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The year 2004 witnessed an unprecedented surge in United Nations peacekeeping operations, widening prospects for ending conflicts and raising hopes for peace in war-torn countries. By the end of the year, the number and scope of these operations approached their highest levels ever. At the same time, these new demands placed huge new strains on United Nations resources, and prompted the Organization to take a critical look at its ability to plan and manage peacekeeping missions so that the UN can meet this challenging period with an effective response.

In addition to the 14 ongoing field operations the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was managing in early 2004, three new missions were established during the year, with more on the horizon. While the Organization was still deploying its largest peacekeeping operation in Liberia, the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was launched in April, with the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) opening two months later. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) underwent a major restructuring and expansion, replacing Liberia as the largest peacekeeping operation and opening new headquarters in the volatile east of the country. Planning also continued for a mission in Sudan to deploy once a peace agreement was signed. DPKO also provided administrative and logistic support to the UN mission in Iraq (UNAMI).

The logistics needed to organize these missions has been daunting. The ability of the Member States to provide funds, troops and equipment has been severely strained. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, head of DPKO, said that the surge had pushed the UN system to the outer limits of its capacity. “For every person in the Peacekeeping Department at the New York headquarters,” he wrote in the International Herald Tribune, “there will be more than 100 in the field, creating major challenges in the areas of planning, force generation, logistics, procurement and command and control.”

The DPKO chief set out four principles that should guide decisions by the international community if peacekeeping is to succeed: avoiding UN engagement in hot wars; placing greater emphasis on partnerships; matching mandates with resources; and committing to see the job completed, that is, until peace takes root. In order to prevent the recurrence of conflicts, peacekeeping must be backed by long-term peacebuilding and development activities.

UN peacekeeping remains, for the most part, operationally effective, despite severe setbacks in the 1990s in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Shashi Tharoor, the USG of the UN’s Department of Public Information, wrote in Foreign Affairs that since the UN’s "blue helmets" won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, they have brought peace and democracy to Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and East Timor. They have also shared the burden of peacekeeping after violent events and regime changes in Haiti in the 1990s, and continued to serve as a key stabilizing factor in conflicts as diverse as the Golan Heights, Sierra Leone, Cyprus, Georgia, Western Sahara and Kosovo.

Peacekeeping remains cost-effective. Even with the new demands of 2004, expenditures on UN peacekeeping operations were projected to be just under $4 billion. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said that the $30 billion spent on peacekeeping operations over the history of the United Nations represented one thirtieth of the amount that was spent in 2003 alone on global military expenditures. UN peacekeeping provides for both burden and risk sharing and is ultimately much cheaper than unilateral action. The universality of the United Nations offers its peacekeepers a unique legitimacy and sends a strong political message that the international community is tangibly committed to resolving each crisis.

Out of almost 75,000 military, police and civilian personnel serving in 17 current operations, more than two-thirds are in Africa. Many of these are multidimensional operations, with robust mandates to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life; provide security for vulnerable populations; reform the judicial and security sectors; monitor human rights violations and resettle refugees and internally displaced persons. These missions provide security assistance while working on humanitarian programmes and economic assistance, and they support complicated political processes and often elections.

The positive signal this surge in African peacekeeping has sent is that some of the continent’s seemingly intractable...
conflicts may be ending. Africans themselves are also becoming more active in finding solutions. The African Union has peacekeepers in Burundi and has sent military observers to the Darfur region of Sudan. The Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) participated in peace efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and more recently in Côte d’Ivoire.

Encouraged by Africa’s readiness to play an active part, the international community has lent support by providing funds and logistics equipment. In June 2004, the Group of Eight industrialized nations (G8) adopted the Africa Action Plan to train and equip thousands of African peacekeepers and develop the capacity of African organizations to manage peace support operations. The European Union has also established an African Peace Facility to assist in building indigenous peacekeeping capacities.

While acknowledging the importance of providing financial assistance and equipment to peacekeeping operations, UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette called on developed countries to contribute troops as well. She noted a “marked shift in the composition of UN peacekeeping forces” over the years: at the end of 2004, the 10 largest troop and police contributors were all from the developing world, providing almost two thirds of UN peacekeepers. Top contributors Bangladesh and Pakistan deployed one quarter of all uniformed personnel. EU member states, however, while paying 40% of the UN’s peacekeeping budget, provided fewer than 10% of the peacekeepers. While the United States gave 26 percent of the peacekeeping budget, it had 318 uniformed personnel in the field at the end of the year. The UN needs, in particular, highly trained units for some specific functions of contemporary peacekeeping missions, which are found more readily in the militaries of developed states.

Meanwhile, at UN Headquarters in New York, DPKO has strengthened its capacity to plan, deploy and sustain complex peacekeeping missions. The department is nearing its goal to be able to set up a mission within 30-90 days of Security Council authorization. DPKO is using new databases for generating troops and has improved ways to plan and use advance funds for a proposed mission before the Security Council authorises its creation. Rapid deployment training, to prepare UN staff to be able to set up a new peacekeeping mission on short notice, intensified in 2004 when scores of field and headquarters personnel acquired concrete skills in establishing functioning missions from day one.

Quicker means of deploying equipment through the use of strategic deployment stocks at the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, worked well in setting up the mission in Liberia, but faced challenges in other missions in 2004. DPKO is aggressively expanding the pool of troop and police contributors to draw in countries which have not contributed before. New and innovative means of planning and deploying were all used in launching recent operations in Liberia, Haiti and Burundi and are part of the planning for the expected mission in Sudan.

Despite these reforms, however, other challenging issues face UN peacekeeping operations. It is still difficult to mobilize adequate funds quickly for some of the core functions of peacekeeping, such as disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants into society. Getting Member States to contribute well-trained and equipped troops and police in a timely fashion and with the right technical and language skills continues to be difficult. DPKO still lacks critical capabilities in communication equipment, maritime capacity, air assets and Special Forces for emergency situations. Finding qualified civilians with appropriate expertise to carry out difficult assignments in high-risk, low-infrastructure environments is also a priority in the coming year.

In 2004, the UN also saw an increase in allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation committed by UN peacekeepers, both civilian and military, against host populations. The UN has launched aggressive investigations into these allegations and is strengthening existing procedures to confront this problem internally, while simultaneously working with troop-contributing countries to address the problem systemically.

The ongoing surge in peacekeeping operations has forced the Secretariat to develop new and innovative strategies. Greater political and financial support is needed from Member States if the United Nations is to succeed in meeting these unprecedented challenges and managing the new outbreak of peace.

The following articles describe several but not all of the UN’s peace operations in 2004 as well as several of the priority areas these missions are addressing.
ONUB: UN peacekeeping comes to Burundi

The UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established on 1 June following United Nations Security Council resolution 1545 of 21 May 2004. The Mission has a mandate to support and help implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and steer the transition towards national elections, which were scheduled to be held by April 2005.

Burundi has been marked by civil strife for the past 11 years, which was triggered by the assassination of the country's first democratically-elected president Melchior Ndayaye in 1993. The massacres and revenge killings of those days, if not earlier in Burundian history, are a sharp reminder of the difficult political and security environment in which the next elections will be held.

ONUB was set up to help Burundians bring the three-year transition period to a successful conclusion, culminating in free, fair and transparent polls and to help bring about national reconciliation, as envisaged in the Arusha Agreement of August 2000. It took over peacekeeping duties from the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the first ever AU peacekeeping mission, which included 2,870 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique. AMIB, together with the members of the Regional Initiative for Peace and South Africa, as the “Facilitation,” demonstrated the strong commitment of regional and African Member States to assist the peace process in Burundi.

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Since its establishment, in close coordination with the Regional Initiative for Peace and the Facilitation, ONUB has been encouraging the various Burundian parties to reach compromises to pave a path for a smooth conclusion to the transition and the post-transitional architecture that would benefit all Burundians.

Among ONUB’s priorities are: working towards achieving a comprehensive ceasefire, in close coordination with its African partners; assisting the preparation of the election process; facilitating the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme and working with donors on development issues.

The Forces Nationals pour la Liberation (FNL), the only armed group outside of the peace process, operates mainly in Bujumbura Rural. While hopes were raised after the FNL had indicated the possibility of entering into a negotiated settlement earlier in the year, such prospects dimmed quickly following the horrific massacre of 152 Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi) refugees in August at the Gatumba transit site near Bujumbura, for which the movement took responsibility. While it is believed that other armed groups may have participated, a UN investigation found no clear evidence of who had organized, carried out and financed the massacre. However, the FNL’s claim of responsibility was supported by witness statements and led UN investigators to believe that the group did, indeed, participate in the attack.

A summit of regional leaders in Dar es Salaam held several days after the massacre declared the FNL a terrorist group, and urged the UN and the African Union to do the same. ONUB suspended contacts with the movement. Afterwards, there was an upsurge of fighting in Bujumbura Rural especially in the area of Kabezi, where the FNL are particularly active. According to human rights observers, abuses have been committed by all sides to the conflict. Organized crime, including armed robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, torture and murder became increasingly prevalent. ONUB increased its presence in trouble spots and also positioned troops around all the refugee camps in the country to help counter threats of attacks and revenge killings.

The escalation of violence in some parts of the country posed a particular problem for the DDR process as the sides grew less willing to disarm. The Burundi army was reluctant to quarter its soldiers in their barracks. Disarmament finally kicked off in early December when rebel fighters and Government forces started handing over their weapons at three demobilization centres set up in the country.

As a result of ongoing political negotiations on outstanding issues, the National Independent Electoral Commission conceded that the transition, which was supposed to end on 31 October, could not be completed on time. A summit of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi held in Nairobi on 15 October endorsed the conclusions of the
Commission, that elections could not be held before 1 November 2004, and called for an extension of the transitional institutions and administration.

