mortality, and 35% of all maternal mortality. Furthermore, it will not be possible to achieve MDG unless progress can be made in fragile states.

Like the chicken and the egg, one may ask if conflict-affected countries are at war because they are poorly-governed, or are they poorly-governed because they are at war. The irony is that development actors tend to withdraw from these countries when they approach violent conflict.

<sup>37</sup> OECD/DAC, *Poor Performers: Basic Approaches for Supporting Development in Difficult Partnerships*, DCD/DAC (2001) 26/REV1, 27 Nov-2001 and *Development Co-Operation in Difficult Partnerships*, DCD/DAC (2002) 11REV1, 16 May 2002.

The likely outcome of such a strategy to engage primarily with good performers and to refrain from engaging with fragile states is that the pressure on humanitarian budgets will increase, the poorest of the poor will continue to be found in states where comparatively few development resources are invested, and sustainable development will not be found in the countries which need it most.

### **Characteristics of Fragile States**

In keeping with the position that the early warning signals of impending violent conflict are clear for those who wish to see them, and that preventive measures allow many more options for action, it is imperative to understand what lessons have been learned about what constitutes a fragile state.

Substantial work has been done to document the characteristics of fragile states which provide ample guidance for those inclined to take preventive measures. These characteristics include:

- Weak/declining economic growth and human development;
- Weak governance;
- Volatile security environment; and
- Low level of trust between donor and recipient governments.

#### **Twelve Risk Indicators of State Decline**

##### Social Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or IDPs
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

##### Economic Indicators


5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

##### Political/Military Indicators

7. Criminalisation and/or Delegitimization of the State
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a «State within a State»
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites
12. Intervention of External Political or Economic Actors

Source: Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse  
[www.fundforpeace.org](http://www.fundforpeace.org)

The European Union Conflict Prevention Network has also provided an overview of risk factors for violent conflict which lays out a similar set of factors:



In the presence of these and other excellent risk assessment frameworks,<sup>38</sup> there is little reason to argue that the early warning signs for impending state failure are not evident. Entry points abound in a pre-conflict situation for those who wish to engage, whether it is for the training of journalists, electoral capacity building (rather than monitoring), the creation of peaceful schools and tolerant children, or employment programs for youth.

**The CPR Network** - As the DAC Task Force was developing a broader consensus on the role of development actors in conflict, an operational network called the CPR (Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction) Network coalesced around implementation of the Guidelines. Although the group first met in October 1997 hosted by USAID, it was actually named in April 1998 at the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting hosted by the World Bank in Paris. The awkward name for the group indicated that in the early days of this Network, there were different interpretations of what constituted “peacebuilding”, but there was a clear understanding by those assembled that it should include conflict prevention – thus a title which reflected this range of activity.

A principle activity of this group was the development of operational tools and frameworks for peacebuilding, and improved consultation and cooperation in conflict-affected countries. The CPR Network focused on documenting lessons learned and good practice, and assembled their

<sup>38</sup> World Bank, USAID, DFID (UK), CIFP Carleton University

documentation in a Compendium of Operational Frameworks for Peacebuilding and Donor Coordination<sup>39</sup> ([www.cprnet.net/compendium](http://www.cprnet.net/compendium)).

A major benefit of this informal network was the presence of both the World Bank and the IMF units responsible for dealing with countries affected by conflict. It was apparent that, even in the presence of donor cooperation, a peacebuilding strategy could easily be negated by the big budgets of the Bank and the Fund. Happily, both organisations have engaged seriously on this subject. Given the protocol of such institutions, one was more likely to hear about “low income countries under stress” or “exogenous shocks”, and people referred to as ‘human capital’ as the rationale for engagement. Like many other organisations, however, the pro-peacebuilding voices are relatively small and often unheard, and CPR Network members often found energy and encouragement in their own company. The Network has cooperated on a number of conflict responses, shares information on country risk assessments and early warning, and has developed joint operational frameworks for peacebuilding including those on gender, children, education, media, small arms, and truth & reconciliation.

As the operational frameworks were being assembled, it was apparent that there was an inconsistent use of the terminology surrounding conflict prevention work. The CPR Network working group on conflict prevention met to clarify the terms and arrived at the following:

### **Conflict Prevention Working Definitions**

*Agreed at the 6th CPR Network meeting held in Oxford, England, 14-17 May 2000.*

According to the Carnegie Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, the cycle of activities in preventive assistance is intellectually, technically and politically too complex to be the responsibility of any single institution or government. Preventive assistance approaches should be broad, encompassing political, economic, military, social, and psychological factors. Approaches must be consistent, strengths pooled, burdens shared, and labour and resources divided among practitioners. Preventive assistance consists not only of avoiding escalation in a crisis, but also of creating a durable basis for peaceful alternatives. The emphasis should be on primary prevention strategies that include operational prevention of incipient crises as well as structural prevention dealing with long-term, underlying factors conducive to peace and equitable development, i.e., linking security, well-being, and justice. Effective preventive strategies rest on three principles: early responses to signs of trouble; a comprehensive, forward-looking approach to counteract the risk factors that trigger conflict; and, an extended effort to resolve the underlying causes of violence.

