We dedicate this report to Cecilia Corneo and Mamadi Condé, valued friends and colleagues in the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) Section in MINUSTAH, who perished in the earthquake that struck Haiti on 12 January 2010. They devoted their lives to the service of peace. Their outstanding efforts in pioneering CVR will have a long-lasting impact on the work of the United Nations.

Acknowledgements:

The DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations is grateful for the generous support from the Government of Canada, which provided the necessary resources to research and write this report.

The DDR Section is also grateful to Prof. Erin McCandless for the research which has been the basis for this report.
SECOND GENERATION DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) PRACTICES IN PEACE OPERATIONS

A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping

Report commissioned by:
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
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Department of Peacekeeping Operations
380, Madison Ave, 11th Floor
New York, NY 10017, USA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As widely acknowledged, United Nations (UN) peace operations are deployed in increasingly complex settings, which require new, dynamic models for conducting peacekeeping. These settings involve greater levels and diffusion of violence against unarmed civilians, often perpetrated by undisciplined armed elements, such as militia and gangs, operating at the sub-national level. As a contribution to the “New Horizon” process of engaging Member States in a policy dialogue on the challenges and opportunities of peacekeeping, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) initiated a study to document the innovative programmes that DDR practitioners are implementing in the field. The aim is to provide policy makers and practitioners with the tools needed to address the increasingly complex reality of DDR operations.

The report is primarily based on four field studies (Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and Liberia) but also draws from experiences of other DDR settings based on a desk review and interviews with partners. The term “Second Generation DDR” is used to describe the set of evolving practices documented in the report. Scholar-practitioners and security oriented think-tanks are beginning to use Second Generation DDR and “Interim stabilization” to describe wider security promotion efforts. From the outset, however, it must be underscored that many of the ideas and practices highlighted in the report are not new, and have been implemented, albeit in a fragmented manner, by national Governments and UN agencies.

To facilitate better understanding of the Second Generation concept, the study contrasts this new approach with “traditional DDR”, which shares the same strategic aims as Second Generation DDR (to support the peace process, create political space and contribute to a secure environment). Whereas traditional DDR focuses mainly on combatants that are present within military structures, the focus of Second Generation programmes shifts away from military structures towards the larger communities that are affected by armed violence. Traditional DDR involves a range of activities falling under the operational categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Second Generation programmes, on the other hand, include a number of different types of activities that can be implemented when the preconditions for traditional DDR are not in place in order to support the peace process, build trust, contribute to a secure environment and help build the foundation for longer term peacebuilding. Instead of implementing relevant provisions of a peace agreement, Second Generation activities are programmed locally using an evidence-based approach. These efforts, reinforced by regular assessments, enable practitioners to more effectively and quickly adapt to new developments.

The study underscores that DDR practice has evolved over the last several decades, demanding institutional change. Prior to the late 1980s, the Cold War shaped an approach to post-conflict security that focused on disarming and demobilizing military establishments and right-sizing armed forces. In the 1990s, more comprehensive objectives were introduced to
conceive of DDR programmes as part of processes aimed at transitioning from war to peace. In 2000, the Brahimi report underlined the importance of strong mandates buttressing the adoption of integrated DDR strategies and, in 2006, the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) were published offering much valuable guidance in addressing the political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions of the post-conflict environment. The IDDRS also includes a set of preconditions which should be in place before a DDR programme begins. These are the signing of a negotiated peace agreement that provides a legal framework for DDR, trust in the peace process, willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR, and a minimum guarantee of security.

With the increasing deployment of UN operations in situations where these preconditions are not present, the guidance provided in the IDDRS needs to be complemented with practical measures that address these new contexts. The Second Generation measures proposed can be conducted instead of, alongside, or after traditional DDR. At the same time, the report underscores that Second Generation measures cannot be expected to overcome major blockages in the peace process without complementary political and security initiatives.

The study explores several key aspects of planning and implementation of Second Generation DDR programmes and then goes on to describe key policy options, including country and regional examples. Considerable challenges have undermined traditional DDR in the past and constitute potential significant obstacles for Second Generation DDR, including lack of political will, the link between DDR and security sector reform, poorly regulated natural resources, illicit drugs and organized crime as well as economic insecurity. Integration and coordination mechanisms constitute key internal challenges.

Despite these significant challenges, the results of Second Generation programmes to date suggest that more resources should be put towards these efforts. The programmes’ evidence-based approach is at the forefront of UN integration efforts. In Liberia, for example, information collected through “hot-spot” assessments were actively used in the design of Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery (RRR) programmes. These assessments were jointly carried out by the RRR Section and the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) involving Heads of Office, military observers and UN police. The report further explores critical issues that should be considered in designing Second Generation DDR options, including national and UN strategic frameworks and mission exit strategies, monitoring and evaluation, regional issues, natural resources and sustainable DDR, as well as environmental factors.

Second Generation measures are grouped into three broad categories. The first, post-conflict stabilization measures, includes emergency employment programmes, reinsertion programmes and sub-national/community approaches. Many of these policy options respond to situations where armed violence permeates communities, where the perpetrators often have varying motivations for violence, and where the state security sector is frequently unable to respond to such threats. At the same time, such armed violence is not merely a criminal act; it can pose serious danger to a fledgling peace process. These options seek to incorporate a sub-national or community focus. Community-based security and violence reduction approaches are particularly valuable in building social cohesion and accountability mechanisms. While these stop-gap measures are not new, the new focus on these issues within peacekeeping (Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and increasingly Afghanistan) is generally being welcomed by
stakeholders as having considerable potential to fill a problematic gap between the demobilization and reintegration phases of traditional DDR processes.

The second grouping, targeting specific groups with different approaches and incentives, includes disarmament and dismantlement of militias, commanders and senior officers incentive programmes, at-risk youth and gang programmes, pension schemes and psychosocial recovery strategies. Several of these policy options focus on targeting undisciplined armed groups, and suggest means for more clearly identifying group needs, interests, agendas and capacities. These approaches respond to a recognized weakness in more traditional DDR models that have tended to target warring parties in a top-down manner and are not suited to addressing armed groups that may not be signatories to a peace agreement.

The third category is alternative approaches to addressing disarmament and unregulated weapons. These approaches include sequencing flexibility, weapons management, as well as weapons for development and lottery initiatives. These policy options respond to situations where disarmament may not be a realistic option of first instance. DDR sequencing flexibility, for example, recognizes the need to adapt to the unique needs of the context in which the process takes place. This requirement for flexibility when implementing DDR programmes is outlined in the IDDRS, however, due to the lack of required preconditions, Second Generation programmes have taken this concept one step further. For example, without minimum degrees of security, disarmament and demobilization may take place after reintegration programmes.

The set of Second Generation DDR practices outlined in this report is a reflection of the broader change in UN peacekeeping. Among the paradigm shifts is the fact that the success of a peacekeeping operation cannot be guaranteed by top-down implementation of a Security Council mandate. Peacekeepers today require more sophisticated skills and tools to negotiate the local dynamics on the ground, which may not reflect the higher level agreement reached between national actors. It is also critical to ensure that programmes are linked to broader peacebuilding/early recovery strategic frameworks, exit strategies of missions, and the development frameworks of UN Country Teams and Governments.

More work is necessary to refine the methodology of these practices, as well as to develop a clear division of labour that ensures that Second Generation DDR is systematically applied in a manner that emphasizes deliverability and builds upon the comparative advantages of all actors. This should become the agenda for DPKO, together with its sister Departments and Offices in the Secretariat, the wider UN family and other partners, including Member States, in the coming years.
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INTRODUCTION

United Nations (UN) peace operations are being deployed in evermore challenging environments. Practitioners on the ground find themselves seeking to implement security and development programming in situations where peace agreements are lacking or non-inclusive; undisciplined armed elements abound and allegiances constantly shift. These settings involve greater levels and diffusion of violence against unarmed civilians, often perpetrated by undisciplined armed groups, such as militia and gangs operating at the sub-national level. The conflicts are protracted, destroy social, political, and economic infrastructure, employ large numbers of child combatants, and result in significant population displacements.

The non-paper known as the “New Horizon” report, prepared by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (DFS) in July 2009, underlined that these increasingly complex settings require new dynamic and innovative models of conducting peacekeeping. In these situations where the peace process is fragile, targeted efforts are required to stave off violence and create the space for a viable process. In the area of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), practitioners have been confronted with situations that required them to develop new and innovative approaches in response to the challenges they face in the field.

The DDR Section of DPKO has conducted a wide-ranging study of these innovative activities as a contribution to the “New Horizon” process of engaging Member States in a policy dialogue on the challenges and opportunities of peacekeeping. This is intended to provide DDR policymakers and practitioners with tools and options for conducting DDR and related programming under circumstances where the preconditions for DDR are not met.

Security oriented think-tanks and scholar-practitioners are beginning to use the concepts Second Generation DDR and Interim Stabilization to describe wider security promotion efforts. These models provide complementary options to reinforce traditional DDR efforts. While it is sometimes suggested that peacekeeping missions are behind the curve on these trends, of the last seven peacekeeping missions with DDR mandates, most have not met the prerequisites of DDR or followed a traditional approach to this process. The majority have in fact implemented a range of Second Generation and Interim Stabilization activities and have extensive lessons to share.

From the outset, it should be underscored that many of the ideas and practices highlighted in this report are not entirely new. National Governments, UN agencies, such as UNDP, and external partners are engaged in different, albeit fragmented activities, that all fall under the Second Generation concept. Building on the existing Integrated DDR Standards...
In order to facilitate comparison and clarify the concepts, this study uses the terms “traditional DDR” and “Second Generation DDR”. It should however be noted that in actual programming on the ground, differences are often blurred. In addition, while the approaches differ in their focus, they are not usually implemented in pure form in any one context. At the same time, a key commonality between the two approaches is that they share the same strategic objectives: to support the peace process, create political space and contribute to a secure environment.

Traditional DDR focuses mainly on combatants that are present within military structures and involves a range of activities falling under the categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The implementation of traditional DDR includes a set of preconditions that should be in place before a DDR programme begins. These are the signing of a negotiated peace agreement that provides a legal framework for DDR; trust in the peace process; willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR; and a minimum guarantee of security. Increasingly, however, the UN is mandated to conduct DDR programmes where the preconditions are not fulfilled. UN senior officials and practitioners are faced with insecure environments and active undisciplined armed groups, such as militia and gangs.

Given the widespread insecurity in many peacekeeping settings and the presence of armed groups, that may or may not be part of a peace agreement and have different motivations, the focus of Second Generation programmes shifts away from military structures towards the community as a whole. These programmes use an evidence-based approach and often engage several components of a peacekeeping mission as well as other entities of the larger UN family. This joint effort, reinforced by regular assessments, enables practitioners to more effectively and quickly adapt to new developments.

As Second Generation DDR has the same strategic aims as traditional DDR, it may be conducted alongside traditional DDR to reinforce the process. It may also be used to address unfinished or failed aspects of a traditional DDR programme. Second Generation programmes can be implemented when the preconditions for DDR are not in place in order to support the peace process, build trust, contribute to a secure environment and help build the foundation for longer term peacebuilding. However, they cannot be expected to overcome major blockages in the peace process, without complementary political and security initiatives. This report shines a light on these programmes and supports a formalization of the concept of Second Generation DDR in order to increase knowledge of various Second Generation activities that are available, as well as their impact, and to promote their earlier consideration in strategic planning.
Increasingly Complex Contexts

Over the last several decades, DDR practice has evolved, adapting to new contexts and demanding institutional change. In developing national programmes and strategies in conjunction with national partners, UN senior officials and DDR practitioners increasingly face irregular and asymmetrical security threats capable of destabilizing the peace or contributing to ongoing conflict.

Evolution of DDR: an adaptive set of practices

Prior to the 1980s, the geo-political dimensions of the Cold War informed an approach to post-conflict security that focused on disarming and demobilizing military establishments and right-sizing armed forces. Bilateral partnerships provided for the development of programs for deconstructing and reforming military structures, as well as alternative employment projects and veteran pension schemes. In the late 1980s, the UN (along with donors) was increasingly drawn into a wider set of activities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, there was growing interest in promoting democratic oversight of military institutions.

In the early 1990s, UN agencies began to adopt a more development-oriented approach to DDR, but implementation strategies remained sequential and insufficiently context sensitive. During this time, DDR programmes were introduced into a broader spectrum of post-conflict environments and with more comprehensive objectives. New considerations included: the livelihoods of ex-combatants and their communities, child and female soldiers, women associated with armed groups, HIV/AIDS-affected combatants, and other vulnerable groups. The international community also began to emphasize the links between DDR and other thematic pillars of peacebuilding, such as rule of law, security sector reform and economic recovery.

Recognizing the need for multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, in 2000, the report of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations (commonly known as the Brahimi Report) underscored the importance of missions with stronger mandates to support the peace process and buttressed the adoption of integrated DDR strategies. The last seven peacekeeping operations established by the UN Security Council have all included DDR in their mandate. At the same time, the UN has increased its DDR engagement in non-peacekeeping contexts with UNDP working in over 30 countries on DDR related issues.

There is also increased attention to cross-border issues, especially for the control of small arms and light weapons, for example in West Africa. Over time, a broader range of weapons destruction, reduction and management measures have been introduced. These include voluntary weapons collection schemes among the civilian population, capacity-building of security forces in weapons management and the establishment of a regulatory framework for weapons possession as well as lotteries.
In 2006, the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (IAWG-DDR) published the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) in an effort to provide practitioners throughout the United Nations system with a detailed set of guidelines and procedures for undertaking DDR programmes. These guidelines cover a wide range of critical areas related to DDR programme planning, design and implementation, including the roles of various local, national and international actors and cross-cutting issues such as women and gender, children, youth, health and HIV/AIDS. Additional guidance on the linkages between DDR and other processes such as security sector reform (SSR) and transitional justice was launched in 2009.