The regional leaders also agreed that the draft constitution should be considered as the provisional constitution until the referendum was held. A few days later, the draft constitution was signed into law following its approval by the national legislature, thus averting a constitutional crisis. Under the provisional constitution, Burundi’s government institutions would be composed of 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi, except for the national defence forces and the Senate where the ratio is to be 50-50.

On 16 October, the National Independent Electoral Commission published a new timetable for the referendum and elections that was endorsed by the Transitional Government. Accordingly, local elections were scheduled for February 2005, with legislative elections in March and the presidential poll in April 2005.

ONUB, meanwhile, has been assisting in a countrywide information campaign to explain electoral procedures to the voters, including the printing and dissemination of the post-transition constitution. In October, it started production of weekly bilingual radio broadcasts on five private and public stations.

Despite staffing constraints and the administrative difficulties still associated with mission start-ups, ONUB is forging ahead to provide the best possible support to Burundi.

**UNOCI: Working to uphold the peace agreement in Côte d’Ivoire**

The United Nations Security Council, by its resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, established the United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to supersede the United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI) as of 4 April. The Security Council transferred authority from MINUCI and the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force, ECOMICI to UNOCI, which acts in collaboration with the French troops (Licorne) and ECOWAS.

With an authorized strength of a maximum of 6,240 United Nations military personnel, including 200 military observers, and up to 350 civilian police officers, the UNOCI mandate includes support for the implementation of the peace process linked to the Linas-Marcoussis agreement; help for the Government of National Reconciliation to implement the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the combatants (DDR), with special attention to the specific needs of women and children; as well as monitoring of the ceasefire and movements of armed groups.

Upon assuming its peacekeeping responsibilities, UNOCI strengthened its liaison activities with the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI), the Forces Nouvelles and Licorne troops. It deployed to the Zone of Confidence, a buffer zone separating Government forces in the south from Forces Nouvelles who control the northern part of the country. The Mission was active in providing security on both sides of the Zone of Confidence, particularly in Bouaké in the north, as well as protection for some Government ministers.

In 2004, despite some encouraging signs, the peace process encountered considerable difficulties. In January, the Forces Nouvelles Ministers returned to the Government of National Reconciliation and participated in subsequent meetings of the Council of Ministers, which started considering some of the major legal reforms envisaged under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. However, the failure of the Government and the legislature to pass fundamental legal reforms soured relations between the Government and the Forces Nouvelles.

In an effort to invigorate the stalled reforms, the two sides engaged in negotiations under the mediation of Secretary-General Kofi Annan and ECOWAS. The talks resulted in the Accra III Agreement of 30 July, which called for changes in the laws on citizenship and eligibility for the Presidency as well as setting specific deadlines for political reforms and disarmament.

But despite efforts by all concerned to get political reforms enacted and disarmament started, little was achieved. As a consequence, disarmament, which was scheduled to start on 15 October, did not take place. On 12 October, President Laurent Gbagbo announced that any amendment to the Constitution would require holding a referendum and that he would submit a draft text to the National Assembly as soon as disarmament commenced. The Forces Nouvelles argued that they could not disarm without political reforms.
With no progress in passing essential legislative and constitutional reforms as stipulated under the Accra III Accord and no sign that the rebels would disarm, the Government launched air strikes against the Forces Nouvelles strongholds in Bouaké on 4 November, in a major breach of the 18-month ceasefire. At the same time, opposition political parties and newspaper premises, as well as the offices of the National Commission for DDR, were ransacked. Two days later, Government fighter planes also attacked a French military base in the same town, which left nine French soldiers dead. In retaliation, Licorne troops destroyed almost the entire airforce of Côte d'Ivoire.

The attack by Licorne forces sparked widespread anti-French demonstrations by pro-government militants on the streets of Abidjan. Some local media exacerbated the situation by airing hate messages against foreigners. Dozens of people were killed and more than 9000 French and other foreign nationals left Côte d'Ivoire.

All through the November crisis, UNOCI's efforts were devoted to maintaining peace along the Zone of Confidence and protecting civilians threatened by violence. It provided shelter to those who were fleeing from rioters and looters and assisted in evacuating foreign nationals. The Mission also intensified its monitoring and analysis of daily media and launched a public information campaign to counter disinformation and hate media aimed at inciting violence and derailing the peace and reconciliation process. The Mission's radio station, UNOCI FM, played a key role in this campaign.

The African Union (AU) sought to get the two sides to respect the ceasefire and commit themselves to the Linas-Marcoussis and the Accra III agreements. South African President Thabo Mbeki headed an African Union mission to Côte d'Ivoire aimed at bringing back the Ivorian parties to the negotiating table. On 14 November, at an emergency one-day mini summit held in Abuja, Nigeria, under the auspices of the AU, West African leaders urged both sides to abide by the ceasefire agreements. They also supported the UN Security Council resolution to impose an immediate arms embargo.

On 15 November, the Council imposed with immediate effect a 13-month arms embargo and warned that travel bans and fund freezes would follow.

However, in December, the Council held back the threat of sanctions to give President Mbeki mediation efforts a chance to work. After five days of separate talks in Côte d'Ivoire with the South African leader, both sides recommitted themselves to the Accra III and Linas-Marcoussis peace agreements. The Security Council welcomed the commitments made by the Ivorian parties, demanded that the parties fully comply with the commitments, and emphasized that it would monitor with vigilance their full implementation.

The fighting in November was a serious setback to the Ivorian peace process. It eroded the confidence of both parties in each other and cast doubt on the chances for an immediate disarmament programme. The hope is that current peace initiatives by President Mbeki on behalf of the African Union, reinforced by the threat of more UN sanctions against individuals who are seen to be obstructing the peace process, will produce positive results.

MINUSTAH: Overcoming growing pains

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established on 1 June 2004 by the Security Council to maintain a secure and stable environment, assist the political process and monitor the human rights situation. The Mission is also expected to assist Haiti’s Transitional Government in restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police as well as in disarming all armed groups.

Haiti's current political crisis emerged in 2000 when former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party claimed victory in a hotly disputed presidential and parliamentary election. A united opposition movement challenged the results, refused to work with the new government, and subsequently called for the President's resignation. In February 2004, facing a mounting revolt by former military officers and rebels, President Aristide resigned under international pressure. A United States-led multinational force was deployed in Haiti to restore order. MINUSTAH, the UN's fifth peace operation in the island nation that has been wracked by decades of poverty and unrest, took over these responsibilities in June.

Meanwhile, the Transitional Government led by Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, who assumed office in March, started the task of restoring order and the rule of law with
MINUSTAH’s assistance. The Mission is to help guide the country’s transitional period leading up to elections for a new Government at the earliest possible date.

Barely three months after its inception, MINUSTAH had to confront a devastating humanitarian crisis: more than 3,000 people lost their lives, and some 400,000 people were made homeless when deadly floods caused by hurricane Ivan and tropical storm Jeanne submerged much of Haiti’s north, including more than 80 per cent of the city of Gonaïves. The catastrophe was worsened by looting and the violent protests against looters that ensued. MINUSTAH - still in the early stages of deployment - was immediately confronted with a political and humanitarian crisis in one of the poorest countries in the world, while at the same time trying to build up its troop strength. The challenges were made more difficult by already massive unemployment in the country, a high illiteracy rate and a shattered infrastructure. To help the humanitarian aid agencies meet the needs of flood victims, MINUSTAH, despite its limited manpower, provided security for distribution points and warehouses and for humanitarian convoys.

By the end of the year, MINUSTAH had on the ground some 6,000 of its authorized 6,700 troops and about 1,400 of its 1,622 authorized Civilian Police (CIVPOL), representing some 40 countries. The military force included a composite contingent of about 360 troops from Spain and Morocco. Haiti's regional neighbours have also taken a big interest in the mission, with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General hailing from Chile, the Force Commander from Brazil, the Police Commissioner from Canada and peacekeepers from eight Latin American countries.

With the national army dissolved years ago under President Aristide, the main focus of CIVPOL has been to train and restructure the Haitian National Police (HNP) so it can carry out law and order duties effectively. MINUSTAH has also been working with the Transitional Government to eliminate corruption through improved working conditions and better wages for police personnel. CIVPOL and MINUSTAH engineers from both the military and the civilian side started rebuilding police stations that were destroyed during or after the turmoil of early 2004, and supplying them with computers, desks and chairs.

An ongoing challenge has been the presence of the disbanded but still existing ex-FADH (Forces Armées d’Haiti) units which have posed a threat to efforts to stabilize the country. Their relationship with the Haitian National Police has varied from friendly co-existence, and even joint patrolling, to open hostilities and hatred.

The Mission has been helping the Haitian police prepare a training programme in accordance with international policing and human rights standards. It developed a “train-the-trainers” course for 54 local police instructors, conducted at the HNP Academy in Port-au-Prince. The Mission also put together a special training team to assess the needs of HNP officers in the regions and develop a training plan for them.

CIVPOL has no policing authority, but nevertheless has been needed to assist the HNP to patrol the streets and to develop “community policing”. UN CIVPOL has been working with orphanages and prisons to tackle human rights abuses in different parts of the country. Within the prison system, CIVPOL has been helping to rebuild cells and improve conditions, separate juvenile delinquents from adult offenders and provide food to inmates. Efforts have also been under way to encourage ex-FADHs to disarm in exchange for the pensions they lost, as disarming the rival armed groups or gangs will be the main priority for MINUSTAH in 2005. Peacekeepers and Haitian police officers have also carried out joint raids against the armed groups.

