# Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary ................................................................. 01
2. Background and Rationale ...................................................... 09
3. Conceptual Framework .......................................................... 15
4. Public Administration, Social Services and Peacebuilding .......... 21
5. Social Services and Peacebuilding: Education ......................... 29
7. Social Services and Peacebuilding: Food Security ...................... 43
8. Emerging Practices in Conflict Sensitivity ................................. 49
9. Findings ................................................................................. 53
10. Recommendations for PBF Strategic Positioning ...................... 59
11. Annexes .................................................................................. 63
    A. The Peacebuilding Fund Decision-Making Process ................. 64
    B. Peacebuilding Outcomes ..................................................... 66
    C. Decentralization and Local Governance Models ................... 67
    D. List of Case Study Programmes .......................................... 68
    E. Case Studies of Education Contributing to Peacebuilding ........ 70
    F. Case Studies of Health and Wash Contributing to Peacebuilding 76
    G. Case Studies of Food Security Contributing to Peacebuilding .. 84
    H. Cross-Cutting Issues .......................................................... 94
    I. Community Consultations Findings ...................................... 99
BOXES

BOX 1: KEY CONCEPTS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL SERVICES ...................................... 12
BOX 2: PEACE DIVIDENDS: CONCEPT AND PRACTICE ......................................................... 16
BOX 3: ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL SERVICES CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEBUILDING;
THEORIES OF CHANGE ................................................................. 17
BOX 4: PBF SUPPORT TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION .............................................................. 22
BOX 5: IGAD REGIONAL INITIATIVE FOR CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT IN SOUTHERN SUDAN ..... 24
BOX 6: DECENTRALIZATION TO IMPROVE LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES IN BURUNDI .......... 25
BOX 7: UNCDF PROGRAMMES IN GUINEA-BISSAU AND LIBERIA SHOW THAT
DECENTRALIZATION PROJECTS WORK ON VERY DIFFERENT LEVELS OF
LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL SUPPORT ........................................... 26
BOX 8: COMMUNITY CONSULTATIONS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, KYRGYZSTAN
AND UGANDA – KEY FINDINGS ON EDUCATION AND PEACEBUILDING ................. 30
BOX 9: PBF FUNDING IN FOOD SECURITY .................................................. 33
BOX 10: COMMUNITY CONSULTATIONS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, KYRGYZSTAN
AND UGANDA – THOUGHTS ON HEALTH, THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT AND THE
ROLE OF HEALTH FOR PEACEBUILDING ........................................... 37
BOX 11: COMMUNITY CONSULTATIONS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, KYRGYZSTAN
AND UGANDA – THOUGHTS ON THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON WATER, AND THE
ROLE OF WATER FOR PEACE ............................................................... 38
BOX 12: PBF FUNDING IN HEALTH ................................................................. 40
BOX 13: FOOD INSECURITY, CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY ......................................................... 44
BOX 14: COMMUNITY CONSULTATIONS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, KYRGYZSTAN
AND UGANDA – THOUGHTS ON CONFLICT, FOOD SECURITY AND PEACE ............. 45
BOX 15: PBF FUNDING IN FOOD SECURITY .................................................. 47
BOX 16: LIBERIA: CONFLICT/PEACE SENSITIVITY IN DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ......... 50
BOX 17: SOUTHERN KORDOFAN, SOUTH SUDAN: CRISIS MAPPING (2010-PRESENT) .......... 51
BOX 18: CONSIDERATIONS FOR PBF SUPPORT TO THE THREE THEORIES OF CHANGE ........ 60
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“In my neighbourhood there is a water pump that doesn’t work. We have paid the city to fix it but they never do. It is causing many problems and people are angry”. (A boy in Kaga, Bandoro, CAR)

“We have approached the government but keep being sent to another department. Nobody is responsible. There is a big gap between the government and the people here. People have no trust in government because it takes too long to restore social services.” (Community member, Kyrgyzstan)

In all societies – especially those emerging from violence – where administrative and social services are lacking or provided inequitably, the resulting void or imbalance is a common driver of conflict. In post-conflict settings, services can be controlled and manipulated, creating or exacerbating horizontal inequalities and fuelling discontent rather than offering a means to foster trust and better relations between state and society. Whether it is by national or international actors, by design or accident, administrative and social services can be delivered in ways that undermine peacebuilding efforts. Infrastructure and delivery systems are often severely damaged during violent conflict – systems that constitute very real, immediate needs for local people. As such, they are priorities that cannot be ignored in terms of the direct contributions they can make to peacebuilding and the early statebuilding efforts that underpin them.

The international policy community is increasingly recognizing the untapped potential of administrative and social services to restore peace and stability. In his 2009 report on Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the United Nations Secretary-General listed the provision of administrative and social services amongst the five recurring priorities for peacebuilding in the years immediately following conflict. Similar priorities have been articulated by the World Bank, OECD-DAC, and members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and statebuilding, among other international partners. These issues are also increasingly prominent in peace agreements and political settlements.

Yet despite their recognized contribution to restoring stability in the aftermath of violence, as with other key sectors, including DDR and SSR, there is no common understanding of precisely how programmes addressing administrative and social services can aid peacebuilding. This gap in understanding is further widened by the variance in terminology, assumptions, methods, and M&E frameworks applied in different post-conflict phases (e.g. immediate aftermath, and longer-term peace consolidation). Bringing greater clarity and coherence to these areas in post-conflict situations can strengthen programme effectiveness for lasting results. Given the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund’s (PBF) mandate – to back programmes that will have a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process – it has a particular interest in supporting efforts to clarify these issues.

This multi-partner United Nations study seeks to determine whether the PBF should increase its support to administrative and social services, and if so, to what types of programming. The study reviews current thinking and practices among United Nations agencies, funds and programmes alongside some of their partners in the areas of administrative services – specifically, the administrative (human and technical) capacities required to deliver services – and social services – including the areas of education, health (including water and sanitation) and food security. It proposes a framework for understanding these contributions and begins to identify promising practices and directions. Areas for expanding PBF support are identified in the process, and it is hoped that the review will help to strengthen United Nations programming in these areas in ways that serve peacebuilding.

The report argues that there is significant evidence to include administrative and social services amongst the menu of choices available to directly support peacebuilding in any given context. Finding the appropriate balance among the many peacebuilding priorities in any setting should ultimately be a country-driven exercise – one that is inclusive of a wide range of stakeholders at different levels, especially historically marginalized groups.
Main Findings

The following summarizes the study’s key findings, which are based on both desk review and field research in CAR, Kyrgyzstan, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia (further elaborated in Section 9):

1. There is a significant and growing body of evidence that suggests that public administration and social services – delivered in an effective and equitable manner – can contribute to peacebuilding. Specifically, they can:
   - address grievances that underlie or trigger violent conflict
   - offer a means for the state to reach out to society, to (re)build its legitimacy and systems of accountability

The research and practice examined in this study, including perception interviews with communities and government representatives in CAR, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda, is strongly supportive of this thesis.

The impact of having access to social services was described by communities in different ways: from “stabilizing,” “tension diffusing,” and “calming aggressions and the belligerent mood” (Kyrgyzstan); to “confidence building,” “fostering unity,” and potentially strengthening the “spirit of collaboration and cooperation” (Uganda). In CAR, the resumption of social services was reported to have signaled the return to “normal life.” As a community member in Bouar put it: “when water pumps were created, people came back from the bush; when teachers returned to schools; students regained confidence in the educational process; when health services resumed, women could give birth in the safety of hospitals again.”

- Community consultations (Annex B)

2. Despite their recognized contributions to peacebuilding, administrative and social services tend to take a back seat to interventions focused on the security sector and political processes in post-conflict settings. The PBF’s limited funding of administrative and social services programming to date – only 25 of some 192 projects – is reflective of this trend.

3. There are three broad theories of change fairly consistently employed, albeit differently in different contexts, across programming in administrative and social services:
   - Delivering peace dividends: Administrative and social services offered as peace dividends can reduce social tensions through the provision of tangible, needed services, create incentives for non-violent behaviour and support statebuilding efforts at critical junctures in the peace process.
   - Strengthening sector governance: Supporting conflict-sensitive sector governance and policy reform and the development of responsive, inclusive and accountable institutions at national and sub-national levels can improve state-society relations and lay foundations for a self-sustaining peace.

Education in Sierra Leone: Education was offered as a peace dividend in Sierra Leone, at first during the humanitarian phase and then in the post-conflict setting. Free education, in particular for girls, along with psychosocial care helped to provide a sense of normalcy and stability for individuals and communities. Furthermore, as the government later assumed control of these schools, this multi-partner programme also exemplifies the successful bridging from a humanitarian project to a longer-term development one; this transition to government ownership – conducted in a conflict-sensitive manner – helped strengthen the relationship between the state and its citizens.
Food security in South Sudan and Nepal: By ensuring food security in food insecure regions, food assistance programmes exemplify how sector programming can promote development and empower national institutions in ways that are conflict-sensitive and address conflict drivers. They can also, as WFP programmes illustrate, simultaneously provide peace dividends. In South Sudan, for example, WFP is building government capacity to manage a grain reserve, while in Nepal its support of a food monitoring system helped the government respond to food price volatility in ways that contributed to state-society interaction and accountability.
Providing entry points to deliver peacebuilding results: Administrative and social services can lead to joint action around programming that can help to build relationships and meet immediate needs in ways that address conflict drivers.

**WASH programming in Somalia:** In establishing a WASH programme in Somalia, UNICEF had to radically adapt its programme to incorporate a component for negotiations to resolve conflicts concerning water access. These extensive negotiations led to an agreement among local leaders on the construction of water systems and monitoring mechanisms.

4. Peacebuilding outcomes manifest differently in different contexts, yet tend to fall into at least one of the following three areas: Resilience and social cohesion; State capacity and legitimacy; Conflict drivers and root causes (see Findings, and Annex B).

These should be viewed as cluster areas where there is growing convergence, but not consensus, on groups of outcomes and indicators that can assist peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation.

5. Despite increasing recognition that administrative and social services constitute a key pillar for state legitimacy and societal resilience in the aftermath of conflict, too little attention is given to integrating them into programming.

6. Supporting administrative and social service oriented programming is not without risks. Each setting has its own history of state-society relations and its related drivers of conflict.

7. Administrative and social service related programming presents specific coordination and coherence challenges. Planning should take into consideration the following:

   • Common context and conflict analyses should be developed according to the priorities that reflect what communities and society as a whole actually want;
• The time period of the initiative (i.e. “immediate aftermath” vs. “longer-term peacebuilding”) is less important than effective coordination and coherence, as well as the sequencing of functions and activities to support peacebuilding needs;

• Transition strategies that clearly link peace consolidation to national ownership and capacity development in areas of public administration and social service delivery require greater attention; and

• The cases with the strongest peacebuilding outcomes employed more than one “theory of change approach.”

8. There are a range of other promising practices that can be supported and built upon to promote peacebuilding outcomes. These are outlined in section 9, and highlighted in the second recommendation for the PBF, below.

**Recommendations for PBF Strategic Positioning**

To date, while the PBF has funded relatively little in the area of administrative and social services, many of the projects it has funded are highlighted amongst the broader spectrum of promising practices by a range of actors. They represent deliberate efforts, on the part of humanitarian and development actors working in conflict and post-conflict settings, to design programming with peacebuilding objectives and outcomes in mind.

Bearing in mind the ample evidence pointing to the importance of social and administrative services in conflict settings, there is significant space for the PBF to expand its support. The following recommendations provide an initial framework to strengthen existing activities and guide new support.

1. The PBF should include greater support to administrative and social services in its funding portfolio, where it can have a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process.

   • **Expansion should occur in particular in PBF’s Priority Area 4,** which presently covers the “establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities.”

   In addition to the recommendations laid out in this report, the forthcoming Lessons Learned Review of UN Support to Public Administration and Local Governance in Post-Conflict Situations (henceforth referred to as the PA and LG Review) will offer findings and recommendations on strengthening PBF support to public administration and local governance.

   • **The PBF should also take social service contributions to peacebuilding into consideration more prominently across each of its four Priority Areas:** 1) supporting peace agreements and political dialogue; 2) promoting coexistence and conflict resolution; 3) revitalising economies to generate immediate peace dividends; and 4) (re)establishing essential administrative services. Efforts to link social service programming to these areas would need to follow thorough conflict and political economy analysis to ensure conflict sensitivity.

2. **After conducting robust and participatory conflict analysis that engages international and national actors,** the PBF should direct its support to programmes in the three areas described above: 1) delivering peace dividends, 2) strengthening sector guidance, and 3) providing entry points to deliver peacebuilding results. Support should be in a manner consistent with PBF’s core mandate and funding criteria (relevant, catalytic, fast, and risk tolerant), bearing in mind risks and challenges (findings 5 and 6), and aiming to produce peacebuilding outcomes (finding 4).

Other promising practices that emerge from the study can further guide PBF programme design and decision-making (examples of which are elaborated in Section 9). These include practices that:

• **Respond to a context specific conflict driver,** especially those that have the potential to unravel a peace process, and/or cause communities to (re)lapse into violent conflict. Such a response could include addressing demand side (financial and social) barriers to accessing basic social services in immediate aftermath settings while longer-term interventions are underway.

• **Multiply beneficial outcomes and impacts,** including, for example, training and capacity building initiatives that are catalytic, strategic and sustainable, and that help to compliment, consolidate and build
upon existing efforts. This can also include programming that widens the reach and impact of a promising practice.

- **Include or leverage a peacebuilding intervention (or ensure a peacebuilding lens) throughout larger humanitarian and development programmes in order to create catalytic peacebuilding impacts.** PBF support can be targeted to ensure such programmes and processes address conflict drivers, and/or help to build the state-society contract.

- **Bridge transition gaps in ways that are relevant for peacebuilding.** This can include gaps between rapid delivery of important social services and longer-term sector reform and/or institution-building efforts.

- **Build capacity of government and civil society in conflict-sensitive policymaking and programming.** In addition to programme and policy design and implementation, this could involve supporting governments to coordinate aid and link policy, planning and budgeting processes in conflict-sensitive ways. The forthcoming PA and LG Review will offer recommendations in this area.

- **Build inclusive, participatory processes and help manage societal expectations.** This might involve bringing together a wide range of stakeholders, including war-affected populations and groups in conflict, to find solutions for common social service-related challenges. It could also actively engage citizens to set and sequence post-conflict priorities. Particular attention is needed to ensure that participation does not raise societal expectations rather than manage them, and that stakeholders give voice to traditionally marginalized groups (e.g. women, ethnic minorities, and geographically isolated communities).

- **Support conflict-sensitive local governance and accompanying efforts to decentralize public administration and service delivery.** This includes building state capacities at the local level for decentralized service delivery in ways that strive to meet inclusive and government supported priorities.

- **Ensure cross-cutting issues are mainstreamed through programming.** Attention to cross-cutting issues – such as human rights, social protection and gender equality – can multiply peacebuilding outcomes. Yet in immediate aftermath settings, challenges related to cross-cutting issues are particularly acute. For example, conflict often leads to a rise in sexual violence against female students and teachers in schools. It can also weaken social protection safety nets to such a degree that populations have no means of coping with food price volatility – another consequence of violence.

3. **The PBF should use its limited resources to support programmes that can have catalytic outcomes and impacts.** In addition to training and capacity building initiatives that are strategic and sustainable, greater attention should be given to the “software” side of programming. Planning and process elements, for example, should be conflict-sensitive, inclusive, transparent, and sustainable. It is important to highlight programmes that widen the reach and impact of a promising practice in context sensitive ways.

4. **In wider support of strategic analysis, planning and coordination for peacebuilding impact, the PBF should consider supporting:**

   - Inclusive processes aimed at developing analyses of context and conflict drivers as well as peacebuilding gaps and priorities, with emphasis on national capacity and ownership
   - Processes to ensure a peacebuilding lens in poverty, food security and other assessments and analyses, and capacity development throughout the UN system in conflict analysis
   - Sectoral studies designed to ensure the peacebuilding impact of sector strategies and programming
   - Studies to identify public perceptions and priorities, facilitating better targeting of UN support in ways that are likely to serve peacebuilding.

5. **Next steps:**

   - The PBF should use the recommendations in this report as a starting point for deepened engagement with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes on the issues outlined.
• **Key policy and planning documents of the PBF need to be adapted to accommodate programming in this area.** This includes: i) language to be added to the PBF’s Priority Area 4 to accommodate the support of programming for social services; alternatively, another priority area should be developed to reflect the five priority areas articulated in the SG’s report on the immediate aftermath of conflict; ii) the terminology of “administrative services” should be changed to “public administration” to avoid the confusion that the former generates; and iii) the Performance Management Plan (PMP) and other M&E frameworks should be aligned with these changes.

• **Further research is needed in many areas to support learning around these vitally important aspects of peacebuilding.** Mechanisms are needed to ensure this learning takes place in relation to and across the many substantive studies underway and in circulation. This will facilitate institutional memory and greater coherence in international action.
2. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
2. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

The 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict stated that if countries can deliver early peace dividends, build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity early on, they can reduce the risk of relapse into conflict and substantially increase the chances for sustainable peace.1 Too often, however, such opportunities are missed. The report acknowledges that the United Nations has “failed to catalyse a response that delivers immediate, tangible results on the ground. Often, it has taken many months before essential government functions resume or basic services are available.”2 This is, however, a modest estimate, as it has commonly taken several years before this occurs.

The same report highlighted five recurring priorities3 for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict that requires support, including: 1) the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees; and 2) the restoration of core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at national and sub-national levels. In June 2011, the second International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPs) involving the G7+ and international partners similarly agreed that “the ability to raise, prioritise and manage resources to finance and develop capacity for accountable and fair service delivery” is one of five goals that should provide a framework for a country-led analysis and strategy development, and orient international assistance for peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile and conflict affected states.4

The increasing inclusion of administrative and social services in peace agreements further underscores the growing awareness of their impact on the peacebuilding process. Between 1990-1998 and 1999-2006, provisions in peace agreements on decentralization rose from 40 to 50 per cent; in education from 51 to 59 per cent; in health from 20 to 30 per cent, and in social security/welfare from 20 to 36 per cent.5 This trend suggests that these issues are not, as is often thought, only development priorities; they are integral to peace-making and mediation efforts, reflecting both drivers of conflict and priorities for peace consolidation.

Understanding the roles that administrative and social services play in violent conflict, as well as in undermining peace in post-conflict settings, is an important starting point for strengthening their contributions to peacebuilding. Poor access to basic services is a defining characteristic of fragile and conflict-affected states.6 Research has shown that where lack of or uneven access to public services is viewed in terms of discrimination towards a particular identity group or region, this can also trigger conflict, even in later post-conflict settings.7 The 2011 World Development Report (WDR) states that societies are vulnerable when local institutions are unable to provide equitable access to justice and economic opportunities. It cites an opinion poll suggesting that the two conflict drivers with the highest ratings are “poverty/poor education” and “injustice/inequality/corruption.”8 If administrative and social services are not administered and delivered in a conflict sensitive manner, they can do more harm than good by reinforcing the horizontal inequalities that triggered conflict in the first place. Basic administrative and social service infrastructure and delivery systems are often severely damaged during violent conflict. They can also be targeted in post-conflict

---

2 Ibid, para. 4.
3 The other three priorities involve support to basic security, political processes, and economic revitalisation.
6 Baird, Mark, “Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States”, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper, (Washington D.C., World Bank 2010), p.3. He argues: low incomes and slow growth make a country prone to civil war; low income countries face disproportionately high risks of relapse; and access to basic services is a main way to raise incomes.
settings in ways that perpetuate conflict. One example of this is the bombing of Afghan schools by groups opposed to secular and girls’ education. Another occurs when criminal factions control basic service delivery after conflict has ended, undermining efforts to build peace. Under such conditions activities associated with conflict can continue, such as sexual violence against female students and teachers, and schools being used as sites for ongoing recruitment and politicization of pupils.

The United Nations and other international institutions are increasing efforts to understand how administrative and social services can contribute to peacebuilding. Currently, UNICEF and WFP both have large studies underway to examine the links between education and food security, respectively, and peacebuilding. The United Nations Working Group on Public Administration in Post-Conflict Environments (PA working group) is conducting a comprehensive Lessons Learned Review of UN Support to Public Administration and Local Governance in Post-Conflict Situations (PA and LG review). The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) has conducted studies in this area as well, which concluded that the effectiveness of public administration and the promotion of accountable, responsive and “citizen-centric” governance lies at the heart of post-conflict reconstruction. In a prior report, UNDESA found that “a solid governance infrastructure, based on well-articulated horizontal and vertical divisions of power, is crucial to delivering political promises along with the needed public goods, such as security, health care, education and infrastructure.” UNDP’s work in this area suggests that effective delivery of social services, which is enabled by a functioning public administration, supports development and statebuilding goals, both of which are key ingredients for sustaining peace. The OECD-DAC’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) is producing considerable research along these lines, spotlighting both the priorities of public administration and social services and the links between them for peacebuilding and statebuilding. The World Bank has also underscored that government capacity and public accountability are clear assets to violence prevention, while trust in and legitimacy for a government is strengthened by early results and confidence building measures. These often come through services. Evidence is also emerging in numerous cross-cutting priority areas – including gender, the environment, and social protection – which illustrate how inclusion of these issues supports the contributions that administrative and social services can make to peacebuilding. As the first report by the UN Secretary-General on women’s participation in peacebuilding states, if services do not reach women or are ill-suited to their needs, not only do women and girls suffer, but programming will yield a diminished rate of return.

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), which was created in 2006 to make a difference in the lives of people in countries emerging from conflict, has also supported this evolving thinking and prioritisation. It has argued in line with the Secretary-General that government provision of basic administrative and social services is “among the most relevant of peace dividends.” To date, however, the PBF has funded relatively little in this area compared to its other priority areas. Given the widely varying interpretations of how these projects are labelled, it is difficult to assess how many projects in this area the PBF has funded. To date, an estimated 25 out of some 192 projects have been supported.

Despite mounting evidence of the role social and administrative services play in conflict and the clear markers of their importance for peacebuilding, the specific contributions that administrative and social services can make remain poorly understood and are not well translated into methodical project design. There is wide variance in use of terminology and methods to understand the contributions of these services in different contexts – i.e. the immediate aftermath and early recovery phase of conflict, and later post-conflict and development settings. This
confusion obstructs coherent and effective practice – a requirement for effective peacebuilding. Sectoral studies are emerging, and there is significant cross-sector coordination and joint programming. However, there is clearly a need for joint thinking across the sectors to reach a consensus on how to maximise the peacebuilding contributions of administrative and social service activities to better support transitions from violent conflict to sustainable peace. This cross-sectoral study serves as a starting point to bring greater clarity to these issues.

