Supplementary note on the recommendations of the Secretary-General for the 2012 QCPR

PART I THE CHANGING DEVELOPMENT LANDSCAPE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM?		

1	*Recommendation*	The General Assembly may wish to:
		1. Recognize the significant changes taking place in the broader environment for global development cooperation and their important implications for the United Nations development system.
		2. Recognize the vital role and comparative advantage of the United Nations development system in accelerating progress on the MDGs and other internationally-agreed development goals, addressing inequality and supporting the most vulnerable, and advancing integration of the three pillars of sustainable development.
		3. Recognize the unique role and comparative advantage of the United Nations system in promoting the values, principles, norms and standards of the United Nations Charter with all Member States, and in supporting Member States, at their request, to integrate these international norms in national policies.
		4. Encourage the United Nations development system to scale up its capacity to engage in innovative partnerships with new and emerging stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector and foundations, and to intensify collaboration with the Bretton Woods Institutions, particularly the World Bank, and the regional development banks.
		5. Take note and welcome the proposal of the Secretary-General and consider engaging in a transparent and inclusive dialogue on the longer-term positioning of the United Nations development system in the rapidly changing development cooperation environment.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• As noted in the Secretary-General's report on the QCPR, the development landscape is changing. Four features were identified as being particularly relevant for development cooperation: (a) emergence of new centres of economic dynamism; (b) intensification of global challenges calling for scaling-up as well as leveraging of development assistance and cooperation around common goals and agreed actions; (c) transforming relationship among states, markets and individuals; and (d) growth of new institutional actors strengthening the ranks of development partners. • In 1990, 95 per cent of the poorest in the world lived in low-income countries. Today, however, the largest absolute number of the poor live in middle-income countries, at about 75 per cent of the world's poorest. The reality of absolute poverty in middle-income countries suggests a continuing role for development cooperation, with emphasis on targeted	• When governments in the survey of programme countries were asked to identify the thematic areas in which they would welcome the UN's support in the future, the most frequently chosen area was the 'environment and sustainable development' including climate change, water and sanitation. This was followed by health, poverty reduction and education. In terms of thematic areas that moved up the list (compared to current development priorities), most notably, economic growth and employment moved up from 14th to 5th place. Countries in all income groups shared this view, and countries in the upper middle-income group selected economic growth and employment more often than any other area besides environment. • Responding effectively to the challenge of sustainable development will require greater clarity and specificity regarding the role of UN operational activities for development (UN-OAD). A presumption that sustainable development impacts on everything and that therefore all agencies should be involved in the work could lead to a fragmented and ultimately inadequate response. Strategic choices will have to be made. Institutional	QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, 31 May 2012 (A/67/93), especially pages 10-16 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/sg_report_for_2012_qcpr.pdf UNDESA: Charts 3, 5, 6, 10, 15 and 48 in report on the survey of programme country Governments: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/government_survey_report_10_june_2012.pdf

programmes and the United Nations "higher-end deliverables", such as policy advice and support to national policy dialogue. Nevertheless, there is a group of least-developed countries which will continue to be heavily aid dependent and for which ODA from all sources remains of vital importance. For them, and the increasing number of countries in crisis and transition situations, UN operational activities for development (UN-OAD) are equally, if not more, important.

- The MDGs agenda has helped to galvanize development efforts and focus action by the United Nations system. Important progress has been made in most countries, but trends are uneven across countries and regions and among social groups, as well as across the specific goals. However, the experience gained over the last 12 years can be applied to accelerate progress on the MDGs.

- The past two decades have seen the intensification of global challenges, which require collective action often based on some degree of national responsibility. These development challenges include: sustainable development, the rising inequality within and among countries, and the increasing number of countries in crisis and transition situations. These challenges illustrate the changing demands on the United Nations development system.

- A fifth of humanity lives in countries experiencing violence, political conflict, insecurity and societal fragility. Conflict-affected countries are home to 60% of the undernourished, 61% of the poor, 77% of children not attending primary school, 65% of people without access to safe water, and 70% of infant deaths. The global challenges of security and poverty are increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected states, and few will meet a single MDG by the year 2015

- Development cooperation is no longer the exclusive domain of nation states. There is an ongoing

fragmentation will have to be addressed. A tighter fit between the normative and operational arms of the UN system may also be needed. The manner in which Member States approach the sustainable development challenge will have an impact on the future direction of UN-OAD. The sustainable development framework, if adopted strategically, could go a long way in contributing to greater integration of the work of UN entities.

- The UN system is also repeatedly being called to provide support to countries in crisis and transition situations. The UN system currently commits a high level of resources to such countries. For example, more than a third of 2010 expenditures on UN-OAD were spent in the 18 integrated mission countries, yet financial allocations are often for unpredictable periods of time.

- Due to the complicated development challenges facing countries in crisis and transition situations, it is important that the UN system evolve operational modalities that allow the entities that represent the different pillars of the organization to operate in a seamless manner in support of national efforts. This calls for a special rethinking on how the work of the UN system can be made more coherent, effective and efficient in crisis and transition situations.

- Governments in all programme countries, regardless of income level, indicated that working towards the achievement of the MDGs had been a focus of the UN's work. At the same time, the focus was the strongest in the countries where incomes are lowest. This would be logical, since this is where, in general, the greatest development challenges are found. In supplementary comments, several governments in programme countries expressed the wish that the UN would provide even more support to help realize the MDGs. Some other countries, however, mentioned that while the social sectors were important, a more rounded approach was needed, including greater focus on economic growth and strengthening national capacities.

- The traditional boundaries between development, humanitarian assistance, human rights, military and political work have also become interwoven and intermingled in complex ways. The need to break down the silos within which agencies work has important implications for every aspect of UN-OAD: the definition of *functions, funding, staffing, organization* and ultimately the

redistribution of power between the state, on the one hand, and markets, individuals and civil society, on the other. Many of the global issues, which the United Nations confronts can no longer be understood and tackled as exclusively or in many cases, even primarily as a matter for intergovernmental action. Engagement and action by a range of other actors is required: the private sector, civil society, research and academic communities.

- The last decade has seen the emergence of a broad range of new institutional actors. These include new multilateral forums, for example, the Group of 20 and its recent rise to the Summit level. There has been a rapid growth of regional bodies and regional alliances. These bodies, such as the EU, APEC and the AU have all become significant actors in a wide range of countries. The United Nations is now frequently consulting or partnering with these organizations; for example, the AU has become a regular partner of the United Nations in peacekeeping operations. Such partnerships potentially enhance the competencies and extend the reach of the United Nations development system.

- There has also been a proliferation of increasingly influential foundations engaged in development cooperation. In the last several decades, the number of foundations involved in such cooperation has tripled. A number of these institutions not only carry significant financial weight, but have also developed significant convening power. A large number of dynamic networks have also emerged in the last few years in areas such as food security, energy for all and every woman every child.

overarching *governance* arrangements.

- Governments were also asked in the survey of programme countries to indicate the relevance to their needs of various UN attributes. The most frequently chosen were 'has global presence' and 'advocates for international norms and standards'. The CSOs were asked the same question, and they too placed these two attributes at the top of their lists.

- The changing development landscape presents opportunities for enhancing the functioning of the UN development system and the effectiveness and impact of its operational activities. This in turn requires a strategic rethinking on how to reposition UN-OAD to ensure that these are relevant, coherent and fully aligned with the dynamics in the broader development cooperation environment and the changing needs of programme countries. The 2012 QCPR can set the stage for such a strategic rethinking of UN-OAD.

- The outcome of a GA-mandated strategic rethinking exercise on the future challenges and opportunities facing the UN development system in a changing development context could serve as an important background document for the Assembly deliberations in September 2015. It is envisaged that this be an informal and consultative process, underpinned by strong focus on technically-oriented scenario analysis. Member States could discuss progress in the strategic rethinking process at the Operational Activities Segment of the 2014 substantive session of ECOSOC with a report of the Secretary-General submitted to the GA in 2015.

PART II	FUNDING OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT

The General Assembly may wish to:

1	*Recommendation*	Stress that core resources, because of their untied nature, continue to be the bedrock of operational activities for development of the United Nations system. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to reaffirm the importance of adequate, stable and predictable core resources for enhancing the coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of United Nations operational activities for development.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• Core resources are those that are comingled without restrictions and whose use and application are directly linked to the multilateral mandates and strategic plans of UN entities, which are approved by the respective governing bodies as part of an intergovernmental process. • In contrast and as determined by the contributors, non-core resources are mostly earmarked and thus restricted with regard to their use and application. The degree to which the use and application of non-core resources are subject to and aligned with the strategic plans approved by governing bodies is not direct. • The TCPR 2007 resolution stressed "that core resources, because of their untied nature, continue to be the bedrock of the operational activities for development of the United Nations system" and urged "donor countries and other countries in a position to do so to substantially increase their voluntary contributions to the core/regular budgets of the United Nations development system, in particular its funds, programmes and specialized agencies, and to contribute on a multi-year basis, in a sustained and predictable manner." • OECD/DAC does not define non-core contributions to the UN development system as multilateral aid for the purpose of DAC reporting. OECD/DAC instead refers to non-core contributions to the UN development system as 'multi-bi'.	• Core funding is generally seen as a more efficient way of building relevant and effective partnerships with programme countries in the delivery of operational activities for development. • Core resources provide the highest quality and flexibility of pooled funding. They are critical for ensuring the capacity of UN entities to deliver on their multilateral mandates and provide continued substantive leadership and innovation around specific goals, advocacy and policy work, in addition to programmatic implementation on the ground. • Core resources are central to ensuring the United Nations' independence, neutrality, universality and role as trusted partner in a changing development cooperation landscape. Heavy reliance on non-core funding also creates a risk of imbalances in resource allocation across countries and sectors, which can undermine the overall development effectiveness of support provided by the UN development system to programme countries. • Governments emphasized in the programme country survey that capacity development entails a long-term commitment, which UN entities often cannot make with non-core funds. The exception would be funds such as the "One UN Funds" that have a longer duration than typical non-core contributions. • Restricted funding in the form of non-core resources is often seen as potentially distorting programme priorities by limiting the proportion of contributions that is directly regulated by intergovernmental governing bodies and processes. Restricted funding is further seen as contributing to fragmentation, competition and overlap among entities and providing a disincentive for pursuing a system-wide focus, strategic positioning and coherence. • Roughly 90% of non-core funding for development-related	Report of the Secretary-General on funding, June 2012: pp 11, 12, 24, 25, 37-41 (A/67/94-E/2012/80); QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: pp 18, 19, 21(A/67/93-E/2012/79) General Assembly resolution 62/208: paragraphs 18, 19 UNDESA: Report on the survey of Governments: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/government_survey_report_10_june_2012.pdf

		activities is programme- and project-specific resulting in a high degree of fragmentation of UN-OAD.	
2	*Recommendation*	Note with concern the declining trend in total contributions to the United Nations development system in the 2008 to 2011 period, as well the ever growing imbalance between unrestricted core and highly fragmented restricted non-core funding for operational activities for development and the manner in which such imbalance may distort overall programme priorities that flow from the established mandates and priorities of the respective United Nations entities.	

	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• See response to recommendation 1. • Tightly earmarked, non-core funded projects are not as effective as those funded by core resources in ensuring alignment with programme country priorities, since non-core funded activities are determined by donor preferences as well as being programme- and project-specific. • The TCPR 2007 resolution noted with concern "that the share of core contributions to United Nations funds and programmes has declined in recent years", and recognized "the need for organizations to address, on a continuous basis, the imbalance between core and non-core resources". • Despite several resolutions urging a more appropriate balance between core and non-core resources, the core share of both total funding for UN-OAD and development-related activities (DEV) has declined since the 2007 TCPR. • The survey of programme country governments revealed mixed views on non-core funding. Many governments did not agree that non-core resources were less relevant to their needs, but explained that they have systems in place to ensure that all UN activities are in line with national needs and priorities. Some governments mentioned that UN activities could be in line with the country's needs but not necessarily with its priorities. One government explained some of the drawbacks they had encountered with non-core resources: "they have a very short time-span for implementation, it is very difficult to make adjustments or changes among components, in general they lack consultation with	• Since 1995, contributions to the United Nations development system have more than doubled in real terms and have grown faster than both total ODA and core multilateral ODA as reported by the DAC. However, almost all of this growth has been in the form of non-core resources, resulting in the core ratio for UN-OAD declining from 53% in 1995 to just 26% in 2010. • Looking only at funding for development-related activities, non-core contributions in 2010 reached a level of more than four and one half times that in 1995, in real terms, corresponding to an average annual growth rate of 10.5%. This is in stark contrast to the modest average annual real growth of 0.6% in core resources in the 1995-2010 period. The core share of total development-related funding declined from 64% in 1995 to 30% in 2010. • For DAC governments only, the core ratio of development-related contributions during the 1995-2010 period declined from 72 to 43%. In 2011, this ratio was slightly higher or 45%, due to decline in development-related non-core funding. • Between 2005 and 2011, total funding for UN-OAD has grown at a slightly slower annual pace, in real terms, than total ODA flows as reported by OECD/DAC, or 2.1 and 3.3% respectively. • Between 2008 and 2011, total funding for UN-OAD dropped by 2% and core resources declined by 8%, while total ODA (excluding debt relief), as reported by DAC, grew by 8%, all figures in real terms. During the same period, total funding for development-related activities increased slightly, or 2%, but core contributions dropped by 6%, both in real terms.	Report of the Secretary-General on funding, June 2012: pp 2, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21 (A/67/94-E/2012/80); QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: pp 16, 17 (A/67/93-E/2012/79); Second report of the Secretary-General on funding, October 2012: pp 2 (A/67/516); General Assembly resolution 62/208: para 18 UNDESA: Report on the survey of Governments: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/government_survey_report_10_june_2012.pdf

	the beneficiary countries and seem to come with 'one size fits all' principles, which creates a problem of internalization and ownership of such funds by implementers".	
	• A distinct pattern was seen when the responses on the core versus non-core question were broken down by type of country. DaO countries held a noticeably more favourable view of non-core resources, suggesting that DaO creates conditions for the effective management of non-core resources by the UN. On the other hand, countries with significant UN humanitarian interventions had the least satisfactory experience with UN non-core resources.	

3	*Recommendation*	Request the President of the Assembly to organize in the first half of 2014 a high-level policy dialogue on funding of operational activities for development of the United Nations system within the broader context of the upcoming intergovernmental discussions on the post-2015 development agenda. In this connection, the General Assembly may wish to:
		a) Request the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes and the governing bodies of the specialized agencies, as appropriate, to undertake a structured dialogue on how to finance the development results to be achieved in the new strategic planning cycle of the respective entities with a view to addressing core/non-core imbalances, making non-core resources more predictable and less restricted, broadening the donor base, and improving the adequacy and predictability of resources flows.
		b) Encourage OECD/DAC member governments and other Member States in a position to do so, to undertake consultations on how to enhance burden-sharing of core funding for development-related activities of the United Nations system and how in particular a more equal burden-sharing can be achieved by donors shifting single-donor, programme- and project-specific non-core contributions to pooled funding mechanisms or core resources. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to encourage OECD/DAC member governments and other Member States in a position to do so, to consider the possibility of adopting an alternative funding model for providing core resources to the funds and programmes such as a "voluntary indicative scale of contributions".
		c) Request the funds and programmes to propose a definition of the concept of "critical mass" of core resources to achieve priority development results and maintain core organizational capacities in the strategic plans of the entities and present a specific proposal in this regard to the respective Executive Boards at the fall session in 2013.
		d) Encourage the implementation of joint programming among members of the United Nations development system through the use of core funds.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• On a number of occasions, various governing bodies have called for or discussed the desirability of a major shift of donor country contributions from non-core to core. However, as the strategic priorities of the United Nations system have become more complex over the decades, so have the aid allocation policies of the major donor countries. In general, donor country aid policies are much more carefully	• Fluctuations in individual non-core contributions have been found to be more pronounced than in the case of core resources, thus the growing core/non-core imbalance results in a higher degree of unpredictability of funding flows to the UN development system. • United Nations entities continue to face challenges of predictability, reliability and stability of funding by individual contributors. Annual changes in donor contributions can be quite	• General Assembly resolution 64/289: paragraph 30 General Assembly resolution 62/208: paragraph 29 Report of the Secretary-General on funding, June 2012: pp 42-44, 51-54 (A/67/94-E/2012/80) QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012:

targeted today than in the past, either by theme or beneficiary, or by some combination of the two.

- Donor aid ministries have also over the years added many new targeted funding lines to their institutional and budgetary structures. Core resources generally come from a budget line used to sustain long-term strategic partnerships with multilateral organizations. Here, the competition for resources has increased dramatically, with the European Union and the global funds being but two examples.

- The TCPR 2007 resolution requested the Secretary-General to undertake, in full consultation with Member States, measures to promote an adequate and expanding base of development assistance from the United Nations system".

- A "critical mass" of core resources can be viewed from a variety of perspectives, but perhaps the most relevant are: (a) for the UN development system as a whole, (b) for United Nations development activities in each programme country and (c) for each entity of the United Nations development system.

- Overlaid on these considerations is the importance of understanding what core resources are used for, namely (a) core programmes, (b) funding what could be called the base structure of each organization and (c) subsidizing management and programme support costs when there is insufficient recovery from non-core resources.

- General Assembly resolution on system-wide coherence (A/64/289) in July, 2010 recognized "the potential positive impact of determining the level of "critical mass" of core funding for United Nations development agencies", and noted, in that regard "that the concept of critical mass may include the level of resources adequate to respond to the needs of the programme countries and to produce the results expected in strategic plans, including administrative, management and programme costs".

significant, including as a result of volatility in exchange rates.

- A recent analysis conducted by DESA comparing OECD/DAC donors' core development-related contributions (DEV) as a percentage of their GNI confirmed that burden sharing is uneven. The median core DEV/GNI ratio was 0.0129 in 2011. The 11 countries that show a core DEV/GNI ratio in excess of the median ratio together contributed $2.0 billion, or 50%, of total DAC core contributions, while their share of total DAC GNI was only 15%. The 11 countries that show a core DEV/GNI ratio below the median ratio also contributed some 47% of total DAC core contributions, but their share of total DAC GNI was 83%.

- The uneven burden-sharing has added importance in view of the fact that core resources are found to subsidize the support to, and management of, activities financed from non-core resources (see Recommendation 6).

- If the 2011 median core DEV/GNI ratio were to be applied as a minimum target for a system of negotiated pledges, total core contributions would have increased by some $2.6 billion, or 52%, to $7.4 billion.

- An analysis was made by DESA of the extent to which shortfalls in core contributions by countries contributing below the median core DEV/GNI level could be covered by those countries switching existing non-core contributions to core contributions. The outcome of the analysis shows that of the total shortfall of $2.6 billion, some $1.8 billion, or close to 70%, could indeed be covered by shifting all or part of existing non-core contributions to core contributions.

- The issue of "critical mass" is directly linked to the growing imbalance between core and non-core sources of financing as well as the issue of cost recovery. While core resources are roughly the same in real terms compared to 15 years ago, the exponential growth in non-core coupled with the fact that core funding subsidizes non-core funding depletes the amount of core resources remaining for UN entities to maintain and continually develop capacities to deliver on their multilateral mandates, including core programme activities on the ground, to provide substantive leadership and innovation, and ensure their independence, neutrality and strategic positioning as trusted partner in a rapidly evolving development environment.;

- To date, virtually all pooled funding has been provided by DAC

pp 18, 20, 21 (A/67/93-E/2012/79)

Second report of the Secretary-General on funding, October 2012: pp 14, 39-41 (A/67/516)

Background study on enhancing the functioning of the Resident Coordinator System (page 47)

• Since the introduction of the term "critical mass", little progress has been made in terms of reaching a formal definition much less determining ways in which it can help promote an increase in core contributions to the United Nations system. A preliminary dialogue on this issue took place at the 2011 Operational Activities Segment of the Economic and Social Council. • The decision of Member States to discuss the concept of a "critical mass" of core resources reflects concerns about the current funding architecture of UN-OAD, particularly the rapid increase of non-core resources as a share of total contributions.	donor countries, which now appear to be under stress. There has been no or very limited pooling of country-level funding, as opposed to entity-specific joint programme funding, provided from the core resources of the UN entities. • The High-level Policy Dialogue on Funding of UN-OAD proposed in the first half of 2014 would help ensure that as the post-2015 development agenda begins to emerge, Member States would also discuss how the new functions of the UN development system would be funded. The High-level Policy Dialogue would also contribute to the process of rethinking the role of the UN development system in a changing development landscape (see part I). • See also rationale under recommendation 2.	