CIVPOL’s need to focus mainly on providing operational support to the HNP, due to the increased security threats, has limited its capacity to address police development and training needs.

As a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH’s mandate also includes paying attention to gender issues and child protection and raising awareness among the population on the dangers of HIV/AIDS. The Office of the Advisor on HIV/AIDS has also been training and sensitizing MINUSTAH’s staff and military contingents, and working towards integrating HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention into the general lives of the population. The Office distributes educational materials, promotes the use and distribution of condoms and provides voluntary testing. By the end of 2004, HIV/AIDS advisors had trained the majority of the
Deploying new missions

CIVPOL, military and civilian staff of the Mission. The Mission’s Gender Advisor has focused on promoting the role of women in civil society, for example, by using gender segregated voter registration information to encourage women to run for office and vote in the next elections.

In mobilizing resources to promote children’s welfare, the Child Protection Unit has had to take into account the deep-rooted causes of Haiti’s crisis, and help to find remedies to the lack of access to primary education, food, potable water and health services for children. Up to 10 percent of the country’s children, the so called Restavecs, live in deplorable conditions, working mostly as unpaid household servants. Child trafficking is rampant, and minors have been lured into armed groups. HIV/AIDS infection among street children has been growing alarmingly. Added to this, Haiti’s juvenile justice system is weak, fragmented, under-funded and in need of a major overhaul.

In the coming year, the mission’s Child Protection Unit intends to train and raise awareness of the plight of these children and to promote and monitor children’s rights by involving peacekeepers, both military and civilian, in regional child protection committees. The unit will also employ some of the contingents’ logistics to rehabilitate schools, houses and juvenile courts.

Both natural and man-made disasters posed significant challenges to the Mission’s start-up in 2004. Yet MINUSTAH has made rapid progress in a short period of time.

Sudan - A new mission on the horizon

Following the signing of peace protocols between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the UN Security Council established the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) on 11 June 2004 to promote peacemaking efforts and to prepare the groundwork for an eventual peace support operation to be set up as soon as a final peace agreement would be signed.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, eventually signed on 9 January 2005 by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, marked the end of a civil war that first erupted in 1983, after the breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. The ensuing 21-year conflict devastated a significant part of Africa’s largest country and deprived it of stability and economic development. The Sudanese people have paid a terrible price: more than 2 million people have died; 4 million have been uprooted and some 600,000 have sought shelter beyond Sudan’s borders as refugees. The nature and size of the country’s problems have frequently overflowed into neighbouring countries and brought misery and insecurity to the region.

Prior to the set up of the advance mission, a small group of UN technical experts had been in the Sudan planning the requirements for logistics, locating suitable premises and facilities, and identifying appropriate areas for headquarters and camps for a future, large peace operation. During the year, while peace talks in Naivasha, Kenya, were ongoing, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) convened a working group to conduct mission planning. A UN Headquarters inter-agency task force composed of all parts of the UN system involved with Sudan met weekly to prepare for the future peace, which promised to pose extremely complex challenges in its realization.

However, when a final peace agreement between the Government and SPLM/A appeared within reach, yet another crisis erupted in the western province of Darfur. Back in February 2003, two Darfuran rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, had taken up arms against the central government, claiming neglect and marginalization in the country’s political and economic life. By early 2004, the rebels were locked in fierce fighting against the Janjaweed, a militia group supported by the Government. The Janjaweed were accused of committing atrocities against civilians, including killings, rape and the destruction of hundreds of villages.

The killings and displacement of thousands of people in Darfur caused outrage around the world. In response, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan traveled to Khartoum in July where he signed an agreement with the Government under which it committed to disarm the Janjaweed militias. The Government also agreed to apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out atrocities and other human rights and international humanitarian law violations. The Security Council threatened to impose sanctions and requested the Secretary-General to set up a Commission of Inquiry to determine whether genocide had taken place in Darfur. Its report was to be issued in early 2005.
As a result of international pressure, in mid-2004 the Government of Sudan agreed to give international humanitarian agencies greater access to camps for displaced persons and to take stronger measures to protect civilians against violence. The UN stepped up the delivery of humanitarian relief to displaced populations and refugees in neighbouring Chad.

Meanwhile, UNAMIS intensified its efforts to engage the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups in the south and in Darfur to help implement their ceasefire and other agreements to ensure the protection and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance to the affected population. In response to massive human rights abuses reported throughout the country, the UN has deployed growing numbers of human rights observers. In addition, UNAMIS continued to submit monthly reports to the Security Council on Sudan's compliance with the Council’s decisions and the situation in the country.

UNAMIS has also provided political and logistical assistance to the African Union (AU) which deployed ceasefire monitors in Darfur, with a mandate expanded to include protection of humanitarian operations and civilians under imminent threat. UNAMIS established for that purpose a liaison office with the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Mission was also assisting the North-South talks in Kenya led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the has been supporting AU-led Darfur talks in Abuja, Nigeria, with mediation resource personnel.

The AU expected to have about 3,320 personnel in Darfur by the end of 2004, including 2,341 military personnel, among them 450 observers, and up to 815 civilian police, as well as the appropriate civilian personnel. Sudan's sheer size — comparable to that of Western Europe — and total lack of infrastructure in the south will require the United Nations to work in the most demanding of circumstances. UNAMIS established an office in Al Fashir, Northern Darfur State, to liaise with the African Union Ceasefire Commission and at the UN's request, was in the process of establishing two other offices in Nyala and Al Geneina, the capitals of South and West Darfur States.

At the end of 2004, as world attention was focused on events in Darfur and the AU-supported negotiations for a ceasefire between the Government and Darfur rebel groups, UNAMIS continued to press the Government and the SPLM/A to sign a comprehensive agreement to end the violence in the south. This would then pave the way for full deployment of the UN mission in support of a comprehensive peace process for the whole country. Planning in DPKO was well underway for an operation which could last six and a half years, the duration of the transition period called for by the proposed peace agreement.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is extremely complex, combining agreements on ceasefire and security arrangements, wealth and power-sharing and future administration for three areas in the centre of the country. It is premised on a vision of promoting stability, rehabilitation and development in all regions of Sudan. At the end of a six-and-one-half year transition period, the people of Sudan will hold a referendum on whether to remain united or divide into entities based on the principle of self-determination.

DPKO has planned for a monitoring and observation operation in the Sudan of 10,000 to 12,000 personnel, which would include political and civil affairs functions; monitoring ceasefire and security agreements; monitoring, coordinating and possibly providing assistance with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; facilitating development and humanitarian activities; promoting peace and rule of law institutions; ensuring human rights and child protection; coordinating mine action activities; and providing electoral assistance and public information. The Security Council was expected to authorize a multidimensional operation under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, meaning the mission will not be responsible for security (which is to be provided by the parties), nor for enforcing the parties' commitments.

In welcoming the Sudan Peace Agreement, Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that “The real challenge now is for all the parties to show the same commitment, determination and courage in fully implementing the Agreement, which will entail equally daunting challenges over a very long period.”

He also expressed hope that the parties in Darfur would be inspired to pursue a wide-ranging political solution to their conflict without any further delay as he said “Peace in Sudan is indivisible.”
UNAMSIL: A success story in UN peacekeeping

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is drawing down in preparation for its closing in mid-2005. In a country that only four years ago was convulsed by a violent civil war, UNAMSIL has largely succeeded in fulfilling its mandate to oversee the peace process. Its tasks included monitoring the ceasefire; overseeing national elections; disarming ex-combatants; training police and human rights monitors; facilitating the voluntary return and resettling of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons; and assisting in the post-conflict recovery. When the Mission winds up its activities in 2005, a residual UN peacekeeping presence will remain to address some remaining core issues.

In the course of 2004, the Mission reduced its strength from an authorized maximum of 17,500 troops to about 5,000. This was accomplished under a well-crafted strategy the objective of which has been the gradual hand-over of responsibilities for security to the Government.

During 2004, the Mission turned over security primacy to Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces in a series of locations, while the Mission's public information section conducted a nation-wide campaign, using performing artists and the Mission radio station to sensitize people to the implications of the drawdown and to allay fears of a security vacuum. Recruitment and training of the Sierra Leone police accelerated so that the current force neared 8,000 at the end of the year.

Also in 2004, the UN-founded Special Court of Sierra Leone commenced its first war crimes trials, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its final report in October, including a child-friendly version prepared by UNAMSIL and UNICEF.

MINUGUA: Leaving Guatemala with mission accomplished

As it closed down at the end of the year, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) could claim to have made great strides forward since the 1996 peace accords between the Government and insurgent groups, which ended 36 years of internal conflict. The political situation has advanced to the point where Guatemala should now be able to deal peacefully with all of its unresolved issues. Violating human rights is no longer State policy; the military has been reduced and brought under closer control, and democratic and peaceful elections have been held. Nevertheless, Guatemala is still beset by corruption, crime and a deep-seated legacy of racism and social inequality.

Several years ago, recognizing that significant substantive areas of the peace accords remained to be implemented, MINUGUA began analyzing the possible effects of withdrawing from Guatemala. The exercise was intended to provide answers on what could be done to consolidate peace in the long-term. A special Transition Unit set up to advise the Mission concluded that the prospects for sustained peace would depend on Guatemalan institutions and citizens. It recommended that the Mission share its accumulated experience by training local experts to carry on after the Mission closed in December 2004.

The transition programme required important changes within the Mission. First, MINUGUA had to lower its political profile and encourage Guatemalans to take a stronger lead; second, the UN had to strengthen the capacity of national counterparts; and finally, the Mission gave more powers to field offices to define local priorities.

