On 16 December 1990, Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was democratically elected President of Haiti by 67 per cent of Haitian voters. He took office on 7 February 1991. The validity of the election was upheld by the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Caribbean community. It was hoped that the election would put an end to a long period encompassing the dictatorship of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier followed by five years of political instability under five different regimes, and mark the beginning of an era of democracy and economic and social progress. However, on 30 September 1991, President Aristide was overthrown in a coup d'état, headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, and forced into exile.
The violent and unconstitutional actions of the Haitian military forces were immediately and strongly condemned by the international community. The Permanent Council of OAS condemned the coup d'état and its perpetrators. It demanded adherence to the Constitution and respect for the legitimate Government, the physical safety of the President and the rights of the Haitian people, and called for the reinstatement of the President. United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar also expressed1 the hope that calm would soon be restored and that the democratic process would be pursued in accordance with the Constitution. The President of the Security Council associated himself with the statement.
Meeting on 2 October 1991, the OAS Ministers for Foreign Affairs heard a statement by President Aristide, and on 3 October they adopted a resolution demanding his immediate reinstatement. The Ministers recommended the diplomatic, economic and financial isolation of the de facto authorities and the suspension of any aid except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes. They decided to dispatch a mission to Haiti and urged the United Nations to consider the spirit and aims of the resolution. On 4 October, a high-level OAS delegation arrived in Haiti and met with representatives of various groups within the country. The delegation's negotiations with the High Command of the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH) were interrupted on 7 October, when soldiers ordered the delegation members to leave the country.
Meanwhile, on 3 October, President Aristide addressed the United Nations Security Council. The President of the Council made a statement condemning the coup, calling for the restoration of the legitimate Government, supporting the efforts of OAS and expressing the hope that the President of Haiti would soon return to his country and resume his functions.
On 11 October 1991, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 46/7, in which it condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti, the use of violence and military coercion and the violation of human rights in Haiti; affirmed as unacceptable any entity resulting from that illegal situation; and demanded the immediate restoration of the legitimate Government of President Aristide, the application of the Constitution and thus the full observance of human rights in Haiti.
Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar actively supported the intensive efforts by OAS and its mediator at the time, Mr. Ramírez Ocampo, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, aimed at finding a political solution to the Haitian crisis. This support was continued by the new United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. On 15 July 1992, he informed the Security Council that he had accepted the offer of the Secretary-General of OAS, Mr. João Baena Soares, to include United Nations participation in a mission to Haiti. The high-level mission led by the OAS Secretary-General visited Haiti from 18 to 21 August 1992. On 10 September, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Haitian parties did not seem to have come closer together. He also reported that OAS was planning to deploy a first group of observers in Haiti and that it would maintain the economic embargo. He intended to continue cooperating with OAS and stood ready to lend any other assistance.
On 24 November 1992, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/20, in which it again demanded the restoration of the legitimate Government of President Aristide, together with the full application of the National Constitution and the full observance of human rights, and requested the Secretary-General to take the "necessary measures" in order to assist, in cooperation with OAS, in the solution of the Haitian crisis.
Following the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General, on 11 December 1992, appointed Mr. Dante Caputo, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, as his Special Envoy for Haiti. On 13 January 1993, the OAS Secretary-General also appointed Mr. Caputo as his Special Envoy.
The Special Envoy held a series of preliminary consultations in December 1992 in Washington, D.C., with President Aristide, and at Port-au-Prince, with various Haitian parties. On 8 January 1993, President Aristide, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, requested, among other things, the following: (a) the deployment by the United Nations and OAS of an international civilian mission to monitor respect for human rights and the elimination of all forms of violence; and (b) the establishment of a process of dialogue among the Haitian parties, under the auspices of the Special Envoy, with a view to reaching agreements for the solution of the political crisis; the designation of a Prime Minister by the President to lead a Government of national concord aimed at the full restoration of democratic order in Haiti; agreements for the rehabilitation of Haitian institutions, including the reform of the judicial system, the professionalization of the armed forces and the separation of the police from the armed forces; international technical assistance for national reconstruction; and a system of guarantees to ensure a lasting solution. An identical letter was addressed to the Secretary-General of OAS.
After further meetings at Port-au-Prince on 16 and 17 January 1993, the Special Envoy received two letters, one from Lieutenant-General Cédras and the other from Mr. Bazin, accepting in principle an international civilian mission and a dialogue among the Haitian parties to resolve the political crisis in the country.
In a letter dated 18 January 1993 to President Aristide, the Secretary-General agreed to United Nations participation in an international civilian mission subject to the approval of the General Assembly and under terms to be agreed jointly with OAS.
Following the Special Envoy's consultations with the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and of OAS concerning the mandate of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) and the modalities of its operations, the joint ideas were presented to and agreed upon by President Aristide. The terms of the agreement regarding the Mission were subsequently incorporated in an exchange of letters between the de facto Prime Minister, Mr. Bazin, and the Special Envoy on 9 February 1993.
Under the agreement, MICIVIH would verify respect for human rights as laid down in the Haitian Constitution and in the international instruments to which Haiti was a party, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. The Mission would devote special attention to the observance of the rights to life, to the integrity and security of the person, to personal liberty, to freedom of expression and to freedom of association. The Mission would be entitled to receive communications relating to alleged human rights violations, to visit freely any place or establishment, to enjoy entire freedom of movement within Haitian territory, to interview anybody freely and privately, to make recommendations to the authorities and verify their follow-up, to undertake a public information and education campaign on human rights and to use the mass media to the extent useful for the fulfilment of its mandate. It would be understood that the Mission was authorized to resort to other international procedures for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Pending the General Assembly's approval, the Secretary-General dispatched to Haiti on 13 February 1993 an advance team and a survey group to prepare for the deployment of the United Nations component of the Mission. On 14 February, an initial group of 40 observers from OAS arrived in Haiti, where they joined forces with a small team of OAS observers that had been in Port-au-Prince since September 1992.
On 24 March 1993, the Secretary-General recommended to the General Assembly that it establish the United Nations component of the joint mission. The United Nations component would comprise some 200 international staff, including 133 human rights observers. OAS would provide another 133 international observers, plus other required personnel for its component. On 20 April 1993, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, its resolution 47/20B authorizing United Nations participation, jointly with OAS, in MICIVIH. The Assembly reiterated the need for an early return of President Aristide to resume his constitutional functions as President and strongly supported the process of political dialogue under the auspices of the Special Envoy. It reiterated that any entity resulting from actions of the de facto regime, including the partial elections to the Parliament in January 1993, was illegitimate.
MICIVIH operated under a Head of Mission, appointed jointly by the United Nations and OAS and reporting to the Special Envoy. Its headquarters was established at Port-au-Prince with 14 regional offices and sub-offices across the country. Deployment in the provinces began on 5 March 1993. By the end of March, MICIVIH had a team in each of the nine departments of the country.
Oil and arms embargo
In the meantime, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy conducted consultations with the parties concerned aimed at seeking a political solution. The immediate objective was to achieve agreement on three main issues, namely the return of President Aristide to Haiti, the appointment of a Prime Minister to head a Government of national concord and the resolution of the question of amnesty. Other critical issues included technical assistance for the economic and institutional reconstruction of the country, and the nature and duration of the international presence in Haiti, coupled with international guarantees to ensure compliance with the agreements. Despite the mounting international pressure, however, the negotiating process undertaken by Mr. Caputo did not succeed.
On 7 June 1993, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, in which he stated that despite the efforts of the international community, constitutional order had not yet been re-established in Haiti because the de facto authorities continued to obstruct all initiatives. In light of that situation, the letter went on, the Government of Haiti requested the Security Council to make universal and mandatory the sanctions against the de facto authorities adopted at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of OAS and recommended in the General Assembly resolutions, giving priority to an embargo on petroleum products and the supply of arms and munitions.
On 16 June, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, unanimously adopted resolution 841 (1993), by which it decided to impose an oil and arms embargo against Haiti as part of the continuing international effort to restore constitutional rule. The Council decided that the sanctions would enter into force on 23 June 1993 unless the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of OAS, reported to the Council that, in the light of the results of negotiations, the measures were no longer warranted. At any time after such reporting, should the de facto authorities in Haiti fail to comply in good faith with their undertakings in those negotiations, the sanctions measures would enter into force immediately.
