
I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 15 December 2014 and addressed to the Secretary-General from the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council, in which the two presidents, following consultations with Member States undertaken by their respective offices, jointly proposed terms of reference for the 2015 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.

As you know, this comprehensive review consists of two stages. In the first, the Secretary-General designated an Advisory Group of seven experts to prepare a review report. In the second, an inter-governmental process will examine that report and take pertinent actions. On 22 January 2015, the Secretary-General appointed the following members of the Advisory Group: Anis Bajwa (Pakistan), Saraswathi Menon (India), Funmi Olonisakin (Nigeria), Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania), Charles Petrie (France), Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala), and Edith Grace Ssempala (Uganda).

As Chair of the Advisory Group, and on behalf of all its members, I am pleased to inform you that we have concluded our work within the stipulated timeframe and in strict compliance with the terms of reference. The Advisory Group engaged in wide consultations and discussions, analysed abundant background documents, and conducted five case studies – Burundi, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste – to motivate its recommendations.

While this Report was being prepared, two other panels were exploring related, critical dimensions of the peace and security pillar of the United Nations: the High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations established by the Secretary-General on 31 October 2014, and the High-Level Advisory Group for the Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, established through Resolution 2122 (2013) of the Security Council. Consultations were held between all three groups in pursuit of coherence and complementarity, without prejudice to the independent nature of these exercises.
It has been an honour to work with such distinguished colleagues in preparing this report. I would also like to acknowledge the excellent support we received from our designated Secretariat, as well as many partners around the world. As you now move forward with the second stage of the Review, we sincerely hope our report will result in concrete decisions on the part of the principal Organs of the United Nations to help the Organization better fulfil one of the highest tasks given to it by the Charter: sustaining peace in the world.

(Signed) Gert Rosenthal
Chair of the Advisory Group of Experts
on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture
THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINING PEACE

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF EXPERTS

FOR THE 2015 REVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE

29 June 2015
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

• ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
• AU: African Union
• CAR: Central African Republic
• CEB: United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
• CEDAW: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
• CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
• CSC: Country-Specific Configuration
• DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
• DPA: Department of Political Affairs
• DPKO: Department for Peacekeeping Operations
• ECOSOC: Economic and Social Council
• ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
• ERSG: Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
• EU: European Union
• FCS: Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
• FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
• GPI: Gender Promotion Initiative
• IcSP: Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
• IDA: International Development Association
• IDP: Internally Displaced Person
• IFC: International Finance Corporation
• IFI: International Financial Institution
• IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
• IMF: International Monetary Fund
• IRF: Immediate Response Facility
• MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
• MIGA: Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
• MINURCA: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
• MINUSCA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
- NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation
- OC: Organizational Committee
- OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- ODA: Official Development Assistance
- OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
- PBC: Peacebuilding Commission
- PBF: Peacebuilding Fund
- PBSO: Peacebuilding Support Office
- PRF: Peacebuilding Recovery Facility
- RC: Resident Coordinator
- SPLA: Sudan People’s Liberation Army
- SPLM: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
- SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
- SSR: Security Sector Reform
- UN: United Nations
- UNCT: United Nations Country Team
- UNDG: United Nations Development Group
- UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
- UNDSS: United Nations Department for Safety and Security
- UNIOSIL: United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
- UNIPSIL: United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
- UNMISS: United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
- UN Women: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
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THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINING PEACE:

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF EXPERTS FOR THE 2015 REVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was prepared at the request of the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council by a seven-member Advisory Group of Experts (“the Group”) designated by the Secretary-General. It represents the first part of a two-stage review of the role and positioning of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), as well as the operational entities of the United Nations (UN) active in peacebuilding. The report is intended to nourish the second, inter-governmental stage, which it is hoped will lead to concrete actions to strengthen the UN’s approach to sustaining peace.

In the view of the Group, the UN’s “Peacebuilding Architecture” cannot be understood as limited to the PBC, PBF and PBSO. Rather, the shortcomings in efforts to fill the “gaping hole” in the UN’s institutional machinery for building peace are systemic in nature. They result from a generalized misunderstanding of the nature of peacebuilding and, even more, from the fragmentation of the UN into separate “silos”.

On the first point, for many UN Member States and UN Organization entities alike, peacebuilding is left as an afterthought: under-prioritized, under-resourced and undertaken only after the guns fall silent. But sustaining peace is amongst the core tasks established for the Organization by the UN Charter’s vision of “sav[ing] succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” It must be the principle that flows through all the UN’s engagements, informing all the Organization’s activities – before, during and after violent conflicts – rather than being marginalized.

On the second point, several principal intergovernmental Organs, and especially the Security Council, hold pieces of the peacebuilding “puzzle,” each from the vantage point of their particular Charter responsibilities. The fragmentation between them is reproduced throughout the UN: within the Secretariat, between the Secretariat and the rest of the UN, and in operations on the ground, where peacebuilding actually takes place. This problem has long been recognized, but periodic attempts to address it have been frustrated. The human and financial costs of lapse and relapse into conflict have become intolerable and call for urgent resolution.

Part I of this report introduces the concept of “sustaining peace”. Part II outlines, in broad strokes, the changing global context for conflict and peacebuilding. After two decades of steady decline, major civil conflicts are once more on the rise. Worse, those conflicts have become more complex, increasingly fragmented and intractable. The drivers of violence – some radically new, some longstanding – raise serious implications for UN, international and regional efforts to support national processes to move beyond conflict. A broader,
comprehensive approach of “sustaining peace” is called for, all along the arc leading from conflict prevention (on which, in particular, the UN system needs to place much greater emphasis), through peacemaking and peacekeeping, and on to post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. The success of such an approach critically relies on uniting the peace and security, human rights and development “pillars” of the UN.

A second critical determinant of success is fostering “inclusive national ownership.” In the aftermath of violence, neither a cohesive nation state nor an inclusive system of governance can be taken as givens. The national responsibility to drive efforts to sustain peace must therefore be broadly shared across all key social strata and divides. A wide spectrum of political opinions and domestic actors must be heard – particularly women and youth.

Success also depends on establishing and adhering to realistic timelines for UN peace operations and other peacebuilding engagements – and even more so for development assistance. Sustaining peace after conflict is a particularly lengthy and costly challenge. Evidence strongly suggests that undue haste and a narrow focus on cessation of hostilities rather than addressing root causes are significant factors in relapse.

Part III of the report presents an assessment not only of what the UN has done well, but more importantly, what it has done poorly. A major conclusion, expressed quite candidly, is that by allowing the UN’s overall fragmentation to continue, Member States are, themselves, part of the problem. The flipside is that they can and must be part of the solution. Simply put, they must accept the need for the different parts of the UN to work together on peacebuilding and find ways to assist them to do so. Without a successful formula through which to unite the common efforts of the three pillars, UN efforts to sustain peace will continue to fail.

Part IV presents concrete proposals to build coherence in delivering sustainable peace. Amongst these are:

**Promoting Coherence at the Intergovernmental Level:** The PBC should become the advisory “bridge” between the relevant intergovernmental organs it was always intended to be. Its main functions would continue to be advocacy, assistance in marshalling resources, assistance in improving coordination within and outside the UN, strategic thinking and policy recommendations, and convening a broad and diverse array of peacebuilding actors. But the PBC should undertake more of its work through its full membership, become much more flexible and transparent in its working practices, and place greater emphasis on advising and advocating. Through its full membership, it should also be accountable to the relevant principal inter-governmental organs and realise the bridging between them in that way.

The success of the above will particularly depend on a deepened commitment from the main intergovernmental peacebuilding actor, the Security Council, which should regularly request and draw upon the PBC’s advice on the peacebuilding dimensions of mandates, with the PBC in turn supported by a strengthened and upgraded **PBSO** working closely
with relevant UN entities. The Security Council should also consider passing to the PBC’s responsibility continued accompaniment of countries on the Council’s Agenda where and when peace consolidation has sufficiently progressed.

**Improving the peacebuilding capability of the United Nations System:** A range of measures is vital to improving delivery on the ground. The UN system needs to pay more attention to the timing and management of transitions between different forms of UN engagement: between different kinds of mission, and from UN Country Teams to missions and back again. Enhancing the authority and capacities of UN leaders on the ground in conflict-prone and conflict-affected countries; making sure there is continuity in leadership across different engagements; and providing UN leaders with the necessary resources to carry out their mandates: all these are critical so that people in need are served and the UN’s credibility is enhanced.

Finally, sustaining peace – which fundamentally concerns reconciliation and building a common vision of a society – must be understood as a task that only national stakeholders can undertake. The United Nations and international actors can accompany and facilitate the process, but not lead it.

**Partnering for sustaining peace:** The scale of the challenge of sustaining peace means the UN cannot succeed alone. Closer strategic and operational partnerships with the International Financial Institutions and with regional and sub-regional organizations are critical. The UN must prioritize developing and deepening both.

**More Predictable Peacebuilding Financing:** Despite a decade of focus, financing for sustaining peace remains scarce, inconsistent and unpredictable. Here also, strategic partnerships and pooling funding between the UN, World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral financial institutions will maximize impact and share risk.

The **PBF** should play to its comparative advantage as a rapid, impactful, procedurally light and risk-taking “investor of first resort” in efforts to sustain peace. Providing the PBF annually with a symbolic 1 per cent of the value of the total UN budgets for peace operations as core funding from assessed contributions would help close the gap between mandates and programme resources. Providing assessed contributions for the programmatic dimensions of peace operations mandates would also assist in this.

**Improving Leadership and Broadening Inclusion:** Building national leadership is an integral part of a reconciliation and nation-building agenda, and the UN must focus particular support on this. It should also prioritize support to broadening inclusion so that peacebuilding processes are “nationally owned” in the fullest sense. Efforts must particularly accelerate to attain and then surpass the Secretary-General’s 15 per cent “gender marker” for financing to peacebuilding approaches that promote gender equality.

If all these measures are implemented together, they will represent a fundamental redefinition and reorientation in the UN’s work: one through which the challenge of
sustaining peace is genuinely seen as central to the Charter’s vision of saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”
I. INTRODUCTION

1. If there is a principal raison d'être for the creation of the United Nations, it is to sustain international peace in all its dimensions. This is the noble goal encapsulated in the Charter’s determination to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.... and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.” The goal of sustaining peace is woven through inter-state and intra-state conflict prevention. Where violent conflicts break out, it implies taking rapid and resolute action to try to end them. Above all, the root causes of violent conflict must be addressed.

2. As this report was being finalized, the United Nations was preparing the post-2015 development agenda. Proposed Sustainable Development Goal 16 calls for the promotion and maintenance of “peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, [which can] provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” This all-encompassing formulation presumes societies liberated from violent conflict, with the capacity to manage the drivers of violence. It is fully compatible with the Charter: indeed, it represents an important effort to continue and sharpen the Charter’s vision.

3. The UN’s approach to the challenge of sustaining peace has evolved over time. The notion of “peace-building” first came into its own in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace in 1992. The concept returned to the spotlight in the 2005 Outcome Document, adopted simultaneously by the Security Council and the General Assembly in December that year, which created three New York-based entities: the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). These were intended to fill a “gaping hole” (according to then Secretary-General Kofi Annan) in the Organization’s institutional and structural capacity to support countries in transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace.

4. At the time, this development was hailed as an important landmark. However, in 2010 a first five-year review of the new entities’ work found that “the hopes that accompanied the founding resolutions have yet to be realized” and presented a number of detailed recommendations on how the work of the PBC, PBF and PBSO might be improved. The hope was expressed that the review would “serve as a wake-up call, helping to strengthen the collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and determined way.”

5. Five years further on, in 2015, those hopes have, if anything, further waned. Over time, it has become increasingly clear that what is needed is a fresh look not only at the specialized architecture itself, but at the whole approach to peacebuilding taken by the United Nations at large. Despite the promise held out by the new entities, it is an
overarching finding of this report is that the key Charter task of sustaining peace remains critically under-recognized, under-prioritized and under-resourced globally and within the United Nations system.

6. If the central goal of sustaining peace is to be achieved, it needs to be understood as a key shared responsibility across the entire United Nations Organization: a thread that must run strongly through all of the UN’s work in prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping, as well as through post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. Improving UN performance in sustaining peace is truly a systemic challenge, one that goes far beyond the limited scope of the entities created in 2005 that have been labelled the “Peacebuilding Architecture”. It requires the engagement of all three principal inter-governmental Organs, as well as the Secretariat, the UN’s programmes and specialized agencies, and, of course, UN operations on the ground.

7. This holistic vision of sustaining peace has profound structural, policy, administrative and budgetary implications, which constitute the main unifying threads of the report:

- Sustaining peace should be understood as encompassing not only efforts to prevent relapse into conflict, but also to prevent lapse into conflict in the first place.
- When considering the peace and security activities of the United Nations, therefore, a strong emphasis must be placed on conflict prevention;
- Sustaining peace requires a fully integrated approach at the strategic and policy-making level as well as at the operational level;
- At the policy-making level, the principal intergovernmental organs of the United Nations must be understood as having a role to play in sustaining peace, each within its respective purview;
- The same holistic and integrated approach is required on the part of the United Nations at the administrative and operational level, both at Headquarters and on the ground, where peacebuilding actually takes place;
- Preventing lapse or relapse into conflict is considerably cheaper, in both human and financial terms, than responding to crisis;
- Conversely, the present failure to prioritize and resource efforts towards sustaining peace is condemning the world and its peoples to tragic, violent cycles of relapse, as the case-studies for this review eloquently demonstrate;
• While capacity building, state building, institution building and development all demand considerable technical expertise, first and foremost peacebuilding must be understood as an inherently political process;

• Numerous and varied stakeholders – public and private, domestic, regional and international – share the responsibility for peacebuilding. The multidimensional nature of sustaining peace is unavoidable and poses major challenges to achieving coherence;

• Conflict and peace impact on every single person in a society. Reaching reconciliation and sustainable peace requires broad and inclusive participation, involving state and civil society stakeholders all the way down to the grass-roots level; and,

• Addressing the root causes of conflict requires long-term commitment and long-term access to regular, predictable and adequate financing.