The Mission's staff and their national counterparts identified technical resources needed to develop appropriate training and reference materials. They distributed digital documents on human rights, judicial reforms, land issues and the history of the peace process. MINUGUA also assisted the National University to create a specialized Peace Library, based on the Mission's archives.

To strengthen the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, the Mission held training workshops on human rights for staff, discussed cases of human rights abuses and jointly investigated alleged violations with the Ombudsman's Office. The
Mission also extended the training to a wide range of civil society organizations. MINUGUA worked with more than 40 local organizations to develop and install a user-friendly database system for documenting human rights violations.

The Mission also created an on-the-job training programme to incorporate 60 young Guatemalan professionals as United Nations Volunteers. A concerted effort was made to identify indigenous and women candidates who would go back to their communities and institutions to share their experience after MINUGUA closed down.

The donor community has been generous. Several countries that contributed to the MINUGUA Trust Fund endorsed using the remaining funds for transition projects.

An important element in the transition strategy has been to assure Guatemalans of continued UN and international support on issues such as human rights, in particular through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights which is expected to expand its presence in Guatemala. The Mission helped draw up a Common Country Assessment and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework to ensure continued focus on the objectives of the peace accords.

MINUGUA made the transition the heart of its work for its final two years. With its early focus on defining a transition strategy, and the involvement of all parts of the Mission in implementing it, MINUGUA hoped to ensure that the efforts will bear fruit for Guatemala long after the Mission has closed.

As the UN Secretary-General pointed out, "MINUGUA stands as a successful example of UN peace-building, with valuable lessons for operations in other parts of the world."

**UNMISET: Winding up six years of peacekeeping in Timor-Leste**

Having contributed to the creation and consolidation of an independent, democratic Timor-Leste, alongside the people of Timor-Leste and in partnership with other multilateral and bilateral actors, UN peacekeepers are preparing to leave in mid-2005.

UNMISET has brought together the Government, the UN system, NGOs and other local and international partners to identify the activities that will be required for a smooth transition from the peacekeeping and peace building operations to a sustainable development assistance framework. A public information campaign has been launched to reassure the local population of the continued international assistance after UNMISET withdraws.

During 2004, Timor-Leste remained peaceful and stable despite demonstrations over veterans issues that were forcefully dispersed by police in July. The unrest revealed an urgent need to tackle the grievances of veterans, former resistance members and other disgruntled groups, for which considerable international assistance would be required.

With the assistance of UNMISET civilian advisers, public administration in Timor-Leste has become capable of addressing the formidable challenges of social and economic development. However, Timor-Leste still lacked a legal framework for a functioning system of law and order. The promulgation of the Police Organic Law and Disciplinary Code in May and June, along with the continued training by UNMISET civilian police advisers, has improved the operational effectiveness of the national police.

The UN Secretary-General in October dispatched a technical assessment mission to Timor-Leste to identify remaining challenges: the Timorese public administration—particularly finance, banking and the judiciary, for example—will continue to require substantial international assistance.

UNMISET civilian advisers have been formulating exit strategies with State institutions to ensure sustainability through continued assistance by other development partners beyond May 2005.

The UN-established Serious Crimes Unit filed its final indictments in December for crimes committed during the violence of 1999 which engulfed East Timor in the wake of the independence referendum. The Security Council had requested that all trials be completed by May 2005. Many of those indicted remain outside of Timor-Leste. The Secretary-General has decided to constitute a Commission of Experts to review the prosecutions and judicial processes undertaken in both Timor-Leste and Indonesia and to suggest future actions. The two countries have also decided to establish a Commission of Truth and Friendship with regard to the events of 1999.
IV. Overcoming crises: missions with special challenges in 2004

MONUC: Facing mounting challenges

The peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo faced major challenges in 2004. The Transitional Government was generally slow in implementing the objectives of the transition, as set forth in the December 2002 peace agreement, such as adopting vital legislation, extending State authority, establishing a unified and integrated army, pursuing the national disarmament programme and preparing for the elections.

The brief seizure of the important eastern town of Bukavu in May and June by dissident but prominent military commanders of ex-RCD-Goma threatened to derail the transition process. Instability spread to other parts of the country. The repercussions of this development were felt throughout the region with a large-scale displacement of civilians, many of whom fled to neighboring countries. On 13 August, 152 Banyamulenge refugees from the DRC were massacred at a transit camp in Burundi.

The security situation in Ituri, in northeastern DRC, had improved after the Transitional Government signed an agreement with the armed groups of the region. However, the situation deteriorated in the last few months of 2004. The pilot disarmament and community reintegration, which was launched by the Government in conjunction with MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on 1 September, has been slow. Armed groups also resumed clashes with rival groups. A MONUC peacekeeper was abducted by the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and remained in detention for three days in September, while the same group abducted staff members of the Government’s commission for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and a UNDP consultant in late December.

The DRC’s bilateral relations with Rwanda were tested in 2004, with various reports of cross-border activities on both sides of the border. In an effort to counter this negative trend, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to establish a Joint Verification Mechanism in September under the Secretary-General’s auspices. The United States also sponsored talks that led to the signing of an agreement which established the Tripartite Mechanism between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. Despite the existence of these new mechanisms, the tensions between the DRC and Rwanda rose sharply in November when Rwanda threatened to undertake a surgical strike in the DRC to take action against the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Rwanda withdrew its threat following a unified condemnation by the international community.

In response to the Secretary-General’s request to augment MONUC in order to help meet the challenges facing the DRC, the Security Council authorized an increase in the Mission’s strength of 5,900 personnel, considerably less than his previous request for an additional 13,100 troops, but raising the military and civilian police ceiling to 16,700. The boost in military strength would make MONUC the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, once fully deployed. With the augmented military strength, two brigades of three battalions each were to be deployed to each of the Kivu provinces, enhancing the Mission’s capacity to assist the Transitional Government in discouraging activities of would-be spoilers.

The Council further requested MONUC to provide advice and assistance to the Transitional Government on essential legislation, which would focus on a package of laws necessary to hold elections and on the post-transition constitution, the reform of the security sector and the holding of national elections in 2005 through the establishment of joint Transitional Government-MONUC-Donor Joint Commissions.

Holding successful elections throughout a country the size of Western Europe with no infrastructure will be an enormous challenge for both the Transitional Government and MONUC. The DRC’s stability depends on credible elections and a constitution that guarantees broad participation, inclusive representation and individual rights. The credibility of the electoral process and its aftermath will be of utmost importance.

To date, MONUC has made some notable achievements. It has peacefully repatriated almost 12,000 foreign combatants and their dependents voluntarily to Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. During the past 16 months, two-thirds of the country has been brought under the control of the central government, and over 1 million internally displaced persons have returned to their homes, particularly in areas where MONUC
peacekeepers are present. MONUC’s investigations into allegations of massacres and other major violations of human rights have created credible records on such wrongdoing for their future prosecution by the relevant judicial entity.

However, MONUC’s achievements have been marred by numerous allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by its personnel. MONUC and the Secretariat throughout the year continued to follow-up vigorously on several fronts. Two investigation teams were dispatched to the DRC to look into the allegations and make recommendations on disciplinary actions, the most recent one being a team headed by the Assistant Secretary-General for General Assembly Affairs. MONUC and other United Nations partners have been developing measures to provide immediate medical and psychosocial assistance to the victims of any abuses, while MONUC continued to implement preventive and advocacy measures in the Mission. This year’s allegations and investigations—not confined to problems in MONUC—are leading to major changes in the way peacekeepers will be inducted and trained, as discussions are underway within the UN and between the UN, its partners and troop-contributing countries on how to coordinate, harmonize rules and standards and enforce discipline so that sexual exploitation and abuse are eliminated from peacekeeping.

UNMEE: Marginal progress in the peace process

The year 2004 saw a deepening of the stalemate in the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process and not much progress on demarcation of the border between the two countries. Despite this setback, UNMEE continued to consult all interested parties in an effort to break the deadlock, and the peace process scored some gains, albeit marginal, on issues such as the resumption of direct flights between the two countries and meetings by military officers from both sides at the local level.

During the year, the positions of both parties remained polarized. At issue has been Ethiopia’s rejection of the April 2002 decision by the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC), which awarded the disputed border village of Badme to Eritrea. Ethiopia continued to justify its rejection of the EEBC decision, arguing that it was "not in the interest of peace between the two countries, and will not advance the major objective of the Algiers Agreement [which in June 2000 ended fighting between the two countries] nor the cause of peace in the subregion," and called for direct talks between the two neighbours. For its part, Eritrea remained firm that the EEBC decision was final and binding, could not be negotiated and should be fully implemented. Eritrea rejected dialogue with Ethiopia, which it said could take place only after the EEBC decision had been implemented.

As the year came to a close, the Ethiopian Government announced on 25 November a five-point proposal which accepts, in principle, the decision of the EEBC and seeks to resolve the conflict with Eritrea through peaceful means. The UN Secretary-General welcomed any step that would contribute to the full implementation of the Algiers Agreement and the subsequent EEBC decision, dialogue between the two countries, as well as to the restoration of normal relations between them. Eritrea, however, has not accepted the Ethiopian proposal.

UNMEE's relations with Eritrea fluctuated during the year. Perhaps the most notable development was in early March, when the Eritrean Government closed UNMEE's main supply route to its contingents in Sector West, citing unexplained "illegal" activities by UNMEE personnel.
Earlier in the year, Eritrean authorities made a series of public accusations in the media against UNMEE, alleging wrongdoing by Mission personnel. The accusations were accompanied by stepped up restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNMEE personnel in and around Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. Personnel of UN agencies were also subjected to similar restrictions, all of which were strongly protested by UNMEE.