4	*Recommendation*	Encourage OECD/DAC member governments and other Member States in a position to do so, to increase contributions to multi-partner trust funds and "One UN Funds" at the global and country level with a view to enhancing the coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of the support of the United Nations development system to programme countries. In this connection, the General Assembly may wish to request the United Nations development system to develop an option paper highlighting existing pooled and joint funding mechanisms applied at the global, regional and country level, including a full review of the role played by "One UN Funds" at the country level and the future role they might be expected to play in the funding of the "One Programmes", particularly in the countries adopting the "delivering-as-one" approach.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• Many reviews in the past have highlighted the fact that the growth in fragmented non-core funding has resulted in a corresponding increase in transaction costs. Negotiating individual funding agreements and separate programme and financial reporting for hundreds or even thousands of individual projects according to widely varying sets of requirements undermines the efficiency of UN-OAD. • Several resolutions, including the 2007 TCPR legislation of the GA, recognized the establishment of multi-partner trust funds, including "One UN Funds", and underscored the importance of contributing more resources to this funding mechanism. • Both multi-donor trust funds and thematic trust funds are forms of pooled resources and thus a more flexible form of non-core contributions. While the thematic trust funds are specific to, and administered by, an individual entity, the multi-	• Multi-partner trust funds, including "One UN Funds", and other loosely earmarked funding mechanisms linked to organization-specific funding frameworks and strategies established by the respective governing bodies are seen as a way to enhance coherence at the country-level and overall effectiveness of the United Nations development system. • Six countries make-up for nearly 80% of total contributions from donor countries to multi-partner trust funds, including "One UN Funds". • The rapid growth in single-donor and programme- and project-specific contributions has led to the fragmentation of UN-OAD and resulted in an ever-larger share of resources being channeled through the United Nations system but not subject to direct programmatic control by governing bodies of United Nations entities. • Pooled funding remains a small share of total non-core resource flows. In 2011, contributions to pooled funding arrangements like multi-donor trust funds, including "One UN Funds" and thematic funds of entities, accounted for some 9% of non-core resource	Independent evaluation of delivering as one UNDESA Background Study: Results of a survey of Programme Country Governments: pp 23, 24, 54, 55. Report of the Secretary-General on funding, June 2012: pp 24, 25 (A/67/94-E/2012/80); QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: pp 16 (A/67/93-E/2012/79); Second report of the Secretary-General on funding, October 2012: pp 28-30 (A/67/516) General Assembly resolution 64/289: paragraph 13; General Assembly resolution 62/208: paragraph 22; MPTF Office Gateway (http://mptf.undp.org/)

donor trust funds concern multi-entity operations and are administered by a designated UN entity; currently, in the majority of cases, the dedicated fund administration services of the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, on behalf of the UN development system.

- The increased use of multi-donor trust funds in recent years can be seen as a result of efforts by the international community to promote enhanced aid effectiveness, counterbalancing a high degree of fragmentation as a result of the predominantly single donor, programme- and project-specific nature of non-core resources flows.

- "One UN Funds" are multi-donor trust funds that were established specifically to support the "Delivering-as-one" pilot initiatives by providing principally un-earmarked resources to cover funding gaps in "One UN Programmes". These funds represent an innovation to support UN system-wide coherence at the country level. In response to resolution 64/289, an independent evaluation of the "Delivering-as-one" experience, including the "One UN Funds", was submitted at the sixty-seventh session of the Assembly as part of the quadrennial comprehensive policy review in 2012.

- The GA in resolution 64/289 (paragraph 37) requested "the Secretary-General to include information on all existing multi-donor trust funds and thematic trust funds, including information on their mandates, performance and governance structures, in the annual report on financial statistics to the Economic and Social Council, with a view to further improving the participation of Member States in their governance".

- The Secretary-General in the 2011 report on funding of UN-OAD (A/66/79-E/2011/107, see page 29) responded to this mandate with detailed information on such funds provided on the DCPB/OESC website: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/fun

flows for development-related activities.

- The share of "One UN Funds" of development-related expenditures in the eight pilot "Delivering-as-One" countries combined was about 14% in 2011.

	ding.shtml • The Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office of UNDP also publishes annually comprehensive information on the mandates, performance and governance of all multi-donor trust funds administered by the office (see http://mptf.undp.org/).	

| 5 | *Recommendation* | Request that as a standard practice, all available and projected financial contributions for operational activities for development of the United Nations system at the country level be consolidated within a common budgetary framework which would not constitute a legal constraint on the spending authority of funds, programmes and specialized agencies, and to use the frameworks to strengthen the quality of system-wide resources planning in support of the UNDAFs. In this regard, the General Assembly may also wish to request resident coordinators, in support of their leadership role of resources mobilization efforts at the country level, to maintain a record of all contributions received from all funding sources for operational activities for development of the United Nations system in the respective programme country, including those provided in non-financial terms, and provide this information in the resident coordinators' annual reports. In this regard, the General Assembly may also wish to request the funds and programmes and encourage the specialized agencies and other relevant entities of the United Nations development system to provide the necessary information on contributions to the resident coordinator. |

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• In October 2010, in response to the 2007 Report of the Secretary-General on "Triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities of the United Nations development system: conclusions and recommendations", the UNDG analyzed the experiences and lessons learnt from the use of common budgetary frameworks (CBF) by the DaO pilot countries with a view to translating good practices into practical guidance for wider application by the UN development system in programme countries. • The CBF is the consolidated financial framework that reflects the agreed costed results of the UNDAF Action Plan. It shows the best financial estimates required for the delivery of the outputs of each participating UN organization. The CBF also reflects the areas which are not funded and require mobilization of additional resources. • The CBF has been made an integral part of the UNDAF Action Plan to ensure there is a comprehensive and results-based projection of financial resource requirements and identified funding gap for the entire programme period. To	• It is recognized that CBFs enable governments in programme countries and other development partners to have a transparent overview of UN activities, including their financing and funding gaps. The CBFs also facilitate more focused joint resource mobilization at the country level under government leadership, with support from the RC. • However, the use of the CBF tool is still optional within the UN development system and this important instrument for enhanced transparency is applied inconsistently in programme countries. • The establishment of a funding registry in the RC office would be to enable the national government, UN entities and other development partners to have a concise and transparent overview of all contribution flows to the UN development system and to reduce overlap in the activities of UN entities at the country level as well as to decrease the risk of unnecessary competition for non-core funding.	Report of the Secretary-General "Triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities of the United Nations development system: conclusions and recommendations" (A/62/253), paragraph 15(e) Independent Evaluation for Delivering as One, main report, p 11. UNDG Guidance Note on Common Budgetary Framework, October 2010

	reflect the available funding as well as resources to be mobilized, an annual CBF is prepared on the basis of annual workplans.	

6	*Recommendation*	Request the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes and the governing bodies of specialized agencies, as appropriate, to implement by the end of 2013 cost recovery rates that ensure that non-core resources pay their proportionate share of fixed-indirect costs (base structure costs) of the respective entities. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to request the Executive Boards of funds and programmes to consider adopting harmonized differentiated cost recovery rates that provide incentives to donors to increase core funding and/or more flexible, and less earmarked, use of non-core contributions at the programme or sector level.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
- Several resolutions, including the 2007 TCPR legislation of the GA, requested the United Nations funds and programmes "to avoid using core/regular resources to cover costs related to the management of extrabudgetary funds and their programme activities". - The extent to which the current subsidization by core resources is counter to legislation adopted by governing bodies is open to interpretation. There exists legislative ambiguity about which costs in fact are expected to be fully recovered i.e. full costs or incremental costs. - The outcome between 2007 and 2010 of a UNDG/HLCM working group on further harmonization and rationalization of practices and cost classifications related to costs and cost recovery was not conclusive. UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA are currently undertaking another joint cost-recovery harmonization exercise as part of the development of an integrated budget framework by 2014. This exercise can provide an impetus in this regard. - A principle of full cost recovery would be based on the premise that all activities, regardless of the source of financing equally benefit, either directly or indirectly, from the totality of substantive and operational capacities of entities.	- Analyses of the sources, modalities and destination of funding for UN-OAD show that core resources subsidize the support to and management of non-core financed activities, despite the repeated calls by the General Assembly to avoid such practice. - The cost recovery issue is closely linked with the issue of burden sharing (see recommendation 3). The very uneven burden sharing of core contributions implies that a few donors are providing an inordinately large share of the management, administration and other non-programme institutional costs, leaving a smaller share available for programmatic activities. These donors therefore face increasing pressure to justify their policy of core funding to their constituencies, which makes providing non-core resources even more attractive. - A review of a high-level breakdown of the use of resources by funding source and by broad cost classifications reconfirms the significant difference in the attribution of programme support and management costs to core and non-core funding sources. Consequently, the remaining shares available for actual programme activities continue to differ greatly: 64% of core funding is applied to programme activities compared with 90% for non-core resources. - It could be explored in the context of a broader discussion on funding flows to the UN development system whether a formula could be devised which could create incentives for donor countries to increase core contributions by offering differentiated cost recovery rates for non-core resources.	Report of the Secretary-General on funding, June 2012: pp 45, 46 (A/67/94-E/2012/80); QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: pp 21 (A/67/93-E/2012/79); General Assembly resolution 62/208: paragraph 23;

7	*Recommendation*	Request the Secretary-General to continue to strengthen the analytical quality of system-wide reporting on funding for United Nations operational activities for development including the coverage, timeliness, reliability, quality and comparability of system-wide data, definitions and classifications.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	UN-OAD account for almost two-thirds of all system-	The Secretary-General's report on funding and related information	Report of the Secretary-General on funding, June

wide activities of the organization. The thirty-seven UN entities that carry out almost all of those activities received some $23 billion in contributions in 2011. • The 2007 TCPR requested the Secretary-General "to continue to broaden and improve the coverage, timeliness, reliability, quality and comparability of system-wide financial data, definitions and classifications for the financial reporting of operational activities for development of the United Nations system, in a coherent way". • The past three years have seen significant progress in improving the quality of system-wide reporting on funding of UN-OAD. The 2012 report of the Secretary-General on funding of UN-OAD (June) also provided in-depth analysis of selected funding issues viewed to be important for enhanced effectiveness of the UN development system. • General Assembly resolution 63/311, requested the Secretary-General to establish a central repository of information on UN-OAD. This central repository became operational earlier this year as part of the financial statistics database and reporting system managed by the CEB secretariat. The collaboration between the CEB secretariat and DESA in this area has enhanced timeliness of reporting of information allowing for reporting of provisional 2011 data in time for the 2012 QCPR. Collaboration has also improved with OECD-DAC to enhance the comparability and complementarity of data and information.	system should become as an authoritative source of quality data, information and analysis on UN-OAD. • The funding report of the Secretary-General also serves as a major input to the QCPR of the GA. A higher-quality report will lead to more informed debate at the intergovernmental level on matters related to funding of UN-OAD. • Despite recent improvements in reporting, several issues and challenges pertaining to system-wide reporting remain. These relate to the use of terminology, sources and coverage, as well as comparability of data and information between the different UN entities. These issues and challenges are outlined in Annex I of the Secretary-General's report on funding (A/67/94-E/2012/80). • As the work of the United Nations system for development has grown in scale and complexity in the recent past, particularly due to the exponential increase in restricted non-core resources, Member States have recognized the need for more disaggregated system-wide reporting on funding flows. The reporting on funding must keep pace with the increasingly complex funding architecture of UN-OAD. • The issue of further strengthening of institutional capacity in DESA for system-wide statistics, analysis and reporting is also discussed in part VI of this supplementary note.	2012: pp 10, 11, 55-58 (A/67/94-E/2012/80); QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: pp 15, 16 (A/67/93-E/2012/79); Second report of the Secretary-General on funding, October 2012: pp 12 (A/67/516); General Assembly resolution 62/208" paragraph 28.

8	*Recommendation*	Request UNDG to develop a common standard for reporting on financial data based on the UNDG Results Reporting Principles adopted in 2011. Upon completion of the new standard, the relevant governing bodies of all United Nations entities could consider adopting this standard for all their agency-specific reports and a United Nations system-wide financial data warehouse should be established.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The 2007 TCPR requested the continuation of broadening and improving "the coverage, timeliness, reliability, quality and comparability of system-wide financial data, definitions and classifications for the	• Multiple reporting formats between UN agencies are inefficient and lead to additional workload. A single standard should be adopted for financial reporting within the United Nations system. • The existing standard of eight expense categories used for the	Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [on the report of the Second Committee A/62/424/Add.2)] 62/208. Triennial comprehensive policy review of

financial reporting of operational activities for development of the United Nations system, in a coherent way".

- The 2007 TCPR resolution also calls for building" a comprehensive, sustainable and consistent financial data and reporting system for the operational activities for development of all the relevant organizations and entities of the United Nations system".

- The UN SG Five-Year Action Agenda highlights as one of the enablers that" the second generation of "Delivering-as-One" to focus on managing and monitoring for results, ensuring increased accountability and improved outcomes".

- When programme country governments were asked whether they receive sufficient information from the UN system to assess its performance, only 17% "strongly agreed" that they did, while one-third either "somewhat" or "strongly" disagreed.

- In 2011, UNDG and HLCM launched a high-level study to identify standardized principles of results reporting. The joint initiative was in response to the continuing and urgent call from Member States, in the context of the TCPR, system-wide coherence and other GA resolutions, for improved reporting, linking funding to demonstrable results.

- The study resulted in an inter-agency agreement to use and apply common principles on results reporting, including:

Mutual accountability

Support national governments to implement their global commitments

Agree on a shared agenda

Improve national M&E systems

Engage in dialogue to facilitate learning

Transparency

Accessible results reporting

Multi-Donor Trust Funds and for Joint Programmes could be expanded in terms of usage and consistency in application.

- Currently, at the end of financial periods, agencies are requested to submit additional financial and statistical data, sometimes resulting in multiple reporting packages. These packages are time consuming to complete.

- The implementation of IPSAS should lead to harmonization in presentation of statutory financial reports. However, there should be common understanding and agreement on what should be included in donor reporting. In this regard, reporting requirements by donors would also need some level of harmonization and consistency.

- It is also critically important when it relates to inter-agency and multi-agency reporting consolidation of results.

- When programme country governments were asked what measures the UN system could take to reduce the workload on national partners, 75% strongly agreed that the UN entities should use a single format for progress reports.

- When UN Resident Coordinators and country team members were asked how effective they thought various measures would be in improving UN coherence at country level, 82% of the 497 respondents advocated 'harmonizing the agencies' reporting procedures'. To put this figure into perspective, only 49% advocated 'providing the UNDG regional team with greater resources'.

- It is thus recommended that taking as the basis the above principles and building on the existing analyses, a *standard financial reporting format* is developed and consistently applied, especially in relation to programmes/funds involving a variety of UN agencies and a number of contributing donors.

operational activities for development of the United Nations system,14 March 2008

The Secretary-General's Five-Year Action Agenda, 25 January 2012

Common Principles of Results Reporting – A UNDG-HLCM Joint Study, 15 July 2011

Proposed Plan for the Operationalization of the Common Principles – Next Steps for the Application of the Principles for Results Reporting, HLCM meeting, 26-27 September 2011UNDESA: Report on the survey of Governments: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/government_survey_report_10_june_2012.pdf

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/unct_survey_report_6_june_2012.pdf

Balanced reporting on successes and challenges Understandable for intended users *Efficient use of resources* Reporting on efficiency initiatives and relative efficiency gains of individual agencies overtime Simplify, standardize and streamline financial, internal management and external results reporting *Effectiveness in results* Individually and collectively reporting on contribution towards national, regional and global results	

PART III	ENHANCING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

(a) United Nations Resident Coordinator System[1]

The General Assembly may wish to *call upon* all members of the United Nations Development Group to:

1	*Recommendation*	Fully implement and monitor the implementation of the Management and Accountability System for the Resident Coordinator system, including strengthening the firewall and mutual accountability for results.

	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	- The Resident Coordinator system is generally considered to include the Resident Coordinator, the UN country team, support at global and regional level and programming instruments like UNDAF and CCA. - The RC system aims to make the UN development system more effective, coherent, efficient and accountable to the host government as well as the UN system itself. - Another purpose of the RC system is to address the image of the UN system as fragmented and non-coherent and to get all agencies involved in country-level support. - The Management and Accountability System for the United Nations Development and Resident Coordinator System (M&A system), was adopted by UNDG in 2008. - M&A system provides four key roles for the RC: (a) leading UNCT in development of UNDAF, (b) leading UNCT in preparation of annual workplan, (c) leading UNCT in monitoring, evaluation and reporting of UNDAF results, and (d) serving as the primary interlocutor of UNCT with Head of State or	- The establishment of the M&A system marked the institutional acknowledgement of the leadership role of the RC in line with the 2004 and 2007 TCPR. 281 out of 399 RCs/UNCT members (70%) surveyed as part of preparations for the 2012 QCPR considered M&A system "very" or "somewhat important" for increasing coherence of the UN development system; 97% considered its full implementation an effective measure to improve UN coherence at the country level. - In "delivering-as-one" countries and those which have voluntarily adopted this approach, 47% of UN RCs/CT members felt that full implementation of the M&A system would be very effective in enhancing country-level coherence in the next four years. - As of July 2012, 7 entities had fully implemented M&A system requirements, 11 entities partially; and 2 entities had not yet met these requirements. - The current situation whereby all UN entities may access common UN funds without participating fully in the M&A system is felt by many agencies not to be sustainable. 53 UN programme countries (39% of the total of 137 countries) have both a RC and a UNDP Country Director.	QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: pp.23, 24, 27, 28. (A/67/93) ECOSOC Resolution 2011/7: paragraph 6 UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: Annex E; Annex H, table 3 and 7 UNDESA Background Study: UNDAF Process: pp. 47, 54 UNDG: Management and Accountability System (August 2008) UNDG: Management and Accountability System Implementation Plan (January 2009) UNDESA: Page 12, RC/UNCT Survey report (http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/pdf/unct_survey_report_6_june_2012.pdf) RC report of SG, April, 2012 (E/2011/86) Review of M&A system commissioned by UNDG (2011)

[1] During the analytical preparations for the 2012 QCPR, seven models were identified for the Resident Coordinator system at country level: (1) standard Resident Coordinator approach, (2) integrated mission approach, (3) joint office approach (Cape Verde), (4) "delivering-as-one" model, (5) UNDP representation (e.g. UNIDO), (6) multi-country accreditation of the Resident Coordinator and (7) no Resident Coordinator at country level.

	Government.	
	• M&A system introduces a "firewall" concept to prevent conflict of interest, i.e. UNDP appointing a Country Director to run UNDP core activities in a programme country, allowing the RC (also the UNDP Resident Representative) to focus on the UN coordination function.	
	• M&A system establishes mutual accountability within UNCT, i.e. RC providing formal input to UNCT members' performance appraisal and vice-versa; UNCT members' performance being assessed against UNCT results; agencies revising resident representative job description to reflect RC role; UNCT member sharing information on resource mobilization/programme implementation relating to UNDAF.	