The IDDRS offers valuable guidance in addressing the broader complex relationships between the political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions of the post-conflict environment. However, as discussed above, it includes a series of preconditions which are necessary for the success of traditional DDR programmes. It further rests on a number of assumptions, such as the presence of existing or possible baselines, the engagement and political will of different actors at different levels and the planning and implementation of DDR within a continuum of events that move from active conflict to peace. Should these preconditions and assumptions be in place, DDR has an excellent chance of achieving its objectives. Unfortunately, the UN is increasingly mandated to carry out DDR operations in contexts where these conditions are not met. Hence the guidance provided in the IDDRS needs to be complemented with practical measures that may replace or work alongside traditional DDR. This type of guidance would allow policy makers and practitioners to consider all available options when deciding on what approach may be best suited to the context in which they are working.

"The UN is increasingly mandated to perform DDR or related programmes in environments where the preconditions outlined by the IDDRS are not met."

Preconditions for DDR often not met
As the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304) notes, the ability of the UN to design and implement effective programmes will be limited unless basic political and security conditions are in place. However, as noted above, the UN is increasingly mandated to perform DDR or related programmes in environments where these conditions are not met. The following brief description of the preconditions for DDR highlights the complexity of the settings in which DDR is currently being conducted.

1. The signing of a negotiated peace agreement that provides a legal framework for DDR
Peace agreements do not always contain clear DDR provisions. In Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement (2001) only made vague references to demobilization, while the Compact (2006) included a succinct provision for disbandment of armed groups. In Haiti there was no agree-
ment at all, and in Côte d’Ivoire, there were multiple agreements with conflicting provisions for DDR. Likewise, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has multiple agreements providing legal frameworks that make for a complex scenario. In Darfur, while the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement included DDR provisions, the Agreement was not signed by all the protagonists of the conflict.

This precondition, which recommends that a negotiated peace agreement be signed, assumes that all warring parties are signatories to that peace agreement. However, in a majority of the cases examined in this study, all warring parties are not included in the peace process. Moreover, the manipulation of gangs by political elites and the proliferation of various types of militias and armed groups may complicate even the identification of all parties to the conflict. In Haiti, the initial target group – the ex-Forces Armées d’Haiti (ex-FAd’H) – was found not to be a threat, but urban gangs emerged as major spoilers. In Côte d’Ivoire militias were addressed through a disarmament and dismantling of militias (DDM) programme, however, the large numbers of people claiming to be militias that were registered has complicated the process and highlighted the need to better define this group. In Sudan, the DDR programme was launched only in February 2009, four years after the signing of the CPA. In Darfur, a comprehensive DDR programme is unlikely to start in the near future unless a more inclusive peace agreement is signed by all the major armed groups operating in the region.

2. Trust in the peace process

While trust of the parties to the conflict in the overall peace process is extremely difficult to evaluate, it is a key prerequisite for successful traditional DDR, as demonstrated by many UN experiences from Central America to Africa. As DDR is often one of the first provisions of a peace agreement to be implemented, it may start at a time when the parties are still unsure of the process. They may wish to hold on to the military means that brought them to the negotiating table, thus delaying the start of DDR. At the same time, DDR practitioners have understood that progress in DDR can serve to foster trust between the parties. This can therefore lead to a vicious cycle where lack of trust delays DDR and the lack of DDR only increases the parties’ mistrust in the peace process. This has arguably been demonstrated in Côte d’Ivoire where the formal DDR of the Forces nouvelles was delayed, due in part, to the group’s concerns that other parts of the peace agreement are not being addressed.

3. Willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR

Political will of the warring parties to engage in DDR is crucial to a successful process. Nonetheless, in many cases, political will has been lacking. In the countries studied, political elites have been involved in the creation and support of militias or gangs. Accordingly, manipulation of gangs by elite members of society complicates the definition of parties to the conflict—a key aspect of developing a successful DDR programme. As an example, in Sierra Leone, despite the signature of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) refused to fully enter the DDR programme. Following a major crisis that threatened to completely derail the peace process in May 2000, a much revamped international and regional political and military approach was launched. This resulted in the removal of the RUF’s recal-
citirant leader, Foday Sankoh, and the exertion of credible pressure on a key RUF backer, the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor. As a result, the RUF finally entered the DDR process in earnest in the second half of 2000.

4. A minimum guarantee of security

Without a minimum guarantee of security, armed groups and individuals are unlikely to disarm. Even where peacekeeping operations are deployed, as in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Haiti, DDR processes have, at times, been hampered by insecurity. In Afghanistan, various disarmament activities are underway, through the Disbandment of Irregular Armed Groups (DIAG) program, in the context of an armed insurgency where nation-wide security is by no means guaranteed. Many combatants will therefore be reluctant to relinquish a weapon which they perceive to be their guarantee of security. Furthermore, in Sudan, despite the presence of two peacekeeping missions the security situation in some parts of the country remains unstable due to armed conflicts and banditry (Southern Sudan; Darfur). In the DRC, continued fighting among armed groups and the FARDC, along with the vast size of the country and poor infrastructure has made it difficult to provide a minimum guarantee of security thus severely hampering DDR efforts.

5. Challenges and Lessons

Given that the UN is operating in increasingly volatile circumstances without the assumed preconditions for successful DDR, extra care must be given to certain critical aspects of the process. Greater attention must be given to, and analysis conducted on, the issues blocking the political will; efforts should be directed towards identifying targeted means to build trust and confidence. It is also important to look beyond the recognized warring parties and conduct analysis on other armed groups that may be present. In the absence of an inclusive or effective peace agreement, urgent attention must be given to developing a coherent joint strategy with partners and the Government on the DDR framework. With continued violence in parts or all of the country, it is also crucial to identify and understand the perceived security concerns and thus to identify what motivates some members of the population to hold arms.
Challenges and lessons in DDR

Disarmament

Challenges
- Ongoing armed conflict
- Lack of political will for disarmament
- Real numbers of weapons not easily obtained and verified
- Initial commitment to disarming may be low
- High number of weapons circulating in community
- Lack of legal framework governing weapons ownership
- Proliferation of militias and fluctuating numbers of members, and thus difficulty in defining who is a militia member, which greatly challenges the generation and management of lists and baselines

Lessons
- Disarmament exercises may not resolve insecurity, and may actually become the source of further insecurity
- Disarmament is not always the most effective component with which to launch a DDR process
- A DDR framework/strategy is needed to address irregular armed groups

Demobilization

Challenges
- Often poor understanding of the types of groups and organizations that are being demobilized (militias, clans, ethnic groups), as well as of their needs and agendas

Lessons
- It is important for these groups to be provided with a positive and constructive activity
- It should also be decided whether or not command structures should be destroyed, weakened or left intact. Incentives should be attractive, pertinent and linked to reintegration strategies

Reintegration

Challenges
- Reintegration is a much longer process than disarmament and demobilization
- Lack of national economic recovery; creating alternative livelihoods and/or jobs is exceptionally difficult in post-conflict or conflict settings, with severely challenged economies

Lessons
- It is critical that all actors in the integrated mission work closely and in tight coordination. Joint planning, coordination and capacity development as well as sustained funding are crucial
- UN agencies should develop long-term reintegration or development opportunities that complement and reinforce the overall DDR process
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING SECOND GENERATION DDR

Second Generation DDR programmes are a response to the challenging contexts in which the UN is working alongside national governments, civil society, and international partners to maintain the peace process and contribute to stabilization. Such efforts have, however, not always been implemented in a systematic manner. In order to better orient support to these programmes, this study documents Second Generation policy options currently being implemented, as well as the challenges faced by practitioners on the ground. While to date the results of these activities suggest that more energy and resources should be put towards these efforts, there are considerable challenges that have undermined traditional DDR in the past, and which also constitute potential significant obstacles for Second Generation DDR.
Challenges

In the countries examined (Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and Liberia) some key recurring challenges were identified. These are:

1. **Lack of political will:** This is systematic in the cases examined, with the exception of Liberia. While peacekeeping operations have the mandates to assist national actors with the design and implementation of DDR, it was found in most case studies that without strong political will, DDR cannot progress.

2. **Inadequate DDR and SSR links:** In all cases DDR-SSR links have not been well developed. Many questions arise on how to include irregular armed groups, militias, and gangs in the peace process. Weapons are still in circulation even where disarmament has occurred, or where the process has been superficial or symbolic, which undermines SSR. In addition, some ill-conceived community security mechanisms can threaten present alternative/competing forces or emergent local police structures.

3. **Poorly regulated natural resources, illicit drugs and organized crime:** In all the countries examined, it is widely acknowledged that there are political elites who are involved in drug production and trade or natural resource exploitation and in some cases organized crime, which undermines state authority and legitimacy. It was further noted that natural resource exploitation continues to fund violence (e.g. Afghanistan) and illegal activities (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia), threatening the likelihood of success for state building and undermining efforts to establish or restore the rule of law. These issues also challenge DDR efforts, as has been the case in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia.

4. **Economic insecurity:** There is a lack of economic security in each of the cases examined, which links increasingly to the issue of the sustainability of DDR and wider stabilization efforts. There appear to be deep-rooted assumptions that in post-conflict settings, economic recovery will occur, providing absorption capacity for former combatants and other war affected people. Yet, evidence for this is severely limited. In post-conflict settings, there is often a lack of diversification in the economy and heavy dependence on particular resources (e.g. Liberia; Afghanistan).

5. **Integration and coordination mechanisms:** While the UN is always challenged by coordination and integration issues in complex settings, with Second Generation DDR, the challenges are even greater given the scope and breadth of the activities involved and the necessary links between security and development work. While there are commendable efforts to address challenges to effective coordination and integration, there remain significant challenges to UN missions around the coordination of Second Generation DDR efforts. In Afghanistan, in addition to the vast range of actors with varied interests operating within the country, coordination between the ISAF and UNAMA is at times difficult as they operate on two different but interconnected Security Council mandates.
Shared analysis and joint assessments

Designing effective programmes in response to increasingly complex settings requires thorough, early and ongoing assessments. The early planning should include careful consideration of costs and benefits, in addition to a review of how the approach fits into wider economic and development frameworks, be they stabilization or peace consolidation. In short, there is no simple model or formula for achieving results.

Experience from several DDR exercises, notably those studied in-depth for this report, suggest that earlier emphasis on, and a more systematic use of thorough assessments of context, conflict issues, political considerations and national capacities, is needed.

Assessment of political and security factors should feed into the DDR process, not only in the pre-planning stage, but throughout the lifecycle of the mission. The ability to monitor, evaluate and adapt to new circumstances should be structured into the process. These assessments would be used to properly inform the development of strategic options for inclusion in peace agreements and Security Council mandates.

There are various models that can be examined for different contexts to address both DDR obstacles and to promote capacities for peace. Deeper analysis of undisciplined armed groups and the wider communities they are embedded within is key to developing strategies to inhibit their proliferation and reintegrate their members into civilian life.

In addition, early warnings of emerging security threats can allow missions and governments to respond quickly and effectively. Similarly, these tools can allow actors to identify critical gaps or failures in DDR programming, which if left unaddressed, may undermine security.

Hot-spot assessment tools and stabilization strategies: at the forefront of integration

Peacekeeping missions, governments and other intergovernmental and non-governmental actors are using “hot-spot” assessments, and similar initiatives under the headings of “integrated” or “security and stabilization” assessments to monitor emerging security threats and identify gaps in the DDR process. These tools allow for more proactive responses, rather than reactive ones, and assist in ensuring that stabilization strategies respond to local circumstances. If implemented regularly, these assessments could build into the programme the flexibility needed to effectively deliver in a volatile environment. A key challenge is ensuring that all relevant stakeholders are involved in such assessments, and that they utilize and build upon similar initiatives for maximum effect.

Various actors, including political, military and police components of peace operations, are undertaking such assessments in mission contexts and developing strategic coordination mechanisms to address the findings. In Liberia, information collected jointly by the UNMIL
Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery (RRR) Section and JMAC (also involving the Heads of Office, Military Observers and UN Police) was actively used in the programme design of RRR programs, and had the potential to be used more widely for other UN programmatic activities. The assessments identified situations with specific and outstanding reintegration challenges, including the engagement of former combatants in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. One comprehensive assessment found that former commanders were often leading illegal resource exploitation activities, indicating that command structures were still intact. Subsequently, projects were implemented to break those remaining chains of command, reintegrate former combatants and gain governmental control over key natural resource areas.

Early warnings of emerging security threats can allow missions and governments to respond quickly and effectively. Similarly, these tools can allow actors to identify critical gaps or failures in DDR programming, which if left unaddressed, may undermine security. If in-depth assessments are implemented early in the process, “mop-up” DDR efforts may be less likely. Involving government at all stages will also help to foster transparency, dialogue, and build national capacity to analyze and respond to emerging security situations. Local NGOs, with experience at more local levels, are obvious partners for these efforts. Jointly conducted assessments will lead to better coordinated strategic responses.

**Critical issues in designing Second Generation DDR options**

DDR policy choices and programming are directly affected by the overall political, strategic and economic context in which programmes are implemented. Without due consideration of these critical factors, activities which may be solid programmatically could fail to deliver. As Second Generation policies share the same strategic and programmatic aims as traditional DDR, several critical issues outlined in the IDDRS must be carefully considered when implementing Second Generation options. These include addressing DDR appropriately in peace agreements and Security Council mandates; linking Second Generation DDR activities with overall economic policy, considering the relationship between DDR and SSR, addressing transitional justice issues, as well as cross-cutting issues which should be considered in all policy. In addition, some key issues, not outlined or fully developed in the IDDRS, are listed below.