8. The assessments and recommendations of the report have been shaped by the five case studies undertaken (Burundi, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste). These studies were not designed as in-depth analyses, but as efforts to glean some key lessons that seemed to hold general relevance for sustaining peace. Many of the main points detailed in this report draw directly from the case studies and the most pertinent of these are illustrated in short case-study boxes scattered through the text.

9. The report is divided into four parts:

• The first is this brief introduction, which simply describes the architecture of the report, built around the unifying themes delineated above.

• The second part draws, in broad lines, elements of the changing global context that fundamentally affect how the United Nations undertakes peacebuilding. It is intended as a background against which to assess the UN’s performance and to highlight the main debates about sustaining peace.

• The third part contains an assessment of United Nations peacebuilding activities, as called for in the terms of reference proposed by the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

• The final part advances conclusions and recommendations, drawing on the findings presented in the report.
II. THE EVOLVING GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR PEACEBUILDING

II.1 Contemporary conflict: continuity and change

10. The two-and-a-half decades since the Cold War’s end have seen both continuity and change in the global dynamics of conflict, as longstanding drivers of violence have been overlaid with new and emergent ones. Some ideologies have crumbled; others have radically energized. New global powers have emerged. So have new authoritarianisms and new extremist movements. The exponential growth of social media has helped both drive and resist these emergences. Conflicts have become more complex and the elements defining them more fragmented.

11. After declining for much of the late 1990s and early 2000s, major civil wars almost tripled from four in 2007 to eleven in 2014. A number of factors are rendering conflicts more intractable, including the growth in violent extremism, links to illicit markets and organized crime, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Roughly two-thirds of UN peacekeepers today and almost 90 per cent of personnel in UN Special Political Missions are working in and on countries experiencing high-intensity conflict.

12. Domestic drivers of conflict play a significant role in animating today’s conflicts. Weak leadership and governance too frequently lead to fragile institutions, inept public management and corruption, compounded by the muzzling of political dissent and the media, and the politicising of the state’s security organs. Not content to see their authority come to an end, some national leaders – including in several countries where the UN has been engaged in recent years – have abetted the promulgation of self-serving legislation or controversial constitutional amendments that benefit them or their parties. Violently disputed political or electoral processes have often followed.

13. The politics of exclusion provides a related set of conflict drivers. One or another set of ethnic, religious or tribal interests dominates power to the exclusion of others. Minorities are oppressed, scapegoated or violently targeted, and the animus against them is politically instrumentalised by elites to maintain their hold over populations.

14. The changing face of global conflict has had a particular and dramatic impact on women. Gender inequalities are deepened and exacerbated by violence. Half the world’s 59.5 million forcibly displaced (19.5 million refugees, 1.8 million asylum seekers and 38.2 million internally displaced people) are women. Sexual violence is used as a tactic to displace refugee and IDP populations, while the ideological opposition of many extremist groups to girls entering public spaces, including educational institutions, is placing them more generally at a heightened risk. The world is witnessing sexual and gender based violence not only as a war strategy but also as a central tactic of terror. Women and adolescent girls in conflict-affected countries face a heightened risk of falling victim to sex
and labour trafficking, and account for the majority of victims of human trafficking overall.x Set against this, women’s vital role as actors in peacebuilding processes is, at least, starting to gain international recognition and support, as discussed later in this report.

15. The economic and environmental sectors also provide drivers of violence. Absence of livelihoods and social-economic deprivation, particularly when coupled with a sense of historic marginalisation, animate grievances. When well managed, natural resources can be a source of progress, wealth and stability for a nation. When mismanaged or misappropriated, they can have severely negative economic, social and environmental effects and constitute a massive loss for peacebuilding and development. A prominent UN study has suggested that since 1990 there have been at least 18 violent conflicts strongly fuelled by natural resources exploitation and that natural resources-related conflicts experience an earlier and higher probability of relapse than others.xi

16. Land and water, in particular, can be structural drivers of conflict. Conflict-affected and post-conflict states are often characterized by weaknesses in land administration and records and recurring tension between customary rights and formal legal systemsxii – the latter sometimes instrumentally used to displace or dispossess populations.xiii Many recent peace agreements have touched on the need to guarantee land rights and introduce effective land registration, but often, little has been achieved.xiv Deterioration in the quantity and quality of water, due to climate change, pollution, privatization and inequities in supply, have also proven to be conflict drivers at both local and regional levels. Many trans-boundary water basins are located in regions with a history of interstate tension, threatening that water might become a significant causal factor in future regional conflicts.xv

17. Population growth and environmental degradation are adding new complexities to the global security milieu. The linkages between declining natural resources per capita (principally land and water), population migration and the emergence of violent conflict are complex.xvi The Security Council has called for a better understanding of the links between climate and fragility, but limited guidance exists on how to apply a “conflict sensitivity” lens to climate change adaptation policies or projectsxvii.

18. Contemporary conflicts show a strong tendency to spill across borders, giving a transnational dimension to what may have begun as a local dispute. Regionalization of conflicts sees states intervening militarily across boundaries, directly or through proxies, and exacerbating local drivers of conflict. People fleeing insecurity and deprivation (which often go hand-in-hand) internationalize further conflict’s impact. In 2013, over a quarter of intrastate conflicts involved external actors supporting one or another warring party.xviii

19. Local, national and international criminal networks further drive violence. They “hollow out” state structures, leaving them dramatically weakened even after conflict.xix
Involvement in criminal economies lowers the “barriers to entry” for rebel movements, reduces their incentives to enter into peace processes or agreements, and decreases their leaders’ ability to ensure the compliance of their forces when they do. Extremist ideologies are also increasingly causing the dynamics of numerous violent conflicts to mutate. Amidst neglect on the part of governments, disaffected populations, and especially youth, can be attracted by visions of worldwide struggle.

20. In a number of contexts, even the notion and function of the nation state are put into question: consider the recent experiences, each with its singular characteristics, of Somalia, Libya, the Central African Republic and Iraq (South Sudan shares some similar features). In such cases, the collapse or absence of a dominant central authority led to the State’s fracturing, often along ethnic or sectarian lines, and to the emergence – through great violence, or even mass atrocities – of ethnically or religiously more uniform regions.

21. The fracturing and loss of credibility in central authority in such contexts are increasingly leading to a profound dilemma. Independent, sovereign nation states are the building blocks of the international order, and of the UN in particular. Member States therefore naturally incline towards a predominant international paradigm of re-creating strong, centralized authority. However, in a context of fragmentation, it is possible that an attempt to rebuild or extend central authority could lead not to peace but to deepening conflict. In such cases, new approaches need to be found, which understand peacebuilding, at least in its early phases, as having more to do with strengthening local domains of governance than trying to re-establish strong central authority.

II.2 Evolutions in understanding the peacebuilding challenge

22. All these complex dimensions of contemporary conflict – some radically new, some longstanding – raise serious implications for the efforts by the UN and other international and regional actors to support national processes to resolve violent disputes. From the perspective of sustaining peace, the old model of ending a conflict through a “comprehensive” peace accord between erstwhile, fairly well-identified enemies has often had to give way to less tidy arrangements with less clearly defined protagonists. This, in turn, greatly increases the risk of relapse.

23. In An Agenda for Peace, peacebuilding was presented as the logical follow-on to peacemaking and peacekeeping: the main objective was to prevent relapse into conflict once a peace agreement had been secured. It was also implicitly asserted that countries emerging from armed conflict should be treated as belonging to a distinct category requiring special attention.
24. Twenty years later, there remain compelling reasons to consider countries already affected by or recovering from conflict as deserving particular attention. Conflict-affected countries, for example, have lagged considerably behind other countries in attaining the Millennium Development Goals. In just one tragic illustration of that, the 10 worst performing countries for maternal mortality globally are all conflict-affected or post-conflict states.

25. Although the sequential idea of peacebuilding continues to prevail, an all-encompassing concept was suggested as early as 1995 in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. More importantly, in February 2001, the Security Council recognized that “peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it.”

26. It is this broader approach that this report embraces. “Peacebuilding” – the term that this report proposes is sustaining peace – needs to be liberated from the strict limitation to post-conflict contexts. Many of the priorities and the tools for preventing lapse or relapse into conflict are similar and it makes little sense to divide limited energies and resources artificially. It is a paradox that the Security Council, which, in 2001, itself proposed an all-encompassing approach, continues to call its agenda-item on the matter “post-conflict peacebuilding”.

27. Ideas about the proper institutional focus for peacebuilding have also evolved over time. Prolonged violent conflict creates trauma and deepens societal cleavages, but it also gravely damages institutions. Without strong institutions, a society lacks the channels that can peacefully manage the tensions that naturally arise and which can quickly turn – or return – to violence. Historically, therefore, alongside efforts to engender a broad enabling environment for reconciliation there has been a focus on rebuilding and reinforcing the resilience of key institutions.

28. There continues to be debate about exactly which institutions and sectors should receive priority attention. But the last few years have seen some emergent consensus. The group of conflict-affected and post-conflict countries who have come together to form the “g7” initiative, for example, have advocated for five key sectors of priority peacebuilding intervention: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services. There is a significant convergence between that analysis and that of World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report (and the country-level surveys behind it).

29. The case studies for this report reflect the successes and failures associated with this kind of institution building. The relapse in the Central African Republic hinged to a
considerable extent on the failure to institutionalize dialogue and to advance security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. By contrast, in Timor-Leste, and to a certain extent Burundi, resilient institutions have been built up. Despite the deep political crisis that has enveloped it while this report was being prepared, Burundi has so far managed to avoid returning to the abyss of mass inter-ethnic violence. In part, this must be attributed to the comparative resilience of its “Post-Arusha Agreement” institutions.

II.3 Peacebuilding templates and timelines

30. A related area of evolution in thinking about peacebuilding concerns time horizons: specifically, that successful peacebuilding requires much longer than had previously been appreciated. The change of attitude needed to move from confrontation to a degree of tolerance and acceptance of “the other” is slow in coming. And, as a new wave of comparative research has demonstrated, creating legitimate institutions that can help prevent relapse takes a generation. Even the fastest-transforming countries in the last century took between 15 to 30 years to raise their institutional performance from the level that prevails in many of today’s “fragile” states.\textsuperscript{xxvi} And all of this takes place in a context in which progress, inevitably, is neither linear nor mono-directional.

31. Yet present UN mission timelines do not currently seem to take account of this. Nor do the bulk of the world’s development assistance programmes. In both kinds of intervention, present horizons of expectation remain completely unrealistic. Indeed, over the last couple of decades, a rough template seems to have emerged for international response to post-conflict challenges. First, mediators achieve a peace agreement, usually fragile and not always sufficiently reflective of the local dimensions of the conflict. This is followed by a limited “Transition” period, often accompanied by temporary power-sharing arrangements and/or some form of “National Dialogue” process. Within a year or so, a new constitution is drafted and adopted. The culmination is the holding of new and democratic elections – usually a massive logistical exercise.

32. This sequence obviously has as its intention the suturing of societal wounds and the careful installation of new national authorities with a democratic mandate to act as primary interlocutor with international partners for subsequent peacebuilding. But all too frequently this model breaks down.

33. The causes are legion. But evidence suggests that a common factor across all the phases is undue haste, based on impracticable timelines. Peace agreements are often hurried and the processes frequently influenced or driven by outside mediation groups with varying levels of international legitimacy. National consultation exercises are
organised with great expense and energy, but many end up predominantly recycling the views of the same narrow political class that jockeyed for power during the violence. Seldom is enough time and space given to organizing dialogue at the grassroots, on the ground, in the provinces, with broad inclusion. New constitutions endeavour to embed hard-won compromises from peace agreements in the national politico-juridical fabric. But when this is rushed, they may do so imperfectly, or in ways that insufficiently transform the grievances that led to conflict in the first place. Amidst all the haste, restarting basic services or creating new livelihoods for affected populations rarely gets the attention it deserves.

34. But it is post-conflict elections that so often pose the most risk for relapse.xxxvii Seen as a means to “turn the page” on violence, they too often become, instead, a moment at which violence tends to re-emerge. The campaign becomes an opportunity for tactics of exclusion (who can run, who can vote, and who can’t do either). Contentious election campaigns turn violent or reopen divisive wounds. Electoral Commissions are often perceived as partisan, favouring incumbents. While the “transition” period sees fragile and cautious power sharing and accommodation, the post-electoral dispensation is often characterised by “winner takes all” and fundamentally threatens previous advances. And too frequently, elections are followed by a premature rejection of international accompaniment by the new authorities in the name of sovereignty and independence.

35. Democratically held elections remain a laudable goal. But the process leading to them must be carefully and judiciously prepared, and must be able to rely on the credibility and support of the population through extended dialogue and outreach. For their part, national dialogue processes should be preceded and paralleled by strenuous efforts to consult with local communities on specific issues, framing the discussions at the national levels.

II.4 The links between peace, development and human rights in peacebuilding

36. Progress in development is critical to preventing both lapse and relapse into conflict. Research is compelling that the failure to develop economically poses a risk of lapse into conflict in the first place.xxxviii As stated earlier, economic and social grievances are often amongst the root causes leading to conflict, especially with rising expectations fostered through mass access to social media, and the inabilities of governments to meet those expectations.

37. If conflict has ensued, there is abundant evidence that risks of relapse are significantly mitigated when economies are reactivated. Indeed – as one leading researcher puts it – “economic development may be the true ‘exit strategy’ for international
peace-keeping”.xxix Overcoming socio-economic grievances, offering populations the means to earn livelihoods and creating the foundations for inclusive, broad-based economic growth are integral to any transition from conflict to normalcy.

38. This said, there is as yet no clear consensus on how to proceed. Current efforts towards promoting post-conflict economic recovery are relatively timid and appear to cluster around a “three track approach”xxx: immediate “stop gaps” (such as emergency employment programmes), early recovery (broadly aimed at recovery of income generating capacity) and longer-term economic recovery (such as economy-wide reforms for enabling growth). But there is not much clarity in either research or practice on re-energizing economies. The usual phase of brisk post-conflict economic rebound proves hard to sustain. Amongst the early casualties of conflict is confidence in the institutions likely to prove critical to longer-term recovery. Priority must be given to finding ways of re-establishing their credibility.

