The Contexts of Social Inclusion

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ABSTRACT

In light of the emphasis on “inclusion” in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), this paper contends that social exclusion and inclusion are context-dependent concepts in at least three senses. First, the ideal of an inclusive society varies by country and by region. Second, different places have different histories, cultures, institutions and social structures. These influence the economic, social and political dimensions of social exclusion and the interplay among them. Third, context – where one lives – shapes access to resources and opportunities. Social inclusion is thus spatially uneven. The paper also shows how context matters, identifying some of the mechanisms by which nation-states and localities influence processes of economic, social, and political exclusion and inclusion.

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Introduction

The emphasis on “inclusion” in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) compels us to specify what social inclusion is and how to accomplish it. The Open Working Group’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals 8, 10, 11, and 16 all refer to inclusion. Goal 8 is to promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable growth with employment creation; Goal 10 to “empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status”; Goal 11 is to “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”; and Goal 16 aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies as well as inclusive institutions. This insistence on promoting social inclusion calls for a more precise understanding of what this entails.

Increasing international attention devoted to inclusion is a consequence of globalization, liberalization, and democratization. First, economic growth and development during the new Millennium went hand in hand in most countries with rising inequality. To be sure, progress has been made towards reducing extreme poverty and hunger in the world. The Millennium Development Goal 1 to halve the number of people living on less than $1.25 a day was achieved. But gains of those at the top of the income distribution exceeded those at the bottom, leading to calls for “inclusive development.”

There is evidence that rising income inequality impedes the economic growth of GDP per capita, and the biggest factor in that effect is the gap between most of the population and the bottom four deciles of the income distribution, not just the poorest (OECD 2014). But growth is not enough. Africa’s income is in fact growing faster than its population, raising average incomes and reducing the share of Africans living in extreme poverty from 60 percent in 1996 to 47 percent in 2011. Even though inequality isn’t rising in most African countries, inequality is already at unusually high levels. But population is rising faster than poverty is falling, causing an increase in the number of people living in poverty (World Bank 2015).

Rising income inequality is not the only pressure. The Great Recession was felt worldwide. It produced over-indebtedness, unsustainable housing costs, and lower consumption, made it hard to save or invest in education and harmed people’s health (Maître, Russell, and Whelan 2014). Long-term unemployment – especially of younger and older less skilled workers – skyrocketed. Even as longstanding welfare states increasingly emphasized work in return for income support, their securely employed workers resisted changes in their hard-won privileges. These troubling trends have led to widespread concern about the exclusion of vulnerable groups from the labor market.

As demand for labor in the developing world expanded, it drew more migrants to cities in search of work. Shantytowns excluded from legal recognition and lacking basic infrastructure have burgeoned, and the number of slum dwellers has grown. While Millennium Development Goal 7b to improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers has been met through increased access to water, sanitation facilities, durable or less crowded housing, other challenges to slum eradication, such as the need for wider streets, police protection and more secure land tenure, remain (United Nations 2014).

Democratization and the demand for equal rights have also increased the political engagement of less advantaged citizens, increasing the urgency to act. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the transition to market economies in China, Viet Nam, and elsewhere, Middle Eastern uprisings against governments, efforts at racial reconciliation in South Africa and ethnic reconciliation in the Balkans – these have all created opportunities for political inclusion. At the same time, ethnic conflict, popular militias,
corruption and organized crime have destabilized weaker states, excluding many citizens from basic protection and producing worldwide displacement of vulnerable populations. Many countries are forcibly preventing refugees from entering safe havens. Even if they are allowed in, receiving countries exclude asylum seekers from citizenship rights. Anti-immigration parties express the exclusionary hostility of native populations towards newcomers, and established democratic parties resist including newcomers and addressing new forms of social exclusion.

Refugees join the many other minority groups who are domestic targets of exclusion. Given the economic and political pressures just mentioned, discrimination in hiring, housing, social services, and policing is difficult to combat. Many members of excluded groups withdraw from public life. From albinos in some African countries to LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons) across many regions, excluded groups fear for their lives. Women, LGBT, people with disabilities, youth, religious, racial and ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, ex-offenders -- many have organized social movements to demand their rights to recognition and equal treatment. Members of these groups are not necessarily poor or materially deprived so much as socially ostracized and disrespected. Taken together, these economic, political, and social trends make the case for the global objective of social inclusion.

These global processes and neo-liberalization of markets make the world look “flat” (Friedman 2005) as if countries are converging, but in fact, the costs and benefits of common trends are spatially and socially uneven. Place and context still matter, shaping the empirical phenomena of social inclusion — not just in words and ideas, but also on the ground. It may be tempting to point to the eclipse of the nation-state, widespread adoption of new technologies, climate change, increasing internationalization of rules, organizations and identities, or other common “drivers” of social exclusion. However, these international economic, political, and social forces have had a very uneven effect on different countries and localities. Some regions are more severely affected by recession, war, migration, and increasing diversity than others. The World Bank (2009) has noted the challenge of spatially uneven development for inclusive development, but proposed purely economic solutions to it, such as “thinning borders” to improve labor mobility. Uneven development is in fact a consequence of economic embeddedness in societies, places, law and politics (Lawson 2010).

In the more precise sense of “contextual effects,” the place where one lives contributes to social inclusion, identity and access. Places of residence — at many scales, such as region, country, or locality — are repositories of collective memory and bestow identities on residents. They also vary in resources, facilities, and social composition. Places are stratified. Exclusion from a territory, therefore, has both ideal and material consequences. Border controls, immigration and naturalization laws, segregation, displacement, seclusion — these are just some of the mechanisms of spatial exclusion with social, economic, political and cultural effects. This is not to reify place, but rather to recognize that place-specific institutional configurations influence beliefs, offer or deny opportunities, and constrain or enable behavior.

This paper aims to clarify and simplify the “context-dependent” understandings and manifestations of social inclusion. Social exclusion and inclusion are context-specific concepts in at least three senses. First, normatively speaking, the dominant image, framework, ideal or paradigm of an inclusive society varies. Second, different places have different histories, cultures, institutions and social structures. These make some dimensions of social exclusion — economic, social, or political -- more salient and important than others. Third, context -- where one lives -- makes a material contribution to social inclusion, shaping access to resources and social proximity.

2 Contextualizing the meaning of social inclusion

My working definition of social in/exclusion is one of a multi-dimensional, relational process of increasing opportunities for social participation, enhancing
capabilities to fulfill normatively prescribed social roles, broadening social ties of respect and recognition, and at the collective level, enhancing social bonds, cohesion, integration, or solidarity. Social inclusion may refer to a process encouraging social interaction between people with different socially relevant attributes or an impersonal institutional mechanism of opening up access to participation in all spheres of social life. Other definitions emphasize some aspects of this definition over others (see European Commission 2004; Sen 2000; World Bank 2013; WHO 2008).

Normatively speaking, the dominant image, framework, ideal or paradigm of an inclusive society varies (Silver 1994). The discourses and terminologies of social inclusion also differ: solidarity, integration, cohesion, social capital (see Alba & Foner 2014; Beauvais & Jenson 2002; Berger 1998; Berger-Schmitt 2000; Bernard 1999; Daly & Silver 2008; Favell 2001; Brunkhorst & Flynn 2005; Kymlicka 2010; Putnam 2007; Silver 1994; Stjerno 2005; Taylor 1992). In essence, conceptions of social inclusion describe the ways a society’s parts fit together and share values.

The concern with social exclusion originated in France from where it diffused to the European Union and its Member States (Silver 1994; Beland 2009). Initially, the term had Republican connotations, but as it spread to new countries, its meaning adapted to the setting in which it was used. In the United Kingdom, for example, the New Labour government of Tony Blair established a Social Exclusion Unit that focused on assisting multiple-problem groups to find employment, combining a communitarian and neoliberal understanding of citizenship rights and obligations (Pantazis, Gordon, & Levitas 2006; Giddens 1998). The approach reached the New Labour government of Australia in 2006 (Silver 2010). In the accession countries of formerly socialist Central and Eastern Europe, social exclusion focused on one group in particular: the Roma (European Commission 2011). Over time, inclusion discourse spread to Latin America, where “marginalization” of informal workers was long considered a problem, one exacerbated by international debt and subsequent inflation and unemployment (Buvinić and Mazza 2004). Each of these settings recognized the rise of a seemingly intractable “new poverty,” one concentrated in particular groups, a compound process of multidimensional or “intersectional” (Collins 2015; Crenshaw 1989; Grzanka 2014) process increasingly called “social exclusion.”