1. **National and UN strategic frameworks and mission exit strategies**

While there has to date been no standard approach for peacekeeping missions and UN Country Teams (UNCTs) to develop a shared strategic vision for peace consolidation, the new Integrated
Strategic Framework (ISF), stipulated in the Policy Committee Decision on Integration (2008/24), will serve as (1) an integrated peace consolidation plan that presents a joint Mission/UNCT strategic vision and related sequenced priorities, (2) a shared accountability framework that outlines the roles, responsibilities and timelines required for delivering on these joint priorities, and (3) a living management and operations tool to facilitate regular stocktaking and prioritization of key initiatives. At mission start-up or following a peace agreement, the ISF will be the platform for short to medium-term UN priorities. The ISF will build upon existing frameworks and planning tools, and may also serve as the priority peacebuilding strategy for the country. While each ISF will be unique, developed with specific needs and requirements of a country context in mind, they will likely incorporate critical components such as security and political issues, state authority, and issues related to the return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees – all of which are deeply connected to the realization of DDR.

The ISF illustrates an increasing convergence of UN and government strategic policy frameworks, which aim to bridge security and stabilization with longer-term peace consolidation and economic recovery goals. This convergence represents vital progress towards a clearer articulation of transitional strategies – from shorter-term reinsertion programs and/or “emergency” type projects (often led by international actors) to longer-term reintegration strategies (often led by governments). The quality of these linkages will depend on the quality of analysis that informs them as well as on strong leadership, a common vision and a shared analytical and planning capacity amongst the various UN entities.

2. Monitoring and evaluation

Effective monitoring and evaluation is all the more important for Second Generation DDR activities given the volatile environments in which peace operations are increasingly mandated to deploy. In the absence of a peace agreement or policy framework, clear monitoring and evaluation mechanisms serve to guide the DDR process, even more so than in a traditional programme. The bottom-up approach of Second Generation measures.
further heightens this dynamic. To structure flexibility, innovation and adaptation, into the process, programmes should give greater attention to analysis of key issues blocking political will. Analysis should also go beyond formalized warring parties, to include early assessments of all irregular armed groups, including those not party to a peace agreement. It is also critical, particularly where security may be lacking, to identify and understand the state of perceived security and the motives for certain groups/populations holding arms. This clarification of the aim of DDR should be complemented by a commitment to reassessment and adaptation where needed – in essence having flexibility to change course if things are not working.

“Analysis should also go beyond formalized warring parties, to include early assessments of all irregular armed groups, including those not party to a peace agreement.”

3. Regional issues

Regional issues have significant importance to Second Generation activities, especially weapons management programmes, hot-spot assessments and facilitating government control over natural resources. Peacekeeping missions, drawing especially on JMAC, Civil Affairs, and DDR sections are well placed to advance regional cooperation on these issues in a more concerted and strategic manner. Key regional considerations can be broken down as follows:

- Regional DDR problems (e.g. Sudan-Chad; DRC-Rwanda; Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire; Pakistan-Afghanistan);
- Regional cross-border approaches to facilitate DDR (e.g. ECOWAS Convention on SALW) and;
- Regional DDR programmes (e.g. World Bank has led seven DDR programmes in the Great Lakes region of Africa under the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program).

Over the past decade, the Security Council has included several key cross-border issues in mandates, such as: the flow of small arms and light weapons; monitoring arms embargoes; supporting repatriation and resettlement of foreign combatants; inter-mission/country coordination and observance of the presence of foreign military forces in key areas of instability.

In cases of the presence of foreign fighters, combatants should be identified as early as possible, disarmed and transported to a secure facility in the host country to be processed for internment, in accordance with international humanitarian law. Cross-border activities must have cooperation from all parties and genuine interest in mutually addressing regional security issues. Additionally, greater coordination is needed between peacekeeping missions in order to exchange information and recommendations to better coordinate a response to regional issues.
4. Natural resources and sustainable DDR

Where illegal natural resource exploitation has been a key factor in fueling conflict, addressing resource governance is critical to the success of DDR. In post-conflict settings ex-combatants, often through networks led by political elites and/or former commanders, may engage in illegal natural resources exploitation, frequently in conjunction with other types of organized crime, including arms trafficking and narcotics cultivation and trade (e.g. Mozambique, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Kosovo, Angola, DRC and Haiti).

The Security Council has often tried to address the illegal exploitation of natural resources through sanctions regimes. However, such approaches do not always effectively address the needs of communities and ex-combatants on the ground where illegal exploitation is occurring. The inclusion of natural resource considerations in peace agreements is still somewhat rare. Likewise, UN peacekeeping mandates typically do not effectively address the governance and regulation of natural resources, particularly in ways that deal with the need for alternative livelihoods for those involved and the regional dimensions of resource trade.

Innovative efforts have been undertaken in Liberia and Afghanistan in this regard. The Government of Liberia and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which is mandated to work with the government to gain control over the natural resources sector, formed the Rubber Plantation Task Force (RPTF) in 2006. The Task Force aimed to jointly assess and design programmes to manage the country’s major rubber plantations, an ongoing security concern and source of disturbance to the DDR process. The RPTF has reformed policies that deter incentives for rubber theft and exploitation and bolstered reintegration efforts by providing economic alternatives to ex-combatants and breaking command structures.

While natural resource abundance is often considered a “curse” for sustainable DDR and peace there is increasing recognition and understanding of the role that good governance of valuable resources can play in building state legitimacy and in providing peace dividends. With greater understanding of natural resources and conflict dynamics, post-conflict actors have the opportunity to transform natural resource-related obstacles into drivers of sustainable DDR and peace consolidation. In addition to stronger and farther-reaching mandates, greater efforts for integration between peacekeeping missions and UN agencies on these issues would no doubt impact positively. Relevant experts/agencies, such as UNODC, can be included earlier in conflict assessments to facilitate planning. Other agencies, such as FAO, who work to build the capacity of government line ministries, can work closely with the peacekeeping mission (Civil or Political Affairs Section) on restoration of state authority to strategically address resource issues at local levels.

5. Environmental factors

Traditionally, environmental factors have not been sufficiently considered in the design and implementation of DDR programmes. The IDDRS highlights the need for operations to include provisions for environmental protection, reduction of pollution and conservation of resources, and to comply with all national environmental regulations. Environmental security is also included in the human security framework. Additionally, environmental impacts
of SALW spread and possession should be considered. However, more work needs to be done in this area in order to facilitate the implementation of environmentally sustainable DDR programmes.

**Menu of policy options**

The following menu of Second Generation DDR options aims to support UN senior management to better advise the parties involved in peace negotiations, and Member States engaged in crafting Security Council resolutions. In some cases, the viability of a traditional DDR programme should be ascertained first. Second Generation activities would be initiated after a traditional DDR programme had been completed, or implemented in parallel with a traditional programme. Second Generation DDR could also be initiated following the determination that a traditional approach would not be appropriate for the particular context. The programme could serve to build trust among the parties and contribute to a secure environment, possibly even paving the way for a more traditional approach in the future, if this was still required.

Consequently, it is important to note that taking one approach does not necessarily exclude the other and that DDR programmes emerging in peace operation contexts might draw...
from and incorporate several of these options at once. In providing these options, no pre-
sumption is made as to who should undertake these activities, which would be dependent
on each specific context. It is clear, however, that many of these options require close partners-
ships between different local, national and international actors.

Please see Annex I for the chart outlining these options, including their advantages and
disadvantages. For specific country examples in each category, please see Annex II.

1. Post-conflict stabilization measures

These options include emergency employment programmes, reinsertion programmes and sub-
national/community approaches. Many of these policy options respond to situations where the
security sector is weak or non-existent. These options seek to incorporate a sub-national or
community focus. Strategies are therefore sensitive to local dynamics and may combine a
variety of activities such as classic weapons collection programmes, vocational training, and
special youth programmes. While the economic dimensions of reintegration are not new, the
new focus on these issues within peacekeeping (Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia and increasingly
Afghanistan) is generally being welcomed by stakeholders as having considerable potential
to fill a problematic gap between the demobilization and reintegration phases.

1.1 Emergency employment programmes

Emergency employment programmes, such as “infrastructure for employment,” are used
in post-conflict settings to provide economic incentives as an alternative to violence. They
often involve labour-intensive projects, usually related to the rehabilitation of infra-
structure, as well as smallholder agriculture and manufacturing schemes. These stop-
gap interventions are critical where national governments lack capacity and revenue for
projects which require a large investment.

Traditionally, the World Bank and national
governments have implemented emergency employment programmes projects without con-
sidering a specific focus on ex-combatants, or at least active encouragement of their partici-
pation. Recognising the need to specifically target ex-combatants in such programmes, in
Liberia efforts were made by the UN (both UNMIL and UNDP), the World Bank and the
government to involve ex-combatants in labour intensive programmes which both helped to
reduce security concerns and assist in the reintegration of former combatants who worked
alongside their receiving communities. Emergency employment projects are also embedded
within the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programme in Haiti.

A key challenge for emergency employment projects is to balance the priorities of observ-
ing the principle of “do no harm” and identifying and implementing projects quickly. There
is also a specific need for institutional linkages and capacity building to manage employ-
ment projects. Involving government in projects that produce tangible results can facilitate
the building of confidence in the peace process and state legitimacy. Emergency employment schemes should be designed and implemented with attention to the project's links with long-term employment creation, labor market demands and development goals; however, this is not common practice. Project funds should be quickly accessed and dispersed in a timely manner to maximize benefits. Wages should be set at a level that avoids exploitation or over-payment. Similarly, food for work programs should be monitored to ensure that disincentives for local production and aid dependence do not emerge. Additionally, economic priorities and realities, as well as expectations, should be considered and managed during all phases. Data gathered during post-conflict needs assessments (PCNA) can inform policymakers on how best to adapt projects to changing labor conditions. In addition, tracking beneficiaries who participate in these schemes can help policymakers identify any emerging social tensions.

1.2 Reinsertion programmes

Reinsertion, which is part of demobilization, is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.

In Côte d'Ivoire reinsertion projects are being extended to include micro-finance, small and medium enterprise development, vocational training linked with labor market demands, and job placement when possible. The program should be seen as an example of an integrated approach by UNOCI and UNDP for early economic interventions with long-term goals.

In Côte d'Ivoire reinsertion projects are being extended to include micro-finance, small and medium enterprise development, vocational training linked with labor market demands, and job placement when possible. The program should be seen as an example of an integrated approach by UNOCI and UNDP for early economic interventions with long-term goals.

Context sensitive, community-oriented and integrated approaches to employment and alternative livelihood related projects early on in the DDR process can provide immediate economic and social dividends. Strategies must also be based on labor market realities. Peacekeeping missions have an important role to play since they have access to: (1) assessed funds (which are therefore potentially accessible early on in the process); (2) well-placed and competent staff across the mission area; logistical capacity (including equipment, vehicles and military engineers when available); and (3) considerable capacity for national public information or sensitization campaigns.

1.3 Sub-national/community approaches to security and violence reduction

Sub-national and community approaches recognize that national security and concerns of the State are deeply intertwined with sub-national and community security, as well as human security (at the level of the individual). Strategies are sensitive to local dynamics, and may combine a variety of activities such as classic weapons collection programmes, vocational training, special youth programmes, and medical and legal assistance within the special requirements of the respective community. Careful pre-programme analysis and constant monitoring, evaluation and adjustment are crucial. Sometimes community security approaches are undertaken in parallel with more traditional DDR activities (e.g. Afghanistan). A key challenge for actors working in peace operations is to ensure that they are not unintentionally supporting the creation of multiple – and at times, competing – mechanisms to enhance...
“Community-based security and violence reduction approaches are particularly valuable in building social cohesion and accountability mechanisms and in lifting vulnerable groups into local governance and conflict management processes.”

Ensuring clear coordination with local governance and security sector mechanisms, including the police and informal community policing structures, is vital to efforts aimed at achieving stability and building legitimate state authority in post-conflict settings.

Community-based security and violence reduction approaches are particularly valuable in building social cohesion and accountability mechanisms and in lifting vulnerable groups into local governance and conflict management processes. Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programmes help expand the scope and scale of violence reduction efforts from the bottom up. Linking project outputs with communities is also critical to avoid the perception that violence is rewarded. At the same time, more attention needs to be given towards creating clear linkages between CVR programmes and sub-national/community security and violence-reduction strategies as well as community policing. This will require greater coordination between those working on such issues in peacekeeping operations, especially UNPOL and Civil Affairs, as well as with external partners such as UNDP.

2. Targeting specific groups

The targeting of specific groups with different approaches and incentives includes disarmament and dismantlement of militias (DDM), commanders and senior officers incentive programmes, at-risk youth and gangs programmes, pension schemes and psychosocial recovery strategies. Several of these policy options focus on targeting irregular armed groups and/or those at risk of taking up arms, and suggest means for more clearly identifying group needs, interests, agendas and capacities. Theses approaches respond to a recognized weakness in more traditional DDR models that have tended to target warring parties in a top-down manner.

2.1 Disarmament and dismantlement of militias (DDM)

Increasingly, conflict environments are characterized by a proliferation of irregular armed groups, including militias, criminal networks, self-defense groups, gangs and other non-state actors. In a worrying trend, many analysts and observers have alleged that heads of state and other powerful political actors may be increasingly involved in creating militias to support their agendas, thus bypassing regulatory constraints on armies and police. These forces are sometimes not represented in political processes or formal institutional mechanisms for DDR, which can hinder the stabilization process. DDM is a policy option aimed at addressing such groups which might otherwise be left out of more traditional DDR processes.

Effective DDM rests on thorough research and analysis. It is critical to understand and map the nature of militias (their agendas, motives and strategies), where they are getting support and what the points of leverage are. In cases where economic incentives may be provided to such groups for their collaboration, this can create disincentives for their dis-
There remain questions as to whether and how to treat militias versus other formerly mobilized groups, such as former military. Such questions are political and not technical as they relate to much larger issues linked to the post-conflict balance of power, political dynamics and commitments contained within a peace agreement (if it exists) and security sector reform process.

