The Planning Toolkit was developed by the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Content by Anna Shotton, Strategic Planning Officer, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions.

The Planning Toolkit can also be found online on the Peace Operations Intranet.
Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
Department of Peacekeeping Operations

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# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Foreword</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Rationale</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Scope</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Development process</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>How to use this Planning Toolkit</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Guidelines</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Terms and definitions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F. References</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Monitoring and compliance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Contact</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I. History</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Section A: Understanding roles and responsibilities on</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>planning and programme management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 1. Guides to UN assessment and planning documents and processes</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 1.1. Hierarchy of plans in UN Field Missions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 1.2. Examples of key plans in UN Field Missions</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 1.3. Key UN assessment processes in UN Field Missions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 2. Guides to UN planning terms</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 2.1. Glossary of planning and programme management terms in UN Field Missions</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 2.2. Comparison of results frameworks used in countries with UN integrated field presences</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Section B: Defining the scope of a plan</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 3. Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) checklists on prioritizing and sequencing early peacebuilding interventions</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Section C: Developing a plan</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 4. Checklist of minimum content for component-level plans</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 5. Templates and samples of good practice of component-level plans</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 5.1. Samples of annual workplans</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 5.2. Other useful templates and examples</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tool 5.2.1. DDR Section: Roles and Responsibilities</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tool 6. Checklist of dos and don’ts and examples to develop component-level plans 75
Tool 6.1. Summary of dos and don’ts 75
Tool 6.2. Checklist of dos and don’ts on objectives 85
Tool 6.3. Checklist of dos and don’ts on expected accomplishments 88
Tool 6.4. Checklist of dos and don’ts on indicators to measure expected accomplishments 91
Tool 6.5. Checklist of dos and don’ts on outputs 102
Tool 6.6. Lists of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments 108
  Tool 6.6.0. Introduction to lists of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments 108
  Tool 6.6.1. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to cross-cutting issues 111
  Tool 6.6.2. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to policing and law enforcement 117
  Tool 6.6.3. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to the judiciary 120
  Tool 6.6.4. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to corrections 124
  Tool 6.6.5. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to DDR 128
  Tool 6.6.6. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to mine action 131
Tool 6.7. List of examples of outputs 143
Tool 7. Planning joint programmes and joint initiatives between a UN Field Mission and other UN partners 147
Foreword

It is my sincere pleasure to launch this DPKO-DFS Planning Toolkit. Whilst developed primarily for rule of law and security institutions components in UN Field Missions, it can equally be used by any other mission component. The Toolkit provides guides, templates, checklists and lists of examples of good practice to help field practitioners develop a wide variety of plans — ranging from a UN-wide Integrated Strategic Framework to the Mission’s Results-based Budget and a component’s annual workplan. I hope that you will find it useful throughout your UN Field Mission’s lifecycle, from start-up to transition and draw-down.

This Planning Toolkit will help components prioritize their work in accordance with the “The Contribution of United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: a DPKO/DFS Strategy for Peacekeepers” (2011). The Planning Toolkit will assist UN Field Missions to prioritize those activities that advance the political objectives of a UN Field Mission and/or a peace process, and which may also contribute to strengthening immediate stability and security, and/or lay the foundations of institution building together with partners. By prioritizing more rigorously and planning to implement those activities for which peacekeepers have a comparative advantage within the UN system, peacekeeping operations should deliver assistance in a more efficient and cost-effective manner and be able exit sooner.

As Under-Secretary-General Ladsous recently remarked to the Fourth Committee, “we need to further improve our efforts to plan and manage missions in an integrated manner so that they, in turn, respond to the complex demands of countries and populations emerging from conflict.” The Planning Toolkit fosters integrated planning across mission components, and helps UN Field Missions plan in close partnership with other UN and non-UN actors in support of shared objectives.

In addition to delivering rapidly and efficiently we are seeking to gather empirical evidence of the impact or effectiveness on the ground. The Planning Toolkit contains examples of indicators and benchmarks to help UN Field Missions gather such evidence and ensure well-informed decisions on plans, staffing and other resource requests.

I would like to thank those at Headquarters and in the field as well as our UN partners who provided input into the development of this Toolkit. The Planning Toolkit should be seen as a living document, which will be updated in the coming years as planning guidance and UN peacekeeping evolve.

Dmitry Titov
Assistant Secretary-General
Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHQ have sent us a Planning Toolkit to help us develop component-level plans like annual workplans and inputs into strategic plans such as the RBB and ISF.

I hope it’s not going to ask us to produce another plan!

No, not at all! The Planning Toolkit doesn’t force you to produce more plans. It just gives lots of practical tips on how to produce the current plans we’re already drafting. The Planning Toolkit will actually make planning easier for you and save you time in the long-run.

Sigh... We’re so busy reading policies and strategy papers coming from above. We never actually have time to implement anything!

You don’t need to read it cover to cover. Just use the tool you need.

Is it only for rule of law and security institutions personnel?

Will it help Budget Officers?

It was developed primarily for them, but it can equally be used by anyone in peacekeeping, and it can help with budget preparation.
Introduction

A. Rationale

Effective planning helps promote a “coherent, system-wide approach to the support of the provision of security, rule of law and sustainable security institutions” (A/61/858). However, audit and evaluation recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) have highlighted weaknesses in UN programme management, including planning, for UN peacekeeping in general and for specific rule of law and security institutions components. Training needs assessments conducted by the Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) (2008) and by the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) (2009) have also identified gaps in knowledge and skills in UN planning and programme management.

These DPKO-DFS guidelines on component-level planning (henceforth the “Planning Toolkit”) provide practical guidance on how to implement existing UN planning obligations in UN Field Missions led DPKO, with particular attention to the planning needs of rule of law and security-related components (namely, police, justice, corrections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and mine action components).

The Planning Toolkit will facilitate compliance with existing UN planning obligations, and improve the quality and impact of component plans in UN Field Missions. It is also intended for personnel in OROLSI in DPKO who support planning in UN Field Missions, including the Office’s standing capacities.

B. Scope

Although the examples used throughout the Planning Toolkit are specific to rule of law and security institutions issues, the guidance on component-level planning can also be used by all other Mission components in DPKO-led Missions, rule of law and security institutions components in Missions led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UN mine action programmes that are not part of a UN Field Mission and all Headquarters personnel from DPKO, DFS and DPA who support planning in UN Field Missions. The Planning Toolkit is also of use to UN and non-UN partners at Headquarters and in the field who engage in integrated planning with rule of law and security institutions components in UN Field Missions, including personnel in the Office of the Controller in charge of reviewing Results-based Budget Frameworks in peacekeeping budgets.

The Planning Toolkit focuses only on the planning aspects of programme management. The content of this Toolkit will need to be updated within two years to reflect guidance documents currently being developed, or under revision, in relevant areas.

The guidance in this Planning Toolkit is based on existing UN planning guidance, particularly the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), guidance from the Office of the Controller on results-based budgeting, and draft DPKO-DFS guidance on programme management and risk management listed in section F. Where no specific guidance exists, the Toolkit is based on existing good practices and lessons learned from the field as well as official guidance on joint programming for UN agencies, funds and programmes. The Toolkit guidance also supplements existing planning guidance available OROLSI (see section F).

The Toolkit is in line with existing policies that touch on planning issues such as the “The Contribution of United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: a DPKO/DFS Strategy for Peacekeepers” (2011), the work of the Capabilities Development Working Group emerging from New Horizons, the DFS Global Field Support Strategy

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1 The Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS), in its audit of the management structures of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (A/61/743), indicated that all staff should receive proper guidance and be informed of what they are expected to achieve, how they should perform assigned tasks, and what they are accountable for in carrying out their duties. In its audit on Peacekeeping Operations (A/63/302 (Part II)), OIOS highlighted the need for field operations to strengthen planning, management, accountability and risk management processes through standardizing operating procedures.

2 OIOS evaluation report no. IED/09-003 (DDR) and OIOS audit no. AP2009/600/04 (UNMAS).

3 For guidance on other aspects of programme management, see related guidance listed under section F.
and the Secretary-General’s response to the recommendations from the International Review of Civilian Capacities (2011). In addition, the lists of indicators in the Toolkit take account of global indicator development initiatives such as those of the “International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding” process as well as UN initiatives such as the UN Rule of Law Indicators.

C. Development process

The Planning Toolkit is the result of a comprehensive consultation, testing, feedback, and refinement process that began in April 2010 and continued through to February 2012. Together with personnel from DPKO, DPA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DODO) and 15 DPKO and DPA-led Missions participated in the initial needs assessment. Scores of UN and non-UN colleagues from around the world have provided their expertise to develop and refine these tools. A high degree of input was provide by the primary target audience of the Planning Toolkit, namely, rule of law and security institutions personnel working in the field.

Many of the tools were developed and tested alongside colleagues in UN Field Missions.

Additional views were obtained from Mission and UN Country Team planners. Feedback was also solicited through Headquarters UN inter-agency working groups such as the Integrated Mission Planning Process Working Group, the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group and the inter-agency mine action working group. The Toolkit’s content on joint programmes and joint initiatives was developed with input from UN agencies, funds and programmes in the field and at Headquarters as well as the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Technical expertise on indicators was provided by research institutes and academic organizations such as the Vera Institute for Justice, the University of Fraser Valley, Cranfield University, the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, and foundations such as the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

OROLSI acknowledges the important contributions made by all the stakeholders involved in the development of this Planning Toolkit, and would like to thank all those involved in making these guidelines.
# How to use this Planning Toolkit

## D. Guidelines

The Planning Toolkit is divided into three parts: sections A, B and C (see table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Use when?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Section A</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Section A provides a series of guides to help users understand their roles and responsibilities in planning.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1 | Guides to UN assessment and planning documents and processes | This section provides three tools to help users understand their planning obligations in a typical year.  
**Tool 1.1.** *Hierarchy of plans in UN Field Missions* provides an idealized representation of the hierarchy of plans within a UN Field Mission.  
**Tool 1.2.** *Examples of key plans in UN Field Missions* provides examples of the typical annual and multi-year plans that a rule of law and security institutions component will have to engage with in a UN Field Mission.  
**Tool 1.3.** *Key assessment processes in UN Field Missions* describes the three main assessment processes that rule of law and security institutions components will have to engage with, either before or after the passing of a Security Council mandate. It also outlines the role of rule of law and security institutions experts in each assessment process. | At all times. |
| 2 | Guides to UN planning terms | This section provides rule of law and security institutions components with a common language for discussing planning issues.  
**Tool 2.1.** *Glossary of planning and programme management terms in UN Field Missions* includes key planning terms and definitions used by rule of law and security institutions components as well as key planning terms of other Mission components of which they need to be aware.  
**Tool 2.2.** *Comparison of results frameworks used in countries with UN integrated field presences* provides a diagramme comparing the hierarchy and terminology of various results frameworks used in countries with UN integrated field presences, such as Results-based Budget (RBB) Frameworks, Integrated Strategic Frameworks (ISF), UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF) and UN Consolidated Humanitarian Appeals (CHAP). | Tool 2.1. – at all times.  
Tool 2.2. – when conducting integrating planning with other parts of the UN system. |
| **Section B** | | Section B provides guidance on assessing needs, which is a necessary step to define the scope of a plan. It is expected that this section on assessing needs will be expanded in future versions of the Planning Toolkit. | |
| 3 | TAM checklists on prioritizing and sequencing early peacebuilding interventions | Tool 3. is an assessment tool that can be used can be used for any type of Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) i.e., a TAM for mission start-up, mandate review, mid-cycle review, restructuring or reconfiguration, draw-down or crisis response, or in response to a specific request from the Security Council (e.g., to establish benchmarks). The tool helps planners to generate a shortlist of prioritized and sequenced interventions for the UN Field Mission to work on in the rule of law and security sectors during year one of a new Security Council mandate, for years two and beyond, or to prioritize and sequence programming options during an in-mission assessment. | During a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) |
### Section C

Sections C provides a wide range of specialized planning tools for particular circumstances. Each tool can be used independently and is accompanied by a unique explanation of how to use it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Use with which type of plans?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Checklist of minimum content for component-level plans</td>
<td>This is the main tool in the Planning Toolkit. The checklist should be followed by rule of law and security institutions components when no official template exists for the production of a particular plan. The checklist specifies categories of information that, at a minimum, must be included in plans produced by police, justice, corrections, security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and mine action field components. <strong>Tool 4 should be used with Tools 5 and 6.</strong></td>
<td>All component-level plans</td>
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</table>
| 5    | Templates and samples of good practice of component-level plans | This tool contains templates and related examples that can be used to develop component-level plans. Tool 5.1. **Samples of annual workplans** provides two examples of annual workplans accompanied by some introductory information. This Planning Toolkit does not require any specific format for an annual workplan. However, should a component wish to follow the template of an annual workplan used for this example, it can be found on the Peace Operations Intranet. Tool 5.2. **Other useful templates to develop component-level plans and related examples** provides an array of templates in use by rule of law and security institutions components in UN Field Missions with related examples. | Annual workplan (use Tool 5.1.)  
Annual workplan (use Tool 5.2.1.)  
Annual workplan (use Tool 5.2.)  
DDR component-level plans (use Tool 5.2.) |
| 6    | Checklists of dos and don’ts and examples to develop component-level plans | This tool contains four checklists of dos and don’ts containing practical guidance on how to define objectives, expected accomplishments and related indicators and outputs (Tools 6.2. through 6.5.). These checklists are accompanied by Tool 6.1. which summarizess key elements from the four checklists and Tool 6.6. which contains six lists of examples of indicators to measure progress towards expected accomplishments on rule of law and security institutions issues. Tool 6.7. contains a list of examples of outputs. | Any type of plan (ISF, Mission Concept, RBB, annual workplan, project etc.) |
| 7    | Tool for planning joint programmes and joint initiatives between a UN Field Mission and other UN partners | This tool is used when developing joint programmes or joint initiatives between a UN Field Mission and other UN partners on rule of law and security institutions issues. **Part I. Questions and answers** provides background information on joint programmes and joint initiatives between a UN Field Mission, other UN entity and national partner(s). **Part II. Checklists on joint programmes and joint initiatives** provides practical guidance on how to develop a joint programme or joint initiative with another UN entity and national partner(s). | Joint programmes and joint initiatives |
E. Terms and definitions
See tool 2.1. glossary of planning terms.

F. References
Normative or superior references
- (ST/SGB/2000/8): Regulations and rules governing programme planning, the programme aspects of the budget, the monitoring of implementation and the methods of evaluation
- Draft DPKO-DFS policy on programme management (2010)
- Draft DPKO-DFS policy on risk management (2010)

Related procedures or guidelines
- IMPP Guidelines: Role of Headquarters, Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences (May 2009), UN Secretary-General
- IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Field, Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences (January 2012), UN Secretary-General
- DPKO-DFS Guidelines: Mission Start-up Field Guide (1 August 2010)
- Draft DPKO-DFS guidelines on programme management (2010)
- Draft DPKO-DFS guidelines on the Mission Concept (21 June 2010)
- DPKO-DFS SOP on Monitoring and Evaluation for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (2010)

Related unofficial guidance
- The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation Guide and Project Tools, DPKO and OHCHR
- How-to Guide on Constructing DDR Indicators (2010), DPKO/OROLSI/DDRS
- ISG Discussion Paper on Joint Programming between UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes and Secretariat Entities, Integration Steering Group (8 July 2010)

G. Monitoring and compliance
Implementation of these guidelines will be monitored by OROLSI in DPKO.

H. Contact
The office responsible for issuing and updating this guideline is the OROLSI front office in DPKO.

I. History
This is the first version of these guidelines.

APPROVAL SIGNATURES:

DATE OF APPROVAL:
I’ve been working on planning for 3 months now. We all use the same words differently. It’s so confusing! There must be a better way to understand each other.

The glossary will help with that. It gives peacekeeping a common language for discussing planning issues. It also helps you discuss planning more easily with other UN partners.
**Tool 1. Guides to UN assessment and planning documents and processes**

**Tool 1.1. Hierarchy of plans in UN Field Missions**

This tool represents an idealized representation of the hierarchy of plans within a UN Field Mission. Not all UN Field Missions will have the full array of plans, particularly at mission start-up.
**Explanation of hierarchy of plans in UN Field Missions**

A UN country-wide, **Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)** brings together the combined mandates of the UN Field Mission (i.e., from the Security Council and General Assembly) and the UN Country Team as well as their resources around an overarching framework of agreed peace consolidation priorities. The ISF is a strategic plan for the UN Field Mission and UN agencies, funds and programmes operating in the host country. It provides a vision of the United Nations’ strategic objectives for peace consolidation, with agreed results, responsibilities and timelines, and a mechanism for monitoring and evaluation. It is usually a multi-year plan. It is required in a country where there is both a UN Country Team and either a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or a special political mission. The UN ISF is linked to national strategies and plans, as well as other relevant UN plans such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP). In some contexts, other UN plans such as an UNDAF are considered to meet the minimum requirements for an ISF and no new plan is developed.

On the basis of an ISF, the **Mission Concept** is developed for the UN Field Mission. The Mission Concept translates the political intent of the Security Council and other mandates into strategic planning guidance for Mission components. The Mission Concept contains a: (a) vision to capture and communicate the purpose of the mission; (b) strategy to promote coherence by sequencing and prioritization of tasks within the context of the conditions governing their achievement; and (c) timely and detailed direction to guide and enable the planning and operational processes of each Mission component. It is a multi-year plan that covers the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission. It is required in peacekeeping operations, but not in special political missions.

On the basis of the Mission Concept, it is good practice for the police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR and mine action components to develop a **multi-year strategy or concept of operation**, which analyses the current situation in a sector, and identifies the strategic objective(s) for the UN Field Mission in this sector and how best to implement them. These multi-year strategies do not contain detailed operational information on outputs and activities.

On the basis of a multi-year strategy or concept of operation, it is good practice for the police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR and mine action components to develop an **annual workplan**. This is a detailed document stating objective(s), expected accomplishments, indicators (in relation to expected accomplishments), outputs, timelines (i.e., the deadline for completion of outputs), and roles and responsibilities. It is used as a monitoring and accountability tool to ensure the effective implementation of the component’s workplan. The workplan is designed as a logical framework (logframe). See Tool 5.1 Samples of annual workplans.

The workplans of individual staff members in the police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR and mine action components (e.g., in the e-Pas) are based on the annual workplan.

In addition, police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR and mine action components may also have **multi-year programmes plans** (e.g., a plan for a multi-year joint programme or joint initiative with the national government and another UN entity on justice issues, or a multi-year training programme to support the national police). These feed into the development of the component’s annual workplan. The annual workplan of a UN Field Mission and multi-year programmes are funded through assessed contributions from the peacekeeping budget (the annual budget of the UN Field Mission is called a “Results-based Budget” (RBB)) and also through voluntary contributions (e.g., from bilateral donors).

As part of the annual workplan, the component may design and implement specific projects with their own **project plan(s)** that are one year or less in duration, such as quick-impact projects (QIPS), operational plans of the police on specific events (e.g., police operational plan to provide security at a national election), projects on specific issues or events (e.g., a joint initiative with another UN entity to refurbish a prison) or projects for sub-contracted work in the area of mine action (e.g., mine clearance work sub-contracted to UNOPS).
Tool 1.2. Examples of key plans in UN Field Missions

**MULTI-YEAR PLANS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN-wide and multi-agency plans</th>
<th>UN Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other UN and non-UN plans*</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission-wide plans</th>
<th>Mission Concept (lifecycle of the UN Field Mission)</th>
<th>Mission Results-based Budget (RBB) (July-June or Jan.-Dec.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Mission Plans**</td>
<td>Other Mission plans**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component -level plans</th>
<th>Multi-strategies or concepts of operation</th>
<th>Annual Workplan (July-June or Jan.-Dec.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-year programme plans</td>
<td>Project plans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- plans where rule of law and security institutions field components play a lead role for their sectors (workload implications are “high”).

- plans into which rule of law and security institutions field components provide inputs (workload implications are “medium” to “low”).
**Examples of other Mission-wide plans (annual or multi-year) into which rule of law and security institutions field components have to provide input into include:**

(i) The DPKO-DFS Action Plan for implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), which articulates the UN Field Mission's plan to implement Security Council 1325 (2000) and subsequent, related resolutions such as 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010). This is a two-year plan that runs from September to August. All rule of law and security institutions component provide inputs through their Gender Focal Points.

(ii) The “Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategy” and its related implementation plan, which articulates the UN Field Mission’s strategy and implementation plan on protection of civilians. This is generally an annual plan. All rule of law and security institutions component provide inputs into this strategy and implementation plan, particularly the police component.

(iii) The SRSG/Head of Mission (HoM) Compact, which states the principle objectives and associated performance measures for the SRSG/Head of Mission. This Compact includes a “Human Resources Management Scorecard” with targets for Mission components on, for instance, recruitment and gender balance. This plan runs from January to December; and

(iv) The DSRSG/Deputy Head of Mission (DHoM) Compact, which states the principal objectives and associated performance measures for the DSRSG/Deputy Head of Mission. This plan runs from January to December.
### Tool 1.3. Key UN assessment processes in UN Field Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-mandate or post-mandate</th>
<th>Post-mandate only</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment Tools</strong></td>
<td>UN Strategic Assessment (SA)</td>
<td>UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
<td>For (re-)formulation of UN system-wide strategic engagement in a political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation.</td>
<td>To provide options and recommendations for the (re-) formulation of a Security Council mandate and on the size scope, tasks and structure of a UN Field Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trigger</strong></td>
<td>Dramatic change in conflict/post-conflict/political crisis situations and/or the need to (re-)formulate the UN’s system-wide strategy</td>
<td>Mission start-up; mandate review; mid-cycle review; restructuring; draw-down; crisis response; or in response to a specific request from the Security Council (e.g., to establish benchmarks).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informs decision-making by</strong></td>
<td>Policy Committee of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition of assessment Team</strong></td>
<td>Integrated (Mission) Task Force (led by DPA or DPKO) with field participation (UNCT and UN Field Mission (if any))*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of Rule of Law and Security Institutions Experts in DPKO and in UN Field Missions</strong></td>
<td>Police, justice, corrections, SSR, DDR and Mine Action experts from DPKO HQ (and possibly from the UN Field Mission) play a lead role in providing strategic advice in their areas of expertise.</td>
<td>Police, justice, corrections, SSR, DDR and Mine Action experts from DPKO HQ (and/or from the UN Field Mission) play a lead role in developing options and recommendations for the Security Council mandate in their areas of expertise, and on the size, scope, tasks and structure of their components in a UN Field Mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comments and examples</strong></td>
<td>The Integrated (Mission) Task Force may appoint a smaller “task team” to conduct the Strategic Assessment. The World Bank has a standing invitation to participate in a Strategic Assessment. Depending on the size of the Strategic Assessment team, a representative with expertise in one area of rule of law and security institutions issues may be responsible for assessing strategic engagement in two or more areas. Example: Burundi Strategic Assessment (2010) [available from DPA’s Policy and Mediation Division].</td>
<td>Depending on the size of the Technical Assessment Mission team, a representative with expertise in one area of rule of law and security institutions issues may be responsible for assessing two or more areas. Example: Report of the Integrated Technical Assessment and Planning Team (ITAPT) (April 2011) [Available from the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) Officer in the Office of Operations, DPKO].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Strategic Assessments and Technical Assessment Missions may include non-UN experts (e.g., from academia, think-tanks, international and local NGOs, national experts, international organizations and multilateral organizations).

** Such assessments could also be conducted as part of UN inter-agency assessments (e.g., UN inter-agency DDR assessment), or inter-agency assessments with non-UN entities (e.g., World Bank, International Organization of Migration (IOM)) or government-led assessments or UN-supported independent assessments (e.g., the Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment (ICNA) of the Justice Sector in Timor Leste in 2009).
Tool 2. Guides to UN planning terms

Tool 2.1. Glossary of planning and programme management terms in UN Field Missions

Purpose

This glossary provides a list of key planning and other programme management terms and definitions that rule of law and security institutions personnel in a UN Field Mission may require when conducting UN assessments and planning. It includes key terms and definitions used by the police, justice, corrections, security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and mine action components in UN Field Missions, as well as the key planning terms of other Mission components of which they need to be aware. It does not include planning terms and definitions of other UN entities or non-UN partners, nor does it include definitions relating to rule of law and security institutions issues that are not specific to planning, as these are beyond the scope of this glossary.

As UN Field Missions are part of the global Secretariat, whenever possible, official terms and definitions of the Secretariat have been used, as well as official terms from DPKO and DFS guidance. Informal interpretations and examples have been provided in italics to clarify a number of official terms and definitions.

Terms and definitions

Accountability: “Accountability is the obligation of the Secretariat and its staff members to be answerable for all decisions made and actions taken by them, and to be responsible for honouring their commitments, without qualification or exception. Accountability includes achieving objectives and high-quality results in a timely and cost-effective manner, in fully implementing and delivering on all mandates to the Secretariat approved by the United Nations intergovernmental bodies and other subsidiary organs established by them in compliance with all resolutions, regulations, rules and ethical standards; truthful, objective, accurate and timely reporting on performance results; responsible stewardship of funds and resources; all aspects of performance, including a clearly defined system of rewards and sanctions; and with due recognition to the important role of the oversight bodies and in full compliance with accepted recommendations.”

Examples of accountability mechanisms used in planning include: Senior Manager’s Compacts and related performance assessments; a UN Field Mission’s Results-based Budget and related performance reports; component-level workplans and related reports; and individual e-PAS workplan and related appraisals.

Activity: “Action taken to transform inputs into outputs”.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ): The ACABQ is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and serves in an advisory capacity to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly on administrative and budgetary matters referred to it, including on the budget proposals and financial performance reports of DPKO, DFS and all UN Field Missions. The ACABQ is composed of 16 experts, who are nominated by their governments and elected by the General Assembly, but who serve in their personal capacity.

Assessed contributions: The contributions that are made by UN Member States towards the budgets of UN Field Missions; the amount paid by each Member State is based on its capacity to pay. The peacekeeping budgets are funded

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4 Such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) or UN Consolidated (Humanitarian) Appeals Process (CAP/CHAP).
5 Such as a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).
6 A/RES/64/259, operative paragraph 8, “Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat”.
8 For UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions see: “Regulation 3.10. Except as otherwise specified by the General Assembly, the appropriations for peacekeeping operations shall be financed by contributions from Member States according to the scale of assessments approved by the Assembly, as modified by any related system of adjustments approved by the Assembly”, Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Financial Regulations and Rules (ST/SGB/2003/7) of 9 May 2003, “Article III. Contributions and other income”, section “B. Peacekeeping operation budgets”.

17
by assessed contributions. A formula similar to
the funding scale for the regular budget is used
and includes a surcharge for the five permanent
members of the Security Council, who approve
all peacekeeping operations. The scale of
assessments for the regular budget is based on
the capacity of the Member State to pay and is
measured by individual Gross National Incomes
which is adjusted to take into account a number
of factors, including external debt and per
capita income. The General Assembly has set
a maximum Member contribution of 22 percent
and a minimum amount of 0.001 percent of the
regular budget.

Assessment:

1. **A working definition** is: A process of data
gathering and analysis to inform decision-
making. An assessment could, for example,
provide options and recommendations to
inform strategic decisions (e.g., a decision on
whether a UN Field Mission should have a role
in strengthening the rule of law in a country)
or programming decisions (e.g., a decision on
which interventions the UN Field Mission
should implement to strengthen the rule of law in a country). Examples of
UN assessments include UN Strategic
Assessments, Technical Assessment
Missions and in-mission assessments
to prepare component-level plans. For
further information, see “Tool 1.3 Key UN
assessment processes in UN Field Missions”.

2. **General Mine Action Assessment**
   (mine action): “The continuous process by
   which a comprehensive inventory can be
   obtained of all reported and/or suspected
   locations of mine or [explosive remnants of war]
   ERW contamination, the quantities and
types of explosive hazards, and information
on local soil characteristics, vegetation
and climate; and assessment of the scale
and impact of the landmine and ERW
problem on the individual, community and
country”.

3. **Impact survey** (mine action): “…An
   assessment of the socio-economic impact
   caused by the actual or perceived presence
   of mines and [explosive remnants of war]
   ERW, in order to assist the planning and
   prioritisation of mine action programmes
   and projects”.

4. **Post-clearance assessment** (mine action):
   “Surveys to assess the effectiveness and
   efficiency of mine action planning, priority
   setting, and implementation processes,
   aiming to enhance the productivity and
effectiveness of mine action, monitor post-
   clearance land use, ensure priority-setting
   processes are clear, transparent and carried
   out correctly, and help identify problems
   faced by communities in transforming
   the outputs of mine action (e.g. cleared
   land) into sustainable developmental
   outcomes”.

5. For assessments of risks, see Risk.

Assumptions:

1. **General definition**: “Hypothesis about
   risks, influences, external factors or
   conditions that could affect the progress or
   success of a programme/sub-programme.
   Assumptions highlight external factors,
   which are important for programme/
   sub-programme successes, but are
   largely or completely beyond the control
   of management”. This definition also
   applies to military or police operations. If
   the planning assumptions change, this is
   an indication that the plan may need to be
   revised. Examples of planning assumptions
   relate to: national commitment to a peace
   agreement or peace process; the security
   or humanitarian situation in a country;
   the scope and degree of political or
   financial support for a UN Field Mission
   or a component’s planned outputs;
   personnel issues; and logistic capabilities.
   In a component-level plan, planning
   assumptions are expressed as positive
   statements of what needs to happen for
   the plan to hold true. Planning assumptions
   for an entire component-level plan may be

9 Standard 3.115 “Glossary of mine action terms, definitions
and abbreviations”, International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) 04.10.

10 Standard 3.137 “Glossary of mine action terms, definitions
and abbreviations”, International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) 04.10.

11 Standard 3.207 “Glossary of mine action terms,
definitions and abbreviations”, International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) 04.10.

12 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
more general (e.g., The security situation will continue to improve) whereas for an output they may be more specific (e.g., The Prison Director will continue to provide full access to the prison). See also External factors.

2). Planning assumptions in a results-based budgeting framework: “The section on planning assumptions in a result-based budget framework should be based on the strategic guidance issued by the Under-Secretary-General of DPKO in the context of budget preparation, and outline the main assumptions about the future operating environment that underlie the mission’s operations and plans during the budget period…”13 This section on planning assumptions includes, inter alia, “main priorities of the mission and major developments which will/may affect the mandate implementation in the budget period” and “major impeding external factors which will/may affect the targets for the budget period”.14 In addition to this narrative section on broader planning assumptions for the entire UN Field Mission, specific external factors are listed for each component in the results-based framework.

Attribution: A causal link between observed (or expected to be observed) changes and a specific intervention. Attribution refers to that which is to be credited for the observed changes or results achieved. With regard to attribution for the achievement of accomplishments/results, evaluations aim to ascertain a credible link between outputs and achieved accomplishments. In assessing this link, attribution takes account of the effects of other interventions that are independent of the effort being evaluated.15

Baseline data: Data that describes the situation to be addressed by a programme, sub-

programme, or project and that serve as the starting point for measuring performance. A baseline study would be the analysis describing the situation prior to the commencement of the programme or project, or the situation following initial commencement of the programme or project to serve as a basis of comparison and progress for future analyses. It is used to determine the accomplishments/results and serves as an important reference for evaluation.16 See “Tool 6.4. Checklist of dos and don’ts on indicators to measure expected accomplishments” for further guidance on how to express baseline data when using indicators results-based budgets.

Benchmark/target/milestone: “A reference point or standard against which performance or achievement can be assessed. It often refers to an intermediate target to measure progress within a given period as well as to the performance of other comparable organizational entities”.17 An indicator can be regarded as a benchmark when it measures whether, or the extent to which, progress has been made towards an expected accomplishment. An expected accomplishment can also be regarded as a benchmark when it expresses an element of the desired end-state.

1). In a results-based budget or component-level plan, an indicator can be regarded as a benchmark when it measures performance against a standard, for instance, “Decrease in the percentage of inmates with less than 3.4 square meters of accommodation space in all state-level prisons of Country X (2010/11: 80 percent; 2011/12: 75 percent; 2012/13: 68 percent)” (where the indicator is based on the specification used by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) for minimum accommodation space in detention). Alternatively, an indicator can be regarded as a benchmark when it measures an intermediary target (or milestone). For instance, to measure adherence to a mine action treaty, a benchmark one year could be, “The parliament of Country X has ratified by 31 December 2012 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel

13 For further information, see the “Controller’s Memorandum and Annex I. Planning assumptions and results-based budgeting frameworks” for each UN Field Mission.
14 For further information, see the “Controller’s Memorandum and Annex I. Planning assumptions and results-based budgeting frameworks” for each UN Field Mission.
15 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
16 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
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Mines and on Their Destruction” and the following year, the benchmark could be “The Government of Country X submits an updated annual report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by 30 April in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.”

2) In the context of decision-making by the Security Council, a benchmark is used to help the Security Council determine when it is possible to transition from a UN Field Mission to another arrangement. Such benchmarks are not about measuring the Mission’s performance per se (though some mission tasks may be measured), but identifying progress in the country such that peace will be self-sustaining without the UN Field Mission’s presence. The benchmarks should articulate aspects of the end-state (e.g., political, security, and socio-economic). For example, UNMIL has general benchmarks such as “Liberia National Police (LNP) operational” (an expected accomplishment) with more specific indicators, including benchmarks/targets/milestones, to measure progress towards or away from the general benchmark such as “Police oversight body established and operational”. See Indicator and Expected accomplishments.

Beneficiary: The individual, group, or organization, whether targeted or not, that benefits, directly or indirectly, from the implementation of a programme, project or output.18 See also End-user and Target group.

Budget year: The financial period covered by a budget. Peacekeeping budgets have a financial period of one year from 1 July to 30 June. Budgets of Special Political Missions have a financial period of two years from 1 January to 31 December, beginning in an even-numbered year (e.g., 2010-12).19

Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC): The CPC is the main subsidiary organ of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly for planning, programming and coordination. The Committee reviews the programmes of the United Nations as defined in the Secretary-General’s Strategic Framework.

Compact: The Senior Manager’s Compact constitutes an annual contract between the Secretary-General and each of his most senior officials. The Compact comprises strategic, special and management objectives, expected accomplishments and associated performance measures. The Compact should reflect commitments related to mandate implementation and programme management for which the Senior Manager will take a leading role. While Compacts are signed between the Secretary-General and Senior Managers, such as Under-Secretaries-General (USGs) at Headquarters and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs)/Heads of Mission (HOMs), Compacts are also signed between USGs and Assistant Secretaries-General reporting to them, as well as between SRSGs/HOMs and their Deputies. The Senior Manager’s Compact follows the UN Field Mission’s budget period i.e., it covers the period either from 1 July to 30 June or 1 January to 31 December.

Concept of Operation (CONOPS): In the implementation of the Security Council mandate of a UN peace operation, the “Military Strategic Concept of Operation” or “Police Concept of Operation” articulates strategic intent for the utilisation of military or police capabilities to achieve an overall objective. “The objective of a component CONOPS is to link the mission mandate to the execution of key objectives such as, strategic intent, organization and deployment (including timelines), security/force protection, terms of engagement/directions on the use of force, administration and logistics, and command and control.”20 The military or police CONOPS drives the formulation of “Operational Plan(s)” (OPLAN) and “Operational Orders” (OPORD) in the UN Field Mission. The military component, police and support components in a Mission all

18 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
19 See “Regulation 1.2. The financial period shall consist of two consecutive calendar years, the first of which shall be an even year, except for peacekeeping operations with special accounts, whose financial period shall be one year from 1 July to 30 June” (ST/SGB/2003/7).
have their respective CONOPS. The CONOPS should be consistent with the overall Mission Concept, and drive the formulation of lower-level, operational component-level plans.

Contingency plans/planning: A working definition is: Contingency plans are alternative plans and strategies to the original programme plan that can be implemented when required. Contingency planning is based upon the assumption that alternative action can be developed more effectively and efficiently if they are prepared before the risk or crisis materializes, rather than reactively and under stress.

Crisis management: “A set of actions designed to ensure situational awareness and accelerated decision-making to address or resolve a crisis”. 21

Deliverables: See Output.

Delivery of output: “An output is generally considered to have been delivered when the service is completed or when the products resulting from a programme activity are made available to the intended primary users”. 22 See Output.

Directive:

1). Secretary-General’s Strategic Planning Directive: It states “the broad strategic objectives, as well as the proposed form and scope of a peace support operation”. 23

2). Under-Secretary-General’s Planning Directive: It “provides the basis for detailed operational planning. This document, based on the strategic objectives articulated in the SG’s Strategic Planning Directive, will include: a summary of the situation; detail on the strategic objectives; a statement of priorities; key benchmarks accompanied by a definition of what constitutes success in achieving them which then will inform the Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) process; a risk assessment and planning constraints (such as Security Council requirements); links to other UN activities including other UN missions in the region) and regional organisations; the functions and responsibilities of the IMTF (including distribution of tasks among its members and the UNCT) and support services to be provided by DPKO; timing and sequencing of planning activities and outputs; and required decision points”. 24

Effectiveness: “The extent to which expected programme/sub-programme activities are achieved”. 25

Efficiency: “Measure of how well inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to outputs”. 26

End-user: “Recipient of an output or accomplishment”. 27

End-state:

1). Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) definition: “Defines broadly (e.g. security, humanitarian, and development aspects) the state of affairs in the country at the conclusion of the ISF implementation period. The focus is on having the minimum elements required for peace consolidation or stabilization in place within time horizons of the peacekeeping/political mission, with a central emphasis on political and security imperatives necessary to lay the groundwork for peace consolidation or peacebuilding. Example: Former war-affected areas stabilized and largely free of violent conflict, illegal armed groups disarmed, and the local population is benefiting from the gradual redeployment of state security, public administration, justice, and basic social services”. 28

2). In a Mission Concept and results-based budget, the end-state of the UN Field Mission is the desired state of affairs in the country on completion of the

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27 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
Security Council mandate (or on completion of the objective for the UN Field Mission in a results-based budget). For example, the end-state in the draft Mission Concept for UNMISS (draft of 31 March 2011) is: “The Government of South Sudan is generally able to establish and maintain control over its territory without recourse to widespread repression or armed violence. It increasingly exercises legitimate authority over its people, on the basis of the expressed consent of the governed, through basic democratic and governance institutions, and in accordance with international human rights standards. The state is able to: institutionalise participation of a broad cross-section of South Sudanese society in the political process; govern according to basic standards of democratic accountability and transparency, and respect for human rights; maintain security within its borders; protect civilians, particularly vulnerable groups, from chronic, large-scale armed violence; and conduct friendly relations with neighboring States.”

3). **(Desired Military) Strategic End-State (military definition) or End-state (police definition):** The desired state of affairs in the country on completion of the military or police objectives. An example of a “Desired Military Strategic End-State” is: “A secured and stable environment that allows for the transfer of security operations to a legitimate Ivorian security force capable of assuring a sufficient level of security, to enable a phased withdrawal of the UNOCI military component.” 29 An example of an “End-State” for a police component is: “Formation of professional, efficient, community oriented and self-sustaining Police Services in South Sudan following democratic principles, and capable of ensuring safety, security and protection of the common citizen of South Sudan.” 30

**Evaluation:** “A systematic and objective process seeking to determine the relevance, effectiveness, and impact of a programme/sub-programme related to its goals and objectives. It encompasses the design, implementation and results of the programme/sub-programme with the view to providing information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into decision-making processes. Evaluation is often undertaken selectively to answer specific questions to guide decision-makers and/or programme managers, and to provide information on whether underlying theories and assumptions used in programme development were valid, what worked and what did not work and why”. 31 See also **Monitoring.**

1). **Evaluation-led evaluation:** Evaluation undertaken directly by the DPKO-DFS Evaluation Unit. 32

2). **Programme-led evaluation:** Evaluation undertaken by a programme/sub-programme with support from the DPKO-DFS Evaluation Unit.