Aims, Methodology and Overview of Study

Given the gaps in knowledge around the roles of administrative and social services in peacebuilding and the relative lack of PBF support to these areas, this review draws upon research from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and even NGOs, projects and practices that aim to:

- Bring greater clarity to the varied ways in which the relationships between these sub-sectors and peacebuilding are understood and programmed
- Highlight promising practices and directions that are manifesting strong peacebuilding outcomes
- Advance policy and practice discussions for improved effectiveness in United Nations programming
- Support PBF efforts to identify which aspects of basic administrative and social services fall within its mandate

The report is organized into four main parts. Part I proposes a conceptual framework to guide thinking about the contributions of administrative and social services to peacebuilding. Part II reviews policy discussions and emerging practices around administrative services that, alongside social services, hold promise for strong peacebuilding outcomes. While this study was being conducted, the above noted PA and LG Review was also underway. Aiming to be complimentary and avoid duplication of efforts, this study places greater emphasis on social services and the links
between administrative and social services. At the same time, this study has benefited from insights in the PA and LG Review. In Part III, three social service sectors and their contributions to peacebuilding are examined: education, health (including WASH) and food security, with detailed case studies provided in the annexes. Emergent practices in conflict-sensitive programming and policy are shared. Findings across cases are then analysed and implications for PBF positioning are drawn in Part IV. Recommendations are targeted to strengthen the peacebuilding contributions of social services for the PBF.

**Box 1: Key Concepts: Administrative and Social Services**

**Social services:** Organized efforts to advance human welfare and/or social well-being are generally understood to be efforts provided by government. While there is no formal UN definition for social services, there is a general understanding that this includes support provided by governments with regard to education, health and water and sanitation.

**Administrative services:** Administrative services are considered to be a subset of public administration in this study – specifically the administrative (human and technical) capacities required to deliver services. Public administration is generally thought of in terms of the way in which the state collects and manages its resources (human, physical and financial) to execute its core functions of ensuring security for its citizens, regulating the economy and distributing public goods/wealth (i.e. delivering services).

Administrative services is the term used by the PBF to articulate one of its priority funding areas, which also includes infrastructure. Terms such as “basic services” and “public services” – which are seldom clearly defined – often include both social services and justice and security.

---

In addition to field research in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, the study benefited greatly from a series of consultations with communities, local government and civil society on the contributions of essential administrative and social services to peacebuilding, organized by UNICEF and WFP in three countries (see Annex I for full report).

*Peace Dividends and Beyond* is part of a wider set of multi-partner reviews of the United Nations that aim to identify and better understand sectoral, programmatic practices that are making direct contributions to peacebuilding. Another review on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is underway, and reviews on Security Sector Reform (SSR), Gender, Elections and Youth Employment are intended to follow.

---

17 The lead author on this study accompanied the PA and LG Review team to Guinea-Bissau and conducted field research in Liberia, in May 2011. Numerous discussions were also held with the PA and LG team, and in particular, Catherine Anderson who also provided valuable comments on the draft.
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

To gain insight into the main questions of this study – whether the PBF should fund more in the areas of administrative and social services, and if so, in what specific areas – and the broader question of how basic administrative and social services contribute to peacebuilding requires some understanding of the term peacebuilding. Although there is no international consensus on its meaning, in 2007 the United Nations Secretary-General’s Policy Committee adopted the following definition:

*Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.*

A key point of departure for some institutions and actors, even for some within the United Nations family, is an emphasis on the need for peacebuilding to address root causes of conflict. The PBF is concerned with ensuring that “key actors involved in the peacebuilding process at national and local level are politically and institutionally able to mitigate risks of lapse or relapse into conflict.” At the same time, the question of how root causes can and should be addressed to mitigate these risks and to guarantee sustained peace remains unclear. The PBF is conducting research to better understand what “catalytic” peacebuilding entails, which rests on the assumption that such programming will not transform a conflict root cause or defuse a trigger per se, but will set conditions for the root cause to be transformed or the trigger resolved.

A related discussion has to do with the timing and phasing of post-conflict efforts. The United Nations, following the 2010 Secretary-General’s report, is working with the term “immediate aftermath” of conflict as the first three years after the signing of an agreement. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has also referred to this period as the “early peacebuilding” phase. Longer-term peacebuilding is often distinguished as “peace consolidation,” although no time frame has been agreed upon and, invariably, each context is different. The very existence of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture speaks to the recognition that a longer-term effort is required, and a key part of its mandate is aimed at sustaining international attention on countries emerging from conflict (see Annex A). Most countries that do revert to conflict do so within five years of signing a peace agreement. With an increasing shift in attention towards statebuilding, however, new questions are being raised about time commitments and the types of efforts needed by the international community. Statebuilding has been defined by the OECD-DAC as an “endogenous process of strengthening the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state, driven by state-society relations.” This is thought to require a “generation,” or 20-30 years. Yet how far statebuilding needs to extend before a self-sustaining peace can be guaranteed remains unclear.

Theories of Change: A Basis For Understanding the Relationships

Bearing the Policy Committee’s definition and PBF mandate in mind, the following framework was developed during the desk study of this review. It synthesises, integrates and builds upon various frameworks being developed and used

---

18 UNDP’s concept of conflict prevention is grounded in the notion of root causes. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also refers to root causes in its “Capstone Document” (2008).
19 PBF Business Plan, p.2
20 These intermediate conditions (or enabling factors) still represent changes in the context but they are not the ultimate peacebuilding changes desired. This creates challenges for evaluation, which is based it on clearly articulated changes: PeaceNexus Foundation Annual Report, (2010) available at http://www.peacenexus.org/sites/default/files/peacenexus_foundation_-_annual_report_2010.pdf.
21 OECD (2008). Previously statebuilding was understood simply as the state’s territorial boundaries and institutions. See OECD/DAC INCAF (2009), p. 6, and McCandless, Erin; Rose, Tore, for UNDP/BCPR “Political Governance in Fragile and Post Conflict States” (2010) for a discussion on this.
22 World Bank, World Development Report, p. 2. Restoring confidence and transforming security, justice, and economic institutions is possible within a generation, even in countries that have experienced severe conflict.
Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding

Unlike the other frameworks, this one employs the concept of theories of change (sectoral and project/programme) rationale, which includes the intended and, where present, actual peacebuilding outcomes as a tool to facilitate analysis and to support future programme design.

Box 2: Peace Dividends: Concept and Practice

Peace dividends have been historically attributed to increased expenditures on social spending (as less is spent on military spending), resting on the assumption that this promotes peace. The United Nations and other international actors now use the concept to describe timely and tangible deliverables, which in particular contexts can facilitate social cohesion and stability, build trust in the peace process and support the state to earn legitimacy under challenging conditions. As stated by WFP:

“A peace dividend should be timely and tangible: can people see it, or feel it, or use it, or spend it? And can they connect receipt of the dividend to political milestones…? If not, the presumed dividend may not be recognized at all; or it may be perceived as another ad hoc emergency or development project.”

Starting or expanding services that may have been disrupted during conflict can demonstrate the capacity and willingness of the state to serve its people and motivate communities to opt for peace. It is important, then, that the public attributes peace dividends to the national authorities. Societal groups will have different understandings of what constitutes a peace dividend, what the priorities are, and what the sequencing should be. Peace dividends can be identified in areas of security, governance/rule of law, economic recovery and social services. Ideally, they should be identified within and respond to challenges identified through an in-depth conflict analysis. The NGO “Peace Dividend Trust” emphasizes the need for peace and economic recovery programmes to empower local markets and build local capacities and institutions.

---

In the social service sub-sections that follow (Sections 5, 6 and 7 and Annexes E, F and G) this framework is used to analyse programmatic contributions to peacebuilding. Each case study (see annexes E-G) consists of two parts. The first outlines key project activities and summary outputs as described in project documents, and the second assesses the theories of change (and related outcomes) based on this framework. In most cases, theories of change...

---

23 Several of these categories were inspired by UNICEF “Education and Peacebuilding” study (ongoing). The lead author of this report worked on the first phase of this study, supporting the methodology and literature review development. WFP is also in the process of developing their thinking on food assistance and peacebuilding, which inspired elements of this framework. The PbF has also recently produced a Performance Management Plan (PMP) which provides strategic guidance to PbF fund users on which results to achieve, and how to measure programme contributions to peace relevant sector changes, in its four priority areas.

24 OECD, 2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid (2009) p. 78. Evaluating peacebuilding relevance and potential effectiveness requires unpacking the intervention logic or theory of change, systematically assessing the links between inputs, activities, outcomes and the context.

25 As defined in “Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners Guide to Benchmarking” (2010) outcomes refer to the wider short- and medium-term effects (positive and negative) resulting from the intended activities and their inputs. It suggests that at the strategic level, peace consolidation has to focus on outcomes that are directly linked to reducing certain risks, addressing critical conflict drivers, and advancing toward goals through implementation of mutual commitments. Peacebuilding outcomes as discussed here are both part of the theory of change design (intended outcomes) and, where possible, the actual project/programme outcomes.

26 In most cases outputs described are sector specific, technical and quantitative - traditional measures of change usually associated with social service delivery.
were not explicit in proposals, reports and evaluations, and have therefore been interpreted on the basis of project justifications, aims and intended results – an accepted and promoted practice.27

The peacebuilding outcome areas used to examine the cases are described further in Annex B. These should be viewed as cluster areas where there is growing convergence, but not consensus, on groups of outcomes and indicators that can assist peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation. Specific outcomes and indicators will manifest differently in different contexts.

**Box 3: Administrative and Social Services Contributions to Peacebuilding: Theories of Change**

**Overarching theory of change:** Administrative and social services contribute to peacebuilding by addressing grievances that underlie or can trigger violent conflict, while offering a means to (re)build state legitimacy and accountability to society. This can occur during a peace process, immediate aftermath or longer-term post-conflict.

**Three Programmatic Theories of Change:** Any particular programme will involve one or more of the following theories of change and result in one or more of the following outcomes. These will vary depending on the context.

1) **Delivering peace dividends:** Administrative and social services offered as peace dividends can: reduce social tensions through the provision of tangible, needed services, create incentives for nonviolent behaviour and support statebuilding efforts at critical junctures in the peace process.

2) **Strengthening sector governance:** Supporting conflict-sensitive sector governance and policy reform and the development of responsive, inclusive and accountable institutions at national and sub-national levels can improve state-society relations and lay foundations for a self-sustaining peace.

3) **Providing entry points for peacebuilding results:** Administrative and social services can lead to joint action around programming that can help to build relationships and meet immediate needs in ways that address conflict drivers.

**Common areas of peacebuilding outcomes:**

- Strengthened resilience and social cohesion
- Advanced state capacity and legitimacy, and improved accountability and state-society relations
- Mediated conflict drivers and/or conditions set to address root causes of conflict through policies/structures/processes

**Assumptions, Contributions and Limitations of this Study**

To review the thinking and practices of a variety of institutional actors presents numerous methodological challenges, the most obvious of which is drawing comparative insights. For this reason, Peace Dividends and Beyond is not focused on providing evidence of the peacebuilding contributions of particular projects. **This study assumes that, as a starting point, a better understanding of existing practice is needed first.** The review, therefore, endeavours to capture, articulate and build analytical coherence around the design logic of existing programmes as well as **their outcomes.** The findings, it is hoped, will help to establish a baseline of practice that can inform deliberate design and greater coherence of peacebuilding programmes. This also supports the development of monitoring and evaluation criteria, which can then be more methodically assessed over time.

---

This study focuses primarily on case examples of programmes that sought to intentionally contribute to peacebuilding; it therefore does not consider the wider area of development programmes that have peacebuilding outcomes. In examining peacebuilding outcomes, however, any unintended consequences that were identified are discussed.

Finally, due to the scope of this study and the decision to focus on sectoral areas of social service, infrastructure\(^2^8\) is not examined separately. **Infrastructure – namely the technical and physical structure needed for society to operate – is nonetheless considered a critical precondition for many social and administrative services to function and can serve as a peace dividend in its own right.** This study assumes, however, that large infrastructure projects often fall within the purview of larger partner organizations – such as the World Bank; it also assumes that the PBF needs to better understand how it can more strategically support the “software” side of peacebuilding, given its relatively modest resources.

\(^{28}\) According to UNOPS infrastructure includes “schools, hospitals, bridges, water supply, sanitation, and harbour facilities.” Retrieved from: http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/focus-areas/physical-infrastructure/service-only/Pages/PhysicalInfrastructureDesignUnit(PIDU).aspx. PBF Terms of Reference (2009) identifies energy, transportation, safe drinking water and sanitation.
4. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SERVICES AND PEACEBUILDING
4. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SERVICES AND PEACEBUILDING

This section reviews emerging thinking and practice around how public administration supports the ability of the state to deliver social services, particularly at sub-national levels, in ways that serve peacebuilding. While **administrative services** is the term PBF uses concerning its Priority Area 4 (see Annex A), this section employs the wider and more commonly used concept of public administration.29

Public administration reform entails more than fixing the institutional systems and processes by which the state collects and manages its resources. It is fundamentally about the way in which the state fosters and gradually increases its capacity to deliver services to citizens in an equitable manner. At the most basic level, the state needs to be able to raise and manage revenue, establish priorities, allocate and account for resources, maintain order, deliver services, pay state employees, procure equipment and services, and develop and implement projects. These activities and their related administrative capacities drive the development of resilient institutions – a requirement for building a strong state-society compact,30 and for building a nationally owned peace.31 Conversely, social service delivery can also be an entry point for political, governance, social, economic and security sector reforms.32 It is also recognized that effective delivery of social services by a functioning public administration for a properly functioning economy33 is a key ingredient for sustained peace and development. Governance reforms may also have more chance of success if they are linked to reforms in service delivery, showing tangible and visible results for the public.34 To synthesise this research and policy discussion, **the way the state collects and manages its resources is a key vehicle for restoring its authority, legitimacy and effectiveness – a foundation for sustainable peace.**35

The discussion that follows is not intended as definitive, but suggests key thematic entry points for understanding the relationships between public administration, social services and peacebuilding. Issues of **access, entitlement and accountability** cut across these areas and are considered throughout.

**Public Financial Management**

**Public financial management, including issues of planning, budgeting, expenditure, and internal and external controls, is amongst the core capacities needed for an effective and legitimate state**36 – one that can ensure **service delivery and access to its citizens.** There are widely divergent views informing practice with respect to how public finance should be included and prioritised in the peacebuilding agenda. These include: that the politics of

---

29 The term “administrative services” is not used by other United Nations actors, and is not defined. This study makes the recommendation to change the language to decrease the confusion around the term that currently exists.

30 Discussions with members of the PA and LG Review (July 2011). See also, UNDP Governance for Peace – Securing the Social Contract, Affected Settings, (forthcoming 2011)

31 Recognition that strong institutions are needed in peacebuilding has grown in response to critiques of templated liberalism being at times producing adverse outcomes in countries emerging from war. See for example, Paris, Roland, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004).


36 UNDP, Building Bridges between the State and the People: An Overview of Trends and Developments in Public Administration and Local Governance (UNDP 2008), p.44. UN Public Administration Working Group, p 12.
Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding

Peace and the economics of the public purse should be pursued along parallel tracks; that policies should be shaped in line with consideration of the political dynamics of the context; and that the political and security dimensions of peace processes should reflect the realities of public finance.37

Box 4: PBF Support to Administrative Services

The PBF’s Priority Area (PA) 4 covers the “establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities,” which may include, in exceptional circumstances and over a limited period of time, the payment of civil service salaries and other recurrent costs.38 Over the six years of its engagement, only a handful of projects on public administration related activities have been supported. The bulk of support for activities under PA4 has gone towards capacity building of local municipalities and trainings of community committees, conflict sensitivity trainings, knowledge sharing and communications about peacebuilding rather than the more “classic” public administration reform related areas, such as civil service reform, public financial management, or other core dimensions of public administration that have a longer time horizon. In Burundi, a more classic approach to public administration was supported, i.e. a decentralization project, which was assessed as having important peacebuilding outcomes (see Box 6). Occasionally, the support in PA4 has included infrastructure projects, such as the provision of electricity in several cities in Sierra Leone (US$ 9,000,000). More than anything else support for the national Peacebuilding Secretariat in countries engaging with the PBC and PBF has been captured in this priority area.

**Box 4: PBF Support to Administrative Services**

To be consistent with statebuilding and peacebuilding aims, it can be argued that decision-making around public expenditure should be transparent and that the total of said expenditure – whether derived through tax revenue, aid, resource revenues or rents and/or human capital – should be seen to be fairly distributed. While the scope of decentralization and inclusion in decision-making around public finance varies and will likely be limited in immediate aftermath settings, visible accountability mechanisms should be a priority.

Regardless of the post-conflict and development phase, there is controversy over whether fiscal (and the accompanying political) decentralization can increase efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the public sector.40 At one end of this debate is participatory budgeting, which aims to concentrate sector-wide decision-making around expenditures in the hands of those directly affected.41 This practice not only supports equity, transparency and ac-

---

41 Schugurensky, Daniel, “Participatory Budget: A Tool for Democratizing Democracy, OISE/University of Toronto”, presented at Some Assembly Required: Participatory Budgeting in Canada and Abroad, Toronto Metro Hall, (29 April, 2004).
countability, but it can promote reconciliation and offer a tool for strengthening state-society relations. Challenges can include lack of political will and administrative capacity, participation dilemmas, and insufficient skills to ensure that agreed priorities emerge rather than wish lists. While capacity may not exist to facilitate such processes in the early post-conflict years, the potential peacebuilding and statebuilding value of these approaches warrants early attention.

**Aid Delivery, National Ownership and Capacity Development**

Given the lack of financial resources and capacity that governments often face in post-conflict settings, aid delivery remains critical. Two prominent issues link aid delivery and capacity development with peacebuilding: the need for aid delivery to foster capacity development and ensure national ownership as early as possible, and the need for effective aid coordination that supports rather than undermines government capacity.

While United Nations agencies, NGOs and donors often provide direct service delivery in humanitarian phases with explicit emphasis on saving lives, there is an increasing consensus within the international policy community that capacity development is the foundation for endogenous statebuilding and nationally driven peacebuilding. Yet to support capacity development strategically in a given country, it is important to consider that it is not just a technical exercise: international service providers need to clarify the “what for” and “how” of capacity development for such efforts to have a positive impact on statebuilding. At the same time, deciding whose capacities to invest in is also political in nature, involving relationships, power structures and questions of governance.

Despite the tensions that may arise in the process, developing a strategy for capacity development should involve all stakeholders — particularly “where state representatives have demonstrated limited willingness for change.” The PA working group has sought to address these questions in an immediate aftermath context, adding a third area for consideration — which national actors need to strengthen capacities. To (re)build trust in government, appropriate institutions, systems and mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that citizens identify their own needs and priorities. Similarly, programmes and public services that are “citizen-centric and equitable” are likely to support the development of a healthy state-society compact.

Wherever services are delivered by non-state actors, it is hoped that governments will play an important role in regulating minimum standards, ensuring security and access, managing public resources, governing sectors and setting policies. In post-conflict settings, and especially in the first few years, a balance often needs to be struck between direct engagement for service delivery and facilitating learning and ownership. Meanwhile, innovative models for service delivery are being explored which involve a broad range of actors, as attention remains focused on the implications for local capacity development and accountability measures. As different sectors are likely to be impacted differently by contracting out, approaches will need to be tailored to the context.

There is increasing support for models that prioritise South-South collaboration and draw upon regional human resources, thereby aiming to promote sensitivity to context (see Box 5 on South Sudan). Such approaches are often...
focused on mentoring – pairing a highly skilled expatriate with a national inside the government bureaucracy. This supports the development of institutional memory and resilience, departing from a tendency to rely on expatriates taking over key government responsibilities in international peace operations.

Box 5: IGAD Regional Initiative For Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan

**Theory of Change: Strengthening sector governance**

After decades of devastating conflict, around eight million South Sudanese yearn for a state capable of delivering basic services. The current compartmentalized public sector reflects delicate power balances rather than pluralistic and transparent principles, and most citizens lack capacity and social capital to engage in political processes at any level. As part of a broader initiative, UNDP is supporting the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan – a US$10.5 million project running from 2010-2013. The deployed civil servants will serve both to enhance capacity and will over time work on expanding local knowledge through “twinning” with South Sudanese counterparts in peer-to-peer partnerships. The long-term duration mirrors lessons learned from other country contexts on the need for sustained engagement. Given that the coaches are from neighbouring contexts that have undergone comparable transitions, this approach promotes local ownership while holding promise for sustained results. The programme also illustrates in-kind South-South cooperation with in-kind staff contributions from neighbouring countries.

Despite extensive international efforts to set standards to improve the effectiveness of aid coordination — from resource collection and management, to planning and delivery of services — major deficits remain that undermine peacebuilding. Guinea-Bissau is a case in point. Although it is one of the highest recipients of per capita aid, aid coordination mechanisms are weak and planning is hampered by the limited knowledge of national needs and capacities across sectors. The failure to link policy, planning and budgeting – both by international and national actors – is considered to be the single most important cause of poor budgeting outcomes in developing countries. Liberia’s stated desire to become independent of external aid by 2020 is an example of the desire of post-conflict countries to take charge of their own development and recovery processes. Public financial management that is accountable, participatory and conflict-sensitive will drive the success of such initiatives.

Promising practices are emerging that build national ownership and capacity in aid management processes. The “Sierra Leone Information Systems” (SLIS) project established by OCHA in 2002 to develop capacity for data collection, processing and analysis at local and central levels has grown into a comprehensive programme that helps the Development Assistance Coordination Office in the Office of the Vice-President. In Nepal, the “Making Aid Work” project supports a nationally led coordination process through improved aid management information systems, which is linked to national planning and budgeting processes. UNICEF has developed a revised “Technical Note – Capacity Development for the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action,” which envisions a clearly phased exit strategy; this shows how knowledge transfer is coupled with gradual national takeover, leading to a complete transfer of responsibilities. Such an approach has been used in Uganda to support a national supply and logistics system.

**Local Governance and Accompanying Forms of Decentralization**

Local governments are often the first to collapse when factions fight for territorial control. In post-conflict settings, the state is often unable to effectively reach parts of its territory for years. Given these challenges, it is no surprise that decentralization and local governance provisions are increasingly prominent in peace agreements and national

---

56 Ibid.; p. 46.
post-conflict peacebuilding agendas. Local governance is a vital means for the populace to have access to government – a foundation for any state-society compact.