Below are some working definitions to facilitate understanding and discussion. It is understood that we are referring to violent conflict, conflict reduction, as well as conflict prevention.

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<sup>39</sup> CIDA led the working group of the CPR Network to assemble the operational frameworks and initially hosted the Compendium on its Peacebuilding website ([www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/peacebuilding](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/peacebuilding) )

### **Conflict Analysis & Country/Risk Assessment**

A means of developing a multi-dimensional understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict as well as the capacities for peace. Frameworks and models designed to assess the potential for violent conflict in a country/region. (These would produce the tools used to determine which countries are at the greatest risk of transiting into violent conflict and presumably on which preventive measures should be focused)

### **Peace & Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)**


Methodologies and tools to assess the likely impacts (positive and negative) that development assistance intervention might have on the conflict dynamics at the country, region, or project levels. (This cluster would produce tools to be used at the project planning, monitoring and evaluation stage. On the humanitarian side, the work of Mary Anderson in *Do No Harm* dealt with the impact of humanitarian responses).

### **Early Response and Preventive Assistance Measures**

Measures or actions which may be taken by internal or external actors in an integrated and comprehensive fashion to reduce or prevent violent conflict. Preventive development refers to development strategies, programs, and projects that are specifically geared to the prevention of violent conflict.

For those interested in working directly ON root causes of conflict, operational tools are available for early warning conflict analysis and decision-making. For the bulk of development actors who do not wish to engage directly ON conflict, but are focussed on delivering the agriculture or water project, etc., there are also frameworks for conflict-sensitive planning. Donors and NGOs have collaborated on consolidating good practice and delivering training and coaching.<sup>40</sup>

## **IN, ON or AROUND Conflict?**



<sup>40</sup> The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre collaborates on such capacity building with UNDESA, WANEP, Saferworld, WSP-International, CRD Somalia, and formerly FEWER.

**Security and Development** - It is clear in both the DAC and CPR operational discussions that the term 'security' meant different things to different organisations largely defined by the mission of the organisation. Current discussions in Ministries of Foreign Affairs focus on "threats to security", and counter-terrorism with substantial new investments being made in such initiatives. Development actors, both Government and NGO, generally have engaged in these discussions by becoming more involved in expanding the definition of ODA eligibility for security sector governance, and supporting more politically-sensitive, and less traditional, involvement in democratic development and good governance, while, at the same time retaining their primary focus on the 'development' mandate. Both have their distinctive but complimentary advantages.

With the repeated success of terrorist attacks around the world, but particularly since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, considerable international will has been galvanised to address the very real threats of global terrorism. News ways of cooperating amongst international and domestic actors have led to talks about a 'whole of government' approach which would link the multiple arms of government responses to the cause of counter-terrorism and security. A similar energy was not seen on the peacebuilding or conflict prevention side of the equation.

Our own trade policies play into this equation. Agriculture continues to be the backbone of most developing countries; however, agriculture continues to be the only sector that is protected by the rich nations and kept beyond the scope of trade liberalization that has been taking place since 1947. James Wolfenson, Chair of the World Bank, notes that "it is inconsistent to preach the benefits of free trade and then maintain the highest subsidies and barriers for precisely those goods in which poor countries have a comparative advantage." Two thirds of the world's poor people depend on agriculture for their livelihood, which in Africa's case is 70 percent of working adults. The European Union dairy subsidy per cow is \$913 US, and the annual income in Sub-Saharan Africa is \$490 US. The annual Japanese dairy subsidy per cow is \$2700 US.<sup>41</sup>

**Cooperation vs. Coordination** - The cooperation challenge in peacebuilding is unique. Stable developing countries have the benefit of Donor Coordination Groups which meet regularly to share information and "coordinate" their long-range development activities. Countries experiencing either natural or humanitarian disasters have the UN Organisation for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the UNHCR which focus on the relief aspect of the international response. However, those countries experiencing conflict have no such coordination body, and are left to the vagaries of the donors, the Security Council, Special Representatives, and other ad hoc mechanisms. The CPR Network was an early attempt to improve the effectiveness of responses to conflict, but there were some donors at the table who made it clear that the Network was not a 'coordinating' body. The performance of the donors in Kosovo is a good example of a bad model of what happens when there are 'too many chiefs', while the East Timor and Afghanistan cases showed considerable improvement in the coherence of the transition planning and implementation. There has been some success in the UN to organise inter-agency 'Framework Teams' to improve the coherence of UN responses, and this is commendable because they have been carried out as 'preventive' missions. However, without the will to move to provide an institutional framework for these countries in crisis, the most horrific

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<sup>41</sup> UNDP, *Development Report*, 2003

of human experiences – torture, war, and despair – will continue to be the fate of the poorest members of the world community.