39. Human rights violations and impunity are also root causes and must be addressed as early as possible. But this raises difficult dilemmas. While the gravity of many conflicts calls for some form of transitional justice, the timing of such processes can be polarizing and appear inimical to establishing enduring non-violent relations. Equally, if unaddressed, impunity risks diminishing trust in and support for the peace process. Institutional and “apolitical” approaches to transitional justice are sometimes criticized as foreign, against a spirit of local ownership. Conversely, home-grown approaches are sometimes criticised for not meeting emergent international norms. Timor-Leste was castigated by the UN and international community for rejecting an international tribunal, instead setting up a “Truth and Friendship Commission” with Indonesia. Yet this approach turns out to have contributed significantly to building early peace.

40. From the UN’s perspective, the triangular relationship between peace, development and human rights demands that the Organization’s three respective pillars work closely together. But this continues to prove enormously challenging, a painful reflection of the fragmentation of the United Nations, born in the distribution of responsibilities contemplated in the Charter between the Security Council and the General Assembly, with the Economic and Social Council occupying an intermediate and somewhat ambiguous space in-between.xxxi The defence and protection of human rights finds some space in the work of the Security Council, but it is addressed in a more systematic manner in the Human Rights Council, a subsidiary body of the General Assembly.
II.5 Broad and inclusive participation

41. It has become a commonplace to insist that the success of peacebuilding fundamentally depends on “national ownership”. This is generally taken to mean that peace cannot be imposed from outside, but must be genuinely and gradually built by a process of accommodation on the part of domestic stakeholders, public and private. These are best placed to understand the local dynamics that condition the achievement of peacebuilding goals.

42. Clearly, peace needs to emerge organically from within society, addressing the multiple concerns and aspirations of different sectors, and seeking common ground so that all sectors feel invested in strategies, policies and mechanisms that offer the way forward. But all too frequently, “national ownership” is defined too narrowly and unthinkingly. It should never be allowed to become a rationalisation for international indifference or inaction. Just as importantly, in the aftermath of violence, neither a cohesive nation state nor an inclusive or effective system of governance should be taken as givens. Much as peace cannot be imposed from outside, peace cannot simply be imposed by domestic elites or authoritarian governments on fractious populations that lack even minimal trust in their leaderships or each other. Too often “national ownership” is equated with acquiescing to the strategies and priorities of the national government. In divided post-conflict societies, such an approach risks perpetuating exclusion.

43. There are no easy solutions to this conundrum, since the UN is made up of the Governments representing member states, collectively the ultimate arbitrators of the Organization. But failure to respond to people’s aspirations or to ensure at least a minimum platform of good governance and trust in their governments can compromise the very concept of making peace sustainable.

44. This report therefore argues in favour of “inclusive national ownership” in peacebuilding, whereby the national responsibility to drive and direct efforts is broadly shared by the national government across all key social strata and divides, across a spectrum of political opinions and domestic actors, including minorities. This implies participation by community groups, women’s platforms and representatives, youth, labour organizations, political parties, the private sector and domestic civil society, including under-represented groups.

45. The UN and other international actors can play an important role of facilitation and accompaniment (or, paraphrasing a respected NGO, the UN should “do less and enable more”). At the operational level this means supporting processes that help governments to “broaden ownership” to as wide an array of domestic stakeholders as possible, so that the latter can engage with those governments and participate maximally in
all stages of peacebuilding, from the inception of policies through actions and projects, priority-setting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of results.

46. Civil society has a critical role to play. But in societies emerging from conflict, civil society is rarely well organized in its capacity to articulate demands. Indeed, it too may be divided, diverse and fragile. And it will likely be dominated by elites, either from within diasporas or from within the country, who are generally more “fluent” in the discourse of international development and diplomacy. It is vitally important, therefore, that diverse voices to find a vehicle of expression through organizations at all levels of conflict-affected societies.

47. There is a particular challenge in ensuring that the voices of the most conflict-affected communities are heard. They are usually the most vulnerable of all. The harsh realities they face to survive make it harder for them to remain independent and unaffected by the violent currents of polarization that will have swept their society. But they must be engaged.

48. Youth affected by conflict also deserves special attention. In the past two decades, the populations in conflict-affected countries grew almost twice as quickly as in developing countries not affected by conflict. As of 2015, half of the population in conflict-affected countries is estimated to be below the age of 20.xxxiv Without educational opportunities and with high youth unemployment, young people can be drawn into anti-social and sometimes violent activities. But too frequently, youth are depicted as only a challenge – or, worse, as a threat – to sustaining peace. Domestic and international actors alike must recognize the potential of youth as agents of positive change. To achieve this, educational systems must be rebuilt and young people involved and given voice in rebuilding their societies. Micro- and small enterprise generation can make a positive impact on creating work opportunities xxxv, particularly for youth employment, as can jump-starting the agricultural sector.

49. The rapid rise of the new information and communication technologies has implications for conflict and peace that are only beginning to be grappled with and which offer possibilities to broaden inclusion around peacebuilding. With more than 200 million blogs, 120 million YouTube videos and 500 million Facebook users worldwidexxxvi, social networking represents a seismic shift in human interaction. The new social media can be harnessed to draw people together, to foster inter-group dialogue, to promote conflict management and resolution and to create the public will to change attitudes and behaviour. Social media can support political reforms and broaden participatory governance: in both the recent and 2011 elections in Nigeria, to choose just one example, social media were extensively used to flag any electoral irregularities.xxxvii But as recent events in Syria and Iraq have demonstrated, social media can equally be used to foment
conflict and spread hatred and division. All too quickly they can become easy vectors for mobilisation of recruits to armed groups, or for funding and publicity to their violent acts.

50. Conventional media have become essential tools in peacebuilding programming – community radio, for example, played a key role in Sierra Leone’s peace consolidation over the last decade. But attention needs to turn to the transformative promise of the new technologies. Traditional media approaches saw populations as passive receivers of carefully crafted messages. The users of the new media tend to resist being lectured to. Communication for sustaining peace must become interactive, offering new horizons for broadening inclusion and national ownership.

II.6 Women’s Participation in Sustaining Peace

51. Women constitute a vitally important dimension of broadening inclusion for sustaining peace. Prompted by the grassroots leadership of women organizing for peace around the globe, the adoption of landmark Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security has started to ensure that alongside a necessary focus on women and girls as victims of global conflict has come an important emphasis on them as vital, active agents in peacemaking and peacebuilding. But, as will be discussed later, there is much more to do to ensure UN peacebuilding approaches are broadened in this critical dimension.

52. Unfortunately, as already noted, overlapping forms of discrimination and exclusion particularly affect women during violent conflicts, placing serious obstacles in the way of ensuring full participation. Given social norms in many conflict-affected societies, sexual violence against women and girls inflicts trauma well beyond the act of violence. Public spaces or activities, such as markets or fetching water and firewood, become dangerous for women – but so can their homes. Conflict increases the burden of unpaid care work of women in countries that have no social infrastructure, and limited access to social services.

53. Many current violent extremist movements brutalise women and girls and make frontal attacks on women’s rights. Yet paradoxically, violent extremist organizations also increasingly target women in their recruitment strategies. Women have become combatants in a number of recent conflicts, and their treatment post-conflict must be carefully considered. And empowering women and all concerned groups of civil society, and promoting social inclusion and cohesion can be the best strategy for countering violent extremist narratives and acts.

54. Reconciliation efforts do not always take into account the long-term trauma of both women and men, and the young in particular. In many cases domestic violence has also
increased, reflecting a social propensity to violence and a failure to heal trauma. Access to justice for women especially from excluded communities is always a problem and traditional justice can reinforce patriarchal norms and strengthen discrimination.

55. Reflecting women's needs in peacebuilding has a number of other specific dimensions. Gender-sensitive security sector reform is critical to enable women to re-enter public spaces safely. Economic recovery strategies need to take into account both women's paid and unpaid work. Prioritization needs to be given to restoring social infrastructure and to establishing basic social services – otherwise women will continue to bear an excessive burden of care, in a situation where conflict will have increased the number of disabled and dependents. Combatting impunity for violence against women in conflict (and indeed beyond) must be a high priority in justice during and post-conflict.

56. Ensuring women's full participation in peacebuilding processes is a question of rights – but it is not limited to that. It is, at last, becoming widely recognized that women's participation is also crucial to the success of economic recovery, political legitimacy and social cohesion.xxxviii As a result, without women's engagement from the earlier moments of attempting to end the violence to the latter stages of consolidating the peace, the dangers of relapse are greatly heightened.

III. AN ASSESSMENT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES

III.1 General comments

57. The preceding section presents a complex and changing environment for the UN's efforts towards sustaining peace. The dynamics of conflict mix some new and some long-standing factors. As a result, conflicts are becoming more complex and intractable, and peacebuilding processes more prone to failure (around half of the conflict-specific items currently on the Security Council Agenda can be considered as cases of relapse after previous rounds of conflictxxxiii). Predominant peacebuilding paradigms have begun to involve but remain insufficiently holistic, preventive, sustained or resourced. They do not yet meet with the vision of sustaining peace as the unbroken thread that must wind through all the UN's actions.

58. By definition, the UN is an external actor, which, in the best of circumstances, is accepted by some domestic players as an impartial “honest broker” and a helpful source of political, technical and financial accompaniment. The UN and other international stakeholders should therefore show appropriate sensitivity towards the peoples and culture of each specific situation. Building peace can only take place on the ground, and can
only ultimately be driven by domestic stakeholders. The specific analysis of the situation, the motivations and aspirations that drive different players, the changing contextual circumstances, and the dynamics of engagement between those players, require intimate knowledge and understanding that only an effective UN presence on the ground can hope to capture (and even then, only partially).

59. Given the overarching vision of the shared responsibility to sustain peace argued for in this report, it immediately follows that within the UN, responsibility cannot be considered as limited to the three new entities created in 2005. Further, it cannot be stressed enough that the PBC, PBF and PBSO are New York-based entities – designed to fulfil a critical but delimited purpose in supporting UN efforts. Vital peacebuilding mandates and activities are entrusted to peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions, as well as to the headquarters departments that support them. Moreover, UN Resident Coordinators (RCs) and UN Country Teams (UNCTs) in both “mission” and “non-mission settings” are increasingly called upon to play central roles in sustaining peace. All of these constitute crucial elements in the UN’s peacebuilding “architecture”.

60. The entire range of UN actors – from peacemakers to peacekeepers to the specialized agencies – must therefore recognize and embrace their centrality to sustaining peace, and must act together accordingly. As of now, that is not always the case.

III.2 The fragmentation of the United Nations and its impact on peacebuilding

61. One of this report’s most important conclusions is that, in spite of numerous major efforts at reform and enhanced coordination – such as the Chief Executives Board (CEB), the establishment of the Integration Steering Group, and the “Delivering as One” initiative – the deep fragmentation of the UN System persists. It is palpable in the distribution of responsibilities between the Organization’s main inter-governmental organs. It is felt again in the distribution of responsibilities between the different Departments into which the Secretariat is divided, in the distribution of responsibilities between the Secretariat and the Funds, Programmes and Specialized Agencies, and in the distribution of responsibilities between headquarters and the operational level.

62. A crucial part of this challenge is found in the differing perceptions of what situations meet the criterion of “threats to international peace and security”. Most members of the General Assembly perceive an “encroachment” by the Security Council in topics normally beyond its remit when it explores the security dimensions of development and environmental issues. Meanwhile, the Security Council, or at least some of its members, view with unease what they perceive as attempts by the General Assembly to encroach in matters related to the maintenance of international peace through the “back
door” of peacebuilding. Yet bringing such issues together is precisely what sustaining peace demands.

63. The “silos” established by the Charter in dividing responsibilities between the principal intergovernmental Organs are directly and unhelpfully mirrored in the distribution of responsibilities between the different UN entities. They communicate with each other in different ways and at various levels, but there is general recognition that deep fragmentation persists, as each entity focuses on its own specific mandate at the expense of over-all coherence, added to the absence of a more forceful culture of coordination from the top. A particular additional layer of fragmentation is added between the UN’s Secretariat and its agencies, funds and programmes, with structural disincentives and even prohibitions against mixing or pooling their respective funding streams.

64. These divisions are, of course, reflected in the field. In spite of some tangible progress under the “Delivering as One” banner, this review’s case studies suggest much remains to be done to prevent the fragmentation at Headquarters from being reproduced in the field. The mind-set of UN leaders and staff on the ground too frequently still reproduces the same tectonic divide seen at the level of the intergovernmental organs, and at the level of the UN system globally.

65. Yet the challenge of sustaining peace sits precisely across all these fault-lines. Without a successful formula through which to unite the efforts of the three pillars, UN peacebuilding will continue to fail. The consequences – all too visible in several of the case studies – are relapse into violent conflict, repeated redeployment of crisis response, and massive human and financial costs. The overall interest of the UN and its member States would surely be better served if it were generally accepted that, at least in the area of sustaining peace, the relevant principal UN inter-governmental bodies can and must collaborate, each within its specific purview and without transgressing its rules of procedures and working methods, and that this should be mirrored in close operational cooperation in the field. Only in one of the five case study countries was there clear evidence that this had been successfully and consistently achieved: that of Sierra Leone (and, to a lesser degree, Burundi).

66. This review strongly holds that in the area of sustainable peace, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council must be partners, each within the particular purview conferred on it by the Charter. In promoting and cementing that partnership, the Peacebuilding Commission has a unique role to play in its advisory capacity to all three of the intergovernmental Organs in question through its specific mandate to “provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations...” in addressing peacebuilding.
Unfortunately, the Security Council is not always understood as a key peacebuilding actor. A close examination of its resolutions over the past decade reveals, in fact, that it has very frequently mandated complex and multidimensional peace operations in “peacebuilding mode” in a considerable number of countries. It is also clear that the Security Council is becoming increasingly overburdened. Some Council members will admit that its heavy workload may be leading to moments where the needed attention to “less burning” contexts of peacebuilding is crowded out by the imperative to focus on proliferating crises. Ideally, mandate formulation should be informed from the beginning by a strategic vision of a desirable “end state” for the affected country. But formulating such a vision requires adequate time for deliberation and – since it entails bringing together the political, security, human rights and development perspectives – the capacity to consult with and distil the views of a diverse array of actors beyond the conventional peace and security realm. As of now that is rarely the case at the UN’s intergovernmental level, highlighting an opportunity to assist that the PBC may be well placed to fill.