**While the contributions of decentralization to sustaining peace remain under-researched and controversial, there is significant agreement around the need to support local government capacity and accompanying forms of decentralization in post-conflict settings.** A decentralized presence allows the state to increase its visibility and establish its legitimacy at the local level, deploy civil servants, prioritise infrastructure needs to benefit effective service delivery, communicate more effectively nation-wide, and maintain order and security. Locally conceived and implemented actions allow for interaction, engagement and cohesion among different ethnic, cultural or religious groups in conflict-prone environments. Ideally, local governance can serve as a valve by mitigating local claims for political and socio-economic power. Many post-conflict countries have large rural populations for whom national power structures are distant and often irrelevant. But a devolved power centre can help control resentment that stems from such classical centre-periphery dynamics, providing a mechanism for local populations to tangibly engage in issues of import to them. It is also argued that decentralization allows local populations to interact with government, while devolution of basic services provides a tool to address grievances – even root causes of conflict.

At the same time, local governance structures may, in fact, be conflict drivers. The process of decentralization implies “that there will be winners and losers, which can ignite new friction between players.” It can encourage elite capture, hurt pro-poor service provision, and create parallel structures, thus undermining state capacity. Furthermore, decentralization may be perceived by national government officials as a means of removing some of their power, opportunities and benefits. While working at the local level is an urgent necessity to stabilise and consolidate peace efforts, decentralization policies and practices can take a considerable length of time to mature.

**Box 6: Decentralization to Improve Local Public Services in Burundi**

**Theories of Change: Delivering peace dividends; Strengthening sector governance**

Decentralization has been supported by the Burundian state since 1959, with a dozen accompanying texts on legislative and regulatory frameworks. Emanating from PRSP recommendations, this two-year (2008-2010), PbF supported, US $3 million programme sought to support decentralization as a way of achieving peace dividends and building state accountability and legitimacy at local levels. The project improved public records offices, built communal offices, and held workshops educating civil servants on the roles and responsibilities of these offices. In total, 3,000 stakeholders participated in the process, during which the Burundi Association of Local Elected Officials was created to support and enable responsible and responsive elected communal officials, with a specific focus on female elected officials. Peacebuilding outcomes included the strengthening and accountability of local institutions, as well as improved social cohesion and state-society relations. Beneficiaries saw it as a peace dividend, improving downward accountability of the state. Despite these contributions, it was felt that the sustainability of the project could have been stronger and its results magnified, i.e. to other sectors and regions. A project evaluation in 2009 stated that the government had not committed resources to reinforce the capacity built through the project and to address the larger needs of the provincial level administration, which is closely linked to the effectiveness of the local level offices.

---

57 OECD/DAC, Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, p. 38
58 See UNDESA, Reconstruction, p. 88.
60 Global Forum on Local Development, p.33.
61 Pavanello and Ducey, Improving the Provision of Basic Services for the Poor, p.21.
In the following example of a decentralization programme in Burundi (Box 6), examples of both the benefits and drawbacks are identified.

What forms of decentralization then, will support sub-national governance and service delivery that fosters peacebuilding? There are many decentralization and service delivery models that range from central and local government provision, to contracting out and various forms of client power. There are also various local and community-driven development programmes (CDD) aimed at delivering services. While these are often vital in the absence of a strong and accountable state authority in post-conflict settings, they can also lead to parallel, competing structures which undermine coherence (see Annex C for full discussion). The work of UNCDF highlighted below promotes an approach that is context sensitive (Box 7).

Box 7: UNCDF Support to Local Governance and Development in Guinea-Bissau and Liberia

Theory of change: Strengthening sector governance

The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) has set up various Local Development Programmes (LDPs) in post-conflict countries. Tailored to specific contexts, LDPs aim to promote more effective, efficient, equitable and accountable infrastructure and service delivery through rural local governments. They do this by twinning innovations in funding mechanisms and capacity development with planning, budgeting, and delivery and accountability arrangements.

In Liberia, where centralised, corrupt and unaccountable governance has been a conflict driver throughout the country’s history, UNCDF is working with UNDP on the Liberian National Decentralization and Local Development programme (LDLD) to help the government develop, adopt and roll out a decentralization policy. The LDLD promotes system and institutional development for effective public expenditure management and local investments in infrastructure and services. The programme involved creating and operating a Local Development Fund (LDF), which experienced issues with accountability in its first efforts, illustrating the challenges of fiscal decentralization.

In Gabu, Guinea-Bissau, the LDP is focused on a range of issues to strengthen the weak local administration, including through public service delivery, creating a regional development fund, responsive planning mechanisms, and promoting the local economy. It also supports the implementation of decentralization policy at local levels through communication and information systems. The Government of Guinea-Bissau has dragged its feet on the holding of local elections and putting into effect its decentralization policy. However, where local authorities are not in place, UNCDF has worked with pre-existing systems to create temporary structures with which to partner. The UNCDF project shows that, even where there may be challenges with political will, progress can be made.

There is a need for in-depth conflict, context, and political economy analysis to understand the roles that the political and public administration systems and structures have played in a particular conflict setting; this will help in the (re) building of new, conflict-sensitive institutions that are legitimate and accountable. The Global Forum on Local Development has suggested that decentralization should not take place alone. Rather, it needs to occur together with other reforms in relevant sectors (e.g. education, health, agriculture), as well as the electoral system and the civil service.

---


---

Some services (e.g. immunization) will require delivery to be coordinated at the regional or national level.\textsuperscript{63}

From this review of public administration thinking and practice, a few fundamental points should guide reflection on the linkages of administrative and social service and peacebuilding in the following sections on education, health and WASH, and food security:

- The manner in which the state collects and manages its financial resources – which is often a driver of conflict – is also a key driver of its legitimacy.

- Effective delivery of public services is considered to be a core factor in (re)establishing public trust and confidence in government institutions, and in facilitating a functioning economy. Both of these are vital ingredients for sustained peace and development.

- Effective public administration and social service delivery – together – provide a foundation upon which state legitimacy, societal resilience, and healthy state-society relations can evolve and flourish.

\textsuperscript{63} Baird, “Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States”, p.11.
5. EDUCATION AND PEACEBUILDING
5. EDUCATION AND PEACEBUILDING

The Linkages

“Education is a good yardstick for measuring peaceful and successful communities”
(Community services officer, Gulu, Uganda)

Education can either be used as a means to catalyse conflict or build peace.64 On the one hand, lack of access to education for young people can be a conflict trigger. As stated by Irina Bokova, Director General of UNESCO, “using schools as a vehicle for bigotry, chauvinism and disrespect for other people is not just a route to bad education, but also a pathway to violence.”65 Schools can be targeted in conflict and post-conflict settings in ways that perpetuate both physical and structural sources of violence. For example, in Afghanistan, in 2010 the Taliban bombed schools. Other barriers to education, often adversely affecting girls, exist in post-conflict settings: sexual violence against female students and teachers, schools as recruitment sites for boys and girls as child soldiers, non-completion due to internal displacement, and chronic absenteeism due to premature uptake of adult domestic roles by girls and informal economic activity by boys (e.g. Pakistan).66 This illustrates that the compounded effects of exclusion from education can only be understood by an appreciation that conflict most severely affects those who are already marginalized and reinforces the disadvantages associated with gender and poverty.67

On the other hand, education can be an important peacebuilding tool when schools teach tolerance, mutual respect, and when education is accessible to the entire population. Schools can provide the means for individuals to learn how to think critically, resolve conflict non-violently, and serve as a venue where students can develop positive relationships across conflict divides. Education itself can also be a tangible and powerful peace dividend. With over 28 million primary aged children out of school residing in conflict affected countries, the resumption of services after the end of a violent conflict, in the form of access to education, is often considered more tangible to the general population than the security sector or constitutional reforms. Rebuilding the education system, if done with attention to conflict issues, can contribute to strengthening and maintaining a legitimate authority and promoting pro-poor development. However, failing to deliver or distribute services equally can reignite social tensions and lead to a resumption of conflict.

**Box 8: Community consultations in Central African Republic, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda, July 2011**

**Key findings on education and peacebuilding**

Education was recognized as a key vehicle for peace by government, community members and students in all three countries. As one official in CAR stated: “*Education’s contribution to peace is fundamental. Education is key to eliminating violence. The uneducated child will do anything, as he is missing knowledge and skills, so he will become a delinquent.*” A secondary school student in CAR stated: “*There is a net difference between educated and uneducated children in resolving conflicts. Those without access to education use violent means, while those who are educated use dialogue to resolve their problems.*”

The consensus was that education is not only a result of peace, but also an entry point and condition for it. Communities in all three countries described the potential for education to lay the foundation for respect, tolerance and social/national cohesion. According to one community in CAR, inclusive education promoted in the Nicola Bari School had a visible impact on tolerance among children of different ethnic backgrounds: “… children can become teachers of such tolerance in their own homes and communities.” According to one girl attending a UNICEF-sponsored centre for Kyrgyz and Uzbek youth in Kyrgyzstan – the only place where the two normally segregated groups could interact – “it made us feel that we are equals (…) we learned that we can communicate with each other without fear, and that we can ask each other for help. Being together made us realize that we share the same goals in life.” Many teachers confirmed the importance of replicating this at the school level, where they observed a dangerous trend of mono-ethnicisation.

Consultations in Uganda, in particular, highlighted the challenges of managing an education system during long-standing conflict. General insecurity and lack of access, schools targeted by rebel forces, abductions, displacement and destruction of infrastructure led to high drop-out rates and a dramatic shortage of teachers. At the same time, overcrowding and the dearth of teachers made it hard to provide quality education in IDP camps. Yet schools were a key avenue for enhancing rehabilitation of children after the conflict, and for promoting social cohesion and laying foundations for peace. According to one adult member of the community, “the school system was often used to pass information to children – and by extension, to their community – related to safety and security, life skills, conflict resolution etc. This helped build a culture of peace and togetherness.”

---

*For more details on the findings in Kyrgyzstan, Uganda and CAR, see Annex I.*

---

* Interview with UNICEF staff, 3 August, 2011.
* This can be derived from interviews in this study. See also: World Bank, World Development Report (2011), p.9.
* The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), Improving the Provision of Basic Services for the Poor in Fragile Environments: Education Sector International Literature Review, (December 2008).
Three core areas of research and related practice around education and peacebuilding are: 1) the role of education in emergencies, 2) the “Do No Harm” and conflict-sensitive approaches, and 3) education and peacebuilding, including reconciliation and the ways in which sector reform supports social transformation. On the second point, the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) argues that service delivery should be equitable, inclusive, and accessible, and it should promote understanding and acceptance of different religions, ethnicities of social classes. The political and social relevance and quality of educational curriculum in a particular context is critical, but this is often too politically sensitive for new governments in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In Rwanda, for example, the government decided to postpone teaching history for ten years following the genocide, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, three parallel education systems were maintained, each with its own distinct historical narrative. A fourth area overlapping the second and third areas is education and fragility, which views public education systems as playing a central role in (re)establishing state legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Schools or other educational facilities are a site for daily interaction between the population and the state, and can serve as a barometer of the state’s commitment to its people. Schools can serve as a stabilising factor and be a means to mitigate conflict and contribute to statebuilding through quality and equitable access. INEE, a global network of more than 5,700 practitioners and scholars, established a working group in 2008 that is spearheading policy discussions and collaborative action on education and fragility.

UNESCO’s 2010 report on the “Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education” emphasizes four failures at the heart of this crisis that need reversing – failures of protection, provision, reconstruction and peacebuilding. The first two address humanitarian concerns around protection of children and the provision of education to children caught up in conflict, as well as critical aspects of the role of education in peacebuilding. UNHCR in particular promotes peace education during the time of displacement (i.e., in countries of asylum), arguing that education can protect children from (armed) violence and recruitment as soldiers. The third and fourth areas of failure relate to post-conflict settings. Failures in reconstruction hone in on the infamous gap between humanitarian aid and long-term development. UNESCO argues that while reconstructing the education system requires a long-term effort, services must be provided so that countries can capitalize on the immediate benefits of education. Such services could focus on exploiting quick wins and delivering the “peace premium,” i.e. removing school fees to facilitate equitable access, scaling up existing community initiatives, offering accelerated learning programmes, teacher recruitment, and providing psychosocial support to former child combatants. During this early period, foundations for long-term recovery should be built, i.e. institutional reforms, such as the development of an education management information system. Notably, the WDR disagrees on strategy. Acknowledging that education systems have the potential to exacerbate conflict, it argues that health and education reforms are “medium-term challenges,” while immediate needs can be met by international actors. The fourth failure highlighted by UNESCO is that education policy has not been sufficiently part of the peacebuilding agenda, yet such policy reforms can influence public perceptions and mitigate long-standing grievances that underpin conflict. Policy reform, i.e. in areas of language of instruction, and curriculum, will require strengthened national planning with attention to principles of inclusivity and conflict assessment. UNICEF is presently undertaking a comprehensive study on education and peacebuilding to address the evidence gap and explore how education can promote peacebuilding in practical terms through service delivery, education sector reform, and broader social transformation.

74 INEE, The Multiple Faces of Education.
75 Ibid.
77 UNHCR, Education policy and guidelines, 2011.
78 UNESCO argues that this is “one of the most important of all post-conflict reconstruction exercises in education” – which aligns resources with needs, improves transparency, and eliminates ghost positions.
80 Most research to date has tended to focus on education and conflict, or education sector capacity and functioning in post-conflict situations, with related indicators. What is needed is a clear understanding of how peacebuilding has been strengthened through education, UNICEF literature review, p.7.
UNIFEM makes the case for reversing the gender bias associated with service delivery that is often reinforced in post-conflict to ensure that peace dividends reach all. Towards this end, the propensity for ungendered conflict analyses that undermine the effectiveness of programmatic responses\(^{81}\) must be addressed, and a gender lens mainstreamed into strategic efforts linking social services and peacebuilding.

**Case Studies**

Around the world, education has been used to divide people – to create and justify historical narratives and promote ideologies of superiority or entitlement of one group over another. The cases chosen and examined in this study illustrate efforts to reverse and prevent the problematic ways in which education is used to promote violence. They were chosen on the basis of their strong representation of programmatic directions and outcomes in peacebuilding\(^ {82}\) (see Annex E for full cases).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTERS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>THEORIES OF CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring the Education of Girls during and after Conflict in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>FAWE (regional NGO) and partners</td>
<td>1995-1999</td>
<td>Peace dividends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, Human Rights and Citizenship Education Programme in Liberia</td>
<td>UNFPA and partners</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools as Zones of Peace in Nepal</td>
<td>UNICEF, Save the Children, and partners</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cases covered in Annex E illustrate how education initiatives are being designed and implemented in ways that capture and build upon the evolution of thinking and practice described above. In Sierra Leone, education as a peace dividend was realized through a number of linked projects that addressed a grievance (lack of education opportunities) of the rebels. The Forum for African Women Educators (FAWE) Emergency Camp School provided emergency education and psychosocial services to children displaced by conflict; it transitioned into a permanent school for girls in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, which exists today. In Liberia, the “Peace, Human Rights and Citizenship Education Project” sought to reverse the pattern of violent behaviour among youth through the national education curriculum – incorporating components on peace and citizen education as well as human rights. The comprehensive “School as Zones of Peace in Nepal” programme provided an entry point for both national and local level contributions to the peace process. By creating Codes of Conduct (CoC) in 325 schools agreed upon by multiple stakeholders, it ensured that schools would not continue to be politicized and militarized in the post-conflict setting, and that they would provide safe spaces for children.\(^ {83}\) Through this process it also created state-society mechanisms to address a conflict driver.

Several factors promise to have a likely influence on peacebuilding outcomes. The programmes in Sierra Leone and Nepal addressed an issue of immediate importance to communities while engaging and reforming national institu-

---


\(^{82}\) UNHCR, UNESCO, Save the Children, and INEE, and UNICEF (especially through their “Education as a Path to Peace” brief) have all suggested different types of effective post-conflict programming, on which the study selection drew.

\(^{83}\) UNICEF, Education in Conflict and Transitional Contexts, Case studies from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, and Southern Sudan (2010), pp. 11-16.
tions. In addition to bridging gaps between humanitarian, immediate aftermath and development efforts, there were various ways in which the programmes were catalytic. In Nepal, for example, the CoC were successful in keeping schools open and in reducing violence and child abduction, while the child clubs empowered children far beyond expectations. At the same time they publicly raised awareness; children across Nepal began demanding that their schools also become Zones of Peace.84 The programmes all sought to address conflict drivers – a first step in conflict-sensitive practice. In Sierra Leone, despite a multiplicity of actors working together, they adapted programming along the way to meet the changing context and needs, e.g. adding medical and psychological services to address the needs of girls and women who were victims of rape and abduction. Finally, many of these programmes responded to widespread, multi-stakeholder desires and demands. This allowed for the development of inclusive processes that foster social cohesion, while creating platforms to improve state-society relations. Both are key ingredients for inclusive sector governance and policy reform.

Box 9: PBF Funding in Education

Of all the social services, the PBF has funded education the most, with 13 projects to date in CAR, Comoros, Guinea, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone and South Sudan. The projects have fallen under PBF Priority Area (PA) 2, coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict, and Priority Area (PA) 3, promoting early economic recovery and peace dividends. Under PA 3, projects are aligned with youth employment through vocational and life-skills trainings, income-generating activities and micro-entrepreneurship, often seeking to strengthen social cohesion by engaging youth as peacebuilding agents. They address economic revitalisation, often through the private, rather than the public sector. Projects under Priority Area 2 primarily focus on the promotion of citizenship and peace education, but often have a link to socio-economic revitalisation. Only one project in CAR targeted the basic restoration of access to education. One project in South Sudan, related to reintegration of IDPs, included the provision of social services. Projects for DDR of children in CAR and Nepal also included educational support and facilities.

84 Ibid.
6. HEALTH, WASH AND PEACEBUILDING
6. HEALTH, WASH AND PEACEBUILDING

The Linkages

Many actors in the health sector have identified the reciprocal impacts between health and conflict. Evidence suggests that poor health and nutrition are associated with greater probability of civil conflict. High disease and mortality rates in fragile states are a cause of fragility, and a state’s ineffectiveness to deliver these services can be a cause of poor health indicators. Health service delivery can also reinforce fragility when access to services mirrors other exclusions among certain social, economic, ethnic, and/or geographically located groups. Conversely, violence has a tremendous effect on the health sector and the population that public health workers serve. Conflicts divert funding away from social services, and during conflict many health facilities are destroyed. Health workers are often killed or flee the country, putting a strain on human resources. Survivors of conflict may cope with disabilities, loss of livelihoods, and the psychological effects of trauma, among them suicide, depression, and increased aggression towards others, including domestic and sexual violence. Further, the impacts of conflict can result in the release of polluting and hazardous substances into the natural environment, leaving a legacy of environmental health risks. After conflict, child morbidity tends to increase, and there are many negative health effects from mass migration resulting from conflict.

The health sector’s contributions to peacebuilding are not particularly well understood. Conceptual frameworks linking the issues exist, but evidence is in short supply, notably due to the absence of measurement tools. As in other sectors, attention is increasingly focused on ways to improve the delivery of health in fragile and conflict-affected states. A new study commissioned by DFID emphasizes the varying expectations and importance of the populace in different settings (see Box 10 for research from this study). Building on other studies, it hypothesizes that the consequences of certain interventions – such as those aimed at dealing with post-traumatic stress and massive gender-based and sexual violence – will influence recuperation at the community level and may contribute

---

85 Pinstrup-Andersen, P., & Shimokawa, S. “Do Poverty and Poor Health and Nutrition Increase the Risk of Armed Conflict Onset?”, Food Policy vol. 33 No. 6 (2008), pp. 513-520.
87 USIP, USIP, Health in Post Conflict and Fragile States: Challenges for the Next Decade, USIP Conference (June 9-10, 2011). See also Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Distinguished Fellow of International Public Management, RTI International.
89 DFID, Statebuilding, Peacebuilding and Service-Delivery in Fragile and Conflict Affected States: Literature Review, 13 May 2011.
to stronger resilience among conflict-affected communities. In health policy discussions, it is argued that when service delivery is accessible, non-discriminatory, standardized, and government-owned, it can enhance citizens’ trust in government by signalling the state’s willingness and ability to respond to its population’s needs over the long-term. Health interventions offer opportunities for governments to engage with civil society and can be used to influence reforms in other areas. Further, if health service delivery equalizes access and addresses these horizontal inequalities, it can reduce conflict risk. Health service delivery can be a useful entry point into political processes, as it can address a cause of instability and is a precondition for further work on economic recovery.

While evidence-based research remains limited, the notion of “Health as a Bridge for Peace” (HBP), developed in 1985 by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), is still promoted by WHO today. HBP is a multidimensional policy and planning framework supporting health workers to deliver services, while simultaneously contributing to peacebuilding.

In 1997 WHO developed technical guidelines for health professionals to assist both peace-making and peacebuilding efforts at different stages of conflict. In 2001, the Complex Emergency Response and Transition Initiative (CERTI) found that the perceived neutrality of HBP initiatives often results in their success, yet health professionals are not trained in negotiation and diplomacy; as a result, opportunities to maximize their potential peacebuilding roles are lost. To further the work on this subject, WHO has suggested strategies that include: 1) strengthening primary prevention re-

---

92 CERTI is a research and networking group that works to prevent and mitigate conflict by supporting bi-lateral organizations (USAID), UN Agencies, NGOs, and universities in developing programming strategies, tools and training models, information available at http://www.certi.org/themes/Health_conflict.htm.
sponses; 2) researching and developing assessment tools to better understand both the impacts of violence on health and the peacebuilding effects of health interventions; and 3) championing and providing victims of war, trauma and war crimes with proper medical and psychological care, and training health workers to recognize early signs of mental distress.94

Box 10: Community Consultations in Central African Republic, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda, July 2011

Key Findings on Health and Peacebuilding

Communities in all three countries identified the limited availability of, and restricted access to, health services as one of the key challenges during times of conflict. Loss of qualified staff (administrative and medical), shortage of medical supplies and degradation of infrastructure were major obstacles to the health systems in CAR and Uganda. While the provision of quality health services in the severely congested IDP camps in Uganda had its own challenges, the absence in the communities of return left citizens feeling neglected by their government.

In Kyrgyzstan, even in the aftermath of violence, it was fear of discrimination and mistreatment by medical staff of another ethnic group that prevented Uzbeks from accessing local hospitals. Yet the medical units in the rural areas – lacking equipment, skilled doctors and specialists – did not have the capacity to provide well-qualified assistance to victims of injury and pregnant women. Healthcare provision was identified as an important entry point for rebuilding trust in government and among different ethnic groups. Towards the latter, the fair treatment of patients, regardless of their ethnicity, was considered an important step in rebuilding inter-communal confidence.