2	*Recommendation*	Use the UNCT Code of Conduct and other tools developed in conjunction with the Management and Accountability System, including the UNDG Implementation Plan and related NRA support mechanisms and plans.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*

	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• UNCT Code of Conduct facilitates the working relations in terms of defining the norms, roles, responsibilities and accountability of members, including reciprocal performance appraisal and dispute resolution. • The UNDG guidance on the UNCT Code of Conduct is based on several country examples and mainly covers day-to-day working norms; clarification of UNCT members' roles and responsibilities; clarification of RC roles and responsibilities; RC system support and functioning; NRA coordination and inclusion; and UNCT accountability and appraisal. • Other UNDG tools/guidance developed to define the working relations in UN country teams include: M&A system implementation plan/guidance note on Resident Coordinator and UNCT Working Relations/Dispute Resolution Mechanism, etc. • As part of the roles and responsibilities of the RC job description, the incumbent promotes and	• These UNDG tools clarify in detail the working relationships in the UN country team in programme countries. • There have been indications that only a limited number of UNCTs have fully established and used the UNCT Code of Conduct and other UNDG tools developed in line with the M&A system. • 78% of respondents in the RC/UNCT survey felt that greater efforts should be made to include NRAs in the activities of UNCTs. • Only 15% of RC/UNCT surveyed strongly agreed that they receive clear strategic guidance from UNDG on issues related to UN coherence. • Involving NRAs in country-level work has often been driven largely by the personal initiative of the RCs. At the same time, it has sometimes been constrained by the lack of effective outreach by NRAs.	UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: Annex E UNDESA Background Study: The UNDAF Process: p.54 UNDG: Guidance Note on RC/UNCT working relations/Code of Conducts (http://www.undg.org/docs/10028/UNCT-Working-Relations---UNDG-Approved.doc) UNDG: Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for UNCTs (http://www.undg.org/docs/10029/Dispute-Resolution-Mechanism---UNDG-Approved.doc) UNDG NRA Work Plan 2009-2011 http://www.undg.org/docs/9864/NRA-Workplan_1.doc Resident Coordinator Job Description (January 2009).

	supports effective dialogue and interaction between the UNCT and NRAs, the government and other stakeholders on national priorities, policy-making and aid coordination mechanisms. In addition, the Resident Coordinator has as one of the 5 key planned results set at the beginning of the year, to 'effectively set-up and manage systems to include NRAs in UNCT work and effectively represent them and their programmes in the host country context and UNDAF'.		
3	*Recommendation*	Agencies to advise their country representatives on the importance of their contributions to the functioning of UNCTs as a collective team and to incorporate that element of their mandate into both their job descriptions and their regular performance reviews.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The ability of the Resident Coordinator to lead at the country level is not based on formal authority, but, rather, on each entity's operating modalities as well as the mandates given by the General Assembly translated into guidelines established by UNDG on the functioning of the RC system and the UNCT. • According to the RC job description, s/he 'leads the UNCT in strategic development of the UNDAF and specifically takes the final decision on strategic focus and allocation of resources against that focus, if consensus cannot be reached within the UNCT'. • As stipulated in the M&A system of the RC system implementation plan, UNDG agencies agreed to revise the job descriptions of resident country team members and to explicitly recognize the role of the RC in strategically positioning the UN in each programme country. • As such, the modality for granting authority to the RC through the UN entities lies with the job descriptions of country representatives.	• While the leadership role of the RC is based on consensus achieved within the UNCT, each UN entity is expected to acknowledge the leadership role of the RC in the job description of their country representative as called for in the M&A system. • According to the M&A system review, only 50% of UN entities have revised job descriptions and appraisal processes for country representatives. The results of a survey of UN country team members in conjunction with the M&A review showed that only 15% of the respondents confirmed that job descriptions had been modified. • The survey of UN RCs and country team members revealed that one of the measures judged most likely to improve coherence was: 'sending clear signals from agency headquarters advocating more coherence at country level'. • Also see recommendation 1 and 4.	UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: pp.24, 25 UNDG: Management and Accountability System (August 2008) UNDG: Management and Accountability System and Implementation Plan (January 2009)
4	*Recommendation*	Implement the previous request of the General Assembly that the resident coordinator contributes to the regular performance appraisals of all entity representatives members of the UNCT on their contributions to its effective and efficient functioning (as per A/50/120, paragraph 37c).	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*

	According to the 1995 TCPR resolution, the GA requested the Secretary-General to develop common guidelines for staff performance appraisal with the aim to assess the contribution of staff members to UN system coordination. Translated to the effective functioning of the UNCT, the performance of UN entity representatives in their particular role as members of the UNCT should be recognized in addition to their vertical accountability for agency-specific functions.	It remains difficult to hold UN country team members accountable for system-wide results. Lines of accountability are mostly vertical between UN entity representatives and their headquarters and place little importance on the broader functioning and coherence of the UNCT at the country level. In conjunction with the implementation of the M&A system, individual UN entity representatives should not only be assessed in line with their vertical accountability, but also with regard to their horizontal accountability as members of a UN country team in support of the Resident Coordinator system. As of July 2012, 9 out of 20 UN entities agreed to have RC assessment of agency country-level representatives as formal input to the agency performance appraisal process. In interviews preparing for the QCPR, a number of RCs noted that the current appraisal processes at the country level is unbalanced. While agency representatives input to the appraisal of the RC, the RC has no ability to input to the appraisals of agency representatives on their contributions to the functioning of the UNCT at the country level. The survey of programme countries revealed that 60% of governments felt it is 'very important' to 'consolidate the UN country presence under a single head that is accountable for all UN assistance' and some 25% of governments felt it is 'somewhat important'. The majority of UN RCs and country team members surveyed also favored 'giving the RC a stronger coordination role over the country team'.	GA Resolution A/50/120: paragraph 37c (1995 TCPR) UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: pp. IV, 27, 51, 58, Annex A UNDG: Management and Accountability System (August 2008) and implementation plan (2009) Survey of Programme Country Governments: p.52, Chart 38 UNDG WG-RCSI tracking of key actions from the M&A System Implementation Plan – updated July 2012
5	*Recommendation*	Decentralize authority from headquarters to their country-level representatives as required to make decisions on programmatic and financial matters related to common programming activities at the country level.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	The preparation of the UNDAF, and increasing number of common country programmes in programme countries, require strengthening of coordination among UN entities at the country level. The common country programming process has shifted the focus away from agency-specific programming to greater effort of the UN system at the country level to develop joint programmes based on some form of pooling of resources. Joint programming captures much of what is described	Agencies are represented at the country level by staff at different levels with varying degree of delegated authority from their respective headquarters. For example, the level of authority delegated to country offices in recruitment and procurement differs significantly from one UN organization to the next. The lack of a one-stop approval of common planning documents for all agencies at the country level increases the time required to complete the common country programming process.	A/RES/59/250 (2004 TCPR): paragraph 45 UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: Annex F UNDG: UNDAF Guidance and Support Package SG report (E/2011/88)

in the CCA and UNDAF guidelines with the UNCT working together with partners to strengthen country analysis, influence national priorities, and respond to those priorities as one UN system.

- Different from agency programming, joint programming requires UN entities at the country level to jointly carry out assessments of problems, design interventions consisting of shared objectives, actions, time frames, resources requirements and a clear delineation of responsibilities. In this regard, UN country team members have an enhanced coordination role in designing and managing such joint activities.

- The effectiveness of the UNCT in setting programming direction is being constrained by the inability of country-level staff to take decisions on programming and financing issues.

- Greater delegation of authority to UN entity representatives as members of a UN country team would enhance their ability to contribute to more effective and efficient programming and coordination. Strengthening the ability of UNCTs to undertake common programming at the country level also requires greater decentralization of decision-making to the country level.

- Particularly in countries in transition from relief to development where programming cycles are short and the situation is volatile, stronger delegation of authority for programmatic and financial decisions to the RCs would enhance the capacity of the UN system to respond more effectively and efficiently to country-specific challenges.

6	*Recommendation*	Provide adequate, cost-effective, and predictable funding for coordination with due regard for the principle of fairness, which should reflect each agency's direct involvement based on the proportion of services used.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	- The RC office supports the coordination function of the RC at the country level. - ECOSOC resolution 2011/7 (OP8) invites UNDG to conduct a review of existing funding modalities in support of the RC system, including appropriate burden-sharing arrangements among relevant UN organizations, and make recommendations to improve the provision of resources and support to the RC system at the country level.	- Currently, RC offices are primarily funded by UNDP regular funds and to a lesser extent by the UN Country Coordination Fund (non-core). - While members of a country team contribute staff time to the work of the RC office, they generally do not contribute financially to the administrative costs of the office. - Cost-sharing arrangements exist for joint programming activities (e.g. retreats for preparation of UNDAF, joint advocacy and communication). - 391 of 493 RCs/UNCT members (80%) "agreed" or "somewhat agreed" that providing the RC office with greater resources will improve UN coherence at country level.	SG report E/2011/86 section VI RC/UNCT survey report
7	*Recommendation*	Strengthen the capacity of the resident coordinator offices with a view to enhancing country-level coherence and effectiveness, and stronger normative and operational linkages, including through improved access to expertise available in the United Nations system in response to national priorities.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	- The RC office plays a key role in supporting the RC in forging system-wide coherence and setting the strategic vision of the UNCT through the UNDAF process.	- Consultations with UN RCs and country team members, the findings of surveys conducted for the 2012 QCPR as well as intergovernmental deliberations at the 2012 Operational Activities Segment of ECOSOC suggest that RC offices have generally	Consultations/interviews conducted during the QCPR process and prior preparations of SG annual report on the RC system Page 11, SG report E/2008/60

	• The RC office also helps the RC in engaging UNCT members, in particular the NRAs in the work of the UN system at the country level. • Resident Coordinators are currently provided with a minimum of one staff and an average of three to support UN-wide coordination at the country level. • In complex, post-crisis settings, the number of staff in RC offices at the country level may increase with the inclusion of international and national professionals such as monitoring and evaluation advisers, specialists in communications and security advisers, especially where support cannot be provided from existing country team capacities. The composition of a RC office therefore varies depending on the country context. • The GA has emphasized that countries should have full access to the mandates and resources of the UN development system, whereby the national governments should determine which resident and non-resident UN agencies would best respond to specific needs and priorities of the individual country, including in the case of NRAs through hosting arrangements with resident organizations.	insufficient capacity considering the mounting demands placed o n their coordination role at the country level. • RC offices are found to be particularly weak in carrying out monitoring and evaluation functions. • Interviews with RCs as part of the analytical preparations for the 2012 QCPR suggest that access to system-wide expertise requires well-resourced RC offices which are aware of the mandates of UN entities and possess the ability to engage them effectively. • Hosting arrangements provided by resident organizations for NRAs appear to be improvised at present. However, there does not appear to be a systematic approach or a standard mechanism by which UN entities can easily engage in such collaborative arrangements.	
8	*Recommendation*	Strengthen coordination with all development partners at the country level under the leadership of the national government in support of national development plans and priorities.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• There is proliferation of development partners at the country level. The UN development system needs to frequently consult other development actors or partner with them. • There have been efforts to institutionalize such coordination with other development partners a the country level, for example the United Nations/World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations, signed in 2008.	• 31% of RCs/UNCT members surveyed for the QCPR judged cooperation with World Bank to be "very" or "somewhat effective". • 21% of RCs/UNCT members surveyed for the QCPR judged cooperation with regional development banks to be "very" or "somewhat effective". • 'Facilitate a more active dialogue among development partners on national development challenges' was rated most highly by CSOs surveyed for the QCPR (227 out of 288 respondents).	QCPR survey of RCs/UNCTs QCPR survey of CSOs Page 46, SG report A/67/93–E/2012/79
9	*Recommendation*	Enhance investment in staff development so that the United Nations development system has the right mix of capacities and skills including for high-quality policy and programme advice and the highest standards of leadership skills, management training and continuous learning to provide effective capacity development and other support in response to national needs and priorities. This would include enhanced emphasis on joint training across agencies.	

	Background		*Rationale*	*References*
	• Each UN entity has its own staff development policies, priorities, practices and learning resources. • Under the auspices of UNDG, arrangements have been made to strengthen learning and competency development for RCs and UNCT representatives, enabling the highest caliber performance, both in terms of substantive results as well as team leadership and behaviors. • Existing UNDG platforms and arrangements include orientation package for RCs; induction for first time RCs; regular training on common country programming process; RC online web facility. • To better assess candidates for the selection and appointment of RCs, the RC Assessment Centre was instituted in 1999, allowing only those candidates who receive a passing grade to be eligible for the RC pool and to apply for RC positions.		• Development needs of programme countries have become increasingly varied. • 94% of programme countries that responded to the QCPR survey considered strengthening national capacities for policy and strategy development most relevant. • Governments also indicated high degree of relevance for some upstream/cross-cutting types of support, including in the areas of norms and standards, and human rights and gender equality, which may call for more specialized staff development and training. • 'Providing equipment, vehicles, supplies and services' became rapidly less relevant as the income level in programme countries went up, and resource mobilization also became notably less relevant.	QCPR survey of programme countries UNDG (2010), Draft conceptual framework for a long term learning and competency development strategy and plan (http://www.undg.org/docs/12537/Conceptual%20framework%20for%20learning%20and%20competency%20developmentdraft07.docx)
10	Recommendation	Find more effective ways of identifying, mobilizing and deploying capacity, including knowledge and expertise, necessary to achieve tangible results in programme countries including through pooling of capacities of different entities in the same sectors and at global, regional and national levels, bearing in mind the differentiated needs of developing, least-developed, middle-income and transition countries.		
	Background		*Rationale*	*References*
	• UNDAF and joint programming processes provide opportunities to identify needs of programme countries and the capacities needed from the UN development system. • RCs, in partnership with UNCTs, identify, mobilize and deploy UN capacity at the country level. If needs arise, RCs address specific requests in this regard to relevant UN agencies or headquarters.		• Approximately 14% of programme countries that responded to the QCPR survey considered the UN "very responsive" to changes requested by governments. • Interviews with RCs suggest that mobilizing expertise of NRAs is not systematic, due to lack of awareness of their mandates and expertise, or weak outreach by NRAs.	QCPR survey of programme countries Interviews with RCs
The General Assembly may wish to call upon the UNDP Administrator, in the exercise of responsibilities for the management of the resident coordinator system and as chair of the United Nations Development Group to:				
1	Recommendation	Equip the resident coordinator system with the necessary capacity and resources to provide cost-effective coordination, taking into account the differentiated needs for coordination and results delivery in different country contexts.		
	Background		*Rationale*	*References*
	• Strategic repositioning of the UN system has been noted as challenging in times of increasing changes in today's world and the need to deliver results in		• The cost of coordination within the UN development system has to a large extent been borne by UNDP. • Extra-budgetary funding to support effective coordination by the RC	UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: pp. 32, 35, Annex H.

	different country contexts. Requirements at the UN system level to support strategic repositioning and further strengthening of system-wide coherence include an increased focus on enhancing coordination within the UN development system, in particular through the RC system (RCS). • The RCS has become increasingly important as a driver of system-wide coherence of operational activities for development. As stated in the 2007 TCPR resolution, the RC, supported by a coordination office, is expected to play a central role in enabling the coordination of the UN system. • The resolution further reaffirms that the RCS has a key role to play in the effective and efficient functioning of the UN system at the country level. • Cost-effective coordination requires support functions for the Resident Coordinator in the areas of monitoring and evaluation, reporting, coordination support and business operations across UN entities at the country level.	at the country level is currently at an average of $150.000 per RC office. • Funding for UN-wide coordination has been declining. In 2011 the contributions to the Support to the Resident Coordinator Fund (SRCF) of UNDP declined by 23% from the 2010 level. In 2011, contributions to the County Coordination Fund also declined by 30% from the 2010 level. Total contributions received for both funds experienced an overall reduction of 30%. • The UN RC/CT survey revealed that a large majority were in favor of 'Providing the Resident Coordinator's Office with greater resources'. The DESA country missions also showed that the additional resources required are not great; funding for just one additional national officer would be sufficient in many cases. • A study by in 2011 estimated that the cost of coordination in the UN development system was about 3% of country programmable resources in 2009. The study also concluded that it was reasonable to assume that benefits of coordination are very likely to exceed the costs. • See also recommendations 6 and 7 above.	RC/UNCT Survey Results. QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.25. (A/67/93) A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraphs 89-92. UNDESA cost of coordination study (2011)
2	*Recommendation*	Ensure that funding the resident coordinator system will not adversely impact on the resources available for development programmes in programme countries and establish an approach to determine the threshold support necessary for effective country-level coordination.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The 2007 TCPR resolution notes that coordination activities represent transaction costs that are borne by programme countries and the entities of the UN system and requests the Secretary-General to report annually on the functioning of the RCS, including its costs and benefits. • The 2011 report of the Secretary-General on funding of UN-OAD concluded that the cost of coordination of country-level activities represents approximately 3% of total UN country programmable resources. • There is currently no systematic approach in place to determine the appropriate resources for the RC function relative to overall programmable resources available to countries.	• According to a 2011 study by DESA, it is difficult to define 'coordination costs' in the UN development system. While it seems that there is still insufficient coherence of UN activities at the country level and resources for coordination are inadequate, there is evidence to suggest that coordination costs could be reduced by streamlining the UNDAF and agency-specific country programming processes as well as by establishing either a lead agency or business centre model for the delivery of common services at the country level. • The survey of programme country governments revealed that 60% of programme country governments consider it "very important" to 'consolidate the UN country presence under a single head accountable for all UN assistance', and another 25% felt it was "somewhat important".	UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: pp. 32, 35 RC/UNCT Survey Results QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.25. (A/67/93) A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraph 93 UNDESA Background Paper: Cost and benefits of coordination, p.27

	• Although funding levels in support of the RCS have significantly decreased in the past two years, it is recognized that the establishment of a system to provide adequate funding for system-wide coordination should not increase transaction costs relative to resources available for development programmes in programme countries.		
3	*Recommendation*	Ensure where possible that cost savings as a result of joint efforts and coordination will accrue to development programmes.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The 2007 TCPR resolution requests the UN development system to ensure, where possible, that cost savings as a result of joint efforts and coordination accrue to development programmes.	• It has been identified that effective joint efforts and coordination within the UN development system can lead to considerable cost savings, e.g. when establishing joint offices, common services, and streamlining the processes for preparing, monitoring and reporting on UNDAFs and agency-specific country programmes. DaO and other selected programme countries have shown the potential for generating cost savings through effective coordination of UN-OAD at the country level. • Technically it has been difficult and costly to identify and attribute savings in the work of the UN system for development at the country level specifically to coordination activities. Administrative regulations and rules also do not allow cost savings to stay in the programme country where they are realized. • Reductions in transaction and overhead costs are also not generally automatically transferable to programme budgets. However, papers prepared for the QCPR have shown that there are considerable opportunities to accrue savings that if closely monitored could be redeployed to development programmes. • According to the survey of UN Operations Management Teams at the country level, 45% agreed that the UNCT achieved quantifiable cost savings through the harmonization of business practices. • According to projections in a background study on business operations prepared for the QCPR, the establishment of common UN service centres in the area of business operations can yield up to over $3 million in annual savings for larger country offices. • It is important to provide incentives to the UN development system to generate savings that can be redeployed in programming in programme countries.	UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: pp.72-75, Annex II, Question 21. Survey of Operations Management Teams: Question QCPR Report of the Secretary- General, June 2012: p.28, 36, 38, 39, 40 (A/67/93) A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraph 104 (b). UNDESA Background Paper: Cost and benefits of coordination, p.27
4	*Recommendation*	Continue, where cost effective, to appoint UNDP country directors to run UNDP core activities, including fund-raising, so as to ensure that	

resident coordinators are fully available for their system-wide tasks.

Background	Rationale	References
• The appointment of UNDP Country Directors is connected to the implementation and effective management of the 'firewall' between the functions of the RC and the UNDP Resident Representative. Removing the RC from UNDP operational responsibilities has been identified as an important step towards supporting the RC function as part of the M&A system. • The Country Director is expected to run the core activities of the UNDP country office, including fund-raising, especially in countries with large country teams or in situations of complex emergency. This allows the Resident Coordinator to focus on his or her coordination functions. According to a survey of RCs carried out by UNDP in 2010, UNDP was represented in 93 per cent of country team meetings by the Country Director or the Deputy Resident Representative. • According to the Secretary-General's report on the QCPR, the firewall could be further strengthened. One option, which has been requested by the GA in the 2007 TCPR resolution, is the additional recruitment of UNDP Country Directors with responsibility for UNDP specific resources mobilization and programme management.	• The M&A review reported that 53 out of 137 countries (39%) had both an RC and a UNDP Country Director. In other countries, the division of labor would either be with the UNDP Deputy Resident Representative or executed by the judgement of the RC. This is the case in many smaller countries, where the appointment of a UNDP Country Director might not be financially feasible. • According to a survey of UNCTs for the M&A review, 77% confirmed that a functional firewall had been established in their countries. While 75% of the respondents reported that the firewall worked either "very well" or "somewhat well", about 53% believed that the RC had "completely" or "mostly" delegated his/her UNDP responsibilities to the UNDP Country Director or the Deputy Resident Representative. • Preliminary feedback collected by UNICEF from various levels within the UN RC system suggests that the separation of functions is effective in about two thirds of programme countries. Interviews with RCs also suggest that when a Country Director has been appointed, the responsibilities of the Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative are better delineated. Under this circumstance, RCs in general do not engage in resource mobilization for UNDP and are perceived as neutral in decision-making on resource allocation.	QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.28-29 (A/67/93) SG report (E/2011/86), April, 2011, p. 16 A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraph 105. UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: pp. 42-45.