**CASE-STUDY  Sierra Leone: Integrating peace and development for peacebuilding**

Sierra Leone has made important progress in its transition from an extraordinarily violent internal conflict to a peace that shows increasing promise of sustainability. National leadership and civil society – in particular women’s organizations – played a critical role in building peace, as did progress in the Truth and Reconciliation Process (though the unconditional amnesties offered were intensely criticized in some quarters). Throughout, there was a notable engagement of the UN with national stakeholders. In the initial phases, the UN focus was on peacekeeping, with a deliberate shift to peacebuilding in 2008. However, progress across the three pillars of the UN – peace and security, human rights and development – was by no means evenly spread.

Key institutions of democratic governance and reconciliation, such as Parliament, Electoral Commission, Human Rights Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Security Sector were, on the whole, strengthened. Challenges remain even in these areas, including a lack of transparency, corruption and a weak civil service. More critically, progress in the economic, justice and social spheres has not met the aspirations of the people. High economic growth has not yet translated into better livelihoods, reduction in poverty or sufficient delivery of basic social services such as education and health – partly because insufficient attention has been paid to illicit financial flows, including those from the trafficking of drugs or illicit natural resources exploitation. The fragility of the public health system was tragically underscored by the Ebola crisis that struck in 2014. Meanwhile, some of the economic and social root causes of the conflict, such as high levels of youth unemployment and pervasive poverty have yet to be addressed.

Both progress and challenges may be related in part to the nature of UN engagement with Sierra Leone over time, which had some unique characteristics reflected in the findings of this report. Security Council Resolution 1829 (2008) essentially converted the UN Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), a peace operation, into a new United Nations Integrated Peace building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). Two salient features stand out: a strong (and unusual) collaboration between the Security
Council and the Peacebuilding Commission; and the UN's ability to “deliver as one” on the ground, in coordination with other stakeholders. Among the notable features of the resolution, the following stand out:

- The functions of the Mission included classical peacebuilding activities (such as consolidating good governance reforms and strengthening the rule of law) combined with a strong political mandate;

- The primary responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone for peacebuilding, security and long-term development in the country was reaffirmed;

- An explicit call was made for “closely coordinating with and supporting the work of the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as the implementation of the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework and projects supported through the Peacebuilding Fund;

- An “Executive Representative of the Secretary-General” was deployed, serving also as Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP, facilitating seamless UN action on the ground;

- The importance of a fully integrated office was underlined, carrying out effective coordination of strategy and programmes across the entire UN family, and calling for “appropriate expertise and adequate material resources” so that UNIPSIL could “effectively and efficiently implement its mandate”;

- The mandate also sought closer partnerships with regional organizations, including ECOWAS and the Mano River Union.

Security Council Resolution 1829 therefore moved in the direction proposed in this report through the guidance it offered to both the national authorities and the United Nations. On the other hand, neither ECOSOC nor the General Assembly were involved in this endeavour. Mandates from these key bodies dealing with the development pillar of the UN could have strengthened early attention to development in peacebuilding on the ground.

The challenges that remain urgently require the UN galvanising all partners to support Sierra Leone in addressing governance and development deficits in order to sustain peace.

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III.3 Ensuring consistency of delivery across UN actions on the ground

68. The intergovernmental fragmentation outlined above is mirrored in UN actions on the ground, leading to “an inverted U” in which there is little effective UN attention to prevention, great attention to crisis response (though still frequently less than is needed), and again relatively little in the recovery and reconstruction phase.
69. In earlier years, again reflecting the fragmentation of mandates and approaches, the
UN’s development agencies and in particular the UN Country Teams tended to pay
insufficient attention to conflict prevention. In recognition of this, in 2004, UNDP and DPA
launched a “Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention.” This
programme has contributed positively to converging development and political actions in
favour of peacebuilding (in both preventive and post-conflict mode), but its expansion
remains limited by funding uncertainties. The Secretary-General’s recent “Human Rights
Up Front Policy,” meanwhile, provides for Regional Quarterly Reviews of countries and has
significant potential to involve the broader UN system in a collective review with
preventive dimensions.

70. In too many cases, though, preventive efforts come too late and do not succeed, and
the UN is forced to consider other more active political options. Here fragmentation is also
palpable. In certain situations, particularly on the African continent, a Security Council
resolution results in deployment of a Special Political Mission or a Peacekeeping Operation,
headed by an SRSG reporting directly to the Secretary General. In many others, however –
perhaps even the majority – a UN Country Team, headed by a Resident Coordinator, is
expected to sustain the engagement amidst crisis – perhaps with some additional political
engagement by a roving UN or regional organization envoy. The objective difference
between the crisis in one kind of setting and another is not always immediately clear. But
the distinction in response has considerable implications for attention and resources, with
a “mission-setting” usually guaranteed a much higher level of support from the UN
Secretariat’s political arm.

71. The RC is accredited to the country directly by the Secretary-General and reports to
the Secretary-General through the Administrator of UNDP, who chairs the UN Development
Group (UNDG). While the “first amongst equals” status of the RC within the UNCT may
have worked suitably in “normal” development settings (and even this is questionable), it
raises questions in conflict-affected and post-conflict peacebuilding settings. In complex
settings, the relationship between the RC and Heads of Agency must be formalized through
a second reporting line to the RC, and the UN presence on the ground supported by a
special Secretariat framework bringing together relevant units (such as DPA, DPKO, the
Office of Legal Affairs, UNDSS and OCHA) and that is tailor-made to country context.

72. As a particular option in complex situations the seldom-used model of a clearly
time-bound Executive Representative of the Secretary-General – combining the roles of
SRSG with that of Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP – could be
revived. This model proved effective in two of the case study countries for this review
(Burundi and Sierra Leone) in enhancing integration around the delivery of peacebuilding
goals during the “mission phase”.

29
When peace operations are deployed, with the ambitious, multidimensional mandates from the Security Council, it is not widely realised that they come without the guarantee of financing to drive their programmatic peacebuilding implications. Mandates regularly call on the UN, for example, to provide support in critical sectors such as security sector reform or rule of law. Even if mission budgets appear, from the outside, as considerable, a closer examination reveals that, somewhat astonishingly, they come without any of the necessary resources for programming in these core mandate areas. Instead, programme resources are dependent on the unpredictable voluntary generosity of donors. The case studies for this review reveal the enormous gap between the expectations established by such mandates and the paucity of resources – political, technical and financial – made available. The incentives for a broader collection of peacebuilding actors to align themselves usually being absent, in a very real sense in many contexts, peacebuilding inadvertently seems set up to fail. A solution must be found to ensure predictable funding for critical programme efforts towards sustaining peace.

The RC and UNCT continue to function through the tenure of a mission and SRSG, but the embedding of the UNCT within the mission is usually tenuous, and this has longer-term consequences for the transition out from Security Council-mandated peace operations back to UNCT management alone once the situation sufficiently stabilizes. The case studies for this review illustrate that more consideration needs to be given to how the UNCT should operate and be funded for sustaining peace before, during and after a mission.

In situations where the conflict is concentrated in a few areas of the affected country, the UN often is unable to or does not even consider continuing development activities in the remaining relatively peaceful areas, in spite of the positive impact such an option would have, not only for their intrinsic value, but as an incentive for warring parties to seek a similar peace dividend. Again, the case studies of both South Sudan and the Central African Republic represent instances of this phenomenon.

In another variant of fragmentation, this review’s case studies highlight the perils of an overly abrupt “transition” between different UN operational configurations. Once a peace operation is drawn down again, there is a visibly diminished investment in the UN’s peacebuilding efforts from the political side of the UN Secretariat. Only recently has the job profile begun to factor in the need for RCs to be able to play a strategic political role when called upon in a peacebuilding setting. Meanwhile, UNCTs, for their part, are not regularly provided with the resources to pay adequate attention to the political and strategic dimensions of peacebuilding. In parallel to the diminishing of political attention post-crisis is the rapid drop-off in financing – again, an aspect of the “silo effect” in which different forms of engagement enjoy radically different modes of funding (a point which will be taken up below).
CASE STUDY  The C.A.R.: The Costs of Inconsistent International Attention

The Central African Republic represents a dramatic and instructive case of peacebuilding failure. This resulted, to a significant degree, from the abrupt and premature transition out of peacekeeping in 2000, the subsequent dramatic shortfall in attention that followed and persisted, the particular failure of international partners to mobilize resources on anything like the scale necessary, and of the national counterpart to live up to its obligations.

The C.A.R. remains a State that needs to be constructed. From its emergence, there has been an almost total absence of central authority outside the capital, Bangui. Colonial and post-colonial leadership were seen largely to share an exclusively extractive interest in the territory. CAR is endowed with enormously fertile soil and regular rains, and with very extensive mineral deposits, including diamonds, gold, and petroleum. The successive ruling elites and their entourage never demonstrated any sense of responsibility or accountability towards the populations they were meant to administer. Poor leadership and governance and the neglect of the regions must therefore be seen as the principal causes of the current conflict. While ethnicity became a field of leverage in the 1980s, religion only became one very recently, during the 2013-2014 crisis – and both were violently instrumentalised.

Almost since the beginning of the violence (in 1996), the UN has deployed a varying sequence of peace operations, beginning with a peacekeeping operation, MINUCRA, in 1998. But the types of interventions authorised by the Security Council seem to have been guided by broader budgetary concerns rather than the needs of the situation in the country. For example, in July 1999, while the Secretary-General’s Report was warning of a sudden upsurge in violence, the impact of the conflict in DRC and the precarious security situation, and even though the national authorities formally requested the mission be retained, the Security Council opted to withdraw MINURCA. The decision appears to have been driven by the desire to reduce the global peacekeeping budget rather than by a sober analysis of what was needed on the ground. The subsequent fifteen years of intervention could be characterized as a succession of UN peacebuilding mandates and small offices trying desperately to catch up with an inexorably deteriorating political and security situation. During this period, there was also a particularly graphic illustration of the divergence between mandates and means: successive Security Council resolutions charged UN peacebuilding offices to play a role in SSR and DDR, but voluntary contributions never sufficiently materialised to enable this.

Even after CAR barely survived its biggest crisis yet – all but tipping into all out genocide in 2013-14 – there still seems to be little appetite to provide the kind of risk-taking donor support that meaningful peacebuilding will require. There even seems to be an assumption in some donor quarters that the establishment of a new and multidimensional peacekeeping operation, MINUSCA, constitutes in itself the provision of adequate assistance and that somehow peacebuilding will automatically flow from that.

Meanwhile, in terms of its most recent mandate, the need for MINUSCA to extend central authority is complicated by the fact that this authority has never existed in many areas of the country, and the legitimacy of the central authority is even contested in some. Compounding the problems of the UN is its inability to attract qualified UN staff to an admitted “hardship” duty station, and the constraints
imposed on direct engagement with local communities by the UN’s post-conflict security regime in C.A.R.

III.4 The UN and Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding

77. As already noted, in the 15 years since the Security Council adopted its landmark Resolution 1325, there has been a paradigm shift from seeing women only as victims of violent conflict to recognizing their vital role as agents of change, including especially the area of peacebuilding. Most countries have developed National Action Plans under 1325 with government and civil society working together, identifying specific strategies, putting in place independent monitoring mechanisms and, in many cases, allocating a dedicated budget.

78. But all these factors have yet to translate into sufficient material changes in women’s lives, or even in the UN’s peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. Research has shown that peace accords that meaningfully include civil society, including women, are at least 50 per cent more likely to endure than when they do not. Yet peace processes do not consistently maximize the ways in which the voices of women’s organizations and civil society can be heard (though the UN has begun to make modest progress in appointing women mediators, ensuring women in the composition of mediation support teams, encouraging women in the negotiating delegations of parties to conflicts, and in women’s participation in peace processes overall). As examples ranging from Colombia and the Philippines (recent peace talks in both have seen balanced gender representation on negotiating teams) to the UN’s support on Yemen (where, prior to the present crisis, the National Dialogue process strictly observed quotas to ensure women’s representation at all levels), it is both feasible and fruitful to engage women meaningfully in efforts to make and consolidate peace.

79. The UN’s efforts towards sustaining peace must, however, offer an opportunity to expand women’s political participation and leadership beyond the “peace table”. Support offered to reforming public administration and governance structures should take into account the need to respond to women’s aspirations and to engage them as active participants. Electoral reforms can introduce “temporary special measures” that build the capacity of women as citizens and leaders and quotas to increase their representation in elected bodies at all levels. Research has shown that the introduction of such measures for the first election after a conflict results in increases in numbers of women elected in subsequent elections – and the UN’s engagement in different parts of the world has shown the benefits of advocacy in this direction.
80. More generally, though, the same issue of UN fragmentation is sadly visible when it comes to the UN’s women and peacebuilding efforts. The case studies for this review tended to reveal a weakness in bringing together the peace and security dimensions and the socio-economic ones of women’s participation. Mission components tended to concentrate on narrow but important questions of political participation and the prevention of conflict-associated sexual and gender-based violence, while the UNCTs worked on gender-sensitive approaches to economic recovery and inclusion without always bringing a “peacebuilding lens” fully to bear. Again, separate funding silos and institutional imperatives reinforced these tendencies. Better coherence and integration between missions and UNCTs in the delivery of gender-oriented UN peacebuilding must urgently be built.

81. Reflecting recognition of the importance of all of these dimensions, in 2009, the Secretary-General adopted a “Gender Marker” (folder under his 7-Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding of 2010) for financing to peacebuilding approaches that promote gender equality. The goal was to ensure that at least 15 per cent of UN peacebuilding expenditures went towards activities that would “address women’s specific needs, advance gender equality or empower women” as their principle objectives. In 2011, to boost efforts to meet the 15 per cent target, the PBF launched a first Gender Promotion Initiative (GPI), calling for targeted projects on women’s empowerment and gender equality.xlv A second GPI is in preparation.

82. Despite this, in not one single country of engagement has the UN attained its own, modest 15 per cent marker – still less exceeded it. Amongst the factors has been the slowness of UN entities on the ground in coming forward with genuinely peacebuilding-oriented gender-related programming proposals, rather than thinly repackaged existing initiatives (a phenomenon that affects more than just the issue of gender). Worse, UN entities have made only limited progress in tracking resource allocation for gender-focused interventions: just one quarter of UN entities currently have systems to track resources for gender equality and women’s empowerment. In comparison, the World Bank’s target of “60 per cent of all IDA lending operations, and 55 per cent of all Bank lending operations being gender-informed” was met in 2014xlv. A major additional push is clearly needed in order to meet and then surpass the Secretary-General’s goals in this critical area.

