adopted and would be taking an active part in the operation.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 43-47.}

The representative of Hungary considered the resolution just adopted to be of fundamental importance in the life of the United Nations, in that it opened up the possibility of joint, determined and innovative action by which it would be possible to put an end to the hardship of an entire people, and to the dangers that were threatening it with extermination. The Security Council had demonstrated that it was quite feasible to adapt to the realities of the world and to undertake an international operation that would make it possible to carry out wide-scale and extraordinary humanitarian actions. The resolution just adopted might, moreover, provide inspiration and guidelines for the future. In the light of the newly authorized operation in Somalia, it seemed to Hungary that it would be even more difficult, confronted with world public opinion, for the international community to avoid its responsibility to meet the challenges arising in hotbeds of crisis as serious as the one that was continuing to tear Somalia apart. His country was pleased that the new type of action had been planned and formulated in such a way as to establish an organic link with the United Nations. It demonstrated how far the United Nations had come since adopting resolution 678 (1990) on the Gulf crisis; the distance covered demonstrated the more effective and dynamic role the United Nations could play in the creation of a new international environment.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 47-49.}

The President, in his capacity as the representative of India, stated that the resolution just adopted recognized the uniqueness of the Somali crisis. The rapidly deteriorating complex and extraordinary situation, with no Government in control, demanded an immediate and exceptional response from the international community. His delegation had favoured the fifth option put forward by the Secretary-General, namely a countrywide enforcement operation carried out under United Nations command and control. In the light of the positions taken by the United States, France and Morocco, which had offered to contribute to the operation, the Indian delegation had favoured an arrangement under which the United Nations would keep effective political command and control while leaving enough flexibility for the contributing States to retain on the ground the operational autonomy they had requested. The views of the non-aligned members of the Council on that important point had been accommodated to a considerable extent in the resolution, notably in paragraphs 10, 12 and 19. India could therefore go along with it, particularly in view of the compelling need for speedy action. He stressed, however, that the present action should not set a precedent. India expected that, should situations arise in the future requiring action under Chapter VII, the action would be carried out in full conformity with the Charter provisions and in the spirit of the Secretary-General’s report entitled “An Agenda for Peace”. This would also be consistent, as was noted in the Secretary-General’s letter of 29 November 1992, with the recent expansion of the Organization’s role in the maintenance of international peace and security and with its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security. It was India’s hope that Member States would develop the necessary political will and confidence in the Organization so that they would be able to contribute to and participate in full-scale United Nations operations.\footnote{S/PV.3145, pp. 49-52.}

7. The question of South Africa


By a letter dated 2 July 1992 addressed to the President of the Security Council,\footnote{S/24232.} the representative of Madagascar, on behalf of the Group of African States, requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in South Africa. He also transmitted the text of a resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting at its fifty-sixth ordinary session, held at Dakar, from 22 to 28 June 1992. In the resolution, the Ministers, inter alia, expressed grave concern over the escalation of violence in South Africa targeted at black communities, in particular the recent massacre at Boipatong Township; called for the urgent
convening of a meeting of the Security Council to examine the issue of violence in South Africa and take all appropriate action to put an end to it as well as to create the conditions for negotiations leading towards a peaceful transition to a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa; decided to send a ministerial delegation to present Africa’s position to the Security Council; and invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to follow closely the evolution of the situation and take all necessary measures aimed at achieving the above-mentioned objectives.

At its 3095th meeting, on 15 July 1992, the Council included the letter from the representative of Madagascar in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the following, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote: at the 3095th meeting, the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, the Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Lesotho, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Uganda, Ukraine, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia; and at the 3096th meeting, the representatives of Greece, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Italy.

At the 3095th meeting, the Council decided, in addition, to extend an invitation, at his request, to the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. At the same meeting, the Council also extended invitations, under rule 39, at the request of the representative of Zimbabwe, to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, to Messrs. Clarence Makwetu, President of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), and Nelson Mandela, President of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC); and, at the request of the representative of South Africa, to the following participants in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA): Messrs. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Lucas M. Mangope, Oupa J. Gqozo, J. N. Reddy, Ebrahim Joosab, Kenneth M. Andrew and E. E. Ngobeni. At the 3096th meeting, the Council extended invitations, under the same rule, at the request of the representative of India, to Messrs. Bantu Holomisa, Essop Pahad, Philip Mahlangu and Manguzi Zitha. In giving the floor to certain speakers invited under rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, the President stated: “This does not in any way entail the recognition by the Council or any of its members of the organization or entity he [the speaker] claims to represent”.2

The Council considered the item at its 3095th and 3096th meetings, on 15 and 16 July 1992.

At the 3095th meeting, the President (Cape Verde) drew the attention of the members of the Council to a letter dated 8 July 1992 from the representative of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General,3 enclosing a letter of the same date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the Secretary-General. In his letter, the Foreign Minister stated that the South African Government welcomed the Secretary-General’s informal proposal for a goodwill visit to South Africa and suggested that it might take place before the envisaged meeting of the Security Council. Should a visit by the goodwill mission not be feasible before the Council met in open session, the Government of South Africa would support a Council meeting to authorize the Secretary-General to send a goodwill mission, which would report through the Secretary-General to the Council as soon as possible.

Commencing the discussion, the representative of Senegal, speaking on behalf of the current Chairman of OAU and of the ministerial delegation of OAU which he headed, stated that Africa as a whole was deeply concerned by the turn of events in South Africa. In the light of the atmosphere of unacceptable violence, as evidenced by the Boipatong massacre, and of the precarious political situation, it was impossible to go on with a credible negotiating process aimed at creating a democratic, non-racial South Africa. OAU believed that the South African Government must be made to shoulder its responsibilities for guaranteeing the security of life and property and creating a climate of civil peace. At the same time, all the parties that believed in the possibility of setting up a democratic regime in South Africa must work for the elimination of all forms of violence. The OAU approach to the Security Council was based on the findings of the Commission of Inquiry on the Prevention of Violence and Public Intimidation chaired by Judge Goldstone (the Goldstone Commission) and recent international

---

2 S/PV.3096, pp. 35, 58, 67 and 137, in relation to Messrs. Buthelezi, Mangope, Gqozo and Holomisa, respectively.
3 S/24255.
commissions of inquiry that the violence in South Africa was gradually eroding the society and causing serious security problems. OAU believed that the Council was the best possible place to seek a solution to the crisis, which, if it continued, threatened to spill over the frontiers of the country and threaten peace and security in the region. The Council could, among other things and in agreement with all the parties concerned, provide a United Nations presence in South Africa, with the aim, inter alia, of helping to consolidate the measures to combat violence, to restore a climate of security and to explore and create conditions in which it would be possible to relaunch the negotiating process within CODESA. Ending the violence was undoubtedly one of the ways to bring about a resumption of the negotiations, which OAU encouraged. Recalling the United Nations long-standing involvement with the problem of South Africa, OAU considered that the United Nations should take up the matter again — to help to identify the causes of the violence and to take the necessary steps to put an end to it. As for the proposed international presence, OAU believed that the designation by the Secretary-General of a Special Representative might be a solution, provided that the Security Council remained seized of the question until the establishment of a democratic, united and non-racial South Africa.