2.2 Commanders and senior officers incentive programmes

Commander incentive programmes (CIPs), or what the IDDRS calls “special packages,” support the dismantling of command structures and hence potentially more effective and sustainable DDR by providing material incentives for peace, minimizing the potential for spoilers. A key challenge in many post-conflict settings is that middle and high-ranking officers have the status and connections to engage in illicit activities and may remobilize in organized crime structures, particularly for arms and drug trade. In some cases, the potential for placing commanders and senior officers in positions of authority, including political or administrative positions (e.g. Afghanistan), or heading up reintegration programmes (e.g. YMCA drivers project run as a part of the UNOCI/UNDP 1000 micro-projects programme in Brobo, Côte d’Ivoire.

Photo: Simon Yazgi
programmes in Liberia), is being explored. Tensions between the benefits of CIPs and the potential promotion of a culture of impunity must, however, be carefully considered.

Most evidence points to the need to dismantle command structures, separate commanders and soldiers at the very beginning of the DDR process, and identify special measures to address commanders. CIPs depend on quality data on the record of leading commanders. In addition, the identification of suitable and trustworthy commanders who would be eligible to assume political or administrative authority requires extra training, monitoring and mentoring mechanisms. Furthermore, the performance of ex-commanders transferred back into civilian life needs to be monitored and evaluated so that the strengths and weaknesses of the process can be assessed and necessary modifications made. It is challenging to satisfy commanders, for whom an incentive package is not likely to be more advantageous than wartime profits.

Finally, there is a strong need for greater shared awareness within peace operations about former commanders and senior officers who may be in political office or involved in organized crime. DDR, Political and Civil Affairs, JMAC and other officers gathering information on and working with national officials should conduct integrated research and analysis on former commanders which could feed into a strategic and political approach toward the participation of these individuals in the peace process.

2.3 At-risk youth and gang programmes

The known links between youth bulges and violence, particularly where there is a lack of livelihood and employment opportunities in post-conflict settings make targeting youth in UN peacekeeping and peace consolidation efforts a priority. The proliferation of militias and armed groups in conflict and post-conflict settings, along with political disenfranchisement and urbanization, are a potent mix that can further exacerbate youth violence. Projects in Haiti, Sierra Leone and the United States provide models for reducing the risk of youth violence.

In conjunction with the CVR programme established by MINUSTAH, Viva Rio (a Brazil-based NGO) implemented the Mobilization, Disarmament and Inclusion into Society (MDI) program to address the root causes of youth associated with violence, which is a key security issue in Haiti. MDI was initiated in Port-au-Prince with the signing of a “micro-peace agreement” between leaders of various armed groups in one of the most volatile neighborhoods in the capital. The programme touched on several areas including gun control, anti-organized crime initiatives, education and job training. The innovative approach involved music scholarships and community
events. The programme was initiated and monitored by Viva Rio and the National Commission on DRR, in partnership with MINUSTAH.

In the United States, projects such as the House of Umoja in Philadelphia, provide useful models for reducing the risks of violence associated with high youth population. Developed in response to the severely high gang related crime rates in the 1970s, House of Umoja focuses on youth from ages 15–18, emphasizing self-esteem, and responsibility through individual group counseling, service to others and a redefining of work associated with virtue, goal setting and conflict resolution.

2.4 Pension schemes

Pension schemes for military veterans, as well as any elements that have the legal right to benefit from them, not only provide material assistance but also represent a form of social recognition. However, the history of such policies and regulations demonstrates that without proper planning, administration and financing, and political willingness to apply the laws transparently, they can create more problems than they resolve. At the heart of most problems is the gap between what is enacted in law and what can be financed. Considerations on security and stability may lead authorities to establish generous benefits for former combatants in the belief that these will help “buy” peace, however, if the benefits proposed are unsustainable financially this will eventually force reforms in the pension scheme that may result in discontent and new political or security challenges.

Pensions for soldiers retired from statutory forces may follow a similar pension system as that in place for civil servants. However, before any such programmes can be instituted there should be a thorough review, and where necessary reform of the pension system, which should be independent of the legal and technical basis of the DDR programme. At the same time consideration should be given to the long-term commitment required by a pension scheme, as compared to the relatively short-term commitment required of a DDR programme. In countries under long-term fiscal duress, pension obligations could be paid out, as a lump sum or in tranches, so as to avoid long-term commitments. In such cases the sums paid out should be proportionally linked to the benefits offered under a DDR programme.

2.5 Psychosocial recovery strategies

Psycho-social challenges are often underserved in traditional DDR programming. Nonetheless, most practitioners recognize that psycho-social issues are a key aspect of reintegration, particularly when combined with programmes supporting livelihood opportunities. For sustainable reintegration, peace operations need to more accurately recognize the trauma that war causes at the individual, community and national levels and ensure that overall peace efforts contribute to addressing this trauma where institutional capacities allow. In Second Generation DDR contexts, psycho-social recovery can focus on three components: trauma healing, social cohesion and public information. Psycho-social recovery addresses the trauma to both perpetrators and victims, recognizing that the experience of many individuals and communities lies somewhere in between. Goals of psycho-social recovery include helping individuals to regain their capacity for resilience, restoring social capital and contributing to a greater sense of national unity.
DPKO can be actively involved in creating a united psycho-social strategy as an early and integral part of the DDR process and ensuring that this is embedded within wider UN mission activities and strategies, especially through national public information activities. UNDP conducts considerable dynamic and effective programming to promote social cohesion that can support and feed into national level messaging strategies. Efforts will be most effective when utilizing indigenous and local resources to develop, translate and communicate positive psycho-social messages. NGOs are particularly well placed to facilitate the development and delivery of these messages, as well as the longer-term psycho-social activities needed for individual and community healing and reconciliation. In South Africa, for example, the Center for the Study of Reconciliation and Violence (CSRV) initiated many innovative approaches to address the reintegration of ex-combatants within their communities, empowering them to take responsibility for themselves and emphasizing alternatives to violence as a means to change.

3. Alternative approaches to addressing disarmament and unregulated weapons

These approaches include sequencing flexibility, weapons management, as well as weapons for development and lottery initiatives. These policy options respond to situations where disarmament may not be a realistic option of first instance, and where conventional DDR is not working or is not working well.

3.1 DDR sequencing flexibility

DDR sequencing flexibility recognizes the need to adapt processes to the unique needs of the context in which the process takes place, cognizant of conflict and security factors and dynamics at play. This concept is outlined in the IDDRS, however, due to the lack of required preconditions, Second Generation programmes have taken this concept one-step further. Depending on the circumstances, not all the components of DDR may be necessary, or they may also occur simultaneously or in a different order. For example, without minimum degrees of security, disarmament and demobilization may take place after reintegration programmes. The early start of reintegration activities (including through the use of “pilot projects”) can provide a practical example of how combatants provide for themselves without a weapon and outside of military structures. Early reintegration can be a very strong incentive for more genuine and sustainable disarmament and demobilization which could take place at a later stage.

“Prioritizing reintegration before starting disarmament and demobilization may be advantageous in cases where political will is lacking for disarmament.”

Prioritizing reintegration before starting disarmament and demobilization may be advantageous in cases where political will is lacking for disarmament. Reinsertion and reintegration benefits and opportunities, or non-material incentives (such as political recognition) may serve to move a stagnant process along and may provide incentives to financially motivated combatants or members of irregular armed groups.
3.2 Weapons management and reduction approaches

Traditional arms reduction programmes concentrate on the supply-side (arms embargoes, sanctions, no-fly zones to reduce arms trafficking, increased border controls, enforced cordon and search operations). On the other hand, weapons management approaches seek to regulate the possession, use, and proliferation of arms and weapons – both at the policy level and within communities. This approach targets a wider group than ex-combatants; it also looks at weapons that may be held by individuals (civilians) or groups (communities, armed gangs, organized crime groups) and can include such measures as registries and licensing systems and legal restrictions on weapons ownership. They can involve voluntary or externally mandated weapons collection, “putting weapons beyond use” and in some cases monitoring of weapons and combatants in cantonment areas. These approaches are also more suitable where weapons used to perpetrate violence may not be small arms (e.g. the use of machetes during the genocide in Rwanda) or where arms are legal and constitutional (e.g. Afghanistan).

3.3 Weapons for development and weapons lotteries

Weapons for Development (WfD) is an incentive-based, development-oriented disarmament approach, the rationale of which is to make the disarmament process more sustainable and link it to the overall goal of development. Strategies include the transfer of responsibility for the disarmament process from the individual to the community as a whole through a reward system. Instead of monetary compensation, communities benefit from development projects designed to meet local needs (e.g. wells; schools; seed banks; gardening projects; professional training; media access). Historically, WfD has been implemented by UNDP in cooperation with the respective government (e.g. Albania, 1998–2001; Mali, 1997–2003; Sierra Leone, since 2002; Cambodia, 2000–2003). With weapons lotteries, arms holders are encouraged to turn in their weapons in exchange for a lottery ticket with the chance to win a prize, from kitchen appliances to motor scooters. Variations have tried to address local gang leaders who are offered incentives such as motorcycles or education scholarships in exchange for meaningful reduction of gun violence in areas under their control. Weapons lotteries have been implemented in the Balkans, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia as well as in Haiti, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

WfD has proved useful both in post-conflict DDR settings and as an independent measure to handle a general SALW problem. WfD programs appear to be particularly suitable where disarmament challenges have spread beyond the combatants throughout civilian populations, and where strong community and/or tribal structures are in place. The determining process for the disarmament-rewarding development projects should be demand driven, bottom-up and decentralized. Voluntary, development-based approaches appear to be more efficient to target diversified arms-holders. Continuing media coverage raises public awareness in support of efforts. WfD programs allow for communities to participate in a disarmament process, and potentially address insecurity due to the presence of weapons. They must, however, start from an acknowledgement of the security needs of the community and the setting in which some arms may be needed for security.
CONCLUSION

As noted in this report, the nature of conflict has changed during the last ten years. Consequently, the shape of the United Nations peace architecture has begun to adapt, notably with the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 and the emergence of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. As the most prominent and visible tool for addressing threats to international peace and security, UN peacekeeping operations have been on the front lines in facing emerging challenges from new conflict dynamics. The set of Second Generation DDR practices outlined in this report is a reflection of the broader change in UN peacekeeping, which was examined in depth in the 2009 “New Horizon” non-paper. The latter concludes that the scale and complexity of peacekeeping today are mismatched with existing capabilities. As regards DDR, however, this report illustrates that the complexity of the environments in which we operate could potentially be addressed by the emergence of a new set of options, often developed in response to localized needs and that can be mixed and matched to meet current contexts.

Among the paradigm shifts is the fact that the success of a peacekeeping operation cannot be guaranteed by top-down implementation of a Security Council mandate; peacekeepers today require a more sophisticated skill set and toolkit to negotiate the local dynamics on the ground, which may not reflect the higher level agreement reached between national actors. For DDR practitioners, this has required that they: gain an in-depth understanding of dynamics surrounding groups of armed individuals; identify and understand perceived security threats and motives of the wider population for holding arms; engage in a process of periodic analysis of the situation, including national and local dynamics that is initiated early on and involves all key stakeholders; in developing specific programmes use evidence-
based approaches, rather than ones which depend on obligations arising from peace agreements; and, finally, develop programmatic interventions aimed at stabilization, that may involve any number of the processes outlined in this report, prior to, alongside or instead of traditional DDR. In doing so they must ensure that this is linked to broader peacebuilding / early recovery strategic frameworks, exit strategies of missions, and development frameworks of the UNCT and Government.

The practices that have been developed during the first decade of this century are grouped under the umbrella of “Second Generation DDR” but the term “DDR” itself may be misleading. These practices are all stabilization and peacebuilding measures with immediate political and security objectives. Above all, rather than focusing on the physical action of removing weapons, they seek to put weapons beyond use. They also occupy particular space in the peace spectrum; a nexus of security and development activities.

While early signs of their impact are very encouraging, much further work is necessary to refine the methodology of these practices as well as to develop a clear division of labor that ensures that Second Generation DDR is systematically applied in a manner that emphasizes deliverability and builds upon the comparative advantages of all actors. This should become the agenda for the DPKO, together with its sister Departments and Offices of the Secretariat, the wider UN family and other partners, including Member States, in the coming year.
ENDNOTES


2 While the researcher conducted an extensive desk review that included many country case studies, four field visits were undertaken to Afghanistan, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia.


4 Today’s multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions are tasked with supporting the implementation of negotiated peace agreements through operational and financial assistance for DDR, security, justice, corrections, human rights and the organization of elections.


7 IDDRS 2.10 The UN Approach to DDR

8 IDDRS 4.30 Reintegration

9 IDDRS 6.10 DDR and Security Sector Reform

10 IDDRS 6.20 DDR and Transitional Justice

11 IDDRS 5.10 Women Gender and DDR, IDDRS 5.20 Youth and DDR, IDDRS 5.30 Children and DDR, IDDRS 5.40 Cross-border Population Movements, IDDRS 5.50 Food Aid Programmes in DDR, IDDRS 5.60 HIV/AIDS and DDR, IDDRS 5.70 Health and DDR

12 IDDRS, 5.40: 12.

13 IDDRS, 4.10, 34

14 IDDRS, 1.20, 11-12 and 21

15 In recognition of the link between security and employment, and the necessity for both short-and long-term planning, the UN recently developed a system-wide policy, “Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration in Post-Conflict Settings” (2008)

16 Official UN definition of reinsertion is “the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical
services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year” (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005.