Governors Island Agreement
On 21 June 1993, the Special Envoy, Mr. Caputo, received a letter from Lieutenant-General Cédras accepting the Special Envoy's earlier invitation to him to initiate a dialogue with President Aristide with a view to resolving the Haitian crisis. On 3 July, after almost a week of talks on Governors Island, New York City, President Aristide and Lieutenant-General Cédras signed an agreement containing arrangements which the parties felt paved the way to a "satisfactory solution to the Haitian crisis and the beginning of a process of national reconciliation".
Under the Agreement, President Aristide was to appoint a new Commander-in-Chief to replace Lieutenant-General Cédras, who would take early retirement. President Aristide was to return to Haiti on 30 October 1993. The parties agreed to a political dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations and OAS, between representatives of political parties represented in the Parliament, with the participation of representatives of the Presidential Commission. The parties further agreed that the President would nominate a Prime Minister, to be confirmed by the legally reconstituted Parliament. Following his confirmation and assumption of office, all United Nations and OAS sanctions were to be suspended. Other provisions dealt with issues of amnesty, the creation of a new police force and international cooperation.
The Agreement specifically requested the presence of United Nations personnel in Haiti to assist in modernizing the armed forces and establishing the new police force. The Secretary-General, after consultation with the constitutional Government of Haiti, was to report to the Security Council with his recommendations on that aspect of the implementation of the Agreement. The United Nations and OAS were called upon to verify the fulfilment of all the commitments set out in the Agreement. The Secretary-General entrusted the verification to his Special Envoy and asked him to report regularly to him and to the Secretary-General of OAS.
New York Pact
On 14 July 1993, representatives of political forces and parliamentary blocs, together with the members of the Presidential Commission which represented President Aristide in Haiti, began the inter-Haitian political dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations and OAS. At the conclusion of the talks in New York on 16 July, the parties signed a new document, known as the New York Pact, which provided for a six-month truce "to guarantee a smooth and peaceful transition" in their country. In agreeing to the truce, the parties undertook to promote and guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to refrain from any action that might lead to violence or disrupt the transition to democracy.
The signatories invited President Aristide to appoint a new Prime Minister as soon as possible, and undertook to ensure that laws necessary for the transition of power were passed on the basis of an emergency procedure. They agreed that the members of Parliament elected as a result of the contested elections of 18 January 1993 would voluntarily refrain from occupying their parliamentary seats until the Conciliation Commission had rendered its verdict on this issue. The United Nations and OAS agreed to make two experts available to help prepare and implement an act establishing the Conciliation Commission.
Suspension of sanctions
On 15 July 1993, the Security Council confirmed its readiness to suspend the sanctions imposed against Haiti under Security Council resolution 841 (1993) immediately after the Prime Minister had been ratified and had assumed his functions. It was agreed that provisions would be made for the automatic termination of such suspension if the parties to the Agreement or any authorities in Haiti failed to comply in good faith with the Agreement. The Council also declared its readiness to terminate the sanctions, upon receipt of a report from the United Nations Secretary-General immediately after the return of President Aristide to Haiti.
On 25 August 1993, the Haitian Parliament ratified the appointment by President Aristide of Mr. Robert Malval as Prime Minister-designate. This led the Security Council, on the Secretary-General's recommendation, to suspend immediately the oil and arms embargo against Haiti as well as the freeze on funds. The Council did so by unanimously adopting resolution 861 (1993) of 27 August in which it also confirmed its readiness to reimpose sanctions if the terms of the Governors Island Agreement were not fully implemented.
The Governors Island Agreement included provision for United Nations assistance for modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force with the presence of United Nations personnel in these fields. On 25 August, the Secretary-General outlined for the Security Council his plans in this regard. He recommended the dispatch to Haiti of a mission consisting of 567 civilian police monitors, 60 military trainers and a military construction unit with a strength of approximately 500 all ranks for an initial period of six months. The mission would be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, namely the Special Envoy, Mr. Caputo, who would also oversee the activities of MICIVIH and who would coordinate the activities of the two missions.
Although the Haitian Constitution provided for a police force separate from the armed forces, the responsibilities of FADH included both military and police functions. The Secretary-General said that, pending the creation of a new police force, United Nations civilian police monitors would help the Government in monitoring the activities of those members of FADH involved in carrying out police functions, provide guidance and advice, monitor the conduct of police operations and ensure that legal requirements were fully met.
As to the modernization of the armed forces, the Secretary-General stated that the military training teams would provide training to officers and non-commissioned officers in non-lethal skills in order to prepare them for what would become their primary mission, including disaster relief, search and rescue, and surveillance of borders and coastal waters. The military construction unit would work with the Haitian military in such areas as conversion of certain military facilities to civilian use and renovation of medical facilities.
On 31 August 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 862 (1993), approved the dispatch of an advance team to prepare for the possible deployment of the proposed United Nations mission to Haiti.
The advance team, headed by Mr. Caputo, travelled to Haiti on 8 September 1993. On the basis of the team's findings, the Secretary-General provided further clarifications to the Council. In analysing the political situation in Haiti, he noted that both sides continued to be divided by deep mistrust and suspicion. The political and social climate in the country continued to be characterized by widespread violations of human rights and by other instances of violence. The Secretary-General shared the view of his Special Envoy that in these circumstances there was an "urgent need to demonstrate through concrete steps the commitment of the international community to the solution of the Haitian crisis". He recommended, therefore, that the Security Council approve the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).
On 23 September 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 867 (1993), authorized the establishment and immediate dispatch of UNMIH for a period of six months. Extension of the mandate beyond seventy-five days was made contingent upon a review by the Security Council of substantive progress towards the implementation of political agreements reached. The Council called upon all factions in Haiti to renounce publicly violence as a means of political expression.
Events of 11 October
In accordance with resolution 867 (1993) and after necessary preparations and consultations, the UNMIH advance team, consisting of 53 military and 51 police personnel, was deployed in Port-au-Prince in the period SeptemberBOctober 1993. However, when the ship Harlan County, carrying 220 personnel of the United Nations military contingent arrived in Port-au-Prince on 11 October, armed civilians (known as "attachés") created disturbances in the area of the seaport and prevented the ship from landing. In addition, they threatened journalists and diplomats waiting to meet the contingent. The Security Council issued a statement deeply deploring the events of 11 October and reiterating that serious and consistent non-compliance with the Governors Island Agreement would prompt it to reinstate the oil and arms embargo against Haiti.
Following the departure of the Harlan County, the other members of UNMIH, the bulk of MICIVIH staff and non-essential personnel of international agencies left Haiti. Many foreign nationals acted likewise, while Haitians living in the capital attempted to flee to the countryside. The Secretary-General's Special Representative remained at Port-au-Prince until 6 November 1993.
On 13 October 1993, the Secretary-General called the Council's attention to the "repeatedly observed lack of will on the part of the command of FADH to facilitate the deployment and operation of UNMIH" and to administrative obstacles created to delay the start of the Mission. He also cited incidents demonstrating a lack of will to act against "attachés" who were terrorizing the population through such actions as assassinations, attacks on the offices of the Prime Minister and a general strike against UNMIH. Moreover, police had facilitated and, in some cases, participated in the actions of the armed civilians.
The Secretary-General went on to say that most of the instructions issued by the Government of Haiti to FADH and police had not been carried out. That was a "clear violation of the principle of the subordination of military forces to civilian authority", which was a central feature of the Governors Island Agreement. Incidents had occurred which reflected a lack of will to cooperate fully with the peaceful transition to a democratic society, as well as the "clear and explicit intent to prevent the democratic process, as accepted in that Agreement, from taking its course". The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and the police chief and commander of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area "have failed to fulfil the commitments entered into by General Cédras in his capacity as co-signatory of the Governors Island Agreement". The Secretary-General declared it necessary to terminate the suspension of the oil and arms embargo and the freeze on funds first imposed by resolution 841 (1993).
The Security Council, by its resolution 873 (1993) of 13 October, decided to reimpose its oil and arms embargo against Haiti and the freeze on funds as of 2359 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST) on 18 October 1993 unless the parties to the Governors Island Agreement and other authorities in Haiti implemented in full the agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of President Aristide and enable UNMIH to carry out its mandate. The Council said it would also consider additional sanctions if they continued to impede the activities of UNMIH or to refuse to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions and the Governors Island Agreement.
Despite diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and mounting international pressure, the military leaders in Haiti continued to defy the Governors Island Agreement. Moreover, on 14 October, the Minister of Justice in the Government of President Aristide, Mr. François-Guy Malary, was assassinated. In a letter dated 15 October 1993, President Aristide requested the Security Council to call on Member States to take the "necessary measures to strengthen the provisions of resolution 873 (1993)".