See also ex-ante evaluation, ex-post evaluation, external evaluation, formative evaluation, independent evaluation, internal evaluation and joint evaluation in “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management”, OECD/DAC, 2002.

**Expected accomplishments:** “A desired outcome or result of the programme/sub-programme, involving benefits to end-users. Expected accomplishments can be expressed as a quantitative or qualitative standard, value or rate. Accomplishments are the direct consequence or effect of the delivery of outputs and lead to the fulfilment of the envisaged objective”. 33 An expected accomplishment can be equated with a “priority result” in an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), an “outcome” in a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and a “cluster/sector objective or outcome” in a UN Consolidated (Humanitarian) Appeal Process (CAP/CHAP) – see “Tool 2.2. Comparison of results frameworks used in countries with UN integrated field presences.”

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**External factors:** “...events and/or conditions that are beyond the control of those responsible for an activity but have an influence on the success or failure of the activity. They may be either anticipated in the form of assumptions or they may be unanticipated”.34 See also Assumptions.

In a results-based budget, external factors are articulated for each component of the budget (i.e., for each grouping of expected accomplishments). The external factors form part of the planning assumptions for the UN Field Mission and can potentially help explain why progress was not achieved as planned. External factors are expressed as positive statements of what needs to happen for the plan to hold true (e.g., Adherence of all parties to commitments under the peace agreement; or e.g., The government will continue to support a culture of democratic governance, including approval of policies and legislation on public sector reform, elections and the media).

**Fifth Committee:** The Fifth Committee is one of the six main committees of the General Assembly. It has responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters and may accept, curtail or reject the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The conclusions and recommendations of the ACABQ often form the basis of the Assembly’s resolutions on administrative and budgetary matters. The Fifth Committee reviews peacekeeping budgets throughout its session and especially at its Second Resumed session in May, which is devoted to consideration of peacekeeping financing issues.

**Gender analysis**35: “[R]efers to the variety of methods used to understand the relationships between men and women, their access to resources, their activities, and the constraints they face relative to each other”.36 During assessment and planning in UN peacekeeping, gender analysis helps identify any differences in the concerns and needs of women, men, girls and boys and thus to design interventions that address any such differences.

**Gender-disaggregated data**37: Data gathered and broken down by sex in order to aid comparison and support gender equality practices.38 For example, data on victims of crime, judicial personnel, prisoners, demobilized combatants, victims of mines and unexploded ordnance or UN personnel is typically disaggregated by gender to provide more nuanced information for decision-making.

**Gender mainstreaming**39: “Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including policies or programmes, at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all policies and programmes.”40

**Guiding principles:** The essential values of a programme/sub-programme that guide its functioning under all circumstances.

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34 Secretary-General’s Bulletin on “Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation” (ST/SGB/2000/8).

35 “All headquarters and mission-based policy development, planning and analysis processes shall employ gender analysis...” Policy on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2010).


37 “All demographic and statistical data and information, including mission reporting, information presented in reports to the Security Council and information posted on the DPKO/DFS website, shall be disaggregated by sex and age in absolute and percentage terms where possible.” Policy on Gender Equality in Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2010).


40 Agreed Conclusions of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Coordination Segment on Gender Mainstreaming, 1997.
Goal: “The higher-order aim to which a programme is intended to contribute: a statement of longer-term intent.” The objective supports the accomplishment of a higher level/overarching goal.

Impact:
1). General Assembly definition: “An expression of the changes produced in a situation as the result of an activity that has been undertaken”.
2). OIOS definition: “It is the overall effect of accomplishing specific results and, in some situations, it comprises changes, whether planned or unplanned, positive or negative, direct or indirect, primary and secondary that a programme/sub-programme helped to bring about. In others, impact could also indicate the maintenance of a current condition, assuming that that condition is favourable. Impact is the longer-term or ultimate effect attributable to a programme, sub-programme or project, in contrast with an expected accomplishment and output, which are geared to the timeframe of a plan.”

Implementing: To carry out or put into effect – according to, or by means of – a definite workplan or procedure.

Indicator: “A measure, preferably numeric, of a variable that provides a reasonably simple and reliable basis for assessing achievement, change or performance. A unit of information measured over time that can help show changes in a specific condition.” See Benchmark/target/milestone.

1). In a UN Field Mission’s results-based budget framework, an indicator of achievement is used to measure whether and/or the extent to which expected accomplishments have been achieved. One expected accomplishment can have multiple indicators. Indicators correspond to the expected accomplishment for which they are used to measure performance.

The term performance indicator is a synonym for an indicator of achievement.

2). A proxy indicator is used when it is difficult to identify direct indicators to measure the result. Proxies are indicators that may tell us indirectly whether a result has been achieved.

See “Tool 6.4. Checklist of dos and don’ts on indicators to measure expected accomplishments” and “Tool 6.6. Lists of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments” for further guidance and examples of indicators.

Input: “Personnel and other resources necessary for producing outputs and achieving accomplishments.”

Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): “…the authoritative basis for planning new multidimensional missions and UNCTs applying the principles of integration, as well for the revision of existing mission and UNCT plans”. Established in 2006 and updated in the 2009-2010 guidance, this is the process guiding UN system-wide planning in countries where the principle of integration applies, i.e. where there is both a UN Country Team and either a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or a special political mission/office. See Integration.

Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF): This mandatory planning instrument in all integrated presences is a short (15-20 page) document embodying the main elements of the Secretary General’s Policy Committee decision of 2008 on integration which are: “(i) a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives [for peace consolidation]...(iii) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and (iv) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation”. The ISF expresses this strategic partnership by bringing the UN Field Mission and UN Country Team around a framework of agreed peace consolidation priorities and a
mutual accountability mechanism. It may also facilitate an appropriate shift in priorities and/or resources and allow for regular stock-taking by senior managers.

Integrated Task Force/Integrated Mission Task Force (ITF/IMTF): “A Headquarter-based inter-departmental and inter-agency mechanism to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance to UN presences applying the principles of integration”. The task forces for DPA-led missions are called ITF, whereas those for DPKO-led missions are called IMTFs. While they are Headquarters-based, their membership extends to field counterparts in the mission and the UNCT.

Integrated UN presence: An integrated UN presence is a mission to which the principle of integration applies. This includes both structurally integrated field missions (e.g., UN peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that have a multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC who reports to the SRSG/head of Mission) such as MONUSCO or UNMIL as well as missions that are not structurally integrated but to which the principles of integration still applies (e.g., UNPOS). See Integration.

Integration: “The main purpose of integration is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace...There should be an effective strategic partnership between the UN mission/office and the Country Team, under the leadership of the SRSG (or ERSG), that ensures that all...operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners...The country level arrangements should reflect the specific requirements and circumstances and can taken different structural forms”.

This last sentence means that “form follows function”. As of February 2012, the principle of integration applies to the following countries and areas: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Timor-Leste.

Joint programme: A set of activities contained in a common work plan and related budget, involving two or more UN organizations and (sub-) national partners. The work plan and budget forms part of a joint programme document, which also details roles and responsibilities of partners in coordinating and managing the joint activities and is signed by all participating organizations and (sub-) national partners. More informal arrangements are referred to by the term “joint initiative”.

Joint programming: A process whereby “UN entities would jointly carry out assessments of problems, design interventions consisting of shared objectives, actions, timeframes, resource requirements and clear delineations of responsibilities”.

Logical framework (Logframe): “Management tool...used to identify...elements of a programme or sub-programme (objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement, outputs and inputs) and their causal relationships, as well as the assumptions and external factors that may influence success and failure. It facilitates planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a programme [or sub-programme] or project”. A Logframe is typically presented in a matrix format. A results-based budget framework is an example of a Logframe. See “Tool 5. Templates and samples of good practice of component-level plans” for an example and template of a Logframe.

Means of verification: A column in a Logframe that indicates where information will be

51 Decision No. 2008/24 on Integration of the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General dated 26 June 2008. See also Decision No. 2011/10 on Integration of the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General dated 4 May 2011.
52 IMPP guidelines – Role of the Field (2009), page 17
53 Decision No. 2008/24 on Integration of the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General dated 26 June 2008. See also Decision No. 2011/10 on Integration of the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General dated 4 May 2011.
54 “ISG Discussion Paper on Joint Programming between UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes and Secretariat Entities”, Integration Steering Group (8 July 2010).
56 Based on “UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms”.
available on the indicators. Possible sources of verification are national statistics, a survey, an independent audit or evaluation, UN statistic, etc.

Milestone/benchmark/target: See Benchmark/target/milestone.

Mission Concept (MC): “The MC is comprised of three substantive parts: (i) a vision to capture and communicate the purpose of the mission, (ii) a concept that promotes strategic coherence by ordering mission tasks by sequence and priority, and (iii) direction to guide and enable the planning and operational processes of individual mission components, as well as supporting the implementation of cross-cutting issues. Non-substantive elements of the MC cover organizational issues, such as Mission structure and procedures... In order to deliver this trio of vision, concept and direction, the MC grows out of a strategic process that translates the political intent of mandates and other higher directives into a form that supports follow-on planning processes (the Mission's cross-cutting and component plans)”.  

Mission deployment phases: “United Nations peacekeeping operations, or missions, have three broad deployment phases:

Phase I: Start-up (rapid deployment and mission start-up)
Phase II: Mandate implementation
Phase III: Transition (handover, withdrawal and liquidation)”.  

Monitoring:

1). The General Assembly refers to monitoring as: “…the periodic determination...of the actual delivery of final outputs in comparison with the commitments for the delivery of outputs set out in the...budget... “Monitoring provides assurance that the implementation of a programme or project is proceeding as planned.

2). A general working definition is: A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specific indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in use of allocated funds. See also Indicator and Evaluation.

Objective: “An objective refers to an overall desired achievement involving a process of change that is aimed at meeting certain needs of identified end-users within a given period of time”. See End-state. See “Tool 6.2. Checklist of dos and don’ts on objectives” for further guidance and examples of objectives used in results-based budgets and component-level plans.

Operational Plan (OPLAN): See Concept of Operation (CONOPS).

Outcome: “In the United Nations Secretariat, “outcome” is used as a synonym of an accomplishment or a result”. See Expected accomplishment.

Output: The final product or deliverables by a programme/sub-programme to stakeholders, which an activity is expected to produce in order to achieve its objectives. Outputs may include reports, publications, training, meetings, security services, etc. See “Tool 6.5. Checklist of dos and don’ts on outputs” and “Tool 6.7. List of examples of outputs” for further guidance and examples of outputs.

Peacekeeping budgets: Consist of the peacekeeping support account budget, budgets for individual peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi (UNLB). The fiscal year runs annually from 1 July through 30 June.

Peacekeeping support account budget: Established to provide a flexible mechanism to fund Headquarters’ capacity to plan, establish and direct field operations. The fiscal period


Based on “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management”, OECD/DAC, 2002.


UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.

matches that of field mission budgets and runs annually from 1 July through 30 June. Currently, approximately 70 percent of the posts approved under this account are authorized for DPKO and DFS. The remaining 30 percent provide backstopping capacity for Offices and Departments such as the Department of Management (DM), the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).

Performance: “The degree to which a programme or project delivers results in accordance with stated objectives, timely and effectively as assessed by specific criteria and standards”. 64

Performance report: A mandated report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly reflecting actual performance against planned performance. 65 The performance report on a results-based budget for a UN Field Mission is an annual report providing reasons for over/underachieving the objective, expected accomplishments and outputs and over-underutilization of resources.

Plan: See Compact, Concept of Operation, Contingency plans, Integrated Strategic Framework, Joint programme, Logical framework, Mission Concept, Operational Plan, Programme/sub-programme plan, Project document, Workplan. See “Tool 1.1. Hierarchy of plans in UN Field Missions” and “Tool 1.2. Examples of key plans in UN Field Missions” for information on different types of UN plans.

Planning: A working definition is: A structured process through which a UN Field Mission develops a plan to achieve its mandate(s) and in a way that is responsive to the environment. Planning includes elements, such as agreeing on objectives, priorities, strategies and activities, and guides the acquisition and allocation of resources to achieve the objectives. Planning takes place from the top of the results-hierarchy downwards. For example, in a results-based budget framework, after the objective is defined, then the expected accomplishments that contribute to this objective are defined. After this takes place, then the outputs that contribute to these expected accomplishments are defined. After the outputs are identified, then the inputs or cost in terms of posts and non-post resources are identified.

Pre-mandate Commitment Authority (PCMA): The sources of budgetary support available to the Secretary-General of the UN to establish or expand a peacekeeping operation or special political mission. Certain conditions govern the use of the PMCA, which may include (depending on circumstances) approval from the ACABQ or notification of the President of the Security Council. 66

Priority objectives [UN Strategic Assessment]: “Objectives that need to be addressed in the short to medium term to promote peace consolidation in the country. These objectives are derived from key conflict factors. If the Strategic Assessment leads to an Integrated Mission Planning Process, these priority objectives should inform the development of an integrated strategic framework”. 67

Programme: “A programme consists of the activities undertaken by a department or office together with a coherent set of objectives, expected accomplishments and outputs intended to contribute to one or more organizational goals established by Member States. The programme is guided by the mandates entrusted to a department/office by the General Assembly or the Security Council”. 68

In the context of a UN Field Mission, the entire Mission constitutes the Programme and all components constitute the Sub-programme. See also Sub-programme and Programme/sub-programme plan.

Programme manager: “A programme manager is the official responsible for the formulation and implementation of a programme/sub-programme”. 69 In a UN Field Mission, a programme manager is the Head and Deputy Heads of Mission, as well as heads of components. The programme manager

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64 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
65 Based on UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms
66 Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS).
68 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
may delegate responsibilities to lower-level programme managers.

Programme management: The centralized and coordinated management of a specific programme to achieve its strategic goals, objectives and expected accomplishments.

Programme performance report: The mandated report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly biennially, reflecting implementation and results for programmes in the Secretariat. An example of a programme performance report is A/65/70. See Indicator.

Programme/sub-programme plan: A detailed document stating objectives, expected accomplishments, activities/outputs, performance indicators, responsibilities, and time frames. It is used as a monitoring and accountability tool to ensure the effective implementation of the programme/sub-programme plan. The plan is designed according to the logical framework. The programme plan of a UN Field Mission is comprised of the totality of all Mission-wide plans (e.g., a Mission Concept, a Results-based-Budget, a Comprehensive Strategy on Protection of Civilians, and a DPKO-DFS Action Plan for implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)). A sub-programme plan of a UN Field Mission corresponds to the totality of plans produced by a Mission component (e.g., a multi-year strategy on security sector reform, and an annual workplan for the security sector reform component). See “Tool 5. Templates and samples of good practice of component-level plans” for an example and template for an annual workplan.

Programme review: An informal assessment of the implementation of the programme/sub-programme that assists the programme manager and their team in continually improving the programme/sub-programme.

Project: “Planned activity or a set of planned, interrelated activities designed to achieve certain specific objectives within a given budget, organizational structure and specified time period. Within the Secretariat, projects are used in technical cooperation activities”. Individual projects within the programme are managed by project managers. The programme manager is responsible for overseeing overlap among the programme/sub-programme projects.

Project document: “A formal document covering a project, which sets out, inter alia, the needs, results, outputs, activities, work plan, budget, pertinent background, supporting data and any special arrangements applicable to the execution of the project in question. Once a project document is approved by signature, the project represents a commitment of resources”.

Project Review Committee (PRC) (for Quick Impact Projects): Responsible for the overall management of the [Quick Impact Project] QIPS programmes in the mission, selection and approval of individual projects, ensuring that selected projects complement and do not duplicate the activities of other UN bodies operating in the country, nominating a mission component for monitoring of individual projects, reviewing individual projects that are subject to delay and taking remedial action as necessary, and regularly reviewing how well the QIPs programme is meeting its objectives.

Proxy indicator: See Indicator.

Qualitative data: Information that is not easily captured in numerical form (although it is possible to quantify). Qualitative data typically consists of words and normally describe people’s opinions, knowledge, attitudes or behaviours.

Quantitative data: “Information measured or measurable by, or concerned with, quantity and expressed in numerical form. Quantitative data typically consists of numbers”.

Quick Impact Project (QIP): Quick Impact Projects are small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population. These projects are used by UN peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby

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70 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
71 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
72 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
73 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
74 DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), 1 March 2009.
75 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
76 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
improving the environment for effective mandate implementation.  

**Regular budget (programme budget):** A biennial programme budget (i.e. January 2010 through the end of December 2012) that outlines the approved expenditures under each programme and sub-programme and provides funding for the core activities of the Departments of the Secretariat and Offices away from Headquarters. It currently funds less than 10 percent of post and non-post resources for DPKO and DFS at Headquarters, with the majority of funding coming from the peacekeeping support account budget. Two peacekeeping missions (UNTSO and UNMOGIP) are funded through the regular budget, as are Special Political Missions (SPMs). See Peacekeeping budgets.

**Result:** “The measurable accomplishment/outcome (intended or unintended, positive or negative) of a programme/sub-programme. In the Secretariat practice, “result” is synonymous with accomplishment and outcome”.  

**Results-based budgeting:** “[A] programme budget process in which: (a) programme formulation revolves around a set of predefined objectives and expected results; (b) expected results would justify resource requirements which are derived from and linked to the outputs required to achieve such results; and, (c) actual performance in achieving results is measured by objective performance indicators”.  

**Results-based budget:** A budget consisting of a results-based budget framework (a logframe) and resource requirements. See Result-based budgeting and Logical framework.

**Results-based budget framework:** See Logical framework.

**Results-based management:** “A management strategy by which the Secretariat ensures that its processes, outputs and services contribute to the achievement of clearly stated expected accomplishments and objectives. It is focused on achieving results and improving performance, integrating lessons learned into management decisions and monitoring of and reporting on performance.”  

**Risk:**

1. **Definition in UN security risk assessments:** “The combination of the impact and likelihood for harm, loss or damage to the United Nations system from the exposure to threats. Risks are categorized in levels from Very Low to Very High for their prioritization”.

2. **Definition for other risks (not security-related):** “The effect of uncertainty on objectives”.

3. **Protection of Civilians (POC) risk:** A POC risk is calculated by weighing a threat to civilians against their vulnerability to that threat. A POC threat exists when members of a civilian population are or may become subject to physical violence.

   **POC risk analysis** helps to identify and prioritize POC risks in order to inform operational planning and responses to address them. A matrix of prioritized POC risks should be included in a mission’s Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategy.

**Risk management:** “Refers to a coordinated set of activities and methods that is used to direct an organization and to control the many risks that can affect its ability to achieve objectives”.  

**Security Risk Assessment:** “The process of identifying those threats which could affect UN personnel, assets or operations and the UN’s vulnerability to them, assessing risks to the UN in terms of likelihood and impact, prioritizing those risks and identifying prevention and mitigation strategies and measures.”

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78 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
80 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
81 For further information on security risk assessment terms and definitions, see DPKO-DFS Policy on the Security Risk Management Process” (2010).
83 A template for the matrix is included in the DPKO-DFS Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2011).
Scope: The magnitude of the effort required to successfully achieve the goals and objectives of a programme/sub-programme. A programme has a wider scope dedicated to meeting the goals of the organization. The scope can change to meet the organization’s goals.

SMART: An acronym often used when creating programme and sub-programme planning elements. It stands for specific, measurable, achievable, realistic/relevant and time-bound.

(S) Specific: Planning elements that are related to the mandate.

(M) Measurable: Quantifiable planning elements that are easily monitored and evaluated for programme/sub-programme success and progress, making it easier to report to stakeholders on progress.

(A) Achievable: Indicated by planning elements that can happen in the specific period.

(R) Realistic/relevant: Being ambitious in creating programme/sub-programme goals and objectives is encouraged; however, managers must ensure that planning elements remain realistic. Managers must also ensure that planning elements fall within mandated tasks.

(T) Time-bound: Managers must ensure that the objectives they have created are achievable within the necessary time frame.

Stakeholder: An agency, organization, group or individual interested in a programme/sub-programme’s end results. Not all stakeholders are involved in completing the actual work of a programme/sub-programme. Common stakeholders for ROLSI field components include Member States, other UN Field Mission components, other UN entities, non-UN entities such as the national authorities, regional organizations and governments, international organizations, think-tanks, academia, the media, civil society, non-formal judicial personnel etc.

Standard (mine action): “Requirements, specifications or other precise criteria, to be used consistently to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose. Note: Mine action standards aim to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by promoting the preferred procedures and practices at both Headquarters and field level”.

Strategic Framework (of the Secretary-General): Covers a two-year period and is the primary document by which the strategy, objectives, related expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement are established for each Department. The proposed strategic framework for each Department/Office is reviewed by the Committee on Programme and Coordination (CPC), the main subsidiary organ of the General Assembly for planning, programme and coordination. The CPC reviews the strategic framework and examines the totality of the Secretary-General’s work programme as well as evaluation reports issued by the Office of Internal Oversight Services and Joint Inspection Unit, the Programme Performance Reports. The Strategic Framework for DPKO and DFS is combined under one programme, in which two regular budget missions (UNMOGIP and UNTSO) are also included. No other UN Field Missions as of June 2011 have Strategic Frameworks. The Framework includes a Logical Framework for each programme, but it also includes extensive narrative.

Strategic Assessment: An internal UN inter-agency assessment tool to formulate or reformulate UN engagement in a political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation.

Strategic Objective: Integrated Strategic Framework definition: “This is a strategic-level outcome that captures a number of inter-related dynamics of conflict, and therefore, peace stabilization/consolidation. Some typical examples could encompass the inter-related aspects of, inter alia, political/governance (or state authority), protection of civilians, security (including security sector reform), return and reintegration, rule of law, and the delivery of peace dividends/early recovery…Example: State authority extended to war-affected areas”.

Strategic Planning: A working definition is: A process that answers the following three

86 Standard 3.265 “Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations”, International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10.

87 DPA “Guidelines on UN Strategic Assessment”, May 2009.


questions: where you are; where you want to be; and how to get there. The strategic planning process typically results in a plan. In UN peacekeeping, examples of strategic plans include an Integrated Strategic Framework, a Mission Concept, a Military or Police CONOPS and a component’s multi-year strategic plan. Strategic plans commonly include elements such as: situation analysis, planning assumptions, mission statement, vision statement (end-state), objectives, expected accomplishments, indicators including benchmarks/targets/milestones. Strategic plans do not commonly include detailed information on outputs and activities.

Sub-programme: “A sub-programme consists of activities within a programme aimed at achieving one or a few closely related objectives as set out in the [Secretary-General’s Strategic Framework of the programme]. The sub-programme structure shall correspond, to the extent possible, to an organizational unit...” In the context of a UN Field Mission, all components constitute the Sub-programme. See also Programme and Programme/sub-programme plan.

Sustainability: The extent to which the impact of the programme or project will last after its termination; the probability of continued long-term benefits.

Technical Assessment Mission (TAM): A type of UN assessment to provide options and recommendations for the (re-)formulation of a Security Council mandate and on the size, scope, tasks and structure of a UN Field Mission. See Assessment. For further information, see “Tool 1.3 Key UN assessment processes in UN Field Missions”.

Target/milestone/benchmark: See Benchmark/milestone.

Target group: The main beneficiaries of a programme or project that are expected to gain from the results of that programme or project. They are closely related to its impact and relevance. It is a synonym for End-user.

Task: See Activity.

Terms of reference: Written document presenting the purpose and scope of the evaluation/inspection/task/group/entity, the methods to be used, issues to be addressed, the resources, schedule, and reporting requirements.

Threats: Definition in UN security risk assessments: “Any factors (actions, circumstances or events) which have the potential or possibility to cause harm, loss or damage to the United Nations system, including its personnel, assets and operations.”

Trust Fund:

1) Trust funds are defined as “accounts established with specific terms of reference or under specific agreements to record receipts and expenditures of voluntary contributions for the purpose of financing wholly or in part the cost of activities consistent with the organization’s aims and policies.” Trust funds contain extra-budgetary resources (also known as “voluntary contributions”), which are provided to organizations on the basis of specific agreements with donors for specific purposes. Their receipt and expenditure are accounted for, and reported to, the donors separately until final disposition of all funds and the closure of the fund. Peacekeeping-related trust funds may be operation-specific in that funds are contributed to supplement specific expenses of a particular peacekeeping operation or may be general in nature and not directly related to a specific operation. A peacekeeping trust fund shall be approved by the General Assembly or by the Secretary-General. All extra-budgetary contributions to the UN Secretariat or UN peacekeeping operations

91 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
92 For further information, see the “IMPP Guidelines: Role of Headquarters”, Office of the Secretary-General (May, 2010).
93 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
94 Based on UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
95 ST/SGB/188.
and special political missions are received by the Controller.96

2). The “Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action” is an example of a Headquarters-based trust fund established to provide special resources for mine-action programmes and projects, including surveys, mine-clearance, mine-risk education, victim assistance, stockpile destruction and advocacy activities, in situations where other funding is not immediately available.

Voluntary contributions: Contributions other than assessed contributions. They are often referred informally to as “extra-budgetary funds”. See Assessed contributions.

Workplan: A detailed document stating outputs to be delivered and activities to be carried out in a given time period, how the activities will be carried out, and what progress towards expected accomplishments will be achieved. It contains timeframes and responsibilities and is used as a monitoring and accountability tool to ensure the effective implementation of the programme. The work plan is designed according to the logical framework.97 Synonyms include sub-programme workplan and component workplan. See “Tool 5.1. Samples of annual workplans”.

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96 The establishment of trust funds is governed by ST/STG/188 and their management is governed by ST/Al/284. For further information on how trust funds are used in UN peacekeeping, see the “SOP on Use of Trust Funds in UNPKOs” (2003).

97 UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms.
Tool 2.2. Comparison of results frameworks used in countries with UN integrated field presences

This chart compares the hierarchy and terminology of the various results frameworks used in countries with UN integrated field presences. It is based on official guidance as of June 2011.

Planning and Budgeting*

* This arrow indicates the need to plan and budget from the top of results-hierarchy downwards. For example, in a UN Mission RBB Framework, after the objective is defined, then the expected accomplishments that contribute to this objective are defined. After this takes place, then the outputs that contribute to these expected accomplishments are defined. After the outputs are identified, then the inputs or cost in terms of posts and non-post resources are identified.

UN Mission RBB Framework

- **Input** → **Output** → **Expected accomplishment** → **Objective**

** Activities are not reflected in the UN Mission RBB framework

UN ISF

- **Indicator**

  - **Priority result** → **Strategic objective** → **Peace consolidation end-state**

UNDAF

- **Indicator** → **Output** → **Outcome** → **National development priority or goal (including MDGs)**

CAP/CHAP

- **Input** → **Activity** → **Output** → **Cluster/sector objective or outcome** → **Strategic Objective or Impact**

Implementation**

** This arrow indicates the cause and effect relationship between the elements in the results hierarchy. For instance, in a UN Mission RBB Framework, if inputs are used to undertake a series of activities then that will generate a number of outputs. If outputs are produced, then this will generate benefits to end-users: this result is known as the expected accomplishment. If an expected accomplishment is achieved, then this contributes to the wider impact of the UN Field Mission: this impact is known as an objective.

RBB - results-based budget; ISF - Integrated Strategic Framework; UNDAF - UN Development Assistance Framework; CAP/CHAP - Consolidated (Humanitarian) Appeals Process
I've been working on planning for 3 months now. We all use the same words differently. It's so confusing! There must be a better way to understand each other.

What does this section of the Planning Toolkit cover?

Great!

It provides guidance on assessing needs in your sector, which will help you decide what to work on.

The TAM checklist will help me with my discussions with UN partners, the national authorities and bilaterals on who is going to do what on security sector reform.

SECTION B: DEFINING THE SCOPE OF A PLAN
Tool 3. Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) checklists on prioritizing and sequencing early peacebuilding interventions

Target audience and purpose

For whom
This planning tool is for use by rule of law and security institutions personnel from DPKO Headquarters and the UN Field Mission who are participating in a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM). This tool can be used for any type of TAM i.e., a TAM for mission start-up, mandate review, mid-cycle review, restructuring or reconfiguration, draw-down or crisis response, or in response to a specific request from the Security Council (e.g., to establish benchmarks).

For what purpose
The purpose of a TAM is to provide options and recommendations:

i) for the (re-)formulation of a Security Council mandate, and

ii) on the size, scope, tasks and structure of a UN Field Mission.

This tool helps planners generate a shortlist of prioritized and sequenced interventions for the UN Field Mission to work on in the rule of law and security sectors, on police, justice, corrections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and mine action issues, during year one of a new Security Council mandate and for years two and beyond. These sequenced priorities are then reflected in a report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council providing options and recommendations on the content of the Security Council mandate as well as on the size, scope, tasks and structure of a UN Field Mission.

As there is often limited space on a TAM team, an individual with expertise in one area of rule of law and security institutions issues may be responsible for assessing priorities in areas where he/she is not a technical expert. In such situations, this tool provides generic guidance on prioritization and sequencing of early peacebuilding interventions.

What this tool contains

The tool contains two checklists. “Checklist A. Prioritization Considerations” contains four elements to be considered when determining whether an intervention is a priority. While Element A.1. must always be met for an intervention to be considered a priority, in practice, it may not always be possible to meet all of the other three elements. “Checklist B. Sequencing Considerations” contains four elements to be considered when sequencing those priorities.

Each checklist also contains examples of questions to help understand each of the four elements. These questions should be reviewed when preparing for discussions on prioritizing interventions both internally within the UN Field Mission and with other UN and non-UN partners. The list of questions is illustrative and not exhaustive. Some questions may not apply in some countries and others will have to be adapted to the local context.

Using the tool

Use the tool after assessing needs in a TAM

A TAM typically identifies sector-specific needs, actors and their capacities, it maps current and future UN and non-UN assistance to each sector, and analyses lessons learned from prior interventions. This TAM assessment process may generate a long list of rule of law and security institutions issues that the UN Field Mission could potentially be mandated to work on. This planning tool should help narrow this list to a more manageable set of sequenced rule of law and security institutions priorities that the UN Field Mission should focus on in years one, two and beyond of a new Security Council mandate.

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98 See “Tool 1.3. Key UN assessment processes in UN Field Missions” for more information on TAMs.

99 An intervention is understood here to mean an objective (e.g., to prevent prison riots), expected accomplishment (e.g., improved living conditions in prisons) or general areas of activities (e.g., training on prison management). The criteria used for prioritizing and sequencing are based on “The Contribution of United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: a DPKO/DFS Strategy for Peacekeepers” (2011).
Consult widely. This planning tool focuses on defining what the Security Council should mandate the UN Field Mission to do; it does not provide guidance on how to define the priorities of others. Nevertheless, priority-setting cannot be done in isolation. Broad consultations on priorities and how to sequence them ensures coherence of effort, maximizes impact and avoids duplication of effort. Investing in consultations is also critical as the UN Field Mission will eventually hand over its functions to other actors on the ground, particularly to the national authorities and UN Country Team (UNCT). Discussions on priorities with the national authorities need to be carefully managed so that expectations of what assistance the UN Field Mission can provide remain realistic.

Use the I(M)TF mechanism

Discussions on the future tasks of a UN Field Mission on rule of law and security institutions issues must involve other members of the Integrated (Mission) Task Force. At Headquarters, this would include other units of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, other parts of DPKO-DFS and other UN entities. At the field-level, this would include other components of the UN Field Mission (where one already exists), members of the UNCT, as well as the national authorities and other relevant non-UN actors (civil society, NGOs, donors, international, multilateral and regional organizations etc.).

Resolving tensions and contradictions

Planning and priority-setting can be a messy, non-linear process. For instance, the I(M)TF may need to produce priorities for the UN Field Mission on rule of law and security institutions issues before national priorities have been articulated. Alternatively, an issue may be a high priority for the UN (e.g., vetting of law enforcement entities for prior human rights abuses) for year one of a new UN Field Mission, whereas it may be a lesser priority for the national government at this point in time. To resolve tensions and contradictions that arise when setting priorities and sequencing interventions, careful judgement should be exercised when using this planning tool and strong involvement of UN leadership is essential.

Complement this tool with other programming guidance

This checklist should be used in conjunction with other relevant guidance that informs planning and programme design, such as:

- International standards and principles (e.g., on human rights, gender equality, landmines etc.);
- UN guidance and standards (e.g., DPKO-DFS guidance, the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)); as well as
- General UN programming principles (human rights-based approach (HRBA), gender equality, environmental sustainability, results-based management, capacity development), other relevant cross-cutting considerations such as the needs of vulnerable groups and HIV/AIDS, as well as the “do no harm” principle and the need for interventions to be sustainable in the longer term.

“My team used this TAM checklist very effectively in start-up planning for UNMISS. We used it to prepare ourselves for meetings with UN partners to discuss what the UN Field Mission would do as compared to UNDP on justice issues in South Sudan.”

Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz Ibrahim, former Chief of the Rule of Law, Judicial System and Prison Advisory Section, UNMISS

100 Including thematic advisers in the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section.

101 Including DPA, UNDP, OHCHR and UNICEF.

102 See the five “UN Country Planning Principles” for development settings.

103 For a full list of principles applicable to post-conflict settings, see the “10 Fragile States Principles”.
Other uses for this tool

Other TAM-related uses

This tool can be helpful in developing terms of reference for TAMs, particularly aspects covering rule of law and security institutions issues.

Using the checklist during in-mission assessments

This checklist can be helpful in generating a list of prioritized and sequenced programming options (expected accomplishments, outputs and activities) during an in-mission assessment, to implement existing Security Council and/or General Assembly mandates. Such in-mission assessments can feed into the development of a variety of plans ranging from component-level multi-year strategies and annual workplans to a UN-wide Integrated Strategic Framework, Mission Concept or other UN plans such as a UN Development Assistance Framework.

Other useful TAM resources


“As we develop the Integrated Strategic Framework, the idea is to coordinate the UN system to jointly identify rule of law and security needs in the country, and then determine how each UN entity contributes to addressing a particular problem and which common indicators they can use to track their progress.”

Ms. Mitch Dufresne,
Rule of Law Coordination/Office of the DSRSG, MINUSTAH

104 For further guidance on in-mission assessments, see the draft “DPKO-DFS Guidelines on In-Mission Assessment of Police, Justice and Corrections Sectors” (expected in 2012) available from the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Section or Police Division in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO.
Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) checklists on prioritizing and sequencing early peacebuilding interventions

Checklist A. Prioritization considerations

**Elements to consider when prioritizing**

A.1. The proposed intervention advances the political objectives of the future UN Field Mission and/or advances the peace process, and:
   (i) Ensures security, and/or
   (ii) Lays the foundation for longer-term institution-building.

A.2. The proposed intervention is in line with the priorities of the national authorities.

A.3. The UN Field Mission has adequate support for the proposed intervention from key stakeholders.

A.4. The UN Field Mission, or UN peacekeeping more generally, has a comparative advantage to carry out the proposed intervention as compared to other UN or non-UN actors.

Checklist B. Sequencing considerations

**Elements to consider when sequencing**

B.1. Political, security, socio-economic and other conditions in the country may affect the timing of the proposed intervention.

B.2. The capacity and willingness of national actors to absorb support offered may affect the timing of the proposed intervention.

B.3. UN Field Mission lead times may affect the timing of the proposed intervention.

B.4. The timing of the proposed intervention may be dependent on another intervention.

Checklist A. Prioritization considerations with guiding questions.

A.1. The proposed intervention advances the political objectives of the future UN Field Mission and/or advances the peace process, and:
   (i) Ensures security, and/or
   (ii) Lays the foundation for longer-term institution-building.

a. How does the proposed intervention contribute to promoting dialogue and/or reconciliation within the country, and/or between the country and its neighbours?

b. How does the proposed intervention open up political space (e.g., agreement on less contentious issues such as mine clearance can build confidence between the parties, thereby enabling them to tackle more politically-sensitive issues)?

c. How can UN peacekeeping use its political leverage, due to the legitimacy derived from the UN Security Council-backed mandate, to implement the proposed intervention or to support the efforts of the UNCT (e.g., to push through key required policy or legislative changes in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, or to defuse conflict and reduce tension or broker solutions)?

d. How does the proposed intervention address commitments made in the peace agreement (e.g., establishment of a DDR Commission)?

e. How does the proposed intervention help to establish early peace dividends, which boost popular confidence in the national authorities or peace process (e.g., providing police equipment or uniforms, basic infrastructure rehabilitation for the police, judiciary and prison service)?

f. How can UN peacekeeping help create a safe environment for other UN and non-UN actors to provide assistance (e.g., to demine key roads that can then be used by the UN and NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance)?
How does the proposed intervention contribute to the **protection of civilians**, including protection of women and children from sexual and gender-based violence?

How does the proposed intervention contribute to **right-sizing national security institutions** (e.g., by reducing the overall size of the armed forces through DDR)?

How does the proposed intervention help **reduce the impact of, or win over, groups** that could destabilize the country (e.g., disarming remnants of armed groups)?

How does it address one or more of the **root causes of the conflict and/or conflict triggers** (e.g., natural resources issues, property disputes, lengthy pre-trial detention and inhumane prison conditions, impunity for human rights abuses including sexual and gender-based violence, weak/absent conflict resolution mechanisms, armed groups) and therefore reduce the risk of relapse into conflict?

How does the proposed intervention contribute to **strengthening the State’s ability to provide security and maintain public order**, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights? How does it transfer essential skills and knowledge to national actors responsible for security, even at this very early stage? How does it encourage the participation of women in the State’s provision of security and maintenance of public order?

How does the proposed intervention contribute to establishing or restoring the **basic functioning, independence and legitimacy of security and justice sector institutions** (and traditional mechanisms) so that disputes and conflict can be addressed without resorting to violence?

How does the proposed intervention help ensure that all UN and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a **coherent and coordinated manner**?

The proposed intervention is in **line with the priorities of the national authorities**.

Is the proposed intervention a **stated priority of the national authorities** (for instance, in their national strategies and plans)?

Is the proposed intervention a **high priority for the UN Field Mission but a lesser priority for the national authorities** (e.g., vetting the national police before providing them with training may be a priority for the UN Field Mission whereas the national authorities may place less importance on vetting)?

Is the proposed intervention a **high priority for the UN system but not a priority of the national authorities** (e.g., protection of civilians may be a priority approved by the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee for a future UN Field Mission, but it may not be a de facto priority of the national authorities)?

Are national priorities legitimate in the eyes of the regional- and county-level authorities or in the eyes of the population at large? Do they reflect the priorities of all segments of society, including women and children?

The UN Field Mission has **adequate support** for the proposed intervention from key stakeholders.

Is there adequate **political support in-country** for the UN Field Mission to carry out this type of intervention (at the national, regional and local levels of the national authorities and amongst civil society)? (e.g., if the national government has decided to reform its corrections service, does the leadership of this institution support this decision)

Is there adequate **political support** for the UN Field Mission to carry out this type of intervention at the **regional** (e.g., from neighbouring countries, with regional organizations such as the African Union) and **international levels** (e.g., the Security Council, other UN Member States, donors)?