17 It is worth noting that almost two decades after the war ended, there are still reintegration challenges that need to be addressed.
## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Afghan Conservation Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Arms for development</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired immune deficiency syndrome</td>
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<td>AITM</td>
<td>Afghan Institute for Training in Management</td>
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<td>AMF</td>
<td>Afghan Military Forces</td>
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<td>ANBP</td>
<td>Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme</td>
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<td>ATU</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorist Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
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<td>CFA</td>
<td>West African CFA franc</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Commander incentive programme</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive peace agreement</td>
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<td>CSACP</td>
<td>Community Security and Arms Control Programme</td>
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<td>CSVR</td>
<td>Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation</td>
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<td>CVR</td>
<td>Community violence reduction</td>
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<td>DDM</td>
<td>Disarmament and dismantlement of militias</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIAG</td>
<td>Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAM</td>
<td>Forca Aérea De Moçambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOLIAG</td>
<td>Government officials with links to armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human immunodeficiency virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAG</td>
<td>Illegally armed group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAWG</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association of the World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFI</td>
<td>Liberia Forest Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDI</td>
<td>Mobilization, disarmament and inclusion into society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDDR</td>
<td>National Commission for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEEPRA</td>
<td>National Emergency Employment Program for Rural Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCNA</td>
<td>Post conflict needs assessments</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick impact project</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPTF</td>
<td>Rubber Plantation Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRR</td>
<td>Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery Section of UNMIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Reintegration Support Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLO</td>
<td>the Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMB</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Bouganville</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>WfD</td>
<td>Weapons for development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men’s Christian Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>YEP</td>
<td>Youth Employment Program (in Sierra Leone)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX I

### MENU OF POLICY OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy/Programme Option</th>
<th>Aims/Components/Benefits/Examples</th>
<th>Contextual factors (Which contexts to use in)</th>
<th>Considerations for design and implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-conflict stabilization measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-national / community approaches to security and violence reduction</strong></td>
<td>Bottom-up approach aims to help eliminate main drivers of violence and build social cohesion</td>
<td>State has limited or no presence</td>
<td>Strong mechanisms for coordination; avoid multiple or competing programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational training; special youth programmes; medical and legal assistance</td>
<td>Irregular armed groups and decentralized violence</td>
<td>Sensitivity to local context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Benefits</strong>: Suited for situations with widely diffused and localized violence by different non-state actors</td>
<td>Conventional DDR is not appropriate (e.g. Haiti)</td>
<td>Pre-programme analysis and constant monitoring, evaluations and adjustments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Examples</strong>: Southern Sudan (community security fund); Haiti (community violence reduction); Macedonia (safety cities); Afghanistan (linked aspects within DIAG)</td>
<td>Weak State institutions</td>
<td>Links with police, local governance and other rule of law mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Where</strong>:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriateness and utility, as well as costs associated with “re-arming” groups (e.g. tribal groups in Afghanistan)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Emergency employment programmes</strong></td>
<td>Provide short-term economic incentives as alternative to violence, to contribute to reconciliation and reintegration, rehabilitation of infrastructure</td>
<td>Transition to longer-term employment and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roads and other labor intensive projects; Emergency public employment services</td>
<td>Economic/labor market priorities and realities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Food-for-work programmes</td>
<td>Part of UN’s three-track post-conflict employment policy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Benefits</strong>: “Quick wins” and peace dividends that provide incentives to comply with the peace process</td>
<td>Does not replace long-term reintegration programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Examples</strong>: Afghanistan; Sierra Leone; DRC; Bosnia; Eritrea; Cambodia; Timor Leste; and Mozambique; New: PKO involvement: Haiti and Liberia</td>
<td>Conflict sensitive targeting (e.g. benefits for community; gender awareness; youth) to promote social cohesion, fair wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Where there is</strong>:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Avoid disincentives for local productivity (particularly with food for work programmes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High unemployment</td>
<td>Capacity and motives of implementing partners, particularly when the private sector is investing in emergency employment projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low labor market absorptive capacity</td>
<td>Sustainability of employment is questionable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gaps between demobilization and reintegration</td>
<td>ILO is exploring its potential role in this area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Reinsertion programmes

- Early and quick interventions linked to immediate security imperatives and longer-term reintegration needs
- Micro-finance projects; small and medium enterprise development; agriculture projects
- Vocational training
- Can be combined with psycho-social support and public sensitization campaigns (economic + social reintegration)

**Benefits:** Addresses the usual gap between demobilization and reintegration. Provides immediate incentives to complete the DDR process.

**Example:** Côte d’Ivoire (1,000 micro-projects programme); Liberia (Landmine Action project)

**Where there is:**
- High unemployment
- Low labor market absorptive capacities
- Gaps between demobilization and reintegration

**Considerations:**
- Does not replace long-term reintegration programmes
- Can help ease tensions, especially in “hot spots”
- Can result in longer-term livelihood development
- Depends on labor market, absorptive capacity of economy
- Efforts to link security and development incentives
- Early and quick implementation – can help build confidence in the wider DDR process
- Conflict sensitivity, especially equitable distribution of benefits to avoid perception of ex-combatants benefiting from violence
- International NGOs can lead/support, often without mandate restrictions

### Targeting specific groups with different approaches and incentives

#### Commanders and senior officers incentive programmes

- Addresses special social role and authority of commanders of former militias and armies
- Supports DDR and dismantling of command structures
- Immediate separation of soldiers from commanders/senior officers
- Special incentives to cooperate with mission/UNDP/government, such as: money, travel and advanced health care, professional and business training, study trips, political or administrative positions

**Benefits:** Provides an incentive for the leadership of the armed groups, who would otherwise lose their status and other benefits in the post-DDR environment, to enter the DDR programme.

**Example:** Afghanistan (CIP); Liberia (YMCA programme)

**Where there is:**
- Proliferation of organized crime, especially arms and drug trafficking
- Difficulty in implementing macro-level peace agreements
- Intact command structures
- Reluctance of commanders to relinquish control over their troops, zone of control because they see this as a loss of status or income

**Considerations:**
- Thorough analysis required to provide attractive enough alternative incentives
- Undertake cost-benefit analysis of paying off commanders
- Transitional justice issues, including amnesties
- Possibility of being seen to be rewarding commanders involved in war crimes, criminal activity, etc.
- Development of selection/screening mechanisms to identify loyal and trustworthy commanders
- Need for extra training, monitoring and mentoring mechanisms
- In the absence of Commanders Incentive Programmes, if there are other more lucrative opportunities, these target groups are more likely to become involved in organized crime
- “Incentives” offered may not match illicit gains provided by organized crime
At-risk youth and gang programmes

- Employment promotion and income generating activities (e.g. public works, private sector initiatives and self-employment programmes)
- Education and vocational training
- Awareness campaigns (i.e. drugs, HIV/AIDS)
- Youth networks and participation mechanisms; psycho-social care
- **Benefits:** Addresses potential spoilers and potential pools for future recruitment by armed groups/gangs.
- **Examples:** Haiti; Sierra Leone

Where there is:
- Youth bulge
- Presence of militias and other armed groups
- Urbanization
- High levels of youth political disenfranchisement
- Adverse socio-economic conditions such as high levels of youth unemployment

Considerations:
- In-depth market analysis (including labor demands)
- Links to overall economic recovery
- Longer-term sustainability of programmes

Pension schemes

- Provides a mechanism to retire/demobilize a large population of older/non-essential members of armed forces or groups, especially if they were part-time or “reserve” troops.
- **Benefits:** Accomplishes the overall goals of DDR without the deployment of logistics-heavy DDR processes.
- **Examples:** Liberia, Kosovo

Where there are:
- Large percentage of older war veterans
- Long legacy of conflict
- Preconditions for transparent, viable and credible long-term commitments can be found
- Proper planning, administration and financing; and political willingness to apply laws on pensions transparently
- Sufficient funding to ensure that the pension scheme is sustainable

Considerations:
- Cost-effectiveness
- Long-term benefits versus lump sum or tranche disbursements
- Coordinating pension benefits with the package offered under the DDR programme
- Possibility of tension between official beneficiaries of a pension scheme and those who entered through the peace process
- The status of fighters should be acknowledged and rewarded by society
- Benefits offered must be financially sustainable
- Pension system should be independent of the legal and technical basis of the DDR programme

Alternative approaches to addressing disarmament and unregulated weapons

D-D-R sequencing flexibility

- Achieve the overall DDR objective through the flexible sequencing of different phases of DDR commensurate with the progress in the political process
- **Benefits:** Maintains the momentum of the peace process
- **Examples:** Burundi; Macedonia; Afghanistan; Côte d’Ivoire

Where:
- Disarmament may not be possible as a first step
- There is lack of political will
- There is ongoing conflict / low levels of security
- Combatants are already in their communities or close to home

Considerations:
- Earlier reinsertion and reintegration can build trust; provide peace dividends and pave the way for formal disarmament
- Helps overcome sensitive political issues surrounding disarmament and demobilization whilst providing a strong incentive for beneficiaries to put weapons beyond use
- Way to link security imperatives with economic/development incentives
- Some militias and/or armed groups may still (in ‘post’ conflict setting) be supported by international actors
- Possibility of rewarding combatants without disarmament and demobilization if the process fails through
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons management and reduction approaches</th>
<th>Manage, organize and control proliferation of arms</th>
<th>Where:</th>
<th>Considerations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third-party verification of weapons storage/management regime</td>
<td></td>
<td>Includes both ex-combatants and the general population</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Registries and licensing systems; Legal restrictions on ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pervasive armed violence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Voluntary or externally mandated weapons collection and destruction</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic incentives associated with weapon ownership</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Benefits: Reduces the accessibility of weapons. Confidence-building measure.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Links with organized crime</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Examples: Nepal; Afghanistan; West Africa – SALW programme across region</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity of State institutions especially in the area of rule of law</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disarmament and dismantlement of militias</td>
<td>Proliferation of irregular, decentralized armed groups and/or organized crime</td>
<td>Requires legal frameworks (laws on weapons ownership) and a means to enforce this (police, judiciary etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programmes targeted at irregular armed groups (e.g. militias and criminal gangs)</td>
<td>No clear political / ideological motivation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May follow similar processes as DDR (i.e. registration of weapons and personnel; information collection; referral and counseling; and reintegration), but with special consideration for different motives, agendas and political dynamics involved</td>
<td>Socio-economic drivers for joining irregular armed groups (e.g. high levels of youth unemployment and a lack of alternate structures for youth to benefit from)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benefits: Addresses a potential spoiler which is often not included in the macro-level peace agreement</td>
<td>Where there is:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Examples: Afghanistan; Haiti; Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Proliferation of irregular, decentralized armed groups and/or organized crime</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-signatory groups that need to be taken into account outside of the political framework offered by the peace agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No clear political / ideological motivation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-economic drivers for joining irregular armed groups (e.g. high levels of youth unemployment and a lack of alternate structures for youth to benefit from)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weapons for development and weapons lotteries</td>
<td>Where there are:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary (and incentive based) weapons collection in exchange for community development projects (e.g. wells, schools, seed banks, media access)</td>
<td>Diverse arms-holders or arms proliferation throughout civilian population (e.g. irregular armed groups)</td>
<td>Deep knowledge of community dynamics required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local participatory processes to determine priorities</td>
<td>Sense of security and trust (will not work if there is a perception that arms are needed for self-protection)</td>
<td>Development-oriented</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Transfer disarmament responsibility from individual to community</td>
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<td>Demand-driven and bottom-up</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Benefits: Transfers the ownership of weapon reduction to communities. By making communities involved, they become stakeholders in the process.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Participation is voluntary and incentive driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Examples: Albania (1st pilot project); Mali; Cambodia; Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td>Requires careful sequencing and phasing with conventional DDR</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Relatively expensive, but benefit beyond mere disarmament; towards development</td>
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ANNEX II
COUNTRY EXAMPLES OF POLICY OPTIONS

The policy options below are listed in the order that they appear in the text.

Hot-spot assessment tools and stabilization strategies in Liberia and Afghanistan

Hot-spot assessments in Liberia
In Liberia, UNMIL’s JMAC and the RRR Section conduct hot-spot assessments to monitor potential security threats and identify reintegration gaps. The assessments identify situations with specific and outstanding reintegration challenges, including the engagement of former combatants in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. One comprehensive assessment found that former commanders were often leading illegal resource exploitation activities, indicating that command structures were still intact. Subsequently, projects were implemented to break these remaining chains of command, reintegrate former combatants and gain governmental control over key natural resource areas. For example, the NGO Landmine Action used information from hot-spot assessments to strategically locate agricultural training centers for ex-combatants near hubs of illegal rubber operations and areas of unrest.

Integrated Approach Working Group in Afghanistan
Under the aegis of the Integrated Approach Working Group, the Afghan government, UNAMA and ISAF are conducting joint district level mappings in security-challenged areas to allow better targeting and coordination of programmes that they and other partners are running. In the context of an active insurgency, the approach also aims to increase government visibility within the growing number of districts that are becoming inaccessible to the government. The programme targets ten “action districts” where security is worsening or where there is capacity for it to improve. This involves the conduct of conflict-sensitive, bottom-up assessments of local challenges which are then synthesized and merged into a joint analysis. To date, progress with this innovative approach has been slow, largely due to the extensive and time consuming work involved in the district level mapping exercises. It has also been challenged by the lack of high-level engagement by all relevant parties to ensure compliance and genuine coordination, as well as difficulties in reconciling security and development approaches as some UNCT members are hesitant to be seen as a part of ISAF’s counter insurgency strategy.
A local NGO called the Liaison Office (TLO) is also undertaking district level participatory conflict assessments with a “do no harm” approach, on various provincial, district and specific areas and projects. The assessments seek to provide: (1) information about provincial context and community needs, especially in relation to the economy and service delivery; (2) information about social structures (ethnic, religious, tribal), inter-group relations and power dynamics on a district level; (3) overview of governance, rule of law and security from the perspective of district residents; (4) background of key actors (local, national and international) and potential for peace spoilers and peacebuilders; and (5) analysis of the structural causes of violent conflict, conflict dynamics and factors that could accelerate or decelerate conflict. The TLO has undertaken numerous conflict assessments, and is mainly working in the more volatile Southeastern and Eastern part of the country.