5	Recommendation	Continue to strengthen the resident coordinator selection, training and appraisal processes to bring and develop high caliber leaders, working on behalf of and reflecting the full spectrum of the United Nations system, including the NRAs.	
	Background	Rationale	References
	• Since 1999, RC recruitment procedures have contained two components including (a) the RC Assessment Centre (RCAC) to assess the eligibility of applicants; and (b) the Interagency Advisory Panel (IAAP) to review and advise the Chair of UNDG on proposed candidates to be presented to the Secretary-General for decision-making. • 2007 TCPR resolution encouraged the UN	• There is a general lack of available information on the RC post and recruitment steps. Staff from specialized agencies, NRAs and the UN Secretariat is less likely to access information and be informed on the RC post as a career option. • The selection of candidates for the RCAC appears to be uneven across UN agencies. • According to interviews with UN RCs and country team members conducted as part of preparations for the report of the Secretary-	QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.26 (A/67/93) A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraph 94 UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: pp. 16, 48 RC/UNCT survey results ECOSOC Report of the Secretary-General

development system to improve the selection and training process of RCs. • The UNDG has revised selection, training and support mechanisms to reflect the increasing scope and complexity of the RC function in different country contexts. • Many UN agencies have or are in process of setting-up internal leadership/management development programmes that incorporate competency development initiatives for agency senior management and the RC post. • RC training and capacity building include RC orientation, RC induction, RC in service training (for example on UN reform and substantive topics), women leadership programme, RC/HC/DO/DSRSG handbook. • RC/HC/DO appraisal is based on the RC/HC/DO assessment of results achieved and structured performance feedback from all UN system stakeholders. The inputs are incorporated into one reporting instrument which is then used by the UNDG Regional Team to appraise the RC/HC/DO across all job functions and to provide feedback on performance.	General on the QCPR, humanitarian experience appear to be under-weighted in the selection process given the significant number of countries in which the RC also functions as a HC (in 30 countries at the end of 2011). • The UN RC/CT survey revealed that the 'leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator' and 'an improved spirit of cooperation in the UN country team' had proved to be by far the most important factors in improving UN coherence at the country level. • In politically sensitive programme countries the RC needs a range of political, peace and security skills that go beyond the traditional role played as coordinator of development and humanitarian assistance. The functions of the RC have been expanding over time to cover a wider range of areas beyond coordination of UN-OAD. • While steps have been undertaken to improve the training of RCs/HCs to enhance their knowledge of other agencies, a concern remains that RCs are not always familiar with the roles and mandates of specialized and non-resident agencies. • According to the analysis conducted for the QCPR, many RCs object to the one-sided nature of the current appraisal processes.	(E/280/2008): paragraphgraphgraphs 45-48. Assessment of RC Talent Management, UNDG (February 2009)
6	*Recommendation*	Consider enhancing the role of the resident coordinator by adjusting the resident coordinator functions and other relevant guidelines to include the following: (a) To recommend to the Government, after consultation with the UNCT and relevant NRAs, as appropriate, amendments to the UNDAF or UNDAF Action Plan when it is determined that some activities are no longer aligned with the United Nations broader strategy in response to the national priorities for the country. (b) To recommend to the Government, after consultation with the UNCT and relevant NRAs, as appropriate, which United Nations entities should participate in the UNDAF or other common programming processes in order to ensure a coordinated and more fully responsive support to the specific development needs and priorities of the country and its expectations for the United Nations system.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The 2007 TCPR resolution reaffirms that the RC assumes a central role in making possible the coordination of UN-OAD at the country level. He or she ensures that those activities are in line with national development priorities, the mandates and	• A key role of the RC is to promote synergy in the work of the UN development system at the country level, i.e. to help ensure that the sum total of UN-OAD is larger than the individual parts. It is difficult for RCs to play this role effectively without some enhancement to their formal authority.	QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.25, 26 (A/67/93) A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraph 89, 90 A/RES/47/199 (1992 TCPR): paragraph 39g

Background	Rationale	References
objectives of UN system organizations and the principles and policy guidance on operational activities for development. • Other important resolutions relating to the role of the UN RC are: "Strengthened role for the senior resident official" (GA 60/1); "RCS has a key role to play in the effective and efficient functioning of the UN system at the country level" (GA 62/208); "Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with…..UNDG, to ensure that RCs have the necessary resources to fulfill their role effectively" (GA 62/208). • A number of GA resolutions call for a further enhancement of the authority of the RC. For instance, the 1992 TCPR calls for enhancing the responsibility and authority of the RC for the planning and coordination of programmes, including proposing the amendment of country programmes, where required, to bring them in line with the national priorities and development plans. • In a nutshell, there appear to be stronger forces working against, rather than for, UN coherence at the country level including the following: ✓ All funds, programmes and agencies have some measure of independence; ✓ RCs can only coordinate, not manage, because no single governing body, or manager, is "in charge" of the UN development system; ✓ Few incentives to put "UN system interests" ahead of "agency interests"; ✓ Governance lines are vertical; ✓ Business practices are vertical; ✓ Accountability lines are vertical.	• The survey of programme country governments revealed that 60% of programme country governments consider it "very important" to 'consolidate the UN country presence under a single head accountable for all UN assistance', and another 25% felt it was "somewhat important". • The agreed authorities for the RC are still limited given the centrifugal forces arising from many long-established individual agency-focused practices. The interviews conducted with RCs and UN country team members for the QCPR report of the Secretary-General supported enhancing the RC function to allow for recommendations to the government, after consultation with the UNCT, to amend the UNDAF or UNDAF action plan and the selection of UN entities to participate in these processes in line with their mandates and comparative advantages. • Top 5 disbursing entities account for 90% of total UN system country expenditures; in 94% of the 132 programme countries, top 5 disbursing entities represent over 80% of UN-OAD expenditures. • Entities with significant levels of assured multi-year funding are more likely to participate in joint efforts, whereas entities with limited resources for multi-year programming are often reluctant to participate in common programming activities, though they can play a more meaningful role in advocacy, promoting policies, norms and standards and small-scale technical cooperation. • Governments could decide based on recommendation from the RCs, which entities should be invited to participate in the UNDAF and resulting common workplans in order to make these processes more cost-effective.	UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: pp. 51, 52 ECOSOC Report of the Secretary-General (E/280/2008): paragraphs 11-13 Programme Country Government Survey Results

| 7 | *Recommendation* | Commission an independent review of the Joint Office model experience to assess its overall cost effectiveness and efficiency in achieving results and examine possibilities of its broader application and report on this review to the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes during 2014. | |
| | *Background* | *Rationale* | *References* |

	Background		Rationale	References
	• The 2004 and 2007 TCPR resolutions provided a relatively detailed description of what constitutes the "One Office" model beyond establishing joint premises. • The *Joint Office* concept refers to the UN operating with one programme and under the leadership of one empowered and accountable RC. According to the UNDG, the primary objective of the Joint Office model is to improve the effectiveness of the UN by rationalizing representation and improving the ratio between programme and support costs. In accordance with this objective, the former UNDG ExCom agencies have agreed on a set of minimum conditions that define a Joint Office – one common programme, one leader who is empowered and accountable, and one team working towards greater efficiency and effectiveness of programme and operations with shared support services to the extent possible. In this regards, common premises are considered to be an important step towards the establishment of a Joint Office.		• So far, the Joint Office model has been applied only in one country. (Cape Verde) While the model has led to increased cost efficiency, several problems have been highlighted, primarily related to relevant support systems and agency difficulties in adjusting agency-specific regulations and headquarters processes for a single office at the country level. • The Joint Office model consolidates business operations support services for the UN system at the country level. According to a business model simulation as part of the UNDESA background study on business operations, the consolidation of administrative support services and procurement could yield annual savings amounting to over $3 million in larger programme countries. • The survey of programme countries revealed that 60% of governments felt it is "very important" to 'consolidate UN country presence under a single head that is accountable for all UN assistance', with another 25% considering this "somewhat important". • Analysis conducted for the 2012 report of the Secretary-General on funding of UN-OAD (second report of the SG, September 2012) shows that in 61 programme countries, or some 41% of the total, the UN development system accounts for less than 10% of total ODA at the country level. In some of the programme countries where the UN development system is a fairly minor player in development cooperation, it may be more efficient to deliver UN-OAD through a Joint Office model.	UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: pp.14, 52-53, 84 QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.28 (A/67/93) A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraph 120 UNDESA Background Study: Resident Coordinator System: pp. 51, 52 ECOSOC Report of the Secretary-General (E/280/2008): paragraphs 11-13 Programme Country Government Survey Results Provisional analysis of funding of operational activities for development of the UN system for the year 2011
8 &9	*Recommendation*	Ensure that resident coordinator annual reports are accessible and made available in a timely manner to members of the United Nations development system, including to the extent possible measurable benefits and results of coordination. Make available the UNDG synthesis of the resident coordinators' annual reports at the operational activities segment of the substantive session of ECOSOC.		
	Background		*Rationale*	*References*
	• The Resident Coordinator Annual Report (RCAR) is an essential element of the accountability and results framework for UN-OAD. • The RCAR provides an opportunity for UNCTs, under the leadership of the RC, to review their collective results and share good practices. • Since 2008, the format of the RCAR is aligned with the RC/DO/HC and UNCT Performance Appraisal		• When asked whether they receive sufficient information from the UN system to assess its performance, only 17% of governments in the survey of programme countries "strongly agreed" that they did, while one-third either "somewhat" or "strongly" disagreed. • Making available the RCARs to entities of the UN development system in a timely manner could help raise awareness of the RC function as well as the results achieved, thereby facilitating mutual accountability within UNCTs.	Programme Country Government Survey Results Guidelines for the completion of the 2010 Resident Coordinator Annual Report (RCAR), DOCO (2010)

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process.
The RCAR helps UNCTs assess progress towards key planned system-wide and UNDAF coordination results; identify good practices and lessons learned in coordination and common programming; and helps strengthen mutual accountability for results.
The RCAR also enables UNDG/DOCO to report to donors on the use of extra-budgetary coordination funds as well as to mobilize and allocate resources from the Support to Resident Coordinator Fund (SRCF) and the Country Coordination Funds (CCFs).
DOCO prepares a synthesis report of RCARs each year, which is usually made available to Member States and other stakeholders after the substantive session of ECOSOC in July.

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There have been regular delays in the submission of RCARs and not all RCs have complied with the requirement to prepare such a report. The RCARs have also been seen by some observers to be too process-oriented. As a result, DOCO has recently revised the template of the RCAR to enable better reporting on the benefits and results of UN coordination at the country level.
Making the UNDG/DOCO synthesis of RCARs available prior to the substantive session of ECOSOC would enable the Council to review the results of coordination activities at the country level with a view to identifying systemic issues that warrant special attention.

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10	*Recommendation*	Request UNDG to develop a set of indicators to regularly assess and report on progress in furthering programme and operational coordination at the country level to inform annual reporting to ECOSOC on the functioning of the resident coordinator system.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	- RC annual reports have been the primary instrument of UNDG to document progress and results of programme and operational coordination at the country level. - Annual QCPR progress reports also contain such information as well as agency-specific information in promoting coordination.	- The present template for the RCAR contains indicators on coordination, which do not cover the full spectrum of issues relating to programmatic and operational coordination at the country level. - The preparation of reporting on the functioning of the RC system has been reliant on ad-hoc data collection efforts and lacks comparable baselines. - Developing indicators on the results and impact of programmatic and operational coordination would enable Member States to better assess progress in this area at the country level. 78% of UN RC/CT members favour the establishment of annual and multi-year targets for increasing UN coherence at the country level.	QCPR survey of RCs/UNCTs http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc /pdf/unct_survey_report_6_june_2012.pdf

(b) United Nations development assistance framework (UNDAF)		
The General Assembly may wish to:		
1	*Recommendation*	Request resident coordinators and UNCTs to strengthen consultations with national governments and relevant stakeholders including civil society and non-governmental organizations with a view to ensuring that the development and implementation of all United Nations planning and programming documents is fully aligned with national development needs and priorities.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
- The 2007 TCPR resolution underscored the fundamental principles of operational activities of the UN development system, including national ownership and leadership, and flexibility in responding to national development requirements. - The 2007 TCPR resolution stressed that there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach to development and UN-OAD should be aligned with national development plans and strategies. - The 2007 TCPR resolution also called on the UN development system to assist national governments in creating an enabling environment in which the links and cooperation between national governments, the UN development system, civil society, national non-governmental organizations and the private sector that are involved in the development process, are strengthened, including during the UNDAF preparation process, with a view to seeking new and innovative solutions to development problems in accordance with national needs and priorities. - The 2010 UNDG Guidance on how to prepare an UNDAF stresses national ownership and partnership in UNCT engagement. It states that ensuring the alignment of the UNDAF with national development priorities and strategies requires government leadership as well as engagement of all relevant stakeholders at different stages of the process, and that the UNCT is required to partner with all relevant stakeholders; all levels of government; social partners; civil society; donors; international financial institutions and other relevant development actors.	- According to the RC/UNCT survey, the preparation of the UNDAF has only to a limited extent provided for the participation of national governments and other stakeholders such as civil society. For instance, about half of all RCs and UNCT members agreed that the UNDAF has helped to increase the participation of civil society in the work of the UN at the country level. - According to the programme country survey, more than 80% of governments agree that the activities of the UN system are aligned with national development needs and priorities. UNDAF and other programming instruments are seen to have contributed to a closer alignment. - Regarding whether UN support is fully supportive of national ownership, the views of governments are mixed. For instance, about 70% of all governments responding to the programme country survey only "somewhat agree" that the UNDAF/integrated strategic framework is effectively aligned with national development needs and priorities. - Several governments pointed out that the UNDAF on its own does not guarantee alignment. For example, one country commented: "It is critical that the interventions listed in the UNDAF are implemented through joint agency programmes, to improve the coherence of the agencies' interventions and make progress towards One UN". Other countries noted the UNDAF was not sufficient to ensure alignment because not all UN agencies "bought into it", and there was still "excessive fragmentation" of the UN system.	GA Resolution 2008/3: paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 UNDG: How to Prepare an UNDAF: Part (I) Guidelines for UN Country Teams (2010): pp.5, paragraph 3 A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraphs 13, 43, 95. A/RES/59/250 (2004 TCPR): paragraphs 46, QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: pp.30, 34,46 (A/67/93) Programme country government survey results UNDESA Background Study: UNDAF: p. 48, 53

2	*Recommendation*	Request UN development system to take measures to simplify the UNDAF and agency-specific programming instruments, processes and reporting requirements, including in the areas of work planning, progress reporting, results-based management and evaluation, with a view to reducing workload on national governments and other partners, decreasing the time necessary for the preparation of relevant documents, ensuring alignment with government planning cycles, improving focus on results, and promoting better division of labour within the United Nations system at the country level.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
- The UNDAF is the strategic programme framework that describes the collective response of the UNCT to the priorities in the national development framework. The UNDAF instrument was introduced as part of the 1997 Secretary-General's reform programme. - The 2007 TCPR resolution invited the governing bodies of all organizations of the UN system actively involved in development cooperation activities and their respective management to adopt harmonization and simplification measures, with a view to achieving a significant reduction in the administrative and procedural burden on the organizations and their national partners that derives from the preparation and implementation of operational activities. - In 2010, the UNDG revised the guidelines on "How to prepare an UNDAF" in response to the call in the 2007 TCPR for simplifying common country programming processes. The guidelines stress the need for the coherence and inter-linkages between the UNDAF and the agency-specific programme documents and operational/action plans. - In countries where a One Budget and Action Plan have been introduced, potential does exist to reduce programming costs for individual agencies. Some of the "Delivering-as-One" countries have successfully simplified and harmonized the way the UN works at country level and aligned the UNDAF in support of national priorities with the aim to reduce transaction cost for the government and the UN system. - The guidance introduced by UNDG in 2010 for the UNDAF aims to simplify the process and give more flexibility to the country team, for example, enabling it to use government analysis in preparing the	- The further simplification and harmonization of programming instruments and reporting requirements offers significant potential to increase the coherence of the UN system at the country level, further enables the inclusion of non-resident and specialized agencies in the programming process and considerably lowers transaction costs for the government and the UN system. - According to the survey of UN RCs/CT members, the majority of the RCs value the UNDAF as the only mandatory framework that brings together the UN country team. The UNDAF programming process, however, was viewed as cumbersome by many country team members. - Common programme and monitoring and evaluation formats would promote more consistent and transparent reporting as well as strengthening UN system accountability towards the national government and other development partners. - In the survey of programme countries, 79% of responding governments considered use of a single format for annual work plans "very important" with another 14% considering it "important". 74% of governments considered the use of a single format for progress reports "very important" with another 20% considering it "important". 65% of responding governments considered simplification of the UNDAF and agency country programming or planning processes "very important" with another 25% considering it "important. - Many UNCTs remain reluctant to develop joint programmes as part of the UNDAF process, even in cases where UN agencies agree that there are solid reasons for that approach. This is often because the transaction costs are judged to outweigh the benefits. - According to the analysis conducted by the Secretary-General for the 2012 QCPR, the UNDAF process has not decreased programmatic transaction costs in most cases. UNDAF programming requirements have been an additional cost to agency programming	UNDG: UNDAF or Common Programming Tool (http://toolkit.undg.org/workstream/1-undaf-or-common-programming-tool.html) Survey of Programme Country Governments: pp.52, Chart 38 Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One – Summary Report: pp.24, paragraph 93 UNDESA Background Study: UNDAF Process: pp. viii, 62, 65, paragraphs xiv, 182, 184, 186, 187 and 193 UNDG: How to Prepare an UNDAF: Part (I) Guidelines for UN Country Teams (2010): pp.3, paragraphs 1, 3 GA Resolution 2008/3: paragraph 34

	framework.	at country level, rather than a process that has replaced agency-specific programming processes. • In this context, it is important to note that when the UNDAF was introduced in 1997, it was envisaged that this instrument would become a single UN-wide programming tool, replacing the agency-specific country programme documents.	
3	*Recommendation*	Request the funds and programmes and encourage the specialized agencies and other entities of the United Nations development system to apply a shared programming process that is driven by the principles of national ownership and the comparative advantage of individual entities of the United Nations system at the country level, while also serving to effectively develop national capacities through results-based joint programming, ensuring a strategic focus and alignment of the programming documents to national priorities, and implementing shared quality assurance, reporting systems and monitoring and evaluation.	

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• The Secretary-General's 2002 agenda for further UN reform called for increased *joint programming* and *pooling of resources* to further enhance the effectiveness of the UN system in programme countries, and to ensure the system's combined resources are put to best use. • Joint programming is "the collective effort through which the UN organizations and national partners work together to prepare, implement, monitor and evaluate the activities aimed at effectively and efficiently achieving the MDGs and other international commitments arising from UN conferences, summits, conventions and human rights instruments" (UNDG). • Joint programming under the UNDAF process involves: planning a joint assessment and analysis of the country situation by the government and UN system organizations, which normally culminates in the Common Country Assessment, and the development of an UNDAF (including its results matrix); implementation (coordination of interventions in support of UNDAF outcomes achievement); and monitoring, evaluation and reporting (joint monitoring and evaluation activities based on the UNDAF M&E plan, including an assessment of UN system collaboration, and the preparation of a single UNDAF progress report per	• A results-based joint programming process adopted by several DaO pilot countries enabled an increased focus on country priorities, and on the assessment of where UN support could best fit to serve national needs. • DaO pilot countries also found that joint programming provides a more pragmatic approach to avoiding or reducing duplication and overlap, and clearly defining the responsibilities and deliverables of all participating organizations and implementing partners. • Governments of Dao pilot countries reported improved transparency and coherence, as well as better coordination among UN organizations, including in relation to government processes. Joint programming has in many cases brought about improved relationships with donor programmes and activities as well. • There is a need to further strengthen both national and UN system planning and monitoring and evaluation capacities at country level for more robust monitoring and evaluation of the contribution of the UN system, as well as for more consistent reporting on programme results and the use of funding. • When the UNDAF was established in 1997, it was envisaged that this tool would evolve into a single UN programming instrument aimed at promoting synergy in the work of different entities at the country level. • According to the QCPR report of the Secretary-General, the UNDAF process has not been effective in reducing duplication of activities. According to the programme country survey, 62% of all responding governments in low-income countries agreed either "strongly" or	UNDG: Guidance Note on Joint Programming (December 2003): pp.2 , paragraphs 2, 4 and 5; pp.3, paragraphs 3 and 4 UNDESA Background Study: UNDAF Process: pp.vii, paragraph ix. Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One – Summary Report: pp.24, paragraph 93 Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One – Main Report: pp.43-44: paragraphs 190, 192-193 A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraph 40 QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: pp.33 (A/67/93) Programme country government survey results UNDESA Background Study: UNDAF: p. 70. Report of the Secretary-General on the functioning of the RCS (2011): paragraph 44

	UNDAF cycle).	"somewhat strongly" to the above statement. • See also the rationale given in part IV below with regard to the issues of capacity development, results-based management and evaluation.	
4	*Recommendation*	Request the UNDG to develop guidelines for simplifying and harmonizing programming instruments and processes at the country level resulting in increased flexibility of the United Nations system to adapt to different country-specific situations and a considerable reduction of transaction costs for national governments and other partnership. Such guidelines to be completed for the review of the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes by the end of 2013 with a view to implementation by the end of 2014.	