Is there **support from key stakeholders working in these areas** (UNCT and non-UN partners such as the national authorities, donors, World Bank, local and international NGOs, civil society etc.) for the UN Field Mission to implement the proposed intervention?

The UN Field Mission, or UN peacekeeping more generally, has a **comparative advantage** to carry out the proposed intervention as compared to other UN or non-UN actors.

Organizational mandate to act

Does UN peacekeeping have a clear **mandate** to work in this area (e.g., Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, Decisions of the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General, UN inter-agency guidance, DPKO-DFS guidance, global agreements, country-level agreements, international agreements, conventions and treaties etc.)?
b. Can the proposed intervention be implemented within the lifecycle of a UN Field Mission?

c. Is the proposed intervention best implemented jointly with other Mission components or with other UN or non-UN partners to maximize impact and avoid duplication of effort?

Unique positioning to act

d. Does UN peacekeeping have a good reputation or proven track record in this area of work (see also A.1.)?

e. Does UN peacekeeping have the legitimacy vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict to work on the proposed intervention?

f. Is the UN Field Mission likely to have access to, or influence over, the relevant key decision-makers?

g. Does UN peacekeeping have clear guidance or standards for this area of work (DPKO-DFS policies, SOPs, guidelines, international standards, and other UN inter-agency guidance etc.)?

h. Can UN peacekeeping provide a multi-disciplinary approach to addressing a problem, using a broad range of skills and assets within a Mission (e.g., military and logistical expertise together with policing, judicial and correctional expertise)?

i. Does the current UN Field Mission have a presence outside of the capital city?

Capacity to act

Human resources

j. Can the UN Field Mission deploy the right number and type of personnel (with the right skills sets) to undertake the proposed intervention (e.g., experts in specific areas of law, police advisers with mentoring and advising skills, gender experts, programme management experts etc.)?

k. Can the required personnel be deployed within a reasonable timeframe (e.g., through standing capacities, stand-by arrangements, use of rosters of specialist experts, recruitment through the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) etc.)?

Logistics

l. Can the UN Field Mission provide adequate support services (infrastructure, logistics, communications, equipment, security for UN personnel and assets etc.) to undertake the proposed intervention, particularly outside of the capital? Do new team sites have to be built?

Financial

m. Is the UN Field Mission likely to secure or access the necessary financial resources to conduct the proposed intervention, within a reasonable timeframe (through assessed and/or voluntary contributions)?

n. Can the UN Field Mission implement the proposed intervention in a cost-effective manner (either directly (e.g., seconded prison officers deliver training to national counterparts directly), or by sub-contracting (e.g., certain mine clearance functions are sub-contracted out)?

o. Does the UN Field Mission have the necessary capacity or mechanism to administer voluntary funds that would be received to implement the proposed intervention?

Capacities of others

p. Are other UN and non-UN actors, who might play the same or a similar role, unlikely to have the capacity to deliver in the immediate future (i.e., whether they are likely to obtain the required funding and personnel with the right skills sets to implement the proposed intervention in the future)?
Checklist B. Sequencing considerations with guiding questions

B.1. Political, security, socio-economic and other conditions in the country may affect the timing of the proposed intervention.

a. What are the political priorities for the national authorities in years one, two and beyond? How does this coincide or differ with the priorities of the UN Field Mission? When is the proposed intervention likely to receive the most political support from the national authorities?

b. Are there going to be elections that could lead to a change in government and major change in policy direction or approach?

c. Are there going to be major events (e.g., elections, referendum) that will divert resources and attention of the senior leadership of the UN Field Mission away from the proposed intervention?

d. How susceptible is the proposed intervention to changes in the security situation in the country (e.g., increased insecurity could cut off access to certain areas of the country)?

e. How susceptible is the proposed intervention to changes in the socio-economic and environmental situation in the country (e.g., rises in prices of basic food commodities could trigger riots; drought could increase the need for police patrols around IDP camps as women venture further afield to find water and firewood)?

f. What are the geographic priorities for the UN Field Mission in the country? Which areas of the country are considered a political priority to stabilize first?

g. How will the seasons (e.g., rainy season) affect deployment of police personnel, travel, transportation and access to areas?

B.2. The capacity and willingness of national actors to absorb support offered may affect the timing of the proposed intervention.

a. Do the national authorities (and other beneficiaries) have the capacity to absorb assistance offered in the coming year(s)?

b. How long will it take to have a clear national counterpart in place?

c. Which are the most sensitive issues that may require more time to tackle and that rely on first establishing a strong relationship of trust with the national authorities and other relevant stakeholders (e.g., security sector reform and human rights)?

d. Is a quick-impact project required to gain the trust and cooperation of the national authorities, before the proposed intervention can be started (e.g., drilling a borehole for a prison can help generate the trust and cooperation of the national prison service thereby enabling the UN Field Mission to address more sensitive issues later on such as prison reform)?

B.3. UN Field Mission lead times may affect the timing of the proposed intervention.

a. How long will it take to get UN senior leadership in place (e.g., to conduct high-level advocacy with the government)?

b. How long will it take to generate/recruit the necessary UN personnel, particularly in remote field locations? Has the turn-over of staff been taken into account? Has gender balance been taken into account?

c. How long will it take to establish the team sites, set up the UN communications networks and procure the UN equipment required to undertake the proposed intervention?

d. How long will it take to secure voluntary funding and disburse it (if needed)?

e. Are necessary legal agreement(s) in place? If not, how long would it take to put them in place before the proposed intervention can be implemented (e.g., an MOU with another UN entity to use the UN Field Mission’s office space or vehicles)?

f. Does the UN Field Mission have to undertake an environmental impact assessment before undertaking the proposed intervention (e.g., for infrastructure rehabilitation or construction initiatives)?
B.4. The timing of the proposed intervention may be dependent on another intervention.

a. Will the proposed intervention enable, or facilitate, a follow-on task by the UN Field Mission or others (e.g., a police station may have to be refurbished before the UN Field Mission can mentor the national police at that location, or roads may first need to be demined to enable the UNCT to deliver humanitarian assistance)?

b. Do other UN and non-UN actors need to complete a task(s) before the proposed intervention can be implemented? (e.g., is a national government strategy required before the UN Field Mission can develop its own detailed plans?)

c. Can the proposed intervention only succeed if others provide assistance at the same time (e.g., efforts by the UN Field Mission to help the national police to bring perpetrators to justice will only succeed if the courts are functioning and can process the cases and if there is adequate space in prisons for new inmates)?

d. What timelines are stipulated in the peace agreement? (e.g., by when does the National DDR Commission have to be established?)
SECTION C: DEVELOPING A PLAN

I was planning mine clearance operations for 15 years before coming to the UN – I certainly don’t need someone to tell me how to plan!

Tamam! What you say is very valid. Every organization has its own way of doing business and of planning.

Providing advice on judicial reform is a highly sensitive, political process. I don’t see how that can be quantified and measured.

You’re right, some results are harder to measure than others. The Planning Toolkit helps by providing lots of examples of indicators that can be tailored to the local context, even sensitive, political processes.

Over time indicators can help tell you whether your advice on judicial reform is having the desired effect.

That’s great. The Planning Toolkit can help us with our monitoring and evaluation.
Tool 4. Checklist of minimum content for component-level plans

How to use this tool

The checklist should be followed by rule of law and security institutions components of a UN Field Mission when no official template exists for the production of a particular plan.

The checklist specifies categories of information that, at a minimum, must be included in plans produced by police, justice, corrections, security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and mine action field components. It also provides guidance on the content of optional, additional categories that may be included in plans.

All the information in the checklist need not be included in every single plan produced by a component. However, the minimum content in this checklist should be evident if one were to look at the entire range of plans produced by a component. For instance, if a justice component produces a multi-year strategy and an annual workplan, these two documents should, between the two of them, contain the minimum content in the checklist. Templates and an example of an annual workplan are provided in “Tool 5. Templates and samples of good practice of component-level plans.”

Checklist on minimum content for component-level plans

☐ Timeframe covered by the plan

☐ Objectives*

☐ Expected accomplishments* and related indicators*

☐ Outputs* and related deadline* for completion of each output

☐ Roles and responsibilities* (i.e., the division of labour: which organization, unit or individual is responsible for implementing each output)

☐ Resource needs (i.e., inputs in terms of assessed and voluntary funds, personnel, equipment, infrastructure etc.)

☐ Planning assumptions

☐ Risks and risk management measures

☐ Monitoring and evaluation system

Cross-cutting considerations (e.g., gender, human rights, protection of civilians, HIV/AIDS) and linkages between the work of the police, justice, corrections, SSR, DDR and mine action components should be mainstreamed throughout the content of the plan.

* This information can be represented in the form of a matrix called a logical framework (Logframe).
**Optional additional content for component-level plans**

Unless an official template exists, components may wish to add other categories of information to their component-level plans. The component should decide which, if any, of the following additional categories are appropriate, depending on the type of plan and specific context:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic direction</th>
<th>Implementation arrangements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Mandate(s)</td>
<td>• Communications plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mission statement</td>
<td>• Training for UN personnel (e.g., training to build the capacity of national staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• End-state</td>
<td>• Administrative and financial arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Guiding principles</td>
<td>• Logistics and equipment (e.g., air and ground transportation, medical services, camp management services, procurement, engineering requirements, information technology equipment etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deployment plans for personnel and equipment (e.g., for the police or for mine action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Related guidance and instructions (e.g., internal standard operating procedures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Situation analysis/assessment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Situation analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Data collection and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lessons learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Plan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organization and structure of the component (e.g., number and location of field sub-offices, reporting lines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Information handling and reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordination mechanisms (within the UN Field Mission and with other UN and non-UN actors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Linkages with UN Field Mission plans, other UN plans and non-UN plans (e.g., national strategies and plans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Draw-down and transition arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sustainability and exit strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitoring and evaluation plan see “Tool 5. Templates and samples of good practice of component-level plans”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revisions (e.g., a proposed date when the plan needs to be revised or a history of prior revisions to the plan)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Change management plan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Visibility (i.e., how to implement visibility requirements of donors for outputs funded through voluntary contributions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reference documents (i.e., documents consulted in developing the plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Distribution list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Annexes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maps (e.g., of areas of operation, team sites etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organigramme for the component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Staffing table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Division of labour table for the component or unit (e.g., showing lead and alternate focal point responsibilities for geographic areas, thematic issues and working groups) see “Tool 5. Templates and samples of good practice of component-level plans:”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tool 5. Templates and samples of good practice of component-level plans

Tool 5.1. Samples of annual workplans

Purpose and content

Two samples of annual workplans for a rule of law and security institutions component in a UN Field Mission are attached: one for a traditional peacekeeping mission (MINURSO mine action) and one for a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation in a country with an integrated UN field presence (UNOCI mine action).

The samples comply with the guidance in this Toolkit in that they contain the minimum content outlined in “Tool 4. Checklist of minimum content for component-level plans” and follow the dos and don’ts contained in “Tool 6. Checklists of dos and don’ts and examples to develop component-level plans”.

Structure

The annual workplan has three parts to it:

1. A narrative section providing an overview of the entire workplan;
2. A logframe that summarizes the main elements of the workplan and can be used to track the status of outputs;
3. An activities tracking sheet to track the status of activities.

How to use the annual workplan

The logframe is a useful tool for discussions with Mission leadership on the status of implementation of a component’s plan, and for reporting on progress to Mission management and Member States, including donors.

The activities tracking sheet is a useful tool for the head of a component to track the status of implementation of activities within his/her component.

Format

This Planning Toolkit does not require any specific format for an annual workplan. However, should a component wish to follow the template of an annual workplan used for these two samples, it can be found on the Peace Operations Intranet.

A few tips on developing an annual workplan

Dos –

1. As a general rule, **align the annual workplan with the budget cycle** of the UN Field Mission (i.e., July to June, or January to December).

2. **First develop a draft annual workplan** and then extract relevant elements and insert them into the Mission’s Results-based Budget Framework.

3. **Align the content of the workplan with higher-level plans** (e.g., national strategies, UN-wide plans such as an Integrated Strategic Framework and Mission-wide plans such as a Mission Concept).

4. **Consult colleagues in the component widely when developing the workplan** (e.g., through a one-day retreat for the component).

5. **Consult other actors widely when developing the workplan**. Broad consultations with other Mission components, particularly rule of law and security institutions components, other UN entities, the national authorities and other non-UN actors ensures coherence of effort and avoids duplication of effort.
Mandate
Affirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire;

*Security Council Resolution 1598 (2005), para. 2*

**Background rationale**

Since the withdrawal of Spain from Western Sahara in 1976 and the ensuing conflict between Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), Western Sahara’s territory has been contaminated with an unknown quantity of mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). While no full landmine impact survey has ever been conducted, a Dangerous Area survey completed in 2008 by the non-governmental organisation “Landmine Action UK” (LMA) now re-named Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) led researchers to conclude that it is one of the most heavily mined territories in the world.

In 1999, the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and the POLISARIO signed a military agreement wherein they agreed to clear mines/ERW in the territory under their control. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) is mandated by the Security Council (see above reference) to implement military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire. This provides MINURSO with the mandate to implement Military Agreement No. 2, relative to the reduction of danger of mines and Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs), 1999 and Military Agreement No. 3 for the purpose of reducing the danger of mines and UXOs, 1999 signed between the RMA and POLISARIO.

In 2008, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) established a Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) within MINURSO. The rationale for the MACC operations lies in its ability to provide coordination and technical support on mine action issues to both parties to the conflict. Under the supervision of the MINURSO MACC, UNMAS’ implementing partner, a joint venture established between AOAV and Mechem, conducts mine clearance operations east of the berm in POLISARIO-controlled territory. Mine clearance operations west of the berm are conducted by the RMA. The MACC plays a key role in ensuring that the mine action response evolves to meet the scope and scale of the threat, and in monitoring that operations are coordinated, prioritised, tasked and conducted in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

**Situation analysis**

Significant mine and ERW contamination continues to pose a daily threat to the local population and UN personnel in Western Sahara. Areas on both sides of the berm, as well as more than 200 other known areas throughout Western Sahara, are contaminated by mines/ERW. The continued presence of these items constitutes a high threat for more than 10,000 Saharan nomads and their families, as well as UN personnel monitoring the ceasefire. The existence of such a large number of dangerous areas hinders the repatriation of an estimated 120,000 Saharan refugees and displaced persons, and the safe pursuit of livelihoods.

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1 Military Agreement No. 2, Relative to the reduction of danger of mines and UXOs, 1999; Military Agreement No. 3 for the purpose of reducing the danger of mines and UXOs, 1999.

2 The “Berm” of Western Sahara (also known as the Moroccan Wall) is an approximately 2,700 km-long defensive structure, mostly a sand wall, running through Western Sahara and the southeastern portion of Morocco. It acts as a separation barrier between the Moroccan-controlled areas and the Polisario-controlled section of the territory that lies along its eastern and southern border (Source: Wikipedia).
In 2011, the MACC, through its contractor AOAV, has completed the explosive ordnance disposal of UXOs in more than 500 known locations that resulted from a survey conducted in 2006/7. In the process, more than 7,000 UXOs have been destroyed. This included aircraft bombs, artillery projectiles, rocket propelled grenades, mortar bombs and hand grenades. In addition, the MACC is supervising clearance of cluster munitions, east of the berm through a contract with AOAV/Mechem.

Since 2009, after completion of the general mine action assessment, up to 2011, the focus has been on clearing cluster munitions and destruction of un-exploded ordnance. AOAV/Mechem has cleared a total of 16,038,698 m² of previously contaminated land and destroyed over 11,519 clusters bomb units. The clearance of such large portions of land east of the berm has resulted in this land now being productively utilized by Saharans.

Now that the threat from cluster munitions east of the berm has largely been reduced with fewer than 20 cluster strike areas remaining to be cleared, the focus on the MACC from 2012 will shift from Battle Area Clearance to clearance of minefields. The flat and slightly undulated terrain throughout the region makes it ideal to use mechanical assets to accelerate demining operations. Although the initial investment in procuring mechanical assets may be judged expensive, in the longer-term it is more cost-effective than manual clearance techniques, which are labor-intensive and time-consuming. Mechanical demining will require training of contractors operating east of the berm, so that they will obtain operational accreditation by the MACC on mechanical integrated clearance techniques and operate safely.

**Priorities for 2012-13**

The MINURSO MACC aims to support implementation of Military Agreements 2 and 3 and Security Council resolution 1598 (2005) paragraph 2, by fulfilling the following objective: “To reduce the threat from landmines and ERW on both sides of the berm”. This objective also advances the political objectives of MINURSO since collaboration on mine action issues, a relatively non-contentious issue for the parties to the conflict, should contribute to building confidence between the two parties.

The MINURSO MACC annual work plan for 2012-13 is also in line with the Mission’s Result-based budgeting framework. The work plan contains three main expected accomplishments:

1. Safe movement of civilians in Western Sahara;
2. Improved mine action operational capacity of the parties to the conflict; and,
3. Protection of UN personnel and other humanitarian workers in Western Sahara from the threat of mines and ERW.

1. **Safe movement of civilians in Western Sahara**

Under the first expected accomplishment, the MACC will focus on areas east of the berm and conduct clearance of contaminated land, mine awareness safety training for UN personnel, mine risk education trainings for the local population, maintenance of an emergency response team, along with Quality Assurance (QA) visits conducted to monitor the MACC implementing partner (AOAV/Mechem). In 2012-13, the MACC will prioritize clearance of the high- and medium-priority known minefields, comprising 137 km². As of February 2012, through a contract with AOAV/Mechem, mechanical demining operations will commence east of the berm, starting from Team Site (TS) Mijek Area of Responsibility (AOR). The primary purpose of these activities and outputs is to protect civilian nomadic populations transiting across the desert in search of water and grazing land from the threat of landmines and ERW. This is in direct fulfilment of Military Agreement 2 and 3. In addition, the MACC’s operations will have the longer-term effect of improving the socio-economic condition of the civilian nomadic populations east of the berm, as land previously suspected of contamination being contaminated with UXOs is now being cleared and productively utilized by Saharans.

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3 Battle Area Clearance “refers to the systematic and controlled clearance of hazardous areas where the hazards are known not to include mines”, IMAS 09.11, First Edition, 01 September 2007.
by mines and ERW is put to productive uses (e.g., used for livestock grazing, to access markets and water points, and to build schools and hospitals). Lastly, mine clearance operations will enhance the mobility of MINURSO military observers and thereby facilitate their ability to monitor the ceasefire between the parties. In an effort to create awareness of the dangers posed by Explosive Remnants of War in the region, personnel from the MACC will conduct Mine Awareness safety training to all new Military Observers, as well as civilian staff. Such training is compulsory and only members who have successfully completed the training are allowed to deploy in the region. In addition to the said training, MACC personnel will also conduct refresher training for military observers on location at the Team sites on a quarterly basis. MINURSO will conduct mine risk education to an estimated 15,000 Saharans east of the berm and in refugee camps in Tindouf through its implementing partners, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines.

2. Improved mine action operational capacity of the parties to the conflict

Under the second expected accomplishment, the MACC is aiming to build local capacity to manage the threat from mines and ERW in the longer-term. This will enable the UN to exit and leave behind a sustainable capacity. To achieve increased safety of clearance operations and techniques, it is of utmost importance that International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) be applied in daily operations, east and west of the berm. To this end, the MACC will work towards fostering cooperation with the RMA, through providing advice on mine clearance procedures and safety procedures and through advocacy through the Permanent Mission of Morocco on the importance of adherence to IMAS. East of the berm, the MACC will focus on building a fledgling, local managerial capacity to manage mine clearance operations. The current POLISARIO focal point on mine action in its “Ministry of Defence” will receive formal and on-the-job training to improve his knowledge of IMAS, and to adjust to a shift from overseeing clearance operations using Battle Area Clearance (BAC) to mechanical mine field clearance techniques.

3. Protection of UN personnel and other humanitarian workers in Western Sahara from the threat of mines and ERW

Under the third expected accomplishment, the MACC plans to conduct mine awareness trainings for all MINURSO newcomers (civilian and military) and targeted refreshment trainings for Military Observers in the TSs, west and east of the berm. This is expected to help prevent casualties amongst UN military and civilian personnel from mines and ERW.

Resource needs
Personnel
To implement these priorities for 2012-13, the following staffing is required for the MACC: 1 × P-4 (Head and Senior Technical Adviser), 2 × P-3 (Operations/Quality Assurance (QA) Officers), 2 × P-2 (Programme Officer (PO) and Information Management Officer (IMO)). All personnel will be requested through the peacekeeping budget, with the exception of one P-3 Operations/QA Officer, who will be requested as an in-kind contribution from Member States or funded through the Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action. In addition, the MACC has a Military Liaison Officer (MLO) embedded in the MACC, who reports to the military component of the Mission, as well as to the head of the MACC. All MACC personnel will be based in Laayoune, except for the P-3 Operations/QA Officer, funded as an in-kind contribution from a Member States or through the Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action, who would be based in Tindouf, southern Algeria. Locating an additional Operations/QA Officer in southern Algeria would enable MINURSO to maintain closer and more regular contact with the POLISARIO focal point on mine action in its “Ministry of Defence” based in Tindouf, and facilitate travel to RMA areas west of the berm.

Equipment
To enhance the transition from BAC operations to mine field clearance operations, the MACC foresees the procurement of a minimum of one additional mechanical asset through the contractor AOAV/Mechem in 2012/13 funded from the peacekeeping budget. It should be noted, that only one such mechanical
asset is totally inadequate to comprehensively address the threat in a reasonable time frame of less than five years. The MACC will therefore require additional funding from 2013 onwards to ensure accelerated clearance of the mine fields.

**Funding**

Funding has been requested from the peacekeeping budget for 2012/13 for a total of USD 2,894,283. This represents a 29 percent increase from the amount approved in the support account for MINURSO mine action activities in 2011/12. This increase is to cover additional costs associated with mine clearance. In addition, voluntary funding will be requested from various donors for USD 1,304,000 to cover additional mine clearance operations by AOAV-Mechem. For 2012, the MACC has already secured voluntary funding from the Spanish Development Agency for a total amount of EUR 150,000 to cover mine risk education activities implemented by NPA and Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines.

**Planning Assumptions**

The MINURSO MACC planning is based on the following assumptions:

1. The ceasefire between the RMA and the Frente POLISARIO will continue to hold and no new mines will be laid.
2. Rainfall will be moderate, so there will be no significant migration of mines.
3. Both parties will remain willing to cooperate and receive technical assistance from the MACC.
4. An additional P-3 Operations/QA officer will be received either as an in-kind contribution from a Member State or funded through the Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action.
5. Voluntary funding of USD 1.3 million will be received.

**Risks and Risk Management Strategies**

**Expected accomplishment 1: Safe movement of civilians in Western Sahara**

**Risk 1: Resumption of the conflict between the RMA and POLISARIO resulting in:**

- New mines being laid. **Risk Management:** Increase the level of political engagement by the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Western Sahara and Senior MINURSO leadership with technical assistance from the MINURSO MACC to both parties to allow for the thorough mapping of Dangerous Areas. In addition, the MACC will endeavor to upkeep the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database with the maximum accuracy.
- Lack of access to areas. **Risk Management:** Establish an information flow system whereby the local population and Military Observers can inform the MACC of newly found hazardous areas; map all such newly reported hazardous areas and disseminate updated maps; enhance community liaison to gather and disseminate related hazardous area information.

**Risk 2: Heavy rains resulting in:**

- Migration of known mines. **Risk Management:** In coordination with MINURSO, the MACC and its implementing partner will conduct reconnaissance missions to known Dangerous Areas, following heavy rains and sandstorms; Increase community liaison to inform communities of new hazards.
- Increased number of accidents. **Risk Management:** Install marking signs along drainage areas adjacent to mine fields to which mines may have migrated.


**Risk 4: Member States will not approve the 29 percent increase in funding requested through the peacekeeping budget for 2012/13, resulting in a reduction in the area of land cleared of landmines, thereby increasing the risk of casualties from mines east of the berm. **Risk Management:** Seek funding from the VTF instead; For mine fields that cannot be cleared due to lack of funds, revert to installing permanent markings around mine fields to warn the local population of the presence of mines.
Risk 5: An additional P-3 Operations/QA officer based in Tindouf is not secured, resulting in:

- Fewer quality assurance visits conducted east of the berm by the Operations/QA Officer based in Laayoune due to increased time spent travelling to Tindouf, resulting in increased risk of non-compliance by AOAV-Mechem and increased risk of accidents and casualties. **Risk management**: The MACC cannot mitigate this risk.
- Less land certified as safe from mines and released. **Risk management**: The MACC cannot mitigate this risk.

**Risk 6**: Voluntary funding of USD 1.3 million is not secured, resulting in less land cleared of landmines, thereby increasing the risk of casualties from mines east of the berm. **Risk Management**: For mine fields that cannot be cleared due to lack of funds, revert to installing permanent marking around them to warn the local population of the presence of mines.

**Expected accomplishment 2**: Improved mine action operational capacity of the parties to the conflict

**Risk**: The RMA and the POLISARIO refuse to cooperate and receive technical assistance from the MACC, resulting in more demining accidents and increased risk of casualties.

**Risk Management**: Increase the level of political engagement with both parties to the conflict, through involvement of MINURSO SRSG and UNMAS’ Director’s increased advocacy with the Permanent Mission of Morocco.

**Expected accomplishment 3**: Protection of UN personnel and other humanitarian workers in Western Sahara from the threat of mines and ERW

Same as risks 1 and 2 (and related risk mitigation measures) under the first expected accomplishment.

**Monitoring and evaluation system**

The MINURSO MACC’s Operations/QA Officer(s) will be in charge of maintaining a portfolio of evidence on all indicators and outputs mentioned in the 2012/13 annual workplan (see Annex 1: Annual workplan log frame). This portfolio of evidence will contain data on progress towards, or achievement of the indicators and outputs, as well as information on data collection methods used. The following data sources will be used:

- Field data collected by the MACC i.e., data on outputs of the MACC, data on deaths or injuries to UN personnel due to landmines/ERW obtained from the Mission’s security focal point and military observers visiting RMA demining caps.
- Data on casualties amongst the Saharan population east of the berm from accidents caused by landmines and ERW collected from the POLISARIO mine action focal point, AOAV/Mechem collect data on increased area of land used for socio-economic purposes through post-clearance survey.
- Field data from AOAV/Mechem on its mine clearance operations.
- Results from a Mine Field Technical Survey conducted by AOAV/Mechem before the start of mine clearance operations.
- Results from one Knowledge and Attitude survey conducted by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) before conducting mine risk education sessions and the survey repeated after the training.
- Outcome documents from the 12th Meeting of the State Parties.
In 2012/13, AOAV-Mechem will have to be accredited by the MACC to use mechanical assets to clear minefields. This will involve operational accreditation of its survey and clearance standards. In addition to this measure, the Operations/QA officer will be responsible for the conduct of at least 10 quality assurance assessments to monitor the quality of the work of AOAV-Mechem. Any assessment reporting below average or non-conformance will require the contractor to suspend all operations. The contractor will be instructed to conduct refresher trainings and operations will only resume if the contractor achieves a quality assurance assessment result that is above average or higher. In addition, on completion of a task, the Operations/QA officer will sample at least 10 percent of cleared land. Only if the required standard of clearance has been achieved, will the land be certified cleared and safe for intended use. After approximately one year, the implementing partner will be tasked to conduct a post-clearance survey to determine if the land has been used and what the beneficiary result of such usage was. Post-clearance surveys will also determine if any accidents occurred on such land, in the immediate vicinity and/or adjacent to the released land. During 2012/13, AOAV-Mechem is expected to conduct one post-clearance survey of land cleared in 2011/12. All such data, after verification, will be captured in the dedicated mine action database, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).

Despite capturing post-clearance data, all data obtained on new Dangerous Areas or Victims Reports recorded by MINURSO Military Observers and AOAV/Mechem, Mine Field Technical surveys and Knowledge and Attitude Surveys will also be maintained in the IMSMA system. Such pre-clearance data is essential for the MACC to plan its activities in detail.

For a summary of the key elements of the MINURSO annual workplan for 2012-13, see Annex 1: Logframe. For a detailed timeline of activities, see Annex 2: Activities tracking sheet.
### Logframe for the annual workplan for the MINURSO mine action component
(1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Expected accomplishment</th>
<th>Performance indicator/indicator of achievement</th>
<th>Output/deliverable</th>
<th>Lead (support)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To reduce the threat from landmines and ERW on both sides of the berm</td>
<td>1. Safe movement of civilians in Western Sahara [Resolution 1598 (2005); Military Agreements no. 2-3; S/2009/200; S/2010/175; S/2011/249]</td>
<td>Maintenance of no casualties amongst the Saharan population east of the berm from accidents caused by landmines and ERW (2010/11: 3 casualties; 2011/12: 0 casualties; 2012/13: 0 casualties)</td>
<td>1.1. Clearance or release of 1,000,000 m² of minefields and suspected hazardous areas through subsurface demining to the local communities [RBB 2012-13 output 1]</td>
<td>AOAV-Mechem</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increased area of land used for socio-economic purposes by the Saharan population in the Area of Operation east of the berm, after being verified as safe from landmines and unexploded ordnance (2010/11: 750,000 m²; 2011/12: 1,000,000 m²; 2012/13: 1,200,000 m²)</td>
<td>1.2. 10 quality assurance assessment visits to mine/ERW clearance operations of AOAV-Mechem east of the berm [RBB 2012-13 output 3]</td>
<td>MINURSO MACC</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3. Delivery of mine risk education trainings to an estimated 15,000 Saharans east of the berm and in the refugee camps in Tindouf [funded through voluntary contributions from the Spanish Development Agency]</td>
<td>NPA (Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines)</td>
<td>31-Dec-12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.4. Maintenance of an emergency response team 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assist with any mines or explosive remnants of war accidents east of the berm</td>
<td>AOAV-Mechem</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Align with the overall objectives of the UN Field Mission

Measures progress towards, or achievement of, the expected accomplishment. It does not measure the outputs.

Indicates which mission component or other UN or non-UN entity has the lead for implementing a particular output, and who is in a support role.

The mission component must be able to make a plausible claim to have contributed to the expected accomplishment.

Must be within the capacity of the mission component to deliver. Outputs contribute to the expected accomplishment.

Indicates the date by which an output must be completed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Expected accomplishment</th>
<th>Performance indicator/indicator of achievement</th>
<th>Output/deliverable</th>
<th>Lead (support)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To reduce the threat from landmines and ERW on both sides of the berm</td>
<td>To reduce the threat from landmines and ERW on both sides of the berm</td>
<td>Reflection of a decision to align RMA clearance procedures with the International Mine Action Standards in a declaration at the 12th Meeting of the States Parties in 2012/13</td>
<td>2.1. Advice, through 3 meetings, with the Royal Moroccan Army on mine clearance techniques including safety procedures</td>
<td>MINURSO MACC</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decrease in the percentage of reported cases of non-conformity by AOAV and Mechem with international mine action standards that are considered life-threatening (2010/11: 2 cases; 2011/12: 1 case; 2012/13: 0 cases)</td>
<td>2.2. Advocacy campaign with the Royal Moroccan Army on the need to adhere to international mine action standards</td>
<td>UNMAS HQ/ MINURSO MACC</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of a senior management capacity for the local mine action capacity east of the berm</td>
<td>2.3. Establishment of a senior management capacity for the local mine action capacity east of the berm</td>
<td>MINURSO MACC</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Protection of UN personnel in Western Sahara from the threat of landmines and ERW</td>
<td>Maintenance of no casualties amongst UN personnel in Western Sahara due to landmines/ERW in 2012/13 (2010/11: 0 casualties; 2011/12: 0 casualties; 2012/13: 0 casualties)</td>
<td>2.1. Training of all MINURSO newcomers on mine awareness, through 36 training sessions for a total of 250 persons</td>
<td>MINURSO MACC</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2. Refresher training for all MINURSO UNMOs on mine awareness through 24 training sessions in 9 team sites for a total of 180 UNMOs</td>
<td>MINURSO MACC</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3. Maintain and update the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) within 30 days from completion of demining task [RBB 2012 - 2013 output 4]</td>
<td>MINURSO MACC</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Acronyms**

- AOAV-Mechem: Action on Armed Violence (AOAV)-Mechem
- ERW: Explosive Remnants of War
- IMSMA: Information Management System for Mine Action
- MACC: Mine Action Coordination Centre
- MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
- NPA: Norwegian Peoples Aid
- UNMOs: United Nations Military Observers
- QA: Quality Assurance
- Frente POLISARIO: Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagua el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro
- RMA: Royal Moroccan Army
- UNMAS: UN Mine Action Service (in DPKO Headquarters)

**Status**

1. 1 or green = on schedule
2. 2 or orange = potential for delays
3. 3 or red = no progress/significantly behind schedule
4. 4 or blue = completed
### Activities tracking sheet for the annual workplan of the MINURSO mine action component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Lead (support) (in unit)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1. Clearance of release of 1,000,000 m² of minefields and suspected hazardous areas through subsurface demining to the local communities.</strong></td>
<td>AOAV/Mechem</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1.1. Mine Field Technical Survey.</strong> AOAV/Mechem</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1.2. Clearance operations.</strong> AOAV/Mechem</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Stand Down</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1.3. Post-clearance survey to be conducted in 2012-13.</strong> AOAV/Mechem</td>
<td>01-Jun-13</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.2. 10 quality assurance assessment visits to mine/ERW clearance operations of AOAV/Mechem east of the berm.</strong></td>
<td>MACC Operations/QA Officer</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>1 visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.2.1. Conduct QA assessment visits.</strong> MACC Operations/QA Officer</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>5 forms</td>
<td>15 forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.2.2. Produce reports.</strong> NPA (Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>5 forms</td>
<td>15 forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.3. Delivery of mine risk education trainings to an estimated 15,000 Saharans east of the berm.</strong></td>
<td>NPA (Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.3.1. Knowledge &amp; Attitude Survey.</strong> NPA (Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.3.2. Mine risk education trainings.</strong> NPA (Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.3.3. Distribution of mine risk informative material.</strong> NPA (Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.4  Maintenance of an emergency response team 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to assist with any mines or explosive remnants of war accidents east of the berm.</strong></td>
<td>AOAV/Mechem</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.4.1. 2 refresher trainings.</strong> AOAV/Mechem</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.1. Advice, through 3 meetings, with the Royal Moroccan Army on mine clearance techniques including safety procedures.</strong></td>
<td>MACC Senior Technical Adviser</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Lead (support) (in unit)</td>
<td>Deadline 2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.2. Advocacy campaign with the Royal Moroccan Army on the need to adhere to international mine action standards.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1. Development of an advocacy strategy.</td>
<td>MACC (UNMAS)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2. 3 meetings between UNMAS and the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the UN.</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.3. Establishment of a senior management capacity for the national mine action capacity east of the berm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1. Secure funding for the POLISARIO Liaison Officer for mine action to attend an internationally recognised Operations/QM training, focusing on landmine clearance.</td>
<td>MACC PO</td>
<td>30-Jun-13</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2. 3 meetings with the POLISARIO Liaison Officer for information exchange.</td>
<td>MACC Senior Technical Adviser</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.1. Training of all MINURSO newcomers on mine awareness, through 36 training sessions for a total of 250 persons.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1. 36 trainings for MINURSO newcomers.</td>
<td>MACC Operations/QA Officer (MACC MLO)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>9 trainings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.2. Refresher training for all MINURSO UNMOs on mine awareness through 24 training sessions in 9 team sites for a total of 180 UNMOs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. Twenty-four refresher trainings on mine awareness in 9 team sites for UN Military Observers.</td>
<td>MACC Operations/QA Officer (MACC MLO)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>6 trainings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3.3. Maintain and update the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) within 30 days from completion of demining task.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1. Capturing of data into the IMSMA database within 30 days from the completion of demining task.</td>
<td>MACC IMO</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 or blue = completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once the plan is underway, use the traffic lights colours or numbering to show progress or otherwise. Comments can be added to the column."
United Nations Mine Action Service in Côte d’Ivoire

UNOCI Mine Action Component Annual Workplan
1 July 2012-30 June 2013
(information as of 17 February 2012)

Mandates
The programme is adhering to the “Protection and Security” mandate as set out in Security Council Resolution 2000 (2011), including the following operative paragraphs: (a) protection of civilians; (b) stabilisation of the security situation; (c) monitoring of the arms embargo; (d) collection of weapons; (e) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme (DDR); and, (f) reconstitution and reform of security and rule of law institutions. Specific wording is found in paragraph (d): “To continue to assist the national authorities, including the National Commission to fight against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, in collecting, registering, securing and disposing of weapons and in clearing explosive remnants of war, as appropriate, in accordance with resolution 1980 (2011).”

The programme is further mandated by international and regional disarmament treaties including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Background rationale
In April 2011, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) conducted an emergency assessment of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)\(^1\), in the wake of the post-election crisis. A problem of unexploded and abandoned ordnance was identified, in addition to that of weapons insecurity. Reporting to the DDR-SSR Division, a Mine Action programme was duly established.

Unexploded and abandoned ordnance
The post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire generated a problem of unexploded and abandoned ordnance in both Abidjan and the provinces. Unexploded ordnance resulted from force-on-force engagements between (i). pro-Ouattara and pro-Gbagbo forces and, (ii). other fighting in which UN peacekeepers and/or the French Forces were involved. Abandoned ordnance resulted from hasty withdrawals from military positions, including barracks.

During 2011, UNMAS deployed specialist teams from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and HALO Trust. In the course of their explosive ordnance disposal work, some 178 missions were completed, leading to the clearance and destruction of 5,978 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

The position as of February 2012 is that while the bulk of the clearance has been completed, recent incidents have highlighted that the problem remains. On 19 January 2012, 14 Katusha rockets were found by the civilian population in a river bed in the West of the country; this caused considerable concern to the community. Second, on 8 February, six children (between the ages of 3 and 12) were injured by a hand grenade while they looked for scrap metal.

Insecure weapons and ammunition
The proliferation of weapons in-country remains a concern to all stakeholders in Côte d’Ivoire; therefore, disarmament is high on the agenda. At the time of writing in February 2012, UNOCI is facilitating weapons collections (on a voluntary basis), ahead of a planned, large-scale DDR programme in which some 40,000 persons will be disarmed.

There is a requirement for Mine Action support to ensure that disarmament operations are conducted in a safe manner, and that weapons and ammunition collected through these operations are processed

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\(^1\) Explosive remnants of war is defined as “Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO)” (Source: 3.91. International Mine Action Standards 4.10 “Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations).
safely. Ammunition that is considered to be unserviceable is being destroyed by UNOCI; unserviceable weapons will also be destroyed upon request by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire.

National capacity to manage and secure weapons and ammunition
Due to the lack of training and an inadequate budget in recent years, the national capacity to manage and secure weapons and ammunition in Côte d’Ivoire (referred to hereafter as “Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM)”) has been seriously reduced. At the time of writing, there are very few examples of weapons or ammunition being stored by the military forces (FRCI), gendarmerie or police, in accordance with the ECOWAS standards for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) or with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs). This problem was identified by HALO Trust in the course of its earliest field reports in May 2011. In August 2011, there was an unplanned explosive incident in Daloa in which two persons were killed and five injured due to poor storage conditions.