III.5 UN credibility and leadership

83. The repeated failure to sustain peace has heavy consequences in human lives and global expenditures. But viewed from the ground, it is also damaging the UN’s credibility. There are a number of dimensions to this. One relates to an “expectations gap” in many conflict-affected countries, where the host state and society find limitations in UN
mandates or budget lines hard to understand. Local communities are puzzled, for example, when UN blue helmets cannot be used to repel armed attacks, or why the budgets used to build UN operating bases or regional offices cannot purchase basic office equipment for local officials striving to re-establish state presence in the same areas. There is often a gap between expectations and the ability of the UN on the ground to deliver.

84. The second dimension concerns the quality and calibre of UN staff on the ground. If the UN is to succeed, it is essential that it deploy staff of sufficient quality. Unfortunately all too frequently, the calibre of UN staff deployed seems well below that needed. The challenges in this area were evident across all of the case studies and consultations undertaken for this report. The management in a number of the UN missions voiced concern about the difficulties in finding qualified and motivated individuals to fill critical posts. Administrative and bureaucratic hurdles were frequently cited as the cause. From the perspective of local interlocutors, meanwhile, UN personnel were often perceived as aloof, isolated, and sometimes even disinterested in the populations they are supposed to be assisting.

85. A third dimension refers to the way in which the UN positions itself with respect to national leaders. In some of the case studies, but also in a number of other contexts, lapses or relapses into violence appear, in part, to have had a link to the UN’s closeness to leaders whose strategies and interests proved not to be aligned with peacebuilding. In many situations of relapse, the leaders around whom peace agreements were framed turned out to have no sense of mutual purpose with broader society beyond their narrow self and group interests. If the population perceives the UN as too “close” to this kind of leader and insufficiently able to open questions of national ownership to broader domestic constituencies, the UN’s credibility suffers.

86. A related dimension concerns the often-overwhelming focus of peace efforts on the protagonists or individuals who bear arms, diminishing the attention given to the rest of society. Too often, no space is afforded for societal “conversations” about the deep-seated causes of the conflict and the collective aspirations for building a more harmonious nation (a criticism particularly levelled from the perspective of women organising for peace). Without an approach to leadership that seeks to encourage a sense of common purpose between elites and the broader society, the UN and those responding to conflict risk the continuation of the cycle of conflict. When populations systematically suffer at the hands of leaders that they perceive as supported by the UN, there is a risk that this will erode the credibility of the Organization. To recover, the Organization must strive to remain on the moral high ground – the main factor that has set it apart from other global actors – and restore the trust of the populations it seeks to protect.
87. Invariably, getting this leadership factor right has a bearing on the demand for inclusive peacebuilding and the question of “ownership”. The arguments against “imported peace” and against “elite peace” are both valid. Experience shows that neither is inclusive or long lasting. Peace agendas must reflect the mutual aspirations of protagonists and the larger society: only when this is achieved can peacemaking or peacebuilding prove inclusive and lasting. Timor-Leste, for example, is a peacebuilding success story not only because of UN interventions and the international community’s continued support, but all the more because of the wisdom of its national leaders and the ease with which they engaged with the country’s people.

**CASE STUDY**  
Timor-Leste: National leadership is critical to sustainable peace

A long history of colonialism followed by a quarter century of struggle against Indonesian occupation steeled a generation of political leaders in Timor-Leste who have made a key difference to sustaining peace in the country at critical junctures and in different ways.

A referendum overseen by the UN led to independence in 1999. Violence after the referendum led to deployment of an international force under a UN mandate, followed by successive UN Missions with mandates shifting from transitional authority to peacekeeping, on to peacebuilding, and back to peacekeeping again in the aftermath of internecine fighting in 2006.

After independence, national leaders opted for a Truth and Friendship Commission with Indonesia, despite UN advice to the contrary. The Commission proved effective in seamlessly addressing reconciliation, peace consolidation and development. In building national reconciliation, Timorese leadership used their traditional and culturally supported systems effectively to address recurrent tensions. Through these efforts Timor-Leste was able address problems at the human level, including the division of families, the lack of livelihoods and at least to some extent, individual trauma.

In dealing with natural resources, national leaders displayed similar farsightedness. The discovery of oil provided a windfall, which was well managed through a negotiated agreement with Australia to postpone the demarcation of the maritime boundary and to set up a Petroleum Fund along Norway’s model. Prudent limits were set on the government’s ability to draw from that fund for annual budgets.

A third example of sage leadership was the active effort to engage in regional and global platforms. Timor-Leste is a member of and current President of the Community of Portuguese Language speaking Peoples, founder member of and host of the Secretariat of the g7+, which brings together fragile states to share experiences and advice, and it is an applicant for membership of ASEAN. In all this, Timor-Leste was helped by a positive approach from the neighbouring countries, particularly Indonesia, which assisted greatly in stabilizing the country quickly.

Support from a wide range of partners and the UN has made a critical difference to Timor-Leste but success can be largely attributed to careful prioritization by leaders of what was central to building sustainable peace.

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III.6 UN partnerships and peacebuilding

88. So great is the challenge of peacebuilding in political, technical and financial terms, though, that building effective partnerships is essential—first and foremost with domestic actors, but also with new groupings, regional and international players, and non-governmental organizations. Yet, this review identified some serious impediments to the UN’s ability to partner for peacebuilding.

89. First, much of the dedicated discussion of “peacebuilding” is confined to New York, in the new peacebuilding entities created in 2005. There is still too little mirroring of such discussions amongst UN and other operational stakeholders on the ground, where the territory in-between crisis response and long-term development remains, for the most part, uncharted.

90. Second, new and highly active international initiatives dealing with the situation of fragile and conflict-affected countries have appeared on the international stage. The g7+, for example and as discussed earlier, has a membership of 20 countries that share experiences and undertake soft diplomacy on preventing conflict and on building peace. Drawing from their own experience, their advice is often to move more gradually along the course of actions advised by the international community and UN, building confidence and capacity before, for example, rushing to elections. They also strongly insist on the link between peacebuilding and development.

91. Third, as is well known, the UN Charter importantly contemplates “Regional Arrangements” in its Chapter VIII “for matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.” Deepened partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations on peacemaking and peacekeeping has developed both at the intergovernmental level (for example, between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union) and between Secretariats and operational units in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Central Europe and especially Africa. Similar cooperation in the area of peacebuilding has yet to materialize. The PBC may be able to play a part in efforts to engender such partnerships.

92. It generally holds true that the regional and sub-regional partners are well placed to have a detailed understanding of the situation on the ground in their member states, and presumably some leverage to influence outcomes. One important caveat, however, is that precisely due to proximity and interdependence, regional and sub-regional actors may also be indirectly involved in the conflict, especially when neighbouring states are involved. That is why a case-by-case analysis is warranted before concluding that the perceived comparative advantages outweigh any potential negative aspects. The generally acknowledged comparative advantages of the United Nations remain its impartiality, its
universality, its global reach, the responsibilities bestowed on the Organization by the Charter, and its comparative access to resources (both financial and human).

93. In the course of the growing engagement between regional and global actors, other issues have emerged, especially regarding the distribution of responsibilities (“who does what” and who is the leading decision-maker), possible differences in strategies and policies, and matters of distribution of costs and financing. All these have surfaced in the area of peacemaking and peacekeeping and they will most likely surface again as cooperation builds in the area of the UN’s peacebuilding engagement.

94. An important lesson learned, therefore, is that the United Nations must better define the scope, content and rules that frame its partnerships with other major stakeholders, be they global, regional or local, public or private. In that context, the partnership between the United Nations and the European Union deserves special attention, because in part it involves joint endeavours between a global and a regional entity, and in part a partnership between two global players. The European Union certainly has global reach and has become a major global actor in peace and security, as well as development. Both the UN and the EU have developed specific instruments to deal with post-conflict and conflict-affected countries. The work of the PBF finds its counterpart in the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), one of the key external assistance initiatives enabling the EU to respond to actual or emerging crises around the world.

CASE STUDY  South Sudan: a Tragedy of Endowment and Lack of Vision?

The 2011 referendum that led to the birth of South Sudan, following a six-year transition period guided by a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), led to widespread celebrations for the emergence of a new, oil-rich country following decades of civil war within Sudan. Indeed, it further raised the already great expectations for the building of a viable, stable and prosperous South Sudan. These were tragically dashed when, in December 2013, southern Sudanese descended once again into violent conflict and society polarised along ethnic lines.

Several factors lie at the root of this crisis. First, the fault lines in South Sudanese society remain unaddressed. The territory’s 64 tribes shared no common history of nationhood and the Southern Sudanese were far from unified even on the eve of independence. Second and related, this lack of common bonds was overlooked in the CPA and during the transition period following it. In the period after independence, little attention was paid to building a national vision, cohesion or identity. Infrastructure in the geographically large and, at times, inaccessible territory was also severely underdeveloped, and the country and its people were in dire need of roads, schools, hospitals and other basic infrastructure that would help to lay a physical foundation for the nation to move forward in a unified manner, and which many Southern Sudanese had expected would accompany peace.
The approach to peacebuilding also fell short of addressing critical leadership deficits – externally and domestically. In order to ensure the security of the new-born state and to help it build peace, state institutions and capacity, the UN deployed a new mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, with a hybrid mandate for peacekeeping and peacebuilding. But neither the CPA nor the peacebuilding effort developed an agenda for steering South Sudan’s leaders and the populations over which they preside toward a common national vision. Leaders of independent South Sudan focused attention and resources on the conflict with the North and the pursuit of narrow interests. The challenges of building capacity to maintain internal security in the face of on-going inter-communal conflicts in several parts of the country, contending with the continued existence of armed groups, or managing the country’s significant resources to deliver the most basic services to its people were left largely to the international community.

In effect, key elements of a nation state were absent. Much of the disparate militia of the pre-independence years, including those that had fought against the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), were now only loosely integrated into the SPLA, leaving their organizational structures and command effectively unchanged. Various SPLA units remained separated by ethnicity and faction and their militia leaders became their commanding generals. Furthermore, the SPLM movement remains in “liberation mode” and has yet to transform itself effectively into a political party. As such it continues to be tightly linked to its military wing, SPLA.

The divergent interests of a range of external actors, not least neighbouring states, contribute to the elusiveness of peace in South Sudan. At the same time, the converging of regional peace efforts – the IGAD process in Addis led by Ethiopia and the Arusha process led by Tanzania and South Africa – illustrates that regional bilateral actors as well as multilateral institutions have the potential to play significant and visible roles in peacebuilding.

Overall, sustainable peace remains elusive in South Sudan. In the absence of more effective leadership and of a relevant vision for sustaining peace, it has become difficult for either internal or external actors to rally around a strategy for moving such an agenda forward. What was euphorically envisioned as a potentially stable and prosperous state now appears as a tragedy of endowment.

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III.7 The Peacebuilding Commission and its Support Office

95. The new peacebuilding entities established in 2005 had as their background the fragmented UN landscape characterized above. In particular, the intention behind the creation of the PBC was precisely that it would build bridges between the three pillars of peace and security, development and human rights. It was even hoped it would help to transcend the traditional divide between the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, since 21 of its members were nominated, in equal proportion, by each of these three principal intergovernmental organs."
96. Instead, the Commission was rapidly condemned to occupy a sort of “no-man’s land” within the fragmented landscape to which it now belonged. Having been created with a subsidiary role to the principal intergovernmental Organs, and especially the Security Council – the PBC is an “inter-governmental advisory body” and even then its recommendations must be formulated “on the basis of consensus” – the Commission had difficulty in finding eager takers for its advice\textsuperscript{xix}. This situation was further aggravated by the disconnection between the members of the Commission and the principal Organ that nominated them, frustrating the original intention that its members should feel a sense of collective ownership of the new entity.

97. There are enough metrics available to substantiate the impression that the expected impact of the Peacebuilding Commission has “yet to be realized.”\textsuperscript{i} The primary example is the small number of countries on the Commission’s agenda, and the apparent resistance shown by other member states to joining that number, compared with the number of contexts that could plausibly be considered in a “peacebuilding” mode globally. Some 32 countries have been designated as recipients of PBF funding over the Fund’s ten-year existence, for example, eclipsing the 6 countries that have ever been formal objects of the PBC’s “Agenda”.

98. In addition, the Commission is clearly a New York-based body, and therefore only assigned functions that can be carried out at UN Headquarters in support of a process that, by definition, takes place “on the ground”. These functions include advocacy, assistance in marshalling resources, assistance in improving coordination within and outside the United Nations, strategic thinking and policy recommendations, as well as offering a meeting place for interested parties. However, the divisions between what could be achieved at Headquarters and what could be carried out in the field became somewhat blurred as the Commission’s “Country-Specific Configurations” (CSCs) progressively took on a life of their own and occupied the space that might otherwise have been the PBC’s as a whole.

99. Related to this are the working methods of the PBC. There are continuing questions as to the relevance of the periodic meetings of the PBC’s Organizational Committee, which until recently had been found to be too “formulaic” – although some recent gatherings have been more substantive and deemed more useful. The Working Group on Lessons Learned, which is a subsidiary body not contemplated in the PBC’s founding resolutions, has piloted some interesting processes, including on the management of UN mission transitions and on institution-building. But the general sense is that the debates have not added all they could to the collective wisdom on peacebuilding.

100. A number of positive examples can readily be found where the PBC and its CSCs have contributed. Among these can be enumerated the recent and commendable work of the PBC in highlighting the impact of the Ebola crisis on the development of several West
African countries, the manner in which it has been able to convene discussions amongst a broad array of actors around the present crisis in Burundi, or around the need for predictable funding for peacebuilding. Against this it has to be noted that not all CSCs, at all points along the arc of their engagement, were able to work out productive divisions of labour with the UN’s operational arms on the ground. The PBC has also remained somewhat underused and under-supported by those UN departments and programmes (principally DPA, DPKO and UNDP) with direct operational peacebuilding responsibilities.