Second to improving the capacity and quality of medical services, psychosocial services were identified as a priority in the aftermath of conflict and considered a condition for reconciliation, rehabilitation and social cohesion in all three countries. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, communities and school principals observed a dramatic rise in psychological distress and trauma among children and youth. This was translating into anger, increased hostilities at school and a readiness for violence among young people. In Uganda, the provision of psychological services was reported to have helped the reintegration of abducted children and former child combatants, and facilitated their acceptance in society.

As in the case of education, many health specialists and donors95 argue that capacity building and transfer mechanisms should be designed immediately in post-conflict settings. Needs to be addressed include infrastructure, information, communication and management systems, as well as mechanisms for creating and implementing policies.96 The Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) has been suggested as a model for fragile states to serve as a foundation for the health system and to establish minimum standards of delivery, linking quick impacts to longer-term goals during the early reconstruction stage.97 It targets vulnerable groups, promotes unified priorities between donor and government and suggests effective means for scaling up and addressing relief-development gaps. Donors can contribute by aligning support to government priorities, ensuring long-term commitment, and reconciling demand and

95 This was a popular view at USIP, Health in Post Conflict and Fragile States: Challenges for the Next Decade, USIP Conference, (June 9-10, 2011). DFID argues that transition from relief to development must take place as early as possible while the WDR advocates waiting until stability has been established before implementing social service programming. DFID, Improving the Delivery of Health and Education Services in Difficult Environments: Lessons from Case Studies (2005), p. 17. World Bank, World Development Report, p. 22.
96 These were popular views at USIP, Health in Post Conflict and Fragile States: Challenges for the Next Decade, USIP Conference, (June 9-10, 2011).
97 Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute and OECD-DAC, Improving the Provision of Basic Services for the Poor, p. 13.
Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding

The need to understand the local context is widely recognized – particularly what the determinants of state fragility might be that can affect interventions. This is especially true for community-based interventions, where more could be done to train community members in trauma healing and mediation techniques, promoting healing and reconciliation in communities in post-conflict settings.

There is growing evidence that employing large numbers of women as healthworkers, especially if they represent a critical mass (or at least 30 per cent) in frontline service delivery, contributes significantly to a programme’s success. This means that healthcare programmes need to plan for and factor in the additional costs of employing female health professionals throughout the supply chain – midwives, auxiliary nurses, doctors, civil servants – both to ensure a gender sensitive approach that responds to the specific needs of women and to maximise the impact of these programmes.

Box 11: Community Consultations in Central African Republic, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda

Key Findings on WASH and Peacebuilding

Communities consulted in the three countries considered water a key priority that government was expected to address. Lack of government accountability and responsiveness to citizen’s basic needs, including water, was a common perception among communities in Kyrgyzstan, Uganda and CAR. In Kyrgyzstan and CAR, public water systems in the cities were damaged during the conflict; in many cases, they were yet to be repaired. This was fuelling resentment among the population and was linked to distrust in government. As one boy in KagaBandoro, CAR, put it: “in my neighbourhood there is a water pump that doesn’t work. We have paid the city to fix it but they never do. It is causing many problems and people are angry.”

Unequal access to water and other basic social services was identified as a key factor in the ethnic conflict of Kyrgyzstan. The consulted Uzbek communities perceived their Kyrgyz neighbours to have better access to water both before and after the conflict, fuelling feelings of discrimination, inter-communal grievances, and lack of trust in government. As one community member in a village near Osh, Southern Kyrgyzstan, put it: “drinking water is not clean, nobody comes to clean it. We have approached the government department but keep on being sent to another department, and then another. Nobody is responsible. There is a big gap between the government and the people here. People have no trust in government because it takes too long to restore social services.”

Several communities highlighted the potential of social services in building inter-communal peace. One WFP project to rehabilitate irrigation channels, for example, brought people together and served as a platform for inter-ethnic cooperation. The project was perceived to have strengthened tolerance and trust among the participating Uzbek and Kyrgyz communities, who were working towards a common goal to benefit both communities.

Lack of access to quality water resources – a daily basic need for all – can be a persistent driver of conflict in humanitarian and post-conflict settings. While WASH interventions – combining issues of water supply, sanitation, and hygiene – have the potential to contribute to peacebuilding, there is a substantial lack of research on how they

---

can. This is especially the case for sanitation and hygiene. Research and practice suggest several entry points for further exploration. First, there is recognition that ensuring efficient water management can potentially prevent and reduce conflicts over resources. In particular, community management and planning of water resources can reduce tensions and provide incentives for cooperation and coexistence (as highlighted in Annex F). Since water is a daily basic necessity for all, it is likely to constitute an agreed priority – at least where lack of access affects all. Women’s inclusion in water management is thought to increase the chances of maintaining and regulating community level water resources in a sustainable manner, while improving their status in the community.

**Case Studies**

The cases examined in this study (see Annex F) illustrate evolving promising practices of health and WASH programming that contributes to peacebuilding. They were chosen on the basis of their strong representation of programmatic directions and outcomes involving the UN family. Collectively they encompass a wide range of programming types thought to be effective in post-conflict situations. The four cases highlighted are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTERS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>THEORIES OF CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immunization Drives as Entry Points for Peace</td>
<td>WHO, UNICEF, Save the Children and partners</td>
<td>Various programmes, 1985-1995</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building in Central America and Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychosocial and Community Support in Post-Conflict Liberia</td>
<td>UNFPA and partners</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH support in Galkayo and Habyo Somalia</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Waste Management in Sudan</td>
<td>UNEP and UNICEF</td>
<td>2008-present</td>
<td>Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cases covered in Annex F illustrate how health initiatives are being designed and implemented in ways that capture and build upon the evolution of thinking and practice described above. They also illustrate this study’s three theories of change. The “Psychosocial and Community Support” programme in Liberia illustrated how health services can be used as peace dividends to support the needs of traumatized communities that, if left unaddressed, could lead to a relapse of conflict. Various cases illustrate how health initiatives provide important entry points into peace-making and peacebuilding processes. Health and WASH are amongst the most urgent needs for people and communities, cutting across conflict lines. Immunization drives in several countries served as entry points to

---

102 See also, UNHCR, Provisional programme guide on coexistence project, 2010.
103 UNIFEM; Joshi, Anuradha, Concept Note: Women at the Frontline of Service Delivery (June 2010), pp. 4-5.
political negotiations by bringing warring parties together to agree to a ceasefire to enable humanitarian work. In Somalia, the conflict around water access prompted UNICEF’s WASH support programme to include a large negotiation component. The extensive negotiations led to an agreement among local leaders on the construction of water systems and monitoring mechanisms. Similarly, water resources management programming provided an entry point to address a key conflict driver in Sudan: water scarcity. The programme met immediate needs by providing a stable water source in IDP camps, while providing for long-term management of the resource, the scarcity of which has the potential to drive conflict.

**Box 12: PBF Funding in Health**

The PBF has funded two main projects dedicated to health: psychosocial and community support in Liberia, and health services support for demobilizing Maoist soldiers in Nepal. Smaller health components are also included in several other projects. The Liberia UNFPA project followed an integrated approach to community-based psychosocial support, involving the establishment and training of psychosocial support teams, strengthening community networks and developing livelihoods. While this project also had a public administration component to strengthen local governance for service delivery, its main aim was to deliver peace dividends and promote social cohesion. Projects for DDR of children in CAR and Nepal also have included WASH and health components.

While their contributions to peacebuilding may detract from the valued neutrality to which humanitarian actors aspire, there is room for the health sector to reflect on past experience and become more intentional about these contributions. Immunization drives in particular, which target the entire population, can provide opportunities for education and outreach, or “peace messaging.” They can even provide opportunities for parallel activities and events that promote peace and reconciliation. Government involvement in health service provision, especially psychosocial counselling, can send a message to former warring parties that all are cared for by the state.
7. FOOD SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING
7. FOOD SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING

The Linkages

There is a small but consistent body of findings linking food insecurity to increased risk of democratic failure and increased protests and rioting, communal violence, and civil conflict. These conflicts, in turn, create widespread food insecurity, malnutrition, and in some instances, famine. Thus food insecurity is one of the mechanisms by which conflicts can be self-perpetuating, the “conflict trap.”

Food insecurity can be both a cause and a consequence of political violence and is deepest in countries affected by conflict. Civil conflict exists almost exclusively in countries with low levels of economic development and high food insecurity, where high food prices can serve as triggers for unrest, riots, and political violence. Food insecurity alone does not normally cause violent conflict, but combined with other factors it can determine the likelihood, nature and severity of conflict.

The crisis in the Horn of Africa illustrates how conflict and fragility can create a context where systems ensuring access to food and other economic resources break down and are politicized and used to fuel warfare. Food insecurity has other deleterious effects which makes it a threat multiplier. These include: negative effects on health, education, livelihoods and individual productivity; setbacks in economic development; and the loss of confidence in state institutions. Poverty, often high in conflict and post-conflict countries, ensures that people are vulnerable to even small price increases for basic goods and services, including food. In fact, the average household expenditure on food is higher in these countries than in other developing countries. At the same time, social protection systems and safety nets are often weak or non-existent in such contexts, and the most vulnerable have few or no means of coping with price increases.

Conversely, violent conflict exacerbates food insecurity. Planting and harvesting cycles are often interrupted, and crops destroyed. During conflict, markets are disrupted, infrastructure damaged, government attention to and investment in social service delivery declines. At the household level, conflict results in a loss of livelihoods, reduction in income, and the sale of productive assets, which further reduces the ability to meet basic needs and exacerbates food insecurity. In situations of fighting, humanitarian actors may not be able to access people in need of relief food assistance. Even after conflicts formally end, as a women’s NGO in Uganda (Isis-WICCE) cautions, violence can continue in the home, as women struggle to provide food for their families in harsh conditions.

There are various theses put forward about food security’s contributions to peacebuilding. At the most basic level, it is argued that improving food security can make important contributions to political stability as a peace dividend. Well-timed food security investments play a critical role in preserving life, livelihoods and nutrition. In support of statebuilding goals, food assistance and livelihood programming are thought to build social cohesion and social capital during the peace consolidation process. If they are well-designed and implemented, they can build resilience to recurrent or new crises. Finally, as part of longer-term social service delivery, they constitute a core building block for broad-based economic growth, human security and sustainable peace, particularly when accompanied by social protection mechanisms. Food security and improved nutrition are also intertwined with achievements in wider social

---

104 Collier, Paul, Elliott, V. L., Hegre, Havard, Hoeffler, Anke, et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank Policy Research Reports, (June 1, 2003). Collier et al argue that the correlation between food insecurity and political conflict is largely due to their being symptoms of low development. Brinkman and Hendrix (2011, p. 4) alternatively underscore a growing body of research linking food scarcity both directly and indirectly (as proxied by environmental scarcity or access to water resources) to various types of conflict.


106 Ibid.; pp. 5-6.

107 Ibid.; pp. 11-12.

and economic service that lay a foundation for peace.¹⁰⁹ Without reliable and stable livelihoods, people are forced to sell (often productive) assets and reduce their food intake and diversity of their diet. Developing sustainable livelihoods can prevent competition for scarce resources that might lead to instability or conflict relapse.¹¹⁰ This is particularly important in rural areas, where people are often not as well served by general infrastructure, food distribution networks and safety nets, receiving less attention from political actors than more visible urban populations.¹¹¹ These threads of research and practice are illustrated in the cases that follow.

**Box 13: Food Insecurity, Conflict and Fragility**

- The majority of fragile states (including post-conflict countries) are food importers. The average household expenditure on food is higher in these countries than in other developing countries.
- Food insecurity is significantly worse in these countries (definition of protracted crises in FAO report) than in other developing countries for key food security indicators: proportion of undernourished, proportion of children stunted, child mortality rate, Global Hunger Index.


¹¹⁰ “From Conflict to Peacebuilding”, Halle,Silja (ed), (August 2009), p. 22.

¹¹¹ Crawford and Deni, Food Security and Emerging from Crisis.
Emerging practices of food security investments from a peacebuilding angle are producing promising outcomes, though further research is required to provide evidence. In response, WFP is embarking upon a large study to gain greater insight into what types of interventions in the wide spectrum of food assistance are effective contributors to longer-term peace and stability. Building on the argument that food insecurity is a cause and consequence of conflict and that improving food security contributes to stability, traditional food security gains in certain contexts can be relevant to overall peace consolidation. Other indicators, such as the return of line ministry civil servants to their posts and functioning sub-national planning and coordination processes, serve as more general indicators assessing progress in statebuilding and peacebuilding. Increased employment opportunities and income indicate heightened resilience to future shocks. Food security assessments generally do not include conflict analysis, although initiatives are underway both within the UN and the World Bank to infuse such elements more widely into strategic frameworks used to guide international action in post-conflict settings.

Box 14: Community Consultations in Central African Republic, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda

Key Findings on Food Security and Peacebuilding

Availability of and access to food was identified as a key condition for peace in Kyrgyzstan, Uganda and CAR. Conflict was perceived as having a negative impact on food security in all communities consulted. Insecurity restricted access to farming land, seeds and other farming input, and in all three countries, harvest was lost. Food prices increased during and after conflict, and markets were either absent or restricted in access. Displacement and destruction disrupted farming activities in CAR and Uganda, and malnutrition rates were reported to be high during times of conflict. In Kyrgyzstan, even after the conflict, continued incidents of violence and discrimination posed challenges to Uzbek communities, restricting outlets for agricultural products and reducing incomes. Many families are still heavily indebted, having relied on loans from relatives and friends to get them through the crisis.

Farming communities in all three countries identified support to food production in the form of distributing seeds, tools and other farming input as well as water for human consumption and irrigation. Other needs identified that are linked to food security included livelihood interventions, income generating activities and employment schemes, in particular for youth.

A WFP funded project in southern Kyrgyzstan demonstrates the viability of using food security related interventions as an entry point for reconciliation. Seeds were distributed to local women who formed self-help groups, bringing together members of both ethnicities. This, according to the affected communities, started a process of reconciliation and rebuilding trust, while strengthening food security among participating families.

For more details on the findings in Kyrgyzstan, Uganda and CAR, see Annex B.

There is also a rights-based orientation to understanding the relationship between food security and peace that is promoted by various actors within the United Nations and some civil society organizations globally (see Annex H).

---

112 These can include percentage of household expenditures on food (compared with averages for fragile and other developing countries), improved food consumption, availability and access to food as well as reduced use of credit and out-migration are all signals that households are recovering from conflict, amongst others.

113 In some countries, WFP’s extensive field presence and expertise in food security monitoring support the wider UN. In collaboration with OCHA and under the UN’s broader strategic framework for peace consolidation, WFP Nepal’s field surveillance for example was used to collect information on food security and other vulnerability factors including governance, unemployment, land rights and health care on behalf of UNMIN. Other initiatives are underway to explore ways of linking food security analysis with micro-level analysis of violent conflict (IFS Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict).

114 For more information see Annex H.
Oxfam, for example, takes the issue of food security a step further, seeing it as a social justice issue. Global food production can meet the world’s food needs, but the ability to access it is limited among various groups, particularly poor people. Rising food and oil prices, land and water grabs, unequal land rights (especially for women) and climate change have made this situation worse. The international food sovereignty movement argues that it is the right of peoples, countries or state unions to define their agricultural and food policy. It prioritises local and national economies and markets, and consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. The ways in which this interacts with “nationally owned” peacebuilding practice has important implications that need to be further examined.

**Case Studies**

The following cases illustrate promising practices that are evolving in the areas of food assistance and related food security programming, and their contributions to peacebuilding. They were chosen on the basis of their strong representation of programmatic direction and peacebuilding outcomes. Collectively they encompass a wide range of programming types thought to be effective in post-conflict situations. The four cases undertaken by various United Nations agencies, national governments and NGOs highlighted are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTERS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>THEORIES OF CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Assistance for Conflict-Affected Populations in Nepal</td>
<td>WFP and partners</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food/Cash For Work, Purchase for Progress (P4P), and School Feeding in Liberia</td>
<td>WFP, GoL and partners</td>
<td>Various programmes, ranges from 2009-2012</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Sector governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding before Peace: Food Assistance, Food for Work/Training, School Feeding, and Nutritional Support in the Philippines</td>
<td>WFP and partners</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Management for Agriculture and Peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>FAO, WFP and partners</td>
<td>2010-Ongoing</td>
<td>Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cases covered in Annex G illustrate how food security initiatives with peacebuilding contributions are being designed and implemented along the three theories of change proposed in this study. As a direct peace dividend, food assistance comes in the form of packages for return and reintegration of displaced populations (e.g. Philippines case), or of special logistics operations to rebuild infrastructure and immediate, quick-impact food assistance.

---

programming; the latter includes, for example, food/cash for work projects aimed at rebuilding damaged or destroyed infrastructure, thus instilling confidence in the peace consolidation process (e.g. Nepal, Philippines and Kyrgyzstan). Food assistance programming is also contributing to building national institutions and the resilience of communities to confront the inevitable shocks (natural disasters, price fluctuations, renewed violence, etc.) that put war-affected communities at risk of food insecurity, thus decreasing the risk of renewed conflict. Such initiatives include local procurement (Purchase for Progress) and livelihood development programming, and national and local capacity building in disaster preparedness – including the management of national food security monitoring systems and emergency grain reserves (Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, and South Sudan). The Water Management for Agriculture and Peacebuilding Programme in Kyrgyzstan seeks to use the rehabilitation and management of water resources as an entry point for multi-ethnic reconciliation and to address the underlying factors that drive and/or exacerbate conflict, including resource scarcity and ethnic tensions. Early outcomes include increased social cohesion across ethnic lines.

In terms of their likely influence on peacebuilding outcomes, several promising factors emerge from these projects, including:

- Targeting both proximal and distal conflict drivers: In Liberia, these conflict drivers included inequitable access to basic services as well as poverty, chronic food insecurity and lack of livelihood opportunities (including youth unemployment);
- Linking communities with national institutions: In Nepal, local authorities were trained to monitor levels of food security in every district, and these national and local linkages have allowed for greater state-society interaction and accountability. Community involvement in addressing the need for water management systems in Kyrgyzstan created opportunities to bring different identity groups together for a common purpose;
- Bridging the gap between immediate needs and fulfilling a longer-term development strategy: In Nepal, efforts to meet immediate food needs dovetail with those building government capacity to manage the national food security monitoring system, food price volatility and other shocks; and
- Addressing multiple challenges and producing strong peacebuilding results chains: In Liberia, training and investing to increase production for smallholder farmers is fused with market initiatives. WFP buys surplus rice and cassava from the same farmer cooperatives to support the national school-feeding programme. Cash and food for asset schemes construct and/or repair local agricultural infrastructure, aiming to support social cohesion and resilience in the community.

Overall, food security programming tends to incorporate the cross-cutting priorities of social protection and women’s empowerment, both of which have the ability to address conflict drivers and support sustainability of programming.

Box 15: PBF Funding in Food Security

The PBF has funded food security projects in six countries - DRC, CAR, Uganda, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, and South Sudan. Two prominent food security initiatives funded by the PBF include: a strategic grain reserve programme in South Sudan and an inter-ethnic water irrigation programme in Kyrgyzstan involving youth and women. The projects have sought to address food insecurity as a conflict driver through agricultural production and strengthening social cohesion and reconciliation. The projects have fallen under PBF priority areas 2 and 3. Food security issues have also been embedded in other areas of PBF-funded projects, primarily related to youth employment and economic revitalization. Given its focus on social services, this study did not examine purely private-sector focused agriculture projects, such as a PBF-funded project in the CAR to reduce unemployment and poverty rates in rural areas.
8. EMERGING PRACTICES IN CONFLICT SENSITIVITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL SERVICES
8. EMERGING PRACTICES IN CONFLICT SENSITIVITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL SERVICES

There is now widespread international recognition of the need for conflict sensitivity in programming, and factoring in considerations of conflict and peace into programme design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. The need for such programme and policy guidance for administrative and social services is clear: precious resources need to be spent responsibly and wisely in peacebuilding settings to meet the panoply of recovery needs and priorities in ways that address conflict drivers and lay the conditions for sustainable peace. Failing to do this will undermine peacebuilding and statebuilding goals.

Despite growing recognition of these issues, a robust analysis of conflict rarely drives post-conflict programming efforts. In most settings there is plenty of analysis generated by multiple departments within a peacekeeping mission, but it is not often generated and used for programming purposes. Alternatively, this type of analysis is often used to set peacebuilding priorities when other types of analysis are needed instead – i.e. process-oriented conflict analyses that build ownership and strategic coherence around action. In some cases the proliferation and use of different conflict analysis tools presents other problems, not the least of which is wasting limited financial resources. To support coherence, actors should work together to choose and utilize a set of tools for a particular setting. At the same time, actors at the table need to be cognisant of the task at hand: understanding, planning and programming for peacebuilding and the associated transitions that need to occur. When actors on the ground deem peacebuilding to be purely a security or political endeavour, humanitarian and development actors can be left out of the process in ways that undermine the very concept of peacebuilding.

The task of designing and implementing conflict-sensitive programmes is also challenged by complex contextual dilemmas that arise. These can include:

- **Normative dilemmas**: when respecting local traditions, or efforts to be context sensitive in other ways, comes into conflict with international standards;
- **Participation dilemmas**: whether and how to promote the participation of “spoilers,” particularly when it may marginalise other stakeholders; and
- **Operational dilemmas**: whether and how to share information with government officials when there are security issues at stake, or how to work with government officials when it is clear their legitimacy is in question.

In the case of administrative and social service programming, these can also involve finding the appropriate balance between:

1) responding to immediate health, educational, and food security needs and building capacity to ensure conflict-sensitive sustainable service delivery; 2) building state capacity and working with non-state providers, which may allow scaling-up of services; 3) supporting and working through central state institutions and sub-national institutions. Critically, there is often too little attention to the coherence of the overall administrative system – between core ministries and line agencies, and national/sub-national entities – that affects state functioning, service delivery, and ultimately, the prospects for peace consolidation. Conflict analysis and wider context analysis, including political economy analysis, can facilitate understanding of the intended and unintended consequences that may arise within the context of these dilemmas and challenges.

---

118 This disconnect can be found between the sophisticated analysis generated for peacekeeping operations to fulfil their mandates, and the extensive work done by United Nations agencies that falls into the categories of peacebuilding and recovery.