Mr. Nelson Mandela, President of ANC, recalled that the United Nations had been seized of the question of South Africa for the past 45 years because its people had been subjected to the policy of apartheid, which the United Nations had determined was a crime against humanity. The decisions taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly had aimed at ending apartheid and helping to transform the country into a non-racial democracy. That objective had not yet been achieved. The Government of South Africa, representing the system of white minority rule to which the United Nations was opposed, continued to govern the country under a constitution that the Security Council had declared null and void. Since its purposes had not yet been achieved, the United Nations should remain seized of the question of South Africa and continue to look for ways and means by which it could help to expedite the process leading to the democratic transformation of the country. In the meantime, an extremely critical situation had arisen. The process for drafting a new constitution for a democratic, non-racial society, set in motion by the Declaration of Intent adopted at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa on 21 December 1991, was deadlocked. The Security Council was meeting because that process had been brought to a halt by the carnage in the black townships. Mr. Mandela contended that the Government of South Africa was involved in the escalating violence — through acts of omission and commission. The regime had failed to use its power and legal authority to stop the violence and take action against the perpetrators; and the complicity of State security forces in the violence had been confirmed by the Goldstone Commission and international fact-finding missions. Directed at the democratic movement, the violence constituted a strategy of State terrorism intended to create the conditions under which the forces responsible for the introduction and entrenchment of the system of apartheid would be able to impose their will on a weakened democratic movement at the negotiating table. Faced, however, with the horrendous escalation of the violence, as evidenced by the Boipatong massacre, ANC had been forced to withdraw from the multilateral process of negotiations that had been taking place in CODESA. Mr. Mandela acknowledged that there were instances of counter-violence by members of the democratic movement, but stressed that ANC stood opposed to the promotion of violence and remained firmly committed to that position.

Recalling earlier decisions of the Council to help the people of South Africa to transform the country into a non-racial democracy, Mr. Mandela and ANC believed that that commitment placed an urgent obligation on the Council to intervene in the South African situation to end the carnage. Moreover, the interest of the Council in seeing the resumption of negotiations so that a peaceful solution could be found — a solution in keeping with the democratic principles contained in the 1989 Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, and the resolutions of the Security Council itself — required the Council to act on the matter of violence in South Africa firmly and speedily. Its failure to do so would undermine its prestige and authority at a time when the Council and the United Nations as a whole were being called upon to play an even more active role in the ordering of world affairs. He therefore urged the Council to request the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for South Africa to investigate the situation with a view to imposing international sanctions against the Government of South Africa.

4 General Assembly resolution S-16/1, annex.
to helping the Council to decide on the measures it should take to help end the violence. The Council should then take the necessary decisions to implement such measures and should continuously monitor the situation to ensure their effectiveness.

During the debate, many speakers condemned the escalation of violence in South Africa, in particular the Boipatong massacre; stressed the Government’s primary responsibility for curbing violence and for maintaining law and order; called for a halt to the violence and for the resumption of the negotiations within the framework of CODESA; supported the proposed appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Africa; and urged the Council to act decisively to address the situation.\(^5\)

The representative of Algeria said that OAU was having recourse to the United Nations because it had worked for more than 40 years to end racial discrimination. Although considerable progress had been made, the escalation of violence was now threatening to derail the entire negotiating mechanism that had been so laboriously established. He thought that the Government of South Africa, which was responsible for maintaining public order and security, should be firmly invited by the Council to exercise that responsibility without discrimination and to bring to justice the perpetrators of those criminal acts. But that, in itself, would not suffice. The Government also had to address the causes of violence. The Council should call upon it to adopt concrete measures, including the dissolution of private militias, the demobilization of the foreign mercenary battalion which specialized in brutal repression in the townships, the purging of police and army ranks of reactionary elements and the promotion of recruitment among the black majority, and the reinstatement of the ban on arms, including “traditional” weapons, in public places.\(^6\)

The representative of France concurred with the previous speakers that the Council should call upon the South Africans to put an end to violence and to resume negotiations. He supported the draft resolution, including the invitation to the Secretary-General to send a Special Representative to South Africa. As France saw it, that envoy would undertake a dialogue with all the parties concerned and determine, in agreement with them, the precise modalities of his mission.\(^7\)

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the responsibility for dealing with the violence lay with the South Africans themselves — primarily the Government and the police, but also those whose position in South African society gave them influence and authority. He welcomed the constructive approach the Government of South Africa was adopting to the various offers of external assistance, in inviting, for example, non-South Africans to participate in its internal investigations. He expected such help to be aimed at reinforcing the peace structures that South Africans themselves had already built. As to the process of negotiation, the sooner it could be resumed, the better. The outside world should do whatever it could to assist; but it should seek to help, not to prescribe. In that spirit, the troika of European Community Foreign Ministers would visit South Africa later in the year to explore with all the parties ways to restore momentum to the negotiating process and to combat political violence. He added that his Government strongly supported the continuing use by the Secretary-General of his good offices, and believed that the best first step was the dispatch to South Africa of a Special Representative. That envoy’s contacts with all parties should enable the Secretary-General and the Security Council to discuss what useful and constructive role the United Nations could play in the period ahead. The Special Representative would need to cooperate closely with other organizations working