101. The PBC’s work on the sub-regional dimensions of the Ebola crisis prompts the thought that – newly reinvigorated – it might be able to contribute greatly to fostering strategic coherence at the regional level concerning peacebuilding. As of now, though, it has not always been able to adapt its structures, mechanisms and working methods to facilitate active engagement with regional organizations, in spite of the obvious potential for greatly strengthening, for example, cooperation on peacebuilding with the African Union. While the African Union has a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework and an African Solidarity Initiative that encourages South-South cooperation, so far little has been done by the PBC or the AU to achieve greater synergy in their respective activities in peacebuilding in Africa.

102. Individual Country-Specific Configuration (CSC) chairs have sometimes been able to add value. But on the whole, the CSCs have proven time-consuming, unclear and improvisational in objectives and outcomes, and insufficiently relevant to the countries on their respective national agendas. Originally conceived as a proxy for the “Friends of...” formula which had been successfully implemented by the UN in peace efforts starting in the 1980s, the CSCs became open forums that met frequently, often attended by numerous participants but at low levels of diplomatic representation and sometimes without host country participation. Where it had been hoped the CSCs would become a modus for close concert with the IFIs on countries of focus, the IFIs generally report finding the utility of CSC meetings too low to engage their interest.

103. Another feature that limits the effectiveness of the PBC as a whole is that the performance of the CSCs has become heavily dependent on the personal qualities and dedication of their Chair (many of them long-serving) and the resources available to them. Indeed, the work of the CSCs appears by now to have “crowded out” the PBC’s overall primacy and convening power. It is worth recalling that the founding resolutions of the PBC made no mention of the establishment of CSCs. Rather, it envisaged that the PBC’s Organizational Committee (OC) could convene “country-specific meetings of the Commission” (op 7 – emphasis added) which, in addition to members of the Committee, might invite representatives of the country in question, countries in the region, financial, troop and police contributing countries, senior UN field and other representatives, and key IFIs and regional organizations. Despite the success with which some of the CSCs have
operated, to a degree they may have done so at the expense of flexibility and of engaging
the attention of the PBC as a whole.

104. The Peacebuilding Commission relies on its own Secretariat, the Peacebuilding
Support Office, to underpin its substantive activities. The PBSO was understaffed from the
start, and has had to dedicate most of its scarce resources to providing secretarial support
to the meetings of the PBC and the country-specific configurations, with little time for in-
depth policy analysis on dealing with conflict-affected states, or on what drives the
recurrence of conflict.

105. None of these perceived weaknesses explain, by themselves, the "unrealized
expectations" of the PBC or the other new peacebuilding entities created in 2005. But, taken
together, especially in the broader context of the fragmentation mentioned above, they clarify some of the challenges that stand in the way of attaining a greater level of relevancy. Again, many of these observations had already been pointed out in the 2010 Review, but relatively little was done in the ensuing period to heed its recommendations.

CASE STUDY  Burundi: Building Resilience?

The overall progress towards peace that has been accomplished in Burundi until the most recent crisis resulted from a unique combination of national willingness to compromise coupled with concerted support and engagement by the region and the international community, including the UN. Unlike a number of other crisis countries, Burundi can be said to have long had relatively strong institutions and the characteristics of a Nation-State (a long, pre-colonial cultural and political history within a defined geographic space). Thus Burundi's conflict was, for the most part, contained within its borders, and the underpinnings of the violence were far more linked to injustice and to the abuse of political power than to weak administrative structures or governance. The beginning to ending the conflict in Burundi came through the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000, which provided a political roadmap for the country based on power-sharing and dialogue.

The Arusha Agreement also established a framework for the international community's support, and there followed a succession of different UN mission deployments. In 2006, Burundi became one of the first countries to be referred to the agenda of the newly created Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) by the Security Council. The integrated UN leadership on the ground, in the person of an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (uniting responsibilities both for the mission and the UN Country Team) was mirrored with the formation of a PBC Country-Specific Configuration (CSC) of the PBC as an additional focus for engagement at the intergovernmental level. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) provided significant resources that allowed for the funding of key – and in some cases, “non-traditional” – activities in support of peace consolidation, including strengthening inter-party dialogue and advancing DDR/SSR. The PBC ensured continued focus from New York, was able to help catalyse significant additional funding, and, particularly in the latter stages of engagement, worked out a productive partnership with the UN’s leadership on the ground.
At the time of writing of this report, Burundi is facing serious new tensions. The President’s decision to stand for a third term has created strong divisions both within society and the political establishment. But paradoxically, the situation so far still serves to underline the comparative success of the Arusha Agreement. The deployment of Burundian forces in Somalia over recent years – testament in itself to the durability of the power-sharing arrangements Arusha foresaw for key institutions like the army – may have helped forge a greater national identity within it. A number of institutions of the state have, in fact, demonstrated their resistance to being drawn directly into the political confrontations. And the strong tensions that have surfaced around the present crisis have remained political and have thankfully not yet led to a resumption of inter-ethnic confrontation.

Unfortunately, by the time of this crisis the UN on the ground had forfeited much of its relevance. The UN had been unable to maintain its political leadership role in the course of its transition from a mission to a more classical “non-mission” UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC) and UN Country Team (UNCT) structure (with a small electoral observation mission, MENUB). The delays in fielding a new leadership team and mobilizing the necessary support, clearly contributed to the reduction in the UN’s credibility and influence. But possibly of greater impact was the new structure’s inability, or even unwillingness, to contest the Government’s insistence that it had no legitimacy or mandate to raise political issues. Against this, and alongside the Security Council, over the recent months the PBC has proven to be an effective and useful venue for broader format discussions amongst international partners on how to support those trying to bring the present crisis to a peaceful conclusion.

III.8 Peacebuilding financing and the Peacebuilding Fund

106. Countries emerging from conflict require significant financing over extended periods. But despite a decade of focus on peacebuilding, financing remains scarce, inconsistent and unpredictable. Though per capita ODA to what the World Bank denominates “fragile and conflict-affected states” has almost doubled since 2000 (and now constitutes about half of all ODA), almost a quarter of that went to just two countries: Afghanistan and Iraq. As recently as 2012, only 6% of foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing country contexts went to such countries, and the bulk of that to just a small number of resource-rich states.iii

107. Meanwhile, to note the marked imbalance between the allocations available for peacebuilding and the global funding either for humanitarian response (estimated at $24.5 billion US dollars for 2014, of which $18.7 billion represented assistance from governmentsliii, an almost four-and-a-half-fold increase within a ten-year periodlv) or for peacekeeping (now annually in the range of 8 billion US dollarslv) is not to doubt the importance of either form of response. It is, however, to invite the obvious thought: if more
global priority were consistently given to efforts at sustaining peace, might there not, over the course of time, be reduced need for crisis response?

108. Even within existing peacebuilding assistance there is a misalignment between priorities and flows. Assistance to the key peacebuilding sectors identified by the g7+ countries (legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services) remain tiny. In 2012, just 4 per cent of total ODA to “fragile and conflict-affected states” was allocated to legitimate politics, 2 per cent to security (and just 1.2 per cent to security sector reform) and 3 per cent to justice.. Just 6% targeted gender equality as a principal objective. The vast majority was devoted to other sectors altogether in 2012-2013. Worse, when the major recipients, Iraq and Afghanistan are put to one side, the percentage devoted to the security sector falls to just 1 per cent of the whole. In short, despite the clear demand to direct ODA to key sectors, donor behaviour has changed very little.

109. The paucity of funding can distort priority setting by the UN and recipients alike. Countries emerging from conflict may have to subordinate their own priorities to the templates of financial institutions, while different programs and agencies of the United Nations System sometimes compete for scarce resources to advance their activities – the fragmentation of the UN System aggravated by a fragmented donor landscape. Despite much apparent attention given to improving “good donorship”, assistance to conflict-affected contexts remains characterized by “cherry-picking”, “flag planting”, a seemingly innate preference for covering fixed costs (rebuilding clinics or schools, for example) rather than recurrent ones (paying salaries to teachers or health workers), and a large-scale aversion to taking the risks inherent in financing in such contexts.

110. Pooled funds have proven attractive for sharing risk by uniting the resources of multiple donors and the capacities of multiple deliverers of programming. The Multi-Partner Trust Fund established in 2014 in Somalia brings together the UN, the World Bank and the African Development Bank and the Special Financing Facility under common governance arrangements. It has two windows, one for UN agencies and one for national entities, and is equipped with a risk management strategy. However, its somewhat uneven performance so far illustrates the tension between principles of speed, inclusive governance, risk tolerance, and national ownership. There are and always will be trade-offs between these different principles. What is important is that the UN and its partners make conscious choices around these trade-offs and employ a judicious mix of different instruments across peacebuilding engagements, pooling risk to the extent possible.

111. In a global context of aid shortfalls, particularly for conflict-affected “aid orphans”, domestic revenue mobilization is increasingly seen as a crucial source of financing. Some post-conflict countries have managed to improve local revenues impressively through
institution building efforts. Burundi, for example, achieved strong revenue growth until 2013, when new legislation suddenly reduced the tax base again. Countries rich in natural resources enjoy a potential advantage, but one obviously hampered by persistent poor governance. The UN’s record in assisting in these efforts is, so far, mixed. And a recent High-Level Panel has underlined that every year the African continent still loses at least $50bn through illicit financial outflows – an enormous loss for peacebuilding and development. Only joint action by the countries concerned and those where the funds are being deposited can address this haemorrhage.

112. When the UN’s new peacebuilding entities were established, addressing the “financing cliff” faced in the aftermath of conflict was a major motivation. The PBF was created to mobilize emergency financing and bridge the vast divide between funding needs and funding availability. Since then, the PBF has played an important role in providing financing to countries emerging from conflict or conflict-affected countries, as well as in advancing strategic alignment between the United Nations and the IFIs. In 2014, the Peacebuilding Fund allocated $99.4 million to 16 countries, continuing an increasing trend from previous years, and total contributions to the PBF in the amount of $78.2 million were made by 21 Member States.

113. The PBF’s interventions have shown particular effect in the case studies that underpin this report where they have been rapid, flexible, and provided funding for crucial interventions that were too “risk-laden” (politically or financially) for more conventional funding streams. Its Immediate Response Facility (IRF) has proven particularly timely in a number of its interventions, such as helping to keep the police on the streets in the C.A.R. in 2014 at the moment of deepest crisis by defraying a considerable proportion of the public sector payroll for months at a time. The fund’s other window, the Peacebuilding Recovery Facility (PRF) has also marked success over the years. But in a number of the case studies national authorities and other partners questioned whether the still comparatively small envelopes of funding that could deliver (particularly when divided across multiple UN implementing partners) were outweighed by the window’s relatively more burdensome administrative procedures.

114. The PBF functions under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General, with its own governing body (strongly influenced by its donors) and an administration under the aegis of the Multi-Partner Trust Fund of UNDP. Early on there was relative alignment between those countries benefitting from attention and accompaniment by the PBC and those receiving support from the PBF, but the last five years or so have seen a divergence.

115. Meanwhile, with total resources of about US $500 million, and a disbursement in the range of US $100 million annually spread across somewhere in the region of 20 countries, the PBF alone is simply too small to achieve the impact required. The goal that its funding
should prove “catalytic” of larger resource flows from other sources has largely failed to materialize. It is the conclusion of this review, therefore, that the PBF should “play to its strengths” and continue to sharpen its niche as a rapid, impactful, procedurally light and risk-taking “investor of first resort” in efforts to sustain peace.

116. The UN as a whole is, indeed unlikely in the foreseeable future, to have access to the volume of financial resources needed for the full scale of global peacebuilding need. Here again, therefore, effective UN partnerships are a prerequisite for sustaining peace, this time with the International Financial Institutions and other new sources of financing. An important step was taken in October of 2008 in UN/World Bank Group collaboration with the signing of the “Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations”. Recognizing that their roles, mandates and systems of governance differ, both parties nonetheless acknowledged that their respective efforts were interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The basis for this partnership was not just good will but the comparative advantages of the two Organizations: the UN with its political mandates, presence on the ground, and primacy role in international peace and security, the World Bank, with its development mandates, comparatively more centralized structure, and core role in development financing.

117. What the Bank calls “fragile and conflict-affected states” (FCS) still constitute a relatively small part of its portfolio, but in recent years they have been growing in importance. During its most recent replenishment of its International Development Association (IDA17) resources, the Bank specifically developed an “exceptional allocation regime” for countries facing “turn-around situations,” including post-conflict ones. In doing so, the Bank noted: “coordinated action constitutes a vital aspect of IDA’s engagement in FCSs. In particular, the Bank and the UN are strongly committed to streamline and enhance their partnership through closer collaboration at the country level, expanding thematic collaboration, coordinating their support to national leadership through the New Deal process and addressing implementation challenges.”

118. Flowing from the 2011 World Development Report the World Bank created a Centre on Conflict, Security, and Development, a specialized unit with a staff of experts co-located in Nairobi, Kenya, and Washington, D.C., signalling the enhanced interest in FCSs within the Bank. The much-touted joint visits to a number of conflict-affected countries and regions by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim also indicate moves in the right direction. But in general, more could be done to operationalize the important findings and recommendations of the 2011 WDR, and there are even concerns this agenda may be suffering under the Bank’s present internal reorganization.

119. Moreover, the distinct bureaucratic cultures of the Bank and the UN have continued to impede more rapid progress in coordination and cooperation, particularly at the
operational level. Yet, it is precisely in peacebuilding that a strong incentive exists for them to cooperate, as the recent and pioneering establishment of small-scale “Joint Facilities” in both Yemen and Somalia have shown – settings where the UN’s significant political engagement and the Bank's financial and programmatic muscle could productively unite.

IV. THE WAY FORWARD: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

120. This report draws a number of overarching conclusions with ramifications for the UN, member states, and broader international efforts towards sustaining peace – operationally and in terms of norms, standards and approaches.

121. The first is that violent conflicts around the world have become significantly more complex over the first decade-and-a-half of this century, with new conflict drivers layered on longstanding ones. International actors, including within the UN system, have yet to absorb fully how their tools and actions must adapt and, in general, too often prefer militarized responses. While these can prove effective in the immediate context of halting violence, they tend to address symptoms rather than root causes. The very nature of such responses, with their emphasis on short-term security and their correspondingly heavy resourcing needs, can sometimes detract support and attention from achieving sustainable peace.