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• Starting from the 2009 Guidelines on UNDAF, UNDG has moved to allow greater differentiation in the UNDAF process, in response to Member States' views that there should not be a "one size fits all" approach, as well as based on feedback from governments, RCs and UNCT members in programme countries. • The 2010 UNDG Guidelines on UNDAF give UNCTs greater flexibility to conduct country analysis and to develop the strategic programming framework based on the national context. The UNDAF formulation process is kept flexible to enhance its adaptability to different contexts, including middle-income country and post-crisis contexts. • For example, while the duration and timing of the UN programming process, including the UNDAF, is synchronized with the national planning cycle (and ideally the UNDAF begins when the national plan commences), the timeframe of the country analysis and UNDAF in transition settings responds to the special circumstances of the country, and takes into account other planning processes, particularly relating to mission planning. UNCTs can have similar flexibility in politically uncertain country contexts.	• The context in which the UN development system operates has changed. The 66th session of the GA adopted a resolution highlighting the need to ensure that strategies and programmes of the UN development system are tailored to the development needs and priorities of middle-income countries. Supporting middle-income countries requires the UN system to reorient its internal planning and coordination processes towards meeting the specific needs of these countries. • Experience shows that what individual governments want from the UNDAF varies. UNDG may have recognized this variability at a strategic level, but not yet reflected it in guidelines to the UNCTs. • The DaO pilot process has shown that the UN system can respond to the specific contexts of very different countries, including least-developed and middle-income countries (Lesson Learned 2). • The independent evaluation of DaO recommended that UNDG provide further guidance on joint planning and monitoring and evaluation systems that are part of the "One Programme" at country level (Recommendation 4). • The issue is how the concept of the UNDAF is operationalized in the context of individual countries and being realistic about what the various tools applied in the UNDAF process can be expected to deliver. • See also the previous recommendations in this section, especially recommendation 2.	UNDESA Background Study: UNDAF Process: pp. ix, 60-61, 64: paragraphs xx, xxi, 179, 189 UNDG: How to Prepare an UNDAF: Part (I) Guidelines for UN Country Teams (2010): pp.3 paragraphs 2, 3; pp.9 paragraph 4 Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One – Summary Report: pp.24, 26: paragraphs 93, 103

5	*Recommendation*	Request the Secretary-General to examine options for the review and approval of common country programme documents and make appropriate recommendations for consideration of the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes and ECOSOC by mid-2013 with a view to implementation by the end of 2014.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• Currently, the funds and programmes of the UN	• The independent evaluation of DaO identified as one of the	Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One –

development system have to develop separate common country programme documents covering only their activities for review and approval by their individual Executive Boards. • Specialized agencies usually do not prepare country programme documents and do not participate in the development of common country programme documents. • Some 30 plus pilot and self-starter programme countries have voluntarily adopted the "delivering-as-one" approach including the development of a "One UN Programme" at the country level. As the number of programme countries adopting this approach increases, so will their demand for holistic consideration of such common country programme documents at the level of the Executive Boards.	"matters to be addressed through intergovernmental decision-making processes such as the QCPR" the cumbersome process of drafting common country programme documents for funds and programmes, as distinct from UN development assistance programme documents (including the UNDAFs), and having them approved by different Executive Boards. • The DaO evaluation suggested that the Joint Meetings of the Boards of the funds and programmes could be endowed with the authority to review and endorse common country programme documents, as an interim solution. Others have suggested that ECOSOC could review and endorse the CCPDs. • See also the previous recommendations in this section, especially recommendation 2.	Summary Report: pp.27, paragraph 117

(c) Simplification and harmonization of business practices		
The General Assembly may wish to:		
1	*Recommendation*	*Request* the UNDG, funds and programmes and encourage the specialized agencies and other entities of the United Nations to further pursue higher quality, more effective and cost efficient support services in all programme countries by reducing duplication of functions and transaction costs through consolidating support services at the country level by either delegating common functions to a *lead agency*, establishing a common United Nations *service centre* or, where feasible, *outsourcing* support services.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• Operations support services of individual UN entities are characterized by a high degree of functional similarity. Apart from the consolidation of selected support services in a number of countries, there has been limited evidence of a successful consolidation of services as requested by previous TCPR resolutions. • The 2004 and 2007 TCPR resolutions requested the UN development system to give the simplification and harmonization of support services a high priority in all areas of business operations. This includes the co-location at the country level, the implementation of joint offices and the set up of common shared support services. • The 2007 TCPR specifically refers to the reduction of transaction costs through the rationalization of the country presence, in consultation with governments, and sharing support services, including the implementation of the joint office model. • The establishment of higher quality and more effective support services is driven by the notion that inter-agency rationalization of business operation services and the implementation of common services leads to increased efficiency and freeing up resources for programme activities. • The recent analysis by DESA has shown that the consolidation of support services can lead to significant quality gains and reduction of transaction costs. While each country has different requirements, the implementation of support functions through a lead agency, UN service centre and/or increased	• According to the 2005 TCPR resolution, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the UNDG, was requested to submit a programme for the full implementation of a wide range of consolidated support services by the end of 2007. The recent analysis has shown that there has been only limited progress made in a number of countries in the consolidation of support services at the country level. • The ECOSOC resolution 2011/7 on the progress of the TCPR resolution urges the UN system to accelerate the implementation of business processes promising the highest rate of return for harmonization and simplification. • According to the survey of UN Operation Management Teams at the country level, 54% of all UN country teams reported cost reductions as a result of harmonized business practices. 60% reported moderate to significant non-monetary gains, including higher quality of support services and reduced time spent on business processes. • According to the survey of UN Operation Management Teams at the country level, 95% of all UN country teams have not pursued to establish a common UN service centres for the provision of support services at the country level. • According to the projections in the recent background study on business operations, the establishment of common UN service centres can yield up to over $3 million in annual savings for larger country offices. A simulation exercise of 20 common services at the country level conducted as part of the above background study also revealed that it would be more cost-effective in all cases to deliver them jointly rather than by individual agencies. • In order to reduce the workload on programme countries, 83% of the governments stated that it was "very important" or "somewhat important" that UN entities "share more services in areas such as	A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraphs 117-120 A/RES/59/250 (2004 TCPR): paragraphs 36, 37 QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: pp.36-38 (A/67/93) UNDG-HLCM Mission Report: p.15 UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: pp.75-84, Annex II, question 19 ECOSOC resolution 2011/7: 11. Report on the survey of programme countries (Chart 38) http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/government_survey_report_10_june_2012.pdf

	outsourcing – in line with the provisions of previous TCPR resolutions – seems highly feasible in terms of increased service quality and cost reductions. • The High-level UNDG-HLCM mission in March 2010 supported the further consolidation of support services at the country level by particularly pointing to the lead agency model, further outsourcing and the creation of joint structures at the country level. • According to the survey of UN Operations Management Teams at the country level, the areas where greatest progress has been made so far in developing common services are security, travel, medical, cleaning and banking.	procurement, human resources and information technology". For comparison, 63% stated that it was "very important" or "somewhat important" that UN entities share office premises.

2	*Recommendation*	*Request* the funds and programmes and encourage the specialized agencies and other entities of the United Nations to further invest in intra-agency rationalization of business operations. The funds and programmes shall present plans in this regard to their Executive Boards by the end of 2014.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• While the UN development system has advanced in the harmonization of business practices across UN entities, individual UN entities have continued to work on solutions for greater efficiency and cost reductions internally. In recognition of these efforts and according to the recent analysis conducted by DESA, aiming to harmonize all business practices across UN agencies might not be the most feasible approach in the short term to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN system at the country level. • The existence of different ERP systems and agency-specific rules and regulations and policies and procedures suggests that the investment in the rationalization of business practices within UN agencies can yield significant efficiency gains equally contributing to a more effective programme delivery and accumulation of savings. • In line with the recent background study on business operations, intra-agency rationalization of business practices by providing services through regional and agency-owned service centres rather than country	• The experiences from the DaO countries and the results of the OMT survey have shown that, to date, there is limited evidence of both the reduction of transaction costs in the provision of business operations support services and other savings through the harmonization of business practices at the country level. • The existence of different ERP systems and agency-specific rules and regulations and policies and procedures suggests that the investment in the rationalization of business practices within UN agencies can yield significant efficiency gains equally contributing to a more effective programme delivery and accumulation of savings. • Intra-rationalization of business operations is felt to offer much potential for achieving short-term efficiency gains e.g. through greater emphasis on regional and global delivery of common services. Intra-rationalization of business operations could also facilitate a process of fostering greater operational interoperability across UN entities. • The analysis conducted for the preparation of the Secretary-General's report on the QCPR suggests that establishing programmatic and operational interoperability across UN entities is critical if the UN development system is to be able to address development challenges that require cross-sectoral cooperation in	QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.39 (A/67/93) UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: pp.85-86, Annex II, question 19

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	office units could potentially be more feasible than seeking to harmonize the same functional area between different agencies at the country level. • It seems to be essential for the success of business practice harmonization at the country level that there is no conflict between the vertical accountability of country team members and staff towards their regional centres and headquarters and their horizontal accountability towards the UNCT and the Resident Coordinator.	an effective manner. • See also recommendation 1 above.	

3	*Recommendation*	*Request* the HLCM and the UNDG to plan and implement common support services based on a unified set of regulations and rules, policies and procedures, at the country, regional and headquarter levels in the functional areas of finance, human resources management, procurement, information technology management and other appropriate core services. Such a plan to be completed for review by the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes and governing bodies of specialized agencies, where appropriate, by the end of 2014 with a view to implementation by 2016.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• The harmonization of regulations and rules, policies and procedures is a long standing request. The 2004 TCPR resolution requested the harmonization and simplification of rules and procedures, and invited the Executive Boards and governing bodies of the funds, programmes and specialized agencies to assess regularly the progress achieved. The 2007 TCPR resolution called on the UN development system to continue to harmonize and simplify rules and procedures. • The harmonization of business practices and the consolidation of support services are limited to the extent to which agency-specific regulations and rules allow for the flexibility to design a common set of policies and procedures across UN entities. • The experience from delivering-as-one and various self-starter countries has shown that the largest barriers to an effective harmonization of business practices lie in the existence of different regulations and rules for similar functional areas. This leads to the continuous provision of services through individual agencies and only few opportunities to effectively reduce transaction costs.	• 92% of all respondents in the survey of UN Operations Management Teams (OMTs) at the country level answered that different rules, policies and procedures prevent the UNCT to further harmonize business practices in the different areas of business operations. • According to the High-level UNDG-HLCM mission in March 2010, the harmonization of regulations and rules and policies and procedures needs to be prioritized and accelerated. The number of solutions to provide for greater harmonization of business practices at the country level is limited without the implementation of common regulations and rules at headquarter level. • According to the results of the DESA survey of UN Operations Management Teams at the country level, the majority of UNCTs in all programme countries have established a number of common services through harmonization of business practices. However, the reported number of established common services is in conflict with the necessary elements for the establishment of common services, such as the calculation of the financial feasibility and potential cost savings, the implementation of relevant inter-agency MoUs or cost sharing agreements, and the establishment of common long-term agreements with local suppliers. • For instance, some 87% of all responding OMTs confirmed that they have established security services as common services. However,	A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraph 113 A/RES/59/250 (2004 TCPR): paragraphs 36-38. QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.38-39 (A/67/93) UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: pp.15, 21 26-28, 61-63, Annex II, question 17 Independent Evaluation of DaO: pp.6, 32 UNDG-HLCM Mission Report: p.16, 26, 33.

	• The independent evaluation of "delivering-as-one" highlighted that there are no common rules and regulations, leading to high operational costs and limited opportunities to generate savings. • According to the High-level UNDG-HLCM mission in March 2010, prioritizing and accelerating the harmonization of regulations and rules and policies and procedures is the most imminent step towards enabling country teams to effectively work on common business solutions. Although a number of solutions to greater harmonization of business practices were developed at the country level, the findings have shown that there is a requirement to accelerate efforts to harmonize agency-specific regulations at the headquarter level.	only 37% reported to have an inter-agency agreement and 33% to have a common long-term agreement in place. Much fewer countries (17%) have conducted a cost-benefit analysis prior to establishing common security services or monitor the savings accrued through this common service (11%). This indicates that the majority of country teams manage most of their business operations support services without engaging in opportunities for efficiency gains and transaction cost reductions.	

4	*Recommendation*	*Request* the funds and programmes and *encourage* the specialized agencies and other entities of the United Nations development system to ensure system-wide interoperability of enterprise resources planning systems (ERP) with the objective to provide an integrated platform for processing internal and external management information and supporting harmonized business processes and practices across the entire United Nations development system by 2016. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to *request* the CEB, including HLCM and the UNDG, to undertake a study to examine the feasibility of establishing interoperability among the existing ERP systems of the funds and programmes and report to the Executive Boards by the end of 2014.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• Agency-specific ERP systems include tailored solutions for programming, project management and budgeting which are connected to their own business operations functions in procurement, human resources and finance. To enable inter-agency harmonization of business practices, inter-agency collaboration of ERP systems has been repeatedly recommended throughout the UN reform process. • Most steps in related business processes are completed in customized ERP systems which leave limited opportunities for the harmonization of related business practices at the country level. The adoption of one ERP system for the entire UN system has been repeatedly discussed as a desirable long-term solution. However, high investments in the development of agency-specific management systems in line with their particular mandates have made it difficult to pursue a strategy of one ERP	• The 2007 TCPR resolution encourages the UN development system to further harmonize enterprise resources planning systems and making use of information and communications technologies to the fullest extent possible. • According to the findings of the recent UNDESA study on business operations, the continuous application of different ERP systems poses the major challenge for an effective harmonization of business practices at headquarter and country level. • The provisions of the GA resolutions to further harmonize agency-specific enterprise resources planning systems are in conflict with the continuous investment in tailored ICT solutions through individual UN entities. The feasibility study aims to provide concrete information and a strategy on how to ensure system-wide interoperability of enterprise resource planning systems to allow for a further harmonization of business practices across UN entities.	A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraph 121 QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.39 (A/67/93) UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: pp.10, 45, 50, 86, 91, Annex II, question 17 UNDG-HLCM Mission Report: p.26, 44

system.

- Agencies continue to improve their existing individual ERP systems or undertake large investments in the development of new agency-specific ERP software. In the course of the recent analysis through UNDESA, there was no evidence found that there are medium or long-term plans to work on the development of a unified system-wide ERP system. The feasibility study would aim to establish a cost efficient and long-term solution to ensure the inter-operability of agency-specific ERP systems enabling the effective harmonization of business practices at headquarter and country level.

5	*Recommendation*	*Request* CEB, including HLCM and UNDG, to develop a common definition of operating costs, including direct and indirect costs, and a common and standardized system of cost control and report to the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes by the end of 2014. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to *request* the funds and programmes and encourage the specialized agencies and other entities of the United Nations system to establish such a harmonized cost classification system by 2016.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• The reduction of transaction costs for the UN development system has been identified as one of the major arguments for increasing coherence and harmonizing business practices. The 2004 and 2007 TCPR resolutions point to a need for significant reduction in the administrative and procedural burden for national partners and UN entities. • Following the experience of DaO countries and the results of recent UNDG and UNDESA studies, there remain considerable challenges in providing evidence for savings and reduction in transaction costs due to the difficulties in measuring and calculating such costs. The overall absence of established systems effectively controlling operating costs of UN entities at the country level was revealed with the introduction of the DaO initiative. The emerging obligation of UNCTs to provide quantified evidence for efficiency gains through the implementation of the "One Office" concept has led to the recognition that the UN at the country level did not calculate and monitor operating and other expenses to the extent that they could serve as a baseline for monitoring	• According to the DESA analysis, the main hindrances for a calculation of transaction costs lie in the complexity of quantifying transaction costs incurred by many independent partners with different accounting systems and business models. Furthermore, there is currently no UN system-wide method for cost controlling, which makes it challenging to calculate costs and quantify potential savings as a result of the harmonization of business practices. • According to the recent UNDG study on transaction costs, current UN budgeting, cost accounting and reporting systems do not allow for the preparation of consolidated reports on expenditures and transaction costs because of differences in the cost terminology, definitions and classifications. • Activity-based costing exercises as part of harmonizing business practices in some of the DaO countries have demonstrated how complex it is to distinguish between operational and programmatic expenditures. According to the experience from DaO countries, the lack of baselines and an established monitoring system of operating costs have made it impossible to provide concrete information on avoided costs and savings as a result of the DaO process.	A/RES/59/250 (2004 TCPR): paragraphs 34-40 A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraphs 112-122. QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.35 (A/67/93) UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: pp.66-71 UNDG Study on Transaction Costs (2010): pp.8, 18, 24.

progress in the reduction of transaction costs.

- A recent UNDG analysis on this subject highlights that there is currently no methodology available or in reach that could provide comprehensive information on the levels and trends of transaction costs for the stakeholders of the UN system at the country level.

- Current UN budgeting, cost accounting and reporting systems do not allow the preparation of consolidated reports on expenditures and transaction costs because of differences in the cost terminology, definitions and classifications.

6	*Recommendation*	Request the UNDG, funds and programmes and *encourage* the specialized agencies and other United Nations entities to develop and conclude inter-agency framework agreements regulating the mutual validity of agreements between United Nations entities and third parties at the country level and delegating the authority to country teams to establish and manage common services and long-term agreements with third parties through standardized inter-agency agreements without further approval requirements by the end of 2013.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
- According to a recent HLCM project on procurement harmonization and the UNDESA analysis on business operations, the establishment of common services and common procurement yield considerable efficiency gains and transaction cost savings. The establishment of inter-agency agreements at the country level has been challenging due to long review and approval processes at headquarters of individual agencies. Oftentimes, agreements with local suppliers and service providers are not accepted by all UN entities, making the establishment of a whole range of common services not possible. - This necessitates that there is an agreement between all UN entities at the headquarter level to enable the establishment of common services for all UN entities at the country level and consequently use long-term agreements (LTAs), which can be processed through another UN agency on behalf of the UN country team. - According to the recent UNDESA study on business operations, it seems to be essential for the success of business practice harmonization at the country level that there is no conflict between the vertical	- According to interviews conducted for the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General on the QCPR, the implementation of common services and long-term agreements is frequently hindered by the long process to establish local inter-agency agreements. The reasons for this are long review periods at regional and headquarter levels of individual agencies and the application of different policies and procedures. - In accordance with the results of the survey of UN Operation Management Teams at the country level, programme countries have not yet fully used their potential to harmonize business practices and do not take advantage of the UNDG guidance on procurement and common services. - 92% of all respondents in the survey of UN Operation Management Teams at the country level answered that different rules, policies and procedures prevent the UNCT to further harmonize business practices in the different areas of business operations. It has been noted in this regards that the implementation of standardized inter-agency agreements at headquarter level should empower UN country teams to effectively implement common services.	UNDG-HLCM Mission Report: p.7, 12, 17 UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: p. 63, 86

- accountability of country team members and staff towards their regional centres and headquarters and their horizontal accountability towards the UN country team and the RC.

- The establishment of common services could be effectively facilitated through a UNDG Framework Agreement regulating the terms and conditions of common services at any country level and committing heads of agencies to join hands in establishing common business solutions.

- This has been recognized by the High-level UNDG-HLCM mission in March 2010, which requested UN entities to speed up review and clearance of legal agreements. To reduce complexity and time needed for the review and clearance of LTAs, it would be necessary for the UN system organizations to agree at the highest level that agreements proposed at the country level would be fast tracked at headquarters by the legal offices concerned. In addition, the high-level mission suggested that UNDG develop model MOUs which would already have received legal clearance and could be used as the need arises, thus allowing UN agencies to work faster together.

7	*Recommendation*	Request UNDG to develop and begin implementing a strategy, by the end of 2013, with concrete goals and targets, to support the establishment of common premises in programme countries, with due consideration of security conditions and cost effectiveness.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	- The 2004 and 2007 TCPR resolutions have stressed the importance of common premises in relation to the rationalization of the country presence and potential savings of transaction costs. While the number of UN houses and common premises has significantly increased, only a small number of programme countries have established a unified UN presence at the country level through common premises. - The establishment of common premises requires a considerable and long-term commitment and upfront investment. In the majority of programme countries, UN country teams have not been in the position to	- According to the survey of UN Operations Management Teams at the country level, only 36% of all UN country teams have conducted a feasibility study for the establishment of common premises. - According to the same survey, the vast majority of countries with common premises replied that the co-location did not lead to any changes in the provision of operation support services through individual UN entities. - According to the survey of UN Resident Coordinators and country team members, 78% favour the establishment of annual and multi-year targets for increasing UN coherence at the country level. The survey of programme countries also revealed strong preference of governments in enhancing the coherence of the UN development system at the country level.	A/RES/59/250 (2004 TCPR): paragraphs 36 A/RES/62/208 (2007 TCPR): paragraphs 120. QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: p.35 (A/67/93) UNDG-HLCM Mission Report: p.8, 30 UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: p.86, Annex II, question 3, 4 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/unct_survey_report_6_june_2012.pdf

	effectively plan for the establishment of common premises due to the lack of resources and individual agency commitment. According to the recent analysis on the provision of common support services, physical co-location of UN agencies at the country level is a major factor in enabling organizational reform beyond the reduction of operating costs in building management and some connected common services. However, to date, the UN system does not foresee any financing options for the establishment of common premises other than through a direct and upfront capital investment. • Current feasibility studies for the establishment of common premises do not include provisions for a more strategic approach, which would go beyond the possible reduction of transaction costs through a common building management and some connected common services. Common premises are an enabler for the effective harmonization of business practices in both the programmatic and operational dimensions of UN-OAD. In the medium and long-term, the investment in common premises yields considerable returns.	• Physical co-location of UN agencies at the country level is a major component enabling organizational reform beyond the reduction of operating costs in building management and some connected common services. With the exception of the establishment of the provision of common services, which are directly related to the building management of common premises, business planning for common premises does currently not include the potential efficiency gains and savings of a physical co-location of UN entities at the country level. This includes the harmonization of business functions, the establishment of a UN service centre or other joint office arrangements. • The absence of direct funding from host governments and UN agencies for the establishment of common premises have led to major challenges for a number of countries, where the implementation of common premises or a UN House was generally found to be feasible. To date, the UN system does not foresee in this regard any financing options other than through a direct and upfront capital investment. • Although the report of the UNDG-HLCM mission in March 2010 has highlighted the importance of establishing a task force to investigate and develop financing options through public-private partnerships, there has been no measurable progress made so far in this direction.	
8	*Recommendation*	Request the United Nations development system to prioritize the availability of financial and human resources to further support the effective harmonization and rationalization of business operations, including the option to develop funding mechanisms in support of innovative and sustainable business solutions supporting the further development and implementation of high quality, effective and cost efficient support services.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The system-wide harmonization of business practices requires considerable funding and human resources for the development of innovative business solutions and change management processes at the headquarter, regional and country level. In parallel to the implementation of the DaO approach, efforts at headquarter and country level have accelerated through a better coordination of the headquarter working mechanisms, the implementation of relevant projects through the HLCM Plan of Action and a number of successful initiatives and best practices in	• According to the survey of UN Operations Management Teams at the country level, 54% responded that the lack of resources has been preventing the UN country team from further harmonizing business practices in the area of common services. • The experience from DaO countries has shown that the harmonization and rationalization of business practices requires additional and different financial and human resources capacities at headquarters and country level, particularly in the area of business planning from common services and change management. • UNDG and HLCM headquarter working mechanisms have successfully designed and implemented change management	UNDG-HLCM Mission Report: p.14 UNDESA Background Study: Business Operations: pp. 21-25, Annex II, question 1 http://www.unsceb.org/ceb/priorities/business-practices

DaO and other countries. • According to the High-level UNDG-HLCM mission in March 2010, the lack of identifiable funding resources in the UN system for effective change management remains a challenge. Various funding modalities to support the investment in change management include the mobilization of additional resources from donors at the country level, allocation of resources from "One UN Funds", where they exist, cost-sharing among UN entities at the country level and with regional support, and additional headquarters level allocations.	projects in a number of functional areas. For instance, the HLCM Plan of Action included projects directly impacting the harmonization of regulations and rules and implementing common business practices across UN entities.	