With time, policy discourse shifted from exclusion to “inclusion,” a seemingly more positive or affirmative term that is now ubiquitous. The ideas are by no means opposites, but are used in that way. Moreover, what people mean by them and the specific groups and social problems they refer to varies by context. The context-dependency of social inclusion is more than a question of labelling. Indeed, many synonyms – solidarity, cohesion, social capital, integration – are in use in different settings. But it is also the case that the conception of belonging, membership, and citizenship that undergirds such terms draws upon history and culture of particular places. Place-specific ideas are embedded in institutions that both constrain individual choices and behavior and shape social cleavages and collective identities.

Paradigms of social inclusion and its sister terms vary by political philosophy (Silver 1994). Liberals envisage social inclusion as a consequence of state-guaranteed individual freedoms to exchange property and ideas, assemble, form groups, and weave dense, plural, crosscutting networks of voluntary civil society associations. Republicans point to the social bond, the solidarity of equal, laïc citizens to achieve the collective good. Social Democrats emphasize the social rights of citizens to a decent minimum standard of living in return for active contributions to society and negotiated class conflicts. More traditional conservative thought sees social order arising from a natural hierarchy of authority and an organic society comprised of encompassing, circumscribed realms of life: family, community, nation. Confucian thought aims for social harmony over individual freedoms. Religious paradigms generally are built on a community of believers who submit to one or more deities and their rules and leaders. In brief, social inclusion...
is conceived in many alternative ways, depending upon ideology. But within any given country, there can be ideological differences that make it hard to generalize about national beliefs.

3 National conceptions of social inclusion

Nevertheless, different places do have different histories, cultures, institutions and social structures, which influence conceptions of belonging, membership and citizenship. Some countries have dominant, even official narratives of what it means to belong to a nation-state. Institutionalized, dominant if not hegemonic ideas of nationhood give rise to contextual variation in social inclusion.

Formal citizenship excludes non-citizens from most rights and obligations of the nation. But dominant national conceptions of membership also draw boundaries. Nationalism is largely selective of history, depicting the origins of the group and its consensual values. Symbolic, even mythical nationalism imagines a cohesive community that varies in openness to newcomers and diversity (Honig 2001; Marx 2005; Wimmer 2013). National conceptions of social inclusion are also embedded in the law and other institutions that regulate entry and socialize offspring and new members – schools, the military, holidays, official languages, recognized religions, and so on. In some contexts, the constitution embodies or evokes national solidarity; in others, the welfare state does; in yet others, a common language or religion plays that role. Metaphors, names, flags, symbols or scriptures may telescope and sacralize national identity. Nations are sometimes racialized and thus, closed to some on the basis of birthplace or parentage. To say that some conceptions of social inclusion are dominant in a given setting is, by definition, to exclude other, perhaps minority conceptions and to conceal those excluded from the nation.

Places too are objects of attachment and identity, invested with sentiment and symbolism, with a “power” of their own (Hayden 1997). The particular character and meaning of places are socially constructed, often by place-making elites and professionals (Gieryn 2000; Paulsen 2004). Rituals, monuments, and everyday practices reinforce place symbolism. Selective history and collective memory forge broad, enduring connections among strangers (Borer 2006), but also draw boundaries that allow residents to protect privileges and ration access to scarce privileges. Places mediate global and national forces, producing distinctive outcomes (Molotch, Freudenberg & Paulsen 2000; Kusenbach 2008). And places are more or less inclusive, precluding some interactions and intensifying others. Spatial exclusion both expresses and generates social exclusion.

National conceptions of social inclusion conceal or play down internal cleavages or account for them as arising from insufficient adherence to national norms and values. Internal divisions may encourage multicultural conceptions of social inclusion, recognizing, even celebrating the differences that restrict social interaction and shared values to some spheres of social life (Kymlicka 2010; Taylor 1992). But irreconcilable cleavages or “bright boundaries” of race, indigeneity, language, religion, and so on may give rise to alternative subcultures, internal strife, and even secession. These outcomes underscore the importance of social inclusion to peace.

Some members of a nation may hold transnational conceptions of social inclusion. They may identify as European, or Arab, or feel part of a national diaspora, or hold a primary loyalty to a religious community or church. For example, the Islamic notion of the Umma refers to a universal community of believers cutting across states with widely divergent outlooks, contrary to the nation-state notion of a political Caliphate or the ethnically based mosques found in practice (Schmidt 2005). Some people may even declare themselves cosmopolitans or citizens of the planet. These imaginaries affect behavior and interaction and so, become real.

Yet most formulations of national or communal solidarity are place-specific and hard to translate to other settings. If the rainbow symbolizes the social inclusion of gays and lesbians in Western societies, post-Apartheid South Africa adopted the unifying
image of a “Rainbow Nation,” coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu after the country’s first fully democratic election in 1994. National conceptions like these influence social inclusion policies. For example, in recent decades, settler, post-colonial, and immigration societies have come to recognize historical exclusion and oppression of indigenous people, knitting such groups into the national narrative. South Africa, Canada, and Australia have established “truth and reconciliation” commissions to heal the wounds created in the process of nation building. States have extended official apologies for earlier wrongs, and in some cases, provided reparations or remedies for historical discrimination. For instance, Australia formulated a social inclusion policy predicated upon newfound respect for and reconciliation with aboriginal peoples: “The Australian Government’s vision of a socially inclusive society is one in which all Australians feel valued and have the opportunity to participate fully in the life of our society” (Silver 2010).

Similarly, Indonesia’s tradition of recognizing its multicultural heritage has made the Muslim majority tolerant of minority religions and ethnicities. The preamble to Indonesia’s 1999 law #39 on human rights recognizes that “besides basic rights, humans also have basic obligations to one another and to society as a whole, with regard to society, nation and state.” This eloquent rendering of social solidarity invokes the Five Principles of Indonesia, the Pancasila: Belief in the one and only God; Internationalism: Just and civilized humanity; Nationalism: The unity of Indonesia; Democracy: consensus arising from deliberation by representatives; and Social justice and welfare for all of the people of Indonesia. Following from this, the PNPM Peduli program for social inclusion emphasizes “care.” As Pak Sujana Royat, Deputy Minister of the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare for Poverty Alleviation, put it in November 2012: “I am convinced that the important path for PNPM Peduli is first bringing back their dignity, or in Bahasa Indonesia, “Kembaliakan dahulu martabat mereka” – Let them be seen and considered and treated equally by the system, community, everybody” (World Bank 2012).

### National contextual effects on social inclusion

The different histories, cultures, institutions and social structures in different places make some dimensions of social exclusion -- economic, social, or political -- more salient and important than others. For example, homogeneous European countries tend to emphasize class conflicts. In contrast, racial cleavages figure prominently in the histories of the United States, South Africa, the Caribbean, and Brazil. Conflicts with indigenous groups have been salient in Canada, Australia, India, and many but not all Latin American countries. Religious exclusion has troubled European and South Asian countries. Exclusion of lower castes is a distinctively Indian issue, although castes can be found in Japan, Egypt, and other South Asian countries. And even though gender, age, migration, and disability are grounds for social exclusion in virtually all countries, the extent and salience of these social differences vary nationally too. National contexts therefore shape the observed forms and culturally significant dimensions of social exclusion as well as the policy approaches to social inclusion in economic, social, and political life.

Yet, dimensions of exclusion are not necessarily related; their association also varies across national contexts (Muffels and Fouage 2001; Pantazis, Gordon & Levitas 2006; Tsakloglou and Papadopoulos 2002a & b). For example, the link between material and social disadvantage is weaker in the Mediterranean than in the northern European countries (Paugam and Russell 2000; Gallie and Paugam 2001; Böhnke 2008). If chronic cumulative disadvantage -- lack of full-time employment, low educational qualifications, lone parenthood, non-EU citizenship and bad health -- serves as a proxy for social exclusion, then it is more severe in Southern European countries with relatively underdeveloped welfare states and in liberal welfare states (Papadopoulos and Tsakloglou 2005). Therefore, contextual influences on exclusion and inclusion should be disaggregated into economic, social, and political dimensions.
a. Economic dimensions

While acknowledging that economic growth is insufficient for “inclusive development,” the proposed SDGs should recognize that pathways to poverty reduction, greater income equality, and decent employment will vary across contexts. No one-size-fits-all program will accomplish these goals in all settings. Microcredit, for example, rests upon conditions of social trust. Collective wage bargaining cannot take place without unionization. Gender mainstreaming may be difficult to achieve in societies where women are spatially segregated. Legal arrangements can hinder anti-discrimination complaints or the formation of nonprofit social enterprises. Without state capacity, it is difficult to enforce redistributive taxation. The most common social policies around the world are minimum income (or food), public education, and health care programs. Yet even these are part of context-specific welfare “regimes” where configurations of institutions are lashed together and interdependent.