122. The second is that the UN must see sustaining peace as the core task set for it by the UN Charter, and, thus, as the thread that must flow through all the Organization's engagements, from preventive action to peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction engagement. Sustaining peace should span an essential combination of actions across the diplomatic, political, human rights, economic, social and security areas, with particular attention to addressing root causes.

123. Third, however, peacebuilding has instead been relegated to a peripheral activity. Within the UN, efforts to sustain peace should take high priority in terms of resources, capacities and organizational hierarchy. A change in mind-set is needed: rather than waiting until crisis breaks out and then making a default recourse to a crisis response, timely efforts to prevent conflict and then sustain peace need to be embedded across all sectors and phases of action. When peace operations are deployed, they must, from the beginning, see their purpose as to maximize the creation of space and opportunity for peacebuilding efforts to advance. And from the beginning they should also plan for and
benchmark their own exit strategies, with a vision of how to ensure effective and appropriately timed follow-on engagement.

124. Fourth, it follows directly from the above points that the “UN’s peacebuilding architecture” should not be considered as limited merely to the structures of the PBC, PBF and PBSO – notwithstanding their names or how valiantly they may have worked over the last ten years. Indeed, much as the term “post-conflict peacebuilding” should be abandoned as misleading, the same can be said for the term “peacebuilding architecture.” The challenge of sustaining peace demands the priority, attention and effort of the entire UN system, including the three relevant principal intergovernmental organs.

125. Fifth, however, the UN system is fragmented at every level – in the intergovernmental organs, in headquarters arrangements, and all the way to the operational level. Very significant impediments to the needed systemic response must be overcome. At the intergovernmental level, the Security Council is, and must understand itself to be one of, if not the principal peacebuilding actor, in partnership with the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The PBC, if its work is reoriented, can become the necessary and effective bridge, acting as the advisory body between those organs.

126. Sixth, at the operational level, the continuity of UN engagement in sustaining peace is challenged by the proliferation of operational formats, ranging from mediation teams in the peacemaking phase (not always UN-led, nor necessarily accountable), to large peacekeeping operations, through smaller follow-on Special Political Missions to “regular” engagement by Resident Coordinators heading Country Teams. The transitions between these different arrangements are frequently poorly timed and poorly managed, further impairing continuity. The greatest gap in continuity often occurs in the transition from a mission to a regular Country Team engagement, with crucial effect on the progress of peacebuilding.

127. Seventh, sustaining peace is, in essence, about individuals and different groups learning to live together without resorting to violence to resolve conflicts and disputes. It must be people-centred and inclusive in approach, and provide a vision of a common future to domestic stakeholders, public and private. External actors, including the UN, can accompany and facilitate, but they cannot impose peace. To this end, the UN’s approach to sustaining peace, in all phases, must be underpinned by a deep commitment to broadening inclusion and ownership on the part of all stakeholders across the societies where it works. Neither peace agreements nor the implementation processes that follow them will likely prosper unless they look beyond the narrow interests of belligerents to a framework that can engage a society’s broad and emergent vision of itself.

128. Eighth, the UN is not the only, and often not even the main external actor. The task of sustaining peace globally goes well beyond the present capacity of the UN to deliver on
its own, in political, technical or financial terms. Partnering better with multilateral, existing and emerging regional and sub-regional actors and civil society is essential to making peace sustainable.

129. Finally, truly ensuring that peace is sustained requires much longer-term engagement and accompaniment than currently recognized. Due to the imperative to halt violence, early peacebuilding efforts have often used a template that has proven flawed: a hasty and supposedly “comprehensive” peace agreement, a brief transition arrangement, hurried elections, and a rapid drawdown. Too frequently this proves a recipe for relapse. As a result of all of these factors, combined in many cases with weak leadership, the UN’s credibility is suffering.

B. Recommendations

130. The following are interconnected recommendations relating to the functioning, resources and modes of UN efforts to sustain peace. It is urged that they be taken up together and that the Secretary-General be asked by Member States to monitor and report regularly on progress in implementation.

Promoting coherence at the intergovernmental level

131. Within the UN, sustaining peace is the business of all intergovernmental entities, and should not be relegated to consideration only by the PBC, which is not a principal organ under the UN Charter. Paradoxically, what some would argue is an inherent weakness of the PBC – being limited to an advisory role – can become one of its main and unappreciated strengths, by offering the relevant principal Organs a bridge between them, helping ensure a UN approach to sustaining peace that is coherent, integrated and holistic.

132. To strengthen its role as a primary peacebuilding body, the Security Council should consider regularly requesting and drawing upon the advice of the PBC, to assist in ensuring that the mandates, benchmarks and reviews of peace operations, however short-term in scope, reflect the longer view required for sustaining peace. The Security Council should further ensure that the mandates for peacebuilding missions emphasize the imperative for an integrated mission that draws upon the strengths of the entire UN system.

133. Where the decision is taken by the Security Council to establish a peace operation, it should build on existing UN and other capabilities and integrate existing UNCT activities into enhanced UN peacebuilding efforts during the mission period, and the UNCTs must therefore be appropriately resourced. In approving the leadership structures of missions, the Security Council should underline integration and accountability.
134. The **Security Council**, the **Secretary-General** (through mission leadership on the ground) and the **national authorities in conflict-affected countries** should together agree “Peacebuilding Compacts” that would govern decisions on the appropriate timing of mission transitions, keeping in mind the need to adapt to the changing dynamics of the conflict. In this connection, the **Security Council** should consider undertaking a systematic assessment of benchmarking in mandates related to sustaining peace, and specifically in the timing of mission transitions. Where such compacts or benchmarks have been agreed with a host government to condition such a transition’s timing, every effort should be made to try to ensure that agreement is adhered to, again keeping in mind the need to adapt to the changing dynamics of the conflict.

135. The **Security Council** should consider passing to the PBC’s responsibility continued accompaniment of countries on the Council’s Agenda where and when peace consolidation has progressed to the point that it is deemed that they no longer constitute a threat to international peace and security. The **PBC** should then keep the Council briefed on further progress in peace consolidation on at least a yearly basis.

136. Building on its past experience with African countries emerging from conflict, as well as the activities of its Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti, **ECOSOC** should consider developing criteria for a special category of conflict-affected countries – perhaps drawing on the guidelines agreed the g7+ has agreed for its membership – to which the international community would be encouraged to devote special attention and funding not just for peace operations but also for governance, human rights and development activities. **ECOSOC and the PBC** should pursue closer cooperation, especially in the broader effort of promoting coherence between the development and the peace and security pillars.

137. In its next and subsequent UN Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Reviews (QCPR), the **General Assembly** should include a specific focus on sustaining peace, examining the UN system’s success in bringing together development, humanitarian and peace and security actions.

138. The **Human Rights Council** should consider dedicating a day a year to reviewing the human rights dimensions of the challenge of sustaining peace, with a focus on specific countries and with the participation of national human rights institutions, relevant civil society actors, and, as appropriate, UN Missions, UNCTs, including particularly OHCHR field offices, and UN gender advisors and other appropriate entities of the UN system.

139. The **Human Rights Council** should also, when turning its attention to conflict-affected countries in its Universal Periodic Review, consider including a specific discussion on sustaining peace and the role of the international community therein.
The Peacebuilding Commission

140. The main functions of the PBC should continue to be advocacy, assistance in marshalling resources, assistance in improving coordination within and outside the United Nations, strategic thinking and policy recommendations, as well as offering a meeting place for interested parties. But the manner in which these functions would be carried out should change qualitatively, through emphasizing an advisory and bridging relationship with the three principal inter-governmental organs.

141. To strengthen the PBC’s bridging role, members of the PBC, in addition to representing their national interests, should understand themselves as accountable to the Organ that elected or designated them and should brief those entities regularly on their work.

142. The PBC should maximize the work – including country and region-specific discussions and engagement – it undertakes in the full format of its Organizational Committee, taking advantage of its membership’s designation by all the key UN organs and constituencies.

143. The PBC should actively seek opportunities where it can help bring needed attention to early conflict prevention priorities at the regional, sub-regional and country level, including through convening discussions with key stakeholders.

144. The PBC should diversify its working methods – including through moving away from the strictures of a formal “Agenda” – to enable it to consider with flexibility a larger and more diverse array of countries and regions, with a greater emphasis on conflict-prevention. In particular, CSCs should represent only one model for PBC engagement. Where CSCs are formed in the future, they should have a smaller and more directly engaged membership, along the lines of the “Group of Friends” model, with a primarily advocacy role.

145. The PBC should make its advice and support available to the Security Council in the formulation of peace operation mandates containing a strong peacebuilding aspect. In doing so, the PBC should use its convening power to bring together all relevant actors including peace operations, UNCTs, government actors, member states, international, regional and sub-regional organizations and institutions, civil society, and IFIs. The PBC should analyse their inputs in a practical manner and, in a timely way, present the Council with concise, realistic and context-specific recommendations. Likewise, it should offer to support the Security Council’s formulation of benchmarks for progress in consolidating peace that, in turn, can help condition the timing of changes in the form of UN operational engagement.
146. Following the Secretary-General’s designations of PBF country eligibility, the PBC should, in consultation with the permanent representative of that country, consider convening discussions within the format of the full Organizational Committee on the country’s goals for and approach to sustaining peace.

147. The PBC should regularize and structure consultation with global and other civil society peacebuilding platforms, including in the format of an annual consultation on sustaining peace. It should take additional steps to become more transparent in scheduling and publishing its forward work programme so that civil society can more easily engage with it.

**Improving the peacebuilding capability of the United Nations System**

148. To promote unity of UN action, the Secretary-General should strengthen the Secretariat’s capacity to conduct strategic planning across the UN system for engagement with conflict-prone and conflict-affected contexts. The PBSO should provide advice to the Secretary-General on encouraging system-wide action in supporting sustaining peace. To support this, the PBSO should be strengthened to become a centre of excellence in the areas of analysis, policy prescription, programme advice, as well as tracking developments in the field.

149. The General Assembly should consider taking necessary steps to ensure a reinforced PBSO, sufficiently financed from the regular budget and with an enhanced number of secretariat posts permanently assigned to it.

150. The Secretary-General should consider integrating objectives on sustaining peace into the Performance Compacts agreed with the heads of all relevant departments in the Secretariat and other relevant UN entities.

151. The UN’s Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) should consider dedicating one of its two sessions a year to discussing the challenge of sustaining peace, including ways in which the system can work better together. These discussions should also be mirrored within the UN Development Group.

152. The Secretary-General should ensure continuity in senior leadership and personnel through the different phases of engagement from preventive action to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, in order to minimize the disruption around transitions in forms of engagement.

153. The Secretary-General should select SRSGs for their capacities and leadership qualities and hold them accountable for bringing the UN system together in-country
around a common strategy for sustaining peace. Where peace operations are deployed and led by SRSGs, these should be fully empowered to direct programme planning towards sustaining peace by the UNCT. Where circumstances indicate, the Secretary-General should consider using the model of an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General to lead peacebuilding missions, combining the functions of representative of the Secretary-General with Resident Coordinator of the UN system and Resident Representative of UNDP.

154. When the mandate of a peace operation contains a substantial peacebuilding dimension, the SRSG or head of mission should lead the UN system to develop a common peacebuilding support strategy that integrates the UNCT’s strategic planning instruments, such as the Common Country Assessment and the UN Development Assistance Framework, with conventional mission planning and funding instruments. This would provide for continuity of focus and funding for programmes when the UNCT continues its work after the mission’s mandate ends.

155. In order to ensure appropriate support for the strengthening of RC and UNCT operations, the Secretary-General should consider calling for an independent review of the current capacities and potential for enhancement of UN agencies, funds and programmes to aid in sustaining peace before, during and after conflicts in both UN mission and non-mission settings.

156. In peacebuilding contexts where UN engagement is led by Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams, the Secretary-General should ensure that RCs and the UN Secretariat systematize stronger and more effective two-way engagement.

157. Where a peace operation with a substantial peacebuilding mandate is drawing down, the reforms currently underway to strengthen the Resident Coordinator with formal authority over the Country Team should be accelerated and the offices of Resident Coordinators should be appropriately strengthened to absorb the relevant political and peacebuilding capacity of the departing mission. In appointing Resident Coordinators for such contexts, the Secretary-General should pay particular attention to ensuring candidates have strategic, diplomatic and political skills, familiarity and sensitivity with conflict or post-conflict settings, and that they and their country teams are afforded appropriate levels of political support on the ground and from HQ.

158. The relevant UN entities should ensure that all Resident Coordinator offices are reinforced with standardised expertise in human rights, peace and conflict analysis, strategic planning, and public information. The Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, within which the deployment of Peace and Development Advisers falls, should be fully and sustainably funded, and expanded to all countries in need.
159. To promote better delivery of gender-sensitive peacebuilding, UN Women (together with other relevant UN agencies, funds and programmes) and the lead departments responsible for peace operations, DPA and DPKO, should actively explore enhanced ways to work in partnership.

Partnering for sustaining peace

160. The Security Council should consider including in all mandates with peacebuilding dimensions an explicit reference to the need for consultation and collaboration between the UN and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in planning and prioritization at the country level.

161. Especially concerning conflict-affected countries, the Secretary-General and the World Bank President should consider urgent steps to strengthen the partnership between the UN and the World Bank Group, including particularly the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Conflict-affected countries are those where synergies can best arise from the comparative advantages of both multilateral institutions. Invigorating the partnership requires systematic upstream consultation, alignment of country strategies and detailed technical engagement in priority sectors. The Strategic Results Framework agreed between the UN and the World Bank should be renewed and emphasized as a formal criterion for determining peacebuilding allocations and operations.

162. The Secretary-General and the World Bank President should particularly ensure deepened cooperation between the UN and the IFC and MIGA to assist post-conflict countries to create enabling environment for private sector development. Together with the IFC and other partners, the UN should pay dedicated attention to efforts to promote employment and livelihoods, particularly amongst youth and in reintegrating former combatants, through but not limited to, skills and entrepreneurship development as well as microfinance.

163. The PBC and World Bank Group should hold an annual high-level working session to discuss and assess joint UN/WBG approaches to sustaining peace and propose new initiatives.