\(^5\) S/PV.3095, pp. 32-40 (Algeria); pp. 41-47 (Egypt); pp. 47-55 (Zaire); pp. 56-58 (Venezuela); pp. 59-62 (France); pp. 62-65 (United Kingdom); pp. 65-69 (Morocco); pp. 69-71 (China); pp. 71-73 (Russian Federation); pp. 73-79 (India); pp. 91-93 (Hungary); pp. 93-96 (Ecuador); pp. 96-97 (Japan); pp. 113-118 (Congo); pp. 132-140 (Uganda); pp. 141-143 (Canada); pp. 143-146 (Sweden); pp. 146-148 (New Zealand); pp. 149-152 (Nepal); pp. 152-155 (Suriname); pp. 156-160 (Indonesia); pp. 162-166 (Angola); pp. 167-171 (Cuba); pp. 171-175 (Philippines); pp. 175-182 (Lesotho); and S/PV.3096, pp. 30-34 (Malaysia); pp. 92-93 (Norway); pp. 97-100 (Portugal); pp. 103-110 (Botswana); pp. 111-113 (Greece); pp. 114-116 (Netherlands); pp. 117-120 (Spain); pp. 121-127 (Zambia); pp. 128-134 (Islamic Republic of Iran); pp. 136-137 (Italy); pp. 187-189 (Cape Verde); pp. 189-192 (Belgium); and pp. 192-195 (Austria).

\(^6\) S/PV.3095, pp. 32-40.

\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 59-62.
for the same objectives, such as the Commonwealth, OAU and the European Community. 

The representative of the United States observed that the participation in the Council’s debate of so many representatives from OAU, other African countries, opposition movements within South Africa and the Government of South Africa provided a unique opportunity to reach a consensus on what must be done to suggest how to bring all South African parties together to continue their negotiations. On the issue of violence, the United States had full confidence in the Goldstone Commission and supported the implementation of its findings by all parties. It also supported the efforts of the National Peace Accord Forum. The United Nations stood ready to support those efforts, but they would only bear fruit if the parties themselves resolved to control the violence. As to what was necessary to get all the leaders of South Africa back to the negotiating table in an atmosphere free of violence, that was impossible for the Council to ascertain precisely. However, a small United Nations team dispatched to South Africa would be able to gain a better perspective. The United States accordingly proposed that a United Nations goodwill mission, under the good offices of the Secretary-General, travel to South Africa to meet all leaders and offer its services to bring the parties closer together. Such a mission would seek to enhance the complex negotiating process, but would not seek to supplant it. 

The representative of Zimbabwe welcomed the agreement on the necessity of the Council taking all appropriate action to ensure that the violence was brought to an end. It was important that the violence be stopped for negotiations to continue. However, what had brought CODESA to a halt was not only the issue of violence but also the refusal of the National Party — the ruling party of South Africa — to accept the principle of majority rule. The negotiations had to get back on track, but on a basis that would clearly lead to non-racialism and democracy within South Africa. Characterizing the tragic massacre at Boipatong and other recent similar incidents as merely the tip of the iceberg, he questioned whether the Goldstone Commission — appointed by the South African Government — was the right body to investigate the endemic violence in the country and provide definitive information about it. Zimbabwe did not think it was enough to internationalize the Commission, as had recently been done. It would have preferred a commission appointed by the Security Council or by another body of the United Nations or, failing that, by the Commonwealth. That would have ensured impartiality and continued monitoring of South Africa. 

Mr. Clarence Makwetu, President of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, stated that the Government of South Africa had been forced to adopt a reformist posture by the twin pressures of heightened internal resistance and the international isolation campaign, including punitive economic sanctions. Relaxing those pressures had played into the hands of the regime, which had announced reforms while simultaneously unleashing an unprecedented wave of violence. The lifting of sanctions against the South African regime by sections of the international community had been premature. Contending that the problem of South Africa had already been internationalized through the involvement of foreign mercenaries, he urged the Security Council to internationalize the solution. He invited the United Nations to send an international commission to South Africa to investigate and recommend measures to end the violence, and to supervise the disbanding and expulsion of foreign mercenaries. He called for the strengthening of selective and voluntary sanctions and the introduction of a moratorium on sports contacts until peace and democracy had been achieved through elections. He also asked the Council to adopt a resolution demanding that the South African regime stop the recruitment of white immigrants, intended to increase the white population in the country, until a democratically elected Government was in place. Contending that the South African regime opposed meaningful and effective international involvement on sovereignty grounds, he said that “Azania” would not be an independent and sovereign State until its colonized indigenous majority had exercised its inalienable right to self-determination. The South African problem, which involved colonialism, apartheid and genocide, was an international problem. In conclusion, he urged the Council to authorize the Secretary-General to identify a neutral venue and representatives of the United Nations to convene, chair and mediate discussions on, and the election of, a

8 Ibid., pp. 62-65.
9 Ibid. pp. 79-81.
10 Ibid., pp. 81-91.
Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

The representative of Nigeria welcomed the suggestion of the Secretary-General of a goodwill mission to South Africa, but advocated a two-pronged approach to the issue of violence. It was important to secure the immediate implementation of the conditions requested by ANC and all the liberation movements in the country. It was also correct to observe that, since an OAU monitoring or fact-finding mission on violence had visited South Africa earlier in the year, township violence had virtually disappeared. If OAU could make such a noticeable impact, he wondered what a United Nations mission could not achieve in a different environment. He said his country saw no reason why the Council could not act immediately on that request of OAU. He suggested that the Secretary-General, in consultation with all the parties involved, could work out the modalities of carrying out the proposal, recognizing that the primary objective was to put an end to violence and intimidation and thereby to help create a climate conducive to successful negotiation and transition to a non-racial and democratic society in South Africa.12

The Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid elaborated upon the two critical issues that must be addressed by the Council — namely, violence and the deadlock in the political negotiations — both of which could undermine peace and security in South Africa and consequently in the southern African subregion. He stated that the Council had an obligation under the Charter to act immediately. Beyond that, the international community had a moral responsibility for the implementation of the 1989 Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa. He noted that various suggestions had been made during the meeting, ranging from the introduction of international monitors to oversee the implementation of the Peace Accord in particular and law enforcement in general, to direct involvement in the political negotiations so as to guarantee the neutrality of both the convener and the venue. Observing that there was a broad spectrum of possible action that could be taken, he urged the Council to act in a timely manner.13