On 16 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 875 (1993), called upon Member States to ensure the strict implementation of the oil and arms embargo against Haiti, and in particular to halt and inspect ships travelling towards Haiti in order to verify their cargoes and destinations. The Council also confirmed that it was prepared to consider further necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the provisions of relevant Council resolutions.
On 30 October 1993, after the deadline for the return of President Aristide to Haiti had passed, the Security Council condemned the fact that Lieutenant-General Cédras and the Haitian military authorities had not fulfilled their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement, and deplored their fostering and perpetuation of a political and security environment which prevented the return of President Aristide to Haiti. The Secretary-General informed the Council on 26 November 1993 that the Haitian military authorities continued to obstruct the deployment of UNMIH. He concluded that the mandate entrusted to UNMIH could not be implemented until there was a clear and substantial change of attitude on the part of the Haitian military leaders. Notwithstanding that assessment, the Council decided on 10 December 1993 to continue the mandate of UNMIH for the full six-month period, that is until 23 March 1994.
As regards MICIVIH, a small group of administrative personnel remained in Port-au-Prince following the evacuation of the bulk of its personnel in October 1993. The Executive Director of MICIVIH, Mr. Colin Granderson, returned to Port-au-Prince after four weeks of absence. Twenty-two United Nations and OAS observers returned on 26 January 1994, beginning a gradual build-up.
MICIVIH reported an alarming increase in violence in Haiti. There had been an outbreak of violence in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas, where the number of murders remained at a very high level, with the persistence of grave violations of human rights and, in particular, extrajudicial executions, suspicious deaths and enforced disappearances. There were a number of mutilations and many of those killed were supporters of President Aristide. In certain cases of suspicious death, MICIVIH obtained information leading to the conclusion that the culprits were members of FADH, their auxiliaries or members of the Front révolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progrès en Haiti (FRAPH). In other cases, testimony pointed to armed civilians and left it unclear whether it was a question of "attachés" or of armed bands acting with the complicity of FADH.
Diplomatic efforts continue
The Secretary-General and his Special Representative, supported by several United Nations Member States ("Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti"), in consultation with the OAS Secretary-General, continued to work intensively to break the impasse and promote agreement between the parties on measures which would make it possible to resume implementation of the Governors Island Agreement.
An important step forward was taken on 14B16 January 1994, when President Aristide convened a conference in Miami, Florida (United States), to which all the political groups that had signed the New York Pact were invited. At that conference a consensus emerged on a sequence of steps to be taken to break the deadlock. In the course of February 1994, further consultations took place in Washington between leading members of both Houses of the Haitian Parliament, representing all political tendencies in that Parliament. On 19 February, the Secretary-General received a letter from a representative group of those Parliamentarians containing a plan for resolving the crisis. On 3 March 1994, this plan was endorsed in a resolution by the Chamber of Deputies of the Haitian Parliament. The plan as presented to the Secretary-General by its authors was transmitted to the Security Council on 20 February 1994. On that occasion, the Secretary-General stated that he considered it to constitute a significant development.
The plan, which was subsequently set out in detail in a letter received on 23 February 1994, provided for the appointment of a Prime Minister, the departure of the Commander-in-Chief of FADH, a vote on the amnesty law, as well as the adoption, after the installation of the new Government, of a law concerning the establishment of a police force, and the return of President Aristide to Haiti.
On 5 March 1994, the Secretary-General met with President Aristide. During the meeting, the President expressed his opposition to this initiative. He further expressed his position in a 7 March 1994 letter to the Secretary-General. Before appointing a new Prime Minister, President Aristide wished to bring about the departure of the leaders of the coup d'état, the adoption of the laws provided for within the framework of the New York Pact and the deployment of UNMIH.
Situation with UNMIH and MICIVIH
As UNMIH's first mandate period neared its end, the Secretary-General saw "no change in the prevailing situation in Haiti that would have allowed the reactivation of UNMIH". In those circumstances, he suggested that the Council might wish to consider authorizing the extension of UNMIH's mandate for a period of three months. In his opinion, that would allow for the possibility of reactivating the mission with a minimum of delay, should the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement be resumed.
The Security Council, by its resolution 905 (1994) adopted on 23 March 1994, decided to extend the mandate of UNMIH until 30 June 1994 and requested the Secretary-General to make specific recommendations on the composition of UNMIH and the scope of its activities within the overall personnel levels established by resolution 867 (1993).
On 29 April 1994, the Secretary-General also recommended that the General Assembly extend the mandate and financing of the United Nations component of MICIVIH for one year. In his view, although the Mission had been unable to rectify a distressing situation in Haiti, it had shed light on certain events there and denounced human rights abuses that would not otherwise have been disclosed. President Aristide could only be returned to power, and democracy restored in Haiti, if both sides made "constructive and accepted concessions". The Secretary-General noted that the recent initiative by a group of Haitian Parliamentarians C which had been supported by the United Nations and OAS C had not been endorsed by President Aristide. Meanwhile, unity among the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti had waned and Security Council sanctions, reimposed in October 1993, had not been effective.
The Secretary-General said the international community's role had changed from that of mediator between the parties to that of sole agent responsible for finding and implementing a solution to the deadlock. There was a danger that the international community would have too extensive a mission, allowing the parties to shirk their own responsibilities in the negotiating process. Given that negotiations had yielded no significant progress, the Secretary-General recommended that "a more specifically Haitian solution" be found. For this reason, the participants should resume an effective role in this process, and the international community and especially those countries most directly concerned should restore a unified approach in the negotiations. Without positive change, both from the Haitian side and from the international community, it was difficult to determine what additional efforts the United Nations could undertake to resolve the crisis. However, as long as material circumstances would allow, the United Nations must maintain its presence through MICIVIH and ensure the continuity of humanitarian assistance.
The General Assembly, in its resolution 48/27B of 8 July 1994, authorized the extension of the mandate of the United Nations component of MICIVIH for an additional year, and requested the Secretary-General to expedite and strengthen the presence of the Mission in Haiti. At the end of June, MICIVIH had 104 international staff including 70 observers.
On 6 May 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 917 (1994), by which it decided to impose a comprehensive set of sanctions against Haiti, which should take effect no later than 2359 hours EST on 21 May, and listed a number of specific conditions for their termination. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it no later than 19 May on steps the military had taken to comply with the terms of the resolution. The military authorities in Haiti, however, continued to defy the will of the international community. Moreover, they supported the installation, on 11 May, of Supreme Court Judge Emile Jonassaint as "provisional President".
The Security Council, on 11 May, strongly condemned the attempt to replace the legitimate President of Haiti and reaffirmed the Council members' commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti and to the return of President Aristide. On 19 May, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the military authorities had not taken any steps to comply with resolution 917 (1994), and, on the contrary, supported the illegal attempt to replace the legitimate President. The new sanctions against Haiti subsequently took effect as scheduled.
In order to tighten the cordon around the island, the United States deployed two additional navy vessels off Haiti, bringing to eight the number of United States ships working with one Canadian, one Argentine and one Dutch ship. A French vessel was also expected to participate. Steps were also taken on land to enforce the sanctions.
On 20 June 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that no progress had been made towards the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. On the contrary, tensions in Haiti increased as a result of the installation of an illegitimate government, the growing impact of economic sanctions, the continued repression and the humanitarian crisis. The "provisional President" had announced that he would be organizing elections by the end of 1994 and would leave office in February 1995, after the election of a new President in January 1995. On 11 June, he declared a state of emergency on the grounds that the nation was facing extreme danger and risks of invasion. Despite the electoral timetable, no legislative action was taken to prepare for the legislative elections due in November 1994.
As to human rights, the Secretary-General reported that the situation had deteriorated sharply, with new patterns of repression such as the abduction and rape of family members of political activists. In a growing number of politically related killings, the implication of members of FADH or of FRAPH was established. The humanitarian situation in Haiti also continued to deteriorate in spite of efforts by the United Nations and OAS, non-governmental organizations and bilateral donors.
On 28 June 1994, the Secretary-General told the Security Council that the continued deterioration of the situation in Haiti had substantially changed the circumstances under which UNMIH had been planned. The Council might wish to consider modifying the original mandate. The Secretary-General recommended that the mandate be extended for a period of one month, to allow for consultations on the possible strengthening of UNMIH and its role in overall attempts to find a solution to the Haitian crisis.