In August, Ethiopia announced that it would allow UNMEE to use a direct flight route between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Eritrean authorities however did not agree.

Smaller but positive developments came in February, when the Military Coordination Commission agreed to hold meetings at the sector level, which strengthened cooperation between the parties by addressing security incidents at local levels.

In addition to carrying out its core mandate, UNMEE also provided humanitarian assistance to the local population by bringing food, water, school lunches and medical clinics to some areas. The Indian contingent provided computer training courses for young people and established a veterinary clinic to train staff and provide service to farmers. Quick impact projects addressed some local needs by reconstructing schools, building latrines and sinking water pumps.

For UNMEE, 2004 was a tough year during which it tried to implement its mandate in a situation of virtual deadlock. Peace, the Mission learned, comes in small steps, with perseverance.

**UNMIK: Holding Kosovo to high standards**

Over the year, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) faced new challenges in maintaining civil law and order, while it continued to transfer civilian administrative functions to the Kosovo government and to support and strengthen the building of democratic institutions in Kosovo. Creating the conditions that would allow the Security Council and the international community to determine the future status of Kosovo was a priority in 2004 and will continue to underlie the mission’s work in 2005.

Considerable progress remains to be achieved in implementing the ‘Standards for Kosovo’, which were endorsed by the UN Security Council in December 2003. UNMIK has made it clear that the Kosovo Provisional Institutions must remain committed to establishing a multi-ethnic Kosovo through the rule of law, freedom of movement, return of displaced persons, and functioning democratic institutions, including decentralisation.

Progress towards achieving these goals was set back dramatically in March by widespread violence between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. Roma and Ashkali communities were also affected. In a series of clashes seemingly spearheaded by Kosovo Albanians, 19 persons lost their lives and hundreds more were injured. UNMIK also suffered casualties.

More than 2000 of the 4,100 people displaced by the March riots could not return to their homes in 2004. Although many houses have been rebuilt by funds from the Kosovo budget, some displaced families remained too afraid to move back in. More than 30 Orthodox Christian churches and religious buildings were damaged in the riots, and reconstruction was delayed over disagreements with the Orthodox Church. Dozens of investigations and prosecutions of the perpetrators and organisers of the violence were launched to ensure confidence in the rule of the law, and some 80 persons were convicted.

The situation in Kosovo remained tense as the year ended. In view of this, UNMIK police and KFOR have been maintaining a high level of visibility, particularly in minority areas. UNMIK has been steering the political process in Kosovo towards gradual stabilization, recognizing that stability in the region is a key factor in achieving any long-term solution.

UNMIK intensified its efforts to help develop Kosovo’s democratically elected provisional institutions in accordance with the “Standards for Kosovo” plan. Progress achieved in key areas such as security and freedom of movement for all, functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, return of dis-
placed persons, and respect for the rights of minorities is considered a pre-requisite for the start of talks on future status. The Security Council will review the implementation of the Standards in mid-2005.

The successful holding of the Kosovo Assembly elections in October confirmed the province’s path toward democratic principles, although the lack of Kosovo Serb participation was regrettable. A new alliance among Kosovo Albanians between Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) and the AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo) surprised many observers, and the new parliament named AAKs leader Ramush Haradinaj, a former Kosovo Liberation Army field commander, as the new Prime Minister, with Mr. Rugova continuing as President.

UNMIK will continue to work closely with the new government and other local institutions to implement the decentralization plan, which was agreed to in July between UNMIK and representatives of the provisional institutions. The plan seeks to address the concerns of minority communities which want more control over the running of their affairs and greater accountability by local governments. It also calls for the creation of “pilot municipalities” to implement different models and concepts of local government reform. The results will then be evaluated to determine how best to extend reforms throughout Kosovo.

Another overriding priority is to strengthen Kosovo’s economy, since progress on inter-ethnic relations has been thwarted by continuing social tension. In partnership with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Kosovo government, UNMIK is developing programmes to create more jobs for the local population. The plans include encouraging business investments and privatizing land and formerly state-owned enterprises.

UNMIK is expected to play a crucial role in preparing the groundwork for talks on the future status of Kosovo. The Mission will need to address perceptions among Kosovo’s neighbours on how the province’s future status will affect their interests and stability. Other important partners in efforts to resolve the future of Kosovo include the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO.

“The next 12 months will be crucial in determining the future of Kosovo,” SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen told the newly elected Assembly.

UNMIK’s success will depend in large part on the performance of Kosovo’s elected institutions, which in turn rely on participation and consent by the people of Kosovo. The mission must continue its efforts to mobilize the public to support its work for a stable and peaceful Kosovo.

UNAMA: Milestone in Afghanistan’s transition to peace

After the successful conclusion of the Constitutional Loya Jirga in January and the signing of the new Afghan constitution, the holding of presidential elections in October was the major political development in Afghanistan during 2004. As laid down in the Bonn Agreement of 2001, the country has now a fully representative government that will be working to move forward and consolidate the transition to peace, assisted by the international community.

With the help of UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), the Joint Electoral Monitoring Body conducted, under difficult conditions, what was generally judged to be a peaceful and credible electoral process. Some 105 million Afghans – 41 per cent of them women – registered to vote. Voter turnout was remarkable. About 70 per cent of the registered voters made it to the polls. Hamid Karzai won the elections with 55 per cent of the more than 8 million ballots cast and was sworn in as Afghanistan’s first-ever democratically elected president in December. As the year came to a close, UNAMA was gearing for its next big challenge – assisting parliamentary and local elections expected to be held in the spring of 2005.

UNAMA has overall responsibility for UN activities in the country. In 2004, as has been the case since the signing of the Bonn Agreement, the priority of the UN system was to support Afghan institutions, with more than 500 UN personnel (international and locally recruited staff) working in Government ministries. UNAMA and several UN agencies and programmes have also been cooperating with the authorities on responses to the six-year drought and other related humanitarian issues affecting 4 million Afghans. Though many children still do not go to school, 4.2 million enrolled in 2004 – the largest number in the history of the country. More than 740,000 refugees returned to Afghanistan in 2004, bringing the total number of returnees since 2002 to 3 million. As a direct result of the UN Mine Action programme, the number of mine victims went down from more than 150 a month in 2002 to fewer than 100 in 2004.

A voter casts her ballot in the Afghan presidential election, Kabul, 9 October 2004.

UNAMA Photo by Marie-Frechon
Effective support for reconstruction and development require a sustained and predictable influx of resources. At the Berlin conference in March, the Afghan Government presented a post-conflict transition plan, which laid out a long-term recovery programme. Donors responded generously and pledged some $8.2 billion towards rehabilitation and reconstruction activities for a three-year period (2004 to 2007), with the pledges fully covering the funding needs of the first fiscal year.

However, Afghanistan's tenuous security situation continued to threaten the gains of the recent transition, with incidents caused by terrorist and criminal activities, as well as factional clashes. The increase in poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking continued to be of particular concern in 2004 as they further eroded the security environment. This situation had a negative impact on assistance and development programmes in the country, as deployment of the United Nations personnel, NGOs and other humanitarian agencies was restricted due to security considerations.

Afghanistan's disarmament programme, launched with UN support in late 2003, has two major components: demobilizing and promoting the reintegration of an estimated 50,000-60,000 soldiers and officers from existing military units registered with the Ministry of Defense, and collecting heavy weapons. About 30,000 members of the Afghan Military Forces had been disarmed by the end of 2004 and more than 7,500 useable or repairable weapons collected, which included tanks, rockets, anti-aircraft guns, and armoured personnel carriers.

Improving security throughout Afghanistan and establishing the rule of law are key elements for a successful transition to peace. Although there has been some progress in the establishment of the new Afghan National Army and National Police as well as in the reform of the justice sector, support from the international community, in particular through the presence of international military forces, will continue to be required.

As part of its assistance mandate, UNAMA’s priorities in 2005 will focus on preparations for legislative elections, the conclusion of DDR, and support to governance and institutional development. UNAMA will devote special attention to the new National Assembly, the continuation of the reform of the justice sector and the fight against narcotics. Work towards the establishment of the rule of law will continue, including support for mechanisms to protect human rights, and in particular for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.

UNOMIG: Supporting the peace process

In 2004, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) continued to play a dual role in the Georgian-Abkhaz post-conflict situation. It verifies compliance with the 1994 Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces – commonly referred to as the “Moscow Agreement” – while striving to keep the sides – the Government of Georgia and the de facto Abkhaz authorities – focused on moving the peace process forward.

UNOMIG has proved to be an effective tool at defusing tensions by managing difficult situations and rapidly responding to challenging moments in the turbulent relationship between the two sides. During 2004, the Mission faced an increasingly complex political situation on both sides of the ceasefire line and a faltering peace process. However, there was progress in some areas. UNOMIG facilitated several meetings between the parties and with the Group of Friends.

The Mission continued to focus on improving the overall security situation and to encourage voluntary and sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees through economic rehabilitation and quick-impact projects, including renovating schools, hospitals and libraries and restoring basic public services. UNOMIG has cooperated closely with UNDP in preparation of a rehabilitation programme, which will focus on agriculture, health, water, sanitation and capacity-building for the Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli districts.

However, these activities must be seen in the context of the Mission’s ultimate aim: to initiate meaningful dialogue between the parties, leading to a comprehensive political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict through substantive negotiations on the future status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia.
UNESCO: UN Special Coordinator works to support peace process

The United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East (UNSCO) continued to serve as the focal point in the Middle East for the UN's contribution to the region's peace process. UNSCO is based in Gaza with offices in Jerusalem and Ramallah.

In 2004, escalating violence in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory led to the deaths of a large number of civilians on both sides and caused destruction of Palestinian property. Construction of the Barrier inside the occupied Palestinian territory continued, despite an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in July which found its current construction contravened international law.