The representative of Australia shared the view of other speakers that the time had come for direct involvement in South Africa. There was a need for prompt, effective and constructive action by the United Nations and other international agencies, such as the Commonwealth, to stem the violence and to restore confidence in the constitutional negotiations. He agreed that, as a first step, a Special Representative should be appointed, and, in determining the precise form of any further United Nations involvement, the Council should await his report. Noting that various options had been mentioned — a goodwill or fact-finding mission, a peacekeeping presence, the establishment of the office of a Special Representative — he hoped that due weight would be given to the needs and wishes of all parties in South Africa. It would also be important that there be close consultation and coordination between the various international organizations concerned with the situation. In conclusion, he stressed that the Council’s meeting should be seen as a beginning of a concerted international campaign to restore a climate for the elimination of violence and the resumption of negotiations, and not as an end in itself.14

The representative of Canada encouraged the efforts that were being made to develop a coordinated international response to the situation in South Africa by organizations such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth. On the negotiations, she stated that it was not appropriate for any country to prescribe a particular constitutional model for South Africans. Her country was convinced, however, that a political settlement must be secured through a process of peaceful negotiations and ratified through free and fair elections. Regarding violence, the speaker underlined that all groups shared responsibility for its continuation and that they must all accept responsibility for ending the cycle of aggression, blame and distrust. In concluding, she suggested that international observers, acting in support of the National Peace Accord, might be able to play a useful role in moving the country towards a non-racial and peaceful democracy. She also urged the Security Council to endorse the proposal to send a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to South Africa.15

11 Ibid., pp. 97-109.
13 Ibid., pp. 119-129.
14 Ibid., pp. 129-132.
15 Ibid., pp. 141-143.
The representative of Suriname considered that international observers should be deployed in South Africa to monitor the policing of the townships and deemed appropriate the request that the Secretary-General appoint a Special Representative.  

The representative of Antigua and Barbuda, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), recalled the position taken on the developments in South Africa by the Heads of Government of CARICOM at their last summit meeting. He expressed their support for the terms of the draft resolution before the Council, and pledged that they would maintain existing economic and financial sanctions against South Africa until an interim Government was established.  

The representative of Angola recalled that his country, with all other members of OAU, had strongly and unequivocally supported the steps taken by the South African Government towards the abolition of apartheid, and the measures for the gradual lifting of sanctions against that country. He regretted the new wave of violence in which the protagonists were mainly the black peoples, with the participation of the South African police and foreign mercenary troops. Expressing his deepest abhorrence of the fact that Angolan citizens had participated in the Boipatong massacre, he urged the Council to take the strongest steps possible towards the immediate disbanding of the foreign mercenary forces before they committed any more atrocities in South Africa, Mozambique, Angola or any other country in the region. He also called for the appointment of a United Nations representative to monitor, step-by-step, the implementation of the measures aimed at the final solution of the conflict and the establishment of a democratic, non-racial South Africa.  

The representative of Cuba described the decision by certain members of the international community to relax international pressure on the apartheid regime as premature and unjustified. Indulgence and inertia were largely to blame for the current situation. In the case of apartheid, nothing had been done in the Council to prevent a “wrong signal” being sent to those who opposed urgent change. He hoped that the question of South Africa and the violence besetting the country would get the attention it deserved. He stressed that the Council had the inescapable duty under the Charter to address, and act upon, all issues that threatened peace and security in the world, irrespective of where they occurred, of the forces involved and of the great Powers’ strategic interests in them.  

The representative of Lesotho said that his country’s immediate neighbours had pinned their hopes on the Council for the establishment of a protection force which, it was hoped, would contribute to genuine multilateral negotiations by all South Africans acting in good faith.  

The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania stressed that the Council’s meeting was about the tragic violence in South Africa, not about the resumption of negotiations. Priority could not be put on negotiations when carnage was going on in South Africa. The whole purpose of negotiations was to secure the restoration to the majority people of South Africa of their fundamental freedom and rights. But before they could enjoy those rights, including their inalienable right to self-determination, they first had to secure their foremost fundamental right, namely the right to life. While acknowledging that the South Africans needed a negotiated constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa, he asserted that no one had a right to ask them to negotiate “with a gun pointed at their heads”. He recalled that the previous Security Council resolutions concerning South Africa, including resolution 418 (1977) imposing an arms embargo — the first and only Chapter VII measure against the Government of South Africa — had all been adopted in response to massive repression and brutality following violence in the country. In planning an appropriate response to the current crisis, the Council should keep in mind that some members of the international community had been in too much of a hurry to lift sanctions. That had emboldened the South African authorities not only to ignore their undertaking to take steps to end the violence but also to slow down the negotiations. The first responsibility of the Council, therefore, was to reaffirm the need for continued pressure on the South African regime; existing sanctions had to be maintained.  

16 Ibid., pp. 152-155.  
17 Ibid., pp. 160-162.  
18 Ibid., pp. 162-166.  
19 Ibid., pp. 167-171.  
20 Ibid., pp. 176-182.  
21 Ibid., pp. 183-191.
At its 3096th meeting, on 16 July 1992, the Council resumed consideration of the item on its agenda. The President drew the attention of the members of the Council to a draft resolution that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations. He also drew their attention to two letters dated 15 July 1992 from the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, respectively, transmitting the statements made by Archbishop Trevor Huddleston and Reverend Frank Chikane at the International Hearing on Political Violence in South Africa and the implementation of the National Peace Accord, held in London on 14 and 15 July 1992.