On 30 June 1994, the Security Council adopted resolution 933 (1994) deciding to extend the mandate of UNMIH until 31 July and requesting the Secretary-General to report to the Council with specific recommendations on the strength, composition, cost and duration of UNMIH, appropriate to its expansion and deployment after the departure of the senior Haitian military leadership.
The situation further deteriorated when, on 11 July 1994, the de facto authorities in Haiti delivered to the Executive Director of MICIVIH in Port-au-Prince a decree of the "provisional President" declaring the international staff of MICIVIH "undesirable" and giving them 48 hours to leave Haitian territory.
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and the Acting Secretary-General of OAS issued a joint statement resolutely condemning this illegal action. The Security Council condemned this decision of the de facto authorities stressing that this action further reinforced the Council's determination to bring about a rapid and definitive solution to the crisis. The Secretary-General then informed the General Assembly and the Security Council of his decision, made in consultation with OAS, to evacuate MICIVIH staff from Haiti for security considerations. Both United Nations and OAS personnel of MICIVIH left Haiti on 13 July.
Force authorized, UNMIH’s mandate revised
As requested by Security Council resolution 933 (1994), the Secretary-General, on 15 July 1994, outlined for the Security Council the tasks of a proposed expanded force in Haiti, its strength and concept of operations. He presented to the Council three options for the establishment of such a force. The Secretary-General supported action under Chapter VII of the Charter by a multinational force in order to ensure the return of the legitimate President and to assist the legitimate Government of Haiti in the maintenance of public order. After these goals were achieved, UNMIH, under Chapter VI, would take over from the multinational force.
On 31 July 1994, the Security Council adopted its resolution 940 (1994). By the terms of that resolution, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and "to use all necessary means" to facilitate the departure of the military leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate Government authorities.
By other terms of the resolution, the Council decided to revise and extend the mandate of UNMIH. An expanded, strengthened UNMIH would assume its full range of functions, and the multinational force would terminate its own mission, when a secure and stable environment had been established and UNMIH had the capability and structure to assume those functions. That determination would be made by the Council, on the basis of recommendations from Member States participating in the multinational force and from the Secretary-General. The Council also approved the establishment of an UNMIH advance team of not more than 60 personnel to monitor the operations of the multinational force. The team would also assess requirements and prepare for the deployment of UNMIH.
The Council extended the mandate of UNMIH for a period of six months and increased its troop level to 6,000. It established the objective of completing UNMIH's mission not later that February 1996. Under its revised mandate, UNMIH would assist in sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and the protection of international personnel and key installations; and in the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force. It would also assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities, and, when requested by them, monitored by the United Nations, in cooperation with OAS.
Final diplomatic efforts
In August 1994, as a personal initiative aimed at the peaceful implementation of resolution 940 (1994), the Secretary-General dispatched a United Nations official with an exploratory mission in order to consider the possibility of sending to Haiti a high-level delegation which would hold discussions with the military authorities. The military authorities refused to meet with the envoy, and the Secretary-General suspended these efforts unless the Security Council gave him a new mandate or the situation changed. However, he informed the Council that he would continue to seek ways to implement resolution 940 (1994) peacefully. The President of the Security Council, in a statement to correspondents, deplored the rejection by the de facto authorities of the Secretary-General's initiative, and reiterated the Council's condemnation of repression, systematic violence and violations of international humanitarian law in Haiti.
At that point, the President of the United States, Mr. William Clinton, stated that all diplomatic efforts had been exhausted and, in accordance with Security Council resolution 940 (1994), force might be used to remove the military leadership from power in Haiti and ensure the return of the democratic Government of President Aristide. President Clinton stated that more than 20 countries had agreed to join the United States in a multinational force. On 17 September, in a final diplomatic effort, the President of the United States sent to Haiti a high-level mission, headed by former President Jimmy Carter. Faced with imminent invasion and after two days of intensive talks, the Haitian military leaders agreed to resign when a general amnesty would be voted into law by the Haitian Parliament, or by 15 October 1994, whichever was earlier. Under the agreement, the Haitian military and police forces would cooperate with the United States military mission.
Multinational force deployed
On 19 September 1994, in a first phase of the military operation authorized by Security Council resolution 940 (1994), the lead elements of the 28-nation multinational force, spearheaded by United States troops, landed in Haiti without opposition. Upon his arrival in Haiti on the same day, Lieutenant-General Hugh Shelton, the Commander of the force, coordinated the entry of the force with Haiti's military leaders.
The Secretary-General welcomed the fact that conditions had been created for the peaceful implementation of resolution 940 (1994). He also said that an advance group of United Nations military observers would be dispatched to Haiti shortly and that he was considering the early redeployment of MICIVIH. Meanwhile, Mr. Dante Caputo, having cited the changing context of the situation in Haiti, resigned on 19 September 1994 as Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and OAS for Haiti. The Secretary-General received the resignation with deep regret and expressed to Mr. Caputo his thanks for the courage and devotion he had lent to the discharge of his duties. To succeed Mr. Caputo, the Secretary-General appointed, on 23 September, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, as his Special Representative for Haiti.
On 27 September, the multinational force submitted to the Security Council the first of thirteen reports summarizing its operations. The report stated that activities of the force constituted the foundation for establishing the secure and stable environment necessary to restore and maintain democracy in Haiti. There was also evidence that the force was on its way towards establishing the conditions necessary for the full implementation of resolution 940 (1994).
The second report was forwarded to the Security Council on 10 October. It summarized the second and third weeks of operations, during which the overall situation in Haiti was relatively quiet, with some incidents of violence among Haitians. The force continued to search aggressively for and seize weapons caches, to protect public safety and to expand its presence in the countryside. The report stated that substantial progress was made in re-establishing democracy in Haiti; in consequence, the force would be drawn down from its peak of 21,000 troops.
UNMIH advance team arrives
The first group of the UNMIH advance team consisting of 12 United Nations military observers arrived in Haiti on 23 September 1994. The tasks of the team included coordinating with the multinational force in preparation for the full deployment of UNMIH, monitoring the operations of the multinational force, making its good offices available as required and reporting to the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 940 (1994).
On 29 September 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 944 (1994), requested the Secretary-General to ensure the immediate completion of the deployment of the observers and other elements of the sixty-person UNMIH advance team. It also encouraged him, in consultation with the Secretary-General of OAS, to facilitate the immediate return to Haiti of MICIVIH. By other provisions of the resolution, the Council decided to lift the sanctions imposed on Haiti, beginning at 0001 am EST on the day after the return to Haiti of President Aristide.
With the arrival in Port-au-Prince on 30 September of seven additional members of the advance team and 30 more personnel on 5 October, the team had become fully operational. In addition to the 16 military observers, the advance team comprised 10 military planners; 13 civilian police personnel and 10 administrative staff personnel. The team was led in the field by the UNMIH Chief of Staff, Colonel William Fulton (Canada), acting under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
The Secretary-General noted that the great majority of the Haitian population welcomed the multinational force, but might be developing unrealistically high expectations of what it would do. He also noted that, in preparation for the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH, the advance team's military component had established a joint working group with the force. The transition could only take place when a secure and stable environment had been established, and when UNMIH's strength and structure were adequate for it to assume its functions.
President Aristide reinstated
On 28 September 1994, President Aristide convened an extraordinary session of the Haitian Parliament to consider draft legislation on an amnesty. On 10 October, after the Parliament had passed the amnesty legislation, Lieutenant-General Cédras resigned as Commander-in-Chief of FADH. Other members of the military leadership, Brigadier-General Philippe Biamby and Colonel Michel François, also submitted their resignations. The President of Panama, at the request of President Aristide, agreed to give asylum to Lieutenant-General Cédras and Brigadier-General Biamby. Earlier, Colonel François had gone to the Dominican Republic. The Secretary-General expressed his satisfaction at the resignation of the military leadership in Haiti and hoped that this step would facilitate the return to power of President Aristide and the restoration of democracy in Haiti.
On 15 October 1994, after the departure of the military leadership, President Aristide returned to Haiti and resumed his functions, after three years of enforced exile. The Secretary-General welcomed the long-awaited return of the President and the resumption of the democratic process in Haiti. On the same day, the Security Council, by its resolution 948 (1994), also welcomed the return of President Aristide and, with his return, the lifting of sanctions at 0001 am EST on 16 October.