The example of Rwanda in 1994, and the failure of the international community to act on the clear warning signs of impending disaster gave rise to the phrase of ‘never again’, and spurred an international debate on the *Responsibility to Protect* and the merits of intervention for humanitarian reasons.<sup>42</sup> It gave rise to the Human Security Network, a Ministerial level forum spurred on by Canada, to move forward on an agenda which placed people first in foreign policy and international affairs. The international dialogue on the role of development assistance retained the objective of ‘Freedom from Want’, but began to include the Human Security Agenda of ‘Freedom from Fear’, and the principle of non-intervention yielded to the international responsibility to protect.

In the fallout of September 2001, the international and internal debate turned from peacebuilding and conflict prevention to security and terrorism prevention. In the absence of financial resources for security, pressure rose on development assistance programs to increase activity in areas that were not consistent either with the ODA eligibility criteria or with the generally-accepted principles and comfort zones for development.

In advocating the mainstreaming of peacebuilding, CIDA hosted an international Roundtable in 2002 with an international group of experts which reflected the added urgency in shaping wise responses to the global problems of poverty and violent conflict.<sup>43</sup> Amongst the Summary of Action-Proposals for consideration were recommendations to:

- Draw the security-development linkage - including the real links to terrorism – without making development cooperation into an arm of traditional national security policy;
- Recognise that countries with the most compelling claim on development aid are often the most fragile and unstable, and those that, in the short-term, pose the greatest risk of failure.
- The concept of “good performance” as the criterion for selecting partner countries needs to be very carefully defined and applied to take account of this reality;
- Recognise that helping build the capacity for good governance in its widest sense is a central challenge of peacebuilding development;
- These changes should be integrated within the context of institutional reform and must aim to bridge the gaps between policy and operational branches.<sup>44</sup>

While the OECD/DAC advocated the mainstreaming of conflict-sensitive development and conflict prevention more broadly into development programs through training and capacity building, there was view in some corners that mainstreaming would occur simply by assigning responsibility to other Branches. Experience has shown, however, that without a clear policy endorsement, coupled with a vigorous, multi-disciplinary strategy (diplomacy, defence,

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<sup>42</sup> This phrase refers to the right to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states for humanitarian reasons. Canada co-chaired the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which advocated the Responsibility to Protect. <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp>

<sup>43</sup> Vancouver, February 14-15, 2002, Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues at the University of British Columbia.

<sup>44</sup> Wood, Bernard, *Development, Conflict, and Peacebuilding – Responses for Canada*, Liu Centre, University of British Columbia, 2002.

development, and trade), funding, tools, and the confidence to engage, programming is unlikely to change.

## **Conclusions**

- Without peace, there can be no development, but without sound socio-economic development, there can be no sustainable peace;
- Continuous economic decline contributes significantly to state collapse and conflict. Economic and social programs are crucial to the pursuit of sustainable peace;
- Violent conflict is the ultimate proof of the failure of governance; therefore, peacebuilding must be the cornerstone of governance and public administration programs;
- There is a clear relationship between poverty and poor governance. Conflicts flourish in weak or failed states. The fact that the incidence of civil war is significantly higher in the poorest countries should make engagement with fragile states a top priority;
- In order to address the real causes of global insecurity, foreign and development policy and practice must address the root causes of conflict rather than the symptoms, and must engage seriously in prevention rather than reaction;
- Those who seek security need to address the current logic of allocating the bulk of resources to post-conflict emergency relief and peace operations rather than prevention, peacebuilding and human security;
- In order to increase the possibility of sustainable peace, development and foreign policy need to fill the persistent gap between emergency relief and sustainable development by developing more robust transition assistance programs to break the cycle of violence;
- There are no 'forgotten' conflicts – simply those which we ignore. Without the will to support an institutional framework for countries prior to crisis, the most horrific of human experiences – torture, war, and despair – will continue to be the fate of the poorest members of the world community;
- Capacity and confidence-building, along with skills/tools for peacebuilding need to be accompanied by a wider organisational capacity to integrate conflict-sensitive programming at all levels of the organisation;
- Advocacy for early warning-early response should continue until the mainstream programs in multilateral agencies and bilateral donors understand that it IS possible to do development in fragile states – just a different kind of development.
- It will not be possible to achieve the Millennium Development Goals for poverty-reduction and socio-economic development without addressing the real issues which tear communities apart.