(d) Transition countries: the challenge of coordination and coherence			
The General Assembly may wish to:			
1	*Recommendation*	Reaffirm the interlinkages among development, peace and human rights and their mutually reinforcing nature in the overarching framework of the work of the United Nations.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• While the concepts of relief and development have evolved since the 2007 TCPR, the term "transition from relief to development" implies an understanding of transition as a "continuum". Countries in transitions are complex environments in which linear progression from one set of activities to another is difficult to achieve, if not impossible in any short-term timeframe. Such contexts are characterized by unpredictable shocks and fragile institutions, creating highly unpredictable environments. • Since 1997, the UN has recognized the interconnectedness between human rights, development and peace and security, and, accordingly, the need for coherent and integrated strategies for development that take account of all the three pillars of the UN system. In transition countries, the UN system has a particular role to play in supporting political processes, basic services, and core government functions, all of which have essential human rights underpinnings.	• It is important to consider where on the "continuum" the transition takes place: in the wake of a sudden or slow on-set of crisis; whether it is a natural or man-made 'disaster'; whether it affects a low- or middle-income country; and, whether the intervention occurs during an identifiable "phase" of the conflict or disaster while acknowledging that such phases are unlikely to proceed in predictable, linear fashion. Recognition of the inter-linkages between development, peace and human rights provides the necessary basis for deeper cooperation and alignment between the activities in these different areas, thus fostering their reinforcing nature. • The starting point for the 2012 QCPR has to be a more nuanced understanding of the "transition" phase, which underscores the diversity of contexts in which they take place and the need for tailored, non-linear and long-term approaches to humanitarian, development and security-related challenges. • Recent global developments have stressed the need for UN support in the human rights sphere, creating new demands for the UN development system to provide technical assistance and advice in building national capacities and strengthening inclusive, people-centred development at the country level. • The realization of human rights is increasingly being seen as critical to development effectiveness. The mainstreaming of human rights in UN-OAD is an integral part of supporting countries in achieving more equitable progress towards the MDGs and the internationally-agreed development goals. Through development, countries can improve their ability to promote and protect human rights. And conversely, through the application of human rights principles, including non-discrimination, participation and accountability, countries can help make national development efforts more effective and peace more secure.	World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1, op.9 & 126) Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review, A/RES/62/208, TCPR Secretary General's Report on Peace in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/63/881–S/2009/304) Secretary-Generals Report on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding (A/65/354–S/2010/466) World Development Report 2011 'Conflict, Security, and Development' Analytical review in preparation for the QCPR 2012, 'Support to countries in transition from relief to development'; Marc Jacquand and Josie Lianna Kaye, Spring 2012 Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, (A/RES/65/1, op.13)
2	*Recommendation*	Call for significant strengthening of strategic, programmatic and operational cooperation and coordination between the development, humanitarian	

	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• UN and non-UN entities building societal capacities for peace and addressing conflict-related issues such as governance, unemployment or exclusion, alongside UN peacekeeping or political missions, contribute to improving the security and political environment, which facilitate recovery in the respective country. A number of UN agencies and departments collaborate to assist transition countries in building resilience by strengthening national and local mechanisms, resources, and skills through which conflicts can be resolved non-violently. • The Secretary-General's 2008 Decision on Integration endorsed the defining elements of integration as: seeking to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response; a strategic partnership between the UN mission and country team; with a shared vision, closely aligned or integrated planning procedures, seeking to achieve an agreed set of results, and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation; and calls for alignment of mission planning processes with existing UN system planning tools, such as the UNDAF, Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP)/Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), PRSPs, and Results Based Budget(RBB). • A number of policies have also been developed to ensure programmatic coherence and align UN project approaches with internationally-recognized practices. Building on the 2009 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding, the Secretary-General's Decision on Rule of Law outlines the need for joint programming on rule of law in peacekeeping and special political missions. In line with similar policies on programmatic coordination, the UN Policy on Post-Conflict Employment Generation, Income Generation and Reintegration seeks to develop a more coherent approach to creating jobs in post-conflict settings.	• Integration represents one of the most significant and impactful policies of the UN system in the field. However, the main remaining challenges linked to the implementation of the integration agenda relate to system-wide cooperation at the programmatic, operational and strategic level. Such cooperation is paramount to reduce transaction and opportunity costs, maximizing the use of resources and fostering a coherent support by the UN system to countries in transition. • The Secretary-General decision 2012/1, adopting the policy of declaration of special circumstances for countries where there is no UN peacekeeping or special political mission on the ground but where demands upon the organization are likely to rise due to a situation of armed conflict, heightened political instability or social unrest, a significant natural disaster with potential political repercussions, or other similar crisis, aims to assist in fostering effective coordination of the different pillars of the UN in such situations. • Interviews with UN Operations Management Teams at the country level, suggest that where UNCT and Peacekeeping Operations/Special Political Missions co-exist, business operations become highly complex. Procedures applied are not always interoperable which undermines effective coordination among the different pillars of the UN system and significantly reduces its responsiveness to national needs and priorities.	Secretary-General's 2008 Decision on Integration (2008/24) Secretary-General's Decision on Special Circumstances in Non-Mission settings (2012/1)
3	*Recommendation* Recognize that an integrated resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator function has important benefits, facilitating linkages between the United Nations humanitarian assistance and recovery and development work, providing smoother transition for United Nations development operations and helping to build resilience.		
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• In accordance with General Assembly Resolution 46/182 "Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency	• Integrating the RC/HC functions (as well as the function of DSRSG in integrated mission settings) is more conductive to exploiting	GA 46/182 Secretary-General's report

- assistance of the United Nations" (December 1991) 'the Resident Coordinator should normally coordinate the humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system at the country level' (paragraph 39).

- The Secretary-General's report E/1998/67, paragraph 24, states: "In accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/182 and the report of the Secretary-General on reform, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, has a number of options available in deciding on the appropriate field coordination mechanism for each complex emergency. The understanding is that the Resident Coordinator should normally coordinate the humanitarian assistance activities of the United Nations system at the country level by assuming the dual function of Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, usually with staff support from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. [..] The above arrangements will be implemented with due regard to the need for greater coherence of United Nations activities in the field, where it is essential that the United Nations should act as one".

- The need for stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground was highlighted in the 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, which states that: "As it is unlikely that a single individual possesses all of the skills and competencies required, the solution must be found in the development and strengthening of well integrated leadership teams that would bring together the senior leadership of the political, peacekeeping and development elements of the United Nations country presence, where relevant. Individual appointments must contribute to the overall balance of complementary skills and strengths within the leadership team".

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synergy between the activities in the different areas (humanitarian, development and security/political); enhance cooperation between UNDG members and mission presences as well as improving flexibility and responsiveness of the UN system to country-level changes.

- Such benefits would be enhanced if the RC/HC would be given more authority in allocating resources and taking programmatic decisions at country level (see recommendation 5 below).

- See recommendation 5 on the RC system.

- See also the section on the RC system (part III (a).

E/1998/67

Secretary General's Report on Peace in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/63/881–S/2009/304)

4	Recommendation	Call for accelerated progress in deepening integration and interoperability between Secretariat entities and members of the United Nations development system, inter alia, through simplification and harmonization of programming instruments and processes and business practices, with a view to providing effective, efficient and responsive support to national efforts in transition countries.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*

Background	Rationale	References
• Under the umbrella of the implementation of the policy on integration, work is ongoing to foster harmonization of business practices and operations between funds, programmes and agencies on the one hand and missions on the other.	• To date, progress in strengthening coordination among Secretariat entities and members of the UN development system includes development of standard cooperation models for logistics and medical services while discussions are ongoing regarding the issues	

• This work takes into consideration and benefits from the similar efforts within UNDG, however, specific focus on the operational cooperation between the funds, programmes and agencies and the Secretariat is required, considering the different applicable rules and governing structures.	of cost-recovery, finances and ICTs. • The experience gained with the integration policy since 2006 and particularly from 2008, shows that the main constraint are difficulties in fostering operational cooperation among different pillars of the UN system. Facilitating such cooperation can thus enhance the overall impact of the UN system at country level. • See also section on harmonization of business practices (part III (d)).	

5	*Recommendation*	Call for further strengthening of the coordination role of the resident coordinator in countries undergoing transition. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to request the members of the United Nations development system to take immediate steps to fully implement the Management and Accountability System to enable the resident coordinator to effectively and efficiently coordinate operational activities for development of the United Nations system in transition countries.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict highlights the unevenness of the support provided to the HC and RC functions, pointing towards a strong deficit on the latter. • A range of policies since the 2007 TCPR have attempted to respond to this, by providing a comprehensive policy platform for the RC system, including a Guidance Note on the RC and UNCT Working Relations, greater clarity on the RC job description and the development of a dispute resolution mechanism for UNCTs. • More specifically, UNDG has established the Management and Accountability system (M&A system) to promote more clarity on the role and responsibilities of the RC and country team members.	• See recommendation 1 on RC system. • See also recommendations on M&A system in the section on the RC system (part III (a)).	Secretary General's Report on Peace in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/63/881–S/2009/304)
6	*Recommendation*	Request the UN development system to assign priority to providing adequate and sustained financial and technical support to ensure effective strategic and operational planning and coordination capacity in resident coordinator offices in countries undergoing transition.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The Secretary-Generals Report on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict highlights the unevenness of the support provided to the HC and RC functions, pointing towards a strong deficit on the latter. • The Resident Coordinator Capacity Gap initiative, endorsed by Security Council decision 2009/29 defines coordination specifically as a service to be provided by the RC office, starting with the UN system itself, extending to the host government, the international community and civil society; it also suggests that in certain circumstances it may be necessary for the RC to establish coordination capacity at the sub-national level.	• The lack of coordination capacity (in support of the RC mainly, but not exclusively) has been well documented. It includes financial and human resources (see paragraph below) but also the absence of simple coordination systems such as a system-wide project and resource databases. • The recognition that the skills and needs for coordination in transition settings are broader than in development settings and need to be linked to national capacity development must be seen in tandem to pursuing the discussion related to burden-sharing of coordination costs currently taking place in the UNDG. Predictability of such resources and rapid deployment must be	Secretary General's Report on Peace in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/63/881–S/2009/304) 'Capacity Requirements For Resident Coordinator Offices in the Context of Crisis and Post-Crisis Recovery and Peace-building', United Nations Development Group, 19 May 2009' Secretary General decision 2009/29

• The Capacity Gap initiative continues to provide support to the minimum requirements of coordination capacity for RCs in transition settings, at the same time promoting partnership of the whole UN system in devising and addressing such requirements. • With the same objective of ensuring the primacy of national capacity development and smooth transfer of activities to governments, OCHA Policy Instruction on Transition suggests setting up support capacity within the RC office when special assistance to the HC is required after the closure of the OCHA office. • In late 2011, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) agreed to a Transformative Agenda which focuses on ensuring a coherent and effective response in the first three months after an emergency especially, but contains policies which relate to the humanitarian response more broadly. The clusters especially are required to become less process-driven, and more focused on delivering results, thereby transferring coordination activities over to national counterparts as soon as possible. The Transformative Agenda also seeks to increase mutual accountability for adherence to a transition plan as agreed at the HCT/UNCT level.	pursued, linked with the use of all available resources to ensure maximum synergy and the least possible duplication. • A differentiated approach could include a range of options in crisis and post-crisis contexts, which would bring together various agreed policy and programmatic principles. For example, the use of assessed contributions in integration mission settings for coordination would support the integration agenda and Member States' calls for greater unity of purpose. Or, the use of MDTF resources for coordination beyond funding secretariat functions would be consistent with OECD/DAC guidance on aligning funding instruments with country strategies and risk management. Continuous support to the Capacity Gap initiative, as a means to ensure that minimum needs are addressed can underpin this approach, ensuring predictability of support, and, ultimately, enhancing the assistance the UN system can provide to countries in transition.	

8	*Recommendation*	Request members of the United Nations development system to further delegate authority in the areas of programming and allocation of resources to field representatives of United Nations entities in order to enable the respective entities to respond effectively and efficiently to national needs and priorities in transition countries.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• Relapses into conflict or the recurrence of disasters are not only possible in transition countries, but highly likely. Expectations of a linear progression betray the reality of complex and fragile settings, and can lead to unrealistic timeframes with unintended, negative consequences. • A more nuanced understanding of transitions, which underscores the diversity of contexts in which they take place, and the need for tailored, non-linear and long-term approaches to humanitarian, development and security-related challenges must be the starting point. This message reflects the tenor of a series discussions held in the Joint Executive Board of UNDP, UNOPS, UNICEF, WHO, UN-Women, and UNFPA over the last year and a half. • The 2010 UNDAF planning guidelines have introduced a much greater degree of flexibility to the process. Such flexibility has also	• Recent discussions at the global level on the role, purpose and ways of international assistance to countries in transition offer an opportunity for the UN system to strengthen its internal and external coherence. Taking into account emerging trends (new actors, technology, role of regional organizations etc.) that are affecting the way in which relevance is defined, and achieved in transition contexts, such an exercise requires the deployment of strategies, skills and resources to offer national partners the time, space and resources to define for themselves the rules of engagement with the international community. • Such role has a number of implications in terms of UN programming and requires an even higher degree of tailoring and swift responsiveness to the specific context in transition settings. • Greater attention to real time management (e.g. at country level) and responses across the political/security, human rights,	Secretary-General's Report on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict (A/66/311-S/2011/527)

	been built into the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), with many countries experimenting with vastly different approaches. However, the centralized nature of the approval processes of such documents, as well as the development and approval of country programme documents of specific entities hinders the capacity of the UN system of being responsive to changes in national priorities, which, in transition countries, happen in shorter cycles. • Several processes, policies and reports, including the Secretary-General's Report on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict in 2011, have responded to the call for greater South-South cooperation as well as the primacy of national contexts, both directly and indirectly.	development and humanitarian pillars, through greater delegation of strategic, programming and funding decision-making, both from Member States and donors (through Agency Boards) to the UN system from UN headquarters to UN country presences, and building on progress made in integrated planning, programming and operations, where relevant, would enhance such capacity for responsiveness. • See recommendation 5 on Resident Coordinator and recommendations 4 & 5 on UNDAF. See also related recommendations in the section on the RC system (part III (a)).	
9	*Recommendation*	Encourage OECD/DAC member governments to commit to the principle of shared risk in crisis and transition countries using existing mechanisms creatively to cover the higher operational and security risks and costs associated with such contexts.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The 2007 TCPR resolution implies a move away from a supply-driven approach to funding for countries in transition, towards one based on the needs of stakeholders. Various policies since the 2007 TCPR have advocated for strengthening pooled funding mechanisms in the work of the UN system in countries in transition. • The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), Policy Statement on Transition Financing, recognized the need to "decrease fragmentation, competition and overlap between mandates and approaches" of donors, through the use of Transition Compacts which align behind national leadership and reinforce national mechanisms, with accountability among international actors to facilitate coordination and coherence in support of national efforts. It also recognized the need for greater use of pooled funds to help manage risk and reduce transaction costs for donors and partner countries alike.	• While resources for fragile/transition contexts represents a majority share of overall ODA funding, two key dimensions are affecting UN system coherence and efficiency. The first relates to the volatility of aid, which remains acute in most fragile states according to a 2011 OECD/DAC analysis, and the second is the steady decline of UN core resources as a percentage of overall funding for UN-OAD. • The number of trust funds has increased significantly but challenges persist: the number of trust funds and their resources do not appear to translate into a proportionate increase in coherence beyond the joint programme dimension; recent reviews of trust funds point to "coherence weaknesses" among the multiplicity of in-country and global trust funds, in terms of programmatic choices, governance mechanisms, and capacity-building approaches. • UN efforts in fostering coherence at country level are not always followed by a "whole-of-government" approach by bilateral partners, thus weakening the impact of a coherent international response and support and putting additional strain on national systems.	Analysis of the funding of operational activities for development of the United Nations system, Report of the Secretary General, A/66/79-E/2011/107; 6 May 2011 International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), Policy Statement on Transition Financing, DCD/DAC/INCAF(2011)
10	*Recommendation*	Encourage the United Nations development system to strengthen operational partnerships with other multilateral organizations and other partners working in transition countries, particularly the World Bank.	
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• The most notable development in this regard since the 2007 TCPR	• Challenges to the effective implementation of the UN/World Bank	United Nations and World Bank

is unquestionably the United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations, signed in 2008. The agreement recognizes the opportunities for partnership between these two major actors, with a particular focus on joint assessments (through greater collaboration in Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Needs Assessments specifically) and pooled funds, through the use of fiduciary agreements to allow inter-operability of disbursements. The agreement also supports efforts to cultivate a culture of partnership, through joint training, events and briefings.

- Substantive efforts have taken place since the 2007 TCPR in promoting a stronger technical cooperation between the World Bank, UN entities and other regional organizations (such as the European Union and the Africa Development Bank), in particular with regard to conducting joint assessment and planning exercises in post-crisis countries, using the PCNA methodology. This was done through familiarization of staff of all institutions with the methodology and the principles of the partnership and joint technical training of mid and senior-level staff.

- The more recent World Bank World Development Report 2011 (WDR) on Conflict, Security and Development has also provided significant avenues for greater partnership in the years ahead. The report confirms and elaborates on important points of convergence amongst the international community concerning conflict and fragility, emphasizing the cyclical nature of political and criminal violence, and its subsequent negative effects on developing contexts around the world. It suggests that the focus of the international community should be on strengthening institutions that provide citizens with security, justice and jobs. The WDR underscores the need for closer partnership between the UN and World Bank in key areas, and advocates for greater and more effective use of tools such as the MDTFs as a way to allow for more flexible coordination between different actors.

partnership agreement include: lack of alignment between joint needs assessments and programmatic follow through among the two partners; donor disincentives; inter-operability constraints; including the overly restrictive scope of the Fiduciary Principle Accord (FPA); and the limited focus at present on mainstreaming this agreement into the day-to-day practice of the two entities.

- There is also need to ensure that the Member States in the respective governing bodies give clear messages regarding the need for greater collaboration between these institutions.

- The World Bank and other relevant development finance institutions should also be encouraged to engage in the QCPR process.