As development activities continued to give way to emergency and humanitarian activities, UNSCO coordinated the work of the United Nations system to ensure an adequate response to the needs of the Palestinian people and to mobilize financial, technical, economic and other assistance. Towards the end of the year, however, UNSCO emphasized the need to focus on development and reform issues.

In a potentially positive development, the Israeli Government, under its Disengagement Plan, called for the evacuation of Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip and parts of the northern West Bank. UNSCO welcomed the initiative as a window of opportunity to resume the peace process under the Road Map, the peace plan presented to the parties in 2003 by the Quartet, a diplomatic grouping comprising the UN, the European Union, Russia and the United States.

Four conditions to its endorsement of the Disengagement Plan were set out by the Quartet: first, the Israeli withdrawal must be full and complete; second, it must lead to an end of the occupation of the Gaza Strip and must be accompanied by similar steps in the West Bank; third, it must take place under the framework of the Road Map and the two-State vision; and finally, it must be fully coordinated with the Palestinian Authority and the Quartet.

Throughout the year, in support of the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 1397, UNSCO continued its mediation efforts, bilaterally with the parties to the peace process, and also as part of the wider international community. In particular, the UN explored avenues to rebuild trust between the parties and expedite a return to the negotiating table. The UN, both separately and within the Quartet, reaffirmed the vision of the creation of two States living side by side in peace and security, and called upon both parties to work towards this end by following their obligations under the Road Map.

UNAMI: A tense year in Iraq

Although its international staff had been out of Iraq since the August 2003 bombings of UN headquarters in Baghdad, the United Nations began to play a crucial role in assisting the political transition process in Iraq from 15 January when the Secretary-General appointed Lakhdar Brahimi as his Special Adviser on Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council had asked the UN to help promote dialogue and consensus-building among Iraqis to ensure a peaceful and successful political transition.

From February to June 2004, Mr. Brahimi played a key role in facilitating the formation of the Interim Iraqi Government led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Following the formal restoration of sovereignty to an Interim Iraqi Government on 28 June, the UN assisted in the preparation of the 15-18 August National Conference, called to ensure broad-based participation by a large number of Iraqi political parties and actors in the transition process.

While Mr. Brahimi shuttled back and forth to Baghdad to solicit and coordinate the views of a broad range of Iraqis on the political transition, teams of UN elections advisors...
made visits throughout the year. As security continued to deteriorate, elections to a constituent assembly were postponed to 30 January 2005.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) continued to operate from Amman, Jordan, and Kuwait City, with a small team based in Baghdad’s “Green Zone” from the early part of the year. In June, the Security Council (resolution 1546) gave UNAMI a stronger mandate, but conditioned implementation upon the prevailing circumstances on the ground.

On 13 August, almost a year to the day since the attack that killed SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello and 22 others including his closest staff, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, arrived in Baghdad.

As the UN sought out and built up security arrangements for staff in Iraq, the self-imposed “ceiling” on numbers of staff deployed to Baghdad rose to some 250 in December, including a 134-strong UN guard unit. Also in December, the Secretary-General approved the opening of internationally-staffed offices in Basra and Erbil.

UNAMI is a political mission guided by the UN’s Department of Political Affairs and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Under resolution 1546, the UN was to provide strategic and technical support to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI); to advise the Iraqi government in the development of effective civil and social services; to contribute to the coordination and delivery of reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance and to promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation and judicial and legal reform.

Throughout the year, humanitarian, development and reconstruction work continued in Iraq, carried out by various implementing partners and Iraqi national staff and guided by UNAMI in Amman. The work in 2004 also focused on capacity-building activities for Iraqis who shuttled to Jordan and other countries for training and conferences. As UNAMI’s Baghdad office grew, so did its assistance to Iraqi ministries and institutions through a system of 11 sectoral clusters.

UNAMI and the SRSG worked to forge contacts with the Interim Government and a broad spectrum of Iraq’s political, religious and civic leadership, with the objective of promoting an inclusive, participatory and transparent Iraqi political process, and in particular, encouraging national reconciliation.

At the same time, a growing team of UN electoral experts provided technical assistance and advice to the IECI, the body appointed to run the January elections for a constituent assembly. One UN expert sat on the Commission as a non-voting member. The UN also trained members of the Commission and thousands of electoral workers, in and outside Iraq.

“Let Iraqis come together as one people. Let the nations of this region and the world come together to help them. And let us all work towards one goal: a stable Iraq, a peaceful Iraq, a democratic Iraq – a new Iraq.”

-Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s address to the International Conference on Iraq, Sharm el Sheik, Egypt, 23 November 2004

While the Iraqi elections were to be an Iraqi process, UNAMI was committed to actively assisting the Iraqi Election Commission in preparing for them.

The guiding principle that Iraqis must own their own political process meant that the UN’s footprint in Iraq in 2004 would be light. This of course was reinforced by the tenuous security climate. As of late 2004, the UN was still seeking countries willing to contribute security personnel to protect its operations in Iraq. By December, only Fiji had committed 134 guards to form an “inner ring” of security detail for UNAMI’s Baghdad premises.

The UN also continued to support efforts by the US-led multinational forces to encourage Member States to provide troops or financial contributions for the creation of a distinct force to provide overall security for the UN presence in Iraq.

By the year’s end, the UN had determined that the technical preparations for elections were on track. A voters list was assembled from the UN’s Oil-for-Food Programme distribution data base, as the Programme, which ended in late 2003, had covered virtually all Iraqis. Some 223 political entities and 34 coalitions had presented 19,000 candidates for the 30 January elections for the national assembly, the local governorates and the Kurdistan National Assembly.
Building peace through elections support

UN electoral assistance has become a regular and increasingly important feature in UN peace operations. In 2004, UN peace missions provided assistance in the organization of presidential elections in Afghanistan, local government elections in Sierra Leone and provisional assembly elections in Kosovo. In 2005, UN peace missions are expected to assist in national elections in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Liberia, as well as polling for the national assembly of Afghanistan. The UN has been playing a leading role in assisting the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq in organizing the national elections scheduled for 2005.

The Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) of the UN Department of Political Affairs coordinates and oversees UN electoral activities in the field. In 2004, the UN system was providing electoral assistance to 63 countries, and EAD received 21 new requests from Member States.

Elections overseen or supported by the UN in post-conflict situations are often the first democratic polling to have taken place in years, decades or even in the country's history. UN elections experts provide advice on organizing democratic elections that will guide countries for future polling. Usually, UN assistance includes a capacity-building function, designed to ensure that there is less need to rely on international assistance for future elections. Democracy is extended as a result of UN involvement in such elections. For example, women are serving in significant numbers in elected bodies in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Timor-Leste, thanks to UN support.

There are various types of electoral technical assistance that UN missions have offered, in addition to ensuring the security of voters, election monitors and ballot boxes. They include advice on electoral laws, regulations and procedures and methods of voter registration and training. UN missions also provide significant logistical support to the electoral authorities.

Assistance with local government elections in May was one of the last major tasks for the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as it faced a significant drawdown in its civilian and military personnel in late 2004. The Mission provided logistical support for the elections, which included land and air transport to most chiefdoms, communications support, assistance to the country's National Electoral Commission in establishing its main operations centre, and technical advice at the national and district levels.

UNAMSIL civilian police organized specific election-related training to the Sierra Leone police. The Mission's public information unit significantly broadened the Commission's outreach with election-related programming on Radio UNAMSIL, which also recruited and trained 20 local journalists to cover the elections.

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) played a significant role in making sure that the 2004 landmark elections were peaceful and credible, notwithstanding the difficult conditions in the country. UNAMAS's electoral team supported the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) as it carried out an extensive voter registration exercise in which more than 10 million voters were registered. The JEMB, with support from UN election experts, then conducted a successful presidential election in October 2004.

The Mission also played a central role in resolving complaints raised by opposition candidates, some of whom had questioned the legitimacy of the election results. The United Nations Development Programme, as part of its mandate, also played an important complementary role in providing technical electoral assistance.

The UN's advisory role in the preparations for the election planned for January 2005 in Iraq was one of the top priorities for the organization in 2004. As mandated in UN Security Council Resolution 1546, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) was engaged in a wide range of work to provide the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) with the expertise, skills and manpower necessary to conduct a successful national election. Unlike its role in Afghanistan, the UN was to have no responsibility for supervising, monitoring, or making key decisions in the Iraq elections.
In the course of 2004, the UN helped Iraqis establish the Commission, draft the legislative framework for elections, create voter lists, train some 6000 temporary electoral workers, open more than 450 registration centres, and begin training up to 130000 poll workers. The diverse candidate rolls, conduct voter education campaigns, were a result of the proportional representation system recommended by the United Nations.

While they do not mark the end of a peace process, free, fair and transparent elections are key to determining democratic governance. The UN’s track record in electoral assistance has been remarkable, as evidenced by the growing number of requests from its Member States.

**Disarmament and demobilization in Liberia**

Disarming and demobilizing thousands of former combatants was one of the major tasks the Security Council gave to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Some three months after the mission was officially established on 1 October 2003, the disarmament and demobilization exercise commenced, but immediately ran into difficulties when a massive turnout of combatants overwhelmed the Mission’s capacity to process them. This was further exacerbated by miscommunication from former combatant leaders regarding benefits that the ex-fighters would receive.

The exercise was suspended until certain conditions could be met, including the deployment of sufficient numbers of UNMIL troops throughout the country to provide adequate security; an extensive public information campaign to educate the combatants on what the programme entailed; demobilization centres ready to process combatants; and the submission by the three armed factions of lists of their fighters, locations and weapons.