Opening the discussion, the representative of South Africa welcomed the even-handedness of the Council’s approach thus far. With regard to the violence, he agreed that his Government bore the primary responsibility for maintaining order. That did not mean, however, that the other parties to the National Peace Accord were absolved from their commitments. He rejected the allegations that the South African Government was involved in fomenting violence or acquiescing in it. In fact, President De Klerk had taken numerous initiatives to combat the violence, leading to the conclusion of the National Peace Accord and the appointment of the Goldstone Commission. He had made many attempts to arrange a joint meeting with the leaders of ANC and Inkatha to consider the issue of violence and possible monitoring mechanisms. The role of the international community, including the Security Council, in an observer or other acceptable capacity, could be considered in that connection. With respect to his Government’s constitutional proposals, the speaker said that they would ensure that the Government would be accountable through free and regular elections in a multi-party system on the basis of one person, one vote. Power would be devolved to autonomous regions and human rights would be entrenched in the Constitution and protected by an independent judiciary. He refuted the allegations that the Government was opposed to an interim Government and favoured the writing of a constitution by a body that was not democratically elected. On the contrary, it favoured the expeditious establishment of a transitional government, operating under a transitional constitution. That remained its primary objective at CODESA. He also denied that the Government was aiming at a transitional government which would be permanent. He stated for the record that if the transitional constitution had not been replaced within three years, a general election would be held. There could be no justification for the claims that the Government’s constitutional proposals proceeded from a desire to cling to power or to entrench a white veto, and affirmed that, following the referendum of 17 March, “the book on apartheid was closed”. In concluding, he associated himself with an analysis that appeared in an editorial of the Washington Post, which supported the sending of a United Nations fact-finding or goodwill mission to South Africa, but stressed that ultimately the task of curbing the violence belonged to South Africans themselves; and added that only South Africans could determine the pace of the transformation of their country into a practising democracy. The Security Council’s meeting enabled the United Nations to mobilize support for that vital transition.

Mr. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, President of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), speaking in his personal capacity, said that he would welcome a strong and effective international fact-finding mission charged with researching the origins of the violence and monitoring it. He qualified the claim by ANC that the Government of South Africa was the dominant cause of violence as unproven, and maintained that an independent United Nations fact-finding team would establish that both insurgency and counter-insurgency forces had killed for political gains. CODESA remained, in his view, the only viable negotiating forum despite its flaws. Its deadlock had nothing to do with the Boipatong violence or the white minority veto. The controversy was about the predetermining of a system of checks and balances. Turning to the draft resolution, he said that the KwaZulu Government and his party would welcome and cooperate with any special representative charged with investigating the origins and underlying causes of the violence, with a view to recommending measures to bring the violence to an end. They had no serious objection, moreover, to the establishment of some monitoring mechanism to observe, on a continuous basis, developments in South Africa and to make recommendations. However, he

22 S/24288, adopted without change as resolution 765 (1992).
23 S/24291 and S/24292.

24 S/PV.3096, pp. 6-29.
sounded a warning that whatever international presence was envisaged would exacerbate the situation if it were perceived to be designed to buttress the position of any party or group of parties to the internal political conflict. It was vital that any investigation should establish the facts of the situation objectively and impartially. He also stressed that, in the prevailing circumstances, nothing in the nature of peacekeeping with security or military forces was called for. In conclusion, he acknowledged that the international community had played a major role in the fight against apartheid and could continue to help, but he added that, if sanctions were kept in place, violence would not stop in South Africa.  

Mr. Lucas M. Mangope, speaking in his personal capacity, stated that Bophuthatswana had thus far largely escaped the violence currently sweeping South Africa. Describing Bophuthatswana as a model of what a near-ideal future South Africa could be like, both in terms of development and inter-racial harmony, he invited the Security Council to visit and see for itself. He contended, however, that ANC was seeking to destabilize Bophuthatswana with the aim of creating a climate of ungovernability in order to install an administration to its own liking. Insisting that the problems of the region would only be solved at the negotiating table, he proposed that all southern African leaders should assume their responsibility to end the chaos and misery through reasoned negotiations. He appealed to the Council and the United Nations as a whole to use their influence to endorse that proposal.  

Mr. Oupa Gqozo, speaking in his personal capacity, appreciated the fact that some other parties, which were a reality in South Africa, were being heard in the Council irrespective of their status with the Council. He stressed that it was not true that ANC alone represented black political aspirations in South Africa. Over the years, many political groups had mushroomed, a number of which were represented at the CODESA negotiations. He emphasized that ANC was not justified, therefore, in presupposing a right to negotiate on behalf of all others. He noted that South Africa had 10 homelands, of which 6 were self-governing and 4 were politically independent and autonomous, like his “country”, Ciskei. Whether or not they were recognized internationally was beside the point. They existed and their leadership could not be wished away. He stated that ANC and its allies had vowed publicly to render South Africa and Ciskei and Bophuthatswana ungovernable, and considered that ANC was intolerant of opposition. He stressed that it was the wish of all South Africans that, whenever an opinion was required, all leaders should be consulted, including the leaders of “independent and self-governing states” in South Africa. He added that a peacekeeping force would not be successful, as it would have to serve ANC interests and comply with its demands.  

Mr. J. N. Reddy, speaking as the leader of the Solidarity Party of South Africa, said that his party was firmly committed to seeking change through peace. The responsibility for ending the violence was a collective one, though the Government of South Africa bore the greater share of that responsibility and should pursue its role vigorously and with greater determination. The way forward lay through negotiations, which could only take place in a climate of peace and stability. His party welcomed the involvement of the Security Council in contributing to conditions conducive to negotiations, and supported the proposal to send a special representative of the Secretary-General to South Africa to facilitate the resumption of the CODESA process and negotiations. It also requested the establishment of a United Nations constitution-monitoring committee to monitor and evaluate the proceedings and outcome once negotiations had resumed.  

Mr. Ebrahim Joosab, of the National People’s Party of South Africa, said that the Council’s decision to invite all the participants of CODESA demonstrated the impartial and objective manner in which the Council had handled the sensitive situation in his country. He stressed that there was no alternative to peace and negotiations. While he believed that South Africans were capable of coming together, there was a genuine need for the international community to be involved. The United Nations had a role to play in providing objectivity and in ensuring that no one was coerced into accepting a particular constitutional model for South Africa. He suggested that the Security Council should play a role in the resumption of negotiations, and underlined that the nature of the role...
Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

of the United Nations or of any other organization should be negotiated between the participants of CODESA.29