The recognition that different ideas and institutions form interdependent systems lies behind the classification of “Varieties of Capitalism” into liberal and coordinated capitalism types (Hall and Soskice 2001). Taking the US and Germany as prototypes, the varieties have different approaches to welfare and account for why some countries have developed dual labor markets, while others have sought more “solidaristic” but flexible solutions to global economic pressures. There are also hybrids. For example, the current Danish model of “flexisecurity” balances social protection with relaxation of employment protection. These configurations of labor market institutions – the uncoordinated neoliberal, flexisecurity; and the traditional welfare state model of labor security and high unemployment benefits – influence levels of employment and labor market job mobility (Muffels, Crouch, and Wilthagen 2014). Regardless of welfare regime, labor market institutions like employment protection legislation for temporary workers, active labor market policies, and collective bargaining act as exclusionary barriers to employment entry and exit and moving into a permanent job. Eastern European countries have fairly high mobility and flexibility compared to Southern Europe, but similarly low unemployment benefits and employment security. Cultural context also matters. Societies with high levels of personal and institutional trust allow people to take more risks either to change jobs, enter self-employment, and move. Thus, even though welfare states are generally moving in a more liberal direction, they are doing so along distinctively national tracks (Thelen 2014).

The varieties of capitalism approach built upon another older typology of “welfare regimes” initially proposed to overcome the earlier emphasis on overall social expenditures and contributory insurance programs (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1997; Arts and Gelissen 2002; Ferrara 1996; see also Thelen 2014). Traditionally, the main distinction between welfare states contrasted taxation based Beveridge systems and the insurance based Bismarckian systems, a distinction now eroding. Welfare regimes have different mixes of assistance, insurance, and citizenship based welfare provided by different mixes of market, state, nonprofit and household, different protections from the market, and different redistributive effects. Yet welfare regimes are more about social protection from risks and provision of minimum subsistence than egalitarianism, so they do not vary in terms of poverty reduction. Moreover, social insurance, once a symbol of national solidarity, often excluded immigrants from benefits; for these residents, tax based systems seem more inclusive (Sainsbury 2012).

In Europe, welfare regime types include the Anglo-American liberal, Continental conservative or corporatist, Nordic social democratic, and Mediterranean or Southern traditional regime. Individual trajectories of social exclusion differ across these regimes (Gallie and Paugam 2000; Begg and Bergmann 2002), although there were no differences across regimes in the relationship between youth unemployment and social exclusion in a study of ten European countries (Hammer 2003, 209). As for intergenerational mobility, recent work demonstrates that the liberal, individualist US in fact has
less upward mobility in earnings than Old World, supposedly class-bound Britain, which in turn has less mobility than the social democratic Nordic countries (Jantti et al. 2006). Intergenerational transmission of unequal incomes works through different mechanisms in the four welfare regime types, Nordic, Continental, Anglo-Saxon and Southern European (Raitano 2015). Anglo-Saxon and Southern regimes transmit parental advantages directly to their children, regardless of the latter’s educational accomplishments, while in Nordic and Continental countries, parental income influences earnings through children’s educational and occupational achievements. The respective ranking of these regimes also reflects national levels of income inequality, with intergenerational persistence greatest in the upper ends of the distribution suggesting opportunity hoarding by the rich.

There is disagreement as to whether there exists a discrete form of welfare regime in Asia. Some maintain that Japan, for instance, is a hybrid between Conservative and Liberal welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1997), while others suggest that East Asian countries represent a type of their own. They share a history of economic and political dependency, more authoritarian democracy, weaker class organization compared to particularistic, regional, patrimonial and clientelistic incorporation of groups, and similarities in welfare provision, such as greater reliance on workplaces and families and less state redistribution. These institutional traits supposedly dovetail with a tradition of Confucianism that emphasizes family obligations, education, paternalism, respect for authority, and social harmony, an essentialist cultural analysis that many reject. One study found that globalization – specifically, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 – was mediated by different Asian subtypes of welfare regimes. Although poverty rates rose in the five economically successful countries in East Asia – the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia -- the welfare regimes of Malaysia and the Philippines were little affected since immigrant and emigrant labor took the brunt. In contrast, Indonesia and Thailand had a cushion of integrated rural–urban households and encouraged community-based social safety nets. Richer, industrialized, and democratic Republic of Korea actually expanded its social insurance state under global crisis pressures (Gough 2001).

When comparing welfare regimes and social policies in the West to elsewhere in the world, other types appear. In developing countries, social insurance pools were traditionally limited to public, middle class, and organized workers, until they underwent neo-liberal reforms that offered social protection to informal workers. For example, developing countries have been classified into informal security regimes in Latin America, insecurity regimes in Africa, and state-led productivist regimes in Asia, including South Asia (Gough & Wood 2004; De Haan 2011). Another classification shows regional welfare regime types vary across democratic and non-democratic states (Haggard & Kaufman 2008). In education and other services that enhance capabilities, there appears to be a universal trend towards decentralization, student choice, and accountability. However, in health, Latin American countries are privatizing services, East Asia is expanding public health insurance and Eastern Europe still has a universal public coverage guarantee. In pensions, Eastern Europe and especially Latin America are privatizing, with total privatization in Chile and Mexico, while East Asia is expanding a minimum public pension benefit. Most significantly for social inclusion, newly democratic middle income countries in East Asia and Eastern Europe are establishing or expanding unemployment insurance. In the post-communism transition countries, early retirement disability and family allowances were used as a last resort, but were not redistributive. In contrast, Malaysia and Singapore took a more liberal approach to safety nets.

While the regimes approach highlights the importance of national context for economic inclusion, these classifications are ultimately based upon bounded nation-states serving as models for the types. However, most countries are hybrids of the types, creating a lot of internal heterogeneity in the classifications. Moreover, some social policy
institutions may be transnational (e.g., European) or local. The regimes approach is also static in that it assumes that national institutional arrangements are consensual and does not specify an agent of change. It is also less concerned with whether policies are redistributive and inclusive.

In recent years, as exclusion from the labor market and from social insurance - especially among informal sector and migrant workers - became an issue, social assistance programs throughout the world underwent reform or were introduced for the first time. For example, the United Nations is promoting a Social Protection Floor of essential social services and income security for all, and the World Bank adopted a Social Protection and Labor Strategy advancing social transfer programs. In many cases, countries use this social assistance as an incentive for “active” inclusion in the labor market, training, schooling or community work. Increasingly, emphasis shifted from insurance to tax-funded minimum income policies targeted to the poor (Nelson 2010; Marx and Nelson 2012). In the OECD, it is maybe too early to speak of a convergence away from universal social insurance schemes towards programs targeted to the poor (Béland et al. 2014), but few dispute the dramatic increase in means-tested benefit expenditure since the 1980s (Ferrarini, Nelson and Palme 2015). The question is whether this “neo-liberalization” of welfare states means national contexts no longer matter.

For example, the World Bank has promoted “conditional cash transfer” (CCT) programs providing income supplements to poor families provided that they use health clinics and send children to school. First came Mexico’s PROGRESA; then Colombia’s Familias en Acción; Chile’s Subsidio Unitario Familiar; and among the largest programs, Brazil’s Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Familia. Some find the transfers increase program enrolment and health care of the poor (Rawlings & Rubio 2005), but given low benefit rates, their effects on coverage and poverty alleviation are harder to demonstrate, with the elderly and young children more excluded from support (Adato & Hoddinott 2010; Handa & Davis 2006; Hanlon et al., 2010; Soares et al 2010). There are national differences. Thanks to conditional cash transfers and direct taxes, inequality and poverty have been falling in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay but less so in Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru (Nino-Zarazua et al. 2012; Gough & Wood 2004; Lustig, Pessino, & Scott 2014).

CCTs were introduced in Africa after Latin America, but became more common as the World Bank funded 60 social protection programs in 23 countries in Africa between 2000 and 2010. One of the earliest programs to be evaluated, South Africa’s Child Support Grant, had a one-third take-up rate, reaching children in poorer households. Children who received the grant were significantly more likely to be enrolled in school in the following years than equally poor non-recipient children of the same age (Case, Hosegood & Lund 2005).

Social protection and guaranteed work programs are developing in the African region, India and other developing countries. Unlike conditional cash transfers, a Basic or Citizen’s Income is guaranteed as a right, and may have lower overall cost than means-tested social welfare benefits that require administrative verification. India has recently instituted laws and schemes to support the ability of the most vulnerable to access their rights (Mehta et al. 2011). These include the 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (now known as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act – MGNREGA), which obliges the state to guarantee 100 days of paid employment each year to chronically poor rural households while providing sustainable infrastructure to rural areas. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in India like Barefoot College also help rural communities develop sustainable basic services such as solar electrification, clean water, education, and livelihood development while encouraging activism and women’s empowerment.