Partnership Framework for Crisis and post-Crisis situations, October 2008

EC, UN, WB joint declaration on crisis and post-conflict assessment and planning, October 2008

(e)	**Delivering-as-one**	
4	*Recommendation*	Encourage the United Nations system to support programme countries that wish to adopt the "delivering-as-one" approach with an integrated package of support comprising: guidance on programming, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting; innovative funding mechanisms, drawing on the lessons from the Expanded Funding Window and the One Fund mechanisms; support to the resident coordinator system in line with the Management and Accountability System; and simplification and harmonization of business practices.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• "Delivering-as-One" pilot countries followed the "One Programme", "One Leader", "One Budgetary Framework" and "One UN Fund" strategies. Most pilots also added the "One Voice" strategy as an approach distinct from the "One Leader". The "One Office" component was intended to promote co-location of UN offices, along with common procedures to reduce transaction costs. • The UNDG has decided that by the end of 2012 the UN development system will have developed minimum Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on programming, business practices, coordination, and leadership arrangements for use in programme countries adopting "Delivering-as-One" approach. • The SOPs will be a minimum package of principles and processes to be implemented by countries adopting the "Delivering-as-One" approach, simplified and harmonized to the extent possible. • The SOPs will provide (a) links to existing UNDG approved guidance, simplified, where appropriate and (b) new guidance in areas, where needed. • The findings of the independent evaluation of the DaO suggest that this approach has strengthened the alignment of the work of the UN system with national development needs and priorities in the respective countries and helped to ensure that non-core funding is aligned with national plans and priorities. • In the programme country survey, many governments also signaled strong preference for the concept of the UN system "delivering-as-one". Governments in DaO countries, in the survey, also	• RCs and country team members in the DaO pilot countries generally perceive support from agency headquarters and the inter-agency system as insufficient. • RCs and country team members observe in particular that headquarter and inter-agency support has not been timely in addressing issues that require decision-making at the country level. • Support to the pilot countries by regional offices and UNDG Regional Teams did not go significantly beyond that provided to UNCTs in other UN programme countries. • The large number of "Delivering-as-one" guidelines, are often issued on the basis of specific missions to pilot countries. • An integrated package would help ensure system-wide and consistent support from UNDG at headquarter and regional level.	• Independent evaluation of lessons learned from "Delivering-as-one" - Note by the Secretary-General (A/66/859) • UNDG High Level Group Standard Operating Procedures for countries adopting Delivering as One - Scope of work and key deliverables

	took a more positive view on the contribution of the UN system to national development than programme countries in general. The survey findings also suggest that the DaO approach may have been helpful in reducing duplication among UN entities and that "One UN Funds" in DaO countries have led to greater UN coherence. DaO countries also generally assess joint funding mechanisms more favourably than other UN programme countries.		

PART IV	PROGRESS IN ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

(a) Capacity building and development

The General Assembly may wish to call upon the funds and programmes and specialized agencies and other entities of the United Nations system engaged in operational activities for development to:

1	*Recommendation*	Strengthen their focus on developing national capacities for development planning, implementation and evaluation with emphasis on the effective integration of the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of sustainable development. In this regard, countries should have full access to the mandates and resources of the United Nations development system, including the knowledge base and expertise of all resident and non-resident agencies.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• The GA has consistently in earlier TCPR resolutions underlined the importance of strengthening national capacities, and as part of that effort, providing coherent UN system support and making optimal use of existing national capacities and systems. • In the programme country survey, governments were asked which functional types of UN support were relevant to their needs. Some 94% of governments chose 'strengthening national capacities for policy and strategy development'. This was 9 percentage points higher than the next most popular type of support (training and institution-building at 85%). • Capacity development has been emphasized in successive editions of the CCA/UNDAF guidelines, for example, the 2007 CCA/UNDAF guidelines identified capacity development as one of the five "interrelated principles that must be applied at country level". The 2007 guidelines reflected the newly-issued UNDG Position Statement on Capacity Development, which stated that "capacity development is the central thrust and main benefit of UNCT cooperation". • Since 2007, UNDG has introduced a capacity assessment methodology and toolkit, and a reference guide for better aid. • The GA has emphasized that countries should have full access to the mandates and resources of the UN development system, whereby the national governments should determine which resident and non-resident UN organizations, would best respond	• The survey of programme country governments indicated that the achievements of the UN development system with regard to capacity development appeared to be less than might be expected. While nearly all governments were inclined to agree, rather than disagree, with the statement that the UN system has been effective in developing national capacities, less than 24% "strongly agreed", which suggests that there is considerable room for improvement. • Similar views were expressed by civil society organizations (CSOs) working closely with UN organizations in programme countries. Capacity development was one of the three most frequently chosen areas from a list of ten suggesting ways in which the UN might make itself more effective. Specifically, some 73% of CSO respondents indicated that it was "very important" that the UN pay more attention to the development of national capacities. • Some governments emphasized that capacity development entails a long-term commitment, which UN entities often cannot make with non-core funds. The exception would be funds such as the "One UN Funds" that have a longer duration than typical non-core contributions. • The survey of programme country governments also explored the extent to which UN entities use national capacities and systems. Out of 110 countries, only one-third strongly agreed that UN entities have used national experts and institutions "as much as possible" in the design of programmes and projects. Moreover, only about 10% of the governments agreed that UN entities use national procurement, financial, monitoring and reporting systems or national evaluation capacities "as much as possible" in order to achieve good results. • According to the survey of programme countries, 54% of	QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, 31 May 2012: pp 45-47 (A/67/93) http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc /pdf/sg_report_for_2012_qcpr.pdf 2007 TCPR resolution, paragraphs 35 to 47 2007 TCPR resolution, paragraph 101 UNDESA: Charts 5 and 26 in the report on the survey of Governments: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc /pdf/government_survey_report_10_june_201 2.pdf http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc /pdf/unct_survey_report_6_june_2012.pdf Findings of QCPR missions fielded by UNDESA

to specific needs and priorities of the individual country, including in the case of NRAs through hosting arrangements with resident organizations.

- Nearly half of the countries classified in 1995 as low-income countries have since moved into the middle-income category. However, in the same period, there appears to have been limited change in the business model of the UN development system at the country level in terms of increasing the use of national systems in programme implementation. For example, it is estimated that approximately the same share of UN-OAD are currently managed through UN systems at the country level as in 1995 despite the significant change taking place in the profile of programme countries in this 17-year period.[2] This suggests that there is much potential to increase the use of national systems in programme implementation of UN-OAD at the country level.

governments considered that 'access to specialized knowledge in a wide range of subject areas' was "very relevant" as an attribute of UN development cooperation.

- In regard to measures that the UN system might take to improve its effectiveness, 41% of governments stated that it was "very important" to 'make better use of the expertise of NRAs'. To put this figure in a perspective, 77% said it was "very important" for the UN to 'focus on areas where it has a clear comparative advantage'.

- UN RCs and country team members were asked whether greater use should be made of NRAs. 38% of respondents "strongly agreed" and 40% "somewhat agreed" with the proposition. 19% "somewhat disagreed" or "strongly disagreed".

- Hosting arrangements provided by resident organizations for NRAs appear to be improvised at present. There does not appear to be a systematic approach or a standard mechanism by which UN development entities can easily take advantage of such arrangements.

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[2] It is roughly estimated that some 80% of UN-OAD are currently administered through UN systems at the country level.

(b) Gender equality and women's empowerment		
The General Assembly may wish to:		

1	*Recommendation*	Request members of the United Nations development system to substantially increase the investment in and focus on gender equality and the empowerment of women outcomes and outputs in programmes in United Nations development frameworks, such as the UNDAF, including through the full and effective implementation of the UNDAF guidelines on gender equality and the empowerment of women.

	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• A large number of resolutions and decisions at the intergovernmental level have called for increased focus on the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment in the work of the UN development system at the country level. • Gender equality is also one of the five UNDG programming principles for the preparation of UNDAFs. • A 2010 review of UNDAFs conducted by the UNDG Task Team on Gender Equality revealed that concrete and dependable gender equality results can be achieved when UNDAFs include this issue as one of the key outcome areas with indicators to measure progress. Moreover, sector and issues specific gender equality results can be achieved most effectively when such outputs and indicators are clearly articulated within the respective outcome areas of the UNDAF.	• Mainstreaming gender equality and women's empowerment is integral to the mandates of UN entities engaged in UN-OAD. • The raison d'être for the establishment of UN-Women was to strengthen the institutional arrangements for support of gender equality and the empowerment of women within the UN system.	Based on several GA and ECOSOC resolutions including: GA resolution 64/289 ECOSOC resolution 2008/34 ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 OP 3

2	*Recommendation*	Call for the full implementation of the United Nations System-wide Action Plan (UN-SWAP) on gender equality and women's empowerment as an accountability framework to be applied throughout the United Nations system. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to recognize the key role played by UN-Women in promoting accountability for mainstreaming gender equality and women's empowerment in operational activities for development of the United Nations system.

	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• In paragraph 53 of GA resolution 64/289 on system-wide coherence, UN-Women is given the "additional role of leading, coordinating and promoting the accountability of the United Nations system in its work on gender equality and the empowerment of women…" • The development of effective accountability mechanisms for gender equality and women's	• ECOSOC in resolution 2012/24 (paragraph 5) "welcomed the development of the United Nations System-wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, under the leadership of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), and its adoption by the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination on 13 April 2012, as an accountability framework to be fully implemented by the United Nations system, and calls upon the	Based on ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 "Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes of the UN" - operative paragraph 5 A/RES/64/289 on System-wide coherence - operative paragraphs 44, and 53

	empowerment has historically been accorded low priority in UN organizations as well as system-wide. • At a time of financial stress in many donor countries along with the establishment of UN-Women, there is some risk that other UN entities may reduce their commitment to the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment in their respective activities.	United Nations system to actively engage in its roll-out". • The 2012 QCPR provides an important opportunity to reaffirm the commitment of Member States to the above objective in ECOSOC resolution 2012/24. • It is important that the QCPR resolution reaffirms the above system-wide mandate and functions of UN-Women, namely to lead, coordinate and promote the accountability of the UN system's work in advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women at the country, regional and global level. • It is equally important for the QCPR resolution to underscore that the establishment of UN-Women was intended to lead to the redoubling of efforts by other UN entities to advance gender equality and the empowerment of women in their respective work programmes.		
3	*Recommendation*	Call upon the United Nations development system to acquire sufficient technical expertise for gender mainstreaming in programme planning and implementation to ensure that gender dimensions are systematically addressed and, in this regard, to draw on the gender expertise available in the United Nations system, including in UN-Women, to assist in the preparation of the UNDAF and other development programming frameworks.		
	Background	*Rationale*		*References*

	• Findings from a three-year review of the implementation of the *Scorecard* mentioned in recommendation 6 below suggest that:
	  ➢ There is a correlation between greater capacity in gender mainstreaming in UN entities and an effective CCA/UNDAF document and process from a gender perspective.
	  ➢ The *Scorecard* has acted as an accountability and planning tool but also helped to strengthen leadership for gender mainstreaming within UN entities by providing senior managers with a practical instrument to assess whether their respective agencies are meeting UN mandates.
		• ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 paragraph 8(f) highlighted the importance of "securing technical expertise for gender equality in programme planning and implementation to ensure that gender dimensions are systematically addressed and, in this regard, drawing on the gender expertise available in the United Nations system, including in UN-Women, to assist in the preparation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and other development programming frameworks".
		• The establishment of UN-Women should not be seen by other UN entities as a reason to reduce commitment to the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment in their respective work programmes.
				Based nearly verbatim on ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 "Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes of the UN" - operative paragraph 8(f)

4	*Recommendation*	Call upon UN entities to ensure that the various existing accountability mechanisms provide for more coherent, accurate and effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting on gender equality results and on the tracking of gender-related resource allocation and expenditure, including through the promotion of the use, where appropriate, of gender markers, and by encouraging the use by United Nations country teams of gender accountability mechanisms to assist and improve their performance at the country level.		
	Background	*Rationale*		*References*
	• A 2010 review of UNDAFs conducted by the UNDG Task Team on Gender Equality recommended that	• ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 paragraph 8(d) pointed out the need to "ensure that the various existing accountability mechanisms of the		Based nearly verbatim on ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 "Mainstreaming a gender perspective

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reporting on UNDAF resources devoted to gender equality programming should be encouraged across UN entities. Overall, the amount of these resources needs to be increased from the current average of 3-4% of total UNDAF resources.	United Nations system provide for more coherent, accurate and effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting on gender equality results and on the tracking of gender-related resource allocation and expenditure, including through the promotion of the use, where appropriate, of gender markers, and encouraging the use by United Nations country teams of gender accountability mechanisms to assist and improve their performance at the country level".	into all policies and programmes of the UN" - operative paragraphgraphgraphgraph8(d)

5	*Recommendation*	Encourage the United Nations development system to collect, analyze and disseminate comparable data, disaggregated by gender and age, in a regular and systematic manner to guide country programming, to support the preparation of organization-wide and country-level documents, such as the strategic, programmatic and results-based frameworks, and to continue to refine their tools for measuring progress and impact.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 (OP 8(h)) requested the funds, programmes and agencies to collaborate in advancing gender mainstreaming including by: "collecting, analyzing, using and disseminating comparable data, disaggregated by sex and age, in a regular and systematic manner to guide country programming investments, to support the preparation of corporate and country-level documents, such as the strategic, programmatic and results-based frameworks, and to continue to refine their tools for measuring progress and impact".	• Improving the quality and comparability of data and information on gender equality and women's empowerment across UN entities is critical for measuring progress and impact of the UN's work in this area.	Based on ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 "Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes of the UN" - operative paragraph 8(h)

Note: The "Background/Rationale/References" sub-header row and the content row for Recommendation 5 span the three columns below the recommendation text.

6	*Recommendation*	Request the United Nations development system to expand and strengthen the use of the UNCT Performance Indicators on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (Scorecard) as a mandatory planning and reporting tool for all UNCTs, with an annual review of Scorecard recommendations so that they are systematically included in UNCT work plans.
	Background	*Rationale*	*References*
	• Investment in and accountability for a cross-cutting issue such as gender equality and women's empowerment have generally been accorded low priority in UN organizations as well as system-wide. • The *Scorecard* was developed by the UNDG Task Team on Gender Equality and endorsed by the UNDG Principals in 2007. • A 3-year review of implementation of the *Scorecard* revealed that: ➢ UNCTs are not meeting minimum standards in any areas. That most progress has been made in the area of programming. But that progress in the areas of budgeting, partnerships, monitoring	• The end of ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 OP 8(d) specifically states "…encouraging the use by United Nations country teams of gender accountability mechanisms to assist and improve their performance at the country level". • OP 8(e) of the same resolution states "supporting UN-Women in its promotion of increased accountability for gender mainstreaming, including through the systematic use of monitoring and reporting mechanisms, including for United Nations country teams…" • The QCPR resolution could clarify the mandatory role of the Scorecard for all UNCTs. • To strengthen follow-up and accountability, it is essential to ensure that UNCTs review the Scorecard recommendations at least once per year, and that this is included in UNCTs work plans.	Based on the need to strengthen accountability mechanisms as expressed operative paragraph 53 of UN-Women's founding resolution A/RES/64/289 on "System-wide coherence" and reiterated in ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 operative paragraphs 6(a), 8(d), and 8(e)

	and evaluation, and quality control, was inadequate.			
	➢ UNCTs exceeded standards in only 10 per cent of the cases.			
	➢ Scorecard uptake has been hindered by lack of clarity as to whether it is mandatory or not.			
	➢ Follow-up to Scorecard recommendations needs to be strengthened.			
7	*Recommendation*	Request resident coordinators to provide in their annual reports adequate and precise information on progress in gender mainstreaming and gender-specific programming, including the results demonstrated by the Scorecard, as well as progress made at national level in achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women in accordance with national development plans, policies and priorities.		
	Background	*Rationale*		*References*
	• The UNDG Task Team on Gender Equality has been conducting a yearly substantive trend analysis of the Resident Coordinator Annual Reports since 2004. • In 2010 (the latest year for which data is available) there was a qualitative improvement in the results reported in the RCARs. Despite some progress in this regard, further improvements are needed.	• The RCARs provide an effective vehicle for providing information on progress in mainstreaming gender equality and women's empowerment in the work of the UN system at the country level.		Based on the need to strengthen accountability mechanisms as expressed operative paragraph 53 of UN-Women's founding resolution A/RES/64/289 on "System-wide coherence" and reiterated in ECOSOC resolution 2012/24 operative paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b)
8	*Recommendation*	Encourage the United Nations development system to institute greater accountability for gender equality in evaluations conducted by UNCTs, in particular, ensuring the application of the United Nations Evaluation Group gender equality-related norms and standards as well as guidance on the integration of a gender perspective in evaluations.		
	Background	*Rationale*		*References*
	• The TCPR 2007 recognized the need to enhance accountability mechanisms for gender mainstreaming within the UN system, including through evaluation. Analysis conducted for the 2012 QCPR recognized that some progress has been made including through the development and implementation of the Gender Scorecard by the UNDG, but acknowledges at the same time that there are still important gaps in monitoring and evaluation of gender-related issues and results. • A recent assessment of Gender Mainstreaming in UN Operational Activities (June 2012) identified serious shortcomings in oversight, monitoring and evaluation and reporting on gender-related issues. Across the UN system, management has not ensured meaningful	• A/RES/59/250 and A/RES/62/208, paragraph 57 "Encouraging the governing bodies of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to ensure that gender perspectives are integrated into all aspects of their monitoring functions in relation to policies and strategies, medium-term plans, multi-year funding frameworks and operational activities, including those relating to the implementation of the Millennium Declaration and the outcomes of major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic and social fields". • TCPR 2007 resolution A/62/253 paragraph 27 (e) (iv) "Strengthen institutional accountability mechanisms, including through a more effective monitoring and evaluation framework for gender mainstreaming based on the gender scorecard developed by the United Nations Development Group". • ECOSOC resolution 2007/64 paragraph 68 (c) "Enhance oversight		Based on ECOSOC resolution 2008/34 on "Mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes in the United Nations system" operative paragraph 4(a)

gender-related monitoring of interventions, or appropriate use of the accepted results-based processes. Evaluation teams are typically not required to review the gender equality implications of programmes, using the methodology developed by the United Nations Evaluation Group.

- The consultation and analysis undertaken to inform the system-wide action plan for the UN System-wide Policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2011) highlights the need for evaluation to systematically assess tangible results in gender mainstreaming, especially at the country level, as a key dimension of the UN system accountability and oversight framework. The policy also establishes a performance indicator on evaluation.

- The recent independent evaluation of "delivering-as-one" recommended (Recommendation 4) that the UNDG should provide further guidance on joint planning and monitoring and evaluation systems that are part of the "One Programme" at the country level. Both national and United Nations system planning and monitoring and evaluation capacities at country level should be further strengthened. Results achieved with the "One Programme", especially on cross-cutting issues, e.g. human rights, gender equality and HIV/AIDS, could then be more robustly monitored and evaluated, including through joint and country-led evaluations, in order to assess the contribution of the United Nations system to progress in development. This will also contribute to more consistent reporting on programme results and use of funding, including across countries. Common programme and monitoring and evaluation formats would favour more consistent and transparent reporting, strengthening United Nations system accountability.

through monitoring, evaluation, audit and reporting procedures; establish common indicators and benchmarks; regularly evaluate progress achieved towards gender equality".

- ECOSOC resolution 2008/34 paragraph 4(a) "Strengthen institutional accountability mechanisms, including through a more effective monitoring and evaluation framework for gender mainstreaming based on common United Nations evaluation standards".

- ECOSOC resolution 2009/71 reporting on implementation of resolution 2008/34 (paragraph 34) highlights that "Although individual entities are making progress in developing and implementing their evaluation strategies, limited progress has been made in reaching a unified methodology". And paragraph 38 states that "The efforts of individual entities suggest a wide variety of approaches, without an emerging unified approach to the development of methodologies. This is a constraint to the ability of the United Nations system to make measurable progress in closing the gaps in gender mainstreaming".

- ECOSOC resolution 2011/114 paragraph 61 highlights the need to "Take appropriate action to continue to promote and ensure effective and systematic gender mainstreaming in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes within the United Nations system".

- SWAP (2011) "The CEB policy sets out six key elements for promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment […] Establishing oversight through monitoring, evaluation and reporting by utilizing, inter alia, peer reviews, gender audits as well as collecting sex-disaggregated data".