The sensitization campaign helped to build public understanding of the role of the entire United Nations system in Liberia in support of DDRR. It also encouraged families and communities that would receive demobilized ex-combatants to focus on reconciliation and forgiveness.

The disarmament exercise resumed in April 2004, with the Mission declaring in December that more than 100000 combatants had been disarmed. The results included a significant contribution to relative peace throughout Liberia, the resumption of economic activities and progress in the restoration of State authority in the country, including the outlying regions. Importantly, the period of calm helped to stimulate a new level of dialogue, and many more Liberians became engaged in determining the future of their country as they prepare for national elections to be held by October 2005.

Having completed the disarmament and demobilization phase, the international community faces in 2005 the enormous challenge of reintegration and rehabilitation of these ex-combatants. Many ex-fighters expected to be enrolled into formal education or skills training centres immediately after demobilization. However, unlike the DD program, which was funded from UNMIL’s regular budget, rehabilitation and reintegration activities rely entirely on voluntary contributions. Despite several appeals made to donors, funding has been slow in coming.
The DDRR exercise in Liberia showed again that for it to be effective, adequate resources must be provided to former fighters for developing marketable skills. In the course of 2004, only a fraction of the demobilized ex-combatants were enrolled in vocational institutions. Consequently, there was increasing restiveness among the ex-fighters which at times degenerated into sporadic riots. Despite these problems, however, the rehabilitation programme was proceeding, albeit slowly.

In addition to DDRR, UNMIL also made progress in restructuring the Liberian police force; supporting the restoration of State authority and revival of government institutions; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons; preparing for the 2005 elections and helping State authorities put down civil unrest in the capital, Monrovia, in October. The Mission also helped the UN Country Team provide food assistance to more than 600,000 people on a daily basis, and immunize more than 800,000 children against fatal diseases.

**Restoring the rule of law for peace and security**

Well-functioning law enforcement bodies, conflict resolution mechanisms and prison systems are often essential ingredients of a stable society. Hence strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict countries is key to sustainable peace and security. The United Nations has started to develop new tools to strengthen its support for the rule of law and transitional justice in States that are either still facing or just emerging from conflict.

In 2004, the rule of law featured prominently in the peacekeeping mandates for Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi. The Security Council approved the deployment of hundreds of experienced international civilian police officers and specialized judicial and corrections personnel to support rule of law activities in these new missions.

In Haiti, the UN mission (MINUSTAH) has been helping the Transitional Government to take measures aimed at ending impunity. The Mission is to assist the Government in establishing the rule of law and an independent judiciary. More than 1,600 MINUSTAH civilian police officers have been helping to restructure the Haitian National Police. They vet and certify the local police personnel and advise on its reorganization and training.

In addition to training and monitoring the local police, the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) has been assisting reforms of the judiciary and correction system as stipulated under the Arusha Agreement of August 2000. In Côte d’Ivoire, the peacekeeping mission, UNOCI, in cooperation with the Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS), is to help the Government reestablish the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout the country.

The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) continued to retain ultimate responsibility for law and order during its fifth year in Kosovo. However, the process of handing over tasks to Kosovo control was under way. Many of the municipal police stations are now run by the 6,000-strong Kosovo Police Service, although some 3,600 UN police remain to support them. International judges and prosecutors continued to adjudicate certain sensitive inter-ethnic and organized crime cases for the Kosovar judiciary; and in December, UNMIK appointed a new special prosecutor for financial crimes. His task, however, is not only to try such cases but also to develop investigative and prosecutorial capacity in Kosovo. In a further devolution of UNMIK’s executive role administering the justice and corrections system, municipalities across Kosovo set up their own Local Crime Prevention Councils in September and October.
The UN mission in Timor-Leste also continued to give direct support to the Special Serious Crimes process, with international prosecutors, judges and investigators.

In Liberia, the UN peacekeeping force UNMIL has been assisting the transitional government in monitoring, restructuring and training the police force to ensure that it meets democratic norms. In this regard, the Mission has supervised the training of 1000 cadets at the National Police Academy. UNMIL continued to work with the Ministry of Justice to develop proposals for the revision, harmonization and codification of laws and also to improve the State’s correctional system.

Instilling a culture of the rule of law in a post-conflict country takes time and requires patience. Experience has shown that hard-won agreements on human rights and the reform of justice are often eroded once domestic and international attention diminishes. It is therefore necessary that everyone stays engaged if gains in establishing justice are to be sustained.

Gender issues getting due attention in peacekeeping

The process of integrating gender issues into all aspects of United Nations peacekeeping operations is picking up momentum, with some notable areas of progress recorded in 2004. The number of gender advisers serving in UN peace missions has doubled, and there is now growing recognition within missions that the political and economic empowerment of women and the protection of their human rights are key to any peace process. The release in October of a resource manual on gender and peacekeeping is expected to advance these efforts.

The UN has established gender units in the majority of its peacekeeping missions. As of the end of 2004, full-time gender advisers have been appointed to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York, as well as to 10 field operations.

Gender advisers promote, facilitate and monitor the inclusion of gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations. They provide training in gender awareness to all UN civilian staff as well as military and police personnel as part of the missions’ induction course. They collaborate with all mission components to ensure that gender issues and concerns are addressed in the activities of their units.

In Liberia, for example, more than 20,000 women associated with fighting forces were demobilized as a result of gender mainstreaming within the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

Remarkable success in gender advancement was made in Afghanistan over the year, despite social and cultural norms that continue to limit women’s public role. The Afghan constitution, adopted in January 2004, states that men and women have equal rights. In the October elections, 41 per cent of the 105 million Afghans who registered to vote were women. By the end of the year, one in every five permanent government employees was a woman.

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keeping operation, to prevent cases of sexual misconduct by UN staff and troops against the host population.

The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations depends on the quality of the services that a mission provides, as well as on the ability of its staff to uphold the highest standards of conduct. Investments in the design and implementation of tools that promote gender equality support both these objectives.

HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness integrated in peacekeeping

In 2004, the Security Council resolutions establishing the new missions in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti made specific reference to the importance of sensitizing peacekeepers about HIV/AIDS. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) have been collaborating closely to build comprehensive mission programmes to reduce the risk of peacekeepers either contracting or spreading HIV.

As of 2004, nine peacekeeping missions have HIV/AIDS advisers, supported by UN Volunteers and national professionals (in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Haiti, Kosovo, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone and Sudan, with Burundi’s under recruitment). Smaller missions have HIV/AIDS focal points, thereby creating a dynamic network across all peacekeeping operations. In March, HIV/AIDS advisers and focal points held their first workshop to discuss HIV issues and share experiences in dealing with mission specific challenges and more general cultural, political and behavioral sensitivities. In June, a joint UNAIDS-DPKO team traveled to Haiti to set up the mission programme and design and build momentum for initiatives with the Haitian National Police. It was the first time that an HIV/AIDS adviser was deployed in advance of major UN troop deployment, setting a precedent that was repeated in Sudan in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation there.

Voluntary counseling and testing is a vital element in HIV/AIDS prevention and support, and there are ongoing efforts to establish such capabilities in peacekeeping missions. The training of counselors includes local participants in order to build national expertise. For example, the training in Kosovo included representatives from the Kosovo Police Service and the Institute of Public Health.

HIV/AIDS advisers have also been developing outreach projects to local communities. In Liberia, the Mission held a training programme for religious leaders to encourage them to use their sermons to raise awareness. In addition, peacekeeping missions use their own radio broadcasts to disseminate information on HIV prevention and to try to reduce stigma and denial. To maximize the effectiveness of their efforts, the HIV/AIDS advisers collaborate closely with UN Country Teams and national AIDS programmes.

The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) contributed $300,000 to the HIV/AIDS Trust Fund for peacekeeping. The funds will be used to set up video teleconference facilities, support outreach projects involving peacekeepers and local groups, to carry out mission assessments and to provide technical assistance to the African Union's HIV/AIDS activities in regional peace support operations. DFID will also help finance the implementation of a knowledge, attitude and practice survey that has been developed in collaboration with the United States Centers for Disease Control, in order to assess the impact of pre-deployment and in-mission HIV/AIDS initiatives.
Peacekeeping is again at a crossroads. In August 2005, it will be five years since the Brahimi process was launched. That milestone leads us to reflect on some fairly fundamental questions. To what degree has the world of peacekeeping changed since then? What will the next five years hold for UN peacekeeping and what might that imply for the types of capacities the UN system should begin to build now in order to be prepared?

These are the big questions that we in the Secretariat need to begin discussing with Member States, and they with one another…. The report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change will certainly contribute significantly to that discussion. I would like to inject a few personal reflections on certain trends and realities that appear to be dominating the peacekeeping terrain.

First, the peacekeeping demands throughout the world today exceed what the UN or any other regional or sub-regional organization, by itself, can meet. From the UN’s perspective it is very welcome that a growing number of international organizations and actors are engaging in post-conflict work. Regional and sub-regional organizations should equally welcome continued investment in the UN’s capacity for peacekeeping. After all, the fact that DPKO has reached a total of 17 operations now, with more potentially on the horizon, is ample confirmation of the fact that the UN peacekeeping remains indispensable. The universality of the UN continues to offer UN peacekeepers a unique legitimacy. And UN peacekeeping has built up – over decades of hard-won experience – a formidable degree of expertise and some unique capabilities.

Second, if the current demand for UN peacekeeping will remain roughly constant over the next five years, concurrent with the demand for non-UN run operations, then we are going to face a serious deficit in the field. There is a need to take a very serious look at the total pool of financial resources – military, civilians, and police – available for post-conflict work; and, to agree on reliable bases for their allocation to UN and other operations.