Ethiopia’s Productive Safety-Net Program, established in 2005, is the largest social protection program in sub-Saharan Africa outside of South Africa. This government and World Bank initiative shifted
millions of chronically food-insecure, extremely poor rural people from recurrent emergency food aid to a more secure and predictable, and largely cash-based, form of social protection. Recipients work on public works projects for six months a year while those who are unable to work and pregnant or breastfeeding women receive grants. Despite drought and rising food prices, participation in public works and transfers for five years had modest effects on hunger, due in part to insufficient transfer levels (Gilligan, Hod-dinott, & Taffesse 2009; Berhane et al. 2014).

The EU’s shift from the Lisbon Process to the 2020 Growth Strategy emphasizes targeting benefits to the poor, with a goal of reducing the risk of poverty and social exclusion among at least 20 million people. Since moving people into work does not always reduce poverty, the EU also calls for raising benefit levels where they are low. The EU “social investment” approach emphasizes high quality academic and/or vocational training to activate the unemployed into high-wage work, a strategy also being adopted in Latin America (Jenson 2010; Cantillon 2011). One study of 40 middle- and high-income countries finds that the size of transfer income explains cross-country differences in poverty more than the degree of targeting of transfer income (Ferrarini, Nelson & Palme 2015). In sum, the comparative study of welfare states is already well developed and amply supports the main point here that context matters for socioeconomic inclusion.

b. Social dimensions

Different countries have different social structures, some more diverse than others. What may appear as a universal tendency to homophily or preference to interact with people similar to oneself may give rise to social exclusion even in relatively homogeneous social settings (Elias & Scotson 1965), so that homogeneity alone does not predict toleration of and interaction across differences. There are enduring national differences in social isolation, integration, and social capital.

The notion of “cohesion regimes” incorporates social cohesion into the classifications of “welfare regimes” and “varieties of capitalism” (Green, Janmaat, and Han 2009). The “liberal” (Anglo-American), “social market” (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium), and “social democratic” (Nordic) regimes are presented as partially path-dependent regional configurations of institutions. Southern and Central and Eastern Europe are variants, possibly complemented by a “Confucian” (Japanese and East Asian Tigers) model. These regimes differ in terms of labor market regulation and minimum wages, “stakeholder” inclusion or collective bargaining, tax structure and progressivity, targeting and coverage of social protection, but the sociological innovation includes the variations in social capital, trust and crime. The latter are indicators of social integration in the Durkheimian sense of shared moral values and commitments to community considered essential to social order.

Some societies insist on and actively promote assimilation as a condition for full inclusion. Others are more accommodating to multiple cultures, recognizing legal or cultural pluralism in some spheres, and celebrating diversity while actively grappling with finding commonalities that keep many groups together. Both of these approaches take for granted exclusive nation-state boundaries in an era of increasingly transnational mobility and loyalties (Favell 2001; 2014). Openness will change a community’s way of life – its distinctive language, occupation, or religious practices. Some members wish to preserve these unchanged, limiting the desire for contact or exchange with others. Others welcome newcomers for enriching the existing culture. In an era of mass immigration around the world, it is not surprising that societies are debating and defending their criteria of social inclusion.

Some societies like Japan and France expect minority religious or ethnic groups to conform to and incorporate into the national culture. Structural assimilation into the labor force should soon extend to all spheres of social life until cultural differences and social distance disappear (Gordon 1964). As institutions – schools, language and citizenship courses, the military, the media -- socialize newcomers into the dominant culture and intermarriage increases,
“bright” social boundaries that impeded interaction become “blurred” and merely symbolic. An integrationist society allows immigrants “to attain, usually gradually and approximately, the opportunities afforded long-term native citizens of obtaining such valued societal goals as improved socioeconomic position for themselves and their children and to gain inclusion and acceptance in a broad range of societal institutions” (Alba and Foner 2014, p. 264; drawing on Berry 1997). However, the assimilationist understanding of social integration assumes immigrants want to assimilate. A downside of such social inclusion may be the loss of one’s native culture and identity.

Therefore, an alternative conception of integration is multiculturalism, a widely acceptable retention of cultural differences in a plural society that recognizes and protects minority identities, values, and practices but also has much interaction across groups (Kymlicka 2010; Taylor 1992). There are costs to achieving this form of integration as well. It can ossify and overemphasize group membership. It also requires all groups, including native majority citizens, to accommodate one another, which may mean legally recognizing and thereby reinforcing differences and treating some groups differently than others (Honneth 1995). The “politics of recognition” (Taylor 1992) may then produce quarrels over “differentiated citizenship” (Young 1990) and “multicultural rights” (Kymlicka 2010). Diverse societies often fragment, suffering from group conflict, competition, and shortage of social cohesion. Only a few countries officially adopted a culturally-based differentialism for immigrants -- the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada -- but over time, have come to emphasize common socio-economic ideas of integration rather than political or cultural dimensions.

The distinction between these two broad forms of integration – assimilation vs. multiculturalism – is often inscribed in state constitutional structure. Unitary states are more centralized than federal ones, and are perhaps more adamant about social integration and national values. As a rule, federal states tolerate greater institutional variation across regions, comporting more easily with cultural pluralism. Confederations are even more loosely integrated. Plural societies like Belgium, Switzerland, or Lebanon may guarantee political representation of the major ethnic, linguistic, and other groups, but these settlements may become destabilized as groups change in size and status over time. A similar process of destabilization may occur when affirmative action and reservations have succeeded at the social inclusion of once-excluded groups.

**c. Political dimensions**

Political inclusion – the capability of all citizens to participate in making collective decisions about matters that affect their lives – varies considerably across contexts. Political rights— to speak, assemble, vote and hold office – are usually restricted to citizens, but sometimes non-citizens are allowed to vote in local elections, participate in civic associations, and establish their own media. More basic rights to the rule of law – to be safe from state violence and crime, to move about or to occupy public space – are broadly inclusive.

At the international level, one type of contextual effect on political inclusion is the impact of war. Wars sometimes entail ethnic cleansing, the displacement or murder of a group as a means of excluding them from a territory. Obviously not all countries are engaging in armed conflicts. Indeed, it may be a good thing to be excluded from a military draft, which might be seen as a type of adverse incorporation, especially in the case of child soldiers. The Institute for Economics and Peace’s (2015) Global Peace Index for 162 states has three broad themes: the level of safety and security in society, the extent of domestic and international conflict, and the degree of militarization. The Middle East and North Africa overtook South Asia as the least peaceful region of the world, while Europe maintained its position as the most peaceful region, supported by a lack of domestic and external conflicts.

Politically inclusive development should improve governance; bad governance certainly impedes development (Kurtz and Shrank 2007). Stability and
peace, rule of law, control of corruption, and government and regulatory effectiveness are as important to good governance and social inclusion as is equal participation of citizens (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005). Yet there is wide variation across countries in the rule of law and public sector corruption. Living in a corrupt country undermines ordinary people’s trust in government to solve their problems and suppresses participation.

In national contexts that systematically exclude some groups from political representation and office-holding, social movements have advocated, sometimes successfully, for “parity” or group representation. Today, reserving political and legislative seats for women is a widespread policy. The World Economic Forum’s annual Gender Gap Report ranks countries on women’s representation in political office. As on other dimensions, it is highest in the Nordic countries, while a developed country like France ranks 63rd in the political sphere, just below Ethiopia. In 2000, France passed pariété or Equivalence legislation that mandated an equal number of men and women candidates on political party lists and introduced fines for noncompliance. While parity in candidacies is no guarantee of election, there has been some progress. Political affirmative action for women is also policy in the Global South. In Eritrea, for example, 30 percent of seats are earmarked for women, who can also contest for the other 70 percent, while in South Africa, women make up about 30 percent of parliamentarians (Piron and Curran 2005).

Affirmative action or constitutional arrangements to ensure the political representation of minority groups similarly promote inclusion in government. India has reservations for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as well as women (Deshpande 2013), and the socialist Morales government of Bolivia allocated a reservation of five percent of parliamentary seats for indigenous people (Htun and Ossa 2013). A long-term, territorially targeted affirmative action project in public employment in Osaka, Japan reduced poverty and exclusion among the socially excluded Burakumin caste. However, when the program ended, the younger Burakumin could not get jobs, and the ones who had them moved to more affluent areas, causing neighborhood solidarity and income to decline (Tsumaki 2012).