Emergency employment in Afghanistan and Liberia

Reconstruction work in Afghanistan

Since 2002, Government-led emergency employment programmes have been in place in Afghanistan with a view to reconstructing important roads and bridges and creating job opportunities for ex-combatants and vulnerable groups. Funded by a $19.6 million Japan Social Development Fund grant, the National Emergency Employment Program for Reintegration and Alternative Livelihood also focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants and sought to provide alternatives to poppy production. In 2003, the programme was redesigned as the National Emergency Employment Program for Rural Access (NEEPRA) with a US$20.4 million World Bank IDA grant and is ongoing in 2009. NEEPRA has generated 2.7 million unskilled labour days.
Repairing infrastructure in Liberia

The Government of Liberia, the UN and the World Bank have prioritized the creation of short-term job opportunities for communities and demobilized ex-combatants in recognition of the effect of unemployment on stability and the sustainability of DDR. In 2006, UNMIL and the World Bank joined forces to address employment principally through the repair of vital road networks. Soon after, the partnership became a four-way collaboration between UNMIL, the Ministry of Public Works, UNDP and the World Bank. The collaboration has undertaken several labor-intensive road rehabilitation projects to provide short-term employment for community members and war-affected populations, while simultaneously opening up important market routes that are necessary for economic recovery and promoting social cohesion. Partners’ roles were defined by their specific capacities and added value to the programme, for example UNMIL coordinated the partnership and provided technical expertise and construction equipment. UNDP managed the project funds disbursed by the World Bank as well as materials and equipment. UNHCR implemented work on one of the roads, whilst the Government of Liberia helped select priority roads and provided engineering expertise.

One such project, the rehabilitation of the Gbaranga-Zorzor and Zwedru-Tappita roadways, produced more than 8,000 jobs and opened up access to markets needed to revitalize economic activity. An evaluation of projects indicated that petty crimes and domestic violence incidences were reduced, and many beneficiaries invested a portion of their earnings into income generation ventures, suggesting links to longer-term employment. This ongoing programme has been lauded as a role model in joint delivery of activities towards peace consolidation. Across all emergency employment programmes in Liberia, women constituted 15–31% of the labor force. Other emergency employment programmes include a WFP project, in partnership with UNMIL and the Ministry of Public Works, which has provided “food for work” for the rehabilitation of roads and bridges. Building on this inter-agency coordination, some have recommended an independent Bureau for Emergency Employment within the Ministry of Labor to further increase government ministry coordination on these issues.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Reinsertion programmes in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone

1,000 micro-projects programme in Côte d’Ivoire

The 1,000 micro-projects programme was launched in Côte d’Ivoire in 2008 in order to provide economic alternatives to violence and sustainable livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants, militia members, youth associated with armed conflict and at-risk youth. The initial programme was implemented in areas that pose ongoing security threats with US$4 million in funding from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). While UNOCI’s DDR section, in partnership with UNDP, is leading the programme, NGOs, community based organizations and UN agencies are also responsible for implementation. The programme is designed to provide education, professional training and income generating activities, as well as psycho-social support and public sensitization and awareness of the need to reintegrate former-combatants. The training period is followed up by on-the-job support, and participants are expected to launch their own business. Micro-projects include agricultural projects, fish farming and animal husbandry (chicken, cattle, pigs, rabbits), small business development (shopkeeping, mechanic workshops, telephone booths), motorbike taxis and small scale industry (such as soap making), and the cost of the programme is around US$700-1,000 per participant.

While the programme is ongoing and it is too early to properly assess long-term impacts, many actors, including the government, consider the programme successful in achieving its objectives and many of the projects have already started a second production cycle with little or no outside support.

Stop-gap projects in Sierra Leone

In 2002, UNAMSIL and the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) implemented the “Early Warning – Proactive Response Stop-gap Programme” to support the reintegration process through reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure and short-term jobs creation. The programme was funded by UNDP, with cost-sharing by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID). Community-based, labor intensive, quick impact projects were implemented in places identified as key areas of unrest and instability [see Hot-spot assessments and stabilization strategies policy option] in an effort to bridge the gap between the payment of conventional reinsertion benefits and the implementation of the Reintegration Opportunities Programme, which was progressing slowly. UNAMSIL and the NCDDR also recognized the need to provide economic opportunities as an alternative to violence, while improving access to rural areas for economic revitalization. Former combatants and vulnerable community members received wages and food aid for labor in the rehabilitation of infrastructure and agriculture. In addition to improving the security situation, evaluations also indicate that the programme contributed to the return of international and local NGOs, helped to build a culture of peaceful conflict resolution and fostered reconciliation by having community members and ex-combatants work side-by-side. A similar stop-gap programme was also implemented in Somalia under the title of UNPOS Stop-Gap/Job Creation for Post-conflict Stabilization and Peacebuilding.
Community Violence Reduction (CVR) in Haiti and Afghanistan

CVR in Haiti

After determining that traditional DDR is inappropriate for Haiti, the Security Council requested MINUSTAH in 2006 to reorient DDR into a Community Violence Reduction (CVR) strategy. In the twelve most violence affected areas, community forums of approximately 100 members representing all civic groupings and led by the mayor’s office identify and prioritize actions to address problems of violence. Violence is often associated with racketeering networks, inter-personal violence (including high levels of domestic violence) and gang violence, which can be politicized. Grants of up to $100,000 are given to the respective communities for use in temporary employment creation programmes that specifically target at-risk youth.

The current approach (with a $3 million annual budget) appears to be contributing to lowering gang violence through the training of former gang members, and by providing temporary livelihood alternatives for at-risk youth. Crime rates have significantly lowered in some communities, while 42 projects provide direct income to over 14,000 laborers; vocational skills for 600 at-risk youths; skills training for 780 former armed inmates; medical/legal assistance and skills training for 100 women victims of violence. In parallel, the programme supports access to justice for women and youth survivors of violence, support to entrepreneurs in at-risk neighborhoods, education opportunities for children from marginalized areas, and prisoner reinsertion opportunities in two of Haiti’s prisons. These projects are intended to reduce impunity for those involved in violence, and to provide positive incentives for communities to invest in their own community development. The programme is also supporting the development of arms legislation and institutional capacity building in this regard.

Sustainable impacts are however interlinked with longer-term livelihood options, major progress on security sector reform, including rule of law, and the rooting out of corrupt high level political elements that manipulate gangs and undermine community security.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Enhancing community security in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, security within communities is closely linked to the overall national security situation. A project currently piloted in six districts of Wardok province involves the establishment of Afghan Public Protection Forces (APPF). These forces, drawn from community members selected by the district shura (council), receive a three-week training by Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and are entrusted to defend the community. While some worry that this could undermine the legitimization of local police, US officials underscore that the force will complement but not replace police functions, and might potentially facilitate the recruitment of police officers who could be drawn from within the ranks of the APPF. They stress that the APPF is not a “tribal militia” since members are drawn from different tribes and villages. In this region, beset in recent years with conflict over grazing rights between the migrant Kuchi and those settled on the land, the APPF may offer a forum for groups to collectively manage their tensions. Presently the APPF members are making about $100 per month, compared with police salaries of $120.

FOR MORE INFORMATION


Disarmament and dismantlement of militias (DDM) in Afghanistan and Côte d’Ivoire

Disbandment of illegal armed groups in Afghanistan

The government-led, and UNDP/UNAMA supported, Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) project in Afghanistan is a follow-up programme to Afghanistan’s 2003-04 DDR programme which addressed the 63,000 Afghan Military Forces (AMF). An estimated 1,800 illegally armed groups (IAGs) holding approximately 56,000 weapons remain a threat. It is believed that many did not participate in the first DDR programme as a result of factional rivalries. DIAG aims to voluntarily disarm illegally armed groups in exchange for a development dividend for their community of residence, although progress has been hampered by the slow delivery of projects. The programme is now developing interim quick impact projects that seek to provide alternative livelihood benefits to both former IAGs, their families and the wider communities. Additionally, the programme supports the development of a private security company (PSC) registration system, which is absorbing some of these groups into...
legitimate alternative livelihood options. A challenge remains in containing the numbers of such groups, and providing incentives that can sufficiently challenge what they are able to sell a weapon for on the market – approximately US$200.

Disarming militias in Afghanistan is complicated by the strengthening of the insurgency which has led the Government, the ISAF, the US and other donor countries, as well as various UN actors to contemplate, and in some cases test, different approaches aimed at enhancing community security. Some view the empowerment of tribal structures to defend themselves (which they have historically done) as a common sense approach in the absence of strong local state and security sector presence. Others view “arming tribal militias” as a conflict generating approach which directly counters disarmament efforts, creating regional security imbalances and exacerbating fears of insecurity and perceptions of injustice, in addition to undermining efforts to create a viable, legitimate security sector. In some cases, irregular armed groups are being hired to assist with the counter insurgency or to even offer forms of protection in support of the insurgency.

DDM in Côte d’Ivoire

There have been several attempts at DDM in Côte d’Ivoire, starting in 2006 when a DDM operation was launched in the West of the country. Although some 2,000 pro-Government militia members were originally targeted, the effort was halted after 981 militia members had been processed due to the low weapons to combatant ratio. Only 110 weapons were collected and it is assumed that the militia's remaining weapons had either been hidden or returned to their original suppliers. A second attempt was made in May 2008 when a weapons destruction ceremony was held; however, no further progress was made on this issue until February 2009, when the Integrated Command Center (ICC) and the National Programme for the Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation (PNRRC) started operations to profile and dismantle militia groups in the West of the country. This process was completed in May 2009 and resulted in the profiling of 37,436 militia members. The militia members are due to receive reinsertion benefits that include a CFA 500,000 “demobilization allowance” and the possibility to access reinsertion programmes put in place for ex-combatants and youth-at-risk [see Reinsertion policy option]. Concerns over the high number of profiled members has prompted a re-assessment of the eligibility criteria and it is expected that by excluding those under 18 at the time of the troubles and those over a certain age the number of eligible beneficiaries can be reduced to around 27,000.

Although these militia have been profiled and dismantled, disarmament has remained a challenge. As with the wider DDR process in Côte d’Ivoire, very few weapons have been collected and rather than a full fledged disarmament programme the parties have opted for an alternative, which is “putting weapons beyond use” – i.e. kept in barracks, guarded by international forces. Weapons collected as part of the DDM programme are stored by the ICC (which includes members of both the national security services and the Forces nouvelles military) under the supervision of UNOCI. It should be noted that whereas this has worked for DDM (possibly due to the very small number of weapons involved) in the wider DDR programme, the Government does not support weapons control for its own forces, articulating
its right to maintain its weapons for security. The *Forces nouvelles* has insisted on reciprocity and demanded that the weapons handed in as a part of the DDR exercise be returned to them for storage under their own supervision.

**FOR MORE INFORMATION**


**Commanders Incentive Programmes in Afghanistan and Mozambique**

**Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP)**

UNDP’s ANBP identified strong social networks between Afghan commanders and their soldiers as a particular threat to security and a successful DDR process. In response, a Commanders Incentive Programmes with a budget of US$5 million was established to ensure the commanders fast and smooth transition from military to civilian life. Overall, the Commanders Incentive Programme was a useful and cost-effective tool to contribute to further long-term initiatives. It bought time to stabilize and to open the gap for other DDR measures. 335 ex-commanders were selected to be provided with intensive business training, while living in groups, for a period of one month at the Afghan Institute for Training in Management (AITM). Several of them were then able to start their own small businesses, while eleven were taken on a field trip to study democratic governance in action in Japan, three of whom later successfully ran for parliament. As many commanders were inclined to run for political office, the government-led DIAG part of the ANBP overall programme sought to screen nominees to government posts by cross-referencing names in their illegally armed groups (IAG) database. Of 221 screened candidates 74 were rejected because of connections to IAGs. Seventy-two former commanders who were already established “Government Officials with Links to Illegal Armed Groups” (GOLIAGs) were also targeted, and 20 remained non-compliant and in office.

**Reintegration Support Scheme in Mozambique**

In Mozambique, the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) implemented a minimalist reintegration programme. This programme primarily relied on the provision of financial support
to combatants over a period of 24 months, in an effort to “pay them and scatter them” to remove them from the conflict equation quickly. Soldiers were paid according to their rank. Following the conflict, Mozambique became a significant transit land for organized criminal activities, such as the drug trade, and former combatants occupying positions within the military and police force played a major role in facilitating this. Involvement in such activities provided a viable alternative revenue since Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) ex-combatants were not eligible for state pensions, as were Forca Aérea De Moçambique (FAM) members. While senior UN management was suggesting that senior officers and generals could have been given shares in newly-privatized industries to buy their participation in the process and to deter their criminal activity, donors remained reluctant to give the most brutal of the soldiers the most generous packages. Instead, many commanders ended up joining organized crime networks.17

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**FOR MORE INFORMATION**


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**At-risk youth and gang programmes in Haiti, Sierra Leone and the United States**

**Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme in Sierra Leone**

The Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme in Sierra Leone was initiated in 2005 to provide rapid employment opportunities and income generating activities to youth through public works, private sector initiatives and self-employment programmes (see Emergency employment programmes and Reinsertion programmes policy options). The National Youth Employment Programme (YEP) aims to prevent the further marginalization of young people and to increase their capacity to participate in decision-making processes in an effort to decrease incentives for participation in conflict and armed groups. With a budget of US$9,342,054, the programme also seeks to improve the capacity of the government, particularly the Ministry of Youth and Sports, to strengthen and expand ongoing youth initiatives with YEP. The programme is financed through a UNDP-managed basket fund in partnership with the government and the Peacebuilding Fund.
Community violence reduction and Viva Rio in Haiti

In conjunction with the CVR programme established by MINUSTAH, Viva Rio (a Brazil-based NGO) implemented the Mobilization, Disarmament and Inclusion into Society (MDI) programme to address the root causes of youth-associated violence, which is a key security issue in Haiti. The programme brought together strategies for SSR, gun control, anti-organized crime initiatives, education, job training, access to social services, family care programmes and reconciliation using an innovative approach that involved music scholarships and community events. MDI was initiated in the Bel-Air neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, with the signing of a “micro-peace agreement” between leaders of various armed groups. The programme was initiated and monitored by Viva Rio and the National Commission on DDR, in partnership with MINUSTAH.