On 25 October 1994, President Aristide designated Mr. Smarck Michel the new Prime Minister. His appointment was ratified by both Chambers of the Parliament on 4 November and his platform was approved unanimously in the Senate on 6 November and by overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies on 7 November. The new Government took office on 8 November 1994.
From 23 to 29 October, the Secretary-General's Special Representative visited Haiti and had a series of discussions dealing with the situation on the ground, the operation of the multinational force and conditions for the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH. On 15 November, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali paid a visit to Haiti. He assured President Aristide that the United Nations, in collaboration with OAS, would continue to assist Haiti on the road to national reconciliation, political stability and reconstruction.
Preparations for UNMIH deployment
In the meantime, the advance team of UNMIH reported that the multinational force continued to operate smoothly towards achieving its objectives under resolution 940 (1994), with few incidents and with evident widespread acceptance by the Haitian population. No acts of intimidation or violence against the United Nations or other international presence were reported. In addition to monitoring the operations of the multinational force, the military and police personnel of the advance team were engaged in on-site planning for the transition from the force to UNMIH.
On 21 November, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the head of the UNMIH advance team believed that the strength of the team should be increased in order to further facilitate planning of the Mission, identification of conditions required for the transition and, most important, preparation for the actual transition. The Secretary-General therefore recommended that the Council authorize expansion of the advance team up to 500 members to allow it to be progressively strengthened so that it would be fully prepared to enter the transition period. The Security Council did so on 29 November by resolution 964 (1994). It also welcomed the positive developments in Haiti since the deployment of the multinational force, and the establishment of a joint working group to prepare for the transition by the UNMIH advance team and the force.
MICIVIH returns to Haiti
The core group of MICIVIH returned to Haiti on 22 October 1994 to join the MICIVIH Executive Director, Mr. Granderson, and the staff of the Office of Human Rights, who had arrived on 6 October to evaluate the conditions for a return of MICIVIH. The activities of the Mission resumed on 26 October with the reopening of an office in Port-au-Prince.
In the meantime, the joint United Nations/OAS Working Group on MICIVIH, which had been set up in 1993 when MICIVIH was first sent to Haiti, met to look at the future of the Mission in terms of its redeployment and possible expansion of its mandate. At the meeting on 4 November in Washington, it was decided that MICIVIH would continue to give priority to the monitoring and promotion of respect for human rights in Haiti. As in the past, it would document the human rights situation, make recommendations to the Haitian authorities, implement an information and civic education programme and help to solve problems such as those relating to detentions, medical assistance to victims and the return of displaced persons. It was also decided that MICIVIH would contribute to institution-building.
On 23 November 1994, the Secretary-General proposed to the General Assembly that MICIVIH, while continuing to verify compliance with Haiti's human rights obligations and to promote respect for the rights of all Haitians, should contribute, in so far as possible, to the strengthening of democratic institutions. The broadening of the responsibilities of the Mission would not have any financial implications, for the total number of its staff would remain unchanged.
On 5 December, the General Assembly took note of the Secretary-General's report, in particular his recommendations with regard to MICIVIH's mandate. The Assembly requested the speedy return to Haiti of all members of the Mission "with the task of verifying compliance by Haiti with its human rights obligations, namely, to promote respect for the rights of all Haitians and to contribute to the strengthening of democratic institutions."
Transition date decided
After the arrival of the international force, FADH disintegrated. Politically motivated violence and human rights abuses decreased. The following weeks were marked by further improvement in the overall situation in Haiti. People could move freely throughout the country, the constitutional Government exercised its authority over the whole country and the Provisional Electoral Council was making preparations for legislative and local elections. No serious danger to the existence of the Government could be identified.
On the other hand, the collapse of FADH, the dissolution of the corps of rural police agents (section chiefs) and the lack of a functioning police force created a security void that contributed to a marked increase in banditry and criminality throughout the country. The security situation was very fragile. On 17 January 1995, the Secretary-General listed for the Security Council a number of factors which could lead to future instability. Among them were the disaffection of former FADH members, the probable continued existence of paramilitary networks and the availability of arms; rising frustration at the inability of the justice system to address past human rights violations and current criminality; the delay in translating economic measures and development programmes into concrete improvements in the daily life of the impoverished majority of the population; and the additional tension that might be generated by the forthcoming elections.
Since UNMIH's mandate was expiring on 31 January 1995, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council authorize its extension for a period of six months, to 31 July 1995. He expected that UNMIH would be able to take over from the multinational force on or around 31 March 1995. The Secretary-General further detailed the mandate of the Mission, its rules of engagement, structure, deployment, concept of operations, preparations for the transition and transition timetable. He noted that in the remaining weeks before the handover to UNMIH, the multinational force would continue to work actively with the Government of Haiti to further improve the security situation. It would continue the disarmament programme even more energetically than before. It would also help the Haitian security forces to investigate every unlawful act and arrest those who, acting individually or in groups, were responsible for many of the crimes in Port-au-Prince and elsewhere. The Secretary-General had already notified the Security Council of his intention to appoint Major-General Joseph Kinzer (United States) as commander of the military component of UNMIH.
In accordance with resolution 940 (1994), the Security Council was to make its determination to terminate the multinational force's mission "taking into account recommendations from the member States of the multinational force, which are based on the assessment of the commander of the multinational force, and from the Secretary-General". On 18 January 1995, the President of the Council received a statement by the member States saying that a secure and stable environment existed in Haiti. They recommended that the Council determine that it was appropriate for UNMIH to begin assuming the full range of its functions. In making this recommendation, they took note of and confirmed the findings of the report of the Commander of the multinational force. The Secretary-General had submitted a report on 17 January 1995.
On 30 January 1995, the Security Council adopted its resolution 975 (1995), in which it determined that a secure and stable environment, appropriate to the deployment of UNMIH, existed in Haiti. The Council authorized the Secretary-General to recruit and deploy military contingents, civilian police and other civilian personnel to allow UNMIH to assume its functions as established in resolutions 867 (1993) and 940 (1994). It also authorized him, working with the commander of the multinational force, to take the necessary steps in order for UNMIH to assume these responsibilities. According to resolution 975, the full transfer of responsibility from the multinational force to UNMIH was to be completed by 31 March 1995. The Council also extended the mandate of UNMIH until 31 July 1995 and authorized the Secretary-General to deploy in Haiti, in accordance with resolution 940, up to 6,000 troops and, as recommended in his report to the Council of 17 January 1995, up to 900 civilian police officers.
As a result of the effective cooperation between the multinational force and UNMIH and thorough preparation work, the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH took place on 31 March 1995, in full compliance with the envisaged timetable. The official ceremony, which was held at the National Palace at Port-au-Prince, was attended, among others, by President Aristide of Haiti, President Clinton of the United States, the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General.
UNMIH established its headquarters in Port-au-Prince and sub-headquarters in six operational sectors (Cap Haïtien, Gonaïves, Port-au-Prince (2), Jacmel and Les Cayes). Five infantry battalions (including the Quick Reaction Force), support units, a military police battalion, an engineering unit, aviation and logistic elements, a military information support team and a civil affairs unit were deployed in 10 locations (Cap Haïtien, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, Gonaïves, Port-de-Paix, St. Marc, Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, Les Cayes, Jérémie). Special Forces elements were deployed throughout the country in 25 locations. As at 10 April 1995, the strength of the UNMIH military component stood at 6,017 and the strength of the UNMIH civilian police component (CIVPOL) stood at 791. Chief Superintendent Neil Pouliot (Canada) had been named CIVPOL commander. Approximately two thirds of the military and one third of the civilian police components of UNMIH came from the multinational force. UNMIH also had 122 out of 220 international civilian staff, 175 out of 240 local staff and 12 out of 29 United Nations Volunteers.
Following the transition, UNMIH provided security throughout Haiti. The overall situation had continued to be generally stable and secure. There were few cases of violence presumed to be politically motivated and the number of vigilante killings dropped significantly. Common crime also levelled off but remained a primary concern of UNMIH. Humanitarian aid convoys and warehouses continued to be targeted by organized gangs, particularly in the seaport area of the capital and in the north of the country.
In its task of sustaining a secure and stable environment, UNMIH carried out patrols; escorted humanitarian relief convoys; provided back-up to the Haitian authorities in law and order situations; and ensured the security of UNMIH personnel and property. In addition, as the Mission evolved, UNMIH military personnel confronted many unforeseen tasks. For example, they assumed prison guard duties in Cap-Haïtien and Gonaïves for more than a month following riots and disturbances, undertook harbour patrols following the departure of the United States Coast Guard and maintained a presence in the national penitentiary and in some of the Port-au-Prince police stations.