Paradoxically, national inclusion produces exclusion of non-nationals. “Fortress Europe” is an apt metaphor. All states have clear rules of entry to their territory and laws determining how immigrants or their children might become citizens, helping to explain why national context matters in letting newcomers join a society. Ideal types of citizenship have also been delineated. Jus sanguinis refers to ethnocultural citizenship acquired “by blood,” descent, ancestry or heritage traceable to common origins, while under jus solis, territorial and political citizenship is based on place of birth (Brubaker 1992). Jus sanguinis citizenship policies typically exclude foreigners, even those native born, from naturalization unless they meet certain required “integration” criteria, including language and knowledge of the country’s culture and history. In comparison, foreign-born ethnics who immigrate to their “homeland” are more socially included and welcome to become citizens. France and the United States are examples of jus solis countries, while Germany, Japan, and Israel are jus sanguinis systems. It is also possible to break out jus domicilii or rights based on residence, as in Sweden. The former Soviet Union was a multinational state that institutionalized both ethnic nationality and political citizenship, a personal identity and a territorial status, explaining why there were residents of Russian nationality living in Ukraine and Ukrainians living in Russia (e.g., Brubaker 1994, 1992).

The regimes approach has been applied to immigration and incorporation policies, rules and norms regulating inclusion in or exclusion from society, the labor market, and participation in all spheres of life (Faist 1995a; Soysal 1994; Castles and Miller 1993). Real cases cut across these models and may be converging (Joppke and Morawska 2003). In addition, countries differ in extending social rights on the basis of entry type: economic and family reunification immigrants are usually treated differently from refugees and asylum seekers or political immigrants. Building on these distinctions, one can delineate
national citizenship regimes as political opportunity structures based upon how generous or lenient they are in granting immigrants access to full and equal citizenship and cultural group rights (Koopmans 2004). On the first dimension, Switzerland and until recently Germany contrasted sharply in ease of naturalization with the Netherlands or Sweden, and *jus solis* principles for the second generation in Britain and France. On the second dimension, France (and regionally variable Switzerland and Germany) promote unitary assimilation while Britain and the Netherlands adopted until recently a more pluralist or multicultural approach. These contextual differences in inclusionary principles influence “political integration,” the extent to which migrants and ethnic minorities participate in public debates and mobilization (claims-making) around issues of immigration and ethnic relations, politics of their countries of origin as opposed to the country of residence, and proactive participation and rights in the country of residence. There is a strong and consistent positive relation between the inclusiveness of local incorporation regimes and the degree to which immigrants participate proactively in public debates on issues concerning them. By contrast, political focus on the countries of origin is most prevalent where there are few channels of access to the decision-making process and little legitimacy is granted in the public domain.

5 Neighborhood contexts

Globalization and liberalization have weakened the nation-state, but as discussed above, there are still significant national differences in social exclusion and inclusion. When it comes to exclusion and inclusion at the subnational level, globalization has only strengthened the importance of local action, ties and identities (Brenner 2004). Nation-states have devolved functions to states and cities that themselves compete as entities in the global economy. Just as international, regional, and national contexts mediate global forces, so too do local contexts. Regions, cities and neighborhoods differ in their natural and built environments, economic resources, social diversity, and political systems, increasing the context-dependency of social inclusion. Historically, and place-specific ideas and institutions set the local terms of belonging and participation.

A key mechanism of social exclusion is segregation or spatial exclusion. Putting distance between people also reduces interaction among them, even with increasingly sophisticated information technology, while sharing the same space means similar interests in the economic, social and political environment – the local labor market, collective activities and political representation. Table 1 illustrates how segregation influences access to opportunities, social inclusion, and participation.

a. Economic dimensions

Where one lives greatly determines access to opportunities, ultimately affecting one’s health, education, and economic outcomes (Sampson 2013). Spatial segregation of cities by income, class, and group memberships has been demonstrated in the United States and Europe to affect the chances of disadvantaged groups and individuals to move up the social ladder (Chetty and Hendren 2015; Rothwell & Massey 2014; Sharkey 2013; van Ham et al 2012; Wodtke, Harding & Elske 2011). Other things equal, living or growing up in a poor neighborhood has an impact on many dimensions of social exclusion (Jencks & Mayer 1990; Ellen & Turner 1997; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002; Sharkey & Faber 2014). It reduces academic, verbal and cognitive development, school completion, well-being, employment and income. It increases exposure to crime, disorder, and violence. Social exclusion has detrimental effects on health (Montgomery and Hewett 2005; World Health Organization Social Exclusion Knowledge 2008). And as we shall see, it has adverse effects on trust and collective efficacy.

Given the impact of neighborhoods on economic prospects, standards of living and social inclusion, the US and Europe adopted policies of social mixing to overcome spatial exclusion, such as inclusionary zoning and housing allowances. The first encourages the construction or subsidization of affordable housing in places where the privileged have secluded themselves. In the US, most inclusionary zoning...
programs are court-ordered or legally mandated, imposed on reluctant towns as a remedy for discrimination. Evaluations show that, despite fears, low income newcomers had none of the adverse effects expected. The second approach to social mixing encourages the poor to move away from slums and ghettos to areas of low poverty. Portable rent subsidies have been extensively evaluated in random control experiments with mixed effects. Moving from a high-poverty neighborhood to a low-poverty area improves perceived safety, health, and control (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000; Rosenbaum and DeLuca 2008), and in the long run, may improve children’s school and economic performance, even if it has little effect on parental employment and earnings (Chetty, Hendren, and Katz 2015; Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008; Ludwig et al. 2013). Yet, a lot of poor parents moved back to poor or racially segregated areas over the course of the experiment, implying that community solidarity and social ties were more important to the poor than mixing with others. Mixing residents of different income levels may thus lead to mutual avoidance.

The effect of living in poor neighborhoods is not confined to American cities. Research on residential segregation in Europe is more recent than that in the US and focuses on immigrant integration rather than racial conflict or crime. Segregation in European cities is generally found to be less pronounced than in the US (Musterd 2005; Glikman and Semyonov 2012), although it has reached substantial levels, in particular in large multi-cultural conglomerations. In comparison to other European and American countries, the level of ethnic residential segregation in the Netherlands is rather high, whereas that of income segregation is relatively low (Bolt, Van Ham and Van Kempen 2008). In Sweden, the welfare state ensures that living conditions do not vary very much across cities, yet neighborhood income mixing in Swedish cities does have an enduring effect on people’s subsequent earnings (Anderson and Musterd 2010; Musterd, Galster, and Andersson 2012). Apparently low levels of ethnic spatial segregation in Southern European cities conceals a real problem of social residential marginalization due to differentiated welfare redistributive arrangements and dualist housing systems (Arbaci 2008). Urban residential segregation by income in developing countries is also pronounced and, based upon data from Ankara, Nanjing, Nairobi, Santiago, Rio de Janeiro and Latin American cities as a whole (Smets and Salman 2008), may be increasing.

In the developing world, living in a slum is especially dangerous, excluding residents from basic hygiene, safety, and public services (Aujero and Sistun 2009; Davis 1997; Koonings & Kruijt 2009; Roy 2005).

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**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>SEGREGATION</th>
<th>MECHANISMS</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC</td>
<td>Concentrated poverty; slums; gated communities</td>
<td>Distance from jobs; no or low quality education, public services, housing, environmental degradation; non-working role models</td>
<td>Employment; schooling; health; intergenerational mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL/CULTURAL</td>
<td>Racial/ethnic segregation or diversity</td>
<td>Peers; family structure; social networks; risky behaviors; stores, churches, institutions</td>
<td>Intergroup relations; trust, cohesion, efficacy; isolation, disorder, crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL</td>
<td>Restricted public space; safety/protection; rights</td>
<td>Interaction with strangers; trust; protection or exposure to violence; policing; rule of law; civil rights to speech, association, etc.</td>
<td>Voting; civic and political participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Corrupt bureaucrats, criminal mafias, usurious moneylenders, and high turnover of slum dwellers can lead to disempowerment, distrust and disengagement in community affairs (Nositer 2013; Weinstein 2014). Sometimes residents must band together as “vigilantes” to address corrupt and uncontrolled police as well as armed criminals. Insufficient protection from violence is also a way of excluding the poor from the potential benefits of an urban existence in megacities of the South.

The total number of slum dwellers in the world reached nearly a billion people in 2001, or 32 per cent of the world’s total urban population and more than one in 10 of the total global population (UN Habitat 2003; Neuwirth 2004). By 2012, the number living in slums fell to nearly 900 million people (UN Habitat 2012). However miserable the environments and informal work conditions, slums are also places of enterprise, enabling rural migrants to earn a living, support families, and invest in their homes, fighting to defend them from demolition (Saunders 2012; Perlman 2011; Romero 2012). Bottom up organizations of residents can sometimes be effective in preventing slum relocation, improving infrastructure, and winning legal recognition (Kimmelman 2013; De Soto 2001; Smets 2008). In sum, the SDG for slum eradication must be approached with care, including residents in decision making that profoundly affects their lives.