Anti-gang strategies in the United States

Projects, such as the House of Umoja in Philadelphia, provide useful models for reducing the risks of violence associated with a high youth population. Developed in response to the severely high gang-related crimes in the 1970s, House of Umoja focuses on youth from ages 15–18, emphasizing self esteem and responsibility through individual and group counseling, service to others and a redefining of work associated with virtue, goal setting and conflict resolution. Peer role models have also been used in other projects to capitalize on dynamics present in youth relationships. These measures can be applied to post-conflict projects to empower youth to meaningfully contribute to the wellbeing of their communities and sustain peace. Importantly, these programmes not only reduce the likelihood of youth participation in immediate violence, but also provide long-term solutions for job opportunities and life skills development.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Pension Programme in Liberia

Long-term measures in Liberia

The signing in Accra on 18 August 2003 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia (GOL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties put an end to the civil war in Liberia. This document included provisions for the restructuring of the Liberian security services, including the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). UNMIL was mandated by Security Council resolution 1509 in conjunction with ECOWAS and other interested states (such as the United States of America) to assist in this process. As part of the restructuring of the AFL, approximately 10,000 AFL personnel were de-activated and a new, much smaller army was recruited and trained by US advisors. All deactivated AFL personnel received a deactivation grant, however, 4,625 AFL members who had been a part of the Liberian security services before December 1989 were also considered to be eligible for a pension, to be provided by the Government of Liberia at an estimated cost of some $2.1 million per year. The remaining 4,500 AFL “war recruits” were disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated through the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) process. The payment of the pension and other benefits (including salary arrears) promised to the deactivated personnel has remained a sensitive issue and the last five years have been punctuated by regular, often violent demonstrations by de-activated security service personnel.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

- Will Bartlett and Merita Xhumari “Social Security Policy and Pension Reforms in the Western Balkans”
- Alejandro Bendaña “War Veterans Policies – A Comparative Study.” (World Bank, 2002)
- For a comprehensive, up-to-date resource for designing and implementing pension reforms please see: www.worldbank.org/pensions

Psycho-social recovery strategies in Liberia, Afghanistan and Colombia

Peer counseling and community relationship centers in Liberia

Seeking to address gaps in reintegration efforts, the YMCA in Liberia has sought to create opportunities that link livelihood development, psycho-social recovery and reconciliation. Specifically they are setting up community relationship centers, alongside other leadership and vocational training activities, for those engaged in the taxi business, many of whom are
former combatants and youths at risk of engaging in conflict. With special competence in addressing the psycho-social dimension, they are seeking to promote positive behavioral change through civic education and peer mediation training and counseling. The reintegration experience in Liberia has led the YMCA to believe that psycho-social healing works best through peers, who former combatants feel they can relate to more easily and trust more than national or international professionals. Strategically, they work to shift the trust and feelings of attachment that ex-combatants had towards commanders, to their communities. The US$250,000 project is supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund.

**Promoting disarmament and peace messages through community and religious leaders in Afghanistan**

The Government of Afghanistan and UNDP, through the DIAG project, are working to involve eminent nationals, local community leaders and religious leaders in developing strategies and messages around disarmament and peace. In a recent (April 2009) Workshop for Tribal Elders of the critical South and South-eastern provinces, participants identified obstacles to the DIAG process, while ministers reiterated in strong terms the importance of traditional tribal structures and tribal elders in restoring peace and stability in the country. The enhanced collaboration with the Tribal and Borders Affairs Ministry is expected to prove vital for future public outreach efforts in the most volatile and difficult areas of the country.

A workshop for religious scholars was also held, resulting in Mullahs collaborating with DIAG by, for instance, incorporating the DIAG message into their Friday prayers.

**Local government-led reintegration in Colombia**

Colombia, which has conducted DDR of paramilitary personnel and defectors from other armed groups since 2002, has been widely acknowledged for its inclusion of psycho-social programming in its DDR approach. The Government has engaged hundreds of psychologists to work specifically with the ex-combatants. The reintegration programme for paramilitaries in Medellin has been cited as a strong example of psycho-social activities being led at a sub-national level. Unlike other programmes in Colombia and elsewhere, the Medellin reintegration programme was developed by the mayor of the city and his administration and was funded with local resources. Psycho-social recovery activities included group counseling for former combatants and their families and encounter groups for victims, their families and perpetrators to promote reconciliation and cohesion. The innovations of the Medellin programme have been incorporated into the national reintegration programme. However, there were shortcomings in the programme, for instance, funding did not support individual counseling, coverage was limited to the city and some have observed a reconfiguration of paramilitaries into an “urban mafia” that provides security in the absence of state authority and protection.
D-D-R sequencing flexibility in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire and Bouganville

Sequencing flexibility in Afghanistan

DDR efforts in Afghanistan require a highly flexible approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities given the ongoing insurgency. While the 2003–2004 DDR programme targeted the former Afghan Military Forces (AMF) following a classically sequenced approach, a realization soon followed that some Afghans would not give up arms in the face of ongoing security threats. In Afghanistan owning arms for self-protection is legal and culturally and historically sanctioned within communities, nation-wide. Additionally, in the absence of well-established civil, security and rule of law institutions at local levels, armed groups have held onto their weapons to ensure economic gain in Afghanistan’s war economy. In response, rather than disarm people, UNDP’s Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), through its DIAG programme, as well as UNAMA’s Integrated Approach Working Group are considering alternative weapons management approaches. These include regulating and monitoring the ownership of weapons and empowering weapons holders to function as security guards for their communities as well as accompanying peace and development projects that include greater attention to local governance structures. [See Weapons management and reduction approaches, Sub-national/community approaches to security and violence reduction policy options, Hot-spot/security and stabilization task forces strategies policy options].

“Disarmament by default” in Côte d’Ivoire

In Côte d’Ivoire, the formal DDR process has been stalled in the last two years. At the same time, the understanding of key components of DDR continuously shift with successive follow-up agreements, the latest one of which is the Ouagadougou Political Agreement IV, signed in 2008. Numerous peace agreements have involved at times, conflicting DDR provisions. UNOCI has put forward the concept of “disarmament by default,” which alters conventional
D-D-R sequencing. The hope is that successful reinsertion will prepare the ground for future disarmament and possibly weapons management measures. The 1,000 micro-projects programme was launched in 2008 to provide socio-economic reinsertion options to combatants who had not yet been formally disarmed, militias, and youth-at-risk. These include educational, psycho-social and job-assistance measures (see Reinsertion programmes policy options). While the lack of disarmament was a major hurdle to the political process, which called for disarmament to take place prior to elections, the “disarmament by default” approach has provided a middle way in which to move forward with the political process in advance of formal disarmament. Moreover, those involved in the 1,000 micro-projects programme have been provided with an alternate livelihood which means that although their weapons remain with their units, the programme participants have indicated that they have no desire to take them up again.

Disarmament after political guarantees are met in Bouganville

In Bouganville, much like in Nepal, demilitarization was tied to a political process involving constitutional reform. Weapons disposal was therefore not discussed when it was clear that this would not work. Rather, disarmament went hand in hand with a referendum on the island’s autonomous status within the Papua New Guinea (PNG) constitution. Steps were taken by each party in tandem to advance the process. Bouganville’s ex-combatant groups had to move weapons to storage when the PNG government enacted constitutional amendments implementing the agreement and upon the withdrawal of its forces from Bouganville. At the same time, constitutional amendments did not come into effect until the UN Observer Mission in Bouganville (UNOMB) verified completion of stage two of the weapons disposal (secure containment).

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Weapons Management in Afghanistan and West Africa

Weapons Management through DIAG in Afghanistan

The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programme, under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, and supported by UNDP and UNAMA, targets the disbandment of irregular groups until 2011. Afghanistan illustrates specific challenges with respect to weapons management where there is an ongoing insurgency and the international community could be considered to be taking a conflicting approach to the issue by, in some parts of the country, providing resources to communities (or arming militias) so that they can defend themselves, while disarming similar groups in other areas. Regulating weapons use and groups who are legally entitled to use them, offers a critical alternative to disarmament in this tense setting (see Sub-national/community approaches to security and violence reduction). Weapons management measures include the setting up of a database that registers and licenses personal weapons. Private security companies are also being registered, aiming to provide a legitimate livelihood alternative for some of these groups. A contract registration system is being designed.

SALW in West Africa

Weapons management in West Africa tackles a huge small arms and light weapons (SALW) problem with 4–8 million weapons circulating the region and 77,000 in the hands of major insurgent groups as well as smaller irregular armed groups and criminal networks. Arms have been flowing into the region since the Cold War, although today leakages from army depots, diversion of legal imports and the development of illicit domestic manufacturing capabilities lie at the heart of the problem. ECOWAS is attempting a regional solution, through the 1998 Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa (ECOWAS Moratorium). National Commissions of member countries oversee its implementation, which includes: the establishment of a Regional Arms Register and Database as well as a separate Peacekeeping Arms Register; training of professional security personnel to monitor, document, and stop the illicit flow of arms in the sub-region; and harmonization of laws, enhancement of border controls and arms collection and destruction. Between 1996 and 2003, the region was able to collect and destroy some 44,000 weapons. The overall number of weapons as well as a lack of funding has hindered the initiative, although, in 2004, UNDP-initiated the ECOWAS Small Arms Project (ECOSAP), introduced with a five-year budget of $31.4 billion to renew the Moratorium process. Results depend heavily on the socio-economic and security realities within the member countries. Initiatives to address SALW in a more locally owned fashion have grown from civil society, and have helped to carry the message of the little known Moratorium to local communities.
FOR MORE INFORMATION


Weapons for Development in Albania and Sierra Leone

Weapons for development in Albania

The first Weapons for Development project in Gramsh district in Albania, 1998–2001 was initiated during an economic crisis and followed the looting of government weapons depots of 656,000 arms. In this setting, not only ex-combatants held arms, but also large groups of civilians. The government budget was strained and, due to the risk of inflation from buy-back revenues, the capacity for a traditional buy-back programme did not exist due to huge numbers of arms. Ultimately, a modest 23,079 weapons were collected at the cost of US$207 per collected weapon. Nonetheless, the project raised public awareness and fostered support for further disarmament efforts. Huge media coverage of the project soon drove other districts to call for their own projects and cleared the way for a follow-up project (2003–2005) that was solely Albanian-led.

Arms for Development in Sierra Leone

Arms for Development in Sierra Leone started in 2002 as a follow-up project to classic DDR programmes which had been interrupted by a brief resumption of the conflict. A pilot project targeted four chiefdoms that were first encouraged to collect and hand over weapons and were then searched by the Sierra Leone Police. If no weapons were found, the communities were awarded a weapons-free certificate and a grant of 40 million Leones (around US$15,000) for the implementation of a community development project. The project was later successively extended to the whole country. In 2004, with an overall budget of US$891,153 it was possible to collect 1,892 weapons, limit illicit cross border trade, and implement development projects, thereby contributing to the UN’s overall effort to diffuse an extremely tense security situation. While the project was managed by UNDP in cooperation with the Sierra Leone government, the presence of unamsil critically provided the operating environment within which such an approach could unfold.
Weapons lotteries in the Balkans

As a legacy from the war of 1992–1995 an estimated 19% of the population is said to hold arms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2006, UNDP introduced a lottery to encourage civilians to hand in their weapons. In Macedonia, weapons lotteries took an even more unconventional approach. During a TV show on 1 November 2003 participants had to surrender a weapon before taking part in the lottery which included prizes such as a car, motor scooter, computer, mountain bike, cell phones and sewing machines. From the estimated 170,000 weapons remaining in the region, only 900 were collected during this period of amnesty. However, awareness-raising via the television show was considered to have further positive impacts in weapons reduction, though difficult to measure.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

- Derek Miller, Daniel Ladouceur and Zoe Dugal, “From Research to Road Map: Learning from the Arms for Development Initiative in Sierra Leone” (UNIDIR, 2006).
The research process involved a wide desk study undertaken to identify trends in Second Generation activities to date, in-depth field visits to Haiti, Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, and a total of 170 semi-structured interviews. (Interviews were conducted in the case countries, at headquarters, and with independent experts.) These cases were chosen given the innovative Second Generation activities that are being attempted to address difficult DDR contexts. Each of the field visits examined the evolution of DDR approaches, the contexts within which efforts have been undertaken, and obstacles to DDR implementation. Focus was given to consideration of Second Generation activities in peace operation contexts – some of which are quite new and thus it is early for formal assessment. Nonetheless, attention was given to the following criteria for evaluating these initiatives:

- **Relevance and strategic positioning**: The comparative advantage and added value of DPKO to undertake these activities, alongside and in coordination with other partners
- **Responsiveness**: How and why such programmes are better able to respond to changing security and stabilization contexts
- **Sustainability**: The potential for second generation activities to be sustainable beyond the lifetime of a peacekeeping operation, and the degree to which national capacities in place to provide leadership in such programmes and communities to absorb them
- **Conflict sensitivity**: The ways in which second generation activities are responding to identified conflict factors in their design and implementation

There were limitations to the study, including the limited human resources as compared the scope of the research. It is also worth highlighting the difficulties of ascertaining clearly articulated information on second generation activities in many cases, particularly where peacekeeping missions are in the lead and there is no project document or progress reports laying out the precise nature and scope of activities and their results. In some cases this is because the efforts are relatively new, and in others, because there is no culture of programme design and management like that found within UN agencies.
ANNEX IV
AUTHORS AND INTERVIEWEES