119 McCandless and Rose, Political Governance in Fragile and Post Conflict Contexts.

120 Pavanello and Ducey, Improving the Provision of Basic Services for the Poor in Fragile Environments.
The need to develop capacity in these areas in countries emerging from war is paramount. The following two cases in Liberia and Sudan begin to illustrate what is possible and what can be built upon in the area of conflict-sensitive policymaking and planning. In Sudan, the Crisis Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) project (Box 17) is modeling an approach that offers promise for both conflict-sensitive public administration and social service delivery. The project involves communities at its core – identifying threats to their security and priorities to address them. Donors are, as a result, aligning their aid in a more coherent fashion according to identified priorities, and the Government has a growing interest in linking the approach with its development planning.

**Box 16: Liberia: Conflict/peace sensitivity in design and implementation**

*Theory of Change: Strengthening sector governance*

Over the last few years, the Government of Liberia has made strong commitments, notably through its Poverty Reduction Strategy, to factor consideration of conflict issues into strategic planning and programming. These plans have been difficult to translate into practice, given the limited capacity within government and civil society. The Liberia Peacebuilding Office in the Ministry of Internal Affairs prioritised training and capacity development in conflict-sensitive policymaking and programming as part of its first tranche of funding from the PbF.

A small project targeted Liberian Ministry technical level focal points. After three days of training they began training county level government and NGO staff. In focus group interviews one year later, participating Ministry representatives expressed enthusiasm, widely affirming the value of the approach. Despite the fact that this was a one off training, they were able to put learned concepts into practice and described how their efforts were having small but important impacts one year later. They shared stories about how they use the approaches in project and activity design and implementation. One representative said she had used the principles to rethink how her ministry should engage civil society, distributing benefits more fairly. She believes this is improving government relations with civil society. Representatives from the Anti-corruption Commission and the Governance Reform Commission (GRC) underscored the relevance of conflict-sensitive approaches for their work. The GRC is mandated to work on the socio-cultural vision for the country, involving culture, symbols and identity. The representative from the GRC stated “every institution needs this training; it is critical!”

Representatives have experienced problems mainstreaming the approaches in their ministries; they feel they are not senior enough to have others follow their lead. While ministers themselves were introduced to the topic, it was clear that the programme would have benefited from a more sustained approach, training trainers who could effectively sustain the momentum within their ministries while sharing experiences and strategies on a regular basis. This type of programme could be very cost effective and highly catalytic. The PBO strongly supports extending its work in this area, but the emphasis in the second tranche of PBF funding shifted to more traditional security priorities.

Despite wide consensus on the need to understand context as a starting point, processes for mainstreaming analysis into programming and policymaking design and implementation are neither sufficiently understood nor utilized. As highlighted in the preceding sections, growing efforts within the United Nations and beyond illustrate movement in conflict-sensitive sector work. There are also sporadic efforts to include peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity in CCAs, UNDAFs, and national planning frameworks, or Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs). Critically, the capacity for conflict-sensitive work in sectoral policymaking, planning and programming remains limited, even among international institutions and actors. The capacity of international and national actors in countries emerging from war will need to grow to inform and strengthen mutual commitments and the likelihood of peacebuilding success.
Box 17: Southern Kordofan, South Sudan: Crisis Mapping (2010-Present)

Theory of change: Strengthening sector governance

UNDP’s Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) project builds government capacities for crisis and recovery mapping, conflict analysis and strategic planning across Sudan and South Sudan. Together with government counterparts, CRMA builds the government planning processes from the ground up. This participatory approach consists of community- and state-level mapping workshops to identify community perceptions of human security risks ranging from lack of access to basic services and natural resources, to environmental issues, community security and vulnerable groups. Beyond collecting grass-roots information of community perceptions, this process poses an important opportunity for diverse communities to come together in the aftermath of crisis to discuss challenges, differing perceptions and views of the future. The risk data is subsequently incorporated in a geo-referenced Digital Atlas, with a range of baseline information and studies, and publicly distributed across the international and national communities. The data collected then undergoes a participatory analysis process led by a joint government and civil society team, through which emerging themes and priorities are subject to multiple consultations with a cross-section of society for feedback and validation. The resulting analysis is published through official UNDP–Government State Situation Analyses, laying the foundation for evidence-based, conflict-sensitive planning and policymaking not only within government structures, but also within the UN system. In certain conflict-affected areas, this process is further used to enhance the capacities of local peacebuilding mechanisms, such as the Reconciliation and Peaceful Coexistence Mechanism in Southern Kordofan, to identify, analyse, mitigate and design responses to community-level conflicts and tensions. Designing and implementing joint data collection, analysis and planning processes with the government, this process has also supported greater aid coordination and coherence within the international community’s response to the world’s two newest nations as they emerge from decades of civil war. Together with UNDP’s Conflict Reduction Programme, this model is now being explored as a conflict early warning system in collaboration with local and government-led peacebuilding mechanisms, with pilots underway in Southern Kordofan and Darfur.
9. FINDINGS
9. FINDINGS

The following represent findings from the study, encompassing both desk review and field research in CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia and Uganda.

1. There is an emerging body of evidence\textsuperscript{121} that suggests that public administration and social services – delivered in an effective and equitable manner – can contribute to peacebuilding. Specifically, they can:
   - address grievances that underlie or trigger violent conflict
   - offer a means for the state to reach out to society, to (re)build its legitimacy and systems of accountability

According to communities consulted, unequal access to social services fuels conflict; if left unaddressed, it represents a key obstacle to peace. There was a clear consensus in all three countries that the state needs to (re)invest in social services to gain legitimacy and the confidence of the population. In Uganda as well as in Kyrgyzstan, community members resented the lack of government transparency, accountability and opportunities for participation in decision-making. Their feeling was one of powerlessness and distrust, due to both their inability to effectively demand from and influence government decisions, and the limited government role in social service delivery.

\textsuperscript{121} This includes both the existing and ongoing research highlighted in the report and the research undertaken for this study.

- Community Consultations (Annex B)

2. Despite their recognized contributions to peacebuilding, administrative and social services tend to take a back seat to interventions focused on the security sector and political processes in post-conflict settings. To date only 25 out of PBF’s 192 projects have funded administrative and social services programming. In some cases this is due to the security and political process activities having greater prominence in priority setting. However, the conflict and political-economy analysis that is the basis for setting priorities remains relatively weak, and processes tend to be driven by political and security actors. Other factors influencing this trend are likely to include the longstanding ideological divide between those who view peacebuilding as primarily security/political versus developmental in nature. A related factor is the perceived lack of clarity and understanding around the direct contributions of administrative and social services to peacebuilding. In the PBF’s case, the absence of language in its Terms of Reference to accommodate social service related programming is particularly prohibitive.

3. While not often articulated, the three broad theories of change – 1) Delivering peace dividends; 2) Strengthening sector governance; and 3) Providing entry points to deliver peacebuilding results – are fairly consistently employed across administrative and social services programming. These are informing practice with visible peacebuilding contributions.

- Delivering peace dividends: Timely and tangible deliverables can be provided at critical junctures in the peace process – either in the immediate aftermath of conflict or later, during peace consolidation. What’s more, there is growing evidence that in particular contexts administrative and social service-related peace dividends are making important contributions to peacebuilding. Citizens consider them to be important in post-conflict settings, commonly seeing the effective and equitable delivery of services not only as a key signifier of peace, but also as a sign of state accountability. (See Annex I, Community Consultations, and Annex D for a list of case studies employing this theory of change).
• **Strengthening sector governance:** Poor governance is often a factor in conflict, undermining the state-society compact and creating or exacerbating the perception of discrimination and actual horizontal inequalities. Strengthening sector governance can contribute to peacebuilding through: 1) Supporting sector governance and policy reform in peace/conflict sensitive ways, as well as efforts preparing for and emerging from UNDAFs and PRSPs. 2) Helping to build national institutions that are both responsive (with effective delivery) and inclusive (in form and function). Processes and mechanisms are needed to foster state-society relations, which will help to build the state-society compact and, consequently, the state’s legitimacy. Programming can ensure that the traditional activities around planning, legislation, policy development and reform, budgeting and financing, and M&E are conducted in an inclusive, conflict and peace sensitive manner. Such work is particularly important in institutions with a service delivery function, for which the impacts are visible and target the immediate needs of local populations. These issues are relevant at both national and sub-national levels, and therefore involve and overlap with administrative services in areas of decentralization and local governance. (See Annex I, Community Consultations, and Annex D for a list of case studies employing this theory of change).

• **Providing entry points to deliver peacebuilding results:** In post-conflict settings where needs are many and resources few, conflicts triggered by lack of or unequal access to basic social services can erupt easily and have the potential to destabilise fragile situations. As a starting point, this study suggests that administrative and social services can provide highly strategic entry points to deliver peacebuilding results. At the national level, peace processes and early post-conflict peace agreement implementation settings are often highly politicized and negotiations protracted. Social services in particular are often perceived to be more technical, and therefore less sensitive to talk about than, for example, power and resource sharing and issues that often touch upon identity. Given their importance to all stakeholders, administrative and social services can be a unifying topic for discussion at any level, and thus provide an opportunity for negotiators to seek agreements that serve popular needs. This is particularly true at sub-national and community levels, where conflicts ultimately need to be resolved. Administrative and social service provision can lead to joint programming action that can help build relationships and meet immediate needs in ways that address conflict drivers. Such programming can also result in tangible projects or joint action; these in turn offer additional opportunities to build relationships between parties and/or communities. (See Annex I, Community Consultations, and Annex D for a list of case studies employing this theory of change).

4. While specific outcomes and indicators will manifest differently in different contexts, peacebuilding outcomes tend to fall into one or more of three areas:

• **Resilience and social cohesion:** Outcomes that support the multiple sources of strength – including human, material and social – that communities can tap into to anticipate risk and collaboratively work for peace and development (resilience), and/or that support the glue that bonds society through economic, social and/or political means (social cohesion).

• **State capacity and legitimacy:** Outcomes that promote and support inclusive and responsive governance institutions and processes that strengthen state-society interaction and state legitimacy and accountability.

• **Conflict drivers and root causes:** Outcomes, diverse in nature, that respond to perceptions and needs of different actors within particular contexts around how to mediate drivers of conflict and/or set conditions to address root causes through processes, mechanisms, and/or policies.

5. Despite increasing recognition that administrative and social services constitute a key pillar for state legitimacy and societal resilience in the aftermath of conflict, too little attention is given to integrating them into programming. Supporting and expanding these linkages will likely require greater attention to the cohesion of systems among core government ministries (ministries of planning, finance, and public administration to name a few), service delivery entities (whether national or international, or private), and their related national and sub-national entities to ensure that planning is done on the basis of real needs and priorities. Sub-national and community participation in planning processes is critical.
Tensions are diffused and social cohesion enhanced when communities feel they have access to services, regardless of ethnic or other affiliation. Secondly, social services have the potential to bring people together; they can serve as platforms for inter-group interaction and are important entry points for “helping/serving each other” which is key to rebuilding tolerance and trust. Examples include Uzbek patients being treated by Kyrgyz doctors, Uzbek and Kyrgyz children interacting in mixed schools and youth groups (UNICEF project), and ethnically mixed self-help groups that are united to rehabilitate mutually beneficial irrigation channels (WFP project). In Uganda, there was consensus that shared health, water, education and other services and resources, if well managed, offered an opportunity for communal unity; in CAR, there was a decrease in social unrest and a rise in government legitimacy after water and electricity were restored in neighbourhoods of Bangui.

- Community Consultations (Annex B)

6. Supporting administrative and social service oriented programming is not without risks. The legitimacy of government officials in post-conflict is often questioned – at different levels, within different regions, by different stakeholders, and particularly within early transitional arrangements – and there are always different forms of legitimacy. Support in all areas of programming should be based on a strong conflict analysis that ensures “do no harm” principles are maintained. Whether and how to promote participation of “spoilers” is a key dilemma, particularly when their participation may marginalise other stakeholders. Increasing participation can generally help to manage expectations, but it can also create and raise them.

Support for education reforms in post-conflict settings can present particular risks, given the extreme political sensitivity around the restoration or reform of curriculum. For example, the Government of Rwanda decided to postpone teaching national history for ten years following the genocide. And in Bosnia and Herzegovina, three parallel education systems with distinct historical narratives were maintained following conflict. 122

7. Administrative and social service related programming presents specific coordination and coherence challenges. Planning should take into consideration the following:

- Common context and conflict analyses should be developed according to the priorities that reflect what communities and society as a whole actually want. While significant efforts to improve knowledge and capacities are being made in this area, such as the employment of the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) in mission settings, significant gaps remain in achieving quality context assessments. This is particularly true as they relate to administrative and social services. There is a propensity to simply transfer analysis from various documents and strategies that have been prepared in different post-conflict phases to save time or to buttress priorities that were not always arrived at through participatory processes. Context and conflict analysis should be as participatory as possible to build national ownership of the peace-building process – a stated United Nations goal. In the interests of supporting the state-society compact, priority setting should respond to what communities and society as a whole want; this may need to be weighed against what particular leaders propose (i.e. through the use of public opinion surveys). In addition, bottlenecks to inclusive service delivery must be examined from a sectoral perspective, as the root causes of exclusion and discrimination may differ from sector to sector. At the same time, particular sector conflict drivers can have adverse impacts on other sectors. However, the fact that each sector has its own technical, institutional and financing characteristics presents challenges that require further attention.

- The time period of each initiative (i.e. “immediate aftermath” vs. “longer-term peacebuilding”) is less important than effective coordination and coherence, as well as the sequencing of functions.

Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding and activities to support peacebuilding needs. This is particularly true for public administration, where the levels and types of state dysfunctionality are highly context-dependent. Emphasis should be placed on clear theories of change that are based on assessments of capacities, needs and priorities not only by national leadership, but the wider public as well (i.e. through public opinion surveys, community level consultations, etc.).

- **Transition strategies that clearly link peace consolidation to national ownership and capacity development in areas of public administration and social service delivery require greater attention.** Such strategies (including civilian drawdown in peacekeeping missions) should be developed as early as possible in post-conflict settings to emphasize that national ownership can be strengthened from the start of peace operations. They should build upon existing strategies, programmes and capacities of other actors, especially United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. According to consulted communities (Annex B), the inter-related nature of social service delivery requires a comprehensive approach.

- **The cases with the strongest peacebuilding outcomes employed more than one “theory of change approach.”** This suggests that the alignment and sequencing of different approaches may contribute to strategic coherence and stronger peacebuilding outcomes. They can be viewed as tools to promote system integration and coordination. Furthermore, while specific outcomes within these areas manifest in context-specific ways, more systematized use of these outcome areas can support the design of effective programmes.

8. There are other promising practices and factors that may promote stronger peacebuilding outcomes, including those that:

   - **Respond to a context specific conflict driver,** especially those that have the potential to unravel a peace process, and/or make communities relapse into violent conflict.

   - **Multiply beneficial outcomes and impacts,** especially programming that can widen the reach and impact of a promising practice in a particular setting. The community enforced Codes of Conduct programme in Nepal (see Annex E) started in one community and then spread to create structures nationwide, successfully preventing school closures and the use of schools as recruitment bases by engaging political leaders at the local level.

   - **Include or leverage a peacebuilding intervention (or ensure a peacebuilding lens) throughout larger humanitarian and development programmes in order to create catalytic peacebuilding impacts.** Projects in Kyrgyzstan and South Sudan (see Annex G) begin to illustrate trends in this direction of PBF support for United Nations agency programming. In the case of South Sudan’s strategic grain reserve and other large development programmes of this nature, opportunities exist to expand both public administration and social service related contributions to peacebuilding.

   - **Bridge transition gaps in ways that are relevant for peacebuilding:** This can include gaps between rapid delivery of important social services and longer-term sector reform and/or institution-building efforts. The case of education as a peace dividend in Sierra Leone (see Annex E) illustrates the transition from a humanitarian project to a longer-term development one in a manner that addressed conflict drivers and built state-society relations. See also: WASH, Sudan (Annex F), and Food security, Sudan and Liberia (Annex G).

   - **Build capacity of government and civil society in conflict-sensitive policymaking and programming.** In Liberia (see Section 8, Box 16), training and capacity building of government representatives from various ministries proved to be promising for a number of reasons. In terms of its strategic relevance and potential for impact to advance statebuilding outcomes, it helped to advance government legitimacy, improve state-society relations, and address conflict drivers.
• **Build inclusive, participatory processes around priority-setting to help manage societal expectations.** Programming can convene a wide range of stakeholders and/or identity groups, including war-affected populations and groups in conflict, to find solutions for common social service-related challenges. Such efforts seek to actively engage citizens in setting and sequencing priorities amongst what are often impossible lists of post-conflict priorities. Particular attention is needed to ensure that participation does not raise societal expectations rather than manage them, and that stakeholder groups also give voice to traditionally marginalized groups (e.g. women, ethnic minorities, geographically isolated). In Kyrgyzstan (see Annex G), the management of water resources was used as an entry point for multi-ethnic reconciliation and to address the conflict factors of scarce resources and ethnic tensions, which increased social cohesion. The Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis mapping in Sudan (see Section 8, Box 17), and various community driven development models (see Annex C), suggest ways in which communities can be involved in identifying both threats to their security and their recovery priorities, and how these processes can also be used as an entry point for reconciliation as well as capacity development.

Discussions in Kyrgyzstan highlighted the importance of inclusiveness, non-discrimination and accountability in service delivery. While the Uzbek ethnic minority clearly felt discriminated against, having limited access to services compared to their Kyrgyz neighbours, the perception of “unbalanced” delivery of post-conflict aid in favour of the Uzbek community had further exacerbated resentment and tensions between the two groups. Functioning social services and other state support, provided without any ethnic or other discrimination, was identified as one key condition for the establishment of trust in government and to provide a basis for peace and stability.

- Community consultations (Annex B)

• **Support conflict-sensitive local governance and decentralization of public administration and service delivery, where the latter is accepted governance policy.** UNCDF approaches are promising in their sensitivity to design with the local context in mind. A conflict analysis component could be added to such programming, as the CRMP project offers, to provide a combination that would serve this goal. Such approaches hold great promise to improve inter-ministerial coordination at all levels. They can also be a basis for transparent and conflict-sensitive public-private partnerships to support economic recovery. Governments could work to assure that quality and quantity basic services also reach marginalised populations at fair rates.

• **Ensure cross-cutting issues are mainstreamed through programming to contribute to, and potentially multiply, important peacebuilding outcomes.** In Darfur, Sudan, integrated water resource management programming engaged and empowered various local stakeholders to collaboratively address water related challenges and think about how to ensure its sustainability. In general, without understanding the hydrological and institutional context, drilling wells risks unleashing new conflicts over water while undermining sector governance, and it often reinforces inequity of access. See Section H for a full discussion of cross-cutting issues.

Social protection programmes and systems, for example, can strengthen national capacity for conflict prevention and management – (i) providing mechanisms and benefits to increase and enhance the resilience of households to shocks and contribute to recovery; (ii) strengthening state capacity in addressing citizens’ needs and thus improving legitimacy. These may serve as critical tools, directly affecting the peacebuilding process at any stage.
10. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PBF STRATEGIC POSITIONING
10. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PBF STRATEGIC POSITIONING

According to the PBF’s guidelines/Terms of Reference, extended support must have a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process. As outlined in Annex A, the PBF supports projects that are relevant, catalytic, fast, and risk tolerant. This review has found a number of promising practices with a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process, which strongly suggests that the PBF should increase its support to basic administrative and social services. Increased support will need to be in line with the PBF’s standard criteria and respond to national priorities, determined through transparent and inclusive processes that link conflict analysis with priority setting.

1. The PBF should expand its support to administrative and social services in its funding portfolio where they can have a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process.

   • Expansion should occur in particular in PBF’s Priority Area number 4, which presently covers the “establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities.” In addition to the recommendations laid out in this report, the forthcoming PA and LG Review will offer findings and recommendations for strengthening PBF support to public administration and local governance contributions to peacebuilding.
   
   • The PBF should also incorporate social service contributions to peacebuilding more prominently across each of its 4 Priority Areas (see Annex A) that relate to addressing threats to the peace process, coexistence and conflict resolution, economic revitalisation, and administrative services. Efforts to link social service programming to these areas would need to follow thorough conflict and political economy analysis to ensure conflict sensitivity. For example, in SSR and DDR, accelerated learning programmes and educational and vocational training could infuse peace and civic education dimensions. Activities could be designed to ensure that such training reflects and incorporates thinking about the emergent national vision for economic revitalisation and peace.

2. Following a robust and participatory conflict analysis that engages international and national actors, the PBF should direct its support towards programmes in the three areas described above – 1) delivering peace dividends, 2) strengthening institutions and governance for service delivery and/or 3) using basic services as entry points for peacebuilding. The programming should be consistent with PBF’s score mandate and funding criteria (relevant, catalytic, fast, and risk tolerant), bearing in mind risks and challenges (findings 5 and 6) and aiming to produce peacebuilding outcomes (finding 4).

   Further considerations that draw on promising practices and should guide decision-making are laid out in Box 18.

3. The PBF should in all possible cases support programmes that can have catalytic outcomes and impacts with (relatively) limited resources. Specific areas include:

   • Training and capacity building initiatives that are strategic and sustainable. It is well recognized that “one-off” training events do not foster sustained results. Liberia’s efforts to build the capacity of ministry staff in conflict sensitivity were extremely well received, but not sustained as a result of their one-off nature (see Box 16). Supporting a process to continue learning and cross-ministry engagement would be highly effective and low cost, supporting PBF’s desire for catalytic results. Longer-term mentoring approaches in capacity development, especially drawing on human resources from neighbouring countries, is also a promising practice that the PBF can fund.

   • Greater attention to “software.” While in some cases the “hardware” (i.e. infrastructure) may need to be funded in the absence of others willing to act fast and take risks, the PBF should focus more on addressing “software,” or planning/process elements, to ensure they are conflict-sensitive, inclusive and transparent, and sustainable, catalysing other donors to make larger financial contributions for the infrastructural elements.
• **Programmes or projects that widen the reach and impact of a promising practice in a particular setting.** In Sudan, a successful community planning approach for water system placement was institutionalized nation-wide by the Government (see Annex F). In such a setting the PBF could, in cooperation with a government, support lessons learned exercises aimed at scaling up the practice. The PBF could also work with other partners to support greater South-South or regional sharing of promising practices in countries emerging from conflict.