Segregation of the poor is a general mechanism of spatial exclusion, but a more specific one is ghettoidization, or the confinement of a racial, religious, indigenous or subcultural group to a specific area, regardless of income (Hutchinson & Haynes 2011; Wacquant 2009; Dubet & Lapeyronnie 1999). This group spatial enclosure is manifested in concentration camps, leper colonies, reservations, townships, guest worker compounds, asylums, prisons, and redlined zones, all designed to isolate a group from social interaction with the majority. It takes little imagination to see how such confinement, as opposed to voluntary clustering, gives rise to economic and other forms of exclusion (Cutler, Glaeser & Vigdor 2008). Because the police are often involved in enforcing enclosure, ghettos are also prone to rioting, reinforcing local disadvantages. Racial and spatially based inequalities persist even in such places, like the post-Apartheid townships of Johannesburg and Cape Town, with affirmative action and black empowerment programs and strategies to upgrade informal settlements (Beall 2002).

The relational mechanisms of confinement differ from the self-segregation or exclusion of other groups. Some ethnic minorities and castes occupy economic niches in the market, even in dishonorable occupations like garbage collection, slaughtering, or leather tanning. Some theorize that, by monopolizing particular activities, outsiders can compensate for their competitive disadvantages in the broader labor market and, by specializing, may innovate in particular fields. This mechanism would represent a case of “dual closure,” in which excluded groups respond by excluding outsiders themselves.

Castes are occupational groupings as well as ranks in a sacred status order. Not all places have caste exclusion, but the specialization and confinement of lower castes in dishonorable occupations also secures them a minimal level of subsistence. To the extent that their necessary functions are deemed disgusting or degrading, they are restricted to particular peripheral places and their practitioners are segregated. In India’s seven largest cities, there are high levels of ward segregation by caste that exceeded segregation based on socioeconomic status. Yet Mumbai had a relatively low level of caste segregation compared to Delhi, perhaps because slums are more evenly distributed and slum-dwellers are more integrated among others in Mumbai than elsewhere (Vithayathil and Singh 2012). In Japanese cities too, the Burakamin caste is segregated in cities near garbage dumps, slaughterhouses, and other noxious areas where they worked as trash collectors, butchers, leather workers, and in similar low paid occupations (Tsumaki 2012).

There is mixed evidence about the economic effects of immigrants participating in an ethnic enclave, whether defined as residence-based or workplace-based. Ethnic enclaves, conceived as distinct
spatial concentrations of immigrant groups with a variety of enterprises serving their own ethnic market and/or the general population and employing co-ethnics, have positive benefits for some participants, like Cubans in Miami (Portes and Jensen 1989). However, for some groups, it appears that working in an enclave has no or even a negative effect compared to competing in the larger economy, as ethnic employers can more easily exploit workers excluded from the general labor market (Sanders and Nee 1987; Xie & Gough 2012). To the extent that involuntary spatial clustering of some group members contributes to economic outcomes, where one lives matters for social exclusion.

A different mechanism of self-segregation is exclusion of the affluent. Rulers have always lived in protected palaces and walled citadels. In modern times, entire tax haven countries have attracted the super-rich. But since the 1980s, there has been a proliferation of “gated communities” all over the world. These exclusionary enclaves not only reinforce rising income segregation, they add to the impoverishment of public life and facilities. “The key element of gating is the effort to control access to the settlement. Gated developments have an inside and an outside” (Grant and Mittelsteadt 2004, 214). By restricting entry, gating allows upper and middle class residents to secede from seemingly uncontrolled public spaces and from citizenship obligations to contribute taxes and time to the larger society. Seclusion makes it possible to hoard resources and earn rents at outsiders’ expense. Residents keep their own costs low and externalize the costs of traffic, protective services, greenery, schools and other public functions.

Thus, in a sense, residents of gated communities enjoy “club goods” (Webster, Glasze, & Frantz 2002). They restrict public access to specialized amenities and eliminate paying for free riders on public municipal services. Gated communities enjoy a price premium compared to non-gated subdivisions in the same area, especially in wealthy zones (La Goix & Vesselova 2013). However, in some settings, like Santiago where gated communities abut poor neighborhoods, there may be some positive spillovers for the excluded (Salcedo and Torres 2004).

Although pioneered and extensively studied in the United States, gated communities have spread internationally, thanks partly to global developers, architects, and real estate marketers and partly to the demands of cosmopolitan affluent residents. Nevertheless, the motivations, composition, physical forms, and exclusionary consequences of gated communities vary considerably across contexts, which now include cities in most world regions (Atkinson & Blandy 2005; Bagaeen & Uduku 2010; Glasze, Webster & Frantz 2006; Webster, Glasze, & Frantz 2002). Especially important to impeding exclusion by the new developments is the presence of strong municipal land use controls (Libertun de Duren 2006) and legal delineation of public and private (Levi 2009). Indeed, the governance within gated communities -- in which citizens commit to a code of conduct and contract away their property and citizenship rights to management corporations whose only goal is preserving property values -- is one of the central themes in the study of gated communities (McKenzie 1994, 2011; Atkinson & Blandy 2005). Symbolizing the decline of community, residents of gated communities profess they want anonymity and to avoid contact with strangers (Wu 2005; Low 2005). In these Geographies of Exclusion (Sibley 1995), spatial boundaries are moral ones as well.

There are numerous types of gated communities (Blakely & Snyder 1997). Some are lifestyle enclaves, like retirement communities. In developing settings, amenities may even include potable water unavailable from the municipality. Other gated communities are fortresses or citadels (Davis 1990; Caldeira 2001), reflecting a fear of crime, a flight to security, and withdrawal of the state from public spaces. Despite residents’ feeling safer (Low 2005), there is no evidence that there is less crime inside these security zones (Blakely & Snyder). Some don’t have gates or fences at all, marking off their exclusive territory with natural boundaries or with an “architecture of fear” (Grant & Mittelsteadt 2004). Most newly built gated communities are suburban or peripheral where
the land is cheap and available, but in European cities, they are sometimes built on once industrial land or obsolete ports to take advantage of demand there for waterfront and central city living. Indeed, gated communities have made least headway in Europe where urban planning is highly developed.

In the United States, gated communities emerged in a setting that was already dominated by capitalist housing development. In other places with poorly developed markets or mostly state provided housing, gated communities and the private services they provide came to compensate for limited government effectiveness as well as confer prestige. In some parts of Latin America and Africa where states may not reliably provide protection, gated communities offer safety, even for the middle class. In Indonesia, some members of the ethnic Chinese community are clustered in gated communities (Leisch 2003), while in Australia, South African émigrés imported gating from security practices in their former home (Landman 2003). In Israel, gated lifestyle communities, some sponsored by churches and NGOs, grew up alongside kibbutzim, frontier enclaves of pioneers, and the armed camps with amenities for settlers (Rosen & Razin 2008a, b). In post-communist transition settings, where local governments now provide services only to those who can pay, gates provide residents with higher quality consumption and prestige (Hirt 2012; Csefalvay 2010). In China, where workplaces once had their own housing compounds, people now live in private gated housing developments that symbolize a post-socialist transition to commodified services, rather than a retreat out of fear (Wu 2005; Pow 2007). Yet prestige is not the only appeal of this housing form. In traditional Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, women and extended families can be secluded behind walls, while guest workers from South Asia are housed in separate compounds. Thus, religious boundaries also provide a different motivation for gating.

In sum, despite the common impacts of globalization and liberalization, there is wide variation in the types, rationales, and quantity of gated communities. They are found in places with low crime and high social cohesion, in capitalist and communist countries. Thus, “the same form has distinct uses and meanings in different political and cultural contexts... It is not enough to acknowledge that local contexts matter in general, one needs to identify the specific mechanisms through which differences are produced.” (Bodnar and Molnar 2010, 808). Local institutions and laws governing markets, public and private, and land use, historical development, and cultural values governing intergroup relations are all sources of contextual differentiation (Webster, Glasze, & Frantze 2002).

b. Social dimensions

Social cohesion and diversity in the local setting have social and cultural as well as economic effects. Social cohesion and social organization increase social control and collective efficacy in an area which in turn reduce crime (Sampson 2013). There are two main theories of the impact of diversity on social inclusion, social capital and intergroup trust. One holds that diversity increases contact between insiders and outsiders who, if socioeconomically similar, will interact, become familiar, and abandon stereotypes (Allport 1954). This is a liberal expectation akin to assumptions about immigrant assimilation. It also undergirds desegregation or “integration” policies. Although most racially integrated neighborhoods are usually in the process of succession from one group to another, there are still stable multicultural neighborhoods (Maly 2005; Ellen 2001). The alternative theory holds that as an outgroup grows in size, it represents a competitive threat to the majority,
undermines norms and social order, and produces conflict (Blalock 1967). Diversity encourages insiders to distrust and avoid the other, to isolate themselves, “hunker down” and constrict social involvement (Putnam 2007). This reduces social cohesion and collective efficacy and may increase crime.