164. The PBC should hold an annual exchange of views with those regional and sub-regional organizations engaged in efforts to promote sustainable peace. In particular, regular desk-to-desk exchanges and joint initiatives between PBSO and the equivalent structures within the African Union and other relevant sub-regional organizations should
be considered. These could contribute, with appropriate engagement from other parts of the UN system, to the development of a “Partnership on Peacebuilding with the African Union”.

165. The PBSO, with other relevant UN entities, should engage in a regular policy dialogue with the IMF and partners on the fiscal and macro-economic dimensions of peacebuilding.

166. Consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and in order to ensure credible and effective regional partners with whom to collaborate in situations requiring establishment, consolidation and sustainment of peace, Member States should consider encouraging regional and sub-regional organizations around the world to consider progressively incorporating peace and conflict prevention-related responsibilities into their charters and foundational documents.

167. The Secretary-General should direct relevant UN entities to deepen the Organization’s partnership with the regional development banks through the strengthening of specific frameworks for strategic cooperation around efforts to sustain peace. Similar cooperation frameworks should also be sought with emerging multilateral institutions, such as the newly established BRICS Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

More Predictable Peacebuilding Financing, including the Peacebuilding Fund

168. To promote the rebalancing of global priorities in assistance and to enhance resource mobilization, the PBSO, together with relevant entities within the UN and amongst the IFIs, should initiate a process of preparing more detailed and accurate country-by-country estimates of the overall funding needs for sustaining peace over the longer-term. Such estimates will help the UN and partners better understand their investments, better discuss compacts with national governments about national contributions, identify prevailing gaps and justify global fundraising. Informed by these improved analytics from the overall costing exercise, and in consultation with its Advisory Group, an appropriate target should then be set for the level to which the PBF should be scaled up.

169. Where a peace operation mandate implies a central UN role in programme assistance to core peacebuilding sectors appropriate to a specific country situation, the General Assembly, in close cooperation with the Security Council, should consider steps to ensure that mandate implementation is accompanied by appropriate
apportionment from assessed UN budgets for programme support, and such support should continue to UN Country Teams for a transitional period after mission drawdown.

170. To improve the delivery of peacebuilding mandates specifically where a Special Political Mission is deployed, the General Assembly should urgently consider the 2011 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the review of arrangements for funding and back-stopping Special Political Missions (A/66/7/Add.21) in response to the report of the Secretary-General on the Review of arrangements for funding and back-stopping Special Political Missions (A/66/340) of 2011.

171. In order to maximize the PBF’s potential and predictability, the General Assembly should consider steps to ensure that core funding representing US$ 100 million or an approximate and symbolic 1 per cent of the value (whichever is higher) of the total UN budgets for peace operations (peacekeeping and Special Political Missions together) be provided to it annually from assessed contributions under the UN budget. The assessed contributions should be provided in a way that ensures necessary oversight without undermining the Fund’s comparative advantage as a fast, un-earmarked, flexible and pre-positioned pooled fund working under Terms of Reference approved by the General Assembly. The PBF should then leverage such funding to catalyse additional voluntary contributions.

172. A scaled-up PBF should prioritize funding activities that play to its comparative advantage as a rapid, impactful, procedurally light, risk-taking “investor of first resort” in efforts to sustain peace. By doing so, it will help catalyse the support of larger players – including the IFIs and regional development banks, regional and sub-regional organizations and bilateral donors. This will demand that the PBF maximally streamline its administrative procedures, build its staff’s surge capacity to support rapid programme elaboration by partners on the ground, and particularly emphasize its Immediate Response Facility (IRF).

173. The PBF should consider ways to use its leverage to encourage the UN system to empower and include civil society (local civil society in conflict-affected countries in particular) in all activities related to sustaining peace, and that civil society receives significant capacity building support. The PBF should consider providing direct funding support to non-UN entities as one means of achieving this.

174. The PBF should also consider developing a new funding area around efforts to strengthen the peacebuilding capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations.

175. In specific national peacebuilding contexts, the UN and World Bank should collaborate to create enlarged funding platforms, bringing together the World Bank Group,
bilateral donors, and regional actors to pool resources, share and mitigate risk, and maximize impact for sustaining peace. These should include a window for direct national implementation to promote national capacity and accountability.

176. Similarly, **UN leaders in peacebuilding contexts** should consider establishing pooled funds, with the possibility of catalytic support from the PBF, to mitigate and share risk amongst funding partners, and to drive integration of UN programming around a central and politically informed strategy for sustaining peace.

177. The limited funds dedicated by international partners to peacebuilding are not always well prioritised or structured to support sustaining peace. As it transforms itself to work more effectively by taking a comprehensive approach to sustaining peace and involving all organisations in the system, the **UN system** should also set norms and standards to enable other partners to adhere to the same principles.

178. **Member State governments** should commit to transparency and accountability in domestic revenues, including from natural resources, including, *inter alia*, through implementing the approaches and recommendations of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the Kimberley Process, and the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa. The **UN system** should work with the World Bank Group, regional development banks and other regional and international partners, to fight corruption and improve domestic revenue generation in the aftermath of conflict, paying attention to private sector development, the role of remittances, strengthening national tax administration, natural resource management, and addressing illicit financial flows.

**Improving Leadership and Broadening Inclusion**

179. **The UN, with its partners**, should consider a new emphasis on building national leadership as an integral part of a reconciliation and nation-building agenda, working to shift the focus away from the personal ambitions of protagonists to engaging in a common vision for the country.

180. **UN mediators and facilitators** should strive to support the crafting of peace agreements that reflect the broad aspirations of all stakeholders in conflict-affected societies and that integrate an agreed framework for sustaining peace. Where this is not possible, peace agreements should ensure that dialogue mechanisms are established that will progressively ensure the broadening of narrow peace deals into inclusive processes implicating wider groups of domestic actors, communities and civil society, including women and youth organizations. Non-UN mediation efforts should also be encouraged to align their actions with such principles.
181. The **UN system** should take a clear stance against the culture of impunity in post-conflict settings, and support governments and civil society to tackle this obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding through political engagement, as well as national and international processes of justice. The UN should equally set a high bar for its personnel and affiliates to abide by set integrity and accountability standards, allowing no vacuum in investigating and reprimanding wrongdoings and criminal acts. Immunity privileges cannot be allowed to compromise the integrity and global mission of the Organization.

182. **The Secretary-General** should direct the UN system to accelerate efforts to attain and then surpass his 15 per cent “gender marker” for financing to peacebuilding approaches that promote gender equality. Its achievement should be written into the Secretary-General’s performance compacts with senior UN leaders on the ground, in mission and non-mission settings, and backed up with an enhanced system for monitoring and tracking achievement. To further adequate financing to this area, the **PBF** should regularize its Gender Promotion Initiative as an on-going, priority instrument.

183. The **PBC** should play a particular role in advocating that national leaders commit to prioritizing gender equality and women’s empowerment as part of national peacebuilding priorities. To underpin this, the PBC should urgently develop the “strategy to strengthen the gender perspective in country-specific engagement” it foresaw in its 8th annual report (A/69/818 - S/2015/174). In support of this, the **PBSO**, in its capacity as the Secretariat to the PBC, should work closely with other pertinent parts of the UN system to ensure that gender expertise is available for the PBC’s integration of gender in its country and region-specific engagement.

184. The **PBC** should play a similar role in advocating for national leaders to commit to the inclusion and empowerment of youth in national peacebuilding priorities and actions.

185. Where the **PBC** elaborates strategic frameworks for sustaining peace with countries or regions affected by violent conflict, it should ensure maximal participation by a broad array of societal actors, including particularly civil society and women’s organizations, in both design and implementation.

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**Redefining Peacebuilding and Implementing the Recommendations**

186. To reiterate: peacebuilding should no longer be defined as merely a post-conflict activity within the **UN** or beyond. Understood as the challenge of “sustaining peace” it must be the strong thread that runs through the complete cycle of UN engagement, from preventive action, through deployment and subsequent drawdown of peace operations, and beyond to post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.
187. Implementing this reconfigured conceptual framework requires, among other aspects, a change in mind-set among member states, and a number of the recommendations contained in this report require legislation, either from the General Assembly, the Security Council, or both. The General Assembly and Security Council should therefore consider adopting parallel resolutions that respond to the recommendations of this report and set out principles for their implementation.

188. Flowing from the previous recommendation, the General Assembly should consider a subsequent resolution setting norms and standards for national and international activities in sustaining peace, drawing on key existing instruments and reports, and taking into account the relevant elements of this report, the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, released on 16 June 2015, the forthcoming High-Level Review of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, and the forthcoming results of deliberations towards the Post-2015 Development Agenda, with particular attention to goals and targets that relate to peaceful societies.

189. Equally, the Security Council should consider a subsequent resolution on sustaining peace, which sets norms and standards for engagement in peacebuilding by peace operations, and which reflects on the reciprocal obligations of member states, also drawing on the aforementioned elements.

190. The Security Council and General Assembly, respectively, should ensure that all these resolutions include a strong gender dimension, recognizing the importance of gendered approaches to protection, prevention and participation for successful peacebuilding, drawing on core documents such as Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and its six subsequent resolutions, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) General Recommendation No. 30. on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, and the Secretary-General’s 7-Point Action Plan on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding.

191. Finally, the United Nations Membership should ensure that the spirit of the proposed Sustainable Development Goal 16 – to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” – in the form in which relevant goals and targets are adopted, forms the basis against which to assess global-level and country progress towards sustaining peace. National reports should be prepared for each conflict-affected country on progress towards these goals and targets. These reports, like the predecessor national MDG reports, should provide an analysis of root causes and of the challenges along the continuum of sustaining peace. Elements of the proposed Goal 16 and the implications of sustaining peace for all SDG goals should also be addressed in the
national monitoring and reporting by all countries – both for countries affected by conflict and for those countries who seek to support the building of peace.
ENDNOTES

i An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping (A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992)
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v In a survey published by the Future United Nations Development System Project, only 20% of respondents believed that the Peacebuilding Commission was performing effectively. Only 52% of respondents believed the UN was performing well in “peacebuilding and development.”


ix S/2015/203 Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 23 March 2015


xi UN Environment Programme (2009), From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (UNEP: Nairobi), p. 5.


xiii UN Habitat and the UN Integrated Framework Team for Preventive Action (2012), Toolkit and Guidance For Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict: “Land and Conflict”, pp. 21, 36

xiv UN Environment Programme and UN Department for Political Affairs (2015), Natural Resources and Conflict: A Guide for Mediation Practitioners, p. 35 - 40

xv See, for example, UN Environment Programme: Vital Water Graphics, An Overview of the State of the World’s Fresh and Marine Waters - 2nd Edition – 2008 -
http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/index.html

xvii “A New Climate for Peace: Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks” (http://www.newclimateforpeace.org/), an independent report commissioned by members of the G7.


xxiv United Nations 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809. “Peace-building is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war […] effective peacebuilding is, in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict” (par. 44).


xxviii Paul Collier (2009) The Political Economy of Fragile States and Implications for European Development Policy, Oxford University, mimeo.


xxx Some parts of the Charter clearly recognize ECOSOC as a principal organ, while others seem to imply that it is subsidiary to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

xxxi See, for example, the Secretary-General’s Report on Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict (S/2012/746), 8 October, 2012.

xxxii http://www.interpeace.org/

xxxiv With average annual growth rates between 1995 and 2015 of 2.5 per cent versus 1.3 per cent respectively. Source: Population figures: World Population Prospects (2012), UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Country classification: World Economic Situation and Prospects list UN/ DESA. Conflict affected countries: PBSO list based on countries with Peacekeeping Operations/ Special Political Missions and/or states that are PBF eligible.

Both Genevand Peacebuilding, or the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, a partnership between the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Interpeace, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the Quaker UN Office (in both Geneva and New York).


xxxviii Report of the Secretary-General on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding, 7 September 2010, A/65/354-S/2010/466

xxxix An approximate estimate of conflict contexts that constituted items within the Security Council’s Agenda (as of May 2015) indicates that just over half might reasonably be considered cases of relapse.

xl By way of illustration, in 2013, the Council held 193 meetings, adopted 47 resolutions and issued 22 presidential statements. In 2014, it held 263 meetings, adopted 63 resolutions and issued 28 presidential statements – representing a 30-40 per cent increase in workload overall in just one year. Source: Highlights of Security Council Practice 2013 and 2014 respectively: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/highlights.shtml. 2014 represented the Council’s most heavily charged year since 2006, while, as of the time of writing, 2015 is on course to be almost as heavily charged.


xlii “In 2014, women were included in all twelve UN (co-led) mediation support teams. Women’s participation in negotiating parties delegations showed a steady upward trend with senior women represented on 17 negotiating parties’ delegations participating in ten processes compared to ... four negotiation parties delegations in fourteen processes in 2011...” Source: Taking stock, looking forward: Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in the Conflict Prevention and Resolution work of the UN Department of Political Affairs (2010 - 2014), an Internal Assessment and Discussion Paper prepared by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, March 2015.


xlv This first GPI allocated US$ 6.1 million to 8 projects (in Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda), which as of August 2014 were mostly still being implemented.


xlvii For example: the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding; the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” (emerging from the Fourth Conference on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, Korea in 2011); the International Network on Conflict and Fragility organized by the OECD, or the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, a partnership between the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Interpeace, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the Quaker UN Office (in both Geneva and New York).
The African Union maintains an Observer Mission at the United Nations, and the United Nations has established an important liaison office at the African Union.

The inclusion of 5 representatives of the major troop contributors and 5 representatives of the major contributors to the UN budget raises some additional issues related to their specific interests.

While the Security Council regularly receives the yearly reports of the PBC and occasionally invites its President to formulate statements in open debates, the engagement between the Council and the Commission tends to take on a more formal tone than a substantive one.

1 A/64/868-S/2010/393, p. 3.

ii OP 23 requests the Secretary-General to establish “a small peacebuilding support office…”

iii Source: the OECD's States of Fragility Report 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions


vi Source: the OECD's States of Fragility Report 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions


viii Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, commissioned by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. It is notable that the report attributes the majority of these outflows not to domestic corruption, as is usually assumed, but to the activities of un- or under-regulated multinational corporations.