Mr. Kenneth Andrew, speaking on behalf of the Democratic Party of South Africa, considered the reports of the Goldstone Commission and the International Commission of Jurists on the causes of violence to be generally correct in their analyses and conclusions. His party shared the view that the causes of violence were “many and varied”. It believed that the international community could play a constructive role in helping to resolve the crisis. One of the most critical problems in restoring peace was the level of mistrust in the security forces and their ability to deal effectively with political violence. The Democratic Party of South Africa was of the view that restoring trust and confidence in the institutions responsible for peace required the promotion and strengthening of the mechanisms established by the National Peace Accord. To that end, he suggested that it might be useful to appoint a panel of international figures, commanding the respect and trust of all signatories to the Accord, to promote the Accord both internally and internationally. He also considered that there might well be a role for a respected and impartial person to undertake a mission to South Africa to facilitate the resumption of negotiations. He believed that the international community could play a role in maintaining the momentum of the negotiation and transition processes, and an independent person or agency could perhaps perform a mediating function. He stressed, however, that, to be effective, any action contemplated by the international community to promote peace in South Africa should be endorsed by all the signatories to the Accord. Involvement of the international community should not absolve political parties inside South Africa from their responsibility to resolve problems, particularly those resulting from violence and the breakdown of negotiations. At best, the international community could help the process. Moreover, it could not impose a constitution on South Africa. In the final analysis, a new constitution, to be durable and binding, would have to be the product of negotiation and agreement among South Africans themselves.30

The representative of Norway said that his country favoured the direct involvement of the United Nations in the current situation. That involvement could be in the form of an international mechanism agreed to by all parties, and should result from close consultations based on fact-finding by the Secretary-General and his proposed special representative.31

The representative of Brazil said that the well-known links between the need to eradicate apartheid and to preserve international security fully warranted the Council’s participation in measures to overcome the problem of civil conflict in South Africa and to accelerate the complete dismantling of the structures of apartheid. In that context, it was the duty of all Member States and organs of the United Nations to assist the efforts of those who sincerely wished to break the cycle of violence and achieve long-lasting civil peace.32

The representative of Botswana stressed the importance of the Council’s meeting, which had given South African leaders the opportunity to express themselves on the issue under consideration. The information they had provided was valuable for the Council because those who came from southern Africa believed it was important that the same concern that the Council had shown for crises elsewhere should be shown for the crises in Africa, of which the crisis in southern Africa was one. He affirmed the commitment of the front-line States, the countries of southern Africa and of the continent at large to the negotiation process, but underlined the need for peace and tranquillity if the negotiations were to succeed. The responsibility for creating such a climate lay with the Government of South Africa. All the leaders of South Africa had a responsibility to help the Government maintain law and order, but the Government bore the primary responsibility in that regard. He hoped that the Council would enable the Special Representative whose appointment was envisaged in the draft resolution to do what had to be done to assist the people of South Africa in their negotiations for the new South Africa.33

Mr. Bantu Holomisa, speaking in his personal capacity, maintained that the South African Government was a colonial administration, as the indigenous people of South Africa were denied self-determination; the international community was therefore justified in intervening in the situation. He

---

29 Ibid., pp. 84-86.
31 S/PV.3096, pp. 92-93.
32 Ibid., pp. 93-97.
33 Ibid., pp. 103-110.
said that members of the international community, such as the Council, should exercise caution when it came to imposing punitive measures against the country. They should avoid taking unilateral decisions without consulting the South African black protagonists. He contended that the international community would be effective only in South Africa when it had a direct say over the negotiation process and was invested with mandatory powers to intervene and arbitrate between the parties. He appealed for the dispatch of an international peacekeeping force to South Africa. Its duties should include dispatching an advance team to the country to meet various leaders; looking into the general stability of the whole country; helping to create a free political climate; helping to identify and repatriate all foreign mercenaries in the employ of the South African Defence Force; monitoring the South African arms manufacturers and preventing the flow of weapons to the surrogate forces of the South African Defence Force and Police; monitoring the possibly extensive violation of the arms embargo; and taking over control of the National Peace Accord and revamping it. In conclusion, he said that he saw no purpose in the international community simply insisting on the resumption of CODESA negotiations under existing arrangements and in the present climate.34

Mr. Essop Pahad, of the South Africa Communist Party, rejected the claim, made by some, that the violence in South Africa was black-on-black violence. He contended that the violence emanated from a corrupt, discredited system, and could have been significantly reduced — if not avoided — if the South African police and South African Defence Force had fulfilled their obligations and not played an active role in fomenting it. As to the negotiations, he maintained that the objective of the ANC-led alliance in the negotiation process had been to seek the transfer of power from a white minority regime into the hands of the people — not into the hands of ANC or anybody else. It was the people of South Africa who must decide who should govern them. That was the nub of the breakdown in CODESA. The continuation of CODESA was inconceivable until the National Party regime gave a clear and unambiguous statement that it was prepared to accept a constitution which gave to the people of South Africa the right to decide who should govern them. If the international community were to intervene on that question, it should be in the direction of giving to South Africa what every other democratic society enjoyed, namely, the right of a people to elect its own government. He stated that his party considered it vital that the international community begin to play a much more active role in monitoring the situation in South Africa. It was crucial that the proposed representative of the Secretary-General arrive in the country as soon as possible, for the Security Council, which had been seized of the situation in South Africa since 1946, had a duty and obligation to all humanity to bring to an end what was a crime against humanity.35

Mr. Philip Mahlangu, of the Intando Yesizwe Party, said that the situation warranted urgent international intervention. He appealed to the Security Council to send a high-powered monitoring committee to South Africa with a mandate, inter alia, to monitor, investigate and report on the violence in the country, to recommend to the Secretary-General steps to be taken by the United Nations to end the violence, and to report on the advisability and necessity of having permanent United Nations observers in CODESA.36

The representative of Ukraine considered that, given the atmosphere of mutual mistrust prevailing in South Africa, the international community had a role to play. An international team of independent investigators should be sent urgently to South Africa to monitor the violence. Moreover, during the transitional period, there should be local, regional and national elections, which would also require some form of international supervision to ensure their fairness. He stated that the complexity of the transitional process called for continuous wide-ranging support from the international community, which could be effective only when properly coordinated. There was a need for a combined approach to the problems of political, social and economic development, the protection of human rights and the democratization of South African society. In that context, he suggested that the role of the Special Committee against Apartheid and the Centre against Apartheid should be increased. He hoped that the Security Council would urge the international community to maintain the existing

34 Ibid., pp. 138-147.
35 Ibid., pp. 147-152.
36 Ibid., pp. 153-160.
measures imposed for the purpose of bringing about an early end to apartheid.37