These hypotheses have been extensively tested in the US, Europe, Australia, and even Malaysia at many scales of analysis with mixed results. The evidence depends upon the context or level at which diversity is measured. One meta-analysis of 90 studies concluded that ethnic heterogeneity reduces social cohesion at the neighborhood level more in US studies than in Europe (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). For example, in the United States, the more diverse the neighborhood is, the less trusting are the neighbors (Putnam 2007). Residents perceive more disorder when there are more immigrants (Sampson 2012). Putnam’s conjectures are less supported, however, primarily in settings outside the US (e.g., Gijsberts, van der Meer, and Dagevos 2011). In West Germany, immigrants living in segregated neighborhoods are more likely to report ethnic discrimination (Dill and Jirhahn 2014). Putnam’s hypothesis was also supported in Australian suburbs, where ethnic diversity attenuated social cohesion and neighborly exchange. However, diversity was less consequential for neighborly exchange among immigrants when compared to the general population (Wickes et al. 2014). Elsewhere, in contrast, attitudes towards out-groups, neighborly exchanges, and social cohesion were related to ethnic diversity in complex ways. There is some support for the contact hypothesis in the Netherlands, depending on the share of Moroccans, Antilleans, and Surinamese in the neighborhood (Havékes, Coenders, Dekker, and van der Lippe 2014). In the UK, poverty has a stronger effect on the two dimensions of collective efficacy -- social cohesion and informal social control – than does diversity, although both are influential (Twigg, Taylor & Mohan 2010).

Neighborhood ecological studies predicting social cohesion or its social effects have rarely been tested outside the context of the United States and Western Europe. A few quantitative studies of crime in poor neighborhoods in developing countries do exist. For example, unlike American areas of concentrated poverty, Brazilian lower-income neighborhoods, including favelas, have higher levels of social cohesion than more affluent neighborhoods, but that greater cohesion is associated with higher, not lower levels of crime. Neighborhood social and physical disorder does increase violent victimization. However, residents’ perceived risk of being victimized increases with social cohesion, partly because greater social interaction diffuses information about crimes (Villarreal and Silva 2006). Another study in Malaysia found a greater sense of belonging and a feeling of morale among the neighborhood residents significantly reduced reported crime victimization, but contrary to the American literature, collective efficacy increased it. In addition, these three social cohesion measures were related to neighborhood racial heterogeneity, with Malay residents having the highest levels of social cohesion measures, followed by the Indian and Chinese respondents (Marzbali et al. 2014).

c. Political dimensions

Places matter, we have seen, for economic and social outcomes. Neighborhood levels of poverty, ethnic diversity, and social cohesion have these effects through multiple mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. Context also influences political participation. It does so through different rules governing citizenship rights and obligations, through the extent of decentralization of decision-making and local organization, and through the provision of open public space.

At the national level, as discussed, access to citizenship is crucial for participation in the electoral process or exercising free speech, assembly, and other rights essential to democratic participation. Legal exclusion leaves the urban poor vulnerable and lacking protection from the legal justice system. Some countries -- Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands -- do permit legal residents who are not citizens to vote in local elections and engage
in local associations since the issues affect their immediate lives (Togeby 1999). In fact, turnout of immigrants is higher in Denmark than in Sweden and other countries where immigrants can vote in local elections partly because the rules for personal voting provide incentives for collective mobilization. More generally, in areas with jurisdictional rather than at-large elections, there are political benefits to spatial clustering of minority group members. They can then compose a majority in at least one electoral jurisdiction and elect a group member to office to represent group-specific interests. Concentration of minorities in an area also allows them to pool resources to pursue group-specific local priorities.

However, allowing non-citizens to vote is also justified by the goal of social inclusion, to allow residents to engage directly in the larger community rather than live on the margins. Indeed, it is at the local level where social integration of migrants is most immediate. UNESCO defines civic inclusion as the connection that migrants feel with the larger urban community in which they live. Civic inclusion is based upon local involvement with the city, whether at the neighborhood, metropolitan, or even transnational scale. Whether one has arrived from the countryside to the city or from one country to another, newcomers learn what it means to belong to the community in their proximate environment. Having the occasion to interact with long-term residents helps acclimate and orient newcomers, even though, research finds, it may lead to conflicts. Local politics is a means of peacefully resolving the conflicts of daily living.

The prototypical context for such local interaction is often the voluntary civic association. Communitarian philosophers since Tocqueville and Madison have extolled the contribution of a pluralism of associations in civil society as schools of democracy for learning other-regarding participatory skills and tolerance. Parents of children who attend the same school often organize for common goals. Residents of the same street may organize around the need for water, toilets, sewers, lighting, garbage removal, safety, quiet, and other collective goods. Small victories on practical matters build trust and teach people of diverse backgrounds that they can cooperate across differences. This expectation rests on the assumption that local jurisdictions and institutions are in fact diverse. High levels of participation among homogeneous residents can rather produce intolerance and exclusionary NIMBY (Not In My BackYard) attitudes.

The World Social Forum has called for more direct, democratic public involvement in decision-making at the local and national government levels. Some places – Switzerland, California, Brazil – have a long tradition of citizen initiatives and direct democracy. Referenda can be proposed from below as well as above. In addition to elections on propositions from ordinary people, public campaign financing is another inclusive device to encourage participation in politics. However, some states forbid or discourage voluntary organizations, seeing them as competing with dominant parties or governments, resulting in political exclusion.

Local participation in community development has become a central theme in the international movement for inclusionary development. Sometimes it is assumed that participation is an empowering, inclusionary, and democratic means to progressive, redistributive ends. The Washington Consensus touted social capital – “the role that values and norms play in economic life” – as a nongovernmental avenue to economic development when states fail (Fukuyama 2002). There is a wide range of participatory mechanisms, including political reservations for minority groups, consumer surveys and service report cards, community representatives to manage or monitor education and health services, and participatory budgeting.

Yet the evidence assessing top-down approaches to enlivening “civil society” is mixed. States can cynically use participatory forums to offload public

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responsibilities, defuse protest, co-opt opponents, impose social control, and mobilize communities behind their own agenda. Public-private partnerships assume that participating civil society organizations that claim to be representatives of excluded groups are legitimate, but unlike parties and unions, they were never elected and are not accountable to those they claim to speak for (Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle 2009). Self-selection into voluntary associations results in relatively homogeneous groups of better educated individuals with more resources, excluding the disadvantaged (Perrin and McFarland 2008: 1234). Even if decision-making forums are open and the poor do participate, more privileged group members dominate the proceedings. Excluded groups face multiple and interrelated disadvantages, impeding their empowerment and social capital. They lack resources of time, money, culture, information, contacts, and rights. They are fragmented by ethnic, language, village, and other cultural differences. They are fearful of both the state and the mafias that replace it. Therefore, outreach and community organizing efforts in depressed areas often fail (Gittell & Vidal 1998). Incorporation in organized decision-making does not guarantee high levels of participation. And direct grassroots participation of powerless people and other forms of political inclusion do not ensure redistributive, inclusive, or pro-poor policies (Desai 2010).

A lot depends on context. For example, thanks to a 1993 constitutional amendment that mandated that women serve as leaders (pradhans) of one-third of randomly selected gram panchayats (village councils responsible for local infrastructure and other decisions), this quota system has improved general perceptions of women’s abilities, improved women’s electoral chances, and raised educational attainment of teenage girls (Beaman et al. 2009). Women leaders are more likely to raise spending on education, health, nutrition and other expenditures benefiting women and children. Another instance is the self-organization of the “new” poor, workers who lost everything in the 2001 Argentina crisis. Already acquainted with unions, these workers organized neighborhood assemblies, barter clubs, and housing cooperatives in occupied vacant buildings (Sitrin 2012).