The early deployment of a permanent and effective police force by the Haitian authorities was considered to be central to Haiti's long-term stability. The Interim Public Security Force, consisting of some 3,300 screened and quickly retrained former military personnel as well as 900 other trainees, was gradually being replaced by the new Haitian National Police. It was decided that Haiti would set up a police force of some 5,000 officers. UNMIH's CIVPOL monitored and guided the work of both the Interim Public Security Force and the Haitian National Police, and provided the latter with on-the-job training. CIVPOL had also to undertake such unanticipated tasks as firearm training for the ministerial security force, and security surveys of the facilities of a number of government ministries and of the National Commission for Truth and Justice. CIVPOL also coordinated the delivery of food for prisoners nationwide and helped to provide prison security.
Civil affairs activities undertaken by UNMIH included projects providing assistance to Electricité d'Haïti to improve power supply, security to food convoys, the transportation and security of repatriated Haitian refugees, the development of a disaster response training programme, assistance to the Haitian Government with animal immunization and nutrition management programmes, engineering support for public construction projects and the removal, in collaboration with the municipal authorities, of hundreds of wrecked vehicles littering the streets of Port-au-Prince.
The Special Representative, Mr. Brahimi, and his senior staff met regularly with President Aristide, the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet, senior government officials, political leaders and members of the general population.
Parliamentary and local elections were scheduled to take place in June 1995. As part of its mandate, UNMIH assisted in maintaining security throughout the election period. In accordance with the division of labour agreed upon by the United Nations and OAS, UNMIH also provided the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council with logistical and financial assistance, while the OAS Electoral Observation Mission (EOM), in cooperation with UNMIH and MICIVIH, organized and led the observation of the elections. In addition, a United Nations Electoral Assistance Team provided technical expertise to the Provisional Electoral Council in such areas as logistical planning and organization of the elections and distribution of electoral materials, budget estimates, preparation of technical documentation, registration of candidates, and polling and counting.
As for MICIVIH, its strength comprised 190 observers (including other substantive staff) and 9 administrative staff (2 OAS, 7 United Nations). Of the observers, 84 were contracted by OAS and 106 by the United Nations, 26 of the latter being United Nations Volunteers. Fifty nationalities were represented. In addition to its headquarters in Port-au-Prince, the Mission maintained nine offices throughout the country. In July 1995, at the request of President Aristide, the Assembly authorized a further extension of MICIVIH's mandate until 7 February 1996.
The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 24 July 1995 that UNMIH had made significant progress towards achieving the goals established by the Council. It was hoped that by February 1996 Haiti would have duly elected institutions and that a functioning security system would be in place. Therefore, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council authorize the extension of UNMIH's mandate until the end of February 1996, as envisaged in resolution 940 (1994) establishing the objective of completing UNMIH's mission by that time.
On 31 July 1995, the Security Council commended UNMIH on its successful efforts and decided to extend the mandate of the Mission for a period of seven months. It looked forward to the conclusion of UNMIH's mandate at that time and to the safe, secure and orderly assumption of office by a new, constitutionally elected government.
From the outset, the Provisional Electoral Council worked to a very tight schedule, and there were widespread concerns that delays or changes in the calendar might adversely affect the organization of the elections. The Council had to extend the deadline for voter registration three times, from 17 to 30 April, then to 31 May, and again to 3 June 1995. In some areas, registration was still under way as late as one week before polling day. As for candidate registration, the complicated selection system and the large number of applications led to several modifications in the final list of candidates, even after its scheduled printing date of 15 May. This resulted in many errors in the ballots. There were also problems related to the training of polling officers, late decision regarding the counting systems, and financial difficulties.
The municipal and local elections and the first round of the legislative elections were held on 25 June 1995. By comparison with previous elections, voters enjoyed unprecedented security and, despite the traditional lack of interest in such elections, turned out in reasonable numbers. On the whole, election day was peaceful, and the level of violence that some had feared did not materialize. A few incidents did occur, however. A candidate for the Chamber of Deputies was killed and a polling station official in a Port-au-Prince suburb was attacked. Other instances of violence included the burning of electoral material and offices, and demonstrations and threats against electoral officials.
Organizational problems, however, prevented many Haitians from voting. A number of polling stations opened late, did not open at all, or were relocated unannounced. An undetermined number of legitimate candidates were omitted from the ballots, leading in some places to demonstrations and to the cancellation of the vote. A number of ballots and tally sheets reportedly disappeared or were destroyed. Allegations of fraud and some intimidation were levelled, and there were numerous complaints of irregularities.
The Secretary-General of OAS, who was present in Haiti at the time of the elections, issued a statement that day declaring that "from all indications, electors were able to exercise their franchise freely". In a report released by the OAS Secretary-General on 13 July, EOM concluded that the elections had "established a foundation which, although shaky, provides the basis for further positive progress towards the continuing evolution of an increasingly peaceful democracy in Haiti". The Mission expressed the hope that "all of those involved in future elections will profit from the mistakes and problems which arose during the course of this election and will continue to build on the positive aspects in the interests of Haiti and its people".
The elections drew strong criticism from many Haitian political leaders. The Lavalas coalition, which supported President Aristide, considered that mistakes and irregularities had not been directed at any single party and that, consequently, the credibility of the electoral process itself was not affected. Most other political parties held the opposite view, demanding that new elections be held in the constituencies where irregularities had been documented or, in some cases, that the 25 June elections be annulled. The Provisional Electoral Council eventually agreed to complementary elections in some constituencies. Following the publication of preliminary partial election results, however, virtually all non-Lavalas political parties threatened to boycott the complementary elections, as well as second-round elections.
In the wake of the criticism, the President of the Provisional Electoral Council, admitting "serious mistakes", and another member of the Council resigned. They were replaced by presidential decree. These changes did not satisfy most political parties that did not belong to the Lavalas coalition, and virtually all of them decided not to participate in the second round, reruns or complementary elections.
The Security Council reacted with deep concern to the irregularities observed in the first round of elections and urged all parties to the process to make every effort to ensure that such problems were corrected in forthcoming balloting. The Council called upon the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and OAS to continue to render all appropriate assistance to the Haitian electoral process. In pursuance of that resolution, UNMIH, MICIVIH and EOM continued to cooperate closely with the Provisional Electoral Council in the organization of the remaining elections.
On 13 August, complementary legislative and municipal elections were held under peaceful conditions. Thorough preparation and increased security allowed EOM to conclude that there was a perceptible improvement in the organization of the elections. However, voter turnout was low, particularly in the Port-au-Prince area.
The second round of the legislative elections and additional reruns took place on 17 September in an atmosphere of tranquillity. The impact of training, better planning and improved security was apparent. According to the Provisional Electoral Council and EOM, voter participation was again rather low (around 30 per cent). While many of the "non-Lavalas" parties boycotted the elections, a substantial number of candidates belonging to them did contest the elections, and five of them were elected. On 8 October 1995, additional run-offs were held in four constituencies and elections were again organized in seven communal sections. These elections also took place without incident.
The polls resulted in a victory for the Lavalas platform, which won a majority in the Senate with 17 of 27 seats and in the Chamber of Deputies with 66 of 83 seats. At the municipal and local levels, the Lavalas platform won 102 mayorships out of 133 and 345 Conseils d'administration de sections communales out of 562. The parties that boycotted the second round of the legislative elections continued to question the results.
November 1995 events
As a result of the more active role played by the Haitian public security forces and of the continued efforts of UNMIH, the security situation in Haiti further improved in September and October 1995. Although the number of popular demonstrations over economic and social issues continued to increase, they were generally peaceful and did not generate any lasting or widespread tensions.
However, the situation deteriorated abruptly in the wake of the attack on 7 November 1995 against two deputies, one of whom was killed and the other seriously injured. Violent demonstrations erupted in Les Cayes, Département du Sud, to which the two deputies belonged, necessitating the deployment of the Quick Reaction Force and joint Haitian National Police/UNMIH patrols for several days until the situation stabilized. On 11 November, President Aristide called for immediate and total disarmament and accused the international community of complacency in this regard. Agitation quickly spread to other cities. Roadblocks were set up, and demonstrations, acts of arson, looting, weapons searches and vigilante justice occurred in various places throughout Haiti, especially Port-au-Prince, Gonaïves and Cap Haïtien. On 13 November, following a meeting with President Aristide, the Secretary-General's Special Representative appealed to the people of Haiti not to take the law into their own hands, and the police, with the support of UNMIH, slowly re-established control. These incidents, which resulted in at least seven people dead, many more injured and considerable property damage, showed that the security situation was still fragile.