Drawing on his country’s experience in dealing with South African Governments, the representative of Namibia maintained that the test for ensuring the resumption of the CODESA process was not only the ending of the violence, but the emplacement of effective and durable mechanisms to prevent the armed forces and security units from being used against opponents of the Government. He noted the unprecedented situation as far as the South African participation in the Council meeting was concerned, which was perhaps indicative of how much things had changed. Apart from the delegations of the Government of South Africa and of the national liberation movements recognized by the United Nations, the Council had decided to afford the privilege of addressing it to some of the parties represented at CODESA. The debate and the draft resolution before the Council clearly indicated the convergence of views between OAU and the Council concerning the events in South Africa. Moreover, various intergovernmental bodies, such as the European Community and the Commonwealth, had already taken initiatives similar to those that had been taken or were being contemplated by either OAU or the United Nations. That broad consensus should send a clear message to the Government of South Africa that, on the one hand, the escalating violence was unacceptable and the South African Government must stop it, and, on the other hand, the international community was ready to help normalize the situation. He welcomed the draft resolution as a necessary first step towards a meaningful United Nations role, but urged that that step be followed by a more permanent mechanism: a monitoring group that would remain in the country until a new constitution was adopted.38

The representative of Zimbabwe, in a further statement, denied the allegation made by the representative of South Africa that the Zimbabwean National Army had assisted in transporting weapons to the liberation movements in South Africa. Zimbabwe had never involved itself in the armed conflict or violence occurring there. He also mentioned another issue that had emerged from the day’s discussions. In his view, there was a need for a referee of the situation in South Africa. He thought the Council and the United Nations in general should view the role of the Special Representative as a slightly broader one, involving some kind of supervision or refereeing of the process.39

The Council proceeded to vote on the draft resolution before it.

Speaking before the vote, the representative of Belgium noted that his delegation had worked to see that the draft resolution was a balanced text and in keeping with reality. However, it considered that certain references in the draft to previous texts were anachronistic. In its view, despite the tragic recent events, there should have been greater acknowledgment of the progress made. As for the mandate to be given to the Secretary-General, Belgium thought it important not to lose sight of the fact that the process of democratization was above all domestic and national in character. It wished to encourage a resumption of dialogue, not the placing of that dialogue under supervision.40

The representative of Austria stressed that, at the request of the parties concerned, the international community should encourage and support the process of change in South Africa. His country supported the idea of giving the Secretary-General a mandate to use his good offices towards creating conditions conducive to further progress.41

The draft resolution was then put to the vote and adopted unanimously as resolution 765 (1992), which reads:

The Security Council,


Gravely concerned by the escalating violence in South Africa, which is causing a heavy loss of human life and by its consequences for the peaceful negotiations aimed at creating a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa,

Concerned that the continuation of this situation would seriously jeopardize peace and security in the region,

Recalling the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa adopted by consensus by the General Assembly at its sixteenth special

37 Ibid., pp. 161-166.
38 S/PV.3096, pp. 176-182.
39 Ibid., pp. 182-186.
40 Ibid., pp. 189-192.
41 Ibid., pp. 192-195.
session, on 14 December 1989, which called for negotiations in
South Africa to take place in a climate free of violence,

Emphasizing the responsibility of the South African
authorities to take all necessary measures to stop the violence
immediately and protect the life and property of all South
Africans,

Emphasizing also the need for all parties to cooperate in
combating violence and to exercise restraint,

Concerned at the break in the negotiating process and
determined to help the people of South Africa in their legitimate
struggle for a non-racial, democratic society,

1. Condemns the escalating violence in South Africa
and in particular the massacre at Boipatong township on 17 June
1992, as well as subsequent incidents of violence, including the
shooting of unarmed protesters;

2. Strongly urges the South African authorities to take
immediate measures to bring an effective end to the ongoing
violence and to bring those responsible to justice;

3. Calls upon all the parties to cooperate in combating
violence and to ensure the effective implementation of the
National Peace Accord;

4. Invites the Secretary-General to appoint, as a
matter of urgency, a Special Representative for South Africa in
order to recommend, after, inter alia, discussion with the parties,
measures which would assist in bringing an end to the violence and
to create conditions for the resumption of negotiations.

Concerning the Goldstone Commission, the Secretary-General
recommended that its recommendations be fully and speedily
implemented by the Government and, when so required, by the parties in South Africa.

He also recommended that the mechanisms established
by the National Peace Accord, to which all parties had
agreed, be strengthened and reinforced. To that end, he
recommended the deployment of some 30 United
Nations observers to South Africa, to work in close
association with the National Peace Secretariat, in
order to further the purposes of the Accord. Their
number could, as necessary, be supplemented by other
appropriate international organizations, such as the
Commonwealth, the European Community and OAU.

As to the negotiations, they were uniquely the
responsibility of South Africans. The Secretary-
General was heartened by the determination of the
major parties to return to the negotiating table as soon
as possible and urged them to do so. He expressed the
view that certain actions could contribute greatly to
improving the political climate and creating trust: for
example, the immediate release of all remaining
political prisoners; and fair and objective reporting on
State-owned radio and television. He endorsed the
CODESA process. For all its shortcomings, it should
be pursued and improved. Others should be encouraged
to join and its work should be better coordinated and
made much more transparent. In addition, the
Secretary-General recommended that the establishment
of a deadlock-resolving machinery at the highest

Decisions of 17 August 1992 (3107th meeting):
resolution 772 (1992) and statement by the
President

On 7 August 1992, pursuant to resolution 765
(1992), the Secretary-General submitted to the Security
Council a report on the mission carried out by his
Special Representative and a small team to South
Africa from 21 to 31 July 1992. The mission had
discussed with a wide range of parties measures to
assist them in bringing an end to the violence and to
create conditions for the resumption of negotiations.
On the basis of its findings, the Secretary-General
recommended a number of measures. On the issue of
violence, he recommended that the efforts of the
Goldstone Commission be supported by the
international community and that its recommendations
be fully and speedily implemented by the Government
and, when so required, by the parties in South Africa. He also recommended that the mechanisms established
by the National Peace Accord, to which all parties had
agreed, be strengthened and reinforced. To that end, he
recommended the deployment of some 30 United
Nations observers to South Africa, to work in close
association with the National Peace Secretariat, in
order to further the purposes of the Accord. Their
number could, as necessary, be supplemented by other
appropriate international organizations, such as the
Commonwealth, the European Community and OAU.