The mine action component is providing technical advice in 2011/12 to ensure that new national standards on PSSM are developed in compliance with international obligations. It is expected that these new national standards on PSSM will be approved by the Government and ready for implementation by 1 July 2012.

The mine action component has confirmed the presence of both cluster munitions and anti-personnel blast mine stockpiles in Côte d’Ivoire. The Air Force presently has no working air fleet and therefore there is no justification for aircraft bombs (of which more than 300 have been identified) or indeed cluster bombs (17 identified). Equally, there is no justification for landmine stockpiles (more than 800 have been recorded in national stores), given that the country has signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and has therefore agreed to destroy all such stockpiles.

Priorities for 2012-13
The 2012-13 workplan builds on 2011-12 efforts and develops, in particular, the DDR and PSSM components. Efforts will also be made to assist Côte d’Ivoire in meeting its obligations under international laws and frameworks, as outlined above.

UNOCI’s efforts in 2012-13 will focus on supporting stabilization of the security situation, in particular in Abidjan and in the west. The mine action component will contribute to this overall objective of the Mission by reducing the threat posed by insecure weapons and ammunition in these areas. UNOCI also aims to reconstitute and reform security and rule of law institutions. The mine action component will help professionalize the security forces by developing their capacity to manage and secure weapons and ammunition. To achieve its objective of reducing the threat posed by insecure weapons and ammunition in the country, the mine action component is aiming to contribute to the following three results (or “expected accomplishments”):

1) Improved protection of civilians;
2) Safe handling and securing of insecure weapons and ammunitions obtained through DDR operations; and
3) Enhanced national capacity to manage and secure weapons and ammunition in Côte d’Ivoire.

Expected Accomplishment 1 – Improved protection of civilians
The mine action component, through Halo Trust, will conduct 100 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks. The coordination of EOD efforts will continue via quarterly coordination meetings. The mine action component works with the national focal point for Mine Action and maintains coordination with UNOCI Engineer assets. The mine action component also liaises with UNICEF, who conducts mine risk education on UNOCI FM radio targeting children in particular. Key messages include a request to the local population to contact UNOCI mine action when they find ERW lying around so that an EOD team can be send out to destroy it.
Expected Accomplishment 2 – Safe handling and securing of insecure weapons and ammunitions obtained through DDR operations

The UNOCI mine action component is providing technical support for all DDR operations. The workload is based on a projected number of 24,000 ex-combatants to be demobilised in 2012/13 out of a total caseload of 40,000 ex-combatants. This will generate significant numbers of weapons and ammunition to be processed. The mine action component will continue to work in partnership with the DDR section and the national commission for DDR. Unsafe weapons and ammunition will be removed from ex-combatants and stored in temporary storage facilities managed by UNOCI, until they are destroyed. During the processing of these weapons and ammunition, the mine action component will screen for illegal weapons that have been smuggled into the country from neighbouring countries in violation of the arms embargo (SCR 1572 (2004)). Illegal weapons will be isolated and kept apart, and dealt with by the UNOCI Embargo Unit. Unsafe weapons and ammunition will be destroyed. Serviceable weapons and ammunition will be retained in the temporary UNOCI facilities, until the Mission leadership authorize their release into the hands of the FRCI, gendarmerie and police.

Expected Accomplishment 3 – Enhanced national capacity to manage and secure weapons and ammunition in Côte d’Ivoire

The UNOCI mine action component will continue to work with the FRCI, gendarmerie and the police to improve their Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) capacity. This will include the reconstruction of three national ammunition depots, 20 police ready rooms, 20 gendarmerie armouries and 20 FRCI weapons/ammunition stores supported by the necessary technical training to ensure longer-term compliance with International Ammunition Technical Guidelines or ECOWAS SALW standards. The focal point for PSSM is the FRCI Logistics Division; other stakeholders include the national commission for Small Arms and Light Weapons, and UNPOL. To ensure a coordinated approach between the international community and the national authorities on PSSM, the mine action component will provide secretariat support to an inter-agency working group on PSSM, which will, amongst other tasks, provide a forum for priority-setting, overseeing national capacity development initiatives and information exchange.

With regard to the legal framework, the mine action component will seek to advise the national focal point for mine action in relation to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Having signed the Treaty in 2000, Côte d’Ivoire must now honour its obligations to destroy its stockpiles (as per Article 4). In addition to advocacy efforts, the mine action component will provide technical advice on stockpile destruction. The mine action component, through HALO Trust, will also destroy the stockpiles, on request of the government.

In relation to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Côte d’Ivoire must now ratify the treaty, having signed it in 2008. Stockpile destruction is required according to Article 3. The UNOCI mine action component will advocate with the government in the hope that the convention will be ratified by 30 June 2013. However, given that the newly-elected national authorities face many competing priorities, it is possible that the convention will not be ratified within the timeframe of the workplan. Regardless of when the convention is ratified, the mine action component will still advocate for destruction in 2012/13 of the current stockpile of 17 cluster bombs and, through HALO Trust, destroy the stockpile, on request of the government.

Lastly, in relation to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the mine action component will aim to provide the necessary technical advice and resources to allow Côte d’Ivoire to be compliant with Article 16: “Management and Security of Stockpiles” and Article 17: “Collection and Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons”.
**Resource needs**

**Personnel**

The UNOCI mine action component will be staffed by the following five international staff positions:

- 1 × Programme Manager (P-5);
- 1 × Ammunition and Weapons Management Officer (P-4);
- 1 × Chief of Operations (P-4);
- 1 × Programme Officer (P-3);
- 1 × Support Services Officer (P-3)

and the following national staff positions:

- 1 × Logistics Assistant
- 1 × Finance/Administration Assistant

**Equipment**

The procurement plan includes the provision of 2 × 4/4 vehicles.

**Funding**

The funding requirement for 2012-2013 is USD 7,400,000, and has been requested from the peacekeeping budget.

**Planning Assumptions**

Successful mine action support to UNOCI is subject to the following assumptions being met:

**Expected Accomplishment 1—Improved protection of civilians**

- Continued security access to the western regions (Man, Toulepleu, Tai)
- Continued quality work by the implementing partner Halo Trust

**Expected Accomplishment 2—Safe handling and securing of insecure weapons and ammunitions obtained through DDR operations**

- The DDR programme will start as foreseen on 1 July 2012 with a total caseload of 24,000 ex-combatants in 2012/13

**Expected Accomplishment 3—Enhanced national capacity to manage and secure weapons and ammunition in Côte d'Ivoire**

- National authorities (including the national focal point for mine action, FRCI, gendarmerie and police representatives, and the national commission for Small Arms and Light Weapons) take ownership on the question of weapons and ammunition management in Côte d'Ivoire.

**Risks and Risk Management Strategies**

**Expected Accomplishment 1—Improved protection of civilians**

**Risk 1:** Mine Action cannot access western regions due to insecurity (Man, Toulepleu, Tai).  
Likely impact(s): Mine Action cannot improve human security in those areas; increased chance of ERW-related incidents (leading to casualties).  
Mitigation measures: Be prepared to deploy national actors e.g., FRCI/Gendarmerie EOD teams instead of HALO Trust. This would entail additional training and quality management requirements for UNOCI Mine Action.

**Risk 2:** HALO Trust do not conduct work in accordance with international technical standards and guidelines.  
Likely impact(s): Increased chance of ERW-related incidents (leading to casualties); reputation of Mine Action programme diminished in the eyes of UNOCI and national institutions.
Mitigation measures: Mine Action will conduct 10 quality assurance visits in 2012/13 (see logframe outputs) to monitor HALO Trust’s adherence to EOD clearance standards (IMAS). Non-compliance will be addressed by contractual penalties.

**Expected Accomplishment 2 –Safe handling and securing of insecure weapons and ammunitions obtained through DDR operations**

Risk 3: DDR programme does not start on schedule.
Likely impact(s): Continued circulation of unsafe weapons and ammunition amongst ex-combatants (leading to continued risk of casualties and on-going risk of instability).
Mitigation measures: The mine action component cannot directly influence the first risk relating to the safety of the population. However, the mine action component would flag this likely impact to the head of the DDR component for appropriate action. In addition, to prevent mine action resources from standing idle, the mine action component will seek approval to re-orientate HALO Trust’s resources towards PSSM projects and training.

**Expected Accomplishment 3—Enhanced national capacity to manage and secure weapons and ammunition in Côte d’Ivoire**

Risk 4: National authorities do not take ownership of weapons and ammunition management and rehabilitated infrastructure is not properly maintained by the national authorities, thereby resulting in non-compliance with PSSM or ECOWAS SALW standards.
Likely impact(s): Increased risk of an unplanned explosion in a densely-populated urban area, leading to high numbers of casualties and damage to the credibility of the newly-elected national authorities and of UNOCI.
Mitigation measures: Monitoring of the infrastructure rehabilitated in 2012/13 to determine whether they are being properly maintained by the national authorities and issues of non-compliance noted and raised through the PSSM working group; Assessment of conditions in newly-identified weapons and ammunitions depots and immediate remedial action to address unsafe storage and management (e.g., separation of explosives from detonators).

**Monitoring and evaluation system**

The Chief of Operations and the Ammunition and Weapons Management Officer will monitor the work of implementing partners. This will cover all outputs and indicators relating to Explosive Ordnance Disposal operations, support to DDR weapons collections, and PSSM projects. Such data will be disaggregated by gender and age in order to allow for a more nuanced understanding of the problem and how to address it. The Chief of Operations manages an operations database which records all relevant operational statistics reported on a weekly basis by HALO Trust, including numbers of ERW destroyed/ammunition destroyed/stored/weapons destroyed/stored. The Ammunition Management Officer ensures that PSSM projects adhere to international guidelines, including the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and the ECOWAS Treaty on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

The current Implementing Partner, HALO Trust, is reporting to the programme on a weekly basis and a system of project handovers is in place. The handover of a completed project requires the sign-off of the following entities: (i). the Implementing Partner; (ii). the beneficiary e.g., FRCI/gendarmerie/police; and, (iii). the UNOCI mine action component.

The Programme Officer will monitor outputs and indicators relating to advocacy and adherence to the three international disarmament treaties, by reviewing government laws and decrees and reports from the relevant treaty implementation support teams (e.g. the Implementation Support Unit for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention).

The mine action component will maintain a portfolio of evidence on the outputs, as well as the indicators listed in the annual workplan matrix, and information on the data sources used (e.g., Halo weekly reports, government laws and decrees).
Evaluation of the programme will be at the discretion of UNMAS. Routine visits are planned but an external evaluation may be launched (subject to budget).

A mid-year review of progress against the workplan will be completed in December 2012 and an assessment of needs will again be formulated at this time.

For a summary of the key elements of the UNOCI mine action annual workplan for 2012-13, see Annex 1: Logframe. For a detailed timeline of activities, see Annex 2: Activities tracking sheet.
### Logframe for the annual workplan of the UNOCI mine action component
(1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Expected accomplishment</th>
<th>Performance indicator/indicator of achievement</th>
<th>Output/deliverable</th>
<th>Lead (support)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To reduce the threat posed by insecure weapons and ammunition in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>1. Improved protection of civilians in Côte d'Ivoire [as per RBB Component 1 - Safe and Secure Environment; as per ISF strategic outcome E]</td>
<td>Reduction in the number of casualties* amongst the local population from accidents caused by Explosive Remnants of War** (2010/11: N/A; 2011/12: 13 casualties; 2012/13: 0 casualties)</td>
<td>1.1. Execution of more than 100 Explosive Ordnance Disposal tasks, as requested by national institutions and/or civil society [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.1]</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>30.06.13</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1.2. Secretariat support to 4 meetings of the inter-agency coordination mechanism on Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) with national EOD teams, IP and UNOCI, including production of a workplan [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.1]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (national EOD teams; HALO Trust; UNOCI Force EOD)</td>
<td>30.06.13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The mission component must be able to make a plausible claim to have contributed to the expected accomplishment.**

**Indicates which mission component or other UN or non-UN entity has the lead for implementing a particular output, and who is in a support role.**

**Must be within the capacity of the mission component to deliver. Outputs contribute to the expected accomplishment.**

**The mission component must be able to make a plausible claim to have contributed to the expected accomplishment.**

**Indicates the date by which an output must be completed.**

**Align with the overall objectives of the UN Field Mission.**

**Measures progress towards, or achievement of, the expected accomplishment. It does not measure the outputs.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Expected accomplishment</th>
<th>Performance indicator/indicator of achievement</th>
<th>Output/deliverable</th>
<th>Lead (support)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To reduce the threat posed by insecure weapons and ammunition in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2. Safe handling and securing of insecure weapons and ammunitions obtained through DDR operations [as per SCR 2000 para d; and ISF strategic outcome C]</td>
<td>No casualties amongst ex-combatants and humanitarian workers from unsafe management of weapons and ammunition in the course of DDR operations in 2012/13</td>
<td>2.1. Removal and provision of temporary safe storage in UNOCI locations of all weapons and ammunition surrendered by 24,000 ex-combatants out of a total caseload of 40,000 ex-combatants [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.2]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (UNOCI DDR; Embargo; HALO Trust; National Commission for DDR; National Commission on SALW)</td>
<td>30.06.13</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2.2 Destruction of all unserviceable weapons and ammunition collected from 24,000 ex-combatants, out of a total caseload of 40,000 ex-combatants, between July 2012 and June 2013 [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.2]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (UNOCI DDR; Embargo; HALO Trust; National Commission for DDR; National Commission on SALW)</td>
<td>30.06.13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Four events to hand over serviceable weapons and ammunition to the security forces, identified through the disarmament of 24,000 ex-combatants, out of a total caseload of 40,000 ex-combatants [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.2]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (UNOCI DDR; Embargo; HALO Trust; National Commission for DDR; National Commission on SALW)</td>
<td>30.06.13</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Enhanced national capacity to manage and secure weapons and ammunition in Côte d’Ivoire [as per SCR 2000 (f) - capacity development through technical assistance; as per ISF strategic outcome C]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (UNOCI DDR; Embargo; HALO Trust; National Commission for DDR; National Commission on SALW)</td>
<td>30.06.13</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Reduction in the number of casualties amongst the local population from life-threatening unplanned explosive incidents at ammunition depots throughout the country (2010/11: N/A; 2011/12: 7 casualties; 2012/13: 0 casualties)</td>
<td>3.1. Refurbishment/reconstruction of 3 ammunition storage areas (Bouake, Seguela, Abidjan) in compliance with International Ammunition Technical Guidelines [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 3.2]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (IP; FRCI Logistics Division)</td>
<td>30.06.13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.2. Refurbishment/reconstruction of 20 police ready rooms for weapons/ammunition storage; 20 x gendarmerie armories; 20 x FRCI armories/ammunition stores to ensure compliance with ECOWAS SALW standards [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 3.2]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (UNPOL; HALO Trust; FRCI; gendarmerie; Police)</td>
<td>30.06.13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Expected accomplishment</td>
<td>Performance indicator/indicator of achievement</td>
<td>Output/deliverable</td>
<td>Lead (support)</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reduce the threat posed by insecure weapons and ammunition in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire destroys 100 percent of stockpiled anti-personnel mines in 2012/13, in fulfillment of article 4 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention</td>
<td>Reduction in the number of casualties amongst the local population from life-threatening unplanned explosive incidents at ammunition depots throughout the country (2010/11: NA; 2011/12: 7 casualties; 2012/13: 0 casualties)</td>
<td>3.3. Provision of 4 training courses on Physical Security and Stockpile Management to a total of 100 FRCI/gendarmerie/police personnel [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 3.2]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (UNPOL; HALO Trust; FRCI; gendarmerie; Police)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire ratifies the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2012/13</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.4. Secretariat support to 4 meetings of the inter-agency working group on Physical Security and Stockpile Management (government-UNOCI), including production of an annual workplan [Ref RBB 2012-2013 3.2]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (UNPOL; HALO Trust; FRCI; gendarmerie; Police)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire ratifies the Convention of Cluster Munitions in 2012/13</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5. 3 screening visits of landmine stockpiles in preparation for destruction [Ref Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and RBB 2012-2013 3.2]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (National Focal Point for Mine Action; FRCI Logistics Division)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire ratifies the Convention of Cluster Munitions in 2012/13</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.6. Advice, through 4 meetings, to the Ministry of Defence in order to secure political acceptance of the need to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 3.2]</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action (National Focal Point for Mine Action; FRCI Logistics Division)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 or green = on schedule</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 or orange = potential for delays</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 or red = no progress/significantly behind schedule</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 or blue = completed</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Status Explanation**

1. 1 or green = on schedule
2. 2 or orange = potential for delays
3. 3 or red = no progress/significantly behind schedule
4. 4 or blue = completed

Once the plan is underway, use the traffic light colours or numbering to show progress or otherwise. Comments can be added to the column.
### Activities tracking sheet for the annual workplan for the UNOCI mine action component
(1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Lead (support) (in unit)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1. Execution of more than 100 Explosive Ordnance Disposal tasks, as requested by national institutions and/or civil society [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.1]</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1. Tasking</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3. Quality assurance</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.2. Secretariat support to 4 meetings of the inter-agency coordination mechanism on Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) with national EOD teams, IP and UNOCI, including production of a workplan [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.1]</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1. Liaison meetings</td>
<td>Programme Manager (Chief Operations Officer, Ammunition Technical Officer)</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2. Technical review of workplan</td>
<td>Ammunition Technical Officer</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.1. Removal and provision of temporary safe storage in UNOCI locations of all weapons and ammunition surrendered by 24,000 ex-combatants out of a total caseload of 40,000 ex-combatants [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.2]</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer (Ammunition Technical Officer)</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1. DDR operations – technical support</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2. Confirmation of temporary safe storage locations</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer (Ammunition Technical Officer)</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.2. Destruction of all unserviceable weapons and ammunition collected from 24,000 ex-combatants, out of a total caseload of 40,000 ex-combatants, between July 2012 and June 2013 [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.2]</td>
<td>Ammunition Technical Officer</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1. Screening of unserviceable weapons and ammo</td>
<td>Ammunition Technical Officer</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2. Routine demolitions</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates which activities need to be undertaken to deliver an output.*

*Indicates which unit/person within the mission component is in the lead for implementing a particular activity, and who is in a support role.*

*Indicates the date by which an activity must be completed.*

*Timeline: Indicates when the activities are taking place. Can be modified to show activities by day, week, month, season etc.*
## Activities

### Output 2.3. Four events to hand over serviceable weapons and ammunition to the security forces, identified through the disarmament of 24,000 ex-combatants [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 1.2]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Lead (support) (in unit)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1. Liaison with DDR Division</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2. Logistical support</td>
<td>UNOCI DDR JLOG</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Output 3.1. Refurbishment/reconstruction of 3 ammunition storage areas (Bouake, Seguela, Abidjan) in compliance with International Ammunition Technical Guidelines [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 3.2]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Lead (support) (in unit)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1. Confirmation of priority under national workplan</td>
<td>Programme Manager (Chief Operations Officer)</td>
<td>15.07.2012</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2. Review of project implementation plan</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer (Ammunition Technical Officer)</td>
<td>31.07.2012</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3. Project implementation</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.4. Quality assurance</td>
<td>Ammunition Technical Officer (UNOPS Infrastructure lead)</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Output 3.2. Refurbishment/reconstruction of 20 police ready rooms for weapons/ammunition storage; 20 x gendarmerie armouries; 20 x FRCI armouries/ammunition stores to ensure compliance with ECOWAS SALW standards [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 3.2]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Lead (support) (in unit)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. Confirmation of priority under national workplan</td>
<td>Programme Manager (Chief Operations Officer)</td>
<td>15.07.2012</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. Review of project implementation plan</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer (Ammunition Technical Officer)</td>
<td>31.07.2012</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3. Project implementation</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4. Quality assurance</td>
<td>Ammunition Technical Officer (UNOPS Infrastructure lead)</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Output 3.3. Provision of 4 training courses on Physical Security and Stockpile Management to a total of 100 FRCI/gendarmerie/police personnel [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 3.2]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Lead (support) (in unit)</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1. Needs assessment of training requirement</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action Chief Ops</td>
<td>15.07.2012</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2. Training programme design</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>31.07.2012</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3. Technical review of training programme</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer (Ammunition Technical Officer)</td>
<td>15.08.2012</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.4. Implementation of training programme</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Lead (support) (in unit)</td>
<td>Deadline</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1. Liaison meetings</td>
<td>Programme Manager (Chief Operations Officer, Ammunition Technical Officer)</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2. Technical review of workplan</td>
<td>UNOCI Mine Action - ATO</td>
<td>30.06.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 3.5. 3 screening visits of landmine stockpiles in preparation for destruction [Ref. Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention and RBB 2012-2013 3.2]</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1. Technical assessment x 3</td>
<td>Chief Operations Officer (Ammunition Technical Officer)</td>
<td>30.09.2012</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2. Destruction of landmines</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>31.12.2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 3.6. Advice, through 4 meetings, to the Ministry of Defence in order to secure political acceptance of the need to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions [Ref. RBB 2012-2013 3.2]</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.1. Liaison meetings</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>31.03.2013</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.2. Destruction of cluster bombs</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>31.03.2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 or green = on schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 or orange = potential for delays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 or red = no progress/significantly behind schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 or blue = completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once the plan is underway, use the traffic lights colours or numbering to show progress or otherwise. Comments can be added to the column.”
Tool 5.2. Other useful templates and examples

Purpose
This tool provides rule of law and security institutions components with a number of other useful templates and related examples to develop component-level plans.

Content
Tool 5.2.1. is an example of an internal division of labour table for a DDR component. This is a useful accompaniment to an annual workplan. The template used in this example, can be found on the Peace Operations Intranet.

A template of the Police Concept of Operation (CONOPS) can be found in Annex 8 of the IMPP Guidelines: Role of Headquarters, Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences (May 2009), UN Secretary-General. Note that this template predates the development of the guidance in this Toolkit and is under revision by the Police Division.

An example of a DDR indicator framework, DDR indicator tracking sheet and monitoring and evaluation plan can be found in Annexes 1 through 3 in the DPKO-DFS SOP on Monitoring and Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (June 2010).
### 5.2.1. DDR Section: Roles and Responsibilities

As of 29 December 2009

| Strategic direction and management of the section: | Ayaka Suzuki |
| Administration: | Ayaka Suzuki, Carolina Gasiorowski |

#### Desk Responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Back-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi (BINUB)</td>
<td>Bruno Donat</td>
<td>Elizabeth Kissam, Simon Yazgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR (BINUCA)</td>
<td>Bruno Donat</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>Simon Yazgi</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur (UNAMID)*</td>
<td>Nikolai Rogosaroff/ Lotta Hagman</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC (MONUC)</td>
<td>Bruno Donat</td>
<td>Elizabeth Kissam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau (UNOGMIBIS)</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
<td>Simon Yazgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>Elizabeth Kissam</td>
<td>Nikolai Rogosaroff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (UNMIS)*</td>
<td>Nikolai Rogosaroff/ Lotta Hagman</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Planning/UNPOS</td>
<td>Bautista Logioco</td>
<td>Simon Yazgi, Nikolai Rogosaroff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Watch Brief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Back-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (UNAMA)</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
<td>Simon Yazgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad/CAR (MINURCAT)</td>
<td>Bruno Donat</td>
<td>Nikolai Rogosaroff/ Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (UNAMI)</td>
<td>Simon Yazgi</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (UNMIK)</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
<td>Simon Yazgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA-areas</td>
<td>Bruno Donat</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal (UNMIN)</td>
<td>Elizabeth Kissam</td>
<td>Simon Yazgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste (UNMIT)</td>
<td>Elizabeth Kissam</td>
<td>Nikolai Rogosaroff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa (UNOWA)</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Task Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget Group</td>
<td>AS</td>
<td>LH, NR, SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication/Knowledge Management Group</td>
<td>BD</td>
<td>AS, EK, SS*, CG (* lead role in knowledge management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Group</td>
<td>AS</td>
<td>BD, SY, EK, LH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Group</td>
<td>SY</td>
<td>AS, NR, EK, SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Group</td>
<td>LH</td>
<td>AS, SY, BD, NR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Other thematic focal points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focal Point</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Back-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU Capacity-building</td>
<td>Bautista Logioco</td>
<td>Simon Yazgi/Nikolai Rogosaroff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
<td>Nikolai Rogosaroff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>Nikolai Rogosaroff</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAWG on DDR</td>
<td>Simon Yazgi</td>
<td>Bruno Donat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-building</td>
<td>Elizabeth Kissam</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td>Lotta Hagman</td>
<td>Sergiusz Sidorowicz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tool 6. Checklist of dos and don’ts and examples to develop component-level plans

Tool 6.1. Summary of dos and don’ts

How to use this tool

**Purpose.** This tool is a summary of key elements from Tools 6.2. to 6.4. This tool can be used by rule of law and security institutions components in UN Field Missions to define objectives, expected accomplishments and related indicators, as well as outputs in a Results-based Budget (RBB) Framework, a component-level plan such as an annual workplan or a project document that forms part of a financial agreement funded through voluntary sources of funding.

Results Framework

The graphic below shows how objectives, expected accomplishments and related indicators, outputs, activities and inputs are related to each other. For a practical example, see also “Tool 5.1. Samples of annual workplans”, particularly the Logframe.

Graphic 1

Results framework used in the RBB Framework in a UN Field Mission (excerpt from Tool 2.2.)

Planning and Budgeting*

* This arrow indicates the need to plan and budget from the top of results-hierachy downwards. For example, in a UN Mission RBB Framework, after the objective is defined, then the expected accomplishments that contribute to this objective are defined. After this takes place, then the outputs that contribute to these expected accomplishments are defined. After the outputs are identified, then the inputs or cost in terms of posts and non-post resources are identified.

UN Mission RBB Framework

**Implementation**

** This arrow indicates the cause and effect relationship between the elements in the results hierarchy. For instance, in a UN Mission RBB Framework, if inputs are used to undertake a series of activities then that will generate a number of outouts. If outouts are produced, then this will generate benefits to end-users: this result is known as the expected...
A. Summary of key points on objectives

“...**Objective** refers to an overall desired achievement involving a process of change and aimed at meeting certain needs of identified end-users within a given period of time.” (ST/SGB/2000/8)

**Dos for objectives**

**In a component-level plan**
1. Use the objective as the **starting point** for the logical framework.
2. Use **on average 1-3 objectives** (e.g., in an annual workplan).
3. **Align** the objective in a component-level plan with:
   (i) **Security Council and/or General Assembly mandates** and other relevant mandates such as in international laws or peace agreements.
   (ii) **Relevant national plans and strategies** (e.g., a national DDR strategy).
   (iii) The higher-level objectives and goals of **Mission planning documents** such as the RBB, Compact between the SG and SRSG, the Compact between the SRSG and DSRSG, and Mission Concept.
   (iv) The objectives of **UN-wide plans** (e.g., strategic objective of the UN Integrated Strategic Framework).
   (v) **Security Council benchmarks** for a UN Field Mission. See Tool 2.1 for guidance on benchmarks.

**In an RBB**
4. As a general rule, the UN Field Mission should **keep the same objective as the previous year’s unless**:
   (i) The objective is completed; or
   (ii) There is a change in the Security Council mandate; or
   (iii) The previous year’s objective needs to be refined.

**Table 1. Examples of bad and good objectives in a component-level plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To strengthen the capacity of the government to ensure a fully functioning judicial system throughout Country X</td>
<td>To establish basic delivery of justice services in Country X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Why?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Why?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>“To strengthen the capacity of the government...” is an unnecessary qualifier. It is assumed that the UN Field Mission’s rule of law component is only one actor contributing to a functioning judicial system amongst many others, including the national authorities and other UN and non-UN actors.</td>
<td>It is assumed that the UN Field Mission is only one actor contributing to the basic delivery of justice services in Country X amongst many others, including the national authorities and other UN and non-UN actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A “fully” functioning judicial system is not attainable within the lifecycle of a UN Field Mission.</td>
<td>This objective is more realistic to achieve within the lifecycle of a UN Field Mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Summary of key points on expected accomplishments

Expected accomplishment: “A desired outcome or result of the programme/sub-programme, involving benefits to end-users. Expected accomplishments can be expressed as a quantitative or qualitative standard, value or rate. Accomplishments are the direct consequence or effect of the delivery of outputs and lead to the fulfilment of the envisaged objective.” (ST/SGB/2000/8)

Dos for expected accomplishments

1. Ensure that the field component can make a plausible claim to have contributed to the expected accomplishment. The field component must be at least partially responsible – directly or indirectly – for the expected accomplishment.

2. Note that the UN Field Mission is typically only one actor contributing to a particular expected accomplishment (e.g., “A stable and secure environment”) alongside others (the national government, bilateral donors, international financial institutions, other UN entities, and NGOs and civil society).

3. Ensure that the expected accomplishment contributes towards the fulfilment of the objective. For example, the expected accomplishment “Improved capacity of the judiciary in Country X” contributes to the objective “To establish basic delivery of justice services in Country X”.

4. Ensure that the expected accomplishment is a consequence or effect of the generation of outputs (e.g., The expected accomplishment of “Enhanced protection of civilians in conflict-affected areas” is a consequence of a range of outputs such as “Demining of 500,000 square meters in Country X”).

5. Align the expected accomplishment(s) in a UN Field Mission’s component-level plan or in an RBB with:
   (i) Relevant national plans and strategies (e.g., a national DDR strategy).
   (ii) The higher-level objectives and goals of Mission planning documents such as the Compact between the SG and SRSG, the Compact between the SRSG and DSRSG, and Mission Concept.
   (iii) The “priority results” of UN Integrated Strategic Framework and other relevant UN inter-agency plans.
   (iv) Security Council benchmarks for a UN Field Mission. See Tool 2.1 for guidance on benchmarks.

6. On average, use 1-3 expected accomplishments per objective in a component-level plan such as an annual workplan, or 1-3 expected accomplishments per component in an RBB.
### Table 1. Examples of bad and good expected accomplishments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RBB Framework</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To contribute to full operational capacity of the Liberian National Police</td>
<td>Enhanced operational capacity of the Liberian National Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why?</th>
<th>Why?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“To contribute to” is an unnecessary qualifier. “Full” operational capacity in Liberia is not attainable within the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission.</td>
<td>Enhanced operational capacity is realistic to achieve within the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component-level plan</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of a human rights-based approach to prison management in Country X</td>
<td>Improved treatment of vulnerable groups in state-level prisons in Country X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why?</th>
<th>Why?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This is an activity of the corrections component, and not a statement about the impact of such work. A “human rights-based approach to prison management” is vague and does not provide specific information on the result that is trying to be achieved. The end-user is not clearly specified.</td>
<td>“Improved treatment of vulnerable groups” is more specific. It is the expected result of outputs such as provision of advice to the prison service on how to meet UN standards for prisons (e.g., on keeping juveniles separate from adults). The end-user is more specific i.e., “state-level prisons in Country X”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. Summary of key points on indicators

Indicator: “A measure, preferably numeric, of a variable that provides a reasonably simple and reliable basis for assessing achievement, change or performance. A unit of information measured over time that can help show changes in a specific condition.” (UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms)

**Dos for indicators to measure expected accomplishments**

1. Use an indicator to **measure progress towards expected accomplishments** (and ultimately towards the objectives): an indicator measures whether, and/or the extent to which, an expected accomplishment has been achieved.

2. Note that, as a general rule, the indicator **provides evidence of the UN Field Mission’s performance as well as that of other actors**. This is because implementing an expected accomplishment (e.g., strengthening the judicial system or protection of civilians) is typically a collective responsibility involving not only the UN Field Mission but also others (e.g., other UN entities, the national authorities, civil society, bilateral donors and International Financial Institutions).

3. As a general rule, an indicator **measures a change or a situation that is external to the UN Field Mission**. For example, if the UN Field Mission is providing advice to the government on drafting a revised Constitution and wishes to determine whether the Mission is contributing to aligning the country’s legal framework with international standards, an indicator could be used to measure whether the revised Constitution adopted by the government contains specific provisions aligned with international standards.

4. Note that a key purpose of using indicators is to **determine trends** over time (e.g., whether the situation is improving, deteriorating or staying the same).

5. As a general rule, **use on average 1-3 indicators for each expected accomplishment**. At times, more than one indicator may be needed to capture the different dimensions of the expected accomplishment. A smaller number of well-chosen indicators is best.

6. Draft the indicators to **make them “SMART”** (see examples below).
   - **S**pecific, in terms of quantity, quality, time, location, target groups etc. For numeric indicators, include a baseline and target figure.
   - **M**easurable: number, percentage, ratio etc., or can be answered by a “yes” or “no”.
   - **A**ttainable: the indicator can be attained within the period of the plan, which is usually a one-year period (i.e., “do not walk on water”).
   - **R**ealistic/relevant: it must measure an expected accomplishment that falls within the mandate of the UN Field Mission.
   - **T**ime-bound: the indicator specifies a particular date or measures change in a specific period.

7. **After selecting an indicator, do a final “sanity check” by reviewing these questions:**
   - Does the indicator provide meaningful information for decision-making on the programme?
   - Can the data be collected within a reasonable amount of time and cost?
   - Is it likely that the indicator will be met within the planning period (usually one year)?
   - Is it “SMART”?

8. **From day one** of a plan, **maintain a portfolio of evidence** for your monitoring and evaluation system, which includes data on each indicator, information on how the data was collected and how key terms are defined. This enables the plan to be easily monitored and evaluated, as well as audited by the Oversight bodies.
Table 1. Three examples of bad and good indicators to measure expected accomplishments

| 1. Expected accomplishment: Strengthened capacity of Country X to ensure security and justice, including in the area of military justice |
|---|---|
| **Bad** | **Good** |
| Indicator | A preliminary baseline assessment reflecting the functioning of police, justice and corrections institutions, and perceptions of justice and security in Country X is provided to the Government | Adoption by the Government of Country X of a baseline assessment reflecting the functioning of police, justice and corrections institutions, and perceptions of justice and security in the country by 30 June 2012 |
| Why? | • It is Specific and Measurable.  
• But it is not Relevant: this is an output of the UN Field Mission, not an indicator. It is not measuring a change or situation external to the UN Field Mission. See Don’t number 1.  
• It is also not Time-bound as it is unclear by when the baseline assessment would be provided. | • Specific: It is specific about what will be adopted and by whom.  
• Measurable: whether the assessment has been adopted can be determined easily through reviewing publicly-available documents (this can be answered either by a “yes” or “no”).  
• Attainable: This seems likely to happen within the planning period.  
• Realistic/relevant: This indicator measures an action that is external to the UN Field Mission (the adoption by the Government of an assessment). It is therefore relevant to track this issue to determine if the UN Field Mission is making progress in strengthening national capacity to ensure security and justice. See Dos number 3.  
• Time-bound: It is time-bound as there is a date by which the baseline assessment would be adopted. |
2. **Expected accomplishment:** Increased security and stability in conflict-affected areas of Country X

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Approval by the Government of Country X of the establishment of a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission by 31 December 2012</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Why?**

- **Specific:** it is not specific. Without in-depth knowledge of this peace agreement, what exactly is being measured is unclear.
- **Measurable:** it is not measurable. “Implementation” cannot be measured easily: when is implementation considered to be complete? See Don’t number 5.
- **Attainable:** this would not be attainable during the duration of a typical plan (one year in length).
- **Relevant:** This is a relevant issue to look at since the UN Field Mission has a mandate to support implementation of a national DDR programme. It is external to the UN Field Mission.
- **Time-bound:** it is not time-bound. The time-frame is unclear.

- **Specific:** what is being measured can be readily understood without in-depth knowledge of a peace agreement.
- **Measurable:** A specific provision in the peace agreement was selected to be tracked, namely, the establishment of a DDR Commission. Whether this was achieved can easily be answered with a “yes” or a “no”.
- **Attainable:** this is likely to be attained during the duration of a typical plan (one year in length).
- **Relevant:** This is a relevant issue to look at since the UN Field Mission has a mandate to support implementation of a national DDR programme. It is external to the UN Field Mission.
- **Time-bound:** There is a specific date mentioned for the approval of the establishment of a DDR Commission.
3. **Expected accomplishment:** Reduction in prison riots in conflict-affected areas of Country X

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bad</strong></td>
<td>☹ Increase in the percentage of probation officers and of corrections officers who received human rights training within the last twelve months, in all state-prisons in Country X (2010/11: 0 percent; 2011/12: 2 percent; 2012/13: 5 percent).</td>
<td>☹ Increase in the percentage of probation officers in all state-prisons in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 2 percent; 2011/12: 3 percent; 2012/13: 5 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why?</strong></td>
<td>• Specific and Measurable: It is not specific and measurable. It is not clear what is being measured since the indicator is trying to measure two different types of information: “the percentage of probation officers”, and “the percentage of corrections officers who received human rights training within the last twelve months”. It is also not clear what the unit in the baseline and targets refers to: is it the percentage of probation officers or is it the percentage of corrections officers who received human rights training within the last twelve months?</td>
<td>• The “bad” indicator can be rephrased as two separate indicators: one indicator tracking the increase in percentage of probation officers, and a second indicator tracking the increase in percentage of corrections officers who received human rights training within the last months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Attainable: This is likely to be attained during the duration of a typical plan (one year in length).</td>
<td>• The indicator is now Specific and Measurable as it tracks a single unit of information (the percentage of probation officers). See <strong>Dos number 27</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relevant: This is a relevant issue to look at where the UN Field Mission is advising the government on alternatives to imprisonment to reduce prison overcrowding and therefore the likelihood of prison riots. It is external to the UN Field Mission.</td>
<td>• See also indicator 3.2. in Tool 6.6.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Time-bound: the baseline and targets of the indicator specify the timeframe covered.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D. Summary of key points on outputs

Output: The final product or deliverables by a programme/sub-programme to stakeholders, which an activity is expected to produce in order to achieve its objectives. Outputs may include reports, publications, training, meetings, security services, etc. (Based on ST/SGB/2000/8)

Dos for outputs

1. Note that there is a causal relationship between the output and the expected accomplishment i.e., if outputs are produced, then this will generate benefits to end-users; this result is known as the expected accomplishment.

2. As a general rule, include on average 5-10 outputs per expected accomplishment.

3. Be selective and only include outputs that have a significant impact on mandate implementation (i.e., without this output, mandate implementation would not be possible).

4. Only include outputs that are resource-intensive in terms of staff time and other costs. This is particularly important for the RBB.

5. Draft outputs to make them “SMART” i.e., outputs should be:

   Specific, in terms of quantity, quality, time, location, target groups etc.

   Measurable in terms of quantity, periodicity etc.

   Attainable: the output can be attained within the period covered by the plan, which is usually a one-year period (i.e., “do not walk on water”). For example, don't include an output to deliver 20 training courses in one year when you are only likely to have enough staff to deliver 10 courses.

   Realistic/relevant: it must be within the mandate and capacity of the UN Field Mission to deliver the output. For example, don't include an output on supporting the government to develop a strategy on security sector reform if the UN Field Mission has no mandate to do so.

   Time-bound: only include outputs that can be achieved within the period covered by the plan. See Dos number 15.