Common crime remained a very serious problem throughout the country, and a major concern for the population. There were also incidents involving theft of property from UNMIH's installations and personnel. Although there was no indication of any organized threat against UNMIH personnel, anti-United Nations slogans appeared on the streets of Port-au-Prince and on some leaflets during the days of renewed tension in mid-November. Earlier, in August 1995, an UNMIH civilian police officer had been shot in his house in Petit Goâve and critically wounded. There were to be other incidents as well. On 17 December, also in Petit Goâve, shots were fired at an UNMIH military vehicle. On 29 January 1996, a civilian police officer was killed in Port-au-Prince in an apparent robbery attempt.
In the following weeks, political activity in Haiti centred around the presidential election. During that period, there was some confusion, including within the Lavalas Movement, stemming from a campaign to have President Aristide remain in office for three more years, thus making up for the time he had spent in exile. President Aristide, however, made it clear that he would hand over power, as provided for in the Constitution, on 7 February 1996.
The election, in which fourteen candidates participated, was held on 17 December 1995. Of the main parties that had boycotted the second round of the legislative elections, only one took part in the contest. In accordance with its mandate, UNMIH provided extensive technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council in preparing for the election, as well as the necessary logistical support.
Polling took place in a peaceful environment. There were no major incidents of violence during the run-up to the election, on polling day, or during the counting. While there were minor problems, the Provisional Electoral Council worked with dispatch to solve them. Over 400 international observers, including EOM, a presidential delegation from the United States, a French parliamentary delegation and several NGOs, all concluded that the election had been free, fair and peaceful. The results were announced on 23 December 1995 by the President of the Provisional Electoral Council. Mr. René Préval, President Aristide's Prime Minister in 1991and the candidate of the ruling Lavalas Movement, won in the first round with 87.9 per cent of the votes. He assumed power on 7 February 1996.
Operation of UNMIH
In the meantime, UNMIH continued to assist in the formation and training of the Haitian national police force. The Interim Public Security Force was abolished by presidential decree on 6 December 1995 following the gradual demobilization of most of its members. By the end of February 1996, the Haitian security forces comprised about 6,000 personnel.
Formal training of the new police force was carried out with the assistance of Canada, France and the United States in the Police Academy, run by the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) of the United States. UNMIH worked closely with the Haitian authorities to provide on-the-job training and to give guidance to the new police officers deployed throughout the country and monitor their performance. In addition, three United Nations police officers were assigned to the Criminal Investigation Unit to investigate particularly sensitive murder cases.
UNMIH continued to assist the Government of Haiti in sustaining a secure and stable environment and protecting international personnel. The Mission provided security to humanitarian convoys, airports, seaports, storage locations and United Nations installations. With financial contributions from the Caisse française de développement and the Inter-American Development Bank, UNMIH engineering units rebuilt the bridge in Jacmel that was washed away late in 1994. President Aristide attended the opening of the new bridge on 15 December 1995. Contingents from Canada, the Netherlands and the United States provided the stimulus for small development projects sponsored by their respective Governments, and other UNMIH contingents also contributed to these activities. Overall, some 1,000 small projects, including training courses on disaster relief and prevention, were initiated by UNMIH.
UNMIH also paid special attention to the planning of a smooth and orderly transfer to the Government of Haiti of its responsibilities and functions. The first meeting of the Trilateral Commission, comprising the Government of Haiti, the United Nations and the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti (at the time Argentina, Canada, France, the United States and Venezuela), was held in Port-au-Prince on 16 November 1995. The Commission formed joint working groups to deal with all issues pertaining to transition, including disarmament, information, justice, prisons and human rights, presidential security, election security, airports, seaports and coastguards, fire-fighting and urban disorders, and traffic.
At the same time, the Secretary-General, mindful of the need for economy, started to reduce the level of UNMIH personnel. A phased reduction of civilian police was conducted between October 1995 and January 1996, when some 540 personnel left Haiti. At the end of February, a total of approximately 300 police officers remained in the country. UNMIH's civilian staff was also significantly decreased. All members of the Electoral Assistance Unit left Haiti during January 1996, following the presidential elections. On the military side, the concept developed for the reduction of the force level envisaged the gradual vacating of outlying areas, starting with the least troublesome operational sectors and culminating in a reduced force in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien. The reduction of the force level was initiated in mid-November 1995. By 29 February 1996, the troop level was down from almost 6,000 to 4,100 combat personnel, deployed in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien.
UNMIH further extended
Since President Aristide's return in October 1994, Haiti had taken a number of steps to strengthen democracy and stability. With the help of UNMIH, local and legislative elections and the presidential election were held in an environment of calm and peace. Power was transferred from one democratically elected President to another in an orderly and constitutional manner. Parliament began to play its assigned role, and measures were taken to improve the functioning of the judiciary.
By all indications, there was no organized threat to the Government of Haiti. However, concern was expressed in many quarters that growing popular discontent could be used by disgruntled groups to foment trouble once President Aristide had handed over power and UNMIH had left the country. Unemployment and underemployment were widespread, services and infrastructure were inadequate or non-existing and there were other economic hardships. The Government of President Préval faced a number of difficult decisions to stimulate economic development and attract domestic and foreign investment.
UNMIH was due to cease all its operations on 29 February 1996. On 14 February, the Secretary-General made an assessment of the situation in Haiti in a report to the Security Council. In the report, he presented his recommendations on the role that the United Nations should continue to play in Haiti to consolidate the gains achieved. The report also took into account a letter dated 9 February 1996 in which President Préval had asked the Secretary-General to "take appropriate steps with a view to bringing about an extension of the mandate of UNMIH so that a gradual withdrawal may take place in the months ahead".
The Secretary-General shared the view expressed by most observers that UNMIH should not cease its activities abruptly on 29 February 1996 but should continue to assist the Government for a few more months. During that time, UNMIH's assets would be gradually withdrawn. The Trilateral Commission also reached the same conclusion. The Secretary-General therefore recommended an extension of the mandate of UNMIH for a period of six months. He also recommended, in the light of the gradual transfer of UNMIH's functions and responsibilities to the Haitian authorities, that the strength of both its military and civilian police components be reduced. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of a stable and secure environment would rest with the Haitian Government. UNMIH would serve mainly as a back-up. It would also continue to focus on training the new civilian Haitian National Police.
In order to achieve UNMIH's objectives, 1,600 infantry personnel, 300 combat support personnel, 300 civilian police, 160 international civilian staff, 18 United Nations Volunteers and 150 local staff would be required. The military component would consist of three infantry battalions, including two incoming reconnaissance companies and a Quick Reaction Force, based on infantry and helicopter assets that would be stationed in Port-au-Prince. The combat support elements would include an engineer company, a transport platoon, an aviation squadron, a field hospital, a military police platoon and headquarters personnel.
On 29 February 1996, acting on the recommendations of the Secretary-General, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNMIH for a final period of four months. It also decided to decrease the level of the military component to no more than 1,200 personnel and the civilian police component to 300 personnel. The Council requested the Secretary-General to take appropriate steps to further reduce UNMIH's strength consistent with the implementation of its mandate, and to initiate planning not later than 1 June 1996 for its complete withdrawal.
In order to bridge the gap between the level of strength of military personnel decided by the Council and the level recommended by the Secretary-General, the Government of Canada decided to make available, entirely at its own expense, 700 additional troops.
On 5 March 1996, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Haiti, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, relinquished his post. Mr. Enrique ter Horst was appointed to succeed him. The Commanders of the military and civilian police components of UNMIH, Major-General Joseph Kinzer (United States) and Chief Superintendent Neil Pouliot (Canada) also completed their tours of duty and were succeeded by Brigadier-General Pierre Daigle (Canada) and Colonel Philippe Balladur of France respectively.
End of mandate
During the final four months of its mandate, UNMIH military component continued to assist the Haitian authorities in their security tasks, such as ensuring an outer cordon of security and logistical support for President Préval during his travels around the country, as well as providing security to former President Aristide. It also provided a security presence at key installations, including the Port-au-Prince international airport and the seaport. Together with HNP and CIVPOL, UNMIH military personnel patrolled the capital, thereby maximizing the impact of the Mission's reduced resources and providing on-the-job training to HNP. The military component also assisted HNP in creating an efficient logistics system.