	(c) and (d) Regional and South-South cooperation	
2	*Recommendation*	Recognize that the achievement of several internationally-agreed development goals are of a trans-boundary nature and can best be addressed through global, interregional, regional and sub-regional cooperation, including South-South cooperation. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to encourage the United Nations development system to take further measures to promote South-South and triangular cooperation in regular country-level programme implementation drawing on the vast experience of middle-income countries and other programme countries in sharing of knowledge, technology transfer and foster regional integration.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• The GA has consistently advocated South-South and triangular cooperation, and in particular has urged UN entities to "mainstream support to South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation". • The 2009 UNDG guidelines for the preparation of UNDAFs and the UNDG priorities for 2010-2011 both included South-South and triangular cooperation as vehicles for national capacity development. • The GA has recognized the contribution of interregional, regional and sub-regional cooperation in addressing development challenges, and has requested entities working at the regional level to strengthen cooperation and coordination with each other, inter alia through closer cooperation within the Resident Coordinator system.	• Some global guidelines remain to be translated into concrete action at the country level. A Joint Inspection Unit evaluation in 2011 showed that out of 109 UNDAFs, 17 explicitly referred to South-South cooperation and five had a specific South-South cooperation-related outcome. Six out of 24 UNDAFs starting in 2010 made reference to South-South cooperation. • Programme country governments expressed their views on the relevance of South-South and triangular cooperation and on regional and sub-regional cooperation in the survey conducted by UNDESA for the 2012 QCPR. 53% of governments in programme countries highlighted the relevance of regional and sub-regional cooperation, 49% identified South-South and triangular cooperation, while 81% of governments rated gender equality and women's empowerment as an important priority area. • The linkages between the UN system's regional support mechanisms and the Resident Coordinators and UNCTs at the country level remain work-in-progress as reflected in the surveys of programme country governments and UN RCs/CT members respectively. The findings of the two surveys could be seen as an indication that programme country governments and UNCTs feel there is an urgent need for regional support structures to demonstrate their value-added more effectively.	2007 TCPR resolution, paragraphs 48-55 QCPR Report of the Secretary General, Recommendations, August 2012: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/sg_qcpr_report_adv_unedited_version.pdf Chart 10 in the survey of programme countries 2007 TCPR resolution, paragraphs 106-111

3	*Recommendation (Regional cooperation)*	The General Assembly may wish to: 1. Request the United Nations regional commissions and UNDG Regional Teams to enhance their support to Resident Coordinators and country teams through demand-driven advisory services and input to country-level programming with regards to the regional and sub-regional dimension of national development goals. 2. Take note of the assistance currently provided to UNCTs across a range of areas (including quality assurance and support to UNDAFs, appraisal of Resident Coordinators, trouble shooting at country level) and request the UNDG Regional Teams to substantially enhance their support to Resident Coordinators and UNCTs in providing expertise in the areas of operational support services, including the development of change management plans in connection with the implementation of common support services at the country level, facilitating headquarter-led guidance and business operations

strategies and exchange of best practices.

3. Request the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the United Nations regional commissions and UNDG Regional Teams, to carry out a study on how to provide regional support to UNCTs in the most effective manner. This study would consider the option of developing a plan to unify regional support services to programme countries under a United Nations Regional Support Team, co-chaired by the head of the respective regional commission and the regional bureau of UNDP, on behalf of UNDG, with analytical, technical and normative support provided by the regional commissions and day-to-day coordination support to UNCTs in programme countries provided by the UNDG Regional Teams. The findings and recommendations of the study conducted by the Secretary-General shall be presented to the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes and ECOSOC in 2013 with a view, and if appropriate, to full implementation by the end of 2014.

4. Request UNDG and UNDG regional teams in close cooperation with the regional commissions to develop and implement a strategy by the end of 2014 for co-location of regional and sub-regional offices of funds and programmes and specialized agencies, with the objective to establish common premises of all United Nations entities at the regional and sub-regional level, wherever possible, and where security conditions permit, by the end of 2016.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• The 2007 TCPR emphasized the need for UN agencies to strengthen cooperation at the regional level. The ECOSOC-mandated regional coordination mechanisms (RCMs) and the UNDG Regional Teams, chaired by the regional commissions and UNDP, respectively, constitute the main instruments for UN coordination at the regional level. The RCMs focus on policy, normative and analytical work and regional and sub-regional programming. The UNDG Regional Teams provide strategic direction, programmatic advice and oversight, technical support, quality support and advice (QSA) performance management and trouble shooting to UM RCs and CTs especially on the UNDAF and joint programming.	• See above – recommendation 2.	2007 TCPR resolution, paragraphs 106-111 QCPR Report of the Secretary-General Recommendations, August 2012: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/sg_qcpr_report_adv_unedited_version.pdf

4	*Recommendation (South-South cooperation)*	The General Assembly may wish to: 1. Reaffirm the comparative advantage of the United Nations development system as a relevant partner in facilitating and promoting South-South and triangular cooperation due to its universal presence in programme countries, the mandate of United Nations regional commissions and UNDG Regional Teams, and the organization's importance as an impartial partner in supporting the achievement of internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs. 2. Request the United Nations development system to strengthen support to South-South and triangular cooperation, drawing on the considerable experiences of middle-income countries and facilitating knowledge exchange, peer learning, technology transfer and regional integration as important contributions to national capacity development. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to *request* the United Nations development system to capitalize on its particular comparative advantage in this area and support programme countries under national leadership through targeted capacity development of national systems with the objective to maximize the impact of South-South and triangular cooperation.

	3. Request the funds and programmes and encourage the specialized agencies and other entities of the United Nations system to mainstream South-South and triangular cooperation into regular country-level programming of operational activities for development, including strengthening the coordination and drawing upon the capacities of the United Nations regional commissions and UNDG Regional Teams.

Background	Rationale	References
• An important message of the first report of the Secretary-General on the QCPR was that the time has come for United Nations entities to transform South-South cooperation from an issue of special attention into a modality for regular, day-to-day programming within the UN system.	• As above – see recommendation 2.	2007 TCPR resolution, paragraphs 48-55 QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/sg_report_for_2012_qcpr.pdf

	(e) Results-based management and planning	
5	*Recommendation*	The General Assembly may wish to:

1. Request the Secretary-General to intensify the efforts in strengthening and institutionalizing results-based management in the United Nations development system, with the objective of improving development results as well as organizational effectiveness. This includes simplifying, streamlining and harmonizing results-based management systems, including performance indicators, to eliminate the burden of multiple reporting, scaling-up capacity development for results-based management especially at the country level, strengthening knowledge networks and communities of practice for results-based management, and investing in developing better guidance and techniques in measuring and evaluating impact in areas that are not easily amenable to measurement.

2. Request the UNDG to articulate and implement by the end of 2014 a more robust results-focused approach to development cooperation that would streamline and improve the planning, measurement and reporting on system-wide results, e.g. using commonly accepted performance indicators as well as a common format or a 'One UN Results Report' (or scorecard) at the country level and provide a standardized results-based management terminology. A 'One UN Results Report' at the country level in lieu of agency-specific results reporting, as a standard practice in most programme countries, would ensure reporting on system-wide results as well as simplification and harmonization of results reporting. To report on progress on system-wide results, the development of a common monitoring system for results shall be fast-tracked and completed by the UNDG by the end of 2014. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to invite the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes and the governing bodies of specialized agencies and other relevant United Nations entities to engage in a focused dialogue on how to balance the need for reporting on system-wide results with the current agency-specific reporting requirements, most effectively.

3. Request the UNDG to fully implement the Management and Accountability System and achieving alignment between results-based management and accountability by the end of 2013. This includes finding ways to strengthen the horizontal accountability of UNCTs for delivering and reporting on system-wide results at the country level. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to request the UNDG to ensure adequate balance between horizontal and vertical accountability for results-based management and reporting at the country level;

4. Request the funds and programmes and encourage specialized agencies and other entities of the United Nations system to focus on developing and sustaining a results culture in their respective organizations. This includes identifying and implementing suitable incentives for results-based management, removing current disincentives to developing a results culture, investing in developing capacities and competencies for results-based management, and periodically reviewing their results-based management systems.

5. Request the relevant mechanisms charged with responsibility for independent system-wide evaluation, to conduct an independent evaluation of results-based management in the United Nations development system and make recommendations to the General Assembly. The evaluation shall assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of results-based management, taking into account the changes in the global environment, in international development cooperation, in funding practices and reporting requirements affecting the funds, programmes, specialized agencies and other entities of the United Nations development system, and international trends in results-based management. The results of the evaluation shall inform efforts by UNDG to strengthen and institutionalize results-based management in the United Nations development system as well as feed into the next quadrennial comprehensive policy review.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• Since the 2007 TCPR, there have been increased efforts on the part of the UN development system to enhance results-based management (RBM) within individual agencies and at the country level, through	• Analysis conducted for the preparation of the first report of the Secretary-General on the QCPR, as well as several other studies, have found that reporting on results within the United Nations system is not as effective as it should be. There are gaps, particularly at the country	QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, June 2012: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/sg_report_for_2012_qcpr.pdf

the UNDAF, as one of its five programming principles. Further impetus for improving RBM comes from demands in both programme and donor countries for the UN development system to demonstrate that it is achieving its objectives, that it does so efficiently and that its activities are relevant to the needs and priorities of programme countries and contribute to improved and sustainable development outcomes.

- According to the JIU, the lack of a common RBM approach across the UN system is impacting negatively on its use at the country level. The JIU also concludes that there is a need to strengthen RBM at country level so as to achieve a system-wide harmonized RBM approach for the implementation of the UNDAFs.

- In January 2011, the UNDG approved the RBM Handbook that was developed in the context of General Assembly resolution 62/208 (and its directives in paragraph 100) to facilitate consistency and harmonization through commonly agreed results-based programme management concepts and approaches in the UN system. The RBM Handbook reflects and complements the 2010 UNDAF guidance package as well as the Guidance Note on the Programming Principles, of which RBM is one. It also links with and builds on the individual agency work conducted on RBM, and as such will serve as the common denominator for RBM for UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies.

- The UNDG also organized a global RBM Training of Trainers workshop in July 2012 to help support UNCTs, in particular those in UNDAF roll-out countries, when applying the RBM principles in developing and implementing their UNDAFs. The participants in this workshop have been placed on an UNDG RBM experts' roster for advisory services to other UNCTs in this area.

level, in the way in which results are understood by those who own and manage them; how results are used for decision-making; and communicating results to stakeholders including national partners. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E), which is an integral part of the RBM life-cycle of results, is also not performed consistently across UN entities and resources for M&E, in many instances, are inadequate.

- The JIU called on the General Assembly and the legislative bodies of the corresponding UN system organizations to reaffirm their commitment to RBM and requested the executive heads of the UN system organizations to harmonize their RBM practices for achieving a common RBM approach at country level with regard to the implementation of the UNDAFs.

- When asked about measures that the UN system might take to improve its effectiveness, 75% of governments in the survey of programme countries stated that it was "very important" to 'make better use of results-based methods'. In fact, this measure received the strongest support after 'focus on areas where the UN has a clear comparative advantage'. For comparison, 62% of governments stated that it was "very important" to 'become more engaged in programme-based approaches'.

- When asked whether they receive sufficient information from the UN system to assess its performance, only 17% of governments in the survey of programme countries "strongly agreed" that they did, while one-third either "somewhat" or "strongly disagreed".

- UNCT members were asked how effective they thought various measures would be in improving UN coherence at the country level. Of the 497 respondents, 84% advocated 'harmonizing the agencies' results-based management systems' and 82% advocated 'harmonizing the agencies' reporting procedures'. To put these figures into perspective, only 49% advocated 'providing the UNDG regional team with greater resources'.

- A UNDG mandated review on the status of RBM implementation in the UN system showed that different RBM definitions and terminology were in use among UN organizations. More importantly, such variations also reflected a different focus, understanding and perception of RBM within the UN system. These differences also made it harder to communicate using a common language. While it was recognized that there is no single 'road map' to RBM and each organization had to adapt RBM to its specificities and mandates in the context of national priorities, there are also a wide range of

QCPR Report of the Secretary-General, Recommendations, August 2012:

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/sg_qcpr_report_adv_unedited_version.pdf

JIU: 'Towards more coherent United Nations system support to Africa' (JIU/REP/2009/5)

Charts 26 and 27 in the report on the survey of programme countries.

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/government_survey_report_10_june_2012.pdf

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/unct_survey_report_6_june_2012.pdf

	commonalities among UN organizations that constituted a basis for harmonizing the implementation of RBM system-wide.	

	(f) Evaluation	
6	Recommendation	The General Assembly may wish to: 1. Call upon members of the United Nations development system to support strengthened national ownership and leadership of evaluation of operational activities for development at the country level. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to request the United Nations entities to intensify efforts to build national capacity in programme countries for evaluation of operational activities for development. Also, in this regard, the General Assembly may wish to request UNEG and the UNDG to develop guidelines for further strengthening of national evaluation capacities for operational activities for development of the United Nations system. 2. Call upon members of the United Nations development system to bolster institutional and organizational capacity for evaluation of operational activities for development, to adhere to the evaluation norms and standards of UNEG, to prioritize allocation of financial resources for evaluation, to increase training and skills-upgrading of United Nations staff and implementing partners in results-based management and monitoring and evaluation methods, and to ensure effective utilization of evaluation results. 3. Note with appreciation the findings and recommendations of the independent review (A/66/852) commissioned by the Secretary-General in response to General Assembly resolution 64/289 on system-wide coherence on a comprehensive assessment of the existing institutional framework for system-wide evaluation of operational activities for development of the United Nations system. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to reaffirm that further strengthening of system-wide evaluation within the United Nations development system should be based on utilizing and enhancing existing mechanisms. 4. Reaffirm the need to strengthen independent system-wide evaluation of operational activities for development. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to recognize that the Joint Inspection Unit is the only entity within the United Nations system with a specific mandate for independent system-wide evaluation and encourage the Unit to vigorously continue its ongoing reform efforts. 5. Consider further steps to clarify what Member States want to achieve through independent system-wide evaluation of operational activities for development of the United Nations system and how this can be best achieved. 6. Welcome enhanced coordination and exchange of experiences among United Nations entities engaged in system-wide evaluation efforts, in particular, the Joint Inspection Unit, the United Nations Evaluation Group, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office for Internal Oversight Services and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 7. Request UNEG, in cooperation with members of the interim coordination mechanism and other United Nations evaluation entities, to develop by end of 2013 a common policy and methodological framework for system-wide evaluation of operational activities for development. 8. Request the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes and encourage the governing bodies of specialized agencies and other relevant United Nations entities, including UNEG, to intensify the use of UNDAF and system-wide evaluations in lieu of agency-specific evaluations of operational activities for development, wherever possible, particularly in programme countries adopting the delivering-as-one approach.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• Evaluation units in the UN system often possess limited staff capacity, and only few agencies such as UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNDP, UN-Women and UNFPA, have been able to decentralize their evaluation work. The financial and human resources for most evaluation units in the UN system are limited to their day-to-day	• The independent review commissioned by the Secretary-General of the existing institutional framework for independent system-wide evaluation of UN-OAD conducted in 2011 to 2012 concluded that while there is a demand for independent system-wide evaluation, the existing institutional framework is inadequate; no clear leadership or strategy for independent system-wide evaluation;	Note by the Secretary-General on the independent review of existing institutional framework for independent system-wide evaluation of UN-OAD (A/66/852) http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/iswe_final_report.pdf

work and participation in system-wide, joint or multi-agency evaluations often means working without extra resources.

- While the 2007 TCPR resolution stressed the importance of evaluating the UNDAF, a relatively small number of countries conducted full evaluations. The majority chose instead to conduct a mid-term review, considering it more useful, with a view to stimulating the implementation process and as an input to the preparations of the next UNDAF, while also being less costly and time-consuming.

- In 2011, in response to GA resolution 64/289 on system-wide coherence, the Secretary-General commissioned a comprehensive review of the existing institutional framework for independent system-wide evaluation of operational activities for development. This review assessed the possibilities for the United Nations to improve institutional mechanisms to provide system-wide evaluations, which are independent, credible and useful, on priority strategic and operational questions or issues facing the UN system.

coordination of independent system-wide evaluations has been ad hoc and inefficient; and the usefulness of reports has been variable. The review further concluded that the politicization of independent system-wide evaluation has been an obstacle to progress, but that there is willingness in the UN system to have substantive discussions and dialogue on independent system-wide evaluation.

- In order to reduce the workload on programme countries, 78% of the governments in the survey conducted for the 2012 QCPR stated that it was "very important" that UN entities 'plan joint monitoring missions and evaluations when working in the same thematic area'.

- 49% of programme country governments either somewhat or strongly disagreed that UN entities used national monitoring and reporting systems "as much as possible". 42% of the governments disagreed that UN entities used national evaluation capacities "as much as possible". To put these figures in perspective, only 20% of governments did not agree that UN entities used national experts "as much as possible" in the design of programmes and projects.

- When asked about measures that the UN system might take to improve its effectiveness, 66% of governments stated that it was "very important" to 'improve the monitoring and evaluation of UN-supported programmes'.

Charts 25, 26 and 38 in the report on the survey of programme countries. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/government_survey_report_10_june_2012.pdf

PART III	QCPR follow-up and monitoring

The General Assembly may wish to *call upon* all members of the United Nations Development Group to:

3	*Recommendation*	Request the Secretary-General to develop an evidence-based monitoring and reporting framework for the implementation of the QCPR resolution anchored in the collection of comprehensive country-level information, data and indicators and report on an annual basis to ECOSOC on progress made in the implementation of the QCPR resolution. In this regard, the General Assembly may wish to request the Secretary-General to conduct biennially a survey of programme country governments on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the United Nations development system as an input to the monitoring of the implementation of the QCPR resolution. In this regard, the General Assembly may also wish to request the Secretary-General to consolidate the annual reports on QCPR implementation and funding in a single annual publication on operational activities for development of the United Nations system to facilitate informed intergovernmental deliberations at the operational activities segment of the substantive session of the Economic and Social Council.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
• Monitoring of implementation of TCPR resolutions of the General Assembly in the past has largely been done through annual reporting of the Secretary-General on overall progress, supplemented by specific reports in the areas of funding, RC system and business practices. • The annual monitoring reports on TCPR implementation in the past have largely been based on information provided by the headquarters of UN entities and DOCO. This monitoring process has not involved independent gathering of data and information from the country level with a view to better assessing the level of progress in implementing the comprehensive policy review legislation of the GA. • GA resolution 64/289 requested the Secretary-General to conduct a survey of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of UN support to programme countries. The findings of this survey have served as a key input for the preparation of the Secretary-General's report on the QCPR.	• The ultimate objective of the QCPR legislation is to improve the results and impact of UN-OAD. • More evidenced-based monitoring of QCPR implementation would enable Member States to annually assess the compliance of the UN development system with QCPR guidance. • Past reporting on TCPR implementation has primarily focused on processes and not been based on country-level evidence of progress in realizing the policy guidance established in the GA resolution. • The proposed monitoring framework to be developed by the Secretary-General aims to provide information that would enable more evidence-based intergovernmental oversight of progress in implementing the GA resolution on the QCPR. • As an example, key indicators could include both generic information on country teams (composition, expenditures, etc.), coordination processes (number of joint programmes, common premises etc.) and the results of coordination processes (cost savings, efficiency gains, related development results). • The programme country survey proved highly valuable in terms of eliciting feedback from governments on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of UN-OAD. The findings of this survey heavily influenced the recommendations of the Secretary-General on the QCPR. In line with national leadership and ownership, views of programme countries should be the most authoritative source of evidence for the assessment of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of UN-OAD. The survey should be conducted every two years in order to provide sufficient time for preparation and analysis. • Consolidating reporting on funding and QCPR implementation into one single publication would improve the effectiveness of communicating the findings and recommendations of system-wide analysis provided by the Secretary-General on UN-OAD; reduce printing costs; simplify the reporting process; and improve transparency in system-wide reporting on the work of the UN	Review of past TCPR reports

		development system.	

4	*Recommendation*	Invite the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly in 2013 for strengthening the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat for policy review and system-wide statistics, analysis and reporting on funding flows for operational activities for development of the United Nations system with the objective of enhancing the effectiveness of policy guidance and oversight provided by the General Assembly and ECOSOC of United Nations operational activities for development.

Background	*Rationale*	*References*
- The Development Cooperation Policy Branch (DCPB)/OESC/DESA serves as the Secretariat for the analytical preparations of the Secretary-General for the QCPR. - DCPB/OESC also serves as the Secretariat for the biennial high-level Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) of ECOSOC as well as the International Development Cooperation Report (IDCR), a flagship report produced by DESA every two years, with the next one scheduled to be released in March 2013. - The current staff strength of DCPB/OESC is insufficient for meeting the growing demands for high quality and extensive substantive in these areas. A specific proposal will be prepared as soon as the request is approved in principle.	- In preparation for the 2012 QCPR, DCPB/OESC has completed 5 Secretary-General's reports and notes and undertaken 9 analytical studies, 4 large-scale surveys, some 60 consultations/workshops, 7 country missions, all implemented in the period September 2011 to October 2012. These responsibilities are in addition to servicing the annual ECOSOC Operational Activities Segment, the 2nd Committee of the General Assembly, the 2012 high-level DCF of ECOSOC, the 2012 Pledging Conference of the GA, the 2013 IDCR, as well as several inter-agency processes and engagement in extensive servicing to senior managers in the Secretariat (see footnote 2). - The increasing demand of Member States for professional statistics, analysis and reporting on UN-OAD combined with the technical complexity of the issues concerned and the need to improve the quality of annual monitoring of QCPR implementation, require additional regular staff capacity in DCPB/OESC. The demands on DCPB/OESC have increased exponentially in the past few years without additional regular staff capacity. - Additional regular staff capacity in DCPB/OESC will allow the Secretariat to further professionalize the functions of policy review and statistics, analysis and reporting on funding of UN-OAD with a view to providing higher quality support to intergovernmental bodies such as the GA and ECOSOC. - The establishment of an evidence-based monitoring system on QCPR implementation, anchored in country-level data and information is expected to further enhance the guidance, oversight and coordination role of GA and ECOSOC in system-wide governance of UN-OAD.	QCPR homepage DESA biennial budget