Third, that there will be demands for peacekeeping is one of the few things in this business that is predictable. As for the rest, we should be prepared to expect the unexpected. We need to equip ourselves for nimble, competent, quick and flexible response….Moreover, though we are learning lessons and codifying best practices, we must also recognize that all the operations we mount face unique political, economic, social and security challenges, with different mandates and a different array of partners and spoilers …

Fourth, the complexity of post-conflict transitions means that our operations must advance concurrently on many tracks – political, humanitarian, development, human rights and security – often in high risk environments. Many of their tasks are peace building, as much as peacekeeping, and so our integrated peace operations must be linked to longer term peace-building and development approaches.

These realities present us with some difficult dilemmas. Should UN peace operations work at the scale that is currently demanded? Are the resources available? What more is needed to strengthen them? Or should UN peace operations focus on a more limited number of niche tasks? And if that, how else do we meet the whole range of needs on the ground?

At least two areas are crying out to be addressed as a priority in the coming year. The first concerns the processes by which we get the right capabilities – troops, the specialized components, the police, the civilians – on the ground in time to implement the mandates of peace operations. The second relates to how these capabilities are best organized and deployed; how we integrate and rationalize the joint efforts of the UN system and the rest of the international community to assist the consolidation of a sustainable peace.

To stop these [sexual exploitation and abuse] abhorrent acts, the UN system needs to work hand-in-hand with Member States...Disciplinary directives for civilian, military and civilian police personnel have been compiled [by DPKO]. Training materials on the prevention of sexual abuse and exploitation have been designed. And, Focal Points on this issue have been created in several peacekeeping missions. This issue is being taken seriously in the Department, but it must and will be given even greater priority in the coming year. Our work cannot be considered complete on this front for as long as sexual exploitation or abuse is being committed by a single peacekeeper or humanitarian worker. Even one incident is unacceptable.
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS since 1948 ....................................................................................................................... 59
Current operations .......................................................................................................................................................... 16

PERSONNEL
Military personnel and civilian police serving in peacekeeping operations ......................................................... 64,701
Countries contributing military personnel and civilian police on ................................................................. 102
International civilian personnel .............................................................................................................................. 4,085
Local civilian personnel ........................................................................................................................................ 7,409
Total number of fatalities in peacekeeping operations since 1948 ................................................................. 1,933

FINANCIAL ASPECTS
Approved budgets for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 ........................................................... About $3.87 billion
Estimated total cost of operations from 1948 to 30 June 2004 ................................................................. About $31.54 billion
Outstanding contributions to peacekeeping ...................................................................................................... About $2.57 billion

CURRENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

**UNTSO**
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization  
Since May 1948  
Chief of Staff: Brigadier General Clive Lilley (New Zealand)  
Strength: military 153; international civilian 94; local civilian 122  
Fatalities: 39  
Appropriations for 2004: $2769 million (gross)

**UNMOGIP**
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan  
Since January 1949  
Chief Military Observer: Major-General Guido Palmieri (Italy)  
Strength: military 43; international civilian 23; local civilian 45  
Fatalities: 9  
Appropriation for 2004: $7.25 million (gross)

**UNFYPS**
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus  
Since March 1964  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission: Zbigniew Wlosowicz (Poland)  
Strength: military 1,226; civilian police 43; international civilian 44; local civilian 109  
Fatalities: 173  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $51.99 million (gross) including voluntary contributions of one third from Cyprus and $65 million from Greece

**UNDOF**
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force  
Since June 1974  
Force Commander: Major-General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal)  
Strength: military 1,018; international civilian 36; local civilian 95  
Fatalities: 40  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $43.03 million (gross)

**UNFICYP**
United Nations Interim Force in Cyprus  
Since March 1978  
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon: Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)  
Strength: military 1,995; international civilian 107; local civilian 299  
Fatalities: 250  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $97.80 million (gross)

**MINURSO**
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara  
Since April 1991  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission: Alvaro de Soto (Peru)  
Strength: military 223; civilian police 4; international civilian 122; local civilian 113  
Fatalities: 10  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $44.04 million (gross)

**UNOMIG**
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia  
Since August 1993  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission: Ms. Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland)  
Strength: military 19; civilian police 11; international civilian 103; local civilian 184  
Fatalities: 7  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $33.59 million (gross)

**UNMEE**
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea  
Since October 1999  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission: Daudi Ngelautwa Mkawakwao (Tanzania)  
Strength: military 4,199; civilian police 75; international civilian 274; local civilian 511  
Fatalities: 159  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $301.87 million (gross)

**MONUC**
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
Since November 1999  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission: William Lacy Swing (United States)  
Strength: military 12,471; civilian police 175; international civilian 727; local civilian 1,125  
Fatalities: 44  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $746.10 million (gross)

**UNMIH**
United Nations Mission in Haiti  
Since September 2003  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission: Jacques Paul Klein (United States)  
Strength: military 14,690; civilian police 1,098; international civilian 485; local civilian 628  
Fatalities: 28  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $846.82 million (gross)

**UNOCI**
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire  
Since April 2004  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission: Albert Tevoedjre (Benin)  
Current strength: military 6,000; civilian police 215; international civilian 252; local civilian 155  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $378.48 million (gross)

**MINUSTAH**
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti  
Since July 2002  
Authorized Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission: Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile)  
Strength: 6,700 troops, 1,622 civilian police  
Current strength: military 6,008; civilian police 1,398; international civilian 303; local civilian 300  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $379.05 million (gross)

**ONUB**
United Nations Operation in Burundi  
Since July 2002  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission: Carolyn McAskie (Canada)  
Current strength: military 537; civilian police 82; international civilian 291; local civilian 215  
Fatalities: 5  
Approved budget 07/04–06/05: $329.71 million (gross)

UNTSO and UNMOGIP are funded from the United Nations regular biennial budget. Costs to the United Nations of the 14 other current operations are financed from their own separate accounts on the basis of legally binding assessments on all Member States. For these missions, budget figures are for one year unless otherwise specified and include the prorated share of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi (Italy). The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), two of a number of United Nations political and peace-building missions, are also directed and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The UNAMA website is located at http://www.unama-afg.org/. Information on UNAMIS can be found at http://www.un.org/peace/ppbm.pdf. For more information on United Nations political missions, see DPI/2166/Rec18, also available on the web at http://www.un.org/peace/.
NUMBER OF MISSIONS .................................................................................................................................................. 11

PERSONNEL
International civilian personnel ................................................................................................................................. 572
Military and civilian police advisors and liaison officers .......................................................................................... 51
Local civilian personnel .......................................................................................................................................... 1,128

For information on United Nations peacekeeping operations, see DPI/1634 Rev43 or visit the United Nations website at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp
CURRENT POLITICAL AND PEACE-BUILDING MISSIONS

UNAMA* Since 28 March 2002
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Jean Arnault (France)
Strength: international civilian 181; local civilian 687; military observer 11; civilian police 8

UNOMB Since 1 January 2004
United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville
Head of Mission: Tor Stenbock (Norway)
Strength: international civilian 2

BONUC Since 15 February 2000
United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic
Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BONUC: Lamine Cissé (Senegal)
Strength: international civilian 23; military advisers 5; civilian police 6; local civilian 30

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Ibrahima Fall (Senegal)
Strength: international civilian 8; local civilian 8

UNOGBIS Since 3 March 1999
United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOGBIS: João Bernardo Honwana (Mozambique)
Strength: international civilian 11; military adviser 2; civilian police adviser 1; local civilian 15

UNSCO Since 1 October 1999
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority: To Be Appointed
Strength: international civilian 22; local civilian 21

UNPOS Since 15 April 1995
United Nations Political Office for Somalia
Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNPOS: Winston A. Tubman (Liberia)
Strength: international civilian 5; local civilian 3

UNTOP Since 1 June 2000
United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building
Representative of the Secretary-General for Tajikistan: Vladimir Sotirov (Bulgaria)
Strength: international civilian 10; civilian police adviser 1; local civilian 17

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa
Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)
Strength: international civilian 7; local civilian 7

UNAMIS Since 14 August 2003
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq: Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan)
Authorized strength: 551 (184 international, 367 local)
Current strength (staff based in Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait): international civilian 139; local civilian 189; military advisor 5

Mission completed in 2004:

MINUCI 13 May 2003- 3 April 2004
United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
MINUCI was succeeded by United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) on 4 April 2004

UNOB 25 October 1993 - 31 May 2004
United Nations Office in Burundi
UNOB was succeeded by United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB) on 1 June 2004

MINUGUA 19 September 1994 - 31 December 2004
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala

* UNAMA, and UNAMIS, although political missions, are directed and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. All other political and peace-building missions are directed by the Department of Political Affairs. For information on political and peace-building missions, visit the United Nations website at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm
### PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS
(Civilian police, military observers and troops)
As of 31 December 2004

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<th>Troops</th>
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**Totals**

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**Top 10 Troop Contributors**

As of 31 December 2004

- Pakistan - 8,140
- Bangladesh - 8,024
- India - 3,912
- Nepal - 3,451
- Ethiopia - 3,432
- Ghana - 3,322
- Jordan - 2,950
- South Africa - 2,331
- Uruguay - 2,492
- Nigeria - 2,890

**Surge in Troops: 1995-2004**

As of 31 December of each year

**Troop Strength of UN Peace Operations in Africa**

As of 31 December 2004

- MINURSO: 227
- UNMEE: 3,918
- UNAMSIL: 4,274
- ONUB: 5,454
- UNOCI: 6,215
- MONUC: 12,646
- UNMIL: 15,788

*As of 30 November 2004"