*The Road to Peacebuilding: You Can't Get There From Here*


*Susan L. Brown*



# FOOD FOR THOUGHT

## World Expenditures

Figure 1: World Expenditures 1993-2002



In 2002 the world spent:

Military	<b>\$784 billion</b>
ODA	<b>\$58 billion</b>
Humanitarian Assistance	<b>\$5.5 billion</b>
UN Appeals	<b>\$5 billion</b>
UN Peacekeeping	<b>\$2.6 billion</b>

(Sources: SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2003; OECD, DAC, "Donor at a Glance Charts; Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2003; OCHA, FTS Tracking; and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations)

**1/5** of the world survives on **less than \$1** a day.

(Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2003)

## The Case for Prevention

**\$** The total cost of peacekeeping and post-conflict relief in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and Macedonia was **\$US 80.5 billion**.

**\$** If preventive measures had been taken, there would have been a savings of **\$US 36.5 billion**.


(Source: Carnegie Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflicts, *The Costs of Conflict*)

## The Human Costs of Conflict

**☠** In 2002, there were a total of **37** armed conflicts in 29 countries. 1/4 of the countries in Africa, the Middle East and 1/5 of the countries in Asia are in conflict.  
(Source: Project Ploughshares, *Armed Conflicts Report 2003*)

**☠** Since 1990, conflict has killed about **3.6 million** people. **90%** who die or are injured are civilians. (Source: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2003*)

Figure 2: Money Talks- Conflict Prevention is Cheap



Sarah Noble, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, March 2004  
Source: Carnegie Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, *The Costs of Conflict*

**☠** There are an estimated **300,000** child soldiers worldwide. (Source: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict)

**☠** As of January 1, 2003 roughly **1 out of every 300 persons on earth (20.6 million)** was of concern to the UN High Commission for Refugees. (Source: UNHCR, *Refugees by Numbers 2003*)

## Human Development and Conflict

☞ If donor countries actually met the UN target for aid set at **0.7% of their GNP**, there would be an additional **\$US 100 billion** towards official development assistance.


☞ **12%** of the countries ranked in the **top half** of the UN Human Development Index (HDI) 2002 experienced armed conflicts during the ten-year period 1993-2002. (Source: Project Ploughshares, *Armed Conflict Report 2003*)

☞ **43 %** of the countries in the **bottom half** of the HDI listing were at war during the same period. (Source: Project Ploughshares, *Armed Conflict Report 2003*)

☞ **48%** of the countries in the **bottom third** of the HDI ranking were at war in the past decade. (Source: Project Ploughshares, *Armed Conflict Report 2003*)

☞ After the typical civil war, incomes are about **15 % lower** than they would have been. (Source: Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*)

**Figure 3: Subsidies and Aid** (Source: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2003*)



EU Subsidy per Cow: **\$913**  
Japan Subsidy per Cow **\$2700**

EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: **\$8 per capita**  
Japan aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: **\$1.47 per capita**

Annual Average Income  
Sub-Saharan Africa: **\$490**

## Words of Wisdom

"It is not that we do not know- it is that we do not act." (Jane Holl, Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict)

"A failed state does not denote a failed people." (Alemseged Tesfai, War Torn Societies Project)

"It is difficult to build democracy on an empty stomach." (IDEA, Stockholm)

"The child we deal with today is the warrior or peacemaker of tomorrow." (Fen Hampson, NPSIA)

## IF NOT YOU, THEN WHO?

### **WHO'S WHO IN PEACEBUILDING**

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Peacebuilding Unit: [www.cida.gc.ca/peace](http://www.cida.gc.ca/peace)

Conflict Prevention & Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Network: [www.cprnet.net](http://www.cprnet.net)

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP): [www.carleton.ca/cifp](http://www.carleton.ca/cifp)

European Platform for Conflict Prevention: [www.euconflict.org](http://www.euconflict.org)

IDRC Peacebuilding and Reconstruction: [www.idrc.ca/peace](http://www.idrc.ca/peace)

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA): [www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int)

OECD/DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development: [www.oecd.org/dac/governance/conflict](http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance/conflict)

Project Ploughshares: [www.ploughshares.ca](http://www.ploughshares.ca)

The Global Partnership: <http://www.conflictprevention-dialogue.org>

United Nations Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery (UNBCPR): [www.undp.org/bcpr](http://www.undp.org/bcpr)

War-Torn Societies Project (WSP): [www.wsp-international.org/wsp.htm](http://www.wsp-international.org/wsp.htm)

World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit: [www.worldbank.org/conflict](http://www.worldbank.org/conflict)

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