Authors
Consultant and main author: Erin McCandless
Senior Research Assistant: Courtenay Siegfried
Research Assistants: Therese Suckow; Elizabeth Buckley; Dianna English

Research back-stopping team in the DDR Section of DPKO
Coordination Officers: Saïd Condé; Sergiusz Sidorowicz
Editors: Lotta Hagman, Elizabeth Kissam, Simon Yazgi, Ayaka Suzuki
Proof-readers: Charles Andreo, Claire O’Connell

List of Interviewees
United Nations Headquarters: New York
Jens Andersen, Chief of Policy and Doctrine, Office of Military Affairs (OMA), DPKO
Margaret Carey, Director, Africa Division I, Office of Operations (OO), DPKO
Andrew Carpenter, Chief, Strategic Planning, Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), DPKO
Saïd Condé, DDR Officer, DDR Section, OROLSI, DPKO
Radha Day, Political Affairs Officer, Asia and Middle East Division, OO, DPKO
Bruno Donat, Policy and Planning Officer, DDR Section, OROLSI, DPKO
Peter Due, Team Leader, West Africa Integrated Operation Team (IOT), Africa Division II OO, DPKO
Renata Dwan, Coordination Officer, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS), Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), DPKO
Abedeji Ebo, Chief, Security Sector Reform Unit, OROLSI, DPKO
Samuel Gahigi, Political Affairs Officer, Africa Division II, OO, DPKO
David Haeri, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General, DPKO
David Harland, Director of the Europe and Latin America Division, OO, DPKO
Paul Keating, Acting Deputy Chief, PBPS, DPET, DPKO
Elizabeth Kissam, Associate Programme Officer, Office of the Assistant-Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO
Corrina Kuhl, Acting Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPET, DPKO
Sebastien Lapierre, Research Officer, PBPS, DPET, DPKO
Sunaina Lowe, Coordination Officer, DPET, DPKO
Wendy McClinchy, Best Practices Officer, PBPS, DPET, DPKO
Gloria Ntegeye, Political Affairs Officer, West Africa Integrated Operation Team (IOT), Africa Division II, OO, DPKO
Kelvin Ong, Senior Political Affairs Officer, DPA
Robert Pulver, Chief, Criminal Law and Judiciary Advisory Section, OROLSI, DPKO
Nikolai Rogosaroff, Policy and Planning Officer, DDR Section, OROLSI, DPKO
Julien Serre, Financing for Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office
Sergiusz Sidorowicz, DDR Officer, DDR Section, OROLSI, DPKO
Nishkala Suntharalingam, Political Affairs Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, DPKO
Ayaka Suzuki, Chief, DDR Section, OROLSI, DPKO
Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO
Sofia Wartmann, Political Affairs Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, DPKO
Nita Yawanarajah, Political Affairs Officer, DPA
Simon Yazgi, Policy and Planning Officer, DDR Section, OROLSI, DPKO
Raisedon Zenenga, Director of Africa Division I, OO, DPKO

**UN Agencies: New York and Geneva**

Sophie da Câmara Santa Clara Gomes, Senior DDR Adviser, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP
Shukuko Koyama, Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction, International Labour Organisation
Priya Marwah, Programme Analyst, United Nations Population Fund
Dean Piedmont, DDR Programme Specialist, BCPR, UNDP
Cornelis Steenken, Coordinator, Inter-agency Working Group on DDR
Afghanistan

UNAMA and the UNCT
Heather Barr, Senior Programme Officer, Democratization and Civil Society Empowerment Unit, UNDP
Manoj Basnyat, Country Director, UNDP
Stephen Brooking, DIAG Transition Coordinator, UNDP
Anne Fahler, UN Country Team Coordination Officer, UNAMA
Jamie Graves, Program Manager, National Area Based Development Programme, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development / UNDP
Lieutenant Colonel, Peter Haindl, Military Advisor, UNAMA
Nick Horne, Development Officer, ANDS Support Unit, UNAMA
Minna Jarvenpaa, Head of Analysis and Planning Unit, UNAMA
Christian Lamarre, Joint Secretariat Coordination Manager, DIAG, UNDP
Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Representative, Country Office for Afghanistan, UNODC
Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Martins, Military Advisor, UNAMA
Talatbek Masadykov, Chief of Political Affairs, UNAMA
Stephanie McPhail, Acting Head, Rule of Law Unit, UNAMA
Malik Qais Mehri, Development Officer, DIAG
Shahmahmood Miakhel, Governance Officer, ODSRSG, UNAMA
Kavil A. Mohan, Programme Director / Acting Director, ANBP/UNDP
Vadim Nazarov, Senior Political Affairs Officer, UNAMA
Alexander Nicholas, Legal Adviser, Head, Officer of Legal Affairs, UNAMA
David Oldfield, Reporting / Donor Relations Officer, ANBP/UNDP
Mustaq Rahim, BPCR/UNDP
Gagan Rajbhandari, Coordinator for Afghanistan, ILO
Peter Schmitz, Chief of Staff, UNAMA

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Aziz Ahmadzai, Director, Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), Joint Secretariat
Mohammad Daud Ali, Operations Manager, DIAG/ANBP/UNDP
General Aziz, Ministry of Defense Representative for Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups, Ministry of Defense
Major General Abdul Manan “Farahi,” Chief of Counter Terrorism, DIAG Joint Secretariat, Ministry of the Interior
Masoom Stanekzai, Vice Chair of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission
Partners

Bailey Hand, Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) to Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF)

Makoto Honda, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan

Lubna Khan, Political-Military Affairs Officer, Embassy of the United States of America

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kubik, Public Affairs Director, Combined Security Transition Command Alpha (CSTC-A)

Brigadier General Anne F. Macdonald, CSTC-A, Deputy to the Commanding General, Police Development

Susanne Schmeidl, Tribal Liaison Office, Afghanistan

Dr. J. Sherwood McGinnis, Political Advisor to COMISAF, U.S. Department of State

Kyoko Okano, Attaché, Embassy of Japan

Colin Townson, Political/Military Affairs Officer, Embassy of Canada

Gardez field visit

Ali Ahmad Mobarez Mobarez, Head of Provincial National Directorate of Security

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Campbell, ISAF, Maneuver, Battalion Commander

CPT Don Moss, Chief of Intelligence Operations. ISAF, PRT Paktya

General Ruhi, Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups, Representative, Ministry of Defense

Christophe Sivillon, Political Affairs Officer, UNAMA

Major Herbert Skinner, ISAF, Maneuver Battalion, Executive Officer

Parekh Vikram, Head of UNAMA Field Office, Gardez

Côte d’Ivoire

UNOCI and the UNCT

Dorcella Bazahica, HIV/AIDS Adviser, UNOCI

Armand-Michel Broux, Conseiller National, Unité Post-Crise, UNDP

Pierre-André Campiche, Acting Police Commissioner, UNOCI

Georg Charpentier, DSRSG, UNOCI

Miguel Côte-Real, aResponsable Coordination et Liaison, UNOCI

Mame Ely Dieng, DDR Advisor, Post-crisis Unit, UNDP

Joseph S. Ezoua, Conseiller au Programme, UNDP

Zenaide Gatelli, Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion Officer, DDR Sub-Office Yamousoukro, UNOCI

Modem Lawson-Betum, Directeur de la Division Politique et de la Planification, UNOCI
Mbanda Martin, Conseiller Principal Post-crise, UNDP
Ambroise Niyonsaba, Représentant Spécial du Président de la Commission de l’Union Africaine, African Union
Benjamin Olagboyé, Spécialiste Réinsertion, Réintegraion, Réhabilitation Communautaire, UNDP
Barbara Orlik, Responsible de l’Unite de Coordination du Système des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire
Alessandro Parlatore, Representative, UNIDO
Françoise Simard, Chief Rule of Law Unit, UNOCI
Ould Sidi Zahabi, Chief, DDR Section, UNOCI
Antoniette D. Ziéhi, Assistant Représentant (Programme), FAO

Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire
Camille Due Kobenan, Conseiller Technique, Cabinet du President
Traore A. Karim, Conseiller aux Affaires Sécuritaires et Militaires, Bureau du Représentant Spécial du Facilitateur en Côte d’Ivoire
Ben Lakp Low, Responsable en charge du Bureau, Bureau International du Travail
Jean-Paul Malan, Coordonnateur, Programme du Service Civique National
Jacques Niamké Adom, Conseiller Technique, Programme du Service Civique National

Partners
Jean-Bosco Rumongi, Coordonnateur Terrain, Coopération Technique Allemande, GTZ
Gianmarco Scuppa, Chef de Section Politique, European Union
Thorvald Boye, Conseiller, Royal Norwegian Embassy
Alcide Djédjé, Ambassadeur, Representant Permament, Mission Permanente de Cote d’Ivoire Aupres des Nations-Unies
Thierry Kayembe, Expert Formation / Emploi, Coopératons Technique Allemande, GTZ

Haiti
MINUSTAH and the UNCT
Hédi Annabi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MINUSTAH
Mariavittoria Ballotta, Protection Officer, UNICEF
Ray Baysden, Chief, Joint Mission Analysis Centre, MINUSTAH
Joël Boutroue, United Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative, DSRSG, MINUSTAH
Fernando Castañón Alvarez, Director, Rule of Law, MINUSTAH
Luiz da Costa, Principal DSRSG, MINUSTAH
Marc-André Franche, Deputy Director for Programmes, UNDP
William Gardner, Chief, Community Violence Reduction Section, MINUSTAH
Colonel Martin Girard, Chief of Staff Military Force HQ, Canadian Army, MINUSTAH
Gerard Le Chevallier, Director of Political Affairs and Planning Division, MINUSTAH
Kathy Mangones, Director, UNIFEM
Heiner Rosendahl, Civil Affairs, MINUSTAH
Frantz Toyo, Membre de Cabinet, Security Affairs Advisor, United Nations Police, MINUSTAH
Richard Warren, Deputy Police Commissioner for HNP Development, MINUSTAH
Fred Wooldridge, Strategic Planning Officer, MINUSTAH

Government of Haiti and Partners
Françoise Adolphe, Deputy Mayor, Gonaives Commune
Eucher-Luc Joseph, Secrétaire d’État à la Sécurité Publique, Ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité Publique
Daniela, Bercovitch, Director, Viva Rio

Gonaives field visit
Marcel Aristilde, CVR Road Project Beneficiary
Julie Augustin, Women’s Sector representative
Abdoul Aziz Thiaye, Human Rights Officer, Regional Coordination, MINUSTAH
Michael Center, Regional Civil Affairs Officer, MINUSTAH
Patrick Cherilus, Representative of the private sector
Pierre Charles Edward, Community elder
Engineer Eloua, Civil Engineer, CVR Road Project
Michel Ferdilus Esrome, Rassemblement National Pour l’Evolution de Pêche en Haiti, Coordinator, CVR Fishing Boat Project
Ricardo Freitas Silva, Regional Security Officer, MINUSTAH

Liberia
UNMIL and UNCT
Aibinu Aderemi Aibinu, DDRR Technical Coordinator, UNDP
Lieutenant General A T M Zahirul Alam, Force Commander, UNMIL
Babafemi Badejo, Head, Political, Policy and Planning Section, UNMIL
Zoran Cetkovic, Military and Police, UNMIL
Elizabeth Chester, Policy Advisor to the SRSG, UNMIL
Renuka Chidambaram, Rule of Law Officer, Office of the D/SRSG, UNMIL
Lieutenant Fasoli, Military and Police, UNMIL
Anders Tang Friborg, Special Adviser to the SRSG, UNMIL
Bisrat Habtemichael Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation, Employment Creation, UNMIL
Peter Hall, International Labor Organization
Colonel Christopher Holshek, U.S. Army Civil Affairs, Chief, G5, Civil Military Coordination, UNMIL
Nessie Golakai, Assistant Resident Representative / Governance, UNDP
Johnny Jimenez, JMAC, UNMIL
Maria-Threase Keating, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
Francis Kai-Kai, Chief, Civil Affairs Section, UNMIL
Doris Kleffner, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery Section, UNMIL
Hanna Matti, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery Section, UNMIL
Dionne Maxwell, Policy Advisor to the SRSG, UNMIL
Paolo Nastasi, Civil Affairs, UNMIL
Eric Perry, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery: Employment Creation, UNMIL
Christopher Rampe, Security Sector Reform Adviser to the SRSG, UNMIL
Gautam Sawang, Deputy Police Commissioner, United Nations Police, UNMIL
Lieutenant Colonel Shahid, Military and Police, United Nations Mission in Liberia
Harinder Sood, Special Advisor to the DSRSG, UNMIL
Andrea Tamagini, Director, Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation Section, UNMIL

**Government of Liberia**

Ruth Ceasar, National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Tarnue Cooper, Senator, Chairperson of the Committee on Resettlement, Repatriation, Relief & Readjustment, Government of Liberia
Natty B. Davis, Minister of State without Portfolio
Wilfred Gray Johnson, Head, Peace Building Office, Government of Liberia
John F. Josiah, Deputy Minister for Administration, Ministry of Labor, Republic of Liberia
Morris Kamara, Protected Areas Manager, Forestry Development Authority
Lahai Lassanah, Senator
Brownie Samukai, Minister of Defense
Christopher Toe, Minister of Agriculture
Jervis Witherspoon, National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

*Partners*
Torvald Boye, Norwegian Consulate, Liberia
Joel Gamys, Manager, Conservation International, Liberia
Chris Lang, Country Manager, Human Security Programme, Landmine Action, Liberia

*Independent Experts*
Mark Sedra, Senior Fellow, Center for International Governance Innovation, Canada
Jaremey McMullin, Lecturer, School of International Relations, St. Andrews, Scotland
Hugo van der Merwe, Program Manager, Transitional Justice Program, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, South Africa
ANNEX V

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