6. From day one of a new plan, maintain a portfolio of evidence for your monitoring and evaluation system that includes data on each output. This will facilitate reporting later on (e.g., for the RBB performance report, Secretary-General’s reports and donor reports).
Table 1. Example of a bad and good output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>😞 Consultations with interested parties</td>
<td>☺ Advice, through 12 meetings, to the Ministry of Justice of Country X on revising the existing laws on juvenile justice to align them with international standards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Why?**

- **Bad**
  - It is not “SMART”.
  - It is not Specific (Who are these interested parties?). If it is not clear which specific parties will attend the consultations; a general indication should be given that is more specific than “interested parties”.
  - It is not Measurable: it is not quantified and there is no indication of frequency (How many/how often should consultation sessions be held? How many parties are involved?). This makes it impossible to measure the output and determine whether it is Realistic, Attainable and Time-bound.

- **Good**
  - Advice is the output.
  - The output is Specific in that it specifies the recipient (the Ministry of Justice of Country X), and the topic of the advice (revising the existing laws on juvenile justice to align them with international standards).
  - It is Measurable as “12 meetings” provides an indication of the quantity/periodicity of the advice.
Tool 6.2. Checklist of dos and don’ts on objectives

This tool can be used by rule of law and security institutions components in UN Field Missions to define an objective in a component-level plan such as an annual workplan or a project document that forms part of a financial agreement funded through voluntary sources of funding. However, in a Results-based Budget (RBB) Framework, the objective is typically defined by the UN Field Mission’s strategic planning capacity. The four key points in the checklist are underlined and in blue.

“…Objective refers to an overall desired achievement involving a process of change and aimed at meeting certain needs of identified end-users within a given period of time.” (ST/SGB/2000/8)

Dos for component-level plans

1. Use the objective as the **starting point** for the logical framework.
2. Use an objective to describe what the field component **intends to achieve during the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission**. The objective of a field component is therefore more concrete and specific than an RBB objective for the whole UN Field Mission.
3. Use **on average 1-3 objectives** (e.g., in an annual workplan).
4. **Align** the objective in a component-level plan **with**:
   (i) **Security Council and/or General Assembly mandates** and other relevant mandates such as in international laws or peace agreements.
   (ii) **Relevant national plans and strategies** (e.g., a national DDR strategy).
   (iii) The higher-level objectives and goals of Mission planning documents such as the RBB, Compact between the SG and SRSG, the Compact between the SRSG and DSRSG, and Mission Concept.
   (iv) The objectives of UN-wide plans (e.g., strategic objective of the UN Integrated Strategic Framework).
   (v) **Security Council benchmarks** for a UN Field Mission. See Tool 2.1 for guidance on benchmarks.
5. Ensure that an objective in a component-level plan relating to early peacebuilding tasks **advances the political objectives** of the future UN Field Mission and/or the peace process, **and**: (i) **ensures security** and/or (ii) **lays the foundation for longer-term institution-building**. See Tool 3 for more guidance.
6. Ensure that the objective is **broad enough** to encompass all the related expected accomplishments and outputs.
7. Refer to the rationale for the **overall benefit or problem** (see underline)
   E.g., 1. **To reduce the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X.**
   E.g., 2. **To improve stability and security in Country X.**
8. Identify the **overall beneficiary**: a country, institutions, region, groups within a population etc. (see underline).
   E.g., **To re-establish the basic functioning of state-level prisons in Country X.**
9. Start the objective with an **infinitive verb** (e.g., To advance...To restore...To maintain ...To strengthen...).
Don’ts on component-level plans

1. **Do not** include the words “through or “by means of” or “with a view to” to describe how the objective would be achieved.

2. **Do not** qualify the verb (e.g., “To contribute to strengthening rule of law in Country X” or “To strengthen the capacity of the government to improve access to justice for vulnerable groups in conflict-affected regions of Country X”).

3. **Do not** state the objective as an activity (e.g., To implement reforms...To develop systems...To focus on...To prepare...To support...To identify...To follow-up on...To monitor...To facilitate).

---

Table 1. Examples of bad and good objectives in a component-level plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1.</strong> To strengthen the capacity of the government to ensure a fully functioning judicial system throughout Country X</td>
<td>☑ To establish basic delivery of justice services in Country X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Why?**
- “To strengthen the capacity of the government…” is an unnecessary qualifier. It is assumed that the UN Field Mission’s rule of law component is only one actor contributing to a functioning judicial system amongst many others, including the national authorities and other UN and non-UN actors.
- A “fully” functioning judicial system is not attainable within the lifecycle of a UN Field Mission.

**Why?**
- It is assumed that the UN Field Mission is only one actor contributing to the basic delivery of justice services in Country X amongst many others, including the national authorities and other UN and non-UN actors.
- This objective is more realistic to achieve within the lifecycle of a UN Field Mission.

| **1.2.** To assist in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1867 (2009) | To strengthen civilian oversight of the security sector in Timor-Leste |

**Why?**
- “To assist” and “implementation” are both activities not objectives.
- It does not state the overall problem or benefit.
- What is trying to be achieved is unclear to someone who is not familiar with the detailed content of that resolution.
- It does not state the overall beneficiary.

**Why?**
- The objective is based on specific language on civilian oversight in Security Council Resolution 1867 (2009).
- The overall benefit is stated.
- What is trying to be achieved can be understood by someone who is not familiar with the detailed content of that resolution.
- The overall beneficiary (i.e., the country of Timor Leste) is stated.
Do note for results-based budgets that

10. An RBB has one objective for the entire UN Field Mission.
11. An RBB objective is used to describe what the UN Field Mission intends to achieve during the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission.
12. The objective is derived from a Security Council mandate.
13. As a general rule, the UN Field Mission should keep the same objective as the previous year’s unless:
   (i) The objective is completed; or
   (ii) There is a change in the Security Council mandate; or
   (iii) The previous year’s objective needs to be refined.
14. The objective in an RBB is found under Section “I. Mandate and Planned Results” under ‘A. Overall’.
15. The RBB objective refers to the rationale for overall benefit or problem (see underline).
   E.g., “To restore international peace and security in Southern Lebanon” (UNIFIL 2008/9).
16. The RBB objective identifies the overall beneficiary (see underline). E.g., To advance peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC 2009/10).
Tool 6.3. Checklist of dos and don’ts on expected accomplishments

This tool can be used by rule of law and security institutions components in UN Field Missions to define expected accomplishments in a Results-based Budget (RBB) Framework, a component-level plan such as an annual workplan or a project document that forms part of a financial agreement funded through voluntary sources of funding. It can also be used to define “priority results” in an Integrated Strategic Framework. The five key points in the checklist are underlined and in blue.

Expected accomplishment: “A desired outcome or result of the programme/sub-programme, involving benefits to end-users. Expected accomplishments can be expressed as a quantitative or qualitative standard, value or rate. Accomplishments are the direct consequence or effect of the delivery of outputs and lead to the fulfilment of the envisaged objective.” (ST/SGB/2000/8)

Dos for purpose and content

1. Use an expected accomplishment as a succinct statement about the intended result.
2. Note that an expected accomplishment may refer to changes in knowledge, skills, behaviour, awareness, condition or status.
3. Ensure that the field component can make a plausible claim to have contributed to the expected accomplishment. The field component must be at least partially responsible – directly or indirectly – for the expected accomplishment.
4. Note that the UN Field Mission is typically only one actor contributing to a particular expected accomplishment (e.g., “A stable and secure environment”) alongside others (the national government, bilateral donors, international financial institutions, other UN entities, and NGOs and civil society).
5. Use the expected accomplishment to describe what the UN Field Mission (in an RBB) or the field component (in an annual workplan) must accomplish within the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission (i.e., before or by the end of the UN Field Mission). This goes beyond the six- or twelve-month duration of a typical Security Council mandate and beyond the one-year cycle of an annual workplan or RBB.
6. Note that, as a general rule, the expected accomplishment of a field component in an annual workplan is more concrete and specific than an expected accomplishment in an RBB Framework, which can be for multiple field components.
7. For expected accomplishments on substantive issues, do ensure that the intended result benefits an end-user outside of the UN Field Mission (e.g., the host population).
8. Ensure that the expected accomplishment contributes towards the fulfilment of the objective. For example, the expected accomplishment “Improved capacity of the judiciary in Country X” contributes to the objective “To establish basic delivery of justice services in Country X”.
9. Ensure that the expected accomplishment is a consequence or effect of the generation of outputs (e.g., The expected accomplishment of “Enhanced protection of civilians in conflict-affected areas” is a consequence of a range of outputs such as “Demining of 500,000 square meters in Country X”).
Dos for selecting an expected accomplishment

10. Note that expected accomplishments in an RBB are grouped under “components” in the budget document. These components are derived from the Security Council resolution.

11. Note that in an RBB, the expected accomplishments are derived from the mandate in the relevant Security Council resolution, and at times also from a peace agreement. For example, the RBB expected accomplishment “Strengthened capacity of the Détachement intégré de sécurité” for MINURCAT (A/63/817) is derived from the mandate language “To select, train, advise and facilitate support to elements of the Détachement intégré de sécurité”, in operative paragraph 6 (a) in S/RES/1861 (2009).

12. As a general rule, in an RBB, keep the same expected accomplishment as the previous year’s unless:
   (i) The expected accomplishment is completed; or
   (ii) There is a change in the Security Council mandate; or
   (iii) The previous year’s expected accomplishment needs to be refined.

13. Align the expected accomplishment(s) in a UN Field Mission’s component-level plan or in an RBB with:
   (i) Relevant national plans and strategies (e.g., a national DDR strategy).
   (ii) The higher-level objectives and goals of Mission planning documents such as the Compact between the SG and SRSG, the Compact between the SRSG and DSRSG, and Mission Concept.
   (iii) The “priority results” of UN Integrated Strategic Framework and other relevant UN inter-agency plans.
   (iv) Security Council benchmarks for a UN Field Mission.
       See Tool 2.1 for guidance on benchmarks.

14. Ensure that an expected accomplishment relating to early peacebuilding tasks advances the political objectives of the future UN Field Mission and/or the peace process, and:
   (i) ensures security and/or
   (ii) lays the foundation for longer-term institution-building.
       See “Tool 3 Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) checklists on prioritizing and sequencing early peacebuilding interventions” for more guidance.

15. On average, use 1-3 expected accomplishments per objective in a component-level plan such as an annual workplan, or 1-3 expected accomplishments per component in an RBB.

16. As a general rule, consolidate expected accomplishments on related results. For instance, in an RBB instead of having three separate but related expected accomplishments on strengthening the legal, judicial and correctional systems, consolidate them into one “Strengthening of the legal, judicial and correctional systems in Liberia” (UNMIL 2009/10).

17. Consolidate two different expected accomplishments if the indicators and outputs could fit under either expected accomplishment. This is a sign that they overlap and should be merged.

18. Note that in an RBB a field component’s outputs can relate to different expected accomplishments. For instance, the expected accomplishment “Secure and stable environment” might include the police component’s outputs relating to patrols of formed police units, whereas the expected accomplishment “Reformed and restructured national police” would include its outputs relating to capacity-building of the national police.
Dos for language, tone and style

19. Start with a noun (e.g., National commitment to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegation of combatants) or an “adjective + noun” (e.g., Improved accountability of all law enforcement agencies in Country X).

20. Try to make the expected accomplishment “SMART”: Specific: specify the benefit to the end-user. Measurable: use an indicator to make the expected accomplishment measurable. Attainable: it can be attained within the life-cycle of the UN Field Mission (i.e., “do not walk on water”). Realistic/relevant: it must fall within the mandate of the UN Field Mission. Time-bound: use an indicator for the expected accomplishment that can be attained or measure change within the time period covered by the plan.

Don’ts for language, tone and style

1. Do not use “Progress towards” in the expected accomplishment, except for results relating to human rights.

2. Do not qualify the expected accomplishment (e.g., “Support improved prison conditions in Country X”).

3. For substantive components, do not include expected accomplishments where the end-user is the UN Field Mission or another part of the UN.

Table 1. Examples of bad and good expected accomplishments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RBB Framework</td>
<td>☹️ To contribute to full operational capacity of the Liberian National Police</td>
<td>☺️ Enhanced operational capacity of the Liberian National Police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Why? | • “To contribute to” is an unnecessary qualifier.  
• “Full” operational capacity in Liberia is not attainable within the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission. | • Enhanced operational capacity is realistic to achieve within the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission. |
| Why? | • This is an activity of the corrections component, and not a statement about the impact of such work.  
• A “human rights-based approach to prison management” is vague and does not provide specific information on the result that is trying to be achieved.  
• The end-user is not clearly specified. | • “Improved treatment of vulnerable groups” is more specific. It is the expected result of outputs such as provision of advice to the prison service on how to meet UN standards for prisons (e.g., on keeping juveniles separate from adults).  
• The end-user is more specific i.e., “state-level prisons in Country X”. |
Tool 6.4. Checklist of dos and don’ts on indicators to measure expected accomplishments

This tool can be used to identify indicators to measure progress towards expected accomplishments (and ultimately towards objectives) relating to the work of police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR and mine action components in a UN Field Mission. Such indicators can be used in monitoring and evaluation systems in a wide variety of plans such as an Integrated Strategic Framework, a Results-based Budget (RBB) Framework, a component-level plan such as an annual workplan or a project document that forms part of a financial agreement funded through voluntary sources of funding. The eight key points in the checklist are underlined and in blue.

Indicator: “A measure, preferably numeric, of a variable that provides a reasonably simple and reliable basis for assessing achievement, change or performance. A unit of information measured over time that can help show changes in a specific condition.” (UN OIOS Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms)

Dos for definition and purpose

1. Use an indicator to measure progress towards expected accomplishments (and ultimately towards the objectives): an indicator measures whether, and/or the extent to which, an expected accomplishment has been achieved.

2. Note that, as a general rule, the indicator provides evidence of the UN Field Mission’s performance as well as that of other actors. This is because implementing an expected accomplishment (e.g., strengthening the judicial system or protection of civilians) is typically a collective responsibility involving not only the UN Field Mission but also others (e.g., other UN entities, the national authorities, civil society, bilateral donors and International Financial Institutions).

3. As a general rule, an indicator measures a change or a situation that is external to the UN Field Mission. For example, if the UN Field Mission is providing advice to the government on drafting a revised Constitution and wishes to determine whether the Mission is contributing to aligning the country’s legal framework with international standards, an indicator could be used to measure whether the revised Constitution adopted by the government contains specific provisions aligned with international standards.

4. Note that a key purpose of using indicators is to determine trends over time (e.g., whether the situation is improving, deteriorating or staying the same).

5. Use an indicator to measure change within the planning period. For an annual workplan and an annual RBB cycle, indicators measure yearly change. For multi-year plans, it is recommended to divide up the plan into segments, for instance, into yearly plans with yearly indicators to facilitate planning, implementation and reporting.

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Don’ts for definition and purpose

1. **Do not use an indicator in an RBB Framework to measure progress towards implementing the Mission’s outputs.** See Example 1 below relating to mine action issues in an RBB Framework.

2. **Do not use the same indicator under several expected accomplishments.** If this can be done, either the indicators need to be defined more clearly or the expected accomplishments are too similar and need to be merged.

**Example 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Achievement</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved protection of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (A/64/670, MONUC).</td>
<td>Reduction in the number of casualties amongst the local population from accidents caused by landmines and explosive remnants of war (2008/9: 105 casualties; 2009/10: 90 casualties; 2010/11: 60 casualties).</td>
<td>😊 This is a good indicator since it measures progress towards implementation of the expected accomplishment (protection of civilians). It is measuring a change in the host country that is external to the UN Field Mission, which is a more credible and reliable measure of the UN Field Mission’s performance on mine clearance efforts. It can be included in an RBB Framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in the number of persons amongst the local population provided with Mine Risk Education materials and briefings (2008/9: 3,000 persons; 2009/10: 4,000 persons; 2010/11: 5,000 persons).</td>
<td></td>
<td>😞 This is a bad indicator since it measures progress towards implementation of the UN Field Mission’s output (5,000 persons amongst the local population provided with Mine Risk Education). It does not measure progress towards implementation of the expected accomplishment. It should not be included in an RBB Framework.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outputs**

- Provision of 5,000 persons with Mine Risk Education through distribution of materials to 5 schools (200 pupils per school) and 40 community briefings (100 persons per briefing).
- Demining of 500,000 square meters in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in coordination with international partners.
Dos for selecting indicators

6. As a general rule, use on average 1-3 indicators for each expected accomplishment. At times, more than one indicator may be needed to capture the different dimensions of the expected accomplishment. A smaller number of well-chosen indicators is best.

7. As a general rule, align indicators across related plans. E.g., When possible, use the same indicators in an Integrated Strategic Framework as in an RBB Framework as in a component-level workplan.

8. As a general rule, if the expected accomplishment is the same as the previous year, keep the same indicators as the previous year’s (as this allows analysis of trends) unless:
   (i) The indicator has been achieved; or
   (ii) The previous year’s indicator needs to be refined. Tip: if data could not be collected easily for last year’s indicator, it may be an indication that the indicator was a poor one and needs to be modified.

9. Choose an indicator that is attainable during the duration of the plan.

10. When selecting an indicator, make sure that it is easy to measure and therefore easy to audit (for instance by the Oversight bodies).

11. Where appropriate, consult key partners such as national authorities and UN partners when selecting indicators, to ensure that the choice of indicator and data collection method is realistic and to improve the partner’s understanding of the UN Field Mission’s work and commitment to it.

12. When possible, agree with other UN and non-UN partners on using the same indicators and share data collection responsibilities and costs. When using the same indicator, do ensure that the indicator is understood in the same way (e.g., there can be different interpretations of when a criminal case is considered “resolved” or of which entities are covered by the term “law enforcement agencies”).

13. Chose indicators that provide information that is relevant to implementation of the mandate of the UN Field Mission and for which data is feasible to collect.

14. Use an indicator to measure how an expected accomplishment relating to early peacebuilding tasks advances the political objectives of the future UN Field Mission and/or the peace process, and:
   (i) ensures security and/or
   (ii) lays the foundation for longer-term institution-building.

      See “Tool 3 Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) checklists on prioritizing and sequencing early peacebuilding interventions” for more guidance. For example, if the expected accomplishment is “Enhanced access to justice for vulnerable groups” then a relevant indicator would be one that measures access to justice for a specific vulnerable group targeted during the conflict such as women and girls who were victims of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict-affected areas.

15. Use an indicator that is relevant to the work of the field component. For example, if the expected accomplishment is “Enhanced security in the eastern region of Country X” and the corrections component is refurbishing prisons to prevent prison escapes, then an indicator relating to reduction in prison escapees would be highly relevant.

16. Note that an indicator must be tailored to the local context, language(s) and culture (e.g., tracking the performance of law enforcement entities may mean tracking the performance of one unified police force in one country and in another country of a police force in the cities and a gendarmerie outside of the cities).
Feasible

17. Follow these four steps when deciding how feasible it is for the UN Field Mission to collect data on an indicator, and how to collect it:

   **Step 1**: Find out if **others are (or will be) collecting this data** and can share it (e.g., programme documents of UN agencies, funds and programmes; national strategies and plans; indicators from the UN Rule of Law Indicators Project (where available)).

   **Step 2**: If not, determine if the **data can be easily collected by the UN Field Mission itself at minimal cost** in terms of staff time, travel costs etc. Typically, data can be easily collected from a **document review (DR)** of written documents, from **field data (FD)** collected by UN entities and others, or from reviewing **administrative data (AD)** of the national authorities.

   **Step 3**: If not, determine if data can be collected by the UN Field Mission through a **survey of experts (ES)** (e.g., by distributing a questionnaire (in hard copy) to legal experts attending a workshop organized by the UN Field Mission, or sending an electronic survey to a group of experts using the software “SurveyMonkey”).

   **Step 4**: If not, then as a last resort, determine if data can be collected by the UN Field Mission through a **public survey (PS)**.

18. Due to the cost and challenges of collecting data through a **survey of experts or public survey**, a field component should **decide whether the benefit of collecting such data outweighs the costs**. If it is too costly or impractical, preference should be given to indicators based on other data sources (as above).

19. If **no internal expertise exists** in the UN Field Mission to design a survey of experts then:

   (i) Consider conducting joint surveys with other UN and non-UN entities to reduce costs for all and harness the research skills of others.

   (ii) Consider outsourcing this data collection by budgeting for an external entity such as a local university, NGO or consultant to conduct an expert survey. In the RBB, this may entail including funds under the consultancy and travel budget lines for this purpose.

Dos for deciding what to measure

21. As a general rule, use a mix of indicators: some measuring the quantity of the result and some the quality of the result. For example, the performance of the national police can be measured through an indicator measuring the quantity of the result (e.g., the percentage of reported intentional homicides resulting in an arrest within the last twelve months – see indicator 1.5. in Tool 6.6.2.) and another measuring the quality of the result (e.g., the perception of experts on whether the police respond promptly to requests of assistance – see indicator 1.6. in Tool 6.6.2.).

22. Note that some indicators provide more meaningful information when used in conjunction with other indicators. For example, the “percentage of investigations of alleged incidents of police misconduct which result in a disciplinary action or the prosecution of a police officer in a given year” (indicator 2.4. in Tool 6.6.2.) is more meaningful when used together with an indicator measuring how freely the population may make accusations of police misconduct.

23. When a complete data set is not available (e.g., due to lack of security access, poor weather conditions, lack of access to court records, poor record-keeping practices, lack of UN staff to collect the data etc.), do use instead a “proxy” indicator. These tell you indirectly whether the expected accomplishment has been achieved. For example, if national data on the number of prisoners in pre-trial detention is not available, then the sample size can be reduced and data can instead be obtained for all state-level prisons where the UN Field Mission is operating and can have easy access to prison records.

24. When measuring sensitive issues that could affect the political work of the UN Field Mission (e.g., corruption, accountability, human rights, ceasefire violations, fatalities and casualties), do consult the Mission’s political affairs component when selecting the indicator. In the past, Member States who scrutinize RBB Frameworks through the Fifth Committee have objected to the choice of certain indicators (see General Assembly resolution 59/296 (section II, para. 4-5) and resolution 55/231, para. 9).

25. When selecting an indicator, do decide which angle provides the most relevant information for decision-making: is it a ratio, percentage, a total number, a total number per month or an average number etc.

26. Get more nuanced information on specific conflict-affected groups (e.g., persecuted ethnic groups during the conflict) and/or vulnerable groups (e.g. victims of sexual violence during a conflict) by either:
   (i) Disaggregating the indicator, for instance, by geographic region, gender, age and other relevant variables; and/or
   (ii) Selecting an additional indicator to measure a specific concern; e.g., the number of children in pre-sentence detention per 100,000 child population (indicator 1.4. in Tool 6.6.3.).

27. Use an indicator to measure a single unit of information. See example 3 in “Table 1. Three examples of bad and good indicators to measure expected accomplishments”.
Dos for using indicators to determine trends

28. Note that one way to determine trends is to use the same indicator (with different baselines and targets each year). For example:

Year 1: Decrease in the number of inmates in pre-trial detention held without a valid judicial order, or beyond the expiration of such an order, per 100 inmates in all prisons in Country X in 2012/13
(2009/10: 25 per 100 inmates; 2010/11: 20 per 100 inmates; 2011/12: 15 per 100 inmates).
Year 2: Decrease in the number of inmates in pre-trial detention held without a valid judicial order, or beyond the expiration of such an order, per 100 inmates in all prisons in Country X in 2012/13
(2010/11: 20 per 100 inmates; 2011/12: 15 per 100 inmates; 2012/13: 10 per 100 inmates).
(See indicator 2.1 in Tool 6.6.4.)

29. Alternatively, use targets/milestones to determine trends. For example:

Year 1: The Government of Country X signs in 2011/12 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (see indicator 5.1 in Tool 6.6.6).
Year 2: The Government of Country X adopts in 2012/13 a national strategy for dealing with landmines and explosive remnants of war, which includes a description of how it will comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (see indicator 5.3 in Tool 6.6.6).

30. For numeric indicators in an RBB, do insert an actual figure from the previous year, a baseline figure from the current year and an estimated target figure for next year. For example, “Decrease in the number of prisoners per prison officer (2010/11: 6.7 prisoners per prison officer; 2011/12: 6.2 prisoners per prison officer; 2012/13: 5.9 prisoners per prison officer) (see indicator 5.1.3 in Tool 6.6.1.). The data for 2010/11 is actual data from the previous planning period i.e., obtained from the RBB performance report for 2010/11; data for 2011/12 is a baseline figure for the current year (1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012), obtained from the published 2011/12 RBB budget document; and 2011/12 is an estimated target figure for the following year.

31. In an RBB, if no actual figure exists for the baseline year (e.g., at the start-up of a new initiative), either:

(i) insert “N/A” for not available. For example, “Decrease in the percentage of inmates with less than 2 square meters of accommodation space in all state-level prisons in Country X (2009/10: N/A; 2010/11: N/A; 2011/12: 80 percent); or
(ii) put an estimated target for the baseline year, when no data is yet available. For example, Decrease in the percentage of inmates with less than 2 square meters of accommodation space in all state-level prisons in Country X (2009/10: N/A; 2010/11: 85 percent; 2011/12: 80 percent) (see indicator 3.1 in Tool 6.6.4).

32. Note that in the RBB, an unrealistic target that has already appeared in an official published RBB document cannot be modified, but an explanation can be provided the following year. For example, the published RBB report for 2011/12 estimated that police reform would result in the number of police services in Country X being reduced to that year, whereas as of early 2011, 8 police services still existed. In the budget document for 2012/13, an explanation is placed in brackets to explain the unrealistic target for the previous year.
E.g., “Reduction in the number of police services in Country X (2010/11: 9 police services; 2011/12: 4 police services (actual as of January 2011 is 8); 2012/13: 5 police services).
33. When repeating the same indicator as the previous year, use the same unit of measurement in the baseline as before, to enable analysis of trends over time. In other words, do not measure the number of villages one year and the number of counties the next year.

34. As a general rule, collect data in a consistent manner each year (e.g., from the same geographic area, or from the same month each year). For instance, if data on prisoner nutrition is obtained in June 2011, it should be collected again in June 2012.

Don’ts for using indicators to determine trends

3. For annual plans, do not use an indicator where the data cannot be collected within a one-year cycle (e.g., certain national statistics where data is collected through household surveys every five years).

4. Do not use an indicator where the data is too difficult, dangerous or expensive to collect.

5. Do not use an indicator such as “Implementation of [X policy] or [Y piece of legislation]” as it is hard to measure when implementation is considered completed.

6. In the RBB, do not include only indicators based on a survey of experts or public survey due to risk of bias. Instead, used such indicators together with others based on a document review, field data or administrative data.

Dos for indicator language, tone and style

35. In the RBB, insert the units of measure in numeric indicators. For example: (2009/10: 30 days; 2010/11: 30 days; 2011/12: 25 days).

36. Draft the indicators to make them “SMART” (see examples below).

Specific, in terms of quantity, quality, time, location, target groups etc. For numeric indicators, include a baseline and target figure.

Measurable: number, percentage, ratio etc., or can be answered by a “yes” or “no”

Attainable: the indicator can be attained within the period of the plan, which is usually a one-year period (i.e., “do not walk on water”)

Realistic/relevant: it must measure an expected accomplishment that falls within the mandate of the UN Field Mission.

Time-bound: the indicator specifies a particular date or measures change in a specific period. See Table 1. Three examples of bad and good indicators to measure expected accomplishments.
37. As a general rule, in the RBB, omit the name of the country and timeframe in the body of the indicator unless it is needed for the sake of clarity (see unnecessary words in strikeout). E.g., Reduction in the number of casualties among the local population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010/11 from accidents caused by landmines and explosive remnants of war (2008/9: 105 casualties; 2009/10: 90 casualties; 2010/11: 60 casualties). (A/64/670, MONUC) (indicator 1.1 in Tool 6.6.6). This is due to word count restrictions in UN official documents.

38. After selecting an indicator, do a final “sanity check” by reviewing these questions:
   □ Does the indicator provide meaningful information for decision-making on the programme?
   □ Can the data be collected within a reasonable amount of time and cost?
   □ Is it likely that the indicator will be met within the planning period (usually one year)?
   □ Is it “SMART”?

Dos for reporting on indicators

39. From day one of a plan, maintain a portfolio of evidence for your monitoring and evaluation system, which includes data on each indicator, information on how the data was collected and how key terms are defined. This enables the plan to be easily monitored and evaluated as well as audited by the Oversight bodies.

40. Note that if the field component is using data collected by others, the component is still responsible for keeping this information in its portfolio of evidence.

41. Decide on which component of the UN field operation is responsible for reporting against each indicator during the RBB performance report (only one field component reports against one indicator).

42. Where appropriate, involve key partners such as national authorities and UN partners in collecting data on indicators. For joint programmes and joint initiatives, joint data collection is encouraged where the indicators are shared.

Don’ts for reporting on indicators

7. Given the poor quality of data that is generally found in post-conflict countries, do not base planning decisions solely on data obtained from indicators. Instead, information obtained from indicators needs to be supplemented with data from a range of other sources, both internal and external to the UN Field Mission such as information from UN situation reports, observations from UN staff, views of the national authorities, perceptions of the local population, information from the local and international media, watchdog organizations, NGOs and think-tanks etc.
Table 1. Three examples of bad and good indicators to measure expected accomplishments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected accomplishment:</th>
<th>Strengthened capacity of Country X to ensure security and justice, including in the area of military justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bad</strong></td>
<td>A preliminary baseline assessment reflecting the functioning of police, justice and corrections institutions and perceptions of justice and security in Country X is provided to the Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Good</strong></td>
<td>Adoption by the Government of Country X of a baseline assessment reflecting the functioning of police, justice and corrections institutions and perceptions of justice and security in the country by 30 June 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Why?**                 | • It is **Specific** and **Measurable**.  
  • But it is **not Relevant**: this is an output of the UN Field Mission, not an indicator. It is not measuring a change or situation external to the UN Field Mission. See **Don’t number 1**.  
  • It is also **not Time-bound** as it is unclear by when the baseline assessment would be provided. |
|                          | • **Specific**: It is specific about what will be adopted and by whom.  
  • **Measurable**: whether the assessment has been adopted can be determined easily through reviewing publicly-available documents (this can be answered either by a “yes” or “no”).  
  • **Attainable**: This seems likely to happen within the planning period.  
  • **Realistic/relevant**: This indicator measures an action that is external to the UN Field Mission (the adoption by the Government of an assessment). It is therefore relevant to track this issue to determine if the UN Field Mission is making progress in strengthening national capacity to ensure security and justice. See **Dos number 3**.  
  • **Time-bound**: It is time-bound as there is a date by which the baseline assessment would be adopted.
**Expected accomplishment:** Increased security and stability in conflict-affected areas of Country X

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Full implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants | **Why?**  
• Specific: it is **not** specific. Without in-depth knowledge of this peace agreement, what exactly is being measured is unclear.  
• Measurable: it is **not** measurable. “Implementation” cannot be measured easily: when is implementation considered to be complete? See Don’t number 5.  
• Attainable: this would **not** be attainable during the duration of a typical plan (one year in length).  
• Relevant: This is a relevant issue to look at since the UN Field Mission has a mandate to support implementation of a national DDR programme. It is external to the UN Field Mission.  
• Time-bound: it is **not** time-bound. The time-frame is unclear. | **Why?**  
• Specific: what is being measured can be readily understood without in-depth knowledge of a peace agreement.  
• Measurable: A specific provision in the peace agreement was selected to be tracked, namely, the establishment of a DDR Commission. Whether this was achieved can easily be answered with a “yes” or a “no”.  
• Attainable: this is likely to be attained during the duration of a typical plan (one year in length).  
• Relevant: This is a relevant issue to look at since the UN Field Mission has a mandate to support implementation of a national DDR programme. It is external to the UN Field Mission.  
• Time-bound: There is a specific date mentioned for the approval of the establishment of a DDR Commission. |
Expected accomplishment: Reduction in prison riots in conflict-affected areas of Country X.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in the percentage of probation officers and of corrections officers who received human rights training within the last twelve months, in all state-prisons in Country X (2010/11: 0 percent; 2011/12: 2 percent; 2012/13: 5 percent)</td>
<td>Increase in the percentage of probation officers in all state-prisons in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 2 percent; 2011/12: 3 percent; 2012/13: 5 percent)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Why?                                                                      | • Specific and Measurable: It is not specific and measurable. It is not clear what is being measured since the indicator is trying to measure two different types of information: “the percentage of probation officers”, and “the percentage of corrections officers who received human rights training within the last twelve months”. It is also not clear what the unit in the baseline and targets refers to: is it the percentage of probation officers or is it the percentage of corrections officers who received human rights training within the last twelve months?  
  • Attainable: This is likely to be attained during the duration of a typical plan (one year in length).  
  • Relevant: This is a relevant issue to look at where the UN Field Mission is advising the government on alternatives to imprisonment to reduce prison overcrowding and therefore the likelihood of prison riots. It is external to the UN Field Mission.  
  • Time-bound: the baseline and targets of the indicator specify the timeframe covered. | • The “bad” indicator can be rephrased as two separate indicators: one indicator tracking the increase in percentage of probation officers, and a second indicator tracking the increase in percentage of corrections officers who received human rights training within the last months.  
  • The indicator is now Specific and Measurable as it tracks a single unit of information (the percentage of probation officers). See Dos number 27.  
  • See also indicator 3.2. in Tool 6.6.4. |

For more examples of indicators, see Tools 6.6.1. to 6.6.6.
Tool 6.5. Checklist of dos and don’ts on outputs

This tool can be used to define outputs relating to the work of rule of law and security institutions components in UN Field Missions. Such outputs can be used in a wide variety of plans such as a Results-based Budget (RBB) Framework, a component-level plan such as an annual workplan or a project document that forms part of a financial agreement funded through voluntary sources of funding. The six key points in the checklist are underlined and in blue.

Output: The final product or deliverables by a programme/sub-programme to stakeholders, which an activity is expected to produce in order to achieve its objectives. Outputs may include reports, publications, training, meetings, security services, etc. (Based on ST/SGB/2000/8)

Dos for definition and purpose

1. First identify the expected accomplishments, then identify the outputs.
2. Note that there is a causal relationship between the output and the expected accomplishment i.e., if outputs are produced, then this will generate benefits to end-users; this result is known as the expected accomplishment.
3. In an RBB, note that there is no causal relationship between the output and the indicator. In an RBB Framework, the indicator measures progress towards expected accomplishments and not towards the outputs.
4. Note that in component-level plans for all rule of law and security institutions field components, indicators to measure progress towards expected accomplishments are required. However, indicators to measure progress in implementing outputs are optional, except for DDR Monitoring and Evaluation Plans where process indicators are also required (as per the SOP on Monitoring and Evaluation for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (2010)).
5. Note that the UN Field Mission’s outputs are only a contribution to the expected accomplishment. This is because implementing an expected accomplishment (e.g., protection of civilians) is typically a collective responsibility involving not only the UN Field Mission but also others (e.g., other UN entities, the national authorities, civil society, bilateral donors and International Financial Institutions).
6. An output must always be something that is within the capacity of the UN Field Mission’s component to deliver. For example, a UN Field Mission without an executive mandate cannot have as an output the enactment of a new law or adoption of a new policy as only government can pass laws or national policies. However, a UN Field Mission could potentially have as an output the preparation of draft text for a new law or policy.
7. As a general rule, note that the recipients of the outputs are external to the UN Field Mission (government officials, the local population, national institutions etc.).
8. Ensure that component-level plans, such as an annual component workplan, also include the outputs mentioned in the RBB. As a general rule, component-level plans should contain more outputs than are contained in the RBB Framework.
Dos for selecting outputs

9. Check the **Security Council mandate** for specific language on activities or outputs that the UN Field Mission should implement. For example, SC Res. 1925 (2010) op. para. 12 (n) asks MONUSCO to “Support the reform of the police led by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including by providing training to battalions of the Congolese National Police (PNC)...”.

10. Ensure that an output relating to an early peacebuilding task advances the political objectives of the future UN Field Mission and/or the peace process, and:
   (i) ensures security and/or
   (ii) lays the foundation for longer-term institution-building.
   See “Tool 3 Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) checklists on prioritizing and sequencing early peacebuilding interventions” for more guidance.

11. In the RBB, as a general rule, insert new and different outputs if:
   (i) A new priority has been identified by the UN Field Mission that falls within the existing Security Council mandate and requires a significant, new request in terms of posts or other resources; or
   (ii) There has been a change in the Security Council mandate that results in new priorities; or
   (iii) The previous year’s output(s) need to be refined.

12. If new outputs are added, as compared to last year’s RBB, then consider deleting some outputs that may now be of a lesser priority.

13. As a general rule, repeat last year’s outputs that were never started (e.g., a workshop in region X that was not held due to insecurity but it still needed next year), unless they are no longer a priority. This also applies to outputs relating to quick-impact projects.

14. As a general rule, include the remaining portion of outputs that were partially completed, unless they are no longer a priority. For example, if two out of three training courses were held and these courses remain a priority, then include the remaining one training course in the next year’s RBB outputs. This also applies to outputs relating to quick-impact projects.

15. Only include outputs that will be achieved within the planning period. This means only include outputs that will be achieved in a one-year period for annual plans such as annual workplans and a one-year RBB cycle. For example, in a one-year plan, only include the number of square kilometres of road demined in one year, not the cumulative total demined since the start of the programme. For multi-year plans, it is recommended to divide up the plan into segments, for instance, into yearly plans with outputs for each year to facilitate planning, implementation and reporting.

16. As a general rule, include on average 5-10 outputs per expected accomplishment.

17. **Be selective and only include outputs that have a significant impact on mandate implementation** (i.e., without this output, mandate implementation would not be possible). This is particularly important for the RBB.

18. Only include outputs that are resource-intensive in terms of staff time and other costs. This is particularly important for the RBB.

19. When selecting an output, make sure that it is easy to measure and therefore easy to audit (for instance by the oversight bodies).
20. **Reflect cross-cutting considerations** in outputs (e.g., gender, human rights, HIV/AIDS, environmental issues etc.). For example, the following output reflects UNMIS’s efforts to mainstream gender considerations into its corrections work:


21. **In an RBB, merge similar outputs under different expected accomplishments** and place them under the component that is the most resource intensive (i.e., merge outputs with the same target audience or dealing with the same issue).

For example, an output relating to training courses on HIV/AIDS for prison officers under one expected accomplishment could be merged with an output relating to training courses on a human rights-based approach to prison management for prison officers under another expected accomplishment.

22. **Include outputs relating to coordination outside of the UN Field Mission** such as UN inter-agency coordination meetings or government-led coordination meetings. For example: “Chairing of monthly meetings of the inter-agency justice sector working group (UNMIT, UNIFEM, UNDP and UNICEF) to... (UNMIT 2009/10)” or “Secretariat support to monthly government-led coordination meetings on ...”

23. **In an RBB, reflect outputs under as many expected accomplishments that are relevant.** This means that, for instance, the mine action component’s outputs, can be reflected partly under an expected accomplishment relating to security and stability (e.g., mine clearance of 3,000 km of humanitarian supply routes) and partly under an expected accomplishment relating to provision of internal support services (e.g., provision of 300 UN personnel with landmine safety briefings).

**Don’ts for selecting outputs**

1. **In the RBB, do not include a long laundry list of all the outputs of all the offices and units in the UN Field Mission who are working on a particular expected accomplishment.** The same applies to component-level plans. Only priority outputs should be included.