The UNMIH civilian police component was deployed at 19 locations throughout Haiti. With the completion of the deployment of HNP, CIVPOL officers focused their efforts on helping HNP draw up an institutional development plan in the various joint working groups set up to ensure a smooth and orderly transfer of the tasks currently carried out by UNMIH. CIVPOL were actively involved in the training of HNP. In addition to assisting in the training of HNP senior officers and instructors, CIVPOL personnel trained the VIP security team of HNP, as well as providing additional instruction to the crowd control units. CIVPOL detachments at various locations around the country provided on-the-job training and guidance, as well as monitored and evaluated the performance of HNP officers in the field. CIVPOL also assisted in the creation of the HNP Officer Corps, including the preparation of selection criteria.
On 30 June 1996, the mandate of UNMIH came to an end, concluding the major phase in United Nations efforts to help the Haitian people restore democracy, stability and the rule of law in their country.
New mission recommended
Assessing the situation in Haiti in his 5 June report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General said that despite the progress made, it was clear that the Haitian National Police was still not in a position to ensure, on its own, the stable and secure environment required for the consolidation of democratic rule in Haiti, and that complete withdrawal of the United Nations military and police presence at that time could jeopardize the success achieved so far by the Haitian people with the help and support of the international community. He also informed the Council of the request from the Haitian Government for the continued presence of the United Nations force in Haiti for an additional period of six months.
Against this background and mindful of the decision of the Security Council that the extension of the UNMIH’s mandate until 30 June 1996 was intended to be final, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment, for a period of six months, of a new Mission to be known as the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) with a mandate limited to the following tasks: (a) assistance to the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police; (b) assistance to the Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the efforts to establish and train an effective national police force; (c) coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti.
On 28 June 1996, the Security Council established UNSMIH by its resolution 1063 (1996). In setting up the new Mission, the Council underlined the need to support the commitment of the Government of Haiti to maintain the secure and stable environment established by the multinational force and extended with the assistance of UNMIH.
Following the 1991 coup d'état, the humanitarian situation in Haiti deteriorated in spite of the efforts of the United Nations and NGOs. In March 1993, the United Nations and OAS launched a consolidated appeal for a humanitarian plan of action designed to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of the Haitian people. The budget required for the implementation of this plan was estimated at $62.7 million, for the areas of health, nutrition, agriculture and education.
Donors, however, provided only $9.6 million in response to the 1993 humanitarian appeal. Throughout 1994, eight agencies working under the United Nations/OAS umbrella C United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)/ World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) C drew on their core resources to fund the shortfall in donor response to the inter-agency appeal and continued humanitarian assistance programmes in Haiti, despite difficulties created by the de facto authorities and the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council. United Nations programmes operated under a United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator serving concurrently as Resident Representative of UNDP.
Working with over 150 Haitian, international and non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies focused on maintaining health and hospital emergency services, distributing basic drugs and medical supplies, helping control transmissible diseases and maintaining the "cold chain" needed for vaccinations. Food relief was also critical. By the time of the arrival of the multinational force in the country, with United Nations help humanitarian agencies were distributing food to some 940,000 needy Haitians. United Nations agency efforts also sought to prevent the breakdown in farm production and income and to improve water supply and sanitation in areas subject to high public health risks. Bilateral donors also continued to carry out significant humanitarian activities, directly and through NGOs.
In its resolution 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, the Security Council terminated the suspension of the embargo on petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related matériel of all kinds imposed on Haiti by resolution 841 (1993). Within the strict framework of the provisions of the resolution providing for possible exemptions for essential humanitarian needs, the United Nations and OAS invited PAHO to assume responsibility for a fuel management plan to permit the continued functioning of humanitarian activities. This programme, which commenced in January 1994, was managed by a steering committee composed of representatives of the organizations of the United Nations system, donors, NGOs and members of the Government. By mid-September 1994, a total of 1.2 million gallons of diesel fuel and over 206,000 gallons of gasoline had been distributed under the fuel management plan to NGOs and agencies engaged in humanitarian operations.
In view of the uncertainty and potential for violence expected to accompany a military intervention in Haiti, United Nations agencies established a communications network among NGOs and public and private hospitals, made contingency plans for dealing with epidemics and built up decentralized stocks of medicines, health supplies, water supply equipment and food to the maximum degree possible.
In late September 1994, an advance team from the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs arrived in Haiti to strengthen the office of the Humanitarian Coordinator. The team provided liaison between the multinational force and the humanitarian assistance community in Haiti, and led an inter-agency effort to identify post-intervention humanitarian needs. On the basis of its consultations with bilateral donors, and international and Haitian NGOs, the United Nations, OAS and the Government of Haiti prepared an appeal to meet immediate humanitarian needs and to facilitate the transition to reconstruction and development in the country. The appeal, covering the period 1 December 1994 to 31 May 1995, required a total of $93.9 million.
The Secretary-General repeatedly stressed the importance of the state of the Haitian economy to the success of the United Nations mission and long-term stability in Haiti. The extreme poverty and high unemployment prevailing in much of the country required sustained international attention. Bearing this in mind, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Cristián Ossa as his Deputy Special Representative and concurrently UNDP Resident Representative. This marked the first time that the United Nations had linked a peacekeeping mission to development activities in this manner. The linkage was intended to promote closer cooperation between all concerned and facilitate the transition from UNMIH to continuing peace-building activities by the United Nations in Haiti.
The political changes in Haiti created high expectations for swift economic recovery. The Haitian public expected that the return of President Aristide would bring a rapid improvement of their standard of living. This could not happen in a short period of time, and the Government started to be blamed for unemployment and the high cost of living. Suffering from the lack of basic infrastructure, the economy of Haiti was in need of private and public investments. Through dialogue and cooperation between the Government and its development partners, nine priority sectors were identified: agriculture and the environment; energy; governance; justice; infrastructure; private sector development; health; education; and poverty alleviation.
As of 31 August 1995, total financial commitments by multilateral and bilateral donors and creditors for the period October 1994 to the year 2000 reached $1.7 billion. Of this, about $650 million (including balance-of-payments support) was expected to be disbursed before the end of 1995. The commitments of the United Nations system amounted to 37 per cent ($630 million) of total multilateral and bilateral financial resources. Of these resources, about a third (including balance-of-payment support and debt forgiveness) were utilized between October 1994 and the end of 1995, but new commitments were made after August 1995. Thus, external resources available for the next few years continued to be well above US$1 billion.
The United States Agency for International Development was at the forefront of total disbursement following the return of President Aristide. Gradually, financing from the Inter-American Development Bank, the non-conditional resources of the World Bank and the European Union began to play a larger role. Bilateral donors, including Canada, France and Germany, continued to serve as an important source of concessional funding. Other donors, such as Japan, Spain and Switzerland, also became more active in support of development programmes.
Sixteen Latin American and Caribbean countries under the sponsorship of the Latin American Economic System and UNDP met in Port-au-Prince from 22 to 24 November 1995 to negotiate development cooperation projects with the Haitian authorities. This unprecedented effort at horizontal cooperation led to agreement on 22 projects totally financed and 73 projects partially financed by Latin American and Caribbean countries.
The United Nations programmes and specialized agencies present in Haiti C UNDP, including the United Nations Capital Development Fund and the United Nations Volunteers programme, UNICEF, WFP, the United Nations Population Fund, UNHCR, FAO, UNESCO and WHO C took various steps to contribute to the implementation of the emergency economic recovery programme, while paying increasing attention to the developmental aspects of their activities. On 12 December 1995, under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator, these institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank met to consider joint activities, emerging issues and priorities, their future programmes and interactions, and post-UNMIH activities.
In addition, UNMIH's efforts complemented those of UN agencies already providing humanitarian and development assistance. By an arrangement unique in the UN system, the UNDP/DHA Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator of the UN system served concurrently as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti. Actions initiated and directly funded by United Nations agencies in 1994 -- 1996, following the return of President Aristide, included: UNDP projects in governance, poverty alleviation and environmental protection; UNICEF assistance to Haitian children; food and technical assistance from WFP; agricultural assistance from FAO; assistance in the field of health and family planning from UNFPA; and WHO/PAHO projects in administrative reform, family and community health.
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