Participatory budgeting, which originated in Porto Allegre, Brazil in 1989 and quickly spread all over the world, is an open process in which community members directly decide how to spend part of a public budget (Goldfrank & Shrank 2009; Shah 2007). It aims to deepen democracy, increase transparency, and promote greater efficiency, thereby increasing citizens’ trust in government. It empowers ordinary residents, whether formal citizens or not, and builds community around common goals. By providing selective material incentives to get involved, participatory budgeting may mobilize and give voice to previously excluded and disaffected citizens (Fung & Wright 2001). For example, in São Paulo, there are territorial and thematic representatives and quotas for socially vulnerable segments—Afro Brazilians, senior citizens, children and adolescents, youth, the LGBT community, women, indigenous groups, the homeless, and people with disabilities (Silver, Scott & Kazepov 2010). Participatory budgeting in Brazilian municipalities between 1990 and 2004 favored the allocation of public expenditures in line with citizens’ preferences and channeled a larger fraction of their budgets to investments in sanitation and health services, which reduced infant mortality rates (Goncalves 2014). In an African context, public services are often ineffective or nonexistent and tax collection often difficult. Participatory budgeting should therefore enable civil society to hold local governments more accountable and undermine corruption.

Yet increased association and public community participation may not benefit the poor if unequal power structures remain in place. Predatory officials often interfere with decentralized or participatory budgeting initiatives. In Africa, for example, social relationships, collective action, and local institutions may structurally reproduce the exclusion of the poorest. “As such, a politically neutral and undersocialized policy focus on strengthening associational life and public participation of the poor is unlikely to lead to their greater inclusion, nor to significant poverty alleviation” (Cleaver 2005). There are clear contextual
differences in the impact of participatory budgeting in different African cities, such as Johannesburg, where the mayor and city officials encouraged citizen participation in public meetings with outreach and training at the ward level, and Harare, where there was little citizen consultation and even bans on community organizations’ capacity building. Indeed, it helped that South Africa’s constitution guarantees local government while Zimbabwe’s does not, allowing central government ministers to dismiss mayors and councilors (Masiya 2012). The comparison of an inclusive practice in two most different African capitals shows the institutional obstacles to citizen participation. More generally, the inclusionary and redistributive impacts of citizen budgeting are modest. Since illiteracy, language barriers, fear of retaliation for criticism and other obstacles lower popular attendance, organized interests can often capture the process (Lerner & Secondo 2011; Goldfrank 2007).

For those excluded from conventional political parties and electoral politics, social movements would seem to provide an alternative participatory mechanism. Resource mobilization theory sees social movement actions as rational adaptations to costs and rewards of alternative courses of action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Movements mobilize based upon changing resources, organization, and opportunities for collective action. Movement strategies shift as they switch from moments of contention to consensus building (Silver, Scott & Kazepov 2010). Insurgent movements ultimately demobilize or shift to standardized, non-threatening, less disruptive collective action. They may meet repression and exclusion, or political parties may adopt their issues and enact changes. Thus, movements may be less an alternative to electoral politics than a stage in the “cycles of protest and institutionalization of dissent” (Hipsher 1998). Movement institutionalization can either marginalize or mainstream the movement. In the 1980s, social movements of indigenous groups, women, slum dwellers and other excluded groups demanded equal rights in Latin America, but since the 1990s, as democracy consolidated, Brazilian movements were institutionalized and integrated into decision-making, while in Chile, the movements were institutionalized but marginalized (Hipsher 1998). Outcomes hinge upon the “political opportunity structure” (Eisinger 1973; Kitchelt 1986) – the shifting institutional structure, the openness of political parties, the unity and ideological dispositions of those in power, potential allies, and crises that change them.

During the 21st century, social movements assumed a somewhat different form. New information technology increased the opportunities for ordinary people to network, share information, solve problems, and disband. Social movements are less likely to have leaders or organizations. Wikipedia, chat rooms, open-source software, and so on allow self-styled experts, many wary of authority, to have a say on virtually any subject. Nevertheless, the selectivity and ephemerality of this horizontal or decentralized activism remain problems that undermine the democratic claims of such movements (Polletta 2014). Participants are often the most extreme adherents to a cause, excluding moderate opinions and those with other priorities. This form of participation does not require compromise. It rests upon a provisional unity rather than consensus. It takes no account of the digital divide.

Although activists may meet and organize on-line, these movements also touch ground. From the Tea Party on the right to Syntagma Square on the left, citizens around the world have been assembling in central squares to protest injustices, climate change, inequality, austerity and repressive governments (Harvey 2013; Sitrin & Azzellini 2014). The recent mobilizations of urban social movements in Zuccotti and Gezi Parks and in Tiananmen, Tahrir, and Independence Squares are dramatic manifestations of the power of public space to communicate democratic aspirations and ownership of the city. These movements combine relations formed in cyberspace and in urban space, but the latter is essential. By seizing
and making themselves visible in public squares, symbolic buildings, and other sites of power, the movements build solidarity and share information through simple “togetherness” and deliberation (Castells 2012).

For all the popular demands for the “right to the city,” direct democratic participation rests upon freedom of speech and assembly in public space. Yet, the new social movements face a recent tendency for states to privatize, police, and displace people from public space. Municipal governments and planners are redesigning or “malling” public squares, plazas, waterfronts, and parks to attract private investment and affluent taxpayers. At the same time, they are displacing and even criminalizing “undesirables” who loiter, beg, sleep, and perform other private acts in public, often barring the very presence of homeless bodies from space. Even when the public is not excluded, Business Improvement Districts, park conservancies, and private security raise questions about democratic control of “the people’s property.” This modern-day enclosure movement, or what Harvey (2013) calls “accumulation by dispossession,” is a form of political exclusion. Not surprisingly, conflicts over the city’s public space – its extent, openness, regulation, and control – are multiplying.

Social movements are helping to create international ties among excluded groups at the local level. Local associations may be encouraged by or assisted in these activities by outside community organizers and even international “non-governmental organizations” with the resources and know-how to solve problems effectively. Self-organized groups often link up with one another within and across localities, and may form federations. Yet when they do, movements concerned with international issues – demonstrations against globalization and climate change and local protests against siting global sports events that call for home demolitions – need a physical place to gather.

In sum, political exclusion takes many forms, but varies by social context. Protection from arbitrary violence seems like a universal right, but in fact is unevenly provided. Legal rights to participate in political decisions that affect people’s lives usually exclude non-citizens, but some places include them in local elections. Civic participation in associations, even where permitted, tends to be greater among more advantaged groups, and thus, may reinforce exclusion. Even when the poor are represented in decision-making bodies, they may not prevail. Participatory budgeting and related direct democratic mechanisms have inclusionary potential, but are often biased as well. While collective action in social movements seems to offer more empowerment, the digital divide and restricted access to public space also impede political inclusion. These factors too are spatially uneven.

### Conclusions

This paper contends that social exclusion and inclusion are context-dependent concepts and phenomena. It not only asserts that context matters, but also shows how it does so, identifying some of the mechanisms by which nation-states and localities influence processes of economic, social, and political exclusion and inclusion. To say that exclusion and inclusion vary in meaning and manifestations across contexts is not to gainsay the impact of globalization trends in generating exclusion, but rather to insist that national and local solidarities and institutions mediate those trends and lead to distinctive patterns in different places. Because ideas and institutions persist in place, inclusion is spatially uneven.

National and local attachments and institutions are resilient despite economic change. Globalization is sometimes juxtaposed to and even blamed for exclusionary particularism. While social exclusion is usually condemned as unjust, it should be remembered that inclusion has its downsides too. Openness can jeopardize valued identities, group ways of life, and the feeling of being at home. Assimilation often means acculturation or the end of group practices, solidarity, and beliefs. Languages become extinct. Tribes can no longer maintain their practices. There is pressure, even coercion for minorities to conform. Cultural rights and group self-determination are
increasingly recognized as universal. Group autonomy at least offers some control over one’s associates. Neighborhood integration is not only resisted for nefarious, self-interested, or bigoted reasons. Spatial clustering may enable a group to achieve a jurisdictional majority and elect its own representatives. Social mixing policies that press subsidized minorities to interact with more privileged neighbors who look down on them can produce a sense of “incorporated exclusion” (Chaskin and Joseph 2015) rather than the intended engagement with equal citizens.

Indeed, the terms of social inclusion may put newcomers at a permanent disadvantage relative to existing members. “Adverse incorporation” is a perverse expression of social inclusion that, in contexts of local monopolies, may perpetuate poverty (Hickey and du Toit 2007). Forced labor or a starvation wage is not a true invitation to participate. Paradoxically, recognizing and assisting an excluded group in the name of inclusion may simultaneously stigmatize, label, or include them in ways they did not choose (Ahmed 2012). Inclusion sounds good – but on whose terms? On the other hand, exclusion may be worse. As Joan Robinson (1962) famously quipped, “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all.” In sum, as the SDGs promote “inclusive development,” it is worth noting that economic inclusion of the poor may take place without poverty reduction. While inclusion is usually a desirable objective, it all depends on the context.
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