2. **Do not include outputs that are internal to the UN Field Mission** (e.g., a weekly situation report to the Mission’s leadership, or coordination meetings internal to the UN Field Mission, or an internal assessment conducted by the rule of law section of needs in the police and law enforcement sector in the host country).

3. **Do not confuse outputs of the UN Field Mission with those of others, when work is done jointly or collaboratively.** For example, a DDR component in a UN Field Mission may have a series of 10 planning meetings with a national DDR Commission to help them develop a national strategy on DDR. The output of the DDR Commission is a national strategy. The output of the UN Field Mission is the “Advice on a national strategy for DDR through 10 planning meetings with the DDR Commission.”
4. In the RBB, do not include outputs that are funded through voluntary contributions. This is particularly important for outputs of mine action components. E.g., if two mine clearance teams are funded from assessed contributions and are to demine 600 square meters in one year, and one mine clearance team is funded from voluntary contributions and is to demine 300 square meters, then the output “Demining of 600 square meters” is included as an output in the RBB and “Demining of 300 square meters” is included as an output in the project proposal for the donor; both outputs are included in the annual workplan of the mine action component.

5. Do not confuse an output with an activity. For example, “monitoring of court cases” is an activity conducted by a justice component, whereas the output is the result of this court monitoring such as a published report (e.g., three reports generated through court monitoring, to the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary, on compliance by the courts in Darfur with rules of procedure and international standards (based on UNAMID 2011-12); see Tool 6.7).

Dos for language, tone and style

24. Draft outputs to make them “SMART” i.e., outputs should be:
   - **Specific**, in terms of quantity, quality, time, location, target groups etc.
   - **Measurable** in terms of quantity, periodicity etc.
   - **Attainable**: the output can be attained within the period covered by the plan, which is usually a one-year period (i.e., “do not walk on water”). For example, don’t include an output to deliver 20 training courses in one year when you are only likely to have enough staff to deliver 10 courses.
   - **Realistic/relevant**: it must be within the mandate and capacity of the UN Field Mission to deliver the output. For example, don’t include an output on supporting the government to develop a strategy on security sector reform if the UN Field Mission has no mandate to do so.
   - **Time-bound**: only include outputs that can be achieved within the period covered by the plan. See Dos number 15.

25. Create specific and measurable outputs by making reference to:
   - **Quantity** (e.g., 5 workshops; 20 villages; 100 participants);
   - **Frequency** (e.g., monthly meetings);
   - **UN partners involved in jointly implementing** the output; and
   - **Recipients** of the output (e.g., the Ministry of Justice; prison officers, villages, IDPs).

   For example:
   - E.g., “10 training courses for 300 prison officers on basic prison duties, in collaboration with UNODC and UNDP.”
26. Note that for police patrols, specify the total number of person days, provide an explanation in brackets of how the total figure was reached and specify the purpose of the patrol. Also specify whether it is a pedestrian or vehicle patrol, due to the difference in cost.

27. Note that for formed police unit (FPU) patrols, the total number of UN formed police unit person days is reached by calculating: number of formed police personnel per patrol \( \times \) number of patrols per platoon \( \times \) number of platoons per formed police unit \( \times \) number of formed police units \( \times \) 365 days.

E.g., 1 (FPUs): 236,520 UN formed police unit person days (8 formed police personnel per patrol \( \times \) 3 patrols per platoon \( \times \) 3 platoons per formed police unit \( \times \) 9 formed police units \( \times \) 365 days) to provide crowd control support to the national police of Country X (generic). See Tool 6.7.

28. Note that for police officer patrols, the total number of UN individual police officer days is reached by calculating: number of individual officers per patrol \( \times \) number of patrols per day \( \times \) number of locations patrolled \( \times \) 365 days.

E.g. (IPOs): 157,680 UN individual police officer days (2 individual police officers per patrol \( \times \) 4 patrols per day \( \times \) 54 commissariats \( \times \) 365 days) to patrol unstable areas and strategic roads in Country X (generic).

29. If the output is advice, training courses, workshops or meetings, do state the topic to make the output more specific.

30. Keep outputs short and succinct, for instance, by:

   (a) Merging outputs with the same target audience or subject matter. For example, several quick-impact projects with the same purpose can be merged as follows: “30 quick-impact projects in the areas of rehabilitation of police stations, correctional facilities, magistrate courts, immigration offices and border posts to strengthen the rule of law infrastructure” (UNMIL 2009/10).

   (b). Removing superfluous verbs and nouns if they do not add anything in terms of clarity or meaning.

      e.g., 1. “Technical advice, through weekly meetings, to...“

      e.g., 2. “Implementation of 4 quick-impact projects to...“

      e.g., 3. “6 capacity-development workshops for the Ministry of Justice on...“

31. As required, include a verb to clarify the role of the UN Field Mission (e.g., chairing, facilitating, hosting etc.). E.g., “Chairing of weekly coordination meetings with the UN Country Team on rule of law...“

32. If a verb is needed for the sake of clarity, use a verb in the present tense (e.g., “Conduct of...”; “Provision of advice through...”

33. Use the term “training course” not “course” or “trainings”.

34. Use the term “training programme” where several training courses are provided that make up a training programme.

35. Use the term “workshop” for a non-training event (e.g., a workshop with government officials to provide feedback on a draft national plan for DDR).
Don’ts for language, tone and style

6. **Do not** use words that are ambiguous. For example, instead of “bi-monthly”, which can mean either twice a month or every two months, give a total such as 24 meetings or six meetings.

7. **Do not** qualify the outputs (e.g., no “timely” advice or “comprehensive” strategy or “systematic” monitoring of court cases).

8. In an RBB, **do not** include acronyms for names of national government institutions, non-governmental organizations, working groups, inter-governmental organizations etc. Instead, write these names out in full.

Dos for reporting on outputs

36. From day one of a new plan, **maintain a portfolio of evidence** for your monitoring and evaluation system that includes data on each output. This will facilitate reporting later on (e.g., for the RBB performance report, Secretary-General’s reports and donor reports).

37. In an RBB, if an output is being implemented by multiple components of the UN Field Mission (e.g., a training course involving the justice, human rights and gender components of a Mission), then the component that is providing the most resources in terms of personnel should be responsible for reporting on it in the performance report.

Table 1. Example of a bad and good output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consultations with interested parties</td>
<td>Advice, through 12 meetings, to the Ministry of Justice of Country X on revising the existing laws on juvenile justice to align them with international standards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Why?**

- It is not “SMART”.
- It is not Specific (Who are these interested parties?). If it is not clear which specific parties will attend the consultations, a general indication should be given that is more specific than “interested parties”.
- It is not Measurable: it is not quantified and there is no indication of frequency (How many/how often should consultation sessions be held? How many parties are involved?). This makes it impossible to measure the output and determine whether it is Realistic, Attainable and Time-bound.

- Advice is the output.
- The output is Specific in that it specifies the recipient (the Ministry of Justice of Country X), and the topic of the advice (revising the existing laws on juvenile justice to align them with international standards).
- It is Measurable as “12 meetings” provides an indication of the quantity/predictivity of the advice.

For more examples, see “Tool 6.7. List of examples of outputs”
Tool 6.6. Lists of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments

Tool 6.6.0. Introduction to lists of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments

Read “Tool 6.4. Checklist of dos and don’ts on indicators to measure expected accomplishments” before using this tool.

How to use this tool

Purpose. The six lists (Tools 6.6.1. to 6.6.6) provide examples of performance indicators that can be used to measure progress towards expected accomplishments (and ultimately objectives) relating to the work of police, justice, corrections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and mine action components in UN Field Missions. The indicators can be used in a range of planning documents such as a UN Integrated Strategic Framework, a Results-based Budget (RBB) Framework, a component-level plan such as an annual workplan or a project document that forms part of a financial agreement funded through voluntary sources of funding. These examples of indicators are all considered to be technically acceptable for inclusion in an RBB Framework, and are expressed in the format used in the RBB.

Selecting an indicator from the lists. A very limited selection of examples of indicators to measure progress in some of the core functions of field components is presented for illustrative purposes only. Users should avoid copying indicators directly from these lists. Instead, indicators must be tailored to the local context, language(s) and culture. These lists are a work in progress and will be updated in light of experience in future revisions to the Planning Toolkit.

Users should select indicators that provide information that is relevant to implementation of the mandate of the UN Field Mission and for which data is feasible to collect. Indeed, in selecting an indicator, please answer the questions below:

- Does the indicator provide meaningful information for decision-making on the programme?
- Can the data be collected within a reasonable amount of time and cost?
- Is it likely that the indicator will be met within the planning period (usually one year)?
- Is it “SMART” (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant/realistic, Time-bound)?

Some indicators provide more meaningful information than others. It is therefore essential to use your judgement when deciding whether to redesign your plan in light of information from indicators. Indeed, given the poor quality of data that is generally found in post-conflict countries, do not base planning decisions solely on data obtained from indicators. Instead, information obtained from indicators needs to be supplemented with: data from a range of other sources, both internal and external to the UN Field Mission (e.g., information from UN situation reports, observations from UN staff, views of the national authorities, perceptions of the local population, information from the local and international media, watchdog organizations, NGOs, think-tanks etc.), and an analysis of planning assumptions and risks.

How the tool is structured

Six lists of indicators are provided under Tool 6.6:

6.6.1. Cross-cutting issues
6.6.2. Police and law enforcement
6.6.3. Judiciary
6.6.4. Corrections
6.6.5. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants
6.6.6. Mine action

The list in Tool 6.6.1. is for use by all components working on rule of law and security institutions issues.

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106 The examples of indicators are drawn from a range of sources such as past RBB Frameworks, the UN Rule of Law Indicators, including the draft “Report on the Implementation of the Rule of Law Indicators in Liberia (23 September 2011)”, as well as suggestions for colleagues in rule of law and security institutions components in UN Field Missions and in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions.

107 See Dos number 16 in Tool 6.4.

108 See Dos number 13 to 20 in Tool 6.4.

109 See Dos number 38 in Tool 6.4.

110 See Don’ts number 7 in Tool 6.4.
“I developed a monitoring tool which measures the quality of work being delivered by mine clearance NGOs. Being able to quantitatively and objectively compare the quality NGOs enabled defensible decision-making on funds allocation.”

Ms. Abigail Hartley,
Chief of Staff, UNMAS Afghanistan

Data sources used in the list

Some of the indicators in these lists are based on the UN Rule of Law Indicators\(^{111}\) which are a set of 135 indicators to measure the strengths and effectiveness of criminal justice institutions in conflict and post-conflict situations. Those indicators monitor changes to law enforcement, judicial, and correctional institutions over time. In countries implementing the UN Rule of Law Indicators, users should determine whether any of these indicators can also be used to measure the UN Field Mission’s performance in strengthening law enforcement, judicial and correctional institutions.

A number of sources of data are referred to in the lists. These are:

- **Administrative data (AD)** – quantitative information compiled routinely by national institutions, international organizations, civil society groups and occasionally customary justice system.
- **Field data (FD)** – data that is already available in the UN Field Mission or with the UN Country Team, or can be collected by UN field staff and other individuals working on rule of law and security institutions issues.
- **Document review (DR)** – information obtained from written documents such as peace agreements, media reports, published laws, judicial rulings, prosecutorial decisions, customary justice rules and decisions, policies, standard operating procedures and guidelines of national institutions, administrative acts, budgets, fiscal reports and reports from NGOs etc. Indicators obtained through “Document Review” are highlighted in colour in the lists, as these are low-cost to collect and require no specialist skills in data collection and analysis.
- **Survey of experts (ES)** – information gathered confidentially from individuals with specialized knowledge based on their experience or professional position using a written questionnaire. Expert surveys should be used with caution, due to the costs and challenges of collecting such data.\(^{112}\) Expert surveys should be designed so as to avoid bias. For example, steps should be taken to ensure that: a diverse group of experts is consulted, ethical considerations are taken into account, a large enough number of experts are interviewed to ensure the validity of the data, and that, as much as possible, the same experts are interviewed from year to year. Further guidance is available on page 27 of “The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation Guide and Project Tools”.
- **Public survey (PS)** – information gathered from the population in a country in relation to particular issues, whether across the country or in a restricted geographical area. Public surveys are particularly useful for collecting data about public perceptions, and are often outsourced to local organizations with the appropriate capacity, relationships and experience to conduct large-scale public surveys. Public surveys should also be used with caution, due to the costs and challenges of collecting such data.\(^{113}\)

“We conducted internal assessments of our community violence reduction projects and used outside experts to conduct public surveys to obtain critical information about the relevance and impact of our programmes.”

Ms. Stephanie Ziebell, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Community Violence Reduction section, MINUSTAH

**Other useful resources**

- “Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit” (UNODC) ([English version](#); [French version](#))
- “How-to Guide on Constructing DDR Indicators” (DPKO, OROLSI, DDRS, 2010) ([English version](#); [French version](#))

114 See Dos number 20 in Tool 6.4.
### Tool 6.6.1. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to cross-cutting issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Accomplishment</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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</table>
| 1. Strengthened policy framework | 1.1. Assessment of needs  
**Issuance of a government report on findings of a national assessment of rule of law and security institutions issues.**  
*Example:* The Government of Country X issues a report in 2012/13 on the findings of a national baseline assessment of the security sector. | DR | Measurement: Review of government documents to determine which government reports have been issued that contain findings of a national needs assessment on rule of law and security institutions issues. Indicators 1.1 through 1.3 may be used sequentially. For instance, in year one, the UN Field Mission may use indicator 1.1 as a measure of progress towards policy reform, followed by indicator 1.2 in year two and indicator 1.3 in year three. |
| 1.2. Strategic plans | Adoption by the Government of a national strategic plan for the police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR or mine action sector.  
*Example:* Adoption by the Government in 2009-10 of the reform action plan for justice and corrections as part of the overall strategic plan for security sector reform. (Based on A/63/806, MONUC 2009-10.) | DR | Measurement: Review of government documents to determine which strategic plans have been adopted. |
| 1.3. Policy reform | Approval by the Government of a new or revised policy on a rule of law and security institutions issue.  
*Example:* Approval by the Government of Country X of a revised policy on national security in 2012/13. | DR | Measurement: Review of government documents to determine which policies have been approved. |
| 2. Legislative framework is aligned with international standards | 2.1. Legislative reform  
**Adoption or amendment by the Government or Parliament of new or revised legislation on rule of law and security institutions issues.**  
*Example 1:* Adoption by the Parliament of Country X in 2012/13 of a revised Criminal Procedure Code with specific provisions on addressing sexual- and gender-based crimes, which are in line with international standards.  
*Example 2:* Adoption by the Parliament of Country X in 2012/13 of a revised Police Act that contains a provision stipulating the obligation of the national police to act independently of political influence and specifying a legal punishment for violation of this obligation.  
*Example 3:* Adoption by the Parliament of Country X in 2012/13 of a revised Prison Bill containing a new provision on the prohibition of torture in accordance with UN Standards for Prisons.  
*Example 4:* Adoption by the Prison Service of Country X in 2012/13 of a revised prison service code of conduct that contains provisions on discipline and punishment in compliance with UN Standards for Prisons. | DR | Measurement: Review of legislative documents to establish which legislation has been adopted or ratified, and which procedures and codes have been amended in light of new/revised legislation. Other examples of legislation that are often revised in the early post-conflict period are the Civil Procedure Code and Penal Code. |

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| 3. Effective implementation of the peace agreement | 3.1. Implementation of peace agreements  
Implementation of specific provisions of peace agreements.  
Example: Establishment of a DDR Commission by the Government of Country X by the deadline of 31 March 2013 stipulated in the comprehensive peace agreement. | DR | Measurement: Review of publically-available documents such as government press releases, media reports, UN and NGO reports etc. |
| 4. Improved accountability, integrity, and transparency of rule of law and security institutions | 4.1. Existence of codes of conduct or other guidance documents stipulating standards of conduct  
Whether standing operating procedures, codes of conduct and other guidance documents exist for rule of law and security institutions that include provisions relating to accountability, integrity and transparency.  
Example: Adoption of a code of conduct on the prevention of sexual violence for FARDC and PNC. (A/63/806, MONUC 2009-10) | DR | Measurement: Review of rule of law and security institutions standard operating procedures, codes of conduct and other guidance documents to establish whether they include provisions relating to accountability, integrity and transparency.  
Indicators can also be created to measure whether training standards and a training curriculum exist on codes of conduct or whether such training materials contain content on accountability, integrity and transparency. |
|  | 4.2. Existence of a vetting process to identify former human rights abusers  
Whether a vetting process exists to ensure that rule of law and security institutions personnel who committed gross human rights abuses and other serious crimes are identified and prevented from serving.  
Example: The establishment of a vetting process in Country X in 2012/13 to ensure that police personnel who committed gross human rights abuses and other serious crimes during the conflict are identified and prevented from serving as police officers. | DR | Measurement: Review of policy documents and standard operating procedures to establish whether an adequate vetting process is in place. |
|  | 4.3. Quality of the vetting process  
Whether the existing vetting process is adequate to ensure that individuals who committed gross human rights abuses and other serious crimes are identified and prevented from serving as rule of law and security institutions personnel.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who rated the adequacy of the current vetting process for ensuring that those who committed gross human rights abuses and other serious crimes are identified and prevented from serving as police officers as "good" or "very good" (2010/11: N/A; 2011/12: 25 percent; 2012/13: 36 percent). | ES | Example question: "How would you rate the current vetting process for ensuring that those who committed gross human rights abuses and other serious crimes are identified and prevented from serving as police officers?"  
Rating: Average score of relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the four response categories: very good (4); good (3); poor (2); very poor (no process in place) (1).  
Measurement: Number of experts who rated "good" or "very good", divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.  
This indicator covers UN Rule of Law Indicators No. 32 and 128. |

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<tr>
<td>5. Improved human capacity of rule of law and security sector institutions to perform basic duties</td>
<td>5.1. Size of the police force, judiciary, prison service or armed forces</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Data can be collected for specific areas of operation in the UN Field Mission that are priority areas of concern (e.g. IDP camps, or insecure, conflict-affected areas). Indicator 5.1 should be used with caution as it is highly context-specific. Terms such as “law enforcement officer” may need to be defined as many parts of government have law enforcement functions. Measurement for 5.1.1 example 1: Total number of police personnel in Country X per 1,000 population. Indicator 5.1.2 should be used with caution. In some countries, the goal is to increase the overall size of the police force (e.g., Haiti in 2011) or of the armed forces (e.g., Afghanistan in 2011). However, in other countries, the goal is to decrease the overall size of the armed forces (e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2011) or the size of the corrections service (e.g., South Sudan in 2011). Indicator 5.1.3 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 123. Measurement for 5.1.3: Number of prisoners per number of prison officers. Example: Increase in the percentage of personnel in the national armed forces who are from former armed forces and groups (2010/11: 0 percent; 2011/12: 2 percent; 2012/13: 4 percent).</td>
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<td>5.1.1. Number of rule of law and security institutions personnel per 1,000 population. Example: Increase in the number of police and other law enforcement officers per 1,000 persons in Country X (2010/11: 1 police and other law enforcement officers per 1,000 persons; 2011/12: 1.6 police and other law enforcement officers per 1,000 persons; 2012/13: 2 police and other law enforcement officers per 1,000 persons).</td>
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<td>5.1.2. Number of rule of law and security institutions personnel in Country X. Example: Increase in the total number of police personnel in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 10,000 police personnel; 2011/12: 12,000 persons; 2012/13: 13,000 persons).</td>
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<td>5.1.3. Number of prisoners per number of prison officers. Example: Decrease in the number of prisoners per prison officer (2010/11: 6.7 prisoners per prison officer; 2011/12: 6.2 prisoners per prison officer; 2012/13: 5.9 prisoners per prison officer).</td>
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<td>5.1.4. Adoption by a government entity of standards on staffing levels for prisons. Example: Acceptance by the Bureau of Corrections in 2011/12 of a standardized staffing level based on good practice in other African countries, ranging from 1 staff per 2 prisoners to 1 staff per 8 prisoners. (A/64/647, UNMIL 2010-11)</td>
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<td>5.1.5. Percentage of personnel in the national armed forces who are from former armed forces and groups. Example: Increase in the percentage of personnel in the national armed forces who are from formed armed forces and groups (2010/11: 0 percent; 2011/12: 2 percent; 2012/13: 4 percent).</td>
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<td>5.2. Quality of national training provided Number of graduates from national training programmes provided to rule of law and security institutions personnel in a given year. Example: Increase in the number of graduates from the national basic training programme for police cadets in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 800 graduates; 2011/12: 850 graduates; 2012/13: 1,200 graduates).</td>
<td>AD or FD</td>
<td>Measurement: Number of persons who completed a national training programme for rule of law personnel, divided by the total number of persons who were registered for the programme, in a given year, multiplied by 100. Indicators can also be created to track specific types of training received, or to track which category of personnel is receiving training.</td>
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| 5. Improved human capacity of rule of law and security sector institutions to perform basic duties | 5.3. Existence of specific capacities or functions  
Establishment of specialized capacities or functions in the rule of law and security institutions sector.  
*Example 1:* Establishment of a community-oriented policing capacity in the national police service of Country X in 2012/13.  
*Example 2:* Establishment of a disciplinary panel in 2012/13 to review alleged misconduct by judges and prosecutors in the judicial system of Country X.  
|                         | 5.4. Gender balance amongst rule of law and security institution personnel  
Percentage of rule of law and security institutions personnel who are women.  
*Example:* Increase in the percentage of judicial officers who are women in Country X (2010/11: 1.3 percent; 2011/12: 1.7 percent; 2012/13: 2 percent). | AD          | Measurement: Number rule of law and security institution personnel who are women, divided by the total number of rule of law and security institution personnel, multiplied by 100.  
It may be of interest to measure gender balance amongst a specific group such as the leadership of a rule of law and security institution.  
This indicator covers UN Rule of Law Indicators No. 34 and 78.  
This indicator can also be used a proxy to measure “Improved treatment of women and children.” |
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| 6. Improved access to the police and to judicial services | 6.1. Geographic coverage of rule of law and security services  
The extent to which the population has access to rule of law and security institutions services.  
Example 1: Deployment of 50 magistrates in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. (A/64/670, MONUC 2010-11).  
Example 2: Increase in the number of mobile courts in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (2007/08: 8 courts; 2008/09: 10 courts; 2009/10: 12 courts). (Based on A/63/806, MONUC 2009-10.)  
Example 4: Increase in the number of legal aid centres or para-legal services providing legal aid services to victims of sexual and gender-based violence in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 2 centres; 2011/12: 2 centres; 2011/12: 3 centres).  
Example 5: Increase in the number of legal aid offices from 12 offices in 12 jurisdictions in 2008/09 to 16 offices in 16 jurisdictions in 2009/10. (A/63/709; MINUSTAH 2010-11)  
Example 6: Increase in the number of police installations per 10,000 population in the eastern region of Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 0.3 police installations per 10,000 population; 2011/12: 0.4 police installations per 10,000 population; 2012/13: 0.7 police installations per 10,000 population). | FD | Indicator 6.1 should be used with caution as it may not provide very meaningful information for decision-making in many countries. For example 6, a police installation can mean either a police station or a police post. |
| 7. Strengthened administrative and management capacity of rule of law and security sector institutions | 7.1. Existence of a strategic planning and budgeting capacity  
The rule of law and security institution has a current strategic plan and budget projections.  
Example: A panel of experts rate the national police service of Country X as having a “limited” planning and budgeting capacity in 2012/13 (2010/11: very limited planning and budgeting capacity; 2011/12: very limited planning and budgeting capacity; 2012/13: limited planning and budgeting capacity). | DR | Measurement: Review of available documents to determine whether the rule of law and security institution has a current strategic plan and budget projections (forecast). Rating: The score based on the review of available documents will use the following categories: the documents reveal that the police have very good strategic planning and budget projection capacities (very good = 4); the documents reveal that the police have a capacity, but the plans and projections are not updated regularly (good = 3); the documents reveal that the police have a limited planning and budgeting capacity (poor = 2); the documents reveal that the police have a very limited planning and budgeting capacity (very poor = 1). This indicator covers UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 38, 84, 85 and 132. |
| | 7.2. Existence of administrative systems to support key management functions  
Establishment of financial, assets, human resources, or procurement management systems in rule of law and security institutions.  
Example: The establishment of a new human resources management system for the police force of Country X in 2012/13. | DR | Measurement: Review of policy documentation, guidelines and standard operating procedures to validate the existence of appropriate administrative systems. |
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<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
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| 7. Strengthened administrative and management capacity of rule of law and security sector institutions | 7.3. Administrative systems of the rule of law and security institution (quality)  
Whether the rule of law and security institution has in place effective administrative systems to support key management functions such as the management of finances, assets, procurement and human resources.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who believe that the prisons service has “very good” or “good” administrative systems on which it relies to perform key management functions such as management of finances, assets, human resources and procurement (2010/11: 20 percent; 2011/12: 28 percent; 2012/13: 32 percent). | ES          | Example question: “How would you rate the administrative systems on which the prison service relies to perform key management functions such as the management of finances, assets, procurement and human resources?”  
Rating: Average score of relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the four response categories: very good (4); good (3); poor (2); very poor (1).  
Note: A supplementary question is asked to identify the main strengths and weaknesses of these systems. This indicator covers UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 39, 86, 87 and 133.  
Indicator 7.3.1 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 37.  
Indicator 7.3.2 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 91.  
Indicator 7.3.3 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 92.  
Indicator 7.3.4 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 134.  
Measurement for indicator 7.3.4: field data should be collected on the quality of the information in a sample of prison files. The quality of the information can be determined by examining whether a sample of prison records contains information such as: (a) information about the inmate’s identity and age; (b) the nature of charge and the reasons for his/her commitment and the authority therefore; (c) information on whether the inmate is a pre-trial or sentenced prisoner; (d) the day and hour of his/her admission; (e) the release date for sentenced prisoners and the next remand date for pre-trial prisoners; (f) defence counsel’s name and contact; (g) family and emergency contacts; (h) other data particular to the mission setting. See also the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, standard 7.  
Measurement for indicator 7.3.5: Number of inmates in prison who are not on the prison register, divided by the total number of inmates who are in prison on a given day. |
|                         | 7.4. Record management capacity (quality of records)                       | FD          | Measurement: Field data gathered from a sample of police files, court records, prosecution files, or prison records to determine whether they contain complete information as per the example indicators. For further guidance on measurement see the UN Rule of Law Indicators.  
Indicator 7.4.1 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 37.  
Indicator 7.4.2 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 91.  
Indicator 7.4.3 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 92.  
Indicator 7.4.4 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 134.  
Measurement for indicator 7.4.1: field data gathered from a sample of police stations visited that have (a) the date the case was transferred to the court, the charge(s) involved and the date of the next hearing or other action.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of police files that contain information on the identity, the charge, the age and the release or transfer of suspects in another place of detention (2010/11: 65 percent; 2011/12: 70 percent; 2012/13: 88 percent).  
Indicator 7.4.2: Whether courts maintain apparently complete records on pending cases, including at a minimum the date the case was transferred to the court, the charge(s) involved and the date of next hearing or other action.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of court files that contain information on the date the case was transferred to the court, the charge(s), and the date of next hearing or other action (2010/11: 30 percent; 2011/12: 35 percent; 2012/13: 43 percent).  
Indicator 7.4.3: Whether prosecutors’ offices maintain apparently complete records on: (a) all cases accepted for prosecution; (b) cases dismissed; and (c) charges for each case.  
Example: Increase in percentage of files in the prosecutor’s offices that contain information on the date the case was received, the action taken in the case to date, the charge (offense) and the date of the next appearance in court (2010/11: 20 percent; 2011/12: 24 percent; 2012/13: 26 percent).  
Indicator 7.4.4: Strength of the prison service’s record keeping and information management system (generic).  
Example: Increase in the percentage of the prison files reviewed that contain: (a) the date of admission; (b) the nature of charge; (c) defense counsel’s name and contact; and (d) inmate’s age or date of birth (2010/11: 2 percent; 2011/12: 6 percent; 2012/13: 8 percent).  
Indicator 7.4.5: Percentage of inmates who are not on the prison register.  
Example: Decrease in the percentage of inmates who are not on the prison register in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 15 percent; 2011/12: 10 percent; 2012/13: 5 percent). |
## Tool 6.6.2. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to policing and law enforcement

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<th>Expected Accomplishments</th>
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| 1. Enhanced performance of police and other law enforcement entities | 1.1. Existence of a crime statistics reporting system  
Whether national police produce crime statistics on a regular basis (at least quarterly) that are disaggregated appropriately.  
Example: The national police of Country X produce quarterly crime statistics in 2012/13 that are disaggregated by (a) type of offence; (b) whether an arrest was made; and (c) geographic area.  
(2010/11: not produced at all; 2011/12: all statistics produced but without disaggregation; 2012/13: all statistics produced with disaggregation). | DR          | Measurement: Review of police and other law enforcement documents. Data could be sourced by reviewing statistical reports produced by the national police force or other agencies responsible for such reports.                                                                                     |
|                                                               | 1.2. Existence of a crime prevention strategy  
Adoption by the national police of a crime prevention strategy which is informed by recent crime statistics.  
Example: Adoption by Country X’s national police force of a crime prevention strategy in 2011/12 which is informed by recent crime statistics. | DR          | Measurement: Review of police and other law enforcement documents. This indicator can only be used if there is a functioning crime statistics collection and reporting system in place.                                                                                     |
|                                                               | 1.3. Existence of police procedures on handling serious crimes  
Adoption by the relevant government entity of standard operating procedures for the national police, including guidance on how criminal cases should be processed.  
Example: Adoption by the Ministry of Interior of Country X within the last twelve months of standard operating procedures for the national police on evidence gathering in criminal cases. | DR          | Measurement: Review of government documents.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|                                                               | 1.4. Existence of training standards on handling serious crimes  
Adoption by the relevant government entity of training standards on handling serious crimes.  
|                                                               | 1.5. Intentional homicide cases resolved by the police  
Reported intentional homicides for a 12-month period resulting in an arrest.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of intentional homicides reported over a 12-month period resulting in an arrest.  
(2010/11: 25 percent; 2011/12: 27 percent; 2012/13: 30 percent). | AD          | Measurement: The number of persons arrested for intentional homicide in a given year divided by the number of reported intentional homicides in the same year (the most recent year for which data is available).  
Note: “Arrest” can be replaced with some other form of case resolution if arrest data is not available. This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 7.                                                                                                       |

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| 1. Enhanced performance of police and other law enforcement entities | 1.6. Police response to requests for assistance  
Diligence of the police in responding to public requests for assistance.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who “fully” or “partly agree” that the police respond promptly to requests for assistance from the public  
(2010/11: 50 percent; 2011/12: 63 percent; 2012/13: 68 percent). | ES          | Question: “To what extent do you agree that the police respond promptly to requests for assistance from the public?”  
Rating: Average score of the relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).  
Measurement: Number of experts who “fully” or “partly agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicators No. 2.  |
| 1.7. Police service to the community  
Whether the police are perceived by the population to be doing as much as they can to be of service to the community.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed public who “fully” or “partly agree” that the police are responding to the needs of the community  
(2010/11: 50 percent; 2011/12: 63 percent; 2012/13: 68 percent). | PS          | Question: “To what extent do you agree that the police do as much as they can to be of service to the community?”  
Rating: Average score of respondents on a four-point scale corresponding to the four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).  
Measurement: Number of respondents who “fully” or “partly agree”, divided by the total number of respondents who participated, multiplied by 100.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicators No.10. |
| 2. Strengthened independence, integrity and accountability of police and other law enforcement entities | 2.1. Discrimination by the police [in response]  
Whether the population perceives the police as treating people of all groups fairly and without discrimination.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree” that the police treat people of all groups fairly and without discrimination  
(2010/11: 50 percent; 2011/12: 45 percent; 2012/13: 50 percent). | ES, PS, FD  | Question: “Do you agree that the police treat people of all groups fairly and without discrimination?”  
Rating: Average score of respondents on a four-point scale corresponding to the four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).  
Measurement: Number of experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.  
Based on UN Rule of Law Indicators No. 22. |
| 2.2. Use of police powers  
Whether the police use their law enforcement powers (e.g. arrest, search, seizure and detention) in strict accordance with the law.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree” that the police use their law enforcement powers (e.g. arrest, search, seizure and detention) in strict accordance with the law  
(2010/11: 40 percent; 2011/12: 50 percent; 2012/13: 58 percent). | ES          | Question: “To what extent do you agree that the police generally use their powers (e.g., arrest, search, confiscation, seizure, detention) in strict accordance with the law?”  
Rating: Average score of respondents on a four-point scale corresponding to the four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).  
Measurement: Number of experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.  
This indicator is more meaningful when used together with an indicator measuring whether the police disciplinary mechanism is functioning.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicators No.13. |

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<tr>
<td>2. Strengthened independence, integrity and accountability of police and other law enforcement entities</td>
<td>2.3. Existence of a procedure for investigating police misconduct</td>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Measurement: Review of documents to determine whether the law provides a formal procedure to independently investigate serious incidents of alleged police misconduct. Rating: Law provides for independent investigation (score: 4); law does not provide for independent investigation (score: 1). This is UN Rule of Law Indicators No.16.</td>
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<td>Whether there is a formal procedure set in law for an independent investigation of serious incidents of police misconduct. Example: A panel of experts rate that the law of Country X provides for independent investigation (2010/11: law does not provide for independent investigation; 2011/12: law does not provide for independent investigation; 2012/13: law provides for independent investigation).</td>
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<td>2.4. [Investigation/]prosecution of police corruption or misconduct [in accordance with established procedures]</td>
<td>Whether alleged incidents of police misconduct or corruption are seriously investigated and, when required by law, prosecuted. Example: Increase in the percentage of cases of police misconduct or corruption that resulted in a disciplinary action or prosecution (2010/11: 32 percent; 2011/12: 36 percent; 2012/13: 56 percent).</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Measurement: Number of alleged incidents of police misconduct which resulted in a disciplinary action or a prosecution in a given year, divided by the total number of allegations of police misconduct for the same period, multiplied by 100. This is UN Rule of Law Indicators No.17. This indicator could be used in conjunction with another indicator that measures how freely the population may make accusations of police misconduct. If no reliable mechanism exists for reporting police misconduct, there is less value in determining how effectively such allegations are investigated.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Improved material capacity of police and other law enforcement entities</td>
<td>3.1. Availability of equipment to perform basic police duties</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Question: “To what extent would you agree that the police have adequate equipment to perform their basic duties?” Rating: Average score of responses by experts on a four-point scale for the following four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1). Measurement: Number of experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100. This is UN Rule of Law Indicators No. 26.</td>
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<td>Whether the police have adequate equipment to perform their basic duties. Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who “fully” or “partly agree” that the police have adequate equipment to perform their basic duties (2010/11: 16 percent; 2011/12: 18 percent; 2012/13: 20 percent).</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Improved human capacity of police and other law enforcement entities</td>
<td>4.1. Skills to gather and protect physical evidence</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Other relevant skills could also be measured such as: handling and use of weapons, gathering of criminal intelligence, handling of different types of serious crimes, public order management, border management, operational planning etc.</td>
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<td>Number of national police officers with specialized expertise relating to gathering and protecting physical evidence. Example: Increase in the number of Haitian National Police officers specialized in ballistics, fingerprints and toxicology (2010/11: 2 officers specialized in ballistics and 2 in fingerprints; 2011/12: 6 officers specialized in ballistics, 6 in fingerprints and 2 in toxicology; 2012/13: 8 officers specialized in ballistics, 8 in fingerprints and 8 in toxicology). (Source: A/63/709, MINUSTAH 2009-10)</td>
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### Tool 6.6.3. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to the judiciary

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Accomplishments</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Improved efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system</td>
<td>1.1. Cases of serious crimes adjudicated</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Measurement: Number of criminal cases submitted by public prosecutors to courts of first instance that are adjudicated in a given year. Example: Increase in the percentage of rape cases from IDP camps A and B submitted by public prosecutors to courts of first instance that are adjudicated in 2012/13 (2010/11: 35 percent; 2011/12: 40 percent; 2012/13: 50 percent). Note that the quality of data on serious crimes is likely to be very poor. This indicator will therefore need to be used together with other indicators measuring the performance of the judiciary. Alternatively, only specific crimes with better data could be tracked. If the quality of the data is so poor as to be misleading, this indicator should not be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Undue delays</td>
<td>Ability of the judicial system to hear and conclude criminal cases without undue delays.</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Question: “How would you rate the ability of the judicial system to hear and conclude criminal cases without undue delays?” Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: very good (4); good (3); poor (2); very poor (1). How to calculate: Number of experts who rated “good” or “very good”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100. This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 52.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Pre-sentence detention</td>
<td>Percentage of all detainees who have been held in detention for more than twelve months while awaiting sentencing or a final disposition of their case.</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Measurement: Percentage of prison detainees on a representative day who have been held in detention for more than twelve months while awaiting sentencing or another final disposition of their case (excluding appeals). Data on child detainees should also be collected and reported when available. This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 54.</td>
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<td>1.4. Children in pre-sentence detention</td>
<td>Number of children in pre-sentence detention per 100,000 child population.</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Measurement: Number of children in pre-sentence detention per 100,000 child population. This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 55.</td>
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</table>
| 2. Improved public confidence in the judicial system | 2.1. Confidence in public prosecution  
   Whether the public believes that prosecution decisions are made in a fair, efficient and effective manner.  
   Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts that “partly agree” or “fully agree” that the public believes that prosecution decisions are made in a fair, efficient and effective manner in Country X (2010/11: 30 percent; 2011/12: 35 percent; 2012/13: 41 percent). | ES          | Question: “Do you agree that the public believes that prosecution decisions are made in a fair, efficient and effective manner?”  
Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).  
Measurement: Number of experts who “partly agree” or “fully agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 44. |
| 3. Improved access to justice | 3.1. Protection of the rights of defendants and victims  
   Whether the rights of victims and defendants are sufficiently protected during criminal court proceedings.  
   Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who “partly agree” or “fully agree” that the rights of victims and defendants are sufficiently protected during criminal court proceedings in Country X (2010/11: 50 percent; 2011/12: 58 percent; 2012/13: 63 percent). | ES          | Question: “To what extent do you agree that the rights of victims and defendants are sufficiently protected during criminal court proceedings?”  
Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).  
Measurement: Number of experts who “partly agree” or “fully agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicators No. 46. |
|                          | 3.2. Availability of free legal assistance for indigent defendants  
   Whether and to what extent indigent defendants receive free legal assistance at all stages of criminal proceedings against them.  
   Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who believe that indigent people accused of serious crimes “very often” or “often” receive free legal assistance at any stage of proceedings against them in Country X (2010/11: 75 percent; 2011/12: 68 percent; 2012/13: 60 percent). | ES          | Measurement: “How often do indigent people accused of serious crimes actually receive free legal assistance at all stages of proceedings against them?”  
Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: very often (4); often (3); rarely (2); never (1).  
Measurement: Number of experts who rated “often” or “very often”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicators No. 49. |