**Box 18: Considerations for PBF Support to Three Theories of Change**

The PBF should consider supporting programmes in the three theory of change areas in settings where there is a risk of lapse or relapse into violent conflict when:

**Delivering peace dividends**
- they respond to a conflict driver
- they help to restore/build basic services in ways that hold promise for facilitating state-society accountability, particularly at sub-national levels
- they create processes and/or mechanisms for state-society engagement and accountability around issues of direct concern for conflict-affected communities
- the PBF can leverage, expand or magnify humanitarian efforts in education, health and food assistance, ensuring they serve as peace dividends in ways that are catalytic

**Strengthening sector governance**
- they respond to a conflict driver, and/or where existing administrative/social service provision is feeding tensions and instability
- initiatives aim to fill the gap between fast delivery of important social services in the immediate aftermath and longer-term sector reform and reconstruction efforts
- they bring national level policy processes to the local level, or vice-versa
- they offer training and capacity building in conflict-sensitive policymaking and programming for government and civil society
- processes or mechanisms proposed support the capacity of government to coordinate aid, and in particular, to link policy, planning and budgeting in peacebuilding settings
- processes and mechanisms proposed support conflict-sensitive decentralization, where this is an accepted Government policy priority

**Creating entry points**
- they respond to a conflict driver that has the potential to unravel peace processes, and/or cause communities to relapse into / engage in violent conflict
- other agencies or donors cannot respond quickly or their mandate restricts them from responding to particular groups in conflict

4. To support strategic analysis, planning and coordination in order to have greater peacebuilding impact, the PBF, with technical support from and in coordination with the PBSO, should consider supporting:

- Inclusive processes aimed at developing analyses of context and conflict drivers as well as peacebuilding gaps and priorities, with an emphasis on national capacity and ownership. Country specific
context analysis should be regularly undertaken on hotspots and vulnerable areas, in which improved social service measures can contribute to peacebuilding outcomes. Such studies should inform the development of priority plans.

- **Processes to ensure a peacebuilding lens in poverty, food security and other assessments and analyses, as well as developing the UN system’s capacity for conflict analysis.** United Nations agencies do substantive and comprehensive poverty and food security assessments in conflict settings. The PBSO could support processes aimed at infusing a conflict lens to ensure that these assessments incorporate identity markers that would better enable the United Nations to support national efforts to address horizontal inequalities.

- **Sectoral studies designed to ensure peacebuilding impact of sector strategies and programming.** PBF could support studies that show how particular systems and institutions are fuelling conflict, such as education curriculums.

- **Studies to identify public perceptions and priorities, and to facilitate better targeting of support for the UN as a whole in ways that are likely to serve peacebuilding.** This could include studies that capture expectations of particular communities and societies about the pace of change, the role of the state, as well as their priorities. Such studies would be particularly valuable early on to establish a baseline of societal perceptions.

- **The development of its own procedural expertise that can be used to support capacity development with key partners.** PBF could maintain a small roster of specialists who work with the fund to ensure coherence in methods and approaches, support institutional learning and memory, and help to build capacity of implementing agencies at headquarters and with PBF key partners where needed in mission contexts.

5. **Next steps**

- In order to attain a comprehensive understanding of the issues, implementation of findings and wide impact, the PBF should use the recommendations in this report as a starting point for deepened engagement with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes on these issues. Ideally, this would take place in a workshop format to foster collective learning and capacity development. Initial discussions around training and capacity development modules from this review should be pursued. These should be “living” documents and tools to promote interaction and joint learning, particularly in light of the fact that so many relevant and complimentary studies are underway. PBF staff should also be engaged in these processes.

- Key policy and planning documents of the PBF will need to be adapted to accommodate programming in this area. In particular, language should be added to the PBF’s Priority Area 4 to accommodate the support of programming for social services; alternatively, another priority area should be developed to reflect the five priority areas articulated in the SG’s report on the immediate aftermath of conflict. Secondly, the terminology of “administrative services” should be changed to “public administration” to avoid the confusion that the former generates. And finally, the Performance Management Plan (PMP) and other M&E documents should align with these changes and work to incorporate the findings within this document.

- Further research is needed in many areas to support learning around these vitally important aspects of peacebuilding. There needs to be further research to promote understanding of the linkages between public administration and social services, and how these linkages can be better operationalized and supported to serve peacebuilding. This study should follow the PA and LG Review, building on its findings. As programming more intentionally follows the design logics identified in this report, and as the policy and scholar communities enhance their understanding of peacebuilding and statebuilding outcomes (see Annex B), research and evaluation can be better targeted to provide evidence in these areas. Finally, further research is needed on transition strategies, particularly in the areas identified under recommendation 4 above.

- There is an ongoing need for mechanisms to ensure learning takes place in relation to and across the many substantive studies underway. This will facilitate institutional memory and greater coherence in international action.
11. ANNEXES
ANNEXES

A. THE PEACEBUILDING FUND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ........................................ 64
B. PEACEBUILDING OUTCOMES ................................................................................. 66
C. DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE MODELS ................................. 67
D. LIST OF CASE STUDY PROGRAMMES ................................................................. 68
E. CASE STUDIES OF EDUCATION CONTRIBUTING TO PEACEBUILDING .......... 70
F. CASE STUDIES OF HEALTH AND WASH CONTRIBUTING TO PEACEBUILDING ... 76
G. CASE STUDIES OF FOOD SECURITY CONTRIBUTING TO PEACEBUILDING ...... 84
H. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES ..................................................................................... 94
I. COMMUNITY CONSULTATIONS FINDINGS .......................................................... 99
ANNEX A: THE FUNDING CRITERIA FOR THE PEACEBUILDING FUND

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is designed to inject fast, relevant and catalytic funding into key projects and programmes that help prevent a country from relapsing into violence. It was launched on 11 October 2006, through General Assembly Resolution A/60/180 and Security Council Resolution S/RES/1645-2005. With an initial funding target set at US$250 million, the PBF has raised US$360 million,\(^\text{123}\) from which it is supporting more than 150 projects in 18 countries. It is managed by the PBSO and administered by the UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF Office). The PBF relies upon voluntary contributions from Member States, organizations and individuals.

The PBF’s Guidelines were revised in 2009 to enhance its effectiveness.\(^\text{124}\) The PBF now allocates funding through two facilities:

1. **Immediate Relief Fund (IRF)** is the **project-based** (single project with a 12-month maximum duration) component of the PBF to address critical peacebuilding needs in the immediate aftermath of conflict or as a result of a dramatic change in the country situation. IRF funding is typically part of a larger package of UN support in such situations, and is based on a strategic framework plan that serves as the basis for broader UN intervention. Allocations from the fund are needs based, relying on existing strategic frameworks, underpinned by a conflict analysis, that explicitly address peacebuilding goals.\(^\text{125}\)

2. **Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF)** is the **programme-based** (multiple activities/programming objectives, with an 18-month maximum duration) component of the PBF. Programming addresses the significant risk of relapsing into conflict, and is compatible with the country Priority Plan, which is developed at the country level and draws from existing national plans to identify critical and catalytic interventions in support of peacebuilding.\(^\text{126}\)

Both facilities fund initiatives that respond to one or more of the following Priority Areas (PA):

- **PA1**: Responds to imminent threats to the peace process and initiatives that support peace agreements and political dialogue;
- **PA2**: Builds or strengthens national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution;
- **PA3**: Stimulates economic revitalization to general peace dividends for the population at large;
- **PA4**: Re-establishes essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities.\(^\text{127}\)

Countries on the agenda of the PBC may receive funding, and those not on the agenda may also receive funding following a declaration of eligibility by the Secretary-General. The Fund’s work in countries on the agenda is informed by the PBC’s work in these countries.

**PBF’s Review Criteria:**

Assuming country eligibility is attained, PBSO reviews the submission against a variety of criteria at the project and portfolio level. Projects must: fill critical gaps (that others cannot fund); have strategic relevance; be catalytic (see below). Projects must also have clear M&E measures articulated, must have an analysis of risks, be technically feasible, and those applying must have the capacity to implement. For more information: http://www.unpbf.org/document-archives/application-guidelines/

---

\(^\text{123}\) As of 31 August 2010. PBSO (2010a)

\(^\text{124}\) This came in response to two evaluations, one by the UN Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and one initiated by donor governments of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.


\(^\text{126}\) Ibid, p. 10.

\(^\text{127}\) PBF website, available at www.unpbf.org.
The need for programming to be *catalytic* is particularly important in the PBF’s determination of where and how it can make a difference. For the PBF, catalytic programming should enable, provoke, facilitate or accelerate shifts in the peace process as a whole, or with respect to different key elements of the peace process. To be catalytic programming should meet the following four criteria:

- Kick start a new longer-term peacebuilding effort, or accelerate an existing blocked peacebuilding effort;
- Ensure that the necessary ownership, capacity and willingness exists to increase the likelihood of catalysing larger, or longer-term peacebuilding change;
- Provide an immediate response to factors that are urgent and relevant to peacebuilding;
- Fill a critical gap not covered by other donors.

This conceptualisation suggests that catalytic programming will help to lay the conditions for a significant change rather than the change itself; it does not transform a conflict root cause or defuse a trigger, but rather it sets up the conditions for the root-cause to be transformed or the trigger resolved.\(^\text{128}\)

\(^{128}\) These intermediate conditions (or enabling factors) still represent changes in the context but they are not the ultimate peacebuilding changes desired. This creates challenges for evaluation, which is based it on clearly articulated changes: PeaceNexus Foundation Annual Report, (2010) available at http://www.peacenexus.org/sites/default/files/peacenexus_foundation_-_annual_report_2010.pdf.
ANNEX B: OUTCOME AREAS

Resilience and social cohesion: The notion of resilience is being used to try to understand the multiple resources upon which communities can rely – including human, material and social. In conflict and post-conflict settings communities require capabilities to anticipate risk, limit negative impact of conflict and crisis, resolve challenges collaboratively and non-violently (even where there are social divisions), and respond and adapt in ways that ensure they participate in and reap the benefits of peace and development. Social cohesion – the glue that brings society together – can manifest in many different ways: economically (i.e. through equal opportunities and reduced disparities); socially (i.e. through strengthened social relations, interactions and ties – social capital); and politically (i.e. through transparent and inclusive institutions). While agreement on indicators that measure resilience and social cohesion is lacking, there is general consensus that they should fall within areas or types of social inclusion.

State capacity and legitimacy: This outcome area promotes and supports inclusive and responsive governance institutions and processes that strengthen state-society interaction and state accountability and legitimacy. Specific outcomes can include local conflict management and resolution systems, inclusive and conflict sensitive settlements and agreements, and similarly, processes, policies, mechanisms and even institutions that are perceived as responsive, legitimate and inclusive. Public perceptions of such processes play an important role as a driver of legitimacy. Citizens’ perceptions of basic services are an indicator for increased quality of service delivery in both the Gallup and World Value Surveys, and are considered to be a key indicator for measuring peacebuilding and statebuilding by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Other draft indicator areas in this process include accountable budget management, revenue generation, and improved natural resource management.

Conflict drivers and root causes: Peacebuilding outcomes in this area can be many and diverse, responding to perceptions and needs of different actors within particular contexts. They include conflict mediation mechanisms to address particular conflict drivers – i.e. lack of access to land and other resources, as well as policies to address high youth unemployment or uneven regional access to social service delivery. The role of public perceptions is crucial here, given that change does not occur overnight. If there are visible attempts to put structures, processes and policies into place, short-term risks or conflict drivers may be mitigated while institutionalised efforts strive to address the root causes over the longer-term.

---

130 Adapted from the Community and Regional Resilience Institute, http://www.resilientus.org/about-us/definition-of-community-resilience.html
131 For example, in access to: financial inclusion and/or income distribution, economic activity, education, human capital, health and technology, ethnic diversity; as trust; and as participation and solidarity. Jensen (2010) and Easterly et al (2006). UNRISD is supporting efforts to bring consensus around the use of the concept and how to measure it. See, Jensen, Jane, “Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion”, (2010), Commonwealth Secretariat and UNRISD.
133 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Indicators, First draft (10 October 2011).
ANNEX C: APPROACHES TO DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

There are many decentralization models. Some distinguish between deconcentration and decentralization, and others, between vertical decentralization (devolution of power from central to local government) and horizontal decentralization (devolution across society, e.g. civil society and NGOs). There are also numerous approaches and innovations in public administration and local governance, i.e. cross border governance, inter-municipal cooperation (aimed at improving service delivery through institutional cooperation between local entities), and Communication for Development (C4D), which is aimed at improving information and communication mechanisms. The degree to which and manner in which financial decentralization occurs will also play a major role in determining suitable approaches. Matching local service delivery competencies with adequate funding will likely require a combination of intergovernmental fiscal transfers and local taxing powers.

As highlighted in the 2004 WDR, there are numerous service delivery models that range from central and local government provision to contracting out and various forms of client power. It is suggested that the suitability of these models depends on three criteria: 1) how much the political system is geared toward pro-poor public services; 2) the homogeneity of regional or community preferences; and, 3) the difficulty of monitoring service outputs.

The World Bank and UNDP both support community-driven development programmes (CDD), but each take different approaches. The World Bank funds communities directly, arguing that effectiveness of CDD programmes is dependent upon the simplicity and transparency of budget mechanisms that deliver money to communities, the quality of the decision-making and monitoring processes at the local level, and how well CDD programmes and processes can adapt to the emerging local government architecture. UNDP, on the other hand, supports community-driven development programmes by channelling money through sub-national government structures. While representing a critically important general notion, the CDD approach – when it occurs simultaneously throughout the same country – can lead to parallel structures that compete with each other and undermine coherence.

Local Development Programmes (LDPs) from UNCDF involve planning, budgeting, and the development of accountability mechanisms, the goal of which is to promote effective, efficient, equitable and accountable infrastructure and service delivery through rural local governments. While embodying a common strategy, they rely on innovations in funding mechanisms and capacity development to respond to particular contexts. The processes of planning and budgeting – done in consultation with local people and based on local needs and opportunities – help build legitimacy of the state through sub-national governance structures and processes while offering a means to address conflict drivers, and even root causes of conflict.
ANNEX D: LIST OF CASE STUDIES

**Public Administration**

Projects in boxes:
- IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in Southern Sudan
- Decentralization to Improve Local Public Services in Burundi
- UNCDF Support to Local Governance and Development in Guinea-Bissau and Liberia

**Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTERS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>THEORIES OF CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring the Education of Girls during and after Conflict in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>FAWE (regional NGO) and partners</td>
<td>1995-1999</td>
<td>Peace dividends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, Human Rights and Citizenship Education Programme in Liberia</td>
<td>UNFPA and partners</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools as Zones of Peace in Nepal</td>
<td>UNICEF, Save the Children, and partners</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Projects in boxes:
- Peace Education Programming in CAR and Guinea
- Informal Peace Education and Conflict Mediation in Liberia

**Health**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTERS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>THEORIES OF CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immunization Drives as Entry Points for Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Sudan and Central America</td>
<td>WHO, UNICEF, Save the Children and partners</td>
<td>Various programmes, 1985-1995</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psycho-social and Community Support in Post-Conflict Liberia</td>
<td>UNFPA and partners</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH support in Galkayo and Habyo Somalia</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Waste Management in Sudan</td>
<td>UNEP and UNICEF</td>
<td>2008-Present</td>
<td>Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Projects in boxes:

- Peacebuilding through Health in DRC
- Gender, Health and Peacebuilding in Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Burundi
- Community Action Plans for Water Management in Sudan

**Food Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTERS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>THEORIES OF CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Assistance for Conflict-Affected Populations in Nepal</td>
<td>WFP and partners</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food/Cash For Work, Purchase for Progress (P4P), and School Feeding in Liberia</td>
<td>WFP, GoL and Partners</td>
<td>Various programmes, from 2009-2012</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding before Peace: Food assistance, Food for work/training, School feeding, and Nutritional Support in the Philippines</td>
<td>WFP and partners</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Peace dividends, Entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Management for Agriculture and Peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>FAO, WFP and partners</td>
<td>2010-Ongoing</td>
<td>Sector governance, Entry point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Projects in boxes:

- National Institutions to address Key Conflict Driver: Strategic Grain Reserve in Southern Sudan
- Fuel Efficient Stoves in Darfur
The decade long civil war in Sierra Leone, which began in 1991, had disastrous effects on children and education. Rape and mutilation were used as weapons of war, the abduction and recruitment of child combatants was widespread, and sexual violence was perpetrated against female students and teachers in schools. To escape, thousands of women and children fled from the provinces to the capital Freetown, where by April 1995 there were over 7,000 displaced children. The government was able to accommodate only 4,000 of them in schools. To meet the needs of the remaining children, the “FAWE Emergency Camp School” was established in July 1995. Initiated and led by the regional NGO FAWE and supported by the education and transportation ministries, international NGOs, the EU, UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF, the programme had the following components:

- Primary and secondary education;
- School feedings and transport to and from school;
- Elimination of all tuition and fees (including textbooks, transportation and uniforms);
- Bi-weekly trauma group counselling sessions, with individual sessions as needed.

In cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the programme transitioned to permanent schooling when the FAWE Primary School for Girls was established in 1999 to address the needs of girls who had suffered from abduction, rape, and pregnancy at the hands of combatants. The school provided:

- Primary education,
- Life skills (vocational and parenting) training for young mothers,
- Medical and psychological treatment for victims of GBV.

This US$65,000 programme was able to provide education services to 4,371 displaced children (2,608 girls) aged 3-18 in Freetown, counsel 2,000 rape victims, provide scholarships for graduates to attend secondary school and created sixty classrooms for the national education system.

**Theory of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes**

By making it possible for children to freely attend school, the programme served as a peace dividend. The nation was (re)emerging from war with a new vision for peace, while, through education, each individual had a chance to be part of this vision. The education sector made its contribution by removing the economic and social burden from...
parents by providing counselling, social protection, education, and food. Their education opportunities continued; graduates of the FAWE School for Girls were offered scholarships to attend secondary education.

The programme drew strength from the complementary skills of the many different actors; high levels of cooperation ensured optimal results for beneficiaries. Specific peacebuilding outcomes included:

- **Resilience and social cohesion:** By eliminating all fees and providing transportation to and from school, the programme removed barriers to education, which increased accessibility for all. The delivery of regular and frequent psychological counselling sessions helped children – especially the girls who were abducted – to recover from their traumatic war-time experiences. Counselling and education mitigates the psychosocial impact of conflict and disaster by giving a sense of normalcy, stability, structure and hope during a time of crisis, and provides essential building blocks for social reconstruction and future economic stability.

- **State capacity and legitimacy:** The high degree of collaboration between government ministries, NGOs and communities to provide a comprehensive service is an example of a highly successful state-society process yielding tangible results. Thousands of children gained access to education during and post conflict, and the peace dividends were attributed to the state through the successful transfer from emergency to formal schooling. Since the community was involved in the process (as volunteers and parents), they were able to see the state’s participation.

- **Conflict drivers and root causes:** The lack of educational opportunities and unequal access to education for young people has been cited as a root cause of the civil war in Sierra Leone. One of the key demands of the rebel army, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), was free education for all, referring to communal “anger at a collapsing education system” as one of the drivers of conflict. While not an articulated programme goal, by providing access to education during the conflict, it directly addressed this grievance. In particular, the programme sought to address youth 15-18 years of age, or “youth at risk,” in today’s parlance. The programme also addressed consequences of conflict – both mental and physical trauma (rape/GBV) – which left unaddressed, could hinder the community’s economic and social recovery.

The programme was considered a best practice by FAWE and other international actors working in Sierra Leone at the time. This was largely because of its relevance and conflict sensitivity – it responded to conflict factors and peacebuilding needs – as well as its ability to adapt and respond to the changing circumstances. The programme drew in actors at all levels and bridged the humanitarian-development gap in transitioning from emergency to public school education.

---

146 Interview with PBSO staff, Kristina Koch-Avan, 14 June 2011.
149 Interview with PBSO, Kristina Koch Avon (14 June 2011).
The decade long civil war in Liberia, which ended in 2003, created a generation of young people for whom violence was the norm. Many young people were abused and denied a stable environment, which is necessary for normal growth and psychological development. Violent behaviour among youth was prevalent in post-conflict Liberia. The objective of the “Peace Human Right and Citizenship Education Project” (PEHCED), initiated and led by UNESCO and supported by the Ministry of Education, UNICEF and UNHCR, was to provide young people with “conflict resolution skills to create and promote peaceful co-existence.”

Programming components included the development of a peace, human rights and citizen education component for the national curriculum, as well as teacher trainings. The programme was operational from 2008 to 2010, and was funded in its entirety (US$900,000) by the PBF. The programme provided peace education training to 1,300 teachers. The peace education curriculum was later integrated into the national curriculum.

Theories of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes

Through the vehicle of formal education, the programme sought to address conflict factors and effectively improve the educational system’s curriculum to foster long-lasting attitudinal and behavioural change in school-going children and youth. Curriculum reform is often viewed as a necessary step towards addressing bias or prejudice that might be present in the often divisive subjects of history, religion, and language, and can promote social cohesion and lay the foundations for an inclusive national identity. Peacebuilding outcomes to date are still emerging, but are suggestive in the following areas:

- **Resilience and social cohesion:** The content of the education programming is helping young people to rebuild trust and social ties within communities.

- **State accountability and legitimacy:** The programme strengthened government capacity in its alignment with existing government plans. In addition to aligning with Liberia’s national development strategy or Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP), it supported the Education for All National Action Plan by “improving the overall quality of basic education through training teachers in participatory methodology, teaching life skills and eliminating gender disparity by making the classroom a more peaceful environment.” The emphasis on sector governance, training for trainers and the development of manuals were all aimed at broadening the reach and sustainability of the programme.

- **Conflict drivers and root causes:** Youth were identified as the major factor needing to be addressed to prevent conflict resurgence in Liberia. Peace education was seen as a mechanism to help them address conflict non-violently and to attain a more productive sense of their role in a healthy society. The civic education component lay a foundation to build state-citizen relations, the deterioration of which was identified as a conflict risk.

---

151 UNESCO, Peace Human Right and Citizenship Education.
152 Ibid.
Box 1: Peace and Civic Education Programmes in Central African Republic (CAR) and Guinea

**Theory of change: Entry point**

The “Civic, Peace, and Coexistence Education in Schools and Communities” programme in CAR (2010-2011) aims to promote peaceful coexistence by means of peace education, tolerance, social dialogue and intra- and intra-community dialogue. Developed by the Ministry of Education, UNHCR, UNESCO, and UNICEF, the programme offers 1000 teachers civic education training in conflict and post-conflict zones and provides access to quality and inclusive education for 17,000 students. Once educated, the children become “peace messengers” in their communities. The programme engages with members of the community – including local authorities, armed groups, women’s and youth groups – to expand the programme’s impact on the community and to increase social cohesion. The production of communication and training materials will facilitate programme expansion and sustainability. PBF contributes US$1,500,000 to this US$ 1,834,330 programme.