As to the negotiations, they were uniquely the
responsibility of South Africans. The Secretary-
General was heartened by the determination of the
major parties to return to the negotiating table as soon
as possible and urged them to do so. He expressed the
view that certain actions could contribute greatly to
improving the political climate and creating trust: for
example, the immediate release of all remaining
political prisoners; and fair and objective reporting on
State-owned radio and television. He endorsed the
CODESA process. For all its shortcomings, it should
be pursued and improved. Others should be encouraged
to join and its work should be better coordinated and
made much more transparent. In addition, the
Secretary-General recommended that the establishment
of a deadlock-resolving machinery at the highest

42 Ibid., pp. 195-196.
43 S/24389.
political level and the appointment of an eminent and impartial person be considered by all concerned. The Secretary-General concluded by stressing that, to discharge its functions, the Security Council should have before it regular, impartial and objective information. To that end, he proposed that missions such as that just completed be undertaken on a quarterly basis or more frequently, if the situation warranted, and that reports be provided to the Council.

At its 3107th meeting, held on 17 August 1992, in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations, the Council included the report of the Secretary-General in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (China) drew the attention of the members of the Council to a draft resolution that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations, as well as to a letter dated 12 August 1992 from the representative of Senegal addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a communiqué issued by the Government of Senegal, whose President was the current Chairman of OAU, welcoming the successful completion of the mission to South Africa by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

The draft resolution was thereupon put to the vote and adopted unanimously as resolution 772 (1992), which reads:

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 765 (1992) of 16 July 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 7 August 1992 on the question of South Africa,

Determined to help the people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle for a non-racial, democratic society,

Cognizant of the expectations of the people of South Africa that the United Nations will assist with regard to the removal of all obstacles to the resumption of the process of negotiations,

Bearing in mind the areas of concern relevant to the question of violence in South Africa, including the issues of the hostels, dangerous weapons, the role of the security forces and other armed formations, the investigation and prosecution of criminal conduct, mass demonstrations and the conduct of political parties,

Also bearing in mind the need to strengthen and reinforce the indigenous mechanisms set up under the National Peace Accord, so as to enhance their capacity in the building of peace, both in the present and in the future,

Determined to assist the people of South Africa to end violence, the continuation of which would seriously jeopardize peace and security in the region,

Underlining, in this regard, the importance of all parties cooperating in the resumption of the negotiating process as speedily as possible,

1. Welcomes with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General of 7 August 1992 on the question of South Africa;

2. Expresses its appreciation to all relevant parties in South Africa for the cooperation they extended to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Africa;

3. Calls upon the South African Government and all parties in South Africa to implement urgently the relevant recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General;

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy, as a matter of urgency, United Nations observers in South Africa, in such a manner and in such numbers as he determines necessary to address effectively the areas of concern noted in his report, in coordination with the structures set up under the National Peace Accord;

5. Invites the Secretary-General to assist in the strengthening of the structures set up under the National Peace Accord in consultation with the relevant parties;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council quarterly, or more frequently if necessary, on the implementation of the present resolution;

7. Calls on the Government of South Africa, parties and organizations, and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord, to extend their full cooperation to the United Nations observers to enable them to carry out their tasks effectively;

8. Invites international organizations such as the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the European Community to consider deploying their own observers in South Africa in coordination with the United Nations and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord;

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa is established.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the President stated that, in connection with the resolution...
just adopted, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:46

It is the understanding of the members of the Council that the Secretary-General will consult the Council on the number of observers he has the intention to deploy from time to time.

Decision of 10 September 1992: statement by the President

By a letter dated 9 September 1992 addressed to the Secretary-General,47 the representative of South Africa submitted a memorandum issued by his Government on the events that had taken place at Bisho, Ciskei, on 7 September 1992, resulting in the death of 28 people and injury of approximately 190. In the memorandum, the Government urged the Secretary-General and the members of the Security Council to demand that the ANC/Communist Party alliance abandon any further provocative actions which put at risk the lives of innocent South Africans. It also appealed to the Secretary-General to consider sending his representative to South Africa, as soon as possible, in order to assist in the strengthening of the National Peace Secretariat and its regional structures. The Government suggested, further, that the Secretary-General's representative attend the proposed meeting of the signatories of the National Peace Accord as an observer, and enter into discussions with the main political players with a view to assisting in bringing violence to an end and in removing the remaining obstacles to the resumption of negotiations.

On 10 September 1992, following consultations held on the same day, the President (Ecuador) made the following statement to the media on behalf of the Council:48

The members of the Security Council deplore the killing of 28 demonstrators and the wounding of nearly 200 others by security elements in South Africa on 7 September 1992. They reiterate their grave concern at the continued escalation of the violence in South Africa. They emphasize once again the responsibility of the South African authorities for the maintenance of law and order and call on them to take all measures to end the violence and to protect the right of all South Africans to engage in peaceful political activity without fear of intimidation or violence. They urge all parties in South Africa to cooperate in combating violence and to exercise maximum restraint in order to help break the spiralling cycle of violence.

The members of the Council emphasize the need to put an end to the violence and create conditions for negotiations leading to the establishment of a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa. They note in this regard that the Council, in its resolution 772 (1992) of 17 August 1992, authorized the Secretary-General to deploy United Nations observers in South Africa, in coordination with the structures set up under the National Peace Accord, to provide a framework and basis for putting an end to violence in the country. They welcome the Secretary-General’s decision to deploy an advance party of 13 United Nations observers in South Africa on 11 September 1992 as part of the complement of 50 observers to be deployed within one month.

The members of the Council call upon the Government of South Africa, parties and organizations, and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord, to extend their full cooperation to the United Nations observers to enable them to carry out their tasks effectively. They reiterate their call to other relevant regional and inter-governmental organizations to consider deploying their own observers in South Africa in coordination with the United Nations and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord in order to facilitate the peace process.

8. The situation concerning Western Sahara


On 18 June 1990, pursuant to resolution 621 (1988) of 20 September 1988, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report on the situation concerning Western Sahara.1 It contained the text of the settlement proposals made by the Secretary- General and the current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as accepted in principle on 30 August 1988 by the parties to the conflict in Western Sahara, namely, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente Polisario). The report also contained the outline of an implementation plan proposed by the Secretary-General for giving effect to those proposals. The main elements of the settlement

__________________
46 S/24456.
47 S/24544.