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| 4. Improved transparency and accountability of the judiciary | 4.1. Judicial or prosecutorial misconduct  
4.1.1. Likelihood of judges being removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined in cases of serious misconduct.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who believe that it is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” for judges found responsible of serious misconduct, to be removed from their post or to be otherwise disciplined in Country X (2010/11: 48 percent; 2011/12: 52 percent; 2012/13: 65 percent).  
4.1.2. Likelihood of prosecutors being removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined in cases of serious misconduct. | ES | For indicator 4.1.1:  
Question: “How likely are judges found responsible for serious misconduct to be removed from their post or otherwise disciplined?”  
Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: very likely (4); somewhat likely (3); unlikely (2); very unlikely (1).  
Measurement: Number of experts who rate “very likely” and “somewhat likely”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.  
Note that a smaller sample may be used if national data is not available on all judges and prosecutors (e.g., the sample could be restricted to all judges and prosecutors in areas where the UN Field Mission is operating). Ideally, data from one year would be compared to data from the same month of the previous year.  
Indicator 4.1.1 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 64 and indicator 4.1.2 is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 65. |
| 4.2. Quality of performance monitoring system for judges | Whether courts have performance guidelines and a system for monitoring performance that holds judges accountable for unnecessary delays in proceedings, case backlog, or absenteeism.  
Example: A panel of experts rates as “poor” the courts’ performance guidelines and system for monitoring performance that holds judges accountable for unnecessary delays in proceedings, case backlog, or absenteeism (2010/11: very poor performance guidelines and monitoring system; 2012/13: poor performance guidelines and monitoring system). | DR | Measurement: Review of documents to determine whether courts have performance guidelines and a performance monitoring system that holds judges accountable for unnecessary delays in proceedings, case backlog, or absenteeism.  
Rating: Very good performance guidelines and monitoring system (4); good performance guidelines and monitoring system (3); poor performance guidelines and monitoring system (2); very poor performance guidelines and monitoring system (1).  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 67. |
| 5. Strengthened integrity and independence of the judiciary | 5.1. Independence of judiciary – tenure | DR | Measurement: Percentage of judges who are appointed for fixed terms that provide a guaranteed tenure, which is protected until retirement age or the expiration of a defined term of substantial duration.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 56. |
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| 5. Strengthened integrity and independence of the judiciary | 5.2. Independence of judiciary – discipline | ES | Question: “To what extent do you agree that judges are protected from arbitrary removal or punishment?”
Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).
Measurement: Number of experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 57. |
| | | | |
Rating: Very comprehensive measures (4); some important measures (3); few measures (2); no measures.
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 72.
A similar indicator could be used to track gender-sensitive measures such as special procedures for women and child victims of sexual and gender-based violence. |
| | | | |
| 7. Improved capacity of the judicial system to deliver basic justice | 7.1. Material resources of the courts | ES | Question: “With respect to the courts across most of the country (not just the capital), to what extent do you agree that courts have the material resources they need to consult the law, record proceedings, schedule cases, and store and maintain records?”
Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).
Measurement: Number of experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 75. |
| | | | |
| | 7.2. Prosecution material resources | ES | Question: “To what extent do you agree that prosecutors have the means and resources to record testimonies, store and maintain evidence, and keep track of pending cases and hearing dates?”
Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).
Measurement: Number of experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100.
A supplemental question could be asked to determine which aspects of this capacity are particularly lacking.
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 77. |

### Tool 6.6.4. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to corrections

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<tr>
<th>Expected Accomplishments</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Enhanced performance of the prison system</td>
<td>1.1. Prison escapees&lt;br&gt;Number of prison escapees per 1,000 prisoners within the last 12 months. &lt;br&gt;Example: Decrease in the number of prison escapees per 1,000 inmates (2010/11: 100 per 1,000 inmates; 2011/12: 50 per 1,000 inmates; 2012/13: 25 per 1,000 inmates).</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Measurement: The number of individual prisoners who have escaped within a given time period, divided by the prison population on a representative day during the same period, multiplied by 1,000. This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 93.</td>
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<td>1.2. Prisoners’ nutrition&lt;br&gt;Whether prisons provide food of sufficient nutritional value for the prisoners to remain healthy and strong. &lt;br&gt;Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree” that prisons generally provide prisoners with food of sufficient nutritional value to remain healthy and strong (2010/11: 52 percent; 2011/12: 57 percent; 2012/13: 60 percent).</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Question: “To what extent do you agree that prisons generally provide prisoners with food of sufficient nutritional value to remain healthy and strong?”&lt;br&gt;Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: fully agree (4); partly agree (3); disagree (2); strongly disagree (1).&lt;br&gt;Measurement: Number of experts who “fully agree” or “partly agree”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100. Suggested experts include Corrections Officers of the National Prison Service as well as NGOs or UN entities providing food aid to prisons. Note that a smaller sample of prisons may be used if national data is not available on all prisons (e.g., the sample could be restricted to all state-level prisons in which the UN Field Mission is operating). Ideally, data from one year would be compared to data from the same month of the previous year. This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 98.</td>
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<td>1.3. Clean water and sanitation&lt;br&gt;The quality of the prisons' clean water and sanitation installations. &lt;br&gt;Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who rate the prisons’ supply of clean water and sanitation installations as “good” or “very good” (2010/11: 34 percent; 2011/12: 40 percent; 2012/13: 42 percent).</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Question: “How would you rate the prisons’ supply of clean water and sanitation installations?”&lt;br&gt;Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: very good (4); good (3); poor (2); very poor (1).&lt;br&gt;Measurement: Number of experts who rate “good” or “very good”, divided by the total number of experts who participated, multiplied by 100. Note that a smaller sample of prisons may be used if national data is not available on all prisons (e.g., the sample could be restricted to all state-level prisons in which the UN Field Mission is operating). Ideally, data from one year would be compared to data from the same month of the previous year. This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 99.</td>
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| Enhanced performance of the prison system | 1.4. Women detained separately from male prisoners | AD | Measurement: Percentage of female prisoners who are held completely separately from male prisoners.  
*How to calculate:* Number of female prisoners who are held completely separately from male prisoners during a given time period, divided by the total number of females in detention over the same time period, multiplied by 100.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 100.  
*Example:* Increase in the percentage of female prisoners who are held completely separately from male prisoners in Country X (2010/11: 88 percent; 2011/12: 91 percent; 2012/13: 95 percent). |
|  | 1.5. Children detained separately from adults | AD | Measurement: Percentage of children in detention not wholly separated from adults, divided by the total number of children in detention, multiplied by 100.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 116.  
*Example:* Increase in the percentage of children in detention kept wholly separated from adults in prisons in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 6 percent; 2011/12: 8 percent; 2012/13: 10 percent). |
|  | 1.6. Health examination at time of admission | AD | Measurement: The percentage of prisoners admitted to prison during a year who were examined by a qualified medical professional at the time of their admission.  
*How to calculate:* Number of prisoners who have been examined by a qualified medical professional at the time of their admission to prison during a given time period, divided by the total number of prisoners admitted to detention during the same time period, multiplied by 100.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 103.  
*Example:* Increase in the percentage of prisoners who have been examined by a qualified medical professional at the time of their admission to prisons in Country X during 2012/13 (2010/11: 5 percent; 2011/12: 6 percent; 2012/13: 9 percent). |
|  | 1.7. Number of prisoners per prison medical staff member | AD | Measurement: Number of prisoners (e.g., average monthly count) divided by the number of prison medical personnel on a given day.  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 104.  
*Example:* Decrease in the number of prisoners per medical personnel in Country X (2010/11: 361 prisoners per medical personnel; 2011/12: 344 prisoners per medical personnel; 2012/13: 321 prisoners per medical personnel). |
|  | 1.8. Education or vocational training in prisons | AD | Measurement: Number of prisoners who have received some form of education or vocational training in prison during a given time period, divided by the total number of prisoners during the same period, multiplied by 100.  
*Example:* Increase in the percentage of inmates who receive some form of education or vocational training in all state-level prisons in Country X during 2012/13 (2010/11: 5 percent; 2011/12: 10 percent; 2012/13: 15 percent). |
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</table>
| 2. Improved integrity of the prison system | 2.1. Lawfulness of detention (using AD)  
Number of inmates in pre-trial detention without a valid judicial order, or beyond the expiration of such an order, per 100 inmates.  
*Example:* Decrease in the number of inmates in pre-trial detention held without a valid judicial order, or beyond the expiration of such an order, per 100 inmates in all prisons in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 20 per 100 inmates; 2011/12: 15 per 100 inmates; 2012/13: 10 per 100 inmates). | AD | Measurement: The number of individual prisoners in pre-trial detention without a valid judicial order or beyond the expiration of such an order during a given time period, divided by the total prison population during the same period, multiplied by 100. Where a specific ethnic group was persecuted during the conflict, data on inmates could be disaggregated by ethnic group to provide more meaningful information. If the quality of record-keeping is poor, indicator 2.2 should be used instead. |
|                          | 2.2. Lawfulness of detention (using an ES)  
Whether people are held in prison without a valid judicial order, or beyond the expiration of such an order.  
*Example:* Increase in the percentage of experts who believe that people are “rarely” or “almost never” held in prison without a valid judicial order, or beyond the expiration of such an order (2010/11: 40 percent; 2011/12: 45 percent; 2012/13: 53 percent). | ES | Question: “How common is it for people to be held in prison without a valid judicial order (or warrant), or beyond the expiration of such an order?”  
Rating: Average score of all relevant experts on a four-point scale corresponding to the following four response categories: almost never (4); rarely (3); commonly (2); very commonly (1).  
This is UN Rule of Law Indicators No. 107. |
| 3. Improved capacity of the prison system to perform basic duties | 3.1. Prison overcrowding  
Percentage of inmates housed in “overcrowded conditions”.  
*Example 1:* Decrease in the percentage of inmates detained in prisons that are over official capacity in Country X during 2012/13 (2010/11: 95 percent; 2011/12: 90 percent; 2012/13: 85 percent).  
*Example 2:* Decrease in the percentage of inmates with less than 2 square meters of accommodation space in all state-level prisons in Country X during 2012/13 (2010/11: 90 percent; 2011/12: 85 percent; 2012/13: 80 percent). | AD | Measurement: Number of prisoners housed in “overcrowded conditions” on a representative day during a given time period, divided by the total number of prisoners in detention on the same day, multiplied by 100.  
The indicator can be rephrased to focus on geographic regions or specific prisons where the problem is most severe.  
The recommended specification used by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for minimum accommodation space in detention is 3.4–5.4 square meters per person. In serious crisis situations, when all other conditions (water, food etc.) are met, 2 square meters per person is acceptable on a temporary basis.  
Based on UN Rule of Law Indicator No. 119. |

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| 3. Improved capacity of the prisons system to perform basic duties | 3.2. Number of probation and/or parole officers | AD | Percentage of corrections officers who are primarily responsible for the reintegration of offenders in the community.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of corrections officers who are primarily responsible for the reintegration of offenders in the community in all of Country X’s Prison Service in 2012/13 (2010/11: 2 percent; 2011/12: 3 percent; 2012/13: 5 percent). |
| | 3.3. Training on human rights (using AD) | AD | Percentage of corrections officers who have received human rights training within the last twelve months.  
| | 3.4. Training on human rights (using ES) | ES | The extent to which prison staff receive adequate human rights training.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who rate the human rights training received by prison staff as “very good” and “good” (2010/11: 60 percent; 2011/12: 65 percent; 2012/13: 71 percent). |
Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed experts who “agree” or “fully agree” that prisons in Country X are managed in compliance with human rights standards (2010/11: 20 percent; 2011/12: 35 percent; 2012/13: 55 percent). |

## Tool 6.6.5. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to DDR

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| 1. National commitment to DDR                                                         | 1.1. Political agreement on specific DDR/CVR requirements  
1.1.1. Peace Agreement: Signatories to a peace agreement approve a national DDR programme. Example: Agreement of signatories of the “statements of commitment” to enter the demobilization process. (A/63/806, MONUC 2009-10, page 16)  
1.2.1. No Peace Agreement: The host government formally commits to support the development and implementation of community-based projects to reduce violence and/or criminality. | DR          | Measurement: Review of strategic framework, Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programme documents and/or another form of formal commitment of the national authorities to the DDR/CVR programme. The “statements of commitment” is an annex to a peace agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An indicator could also be created to track whether a peace agreement contains specific provisions for the immediate release of children associated with armed forces or groups. See also “Tool 6.6.1. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to cross-cutting issues”, indicator 3.1. |
| 1.2. Political agreement on specific DDR requirements                                  | Signatories to a peace agreement agree on the number of persons eligible for DDR programmes. Example: An agreement is reached by all the signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement and subsequent peace agreements on the total number of eligible combatants qualified for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme targeting Darfuri armed groups. (A/63/717, UNAMID 2009-10, page 26) | DR          | Measurement: Review of peace agreements. An indicator could also be created to track whether a peace agreement contains specific provisions for the immediate release of children associated with armed forces or groups. See also “Tool 6.6.1. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to cross-cutting issues”, indicator 3.1. |
| 1.3. Existence of national strategies, policies or programmes addressing the needs of women and vulnerable groups | Whether the government approves particular strategies, policies, or programmes addressing the specific needs of women associated with armed forces and groups, or children associated with armed forces and groups, or disabled ex-combatants. Example: The national strategy on DDR approved by the government of Country X in 2012/13 contains provisions on the specific needs of children associated with armed forces and groups. | DR          | Measurement: Review of documents of national organizations involved in DDR. An indicator could also be created to track whether a national strategy on DDR contains gender-sensitive eligibility criteria for DDR programmes. See also “Tool 6.6.1. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to cross-cutting issues”, indicators 1.2 and 1.3. |

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<tr>
<td>2. Improved stability and security in the country</td>
<td>2.1. Injuries to combatants and ex-combatants caused by violence</td>
<td>AD or FD</td>
<td>This indicator should be disaggregated by sex and age (adult/child). For further information on this indicator and how best to collect data on it, see indicator d.2 in the “How-to Guide on Constructing DDR Indicators”, (DPKO, OROLSI, DDRS, 2010).</td>
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<td>Number of combatants and ex-combatants who are treated in a hospital for gunshot wounds, bomb blasts or knife wounds per year. Example: Decrease in the number of ex-combatants in the eastern region of Country X who are treated in a hospital for gunshot wounds, bomb blasts or knife wounds in 2012/13 (2010/11: 35; 2011/12: 30; 2012/13: 25).</td>
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<td>2.2. Violent incidents involving dismantled armed forces/groups</td>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Measurement: Review of publically-available reports such as media reports. This indicator should be disaggregated by sex and age (adult/child).</td>
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<td>Number of reports of violent incidents involving dismantled armed forces/groups and/or participants of community violence reduction programmes. Example: No reports of violent incidents involving dismantled pro-government militias. (A/64/673, UNOCI 2010-11)</td>
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<td>2.3. Participation of ex-combatants in chains of command</td>
<td>FD</td>
<td>Measurement: Number of ex-combatants who remain part of chains of command after the demobilization phase, divided by the number that entered it, multiplied by 100. This indicator should be disaggregated by sex and age (adult/child). For further information on this indicator and how best to collect data on it, see indicator d.4 in the “How-to Guide on Constructing DDR Indicators”, (DPKO, OROLSI, DDRS, 2010).</td>
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<td>Percentage of ex-combatants who remain part of chains of command after demobilization. Example: Decrease in the percentage of ex-combatants in the eastern region of Country X who remain part of chains of command after demobilization, in 2012/13 (2010/11: 20 percent; 2011/12: 17 percent; 2012/13: 9 percent).</td>
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<td>2.4. Existence of chains of command</td>
<td>FD</td>
<td>For further information on this indicator and how best to collect data on it, see indicator d.5 in the “How-to Guide on Constructing DDR Indicators”, (DPKO, OROLSI, DDRS, 2010).</td>
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<td>Number of chains of command which remained in place after demobilization and for which there is credible evidence. Example: Decrease in the number of chains of command that remain in place in the eastern region of Country X after demobilization, in 2012/13 (2010/11: 5 chains of command; 2011/12: 4 chains of command; 2012/13: 2 chains of command).</td>
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### Expected Accomplishment

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants</strong></td>
<td>3.1. Completion of economic reintegration programmes</td>
<td>FD</td>
<td>This indicator can be compiled from the records of implementing partners and should be disaggregated by sex and age (adult/child). Measurement: For a given year, the cumulative total number of ex-combatants that entered an economic reintegration programme since the start of the DDR programme, divided by the cumulative total number that completed it since the start of the DDR programme, multiplied by 100. For further information on this indicator and how best to collect data on it, see indicator a.5 in the “How-to Guide on Constructing DDR Indicators”, (DPKO, OROLSI, DDRS, 2010).</td>
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<td>Percentage of those ex-combatants entering an economic reintegration programme who formally complete it. Example: Increase in the percentage of ex-combatants entering an economic reintegration programme that completed it during the last twelve months (2009/10: N/A; 2010/11: 66 percent; 2011/12: 75 percent).</td>
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<td><strong>4. Successful social reintegration of ex-combatants</strong></td>
<td>4.1. Re-recruitment into armed forces or groups</td>
<td>FD</td>
<td>This indicator should be disaggregated by sex and age (adult/child).</td>
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<td>Number of individuals who have been re-recruited into armed forces or groups. Example: Decrease in the number of individuals re-recruited into armed forces or groups in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 25 persons; 20010/11: 15 persons; 2011/12: 5 persons).</td>
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<td><strong>4.2. Perceived level of social integration</strong></td>
<td>Percentage of DDR communities where community leaders regard the ex-combatants as “well” or “very well” socially integrated. Example: Increase in the percentage of DDR communities in 2012/13 where community leaders regard the ex-combatants as “well” or “very well” socially integrated (2010/11: N/A; 2011/12: 50 percent of DDR communities; 2012/13: 60 percent of DDR communities).</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Question: To what extent are ex-combatants socially integrated into your community? 1= not at all; 2= not sufficiently; 3= well; 4= very well. Measurement: Number of DDR communities where community leaders ‘agree’ or ‘fully agree’, divided by the total number of DDR communities who participated, multiplied by 100. Community leaders interviewed should include both women and men. For further information on this indicator and how best to collect data on it, see indicator b.1 in the “How-to Guide on Constructing DDR Indicators”, (DPKO, OROLSI, DDRS, 2010).</td>
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<td><strong>4.3. Community perception of the social reintegration of ex-combatants</strong></td>
<td>Percentage of community members in communities who regard the ex-combatants of a DDR programme and/or participants of a community violence reduction programme as “very well socially integrated” or “well socially integrated”</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Question: In your opinion, how well are ex-combatants reintegrated with your community? Rating: (4) very well socially reintegrated; (3) well socially reintegrated; (2) somewhat socially reintegrated; (1) not socially reintegrated at all.</td>
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<td><strong>5. Successful political reintegration of ex-combatants</strong></td>
<td>5.1. Satisfaction of ex-combatants with the political system</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Question: Do you agree that the electoral process in your country is fair? 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= agree; 4= fully agree. Measurement: Number of ex-combatants who “agree” or “fully agree”, divided by the total number of ex-combatants who participated, multiplied by 100. This indicator should be disaggregated by sex and age (adult/child). For further information on this indicator and how best to collect data on it, see indicator c.1 in the “How-to Guide on Constructing DDR Indicators”, (DPKO, OROLSI, DDRS, 2010).</td>
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<td>Percentage of ex-combatants who are satisfied with the political system. Example: Increase in the percentage of surveyed ex-combatants who “agree” or “fully agree” that the electoral process is fair in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: N/A; 2011/12: N/A; 2012/13: 50 percent).</td>
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### Tool 6.6.6. List of examples of indicators to measure expected accomplishments relating to mine action

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| 1. Enhanced security of local populations, or Enhanced protection of civilians | 1.1. Safety of the local civilian population  
Number of casualties among the local civilian population from accidents caused by landmines and explosive remnants of war.  
Example: Reduction in the number of casualties among the local population from accidents caused by landmines and explosive remnants of war (2008/9: 105 casualties; 2009/10: 90 casualties; 2010/11: 60 casualties). (A/64/670, MONUC) | FD or AD   | 1.2. Safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees along routes of return and final places of settlement  
Number of deaths or injuries to IDPs and refugees due to landmines or explosive remnants of war along return routes and in final places of settlement.  
Example: No deaths or injuries to IDPs or refugees due to landmines or explosive remnants of war along return routes and in final places of settlement in Country X in 2011/12 (2009/10: 10 deaths or injuries; 2010/11: 3 deaths or injuries; 2011/12: 0 deaths or injuries). | FD or AD   |
|                         | 1.3. Perception of safety of local population from mines and explosive remnants of war  
Whether people in demined areas feel safe from the risk of mines and explosive remnants of war.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of survey respondents in the previously mined northern provinces of Country X who ‘agree’ or ‘fully agree’ that they are now safe from the risk of mines and explosive remnants of war in 2012/13 (2010/11: 15 percent; 2011/12: 25 percent; 2012/13: 55 percent). | PS          | 1.4. Safety of ex-combatants and humanitarian workers at disarmament sites  
Number of casualties amongst ex-combatants and humanitarian workers from unsafe handling and securing of weapons and ammunition at DDR cantonment sites in Country X in a given year.  
Example: No casualties amongst ex-combatants and humanitarian workers from unsafe handling and securing of weapons and ammunition at the 18 cantonment sites in Country X in 2012/13. (UNOCI mine action workplan 2012-13) | FD          |

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<td>2. Enhanced national capacity to manage and secure stockpiled landmines, weapons and ammunition in Country X</td>
<td>2.1. Quality of national stockpile management of landmines, weapons and ammunition. Percentage of locations known to the UN Field Mission containing stockpiles of landmines, weapons and ammunition in Country X that are managed in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards and international ammunition technical guidelines, in a given year. Example: All locations known to the UN Field Mission containing stockpiles of landmines, weapons and ammunition in Country X are managed in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards and international ammunition technical guidelines, in 2012/13 (2010/11: N/A; 2011/12: 50 percent of known locations; 2012/13: 100 percent of known locations).</td>
<td>FD or AD</td>
<td>See also indicator 5.5 “Implementation of international mine action treaty obligations (stockpile destruction)”.</td>
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<td>3. Improved socio-economic conditions for local populations in areas previously contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war, or suspected thereof</td>
<td>3.1. Increased access to development and reconstruction assistance. Number of development and reconstruction projects in villages formerly impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war, in a given year. Example 1: Increase in the number of development and reconstruction projects in 2011/12 in villages formerly impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X (2009/10: 0 projects; 2010/11:10 projects; 2011/12: 11 projects). Example 2: Increase in the number of national development or reconstruction projects in 2011/12 in areas formerly impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X (2009/10: 0 projects; 2010/11: 0 projects; 2011/12: one project). Example 3: Approval by the Government of Afghanistan in 2012/13 to build power lines through areas formerly impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war.</td>
<td>FD or AD</td>
<td>Examples of such projects are development of irrigation systems, hospitals/clinics, schools, employment creation initiatives, road/bridge/dam construction, etc.</td>
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<td>3.2. Increase in development and reconstruction investment. Increase in estimate value of development and reconstruction projects in villages formerly impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war, in a given year. Example: Increase in the estimated value of development and reconstruction projects in 2011/12 in villages formerly impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X (2009/10: 0 projects; 2010/11:10 projects; 2011/12: 11 projects).</td>
<td>FD or AD</td>
<td>Examples of such projects are development of irrigation systems, hospitals/clinics, schools, employment creation initiatives, road/bridge/dam construction, etc.</td>
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<td>3.3. Access to public facilities and infrastructure. Percentage of all public utilities or infrastructure that are operational in villages formerly impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war, in a given year. Example: Increase in the percentage of primary schools that are operational in 2011/12 in villages currently or formerly impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X (2009/10: 50 percent of schools; 2010/11: 80 percent of schools; 2011/12: 100 percent of schools).</td>
<td>FD or AD</td>
<td>Measurement: The number of primary schools that are operational in villages impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war, divided by the total number of primary schools in the same area during a given time period, multiplied by 100. Public utilities or infrastructure could include schools, community centres, churches and mosques, football fields, telephone masts, electricity pylons, railway lines etc.</td>
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| 3. Improved socio-economic conditions for local populations in areas previously contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war, or suspected thereof | 3.4. Potential for livelihoods among the local population  
Area of land used for socio-economic purposes by populations affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war, after being verified as safe, in a given year.  
Example 1: Increased area of land used for socio-economic purposes by the Saharan population in the Area of Operation east of the berm, after being verified as safe from landmines and unexploded ordnance (2010/11: 7 ksquare meters; 2011/12: 20 ksquare meters; 2012/13: 12 ksquare meters). (MINURSO annual workplan 2012-13)  
Example 2: Increase in the area of formerly suspected/contaminated land cultivated by IDPs in areas of return or areas of local integration in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 10 ksquare meters; 2011/12: 10 ksquare meters; 2012/13: 35 ksquare meters). | FD or AD | |
|                          | 3.5. Availability of safe commercial airports  
Percentage of commercial airports verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X in a given year.  
Example: Increase in the percentage of commercial airports verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 25 percent of airports; 2011/12: 50 percent of airports; 2012/13: 100 percent of airports). | FD | |
|                          | 3.6. Freedom of movement of the local population  
Increase in number of kilometres of roads in use by the local population of Country X in a given year, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war.  
Example: Increase in the number of kilometres of roads in use by the local population of Country X in 2011/12, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war (2009/10: 2,000 km; 2010/11: 4,000 km; 2011/12: 8,000 km). | FD or AD | |
|                          | 3.7. Lawful use of demined land  
Number of land ownership disputes which relate to mine clearance operations, in a given year.  
Example: Decrease in the number of land ownership disputes which relate to mine clearance operations in Country X in 2011/12 (2009/10: 45 land disputes; 2010/11: 38 land disputes; 2011/12: 33 land disputes). | FD or AD | |

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<td>4. The legal framework of Country X addresses the needs of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war, or The policy framework of Country X addresses the needs of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war</td>
<td>4.1. Existence of a data collection system on casualties of landmines and explosive remnants of war Establishment of a comprehensive mine casualty data collection mechanism in Country X in a given year. Example 1: The UN Mine Action Centre establishes a mine action casualty data collection mechanism in 2012/13, on behalf of the government of Country X. Example 2: The Government of Country X takes over the ownership and management of the mine action casualty data collection mechanism from the UN in 2013/14.</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>This indicator helps measure the extent of the challenge faced in a country. The examples illustrate the typical transfer of responsibility for the mine action casualty data collection mechanism from the UN to the national government, as UN assistance draws down.</td>
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<td>4.2. Existence of comprehensive national data on casualties of landmines and explosive remnants of war Existence of national records on casualties of landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X containing information on the number and location of casualties, from all mine action organizations operating in a given year. Example: The national records on casualties of landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X contain information on the number and location of casualties, from all mine action organizations operating in 2012/13.</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>This indicator helps measure the extent of the challenge faced in a country. The indicator aims at measuring whether comprehensive information is available on the number and location of mine casualties, for the purpose of programme management and resource mobilization.</td>
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<td>4.3. Adoption or ratification of (revised) national laws protecting the rights of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war Adoption by the government or ratification by the parliament of Country X of national laws protecting the rights of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war in Country X in a given year. Example: The Parliament of Country X ratifies a national law to protect the rights of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war in 2012/13, in accordance with the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.</td>
<td>DR</td>
<td>See also indicator 5.1 on ratification of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.</td>
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<td>4.4. Adoption of a national plan protecting the rights of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war Adoption by the Government of Country X of a national strategy protecting the rights of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war, in a given year. Example: The Government of Country X adopts a national strategy to protect the rights of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war in 2012/13.</td>
<td>DR</td>
<td>See also indicator 5.3 on adoption of a national strategy or plan to fulfil international treaty obligations; indicator 6.1 on inclusion of mine action (or victim assistance) in national stabilization/development plans; or indicator See also indicator 6.2 where national budget allocation or spending on victims of landmines and ERWs can be tracked. This indicator measures implementation of national laws and/or policies relating to the victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war.</td>
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| 5. Enhanced political commitment of Country X to address the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war | 5.1. Adoption or ratification of international mine action treaties  
Adoption by the government or ratification by the parliament of Country X of:  
- The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention; or  
- The Convention on Cluster Munitions; or  
- The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), including Protocol II: Landmines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, and Protocol V: Explosive Remnants of War; or  
- The Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  
An indicator could also be created wherein the government issues a statement announcing adherence to the provisions of an international convention, or adopts a roadmap towards becoming party to an international convention. |
| 5.2. Identification of extent of work required to fulfill treaty obligations  
The Government of Country X endorses the findings of a survey by a certain date that defines the extent and nature of mine-action activities required to fulfill treaty obligations, including confirmed explosive hazards in accordance with Article 7 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.  
In addition to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, other treaties in which obligations might exist are:  
- The Convention on Cluster Munitions; or  
- The Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. |
| 5.3. Adoption of a national strategy or plan to fulfill treaty obligations  
The government of Country X adopts a national strategy or plan for dealing with landmines and explosive remnants of war, which includes a description of how it will comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.  
Example: Adoption by the government of Country X in 2012/13 of a national strategy for dealing with landmines and explosive remnants of war, which includes a description of how it will comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. | DR | Measurement: Review of government documents.  
Under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the State Party has up to 10 years to destroy all anti-personnel landmines in mined areas. This is an example of an intermediary milestone that can be used to measure progress towards full implementation of Article 5.  
A similar indicator can be developed on clearance of cluster munitions from “Article 4 – Clearance and deconstruction of cluster munition remnants and risk reduction education” from the Convention on Cluster Munitions. |
| 5.4. Fulfillment of reporting obligations  
Submission by the government of Country X of reports stipulated in international mine action treaties and conventions to which it is a signatory.  
A similar indicator can be developed to measure compliance with “Article 7 – Transparency Measures” of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. |

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| 5. Enhanced political commitment of Country X to address the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war | 5.5. Implementation of international mine action treaty obligations (stockpile destruction)  
All stockpiled anti-personnel landmines owned or possessed or under the jurisdiction or control of a country are destroyed.  
This indicator measures whether the target set in “Article 4 – Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines” of the Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention has been met.  
A similar indicator can be developed on cluster munitions from “Article 3 – Storage and stockpile destruction” from the Convention on Cluster Munitions.  
If appropriate, intermediary targets could be used to measure progress towards full compliance with these treaties. For instance, in the early life cycle of a UN Field Mission, the indicator may be “25 percent of all stockpiled anti-personnel landmines...are destroyed in 2012/13” and the following year, the indicator may be “40 percent of all stock-piled anti-personnel landmines...are destroyed by 2013/14.”  
This indicator can also be used to measure expected accomplishment “2. Enhanced national capacity to manage and secure stockpiled landmines, weapons and ammunition in Country X”. |
| 6. Improved national capacity to manage the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war (material resources) | 6.1. Inclusion of mine action in national stabilization/development plans  
Whether mine action is included in the national stabilization/development plan.  
This indicator is only meaningful in situations where landmines and explosive remnants of war are a significant constraint to stabilization or reconstruction and development.  
An indicator could also be created to measure the extent to which mine action concerns are adequately addressed in national stabilization or development plans. |
|  | 6.2. National funding allocated to/spent on mine action  
Whether the government of Country X has allocated funds for mine action in the national budget or spent part of its national budget on mine action.  
Indicators could also be created to track the amount of money allocated to mine action in the national budget or the amount spent from the national budget on mine action, as the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission progresses. |
|  | 6.3. National reliance on external funding for mine action  
Change in the proportion of funds for mine action that comes from the national budget of Country X in a given year.  
As national capacities develop, a reduction in international funding and an increase in national source of funding are expected. |

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| 6. Improved national capacity to manage the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war (administrative and management capacity) | 6.4.  **Legislative framework for the National Mine Action Authority**  
Adoption by the parliament of Country X of legislation that establishes a National Mine Action Authority and outlines its structure and responsibilities.  
In countries where parliamentary legislation is followed by the adoption of a regulation or “application decree,” an indicator could be created regarding the adoption of an application decree on the implementation of mine action legislation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|                                                                                                                                             | 6.5.  **National Mine Action Authority starts operating**  
Issuance by the National Mine Action Authority of an official notification of the appointments of chairperson and commission members, with terms of reference and/or description of roles and responsibilities.  
*Example:* Issuance by the National Mine Action Authority of Country X by 31 December 2012 of an official notification of the appointments of chairperson and commission members, with terms of reference and/or description of roles and responsibilities. | DR          | Measurement: Review of government documents and media reports.  
|                                                                                                                                             | 6.6.  **Adoption of a regulatory framework by the National Mine Action Authority at start-up**  
Approval by the National Mine Action Authority of Country X of a policy:  
– on coordination of mine action-related activities;  
– defining a division of labour on mine action issues within the country;  
– authorizing the establishment of a Mine Action Centre and its related terms of reference;  
– on quality management;  
– defining the standards under which mine action organizations will operate; or  
– delegating licensing and accreditation authority to the Mine Action Centre to approve implementing partners to conduct mine action operations.  
*Example:* Approval by the National Mine Action Authority of Country X by 31 December 2012 of a policy that authorises the establishment of a Mine Action Centre with delegated authority to approve implementing partners. | DR          | Measurement: Review of government documents.  
|                                                                                                                                             | 6.7.  **Adoption of national standards on mine action**  
National standards on mine action are adopted by the National Mine Action Authority of Country X in line with the International Mine Action Standards.  
*Example:* Adoption by the National Mine Action Authority of Country X by 30 June 2012 of national standards for mine action, which are in line with the International Mine Action Standards. | DR          | Measurement: Review of government and International Mine Action Standards.  
An indicator can also be created to measure whether the International Mine Action Standards have been translated into local languages in a given year.  

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<td>6. Improved national capacity to manage the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war (administrative and management capacity)</td>
<td>6.8. Functioning of the National Mine Action Authority Secretariat</td>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Measurement: Review of government documents. A similar indicator can be produced for example 2 either tracking the performance of other technical working groups where the UN Field Mission has a mandate to provide support, for instance, on mine risk education or victim assistance.</td>
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<td>The extent to which the National Mine Action Authority secretariat is functional within a given year.</td>
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<td>Example 1: Approval by the National Mine Action Authority of an annual workplan for the mine action sector in 2012/13. Example 2: Increase in the number of meetings of the National Mine Action Authority’s technical working group on demining that have an agenda and minutes, in 2012/13 (2010/11: 4 out of 10 meetings; 2011/12: 6 out of 10 meetings; 2012/13: all 10 meetings). Example 3: Chairing functions for the inter-agency working group to develop a national strategy on mine action are performed by the national authorities of Country X by 30 April 2011.</td>
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<td>The adoption of criteria for setting mine action priorities, or the adoption of a national list of priorities, by the National Mine Action Authority of Country X that can serve as a guide for national and international assistance.</td>
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<td>Example: Adoption by the National Mine Action Authority of Country X by 15 March 2012 of a national list of priorities for the mine action sector.</td>
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<td>6.10. Existence of a transparent process of Accreditation of mine action providers by the National Mine Action Authority</td>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Procedures and human resources capacity are in place to perform efficient accreditations and implement subsequent quality assurance or quality control procedures. The first example can be used to track the shift of accreditation from the UN Field Mission to the National Mine Action Authority, as the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission progresses.</td>
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<td>6.11. Quality of accreditation of mine action providers by the National Mine Action Authority</td>
<td>DR</td>
<td>The indicator can apply both before the UN Field Mission has transitioned the accreditation process to the National Mine Action Authority, and after, as the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission progresses. Note: Speed of accreditation is not necessarily an indicator of quality, given that too short a time might show that the accreditation is rushed. However monitoring the time for accreditation is an option for ensuring the process is functioning appropriately.</td>
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<td>The quality and efficiency of the accreditation process for mine action providers by the National Mine Action Authority. Example: Decrease in the amount of time required by the National Mine Action Authority to accredit a mine action operator following an application for accreditation (2010/11: 6 months; 2011/12: 5 months; 2012/13: 2 months).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Example: Decrease in the amount of time required by the National Mine Action Authority to accredit a mine action operator following an application for accreditation (2010/11: 6 months; 2011/12: 5 months; 2012/13: 2 months).</td>
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<td>6. Improved national capacity to manage the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war (administrative and management capacity) (operational capacity)</td>
<td>6.12. Quality of mine action coordination mechanisms with donors&lt;br&gt;Extent to which the national authorities of Country X are engaged in the formal coordination mechanism between international donors and the national authorities on mine action.&lt;br&gt;Example 1: Chairing functions for the formal coordination mechanism with international donors on mine action are performed by the national authorities of Country X by 30 June 2013.&lt;br&gt;Example 2: Increase in the number of coordination meetings held between international donors and the national authorities on mine action that have an agenda and minutes, in 2012/13 (2010/11: 4 out of 10 meetings; 2011/12: 6 out of 10 meetings; 2012/13: all 10 meetings).</td>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Measurement: Government and international donor documents.</td>
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<td>6.15. Existence of the operational arm of the National Mine Action Authority (the Mine Action Centre (MAC))&lt;br&gt;Establishment of a Mine Action Centre within a given year.&lt;br&gt;Example 1: Establishment of the Mine Action Centre of Country X by 31 December 2012.&lt;br&gt;Example 2: Management of the MAC is transferred from the UN Field Mission to the National Mine Action Authority of Country X in 2012/13.</td>
<td></td>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Measurement: Review of government documents. For more information, see the UN Mine Action Programming Handbook (2004), p. 92. Initially the Mine Action Centre will be managed by the UN Field Mission on behalf of the National Mine Action Authority before it is transitioned to be run by the NMAA.</td>
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| 6. Improved national capacity to manage the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war (operational capacity) | 6.16. Performance of specific aspects of the Mine Action Centre at start-up  
   - The extent to which the Mine Action Centre performs operational tasks within a given year.  
   - Example 1: The Mine Action Centre of Country X issues an organizational chart by 31 December 2012.  
|                                                                                       | 6.17. Existence of IMSMA in the Mine Action Centre  
   - Existence of a national database on landmines and explosive remnants of war for Country X.  
|                                                                                       | 6.18. Transition of IMSMA to the National Authority  
   - Transition of the ownership and maintenance of the national database on landmines and explosive remnants of war to the National Mine Action Authority of Country X.  
   - Example: The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) of Government X is managed and maintained by the National Mine Action Authority in 2012/13. | DR          | Measurement: Review of data from the national mine action centre.                                                                                                                                 |
|                                                                                       | 6.19. Deployment of national mine clearance capacity  
   - The extent to which national mine clearance capacities are deployed throughout the country in a given year.  
|                                                                                       | 6.20. Deployment of community-based deminers  
   - The extent to which community-based deminers are deployed throughout the country in a given year.  