**Theory of change: Sector governance**

The “Peace, Civic, and Human Rights Education Programme” in Guinea was led by UNESCO and the Ministry of Professional and Civic Education from April 2010 to April 2011, and supported by the PBF (US$349,922). The programme was geared towards strengthening social cohesion and educating the population in preparation for upcoming elections. Programme activities included teacher trainings on peace and citizenship education (specifically on the rules and principles of democratic elections), with a view to making them aware of their rights as citizens and more likely to engage in democratic processes. Such programmes have been implemented by UNESCO, UNHCR, and UNICEF in several countries, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia, and Sudan.

---

6 Waiting for confirmation from the organization.

Box 2: Community Empowerment and Peace Education in Liberia

**Theory of change: Entry point, Peace dividends**

The “Community Empowerment: Peace, Human Rights, and Civic Education” Programme in Liberia was led by UNHCR (2008-2010) and supported by the PBF (US$932,400 out of a US$1,210,386 project). Through a series of intensive eight-day peace education workshops, the project aimed to equip ordinary Liberians with non-violent tools to constructively deal with conflict through non-formal peace and civic education. More than 10,000 ordinary Liberians were trained in the worst conflict-affected counties and areas of high returnees (Nimba, Grand Gedeh and Lofa). At the end of each workshop, an opportunity plan to realize collective actions to address conflict was produced by the participants. The project’s theory of change rested on the notion that “peace comes through a transformative change of a critical mass of individuals, their consciousness, attitudes, behaviours and skills” – supporting the notion of education being an entry point for peacebuilding results. The project formed a mediation committee at the community level after each workshop to ensure ongoing community involvement. As a result, there was a noticeable increase in peaceful conflict resolution, both at the individual and community level. This was measured by the reduced number of cases going before magistrates, while the number of cases going to mediators increased. Given the challenges that remain for many to access formal education in Liberia, the project delivered non-formal education to the rural communities – thus also working as a peace dividend.

---

PROJECT: SCHOOLS AS ZONES OF PEACE: NEPAL

Theories of Change: Peace dividends, Sector governance, Entry point
Implementers: UNICEF and Save the Children

In Nepal, the Maoist insurgency, which lasted from 1996-2006, took a severe toll on the provision of educational services and child safety. Schools were often closed due to outbreaks of violence, strikes, and protests. Children were recruited into armed groups and political groups campaigned at schools. Political groups used schools to increase their supporters, and School Management Committees (SMCs) were often unable to function properly due to polarization of external issues. These problems persisted even after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2006. The “Nepal Schools as Zones of Peace: Education for Stabilization and Peacebuilding Programme” was developed and implemented by UNICEF, Save the Children Norway, and the Government of Nepal from 2006-2009. Schools as Zones of Peace, or SZOP, is an approach to protect the right of children to access school in conflict- and crisis-affected areas and to ensure education is not hampered by violence. It incorporates UNICEF’s “child friendly schools” model, which promotes inclusivity, safety, community involvement, and gender-sensitive approaches to programming.

The primary objective of Nepal SZOP was to protect schools and school children from violence and disturbance by armed political groups, but also to improve the quality of the education response in emergencies and transitions and to use the education system to foster a culture of peace and human rights. The programme had the following components:

- Reintegration of former child soldiers into schooling
- Development of school Codes of Conduct (COC)
- Child Clubs, designed to educate children about their rights and help children articulate and defend them to adults
- Accelerated Learning Programmes
- Peace education and curriculum reform

Through this programme 524 schools received support to plan for SZOP, and 325 schools created Codes of Conduct (COC). 690 child club facilitators were trained and are using mediation and communication skills related to harmful community practices (district level). Finally, UNICEF and Save the Children worked with the Ministry of Education (MoE) to support the gradual revision of the national curriculum. More specifically, they focused on the content of the Social Studies curriculum, including the development of lessons for teacher guides as well as rewriting textbooks to include lessons containing information, messages and themes of Peace, Human Rights and Civic Education.

---

153 The EEPCt (Education in Emergencies and Post Conflict Transition) total support educational support to Nepal education totaled US$2.6 million over four years.
154 Save the Children, Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal Country Report (November 2010), p. 14. Child Clubs are a part of Save the Children’s Children as Zones of Peace, which include child clubs, the roads they used to go to school and clubs as safe areas.
155 UNICEF and Save the Children have been working with the Ministry of Education (MoE) supporting the gradual revision of the national curriculum – specifically the content of the Social Studies subject, from curriculum content identification, development of lessons to be included in teacher guides as well as the re-writing of text books to include lessons containing information, messages and themes of Peace, Human Rights and Civic Education. Source: UNICEF, “Peacebuilding Strategy Concept Note: Nepal”, draft 3.
156 UNICEF, Education in Conflict and Transitional Contexts, Case studies from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, and Southern Sudan (2010), pp. 11-16.
157 UNICEF, Peacebuilding Strategy Concept Note.
158 UNICEF, Nepal Peacebuilding Strategy, p. 14
Theory of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes

This programme was part of UNICEF’s efforts to provide immediate safety and access to schooling while contributing to the long-term goal of “promoting a culture of peace and tolerance, showing respect for different ethnic groups, opinions and values and promoting civic responsibility among children and young people.”159 By providing education and guaranteeing access to schools, SZOP incorporated all three of this study’s theories of change. SZOP delivered education while contributing to sector governance and serving as an entry point for peacebuilding results – namely, the CoC.

Peacebuilding outcomes that can be associated with the SZOP in Nepal included:

- **State capacity and legitimacy**: The CoC outlined rules for teachers and students, stipulating that schools could not be used politically, i.e. by political groups for campaigning and recruitment. These were developed by school administrators, teachers and students together with local political leaders and the wider community as a whole; this process contributed to the building of state-society relations. All participants agreed to collectively enforce them. The fact that they have been upheld illustrates the success of this agreement.160 Armed political groups were respectful of the CoC and there were reports of less extortion and interference in several districts. In targeting institutions, sector governance and policy reform issues through curriculum reform the programme also made contributions to statebuilding. The national curriculum was revised, and it now has as one of its objectives the creation of an inclusive society based on non-discrimination, irrespective of race, caste, religion, and gender.

- **Child empowerment** was highlighted as an important outcome of the Nepal programme. Trained through Child Clubs about the challenges facing their schools, children were then able to raise awareness and demand that their schools become SZOP, and demand their right to education in a more compelling way. Furthermore, on a number of occasions children had expressed their desire to be part of the election process to influence the political process for their benefit. Opportunities were created for children to participate in the Constitution Assembly Election process. This nation-wide process was collectively initiated by the organization working for children. A national consultation was organized inviting children from 68 districts to share their views, and their declaration was given to the Speaker of the House before representatives of political parties. 161

- **Conflict drivers and root causes**: Strikes and flare-ups of political violence were identified as the most prominent issues hindering children’s ability to attend school (in 2007-2008, 50-150 days of school were lost, out of 220). As a result of the development of the CoC, political armed groups moved camps out of schools and police personnel moved out of one school. Due to community monitoring of SZOP CoC violations, and pressuring political and armed groups to keep schools open, over 1 million students in 3,337 schools directly benefited, and more schools refused to close for small protests and strikes. Evidence shows that schools with active School Management Committees (SMCs) and/or Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) function better and tend to have better facilities and more community support. Without active SMCs and PTAs there is no structure to address or diffuse conflict, making the school more vulnerable to intimidation and external interference.

This programme was catalytic. Its programme elements, such as the CoC, were established and “owned” by state and society, and are enforced by the community; their enforcement is likely to continue after completion of the programme. They were successful in keeping schools open, while also helping to reduce child abduction and violence in and around schools.

159 UNICEF, Education in Conflict and Transitional Contexts p. 11.
160 Save the Children, Rewrite the Future, p. 21.
ANNEX F: CASE STUDIES OF HEALTH CONTRIBUTING TO PEACEBUILDING

**PROJECT: IMMUNIZATION DRIVES AS ENTRY POINTS FOR PEACEBUILDING IN SUDAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA**

Theory of Change: Peace dividends, Entry point
Implementers: UNICEF and Save the Children

Immunization drives, which became part of the Bridge for Peace initiative (see *Theories of Change*, above), can provide important entry points into political processes that serve peacebuilding. “Immunization ceasefires” have been used during conflict to bring warring parties together to ensure that children have access to critical long-term health care needs in a peaceful setting. Other positive peacebuilding spill-over effects have been identified in the process of these ceasefires, and it is believed their potential to contribute to peacebuilding has not been fully actualized.162

**Polio Eradication Campaigns**

In the mid-1980s, when many countries in Central America were experiencing conflict and violence, immunization drives to eradicate polio and other preventable diseases were conducted, the parallel goal of which was to support peace efforts. “Immunization ceasefires” were reached and campaigns conducted for these annual drives throughout the years of civil war (1985 to 1991). They were coordinated by the Ministry of Health with the support of the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), UNICEF, Rotary International, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Catholic Church, NGOs and international donors.

The political momentum achieved through the high-level discussion at regional levels in Central and Latin America during this period took place simultaneously with WHO’s development of its “Health as a Bridge for Peace” initiative. The successes of temporary ceasefires and completed immunization drives in El Salvador inspired many other “days of tranquillity initiatives” and “immunization ceasefires” in other countries around the world.164

Another example, “Operation Lifeline Sudan” (1988-89), was the temporary ceasefire brokered by the UN between government and rebel forces, which allowed health workers access to provide immunizations to war-affected populations. Similar ceasefires and negotiated access, sometimes called “zones of peace” or “days of tranquillity”, were used during other complex emergencies in Somalia, Angola, and DRC.

**Guinea Worm Treatment Campaign in Sudan**

In 1995, the Carter Center, in cooperation with UNICEF, UNDP, WHO and others, was able to secure a ceasefire from Sudan President Bashir and then SPLM/A leader Dr. John Garang to allow for the treatment of Guinea worm and other diseases, piloting the effort against river blindness, and providing an opportunity for children to be immunized against polio and other illnesses. This ceasefire lasted almost six months, the longest such humanitarian ceasefire ever achieved. The successful negotiations of “zones of peace” and “days of tranquillity” have made it possible to conduct campaigns against polio and dracunculiasis (Guinea Worm disease) in countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan and Uganda.165

**Theories of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes**

Immunization drives can take place during or after a conflict with potential contributions for peacebuilding. If drives take place during conflict they can serve as entry points for peace agreement negotiations and cooperation between warring parties. Negotiating a ceasefire for health initiatives can be the starting point for building trust and

---

162 CERTI, How can Health Serve as a Bridge for Peace?.
164 Newbrander, William, “Rebuilding Health Systems and Providing Health Services in Fragile States”. See also CERTI, How can Health Serve as a Bridge for Peace.
cooperation between parties, which can lead to a final peace settlement. National immunizations days provide a rationale for negotiating truces or ceasefires by focusing the attention of warring factions on their children’s health. The negotiation of ceasefires or days of tranquillity may contribute to peacebuilding in war zones.

Specific peacebuilding outcomes that have been identified with immunization programmes include:

- **Resilience and social cohesion:** Immunization drives have brought together diverse groups of people, offering possibilities for dialogue and the space to recognize common concerns and needs across identity groups. UNICEF has argued that working together on common goals – such as ensuring the children of both sides have a chance for healthy lives – encourages cooperation and helps to build trust necessary for permanent solutions. Ceasefires provide – even if short-term – a relative sense of normalcy for communities and offer hope that peace is attainable. All these elements can strengthen social cohesion. Further, the health benefits of immunizations increase the physical health and resilience of children in the community.

- **State capacity and legitimacy:** The process of negotiating even short ceasefires for immunizations can have spill-over effects, fostering a spirit of conciliation that can permeate the final settlement of a conflict – a form of state-society relations. They also illustrate that health authorities, as representatives of the state, are able to put the health needs of the population above warfare, if even temporarily. Immunization days also support statebuilding goals over the long-term by ensuring the institutionalisation of a critical health service, despite the conflict context.

- **Conflict drivers and root causes:** National immunization days are often the only health services vulnerable population groups receive. Given that they are a service provided to vulnerable groups in an equitable manner, they can serve to reduce horizontal inequalities, a common cause of conflict.

The World Health Assembly’s vaccination resolution for polio eradication achieved a temporary humanitarian ceasefires in several countries. In at least one instance, after the campaign was initially disrupted, combatants agreed on ceasefires to allow the immunizations to take place. The intervention provided a valuable entry point for negotiators and other international actors to bring warring parties to the negotiating table to permanently halt conflict.

While in the past these activities have been ad-hoc, undertaken when humanitarian needs in a war zone became acute, when used strategically immunization drives can support community resilience and social cohesion, as well as statebuilding aims. Drawing on work in Afghanistan, Shamsul Farooq, Deputy Director, UNICEF Supply Division, states, “Immunizations during Days of Tranquility give health authorities a sense of confidence because they have been able to achieve something that is visible, concrete and impact-oriented.” Peace messaging is just one strategy to expand the peacebuilding outcomes of immunization drives. Other possibilities might include contextually appropriate cultural and reconciliation-oriented activities aimed at maximizing the benefits of communities coming together for such purposes.

Lessons learned also indicate the careful monitoring of ceasefires is imperative, as they can be used as a propaganda tool and/or an opportunity for warring parties to re-arm. UNICEF has also underscored that it is vital to have relationships with local religious groups and NGOs, as they are able to make contact with conflicting parties.
Box 3: Building Peace through Health in Democratic Republic of the Congo

Theory of change: Peace dividends

HEAL, an NGO in eastern DRC, has been addressing the health needs of the North Kivu province through its hospital in Goma and 64 health centres since 2000. Goma has been affected by conflict for over a decade, despite the national peace accord in 2008. In addition to offering standard health services, medical and psychological services for victims of rape and GBV, HIV/AIDS treatment, and psychosocial care, HEAL also has programmes that aim to contribute to conflict prevention, help communities recover from conflict and address issues that drive fragility. The Mawe Hai project, for example, which was designed to address the lack of employment and reliance on the war economy, provided training in agriculture to increase production. As a result, the community had better nutrition (through increased agricultural production), higher school attendance rates, and was not dependent on the continuation of the conflict. To address gender imbalances in the system, strong programmes are available for women, particularly around material healthcare. By providing neutral (treating both civilians and combatants), equitable, legitimate, and permanent care, HEAL is able to provide peace dividends and support local peace efforts by targeting conflict drivers in health delivery.

The WHO states that a range of health problems, including depression, anxiety, suicidal behaviour and post-traumatic stress disorder, occur during times of conflict. Before a population can fully recover and contribute to peace and economic development, these traumas must be addressed. The “Psychosocial and Community Support” programme in Liberia represents an integrated approach to community-based psychosocial support. The US$889,902 project supported by the PBF was operational in three pilot counties between March 2009 and December 2010 – Bong, Margibi and Montserrado – and was implemented by UNFPA and the Ministry of Health and Social Work (MoHSW).

Specific activities included:

- The establishment and training of psychosocial support teams and the strengthening of community-based networks in six communities
- Reinforcement of ongoing psychosocial support services
- Livelihood extension and support in the form of skills training for returnees

Specific outputs included training and deployment of 40 social workers along with other staff in each of the three counties, community awareness campaigns on psychosocial and community support services; at the national level, a Steering Committee on Psychosocial Support was established with government, civil society and UN agencies to facilitate coordination.

Theory of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes

The programme can be viewed as targeting all three theories of change associated with this study: peace dividends, sector governance and providing an entry point for peacebuilding results. Before the launch of the programme the public had no confidence in the health sector’s ability to deal with the large caseload of people with a psychosocial disorder, and the absence of psychosocial counsellors would have widened the gap between community residents and access to health services. Offering such services to address psychosocial needs, it was felt, would serve as an entry point for promoting reconciliation and help to relieve reintegration pressures, among them social exclusion; at the same time, it addressed a potential conflict driver – unmet trauma and mental health issues – that if left untreated can lead to aggressive behaviour and conflict. Supporting the development of psychosocial support structures that are available at the community level places the MoHSW in a better position to coordinate delivery, thereby illustrating responsive national institutions. Specific peacebuilding outcomes of the project included:

- **Resilience and social cohesion:** Individuals who completed psychosocial counselling had a decrease in symptoms of depression and aggression. Feelings of vulnerability within the community were also reduced, an indicator associated with trust and a sense of inclusion that supports enhanced social cohesion. Community residents, including returnees, were better able to reconcile their differences; furthermore, the project was believed to have an impact on reducing gender based violence within the community.

---

175 PBF, Peacebuilding Fund Liberia: Mid-Term Review (March 2010).
176 PBF, Peacebuilding Fund Liberia: Mid-Term Review, p. 59.
• **State capacity and legitimacy:** The MoHSW took over responsibility of coordinating meetings and is hiring some of the psychosocial counsellors on a permanent basis. The programme bolstered the MoHSW’s capacity to coordinate and deliver services at the community level, promote reconciliation and address psychosocial needs of SGBV survivors.

• **Conflict drivers and root causes:** Psychosocial counselling is felt to have minimized instability within the pilot communities. These three communities were areas of high return and were chosen by IDPs themselves. Increasing communities’ understanding of mental disorders, counselling, and entrepreneurial grants for patients – as well as building peer support – was also deemed to have a stabilizing effect on the small communities.

**Box 4: Gender, Health and Peacebuilding**

*Ensuring Recognition of Sexual Violence as a Tool of Conflict in the Nepal Peacebuilding Process through Documentation and Comprehensive Services to Victims* is a programme in Nepal aimed at providing reproductive health services and psychosocial counselling through the establishment of medical camps and training of local medical and mental health providers. Led by UNFPA and UNICEF (2010-2012) with PBF support, the programme was developed to address the culture of silence around sexual violence during the conflict and its aftermath in order to ensure its inclusion in the Nepal peace process. Service delivery acted as an entry point to document incidences of violence. Victims are supported to access justice and encouraged to participate in transitional justice and other peacebuilding activities. In three months 252 women received legal counselling, and 62 of these cases have been referred to the Nepal Bar Association for further legal support.\(^a\)

*Strengthening National Responses to the Prevention and Management of Gender Based Violence* in Sierra Leone was developed to protect and promote the reproductive rights of women and girls, and to contribute to an accessible legal environment to address the incidences of GBV during the civil conflict. Led by UNFPA (January 2011-December 2011) and supported by PBF funding, the programme strengthens the national referral system for victims of SGBV by strengthening community involvement, capacity building of institutions, and data collection to improve delivery of medical, psychological, and legal services; it also engages communities, including men and boys, to protect women’s rights. To date 40 chiefdom advocacy groups have been formed to promote enhanced knowledge of sexual and reproductive health rights of women and girls.\(^b\)

*The Women’s Peace and Recovery Project* was a programme in Burundi implemented by the Friends Women’s Association in partnership with the American Friends Service Committee in 2010 to provide psychological care for women victims of war trauma. The programme trained local women through workshops to serve as physical (specifically HIV/AIDS) and mental health workers to ensure the programme’s sustainability. These women were also trained in conflict resolution and peacebuilding skills. This programme sought to address both the physical and psychological needs of a community affected by violent conflict and contributed to community reconciliation, peaceful cohabitation and community development.

---


\(^b\) UN Peacefund for Nepal, Project Update, (January-March 2011), p.3.


\(^d\) Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Fund, Project Status Report (30 June 2011).
Access to water and land grazing rights have been the source of great conflict between the three sub-clans in the drought-affected region of Galkayo and Habyo, Somalia. UNICEF initiated the US$1 million programme, “WASH support programme in Galkayo and Habyo,” to mitigate the negative effects of drought in an area of Central Somalia. As UNICEF was developing the project, which involved the construction of four water systems and system maintenance training, challenges and disagreements among the communities increased. In response, UNICEF adopted a formal negotiation dimension to the project.

The difficult negotiations took nine months to conclude. Once the communities had reached a settlement and drilling began, it only took 10 days to deliver water to all three drought-affected communities, achieving conflict resolution among several sub-clans on the basis of their collective needs for water. Approximately 26,000 people in Sedexigle, Heco Duluqad, Jilable and Gallinsor, and Galkayo now benefit from a sustainable water supply. Thirty people were trained to maintain and operate the water systems, and UNICEF and community elders are holding discussions on the formation of a water committee to manage the new resource. They are considering collaboration among local authorities and businesses – a public-private partnership – to ensure sustainability of the water source. The establishment of a sustainable water management system is critical to sustain peace among the communities.

**Theory of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes**

Conflict analysis and peacebuilding were not intentional parts of the project, but they became instrumental for project implementation and success. The efforts required for negotiating access to local drilling sites and construction of water systems created an entry point for peace among clans warring over water, as well as local level mechanisms for ongoing governance of the source. Other peacebuilding outcomes include:

- **Resilience and social cohesion:** Negotiations for the placement and management of the water systems brought fighting parties together and facilitated reconciliation. Since placement of the systems was agreed on by all parties, the likelihood of future conflict is reduced. Further, bringing these disparate groups into discussion with one another contributed to social cohesion. The envisaged joint management of a monitoring system presents another opportunity to strengthen ties among communities.

- **State capacity and legitimacy:** Although Somalia is notoriously “stateless,” the local authorities, clan elders and communities were part of the process, thus strengthening relations between authorities and their communities, while also fostering a social contract around a vital resource.

- **Conflict drivers and root causes:** A reliable water supply reduces conflict over the limited resource, but it could also be a catalyst for further conflict if one group is seen to control the resource to the exclusion of others. Therefore, the ongoing process to form a water management committee is a positive outcome that is crucial for sustainable peace.

Establishing an effective management system for these water systems is essential. High yielding boreholes, such as the one cited in this case, have the potential to generate substantial revenue. Thus, in addition to competing for water there may also be competition over control of the business – in this case whether community members may need to purchase water for a fee and the associated costs – a new potential conflict risk that will need to be mediated. A public-private partnership which clearly lays out roles and responsibilities for different stakeholders (authorities, utility company, users etc.) and establishes rules for the equitable distribution of water to different groups has proved to be successful in other water systems. Substantial mentoring and support will be necessary to ensure sustainable water supply and peace.
In Darfur, the combination of recurrent drought and increasing demographic pressure, water scarcity and the steady loss of fertile land have triggered regional conflict since 2003. The increased and concentrated demand for water from IDP camps puts a further strain on resources. While water access supply and water resource management is vital to peacebuilding, the monitoring of water levels in camps did not begin until four years after camps were established. Established and operational since 2008, “The Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) programme,” is led by UNEP and supported by the Sudan Ministry of Irrigation, UNICEF’s Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) programme and Oxfam. It aims to fill this monitoring gap and decrease water shortages by providing new water sources and management mechanisms. IWRM is a systematic process for the sustainable development, allocation and monitoring of water resources.