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<th>Expected Accomplishment</th>
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<tr>
<td>6. Improved national capacity to manage the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war (operational capacity)</td>
<td>6.21. Quality of demining: extent of Number of reported cases of major non-conformities of demining actors with national mine action standards, including preventable injuries amongst other types of non-conformity, in Country X in a given year. <em>Example</em>: Decrease in the total number of reported cases of major non-conformities of demining actors with mine action standards in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 20 cases; 2011/12: 15 cases; 2012/13: 10 cases). <em>Example 2</em>: Number of cases of preventable injuries amongst deminers in Country X in 2012/13 (2010/11: 5 cases; 2011/12: 4 cases; 2012/13: 2 cases).</td>
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<td>7. Enhanced protection of UN personnel and assets or non-UN humanitarian personnel from the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war</td>
<td>7.1. Safe supply routes for the UN Field Mission Number of kilometres of UN Field Mission supply routes in use in a given year, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war. <em>Example</em>: Increase in the number of kilometres of the UN Field Mission’s supply routes in use in 2011/12, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war (2009/10: 5,000 km; 2010/11: 7,000 km; 2011/12: 10,000 km).</td>
<td>FD</td>
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<td>7.2. Freedom of movement for UN military peacekeeping personnel Increase in number of kilometres of UN military deployment routes in use in a given year, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war. <em>Example</em>: Increase in the number of kilometres of UN military deployment routes in use in 2011/12, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war (2009/10: 2,000 km; 2010/11: 4,000 km; 2011/12: 8,000 km).</td>
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<td>7.3. Safe airport, airstrips and helicopter landing sites for the UN Number of airports, airstrips or helicopter landing sites in use in a given year, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war. <em>Example</em>: Increase in the number of UN airstrips in use in 2011/12, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war (2009/10: 20 airstrips; 2010/11: 25 airstrips; 2011/12: 35 airstrips).</td>
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<td>7.4. Safe team sites for UN personnel and non-UN humanitarian workers Number of team sites in use in a given year, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war. <em>Example</em>: Increase in the number of UN team sites in use in 2011/12, after being verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war in 2011/12 (2009/10: 150 team sites; 2010/11: 159 team sites; 2011/12: 169 team sites).</td>
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<th>Expected Accomplishment</th>
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| 7. Enhanced protection of UN personnel and assets or non-UN humanitarian personnel from the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war | 7.5. Safety of UN personnel and non-UN humanitarian workers  
Number of deaths or injuries to UN personnel and non-UN humanitarian workers due to landmines, explosive remnants of war, or unplanned munitions explosions in a given year.  
*Example:* No deaths or injuries to UN personnel and non-UN humanitarian workers in Country X due to landmines, explosive remnants of war, or unplanned munitions explosions in 2011/12 (2009/10: 1 death; 2010/11: 0 deaths or injuries; 2011/12: 0 deaths or injuries). | FD | |
| | 7.6. Safety of UN property, equipment and assets  
Number of UN properties, equipment and assets damaged by landmines or explosive remnants of war in a given year.  
*Example:* No UN property, equipment and assets in Country X damaged by landmines or explosive remnants of war in 2011/12 (2009/10: 2 properties; 2010/11: 0 instances of damage; 2011/12: 0 instances of damage). | FD | |
| | 7.7. Improved delivery of humanitarian assistance by air  
Number of all UN humanitarian flights to conflict-affected areas using airports or airstrips that were verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war by the UN Field Mission in a given year.  
*Example:* Increase in the number of humanitarian flights to areas with IDPs in Country X using airports or airstrips that were verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war by the UN Field Mission in 2011/12 (2009/10: 200 flights; 2010/11: 210 flights; 2011/12: 221 flights). | FD | |
| | 7.8. Improved delivery of humanitarian assistance by road  
The number of UN and NGO deliveries of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected camps along roads that were verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war by the UN Field Mission in a given year.  
*Example:* Increase in the number of food aid deliveries to IDP camps in Country X along roads that were verified as safe from landmines and explosive remnants of war by the UN Field Mission in 2011/12 (2009/10: 90 deliveries; 2010/11: 100 deliveries; 2011/12: 110 deliveries). | FD | |

Tool 6.7. List of examples of outputs

Read “Tool 6.5 Checklist of dos and don’ts on outputs” before using this tool.

How to use this tool

Purpose. This tool provides examples of well-written outputs that are succinct and “SMART” (specific, measurable, attainable, realistic/relevant and time-bound).

Outputs are used in a range of planning documents such as a Results-based Budget (RBB) Framework, a component-level plan such as an annual workplan or a project document that forms part of a financial agreement funded through voluntary sources of funding. These examples of outputs are all considered to be technically acceptable for inclusion in an RBB Framework, and are expressed in the format used in the RBB. Many of the examples were derived from existing RBB Frameworks and other examples are generic.

The selection of examples of outputs is presented for illustrative purposes only. Users should avoid copying outputs directly from these lists. Instead, outputs must be tailored to the local context. These lists are a work in progress and will be updated in light of experience in future revisions to the Planning Toolkit for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Personnel.

Examples of Outputs

Advice and workshops (non-training related)

1. Advice, through weekly meetings, to the Ministry of Justice on compliance of Sudanese law with international standards (generic example).

2. Advice on reform of the defence sector through weekly participation in the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo working groups on reform of the defence sector (MONUC 2008/9).

3. Advice to the Ministry of Justice on the coordination of international aid and donor community support to the justice sector through quarterly meetings of the National Rule of Law Coordination Mechanism (MINURCAT, 2009/10).

4. Advice, through monthly meetings, to the Ministry of Justice on the development of a national strategy on juvenile justice (generic example).

5. Advice and on-the-job training to government trainee prison officers on a human-rights approach to prison management through co-location of 23 mentors at 16 prisons in Liberia (based on UNMIL 2009/10).

6. Daily advice, through co-location of United Nations police with Southern Sudan Police Service officers at 73 co-location sites in all 10 states in Southern Sudan, on police operations, including criminal investigations, gender and child protection, community policing, traffic management and traffic law enforcement (UNMIS 2010/11).

7. Advice, through 6 bimonthly meetings, to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights on human rights abuses, impunity, violence against women and electoral list disputes issues, based on monitoring of court cases through regular visits to each of the 34 tribunals in Côte d’Ivoire (based on ONUCI, 2010/11).

8. Advice to the Ivorian penitentiary authorities on the implementation of prison regulations in accordance with international standards, through monthly meetings, based on 33 prison monitoring visits and a joint monitoring visit with the National Penitentiary Administration of 11 prison facilities situated in the northern prefectures of Côte d’Ivoire (based on ONUCI 2010/11).

9. Recommendations, through 3 drafting workshops, with the Constitutional Drafting Committee on how to align the new Constitution with international standards on women’s rights (generic example).

10. 1 workshop for traditional leaders and Ministry of Justice officials on facilitating access to justice for vulnerable groups including women, children, internally displaced persons and refugees (MINURCAT, 2009/10).

Training courses

11. 4 training courses, each for 25 mid-level prison officers, on gender mainstreaming and gender-sensitive correctional services, in Khartoum and Kordofan, River Nile and White
Nile States, in collaboration with the United Nations Country Team (based on UNMIS 2009/10).

12. 6 training courses for 180 Government of the Sudan prison officials on basic prison duties, 1 training course for 20 middle level prison managers on record management, and 1 train-the-trainers course for 30 prison staff on basic prison duties in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (based on UNAMID 2011/12).

13. Refresher training courses for 17,683 Congolese National Police in 14 locations on crowd control, judicial police, special anti-criminality squads, investigation techniques, intelligence, negotiation and non-lethal policing (based on MONUC 2009/10).

14. Training sessions for 300 justice personnel and court support staff on court administration and management (based on MONUC 2009/10).

15. 1 training programme for the Liberian National Police, including basic training to 300 recruits to increase the size of the Liberian National Police, and specialized and managerial training for 96 Liberian National Police officers of senior and middle management, including external training with emphasis on recruitment of females (based on UNMIL 2009/10).

Coordination mechanisms

16. Chairing of monthly meetings of the inter-agency justice sector working group (UNMIT, UNIFEM, UNDP and UNICEF) to coordinate policy and international assistance for the justice sector (UNMIT 2009/10).

17. Organization of quarterly inter-agency coordination meetings with international partners (the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, the European Union and NGOs) and the donor community on the funding and implementation of reinsertion and reintegration programmes for former members of armed groups, at-risk youth and women (UNOCI, 2010/11).

18. Secretariat support to 12 monthly meetings of the National Rule of Law Coordination Mechanism, including production of four background papers on rule of law issues (generic example).

External reports and assessments

19. 1 report to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights on the functioning of prison facilities in the northern prefectures of Côte d’Ivoire, including on the application of internal rules and newly created standard operating practices by prison management (ONUCI 2010/11)

20. 1 report (MONUC-OHCHR) on transitional justice needs and recommendations to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (based on MONUC 2008/9).

21. 3 reports generated through court monitoring, to the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary, on compliance by the courts in Darfur with rules of procedure and international standards (based on UNAMID 2011-12).

Quick-impact projects and projects

22. 4 quick-impact projects to improve prison conditions in region X (generic)

23. 30 quick-impact projects in the areas of rehabilitation of police stations, correctional facilities, magistrate courts, immigration offices and border posts to strengthen the rule of law infrastructure (UNMIL 2009/10)

24. 500 reinsertion projects, as a part of the micro-projects programme, to support reinsertion of former members of armed groups, at-risk youth and women (based on UNOCI, 2010/11).

25. 25 labour-intensive projects for former members of armed groups, at-risk youth and women (total of 35,000 beneficiaries) in high-risk neighbourhoods, including 5 projects specifically targeting women affected by violence in the 5 most violence-affected departments (based on MINUSTAH, 2009/10).

Police-specific

26. 236,520 UN formed police unit person days (8 formed police personnel per patrol × 3 patrols per platoon × 3 platoons per formed police unit × 9 formed police units × 365 days) to provide crowd control support to the national police of Country X (generic).

27. 157,680 UN individual police officer days (2 individual police officers per patrol × 4 patrols per day × 54 commissariats × 365 days) to patrol unstable areas and strategic roads in Country X (generic).
28. 219,000 UN-host state joint police patrol person days (5 UN police officers per joint patrol × 4 patrols per day × 30 police stations × 365 days) with the National Police of Country X to maintain a joint continuous presence at the 4 key land border crossings (based on MINUSTAH 2009/10).

29. 689,850 police operational days in camps for internally displaced persons including joint patrols with community policing volunteers (9 UNAMID police personnel per shift × 3 shifts per community policing centre × 70 centres × 365 days) (based on UNAMID 2011/12).

30. 50,000 person hours of operational backup by formed police units to the Haitian National Police in crowd control, including joint training exercises (based on MINUSTAH, 2009/10).

31. Establishment of Police Gender Desks in 70 Community Policing Centres to coordinate gender activities and address sexual and gender-based violence in partnership with the Government of the Sudan/Movement police, NGOs, United Nations agencies and Community Policing Volunteers (UNAMID 2011/12).

Corrections-specific

32. Establishment of a prison database for handover to authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC 2008/9).\(^\text{116}\)

33. Demobilization and disarmament of 10,000 out of a total caseload of 20,000 combatants of armed forces and groups since the start of the programme (generic).

34. Reinsertion assistance for 25,000 male and 300 female ex-combatants and 3,000 women associated with armed forces and groups (out of a total caseload of 50,000) (generic).

35. Organization of 20 meetings of the national DDR Steering Committee to develop a national strategy on DDR (generic).

36. Sensitization of all armed groups and the public on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities through 1 multi-media campaign (based on MONUC 2009/10).

Mine Action\(^\text{117}\)

37. Route survey of 3,000 km of roads in Province X (generic example).

38. Conduct of 10 surveys and mine clearance (if necessary) at planned humanitarian or development project sites (generic example).

39. Release of 100,000 square meters of land, previously suspected of being contaminated by mines or explosive remnants of war, through a [non-Technical Survey] [Technical Survey].

40. Release of 1,000,000 square meters of land through Battle Area Clearance.

41. Demining of 500,000 square meters in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in coordination with international partners (based on MONUC 2009/10).

42. Mine clearance of 3,000 km of humanitarian supply routes.

43. Mine clearance of 5 runways and helicopter landing sites for humanitarian supplies (generic example).

44. Provision of 5,000 persons with Mine Risk Education through distribution of materials to 5 schools (200 pupils per school) and 40 community briefings (100 persons per briefing).

45. Destruction of 10,000 kg of unserviceable ammunition.

46. Destruction of a stockpile of 500 anti-personnel mines in accordance with obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.

Support-related outputs

47. Logistical support for the repatriation of 4,000 foreign ex-combatants and their dependents to their countries of origin (MONUC 2009/10).


49. Storage and supply of daily rations and water for an average of 18,163 military personnel and 2,438 formed police personnel (MINUSTAH, 2009/10).

\(^\text{116}\) Note that if planning assumptions do not hold true (e.g., the caseload to be demobilized and disarmed stated in the peace agreement is reduced or increased by the government), it is possible to see a reduction or increase in the total caseload.

\(^\text{117}\) The numbers are purely illustrative and will vary widely depending on the extent of contamination by mines and explosive remnants of war in a given country.
**Tool 7. Planning joint programmes and joint initiatives between a UN Field Mission and other UN partners**

**Target audience, purpose and content**

**For whom.** This planning tool is for use by rule of law and security institutions personnel in UN Field Missions who wish to develop a joint programme or a joint initiative with another UN entity and a national partner(s). This tool focuses on the specific planning considerations that arise between a UN Field Mission and other UN entity when they develop a joint programme or joint initiative.

**What it contains.** “Part I. Questions and answers” provides background information on joint programmes and joint initiatives between a UN Field Mission, other UN entity and national partner(s). “Part II. Checklists on joint programmes and joint initiatives” provides practical guidance on how to develop a joint programme or joint initiative with another UN entity and national partner(s). More specifically, Checklist A provides guidance on how to identify potential UN partners as well as some tips on building a relationship of mutual trust. Checklist B should be used to determine whether or not to pursue a joint programme or joint initiative with another UN entity. Once the decision has been taken to pursue a joint programme or joint initiative, Checklist C provides suggestions on how best to design it.

**When to use the checklists.** When developing a joint programme or joint initiative from scratch, all three checklists can be used sequentially, starting with Checklist A. Alternatively, Checklist C can be used on its own, if a joint programme or joint initiative already exists and needs to be reviewed.

“*The Haitian National Police Reform Plan 2006-2011 is joint programme between the UN and the national authorities, which suffered from lack of national ownership. To remedy this situation, the development of the next plan for 2012-16 started off with a joint strategic assessment and planning process involving both the UN and the national authorities during which the priorities and objectives of the new plan were discussed and agreed upon.*

Mr. Jaime Vigil, Senior Planning Officer, police component, MINUSTAH

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**Part I. Questions and answers**

**What is a joint programme? What is a joint initiative?**

Joint programmes are formal arrangements and infrequent, whereas joint initiatives are informal arrangements (based on a “gentleman’s agreement”) and more frequent.

A joint programme is “a set of activities contained in a common work plan and related budget, involving 2 or more UN organizations and (sub-) national partners. The workplan and budget are part of a joint programme document, which also details roles and responsibilities of partners in coordinating and managing the joint activities and is signed by all participating organizations and (sub-) national partners”. More informal arrangements are referred to by the term “joint initiative”.

**What are some examples of joint programmes and joint initiatives?**

Three examples are provided below to show the range of formality of joint programming arrangements between a UN Field Mission and other UN partners. Example 1 is an example of a formal joint programme with a formal agreement signed between all partners. Example 2 is an example of an informal arrangement.

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called a joint initiative with no signed, joint programme document between the UN partners. Example 3 is somewhere in-between in terms of formality: it is a joint initiative with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the UN Field Mission and the other UN partner.

Example 1. The West African Coast Initiative (WACI) is an example of a joint programme between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) through its United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) with the purpose of supporting the efforts of the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone). A key component of the joint programme is the establishment of specialized transnational crime units in host-states across the region.

UNOWA mobilizes political support at all levels and coordinates all UN assistance to ECOWAS. DPKO, through the Police Division, provides technical expertise to develop national policing and law enforcement capacities. UNODC provides technical and programme management expertise, and INTERPOL oversees the strengthening of existing National Central Bureaus and, where appropriate, provides specialized training and operational support to law enforcement.

WACI has the following joint characteristics: joint assessment; joint planning; a joint workplan and related budget outlining a set of agreed outputs, activities, roles and responsibilities and timelines; three-levels of joint committees (for strategic decision-making, for programme oversight and for country-level operational and technical oversight respectively); joint monitoring and evaluation; joint implementation of activities; co-location of staff; a joint communications strategy; and joint resource mobilization. The joint programme document consists of a concept paper endorsed by the heads of the four UN partners and INTERPOL.

Example 2. The UNAMID joint initiative on prison officer training and rehabilitation of prison infrastructure (2010) in Darfur, Sudan, is a joint initiative between the Mission’s corrections component and UNDP’s rule of law component to provide training to Sudanese prison officers on basic prison duties, rehabilitate prison infrastructure, and provide equipment. UNAMID Corrections Officers provide substantive expertise in the design of the training curriculum and deliver the training sessions. The UN Field Mission also provides transportation for training participants on Mission flights and prison engineering expertise for infrastructure designs as well as draws up bills of quantities, prepares bid documents and supervises the work being done by contractors. UNDP pays for the training venue, training materials, daily subsistence allowance for the participants and provides programme management expertise so that the joint initiative is well-managed. UNDP also pays for equipment supplied and the cost of construction and rehabilitation works.

All aspects of the joint initiative are kept separate (personnel, reporting lines, office space and other assets, workplans, funds, reporting formats etc.) with the exception of the following aspects which are carried out jointly by UNAMID and UNDP, namely, assessment of training needs; identification of which prison infrastructure to rehabilitate and which equipment to purchase; planning to identify a common set of objectives, expected accomplishments and outputs/activities; an agreed division of labour and timelines for implementation; and monitoring of programme implementation. There is no joint programme document.
What is the added-value of a joint programme or joint initiative?

A joint programme or joint initiative is meant to ensure a more efficient and effective use of resources by reducing duplication of effort and by basing the division of labour on each partner’s comparative advantage. In addition, a joint programme or joint initiative is a way for a UN Field Mission to harness critical capacities and expertise available through other partners. In the longer-term, this is expected to improve the impact of the UN in the host country.

A joint programme or joint initiative based on each UN partner’s comparative advantage is often more credible in the eyes of national authorities and other beneficiaries.

Similarly, joint programmes and joint initiatives can be attractive to donors who are looking for multi-sectoral responses to particular problems and who want the UN and its partners to work together in a coordinated and coherent manner.

Example 3. The joint prison reform initiative between the UNMISS Corrections Advisory Section, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR) was established in Southern Sudan (now South Sudan) in 2007 and aims to strengthen the institutional capacity of the South Sudan Prisons Service.

UNODC, ICCLR and UNMISS Corrections Advisers provide combined technical expertise on a wide variety of issues, including management and specialist training, prisoner records management, treatment of vulnerable groups among the prison population, development of linkages in the criminal justice system, the establishment of a probation and aftercare unit, the development of a Prison Service Training Academy, improving health and hygiene, as well as strengthening legal, regulatory and policy frameworks. More specifically, UNMISS also provides trainers for courses for the South Sudan Prisons Service such as on leadership or prison agriculture and are responsible for day-to-day mentoring and advisory services. UNODC provides donor funding for specific activities.

The joint initiative has the following joint characteristics: joint needs assessments; agreed objectives, outputs and activities; agreed roles and responsibilities, at the start of each project phase; regular project planning meetings; the provision of coordinated technical expertise; combining financial, human and other resources from different UN partners to implement specific activities (i.e., donor funds are channelled through the UNODC project, technical expertise from three entities is combined, and there is use of Mission assets and services); co-location of UNODC project staff with UNMISS Corrections Advisers.

This initiative differs from a joint programme in that UNODC and UNMISS have never formally concluded a joint programme document with a common workplan and related budget. Instead, UNODC has a formal, signed project document with the Government of Southern Sudan (now Government of South Sudan) in which the UN Field Mission and ICCLR are included as implementing partners. The logistics arrangements between UNMISS and UNODC are laid out in a signed MOU enabling UNODC to use the Mission’s office space and related equipment and facilities, assets (vehicles and aircraft) and security services. UNODC and UNMISS maintain separate workplans. UNODC operations rely on voluntary contributions whereas UNMISS uses assessed contributions; funds are therefore kept separate since these two types of financial contributions cannot be merged.

“Joint planning brings understanding among the agencies, defines roles based on mandates, avoids conflict, utilizes resources based on comparative advantages and promotes credibility of the UN as a family in the eyes of the nationals.”

Mr. Aggrey Nyapola, Project Coordinator, UNODC
Other benefits identified in a UN survey on joint programming between UN agencies, funds and programmes and Secretariat entities\textsuperscript{119} conducted in 2010 include improved information-sharing, understanding of each other’s working cultures, consensus amongst UN actors and with government partners on priority interventions as well as better overall coordination in specific sectors.

**What are some of the barriers to developing a joint programme or joint initiative?**

Barriers to effective joint programming between the UN Field Mission and other UN partners include: (i) distinct administrative and support arrangements (e.g., differences in contractual arrangements, conditions of service for staff working in the same team depending on the type of contract, overhead costs on voluntary contributions, e-mail systems etc.); (ii) different planning approaches, and methodologies and budget cycles; (iii) different reporting requirements, data collection and analysis tools, and reporting formats; and (iv) lack of flexibility to reallocate existing resources to new joint programmes or joint initiatives. These structural barriers mean that the success of a joint programme or joint initiative often relies on the quality of the relationship between key personalities in the UN Field Mission and other UN entity on the ground. Differences in mandates and priorities can also create tensions in joint programmes or joint initiatives. Checklists A, B and C flag these barriers and, when possible, suggest practical ways to mitigate or overcome these challenges.

“As they say, failing to plan is planning to fail. We work with our Haitian partners on crisis management issues in prisons and encourage them to plan a response for all eventualities.”

Mr. Chems Eddine Diagne, corrections component in MINUSTAH

**Other useful resources on joint programmes and joint initiatives:**

**Peacekeeping resources**
- “ISG Discussion Paper on Joint Programming between UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes and Secretariat Entities”, UN Integration Steering Group (8 July 2010)
- “Supporting Programmes with Extra-budgetary Resources: Options for UN Peace Operations”, Peacekeeping Practice Note (January 2009)

**Development resources**
- UN Development Group website on joint programmes between UN agencies, funds and programmes, which includes information on mechanisms to manage funds (parallel, pooled and pass-through mechanisms), and on Multi-donor Trust Funds.
- For joint initiatives between UN agencies, funds and programmes, see the upcoming “Guidance note on transferring contributions from one UN Agency to another for the purposes of programmatic activities” (Draft 4 November 2011), UNDG Fiduciary Management Oversight Group, available from the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO) of the UN Development Group (UNDG).

\textsuperscript{119} “ISG Discussion Paper on Joint Programming between UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes and Secretariat Entities”, UN Integration Steering Group (8 July 2010).
Part II. Checklists on joint programmes and joint initiatives

Checklist A. Preparing to partner effectively with other UN entities

To partner effectively with other UN entities through a joint programme or joint initiative, it is important to understand who they are, what they do, what are their priorities and comparative advantage (in terms of organizational mandate, unique positioning to act and capacities), as well as where and how they operate. It is also critical to develop a relationship of mutual trust with a potential UN partner. This checklist focuses on identifying potential UN partners. However, a limited number of questions are also included to help identify national partner(s).

“Don’t pretend that peacekeeping and UNDP are the same. They have different time horizons and different goals. Planning together helped us understand each other's organizational cultures and mandates so we could work better together.”

Mr. Murray McCullough, former head of the SSR component in UNMIT

Step 1: Find out what you can about potential UN partners

Who are potential partners?

1. Who are the members of the UN Country Team? Which UN entities have no physical presence in-country, but might be a potential partner?
2. What coordination mechanisms exist in your sector (e.g., a government-led working group, UN Integrated Strategic Framework working group, UN humanitarian cluster working group)?
3. Do the UN Field Mission and other UN entities currently have any joint programmes/initiatives in place? Are there any lessons learned from past joint programmes/initiatives?
4. Who would be a potential national government counterpart for a joint programme/initiative?
5. If the UN Field Mission is drawing-down, which UN entities are likely to take over functions previously performed by the UN Field Mission? Would a joint programme/initiative help to hand over functions from the UN Field Mission to other UN entities?

What are the priorities of potential partners?

6. What are the priorities, strategies and plans of the national authorities?
7. What UN-wide plans are in place for the country (e.g., Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP))?
8. What are the humanitarian and/or development priorities of the UN entity in the host country? How do these coincide with, or differ from, the UN Field Mission’s peace consolidation priorities?

What is the comparative advantage of each potential partner?

Organizational mandate to act

9. Are there instances where the political objectives of the UN Field Mission might clash with the objectives of the UN entity or with the objectives of the national authorities? How would such tensions affect a joint programme/initiative?
10. Are there instances where the short-term goals of UN peacekeeping (such as establishing immediate security) might clash with the longer-term goals of the UN entity (such as building national law enforcement capacities)? Could appropriate sequencing of activities mitigate such tensions?
11. What is the UN entity’s organizational culture and values? How does this differ from that of the UN Field Mission?

Unique positioning to act

12. What are the UN entities’ organizational strengths and weaknesses – globally and in-country? How do these compare to those of the UN Field Mission and of UN peacekeeping more generally?
13. In which areas does the UN entity have a proven track record? How do these compare to those of the UN Field Mission and UN peacekeeping more generally?
14. Are there areas of overlap between the areas of work of the UN Field Mission and other UN entities (e.g., in terms of where they work in the country, or the area of expertise)?

15. Do the UN Field Mission and UN entity have a good relationship with the national authorities in this sector?

**Capacities to act**

16. What expertise does the UN entity have on the ground? Are experts providing assistance at the national, state or country levels?

17. Would the UN entity generate additional expertise needed for joint programmes/initiatives through reliance on existing staff, UN Volunteers, external consultants, seconded personnel, sub-contractors, or experts from pre-cleared rosters? Would the UN entity generate the additional expertise through entering into a partnership with a non-UN entity? Do these mechanisms enable the UN entity to generate/recruit the right type and number of personnel, within the required timeframe?

18. What are the capacities of the national authorities in the sector? What are their needs in terms of material capacity (e.g., infrastructure, equipment), human capacity (e.g., training) and administrative and management capacity (e.g., record-keeping systems).

19. What is the capacity of the national authorities to absorb assistance offered, and participate in a joint programme/initiative?

**Where do potential partners operate?**

20. Which organizations are working where (at the national/state/country level, in urban/rural areas) and on what issues (i.e., UN, government, civil society including NGOs and women’s organizations, international organizations (World Bank etc.), bilaterals, multilaterals, regional organizations etc.)?

**How do potential partners operate?**

**Planning and Management**

21. To what extent is the UN entity able to modify existing programmes and plans to accommodate a new joint programme or joint initiative?

22. Who would need to approve the joint programme/initiative (in the UN entity and national authorities)? How long will this take?

23. When implementing a joint programme/initiative, which key decisions can the UN entity take in-country and which have to be referred to its Headquarters? How will this affect timelines?

**Administration, finance and logistics**

24. How is the UN entity funded (through assessed and/or voluntary contributions)? Does the UN entity have access to funding that is unavailable to the UN Field Mission (e.g., stand-by funds like the Peacebuilding Fund)?

25. How does the UN entity channel funds to joint programmes/initiatives?

26. How long will it take the UN entity to mobilize staff, equipment and funds for the joint programme or joint initiative? What is its track record in this regard?
Step 2: Build a relationship of mutual trust with a potential UN partner

Dos for relationship building

1. Do be open to taking advice from those who were there before you: many UN partners were present in the country before the UN Field Mission arrived and will have in-depth knowledge of the local context, and strong networks of contacts.

2. Do discuss any fears that UN partners may have as a result of the arrival of the UN Field Mission such as jeopardising relationships with the national authorities on sensitive issues, losing competent national and international staff to the UN Field Mission or competition over donor funding.

3. Do discuss how differences between the UN Field Mission and UN partner may affect a joint programme or joint initiative (e.g., differences in terms of mandates, priorities, planning approaches, organizational culture and values etc.).

4. Do meet the national authorities together with other UN entities when discussing joint programme/initiatives.

5. Do exchange workplans with potential UN partners and the national authorities, as well as other relevant information on each other’s priorities and activities.

Don’ts for relationship-building

1. Do not raise unrealistic expectations with the national authorities and other beneficiaries about the joint programme/initiative, particularly if new funding is needed and not yet secured.

2. Do not re-invent the wheel. Instead, find out what related initiatives have taken place in the past, and build on past and on-going efforts.
A joint programme or joint initiative works best when the following four criteria are met. Guiding questions are provided to help determine whether each criterion has been met.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes (tick)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. There is adequate support for the joint programme/initiative from all key stakeholders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is the joint programme/initiative a <strong>priority for both</strong> the UN Field Mission and the UN partner (e.g., as reflected in the UN Integrated Strategic Framework)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is the joint programme/initiative <strong>aligned with national priorities</strong> and with the priorities of the main beneficiaries of the joint programme/initiative? Are these <strong>national priorities legitimate</strong> in the eyes of the regional- and county-level authorities or in the eyes of the population at large? Do they reflect the priorities of all segments of society, including women and children?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have the <strong>national authorities requested that the UN Field Mission work with the UN partner</strong> through a joint programme/initiative?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is there <strong>political support</strong> for the new UN Field Mission and UN partner to carry out this joint programme/initiative (at the national, state and local levels of the national government, at the regional level such as from regional organizations, and at the international levels such as from bilateral donors)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is there <strong>support from key partners</strong> for the joint programme/initiative (e.g., members of the UN Country Team, local and international NGOs, civil society, donors, World Bank etc.)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to, or influence, over key decision-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is/are the UN Field Mission and/or UN partner likely to have <strong>access to, or influence over key decision-makers, in the national authorities</strong> affected by the joint programme/initiative?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is there <strong>UN senior management support</strong> for the joint programme/initiative within UN peacekeeping and the UN partner (both at country level and at Headquarters)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is there a relationship of <strong>mutual trust</strong> between the UN Field Mission and UN partner, particularly at the management level in-country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do the UN Field Mission and UN partner both feel that they have <strong>equal ownership</strong> of the joint programme/initiative?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. The joint programme/initiative will do no harm and is sustainable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Will the joint programme/initiative <strong>do no harm</strong> (e.g., in terms of women’s rights, good governance, socio-economic and environmental impact etc.)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the joint programme/initiative have an <strong>exit strategy and is it sustainable</strong> i.e., can the benefits generated by the joint programme/initiative be sustained after the completion of the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is the joint programme/initiative <strong>cost-effective</strong>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is the joint programme/initiative <strong>unique</strong> and does not duplicate other efforts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. The roles and responsibilities of each partner are based on an analysis of their comparative advantages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the UN Field Mission need to partner to <strong>help fill a critical capacity gap</strong> (e.g., in terms of skills and expertise, or funding)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does it appear that the joint programme/initiative cannot be implemented without the contributions of both the UN Field Mission and the UN partner i.e., that <strong>neither can do it alone</strong>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are the <strong>skills and resources</strong> that the UN Field Mission and UN partner bring to the joint programme/initiative <strong>complementary and not duplicative</strong>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do the UN Field Mission and UN partner <strong>understand each other’s different organizational mandates and priorities</strong> and the differences in how they operate? Are the political objectives of the UN Field Mission and its implications for the joint programme or joint initiative understood by all?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are there <strong>international standards</strong> or is there a <strong>UN inter-agency policy</strong> that clarify/ies the approach the joint programme/initiative should take (e.g., the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS))?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is there a <strong>global partnership agreement</strong> (such as an MOU or exchange of letters) or <strong>country-specific agreement</strong> in place that already endorses this type of joint programme/initiative and/or clarifies roles and responsibilities?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Yes (tick)

4. There is adequate capacity to implement

- Is it realistic and achievable to implement the joint programme/initiative within the proposed timeframe? Has the lead time required to generate/recruit personnel, set up logistics and IT infrastructure, procure equipment and services, raise new funds and disburse funds been taken into account?
- Do the national authorities and main beneficiaries have the capacity to absorb the assistance offered through the joint programme/initiative?
- Is the funding for the joint programme/initiative already secured and have donor restrictions, if any, been taken into account?

Checklist C. How to design a joint programme or joint initiative between a UN Field Mission, other UN entity and national partner(s)

A joint programme or joint initiative works best when the following elements are taken into account during its design:

Yes (tick)

Assessment and planning processes

1. Planning is based on a joint or coordinated assessment that involves all project partners and produces a shared understanding of the nature of the problem and how to address it.

2. Planning is conducted either jointly or in a coordinated manner from the start and involves all project partners.

3. Other activities in the same field are mapped, identifying potential overlap and gaps to be addressed during the design of the joint programme/initiative. The timing of related activities is taken into account.

4. During the design of the joint programme/initiative, adequate time is taken to consult amongst partners and with national stakeholders, including the main beneficiaries.

5. The necessary approvals are obtained for the development of a joint programme/initiative (e.g., from the national authorities, the Headquarters and country-level management of the UN Field Mission and UN entity, any UN inter-agency coordination group etc.).

Alignment with higher-level guidance and priorities

6. The joint programme/initiative is aligned with national priorities. These national priorities are legitimate in the eyes of the regional- and country-level authorities or in the eyes of the population at large, and reflect the priorities of all segments of society affected by the joint programme/initiative, including women and children.

7. The joint programme/initiative is aligned with the peace consolidation priorities of the UN (e.g., as reflected in the UN Integrated Strategic Framework).

8. The joint programme/initiative is in line with any relevant global partnership agreement or country-specific agreement (e.g., MOUs).

9. The joint programme/initiative complies with any relevant international standards or UN guidance (e.g., the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)).

Substantive content

10. There is an agreed set of objectives, expected accomplishments and related indicators as well as outputs and activities, with clear roles and responsibilities and timelines for implementation of the outputs.

11. The objectives, expected accomplishments and related indicators in the joint programme/initiative are aligned with those in higher-level UN plans (e.g., Integrated Strategic Framework, UN Development Assistance Framework, UN Field Mission’s Results-based Budget Framework).
12. **Lessons learned** and findings from past evaluations are incorporated into the design of the joint programme/initiative.

13. Relevant **linkages** are made to the activities of other UN entities, including to the activities of other components of the UN Field Mission (e.g., police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR, mine action).

14. The design of the joint programme/initiative takes into account UN **programming principles and cross-cutting issues**: a human rights-based approach (HRBA), gender equality, environmental sustainability, results-based management, capacity development§ and other relevant considerations such as the needs of vulnerable groups and HIV/AIDS.

15. The joint programme/initiative meets the principle of “**do no harm**”* (e.g., it does not inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse).

16. The joint programme/initiative has an **exit strategy and is sustainable**. In other words, there is a plan describing how the benefits generated by the joint programme/initiative will be sustained after the completion of the project (e.g., a plan for maintaining a training programme developed for the national authorities or to maintain equipment purchased for the national police).

17. The joint programme/initiative is **cost-effective**.

18. **Risks, likely impacts of those risks and risk management measures are identified** for the joint programme/initiative. These risks can be external risks relating to the political, economic or security situation in the country or difficulties in securing new funding, or internal risks for the UN such as delays in recruitment, procurement and disbursement of funds.

**Division of labour**

19. **Roles and responsibilities are based on the comparative advantages** of the UN Field Mission and UNCT, and an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of each partner.

20. There is **agreement on the respective contributions** (expertise, staff, money, logistical support, office space, programme management functions etc.) to be provided by each partner and agreement on when each contribution will be provided.

**Management**

21. **Adequate resources** are dedicated to managing the joint programme/initiative: each partner has the required staff and skills to manage its part of the joint programme/initiative. When possible, dedicated, full-time programme managers are assigned to the joint programme/initiative.

22. **Programme management roles are clear**, particularly when part-time focal points are used (e.g., these roles are written into the terms of reference for the focal points, in their job descriptions and/or individual workplans).

23. There is **clarity on the reporting lines** for programme personnel, particularly for staff who will be managed by a supervisor from another UN entity. Note that a UN staff member can report substantively to a supervisor from another UN entity, but administratively they remain the responsibility of their parent organization (in terms of performance appraisal, contract renewal, disciplinary action etc.).

24. There is **agreement on how management decisions will be taken** on the joint programme/initiative (e.g., through a government-led steering committee, an inter-agency coordination body, a formal project management board). Where a steering committee exists for the project, the roles and responsibilities of each partner on this committee need to be clearly spelt out.

25. There is agreement that **decisions on the allocation of funds to project activities** will be taken either jointly or in a consultative manner involving all partners. This is particularly relevant where the UN Field Mission is providing only an in-kind contribution.

26. There is **agreement on how to modify** the joint programme/initiative, and when and how to end it, particularly if essential funding is not secured.

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§ See the five “**UN Country Planning Principles**” for development settings.

* For a full list of principles applicable to post-conflict settings, see the “**10 Fragile States Principles**”. 
### Yes (tick)

#### Monitoring and evaluation

27. **Monitoring and evaluation arrangements are clear** to all, including the timing of such activities and the respective responsibilities. This includes clarity on when planning assumptions and risks and related risk management measures will be reviewed.

28. **Monitoring and evaluation is done jointly or in a coordinated manner.** For example, joint or coordinated data collection and analysis can reduce costs in terms of staff time and transportation costs.

#### Reporting and communications

29. **There is agreement on how programming information will be shared internally** amongst partners. This includes information on funding for the joint programme/initiative where funds are kept separately.

30. **There is agreement on how information on the joint programme/initiative will be shared externally** (e.g., through a communication plan).

31. **There is agreement on how to report progress** on the joint programme/initiative (to internal management, to donors etc.). Whenever possible, the same reporting formats are used by all partners. There should be clarity on what to report on, the formats to use and the deadlines to meet.

32. **There is agreement on how to provide visibility** to each partner and donors, no matter how small the contribution.

#### Administration, finance and logistics

33. **The lead time for recruiting personnel, setting up logistics and IT infrastructure, procuring equipment and services, raising new funds and disbursing funds is considered** when sequencing activities. The turn-over rates for personnel and need for gender balance are taken into account.

34. **A resource mobilization strategy is in place to raise any new funds required.** The roles of each partner in resource mobilization are clearly spelt out, including how and when it will be done. The implications of not securing new funds required are discussed, particularly with national stakeholders.

35. **Budget officers/experts are consulted** to decide how best to manage all funds for the joint programme/initiative. The decision is aimed at achieving the most effective, efficient and timely implementation, and reducing transaction costs for national partners, donors and the UN.

36. If the joint programme/initiative expects to receive voluntary funding, the UN Field Mission’s component understands the implications of channelling the money through a particular trust fund, particularly, in terms of overhead costs, administrative responsibilities and reporting obligations as well as in terms of who retains programmatic and financial accountability to the donors.

37. **Donor conditions and restrictions are factored into** the design and management of the joint programme/initiative and its funds.

38. If the joint programme/initiative involves sharing of assets, provision of services or may incur liability for any parties, the need for a formal, signed agreement such as an MOU or signed project document is considered. The UN Field Mission’s legal office and mission support component are consulted for guidance in this regard.

39. **Assets and services are shared** to reduce costs whenever possible (e.g., office space, communications equipment, IT, transportation etc.). An MOU is needed to share Mission assets and services with a UN agency, fund or programme. No MOU is needed for sharing of Mission assets and services with another part of the UN Secretariat (e.g., OCHA, OHCHR).

40. **There is a clear plan for how personnel, assets and other resources will be managed on completion of the joint programme/initiative.** If the UN Field Mission wishes to transfer Mission assets to the national government or a UN agency, fund or programme on completion of the joint programme/initiative, this must be done in accordance with UN Financial Rules and Regulations 10522.

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*Examples of trust funds include peacekeeping-related trust funds, the Headquarters-based “Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action” (only for mine action activities) and Multi-donor Trust Funds (with UNDP acting as an Administrative Agent designated by the Participating UN Organizations).*