Specific activities include:

- Holding integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) information sessions in Darfur together with the WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) sector to raise awareness of the project.
- Participating in the International Darfur Water Conference for Sustainable Peace, a conference jointly organized by the Government of Sudan, the peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID), UNICEF and UNEP.
- Facilitating south-south information sharing between government officials in Sudan and South Africa. During a mission by Sudanese officials to South Africa, participants explored legislation and public policy, inter-ministerial collaboration, infrastructure development and community-based approaches to water catchments management.
- Rehabilitating the large reservoir (Golo Dam) for El Fasher. The programme is also providing support for groundwater monitoring of 200 wells.
- Conducting groundwater assessments at 26 camps that are particularly vulnerable to groundwater depletion, and raising awareness among vulnerable communities about this risk.

By 2008, 49 water level loggers (recorders) were installed in wells, rain gauges were established, and baseline data was collected to advise future management. In 2011 the IWRM framework was drafted as a regional water management plan for all three Darfur states, endorsed by the government of Sudan.

**Theory of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes**

Environmental stress linked to water has created conditions wherein other factors (political, ethnic, tribal) can trigger conflict. Better water management is essential to raise living standards; as communities become aware of the chronic depletion of water, they can take steps to rehabilitate water sources and prepare for drought. While drought preparedness at camps is rightly part of emergency response plans, the programme states that this work must not be seen in isolation from larger scale water resource management activities. Rather, the development of drought preparedness strategies for these communities should be seen as an entry point to supporting agricultural and environmental recovery and development demands once IDPs have returned home. To ensure the programme’s sustainability, institutional development and capacity building was emphasized along with a consultative multi-sectoral approach.
that acknowledges the complexity of governance structures in Darfur by including formal and traditional government in addition to technical water professionals and civil society. Peacebuilding outcomes include:

- **Resilience and social cohesion:** The conflict and competition for scarce water resources has undermined the means by which different ethnic groups in Darfur have traditionally worked together to overcome the challenges of stressed livelihoods, environmental decline and conflict. Water management systems contribute to reducing and managing the risks of conflict and environmental decline, and help foster the renewal of cooperation within the community.

- **State capacity and legitimacy:** This programme had significant capacity development, awareness-raising, and information sharing elements. The conferences benefited government leaders, who recognised the importance of not only addressing proper water supply but also the sustainable management of the resource. As a result of the information sharing between South Africa and Sudan, there is now formal cooperation between these two countries in the water sector.

- **Conflict drivers and root causes:** The lack of a permanent water supply has been cited as a conflict factor in Darfur. By rehabilitating dams, increasing water supply and improving source management, this programme mitigates the conflict factor. UNEP’s programme aims to provide new water sources and water management mechanisms to decrease water shortages. It can therefore be said to negate a conflict factor and contribute to peacebuilding.

**Box 5: Community Action Plans for Water Management, Sudan**

**Theory of change: Sector governance**

In response to inequity, injustice and disparity related to water supply, UNICEF developed the Community Action Plan (CAP) as a planning mechanism for WASH programming in Northern Sudan in 2008. To counteract the potential for violence, the objective of CAP was to involve the community in each step of the decision-making process and ensure that each household has equal access to the resource. This is illustrated in the “Triple Methodology” of CAP, which includes assessment (mapping of villages, water supplies and health facilities), analysis (with community identifying priorities) and action (implementation and education). The process facilitated community participation and addressed inequalities and disparities of access to water supplies within communities, which has in the past led to violence and insecurity. UNICEF states that community decision-making for WASH interventions has been realized as the most important element to address sustainability, equity and thereby contribute to peace in communities. The government of Sudan has since decided that all WASH programming in the country would use the CAP approach, ensuring a far greater peacebuilding impact.

---

*UNICEF; Koirala, Ram, “Community Action Plan (CAP) Innovative way for WASH intervention as a means for Peacebuilding and Equity in North Sudan” (2011).*
ANNEX G: CASE STUDIES OF FOOD SECURITY CONTRIBUTING TO PEACEBUILDING

PROJECT: FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR CONFLICT-AFFECTED POPULATIONS IN NEPAL

Theories of Change: Peace dividends, Sector Governance, Entry point
Implementers: Led by WFP, Supported by UNFPA, UNICEF, FAO, EU Food Facility (EUFF)

While Nepal’s 11-year civil war ended in 2006, its citizens have not yet reaped the benefits of peace. Conflict, high food prices, chronic food insecurity, and frequent natural disasters have recurrently placed millions of people on the edge of hunger and in need of food assistance. In 2011, 24 per cent of the population still lived on less than US$1 per day and 30 per cent live below the national poverty line. Indicators for income level, education attainment and access to social services are poorest among ethnically marginalized and socially excluded groups. One could argue that the primary grievance of the Maoist rebel group, “inequality,” and in particular, the marginalization of certain groups and unequal access to services and resources, has not been resolved. Since food insecurity can act as a conflict multiplier, it can be argued that predictable and equal access to food would contribute to stability.

WFP’s “Food Assistance for Conflict-Affected Populations in Nepal” programme (2007-2010; US$121,964,373) sought to address these problems. The programme’s primary objectives were to reduce immediate vulnerability and food insecurity, increase resilience against shocks and improve longer-term food security; it also aimed to strengthen the capacity of government and other national organizations to monitor and respond to food insecurity. Aligned with the global food security outcomes set in Nepal’s Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA, 2008), it had the following components:

- Critical infrastructure and livelihoods: Food and cash for asset creation and trainings were implemented; this was done initially to rebuild damaged or destroyed infrastructure, and later to increase agricultural productivity, market access, and livelihoods. Asset creation projects were combined at first with civic education, and later included agricultural improvement training through farmer field schools.

- Return and reintegration: An initial food assistance package was provided to formerly displaced populations and children formerly associated with armed forces/groups. Additional assistance was provided to former IDPs and children returning to food insecure, conflict-affected areas through community-based food and cash for asset schemes.

- National capacity development for monitoring food security: The programme supported the establishment of a food security monitoring unit based at the central level in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MoAC), with appropriate technology and facilities necessary to conduct monitoring and analysis and maintain food security information forums in all 75 districts of Nepal. Furthermore, WFP is supporting government efforts to develop a comprehensive national food security/nutrition information management system, including disaster risk reduction and management with FAO and other partners.

Between 2008 and 2010 the programme as a whole reached an average of 1.3 million people per year. The 2010 final evaluation survey showed that in programme areas, 85 per cent of surveyed households perceived that the programme had provided assistance to those households most in need. Food consumption scores were higher among

---

179 Ibid, p. 2.
180 Basniet Yurenda, Development Studies Institute, From Politization of Grievances to Political Violence: An Analysis of the Maoist movement in Nepal (March 2009), p. 4.
183 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
participating households than other households, and recipients reported improved access to food and improved coping strategies and reduced out-migration and use of credit (proxy indicators for resilience). During the programme cycle, the prevalence of acute malnutrition dropped. Food and cash for asset programmes rehabilitated or built hundreds of local infrastructure assets, water and irrigation systems and agriculture storage units, and community facilities, including schools and clinics. Results from mid-term and final evaluations concluded that 80% of the assets were used by at least half of the people in the community during the previous year.184 District Food Security Network trainings were completed with local government officials and NGOs in 43 out of 72 districts, and 1,596 persons were trained in food security monitoring and analysis.185

Theories of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes

The programme addressed several of this study’s theories of change: It worked to build the capacity of national institutions to respond to food price volatility, while effectively providing peace dividends through the cash for work aspects of the programme. Specific peacebuilding outcomes included:

- **State capacity and legitimacy:** Government capacity to monitor food security and respond to shortages was strengthened. WFP’s Food Security and Monitoring Analysis Unit trained national and local government, although it was emphasized that several years of training would be further needed to fully transfer to capacities at local levels. Training local government officials to use the District Food Security Networks and training citizens in food security monitoring, and the cooperation that will stem from this, can be viewed as an important vehicle to strengthen state-society relations.

- **Conflict drivers and root causes:** The programme increased participants’ access to and availability of food in the short- and longer-term; households that received food assistance generally reported shortages as less severe than in the previous year, and reported higher levels of income.186 It also made participants less vulnerable to price and weather changes.

This programme innovatively sought to meet immediate needs (regular food supply) and to reconstruct community assets, which effectively helped to bridge the gap between immediate needs and fulfil a longer-term development strategy. At the same time, these types of programmes are usually provided by WFP; for such an approach to be sustainable, government capacity and funding sources would need to be addressed.

---

185 Ibid, p. 15.
186 Ibid, pp. 3, 10.
After Liberia’s 14-year civil war ended in 2003, the country is still struggling to recover and the root causes of conflict remain – among them social and ethnic tensions resulting from horizontal inequalities, and highly centralized and weak governance institutions. Food insecurity, a trigger for Liberia’s civil war, persists; nearly 65 per cent of Liberia’s population lives on less than US$1/day and more than 40 per cent have an unacceptable food consumption level. Given Liberia’s high dependence on food imports and the recent food price spikes (in 2008 and 2010), continued food insecurity could derail other stabilization efforts. The agricultural sector, with great potential to address food insecurity as a source of livelihood for 70 per cent of the population, needs significant support. WFP, together with the GoL, and support of FAO, UNDP and UNICEF, have three programmes that work together to address food insecurity and the lack of sustainable livelihoods, both of which are conflict factors. Programme components include:

- **Food and asset schemes** are used to address the impact of transitory and chronic food insecurity on vulnerable households in food insecure rural communities while assisting them to rehabilitate, create and maintain productive agricultural assets such as feeder roads, productive lowlands/irrigation facilities, and agro-processing facilities (storage and drying floors). The Livelihood Asset Recovery (LAR) Programme is designed as a labour intensive work scheme, providing short-term employment opportunities for unskilled rural youth (2009-2012).

- **Local Procurement (Purchase for Progress – P4P)** is an initiative that builds upon the Livelihood Asset Recovery program. WFP procures surplus rice produced by local smallholder farmer cooperatives at a fair price for the national school-feeding programme. The first phase of the pilot had a budget of US$1,372,000, and was operational from November 2008-October 2010. It provided the farmers access to reliable markets and improved the capacity of farmer cooperatives in agro-processing and marketing, and in the development of procurement processes. The second phase, 2011-2014, is ongoing. WFP is also preparing to launch four pilot grain reserves. Managed by rural women farmer groups, these reserves aim to develop community-sustaining safety nets by ensuring grain is available to food insecure families during the lean season. A total of 3,750 people will benefit from SGRs in the Bong, Lofa and Nimba Counties.

- **School feeding** has been part of WFP’s response to transitory and chronic food insecurity and low primary school attendance in rural communities since 2003. Students receive one hot meal and girls receive an additional take-home food package to encourage their families to allow them to go to school. A phased handover of (all WFP) school feeding activities to the government is planned, with WFP continuing its logistical support.

Over 4,500 households have benefited from food and cash for asset schemes, earning an average income of US$203 per day, with over 50 per cent of the beneficiaries being women. Some 756 hectares of lowland have been rehabilitated and six small-scale irrigation systems have been constructed to date. Further, the initiative has built linkages between farmers’ cooperatives – which include many youth members – and markets where youth increased their

---

187 There is a common perception in Liberia that the 1979 the “Rice Riots” over the high price of rice triggered the chain of violence that culminated in civil war.
189 WFP, “Update on Livelihood Assets Rehabilitation (LAR) Project”.
income. Over 70,000 students have received school lunches (of which around 25,000 are girls) and 110 school gardens (in 30 per cent of the schools) have been established for training and to provide additional school meals in collaboration with FAO and the Ministries of Agriculture and Education.

All of these programmes are ongoing, and UN agencies are working together and with the GoL to ensure coherence and synergies. They are also closely linked with the National Youth Policy Action Plan, the Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme and Liberia’s Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (LASIP). The Ministry of Agriculture is involved at both national and county levels, providing technical assistance for the training activities under LASIP in cooperation with FAO, while the Ministry of Gender has worked to include strong gender components within the projects.

**Theories of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes**

These projects serve as peace dividends in multiple ways, given the wide-ranging involvement of government ministries and tangible results being produced that benefit vulnerable communities, while supporting social protection and women’s empowerments – two vital cross-cutting peacebuilding priorities. The projects are also supporting enhancement of sector governance. Specific outcomes include:

- **Resilience and social cohesion:** Food and cash for asset schemes had positive impacts on the local economy and helped to promote community peace and reconciliation. People worked together to achieve common goals and to better care for their families; capacity development and trainings for communities in land development, irrigation management, improved crop production, group management, decision-making and planning have helped to build community resilience; and gender promotion throughout these activities has seen women participating more in community structures. For example, women are now very involved in lowland rehabilitation activities and in committee management. There was also a corresponding reduction in domestic violence associated with increased income and means to acquire productive assets. Additionally, the planned grain reserves are a key tool for community resilience.

- **State capacity and legitimacy:** This programme played a major role in bringing food security and nutrition issues to the forefront of Government and United Nations policy discussions, and ensured that food security concerns were reflected in the broader national policy agenda. Since the programmes support and are aligned to the actions of relevant Liberian line ministries, as well as produce tangible outputs and capacity development in multiple areas, they can be viewed as tools to increase the legitimacy of government institutions at both national and sub-national levels. The government’s technical capacities that are being developed will contribute to the sustainability of these peacebuilding outcomes.

- **Conflict drivers and root causes:** Although no impact studies have been conducted yet, annual reporting suggests that school attendance and the prevalence of acute malnutrition have stabilized, and agriculture production has improved. Food assistance (and cash assistance at pilot level) has supported the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and productive agriculture assets, and provided trainings to increase food production and quality as well as to respond to changes in demand.

This programme is a holistic way to address several conflict drivers and cross-cutting peacebuilding priorities. Programmes are all designed and linked in ways that promote strong results chains.

191 WFP, Concept Note for Liberia’s Peacebuilding Priority Plan.
193 Ibid, pp. 34-35.
194 Ibid, pp. 11, 34.
195 Crawford and Deni, Food Security and Emerging from Crisis, p. 10.
Box 6: Strategic Grain Reserve to Address Conflict Driver in South Sudan

Theory of change: Sector governance

The new Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has declared food security for all to be its third highest priority. WFP is assisting the government in its goal by supporting the establishment of a grain reserve system, comprised of five main storage compounds and 20 satellites (linked to a feeder roads project); it is also training government staff to manage the system and administer the reserve. The total budget of this three-year programme is US$99,624,552, of which US$2,000,000 is provided by the PBF/IRF. Having a strategic grain reserve that builds and strengthens national capacities will cut down on the lead time needed to ship in food assistance to the region in the event of crisis, thus increasing the government’s ability to grant a sense of stability to affected communities, build trust with the population and demonstrate overall social protection for its citizens. The project is directly addressing a key conflict driver and laying the foundation to address a root cause of conflict – South Sudan’s underdevelopment. It will also support state legitimacy by building government capacity and its ability to deliver on a critical issue for its people in a visible and concrete manner. The project is being developed in a gender and conflict sensitive manner, with three of the five grain reserve warehouses situated in areas with high concentrations of food insecure populations. It also has a 25 per cent target of government officials involved to be female staff.

---


1 PBF, PBF Project Document, Strategic Grain Reserve in Southern Sudan.
The Philippines has suffered a civil war of more than 30 years, which is based on the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims and other indigenous people and the issue of land ownership. The Mindanao region was especially affected: 64 per cent of people in this region suffered from food insecurity, and while the region is resource rich, the conflict has left the area underdeveloped. At the request of the GoP, WFP set up the Philippine Emergency Operation “Assistance to Conflict Affected Mindanao” programme in 2006 to support the peace process. The GoP and the primary rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), worked together to identify the specific areas in the region that WFP would target, and WFP worked closely with government ministries to support their human security framework. Specifically, WFP supported the “Accelerated Hunger-Mitigation Program” (AHMP), which aims to cut the incidence of hunger in half by encouraging agricultural production and providing school feedings, included the following activities:

- **Food assistance packages to IDPs:** Food rations of 25kg of rice per family, per month. The programme planned to distribute vegetable oil as well, but due to pipeline and funding constraints it was not distributed regularly;
- **School feeding:** Regular lunches at school, take-home rations and the development of school gardens;
- **Food for assets/training:** Peacebuilding trainings for youth were offered, and communities were actively involved in both the identification and implementation of projects;
- **Nutrition and maternal health care:** The Maternal Child Health and Nutrition (MCHN) programme distributed food at rural health centres as an incentive for mothers to receive pre- and post-natal care, to improve access to health services, and to decrease malnutrition.

The culmination of various factors in 2008 – a breakdown in the peace talks and an upsurge in fighting, an increase in food prices (and food insecurity), and a typhoon – led to an influx of IDPs (86,000) and forced WFP to divert resources away from other programming to focus on food assistance to them. Nonetheless, from 2006 to 2009, this US$55,465,213 programme distributed food assistance to 201,000 IDPs, and 21,449 children received school meals and 186,785 children took home rations. Some 45,000 women participated in the nutrition programme.

**Theories of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes**

WFP’s programming sought to address a root cause of conflict through peace dividends, targeting programmes to the historically marginalised Muslims and other indigenous peoples in Mindanao, while promoting social protection and women’s empowerment. The programme also served as an entry point into the peace process to assist in stabilizing this conflict-affected area.

---

197 Ibid, p. 27.
• **Resilience and social cohesion:** All elements of programming promoted social cohesion. Communities worked together to repair damaged infrastructure and all reaped the benefits of their work. The Parent Teacher Community Association (PTCA) actively participated in preparing meals and distributing take home rations. The “spirit of self-reliance” that was developed within the PTCA increased the likelihood of sustainability of the school feeding component. In general, this cooperation had a positive psychological impact. Community members said that the programming “provided a cushion or buffer against hunger and hopelessness,” and IDPs stated that the “international presence gave them hope for the future and assurances for [their] eventual return.”

• **Conflict drivers and root causes:** The school feeding and food for work/training components increased households’ intake of food and increased food security and access. Further, by addressing the needs of the most vulnerable and the marginalization of communities in the Mindanao area, this programme addressed and reduced conflict factors.

The flexibility of this programme contributed to its success. In a conflict sensitive manner, WFP was able to adjust both the content and methods of delivery along the way.

---

199 Ibid, p. 45.
In April 2010 opposition-led protests overthrew the Government of Kyrgyzstan (GoK), and in June 2010 violent clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic communities in southern Kyrgyzstan killed 200 people and affected thousands through displacement and lost livelihoods. The majority of the population in the south are farmers and their livelihoods are threatened by violent conflict, regardless of their ethnicity.

FAO and WFP have been working in Kyrgyzstan since 2010 to address the consequences and causes of this conflict by securing livelihoods and facilitating dialogue through the shared management of water resources for agriculture. PBF supported the first phase of the project (October 2010-2011, totalling US$3.04 million, of which US$278,000 went to this component). “Empowering youth, women and vulnerable communities to contribute to peacebuilding and reconciliation in Kyrgyzstan” had the following programme components:

- **Food for Work programming** to clean and rehabilitate the 44 kilometres of the Uvam canal;
- **Promotion of Equal Access to Resources**: The management of irrigation water is used as a platform for implementing a variety of peacebuilding initiatives. This will be done through capacity building activities for the local Water Unit Associations (WUAs) to help them resolve water disputes at the local level.

By the end of this phase the Uvam irrigation system in Karasuu district was rehabilitated, and now provides water to irrigate the fields of 100,000 people of diverse backgrounds. More than 10 metric tons of food was distributed through WFP’s food for work projects.

The second project under the same programme, called “Cultivating Peace – Using water-based agriculture to facilitate reconciliation among multi-ethnic residents of Karasuu”, began in July 2011. This 12-month project with a budget of US$1,704,578 (two-thirds of which is provided by PBF) is in the early stages of implementation. It aims to develop plans to use the water from the irrigation canal more efficiently and equally while facilitating reconciliation and dialogue among multi-ethnic residents of the district. It should benefit 22,084 household members, 40,000 indirect beneficiaries and 21 WUAs. Planned activities include:

- Food for work programming to line and maintain the irrigation channel
- Income generation programmes geared towards women (with support from UNWOMEN), which support 22 already established community funds, in which women re-invest portions of their earnings. Women of different identity groups work together to manage these funds. In addition, in phase two of the programme local NGOs will implement 50 Farmer Field School programmes to enhance the skills of the region’s many subsistence farmers. They will also be connected to agribusiness processors.
- Support to Local Conflict Management Structures: Phase two of the programme will enhance early knowledge and recognition of problem areas or growing destabilisation trends and increase local capacities,

---

201 PBF Project Document, Empowering youth, women and vulnerable communities to contribute to peace building and reconciliation in Kyrgyzstan (October 2010) p. 5.
203 Notes provided by WFP, July 14, 2011.
204 Notes provided by WFP, July 14, 2011.
namely the WUAs, to correctly report and address these issues at the local level. They will also be encour-
aged to educate and establish early warning vehicles in the communities where they do project-supported work. 206

Early outputs include preparatory work such as local consultations and project assessments and implementation of food for work activities (maintenance of the canals). This programme expects to benefit 20,000 among the farming community, and well as 40,000 other water users.207 Better management should increase agricultural production.

Theories of Change and Peacebuilding Outcomes

According to FAO analysis, food insecurity in Kyrgyzstan “deepens poverty and heightens disaffection within communities, and particularly among conflict-affected populations” – disaffection that can also be exploited in the context of political instability. Further, increases in food prices and declining harvests have exacerbated existing inequalities, and are potential conflict triggers. This could lead to further displacement and cross-border migration. They also highlight problems with food availability and access, which if left unchecked, could lead to a humanitarian crisis. Their analysis concludes: “The situation requires a multi-dimensional response by the United Nations and a high degree of collaboration by outside parties.”208 Peacebuilding outcomes include:

- Resilience and social cohesion: The programmes will increase social cohesion across ethnic lines when farming households see the potential benefit of achieving higher small farm family incomes in the near term through collaboration and reconciliation. Food for work engaged community members from diverse backgrounds working together on a common project has helped to build solidarity, reduce tension and support reconciliation; in fact, the Uvam canal has been renamed as the Uvam-Dostuk, meaning friendship.209 Young people (who suffer from unemployment and are seen as the group most prone to resort to violence) and women (a key peacebuilding resource) are targeted in both programmes. This programme is also creating and maintaining a productive asset that will increase production potential and also build community resilience to future weather and price shocks.

- State capacity and legitimacy: The technical support and capacity building training for implementing partners is increasing state capacity to manage resources in an equitable manner. Local NGOs, with support from FAO, will take the lead in teaching at Farmer Field schools as part of the second phase of the programme, which enhances local ownership. Local government authorities and citizens will be active in both the planning and implementation phase of the programme.

- Conflict drivers and root causes: FAO has identified food insecurity and ethnic tensions stemming from poverty and unemployment as conflict factors. This programme is rehabilitating a productive asset that will increase production potential and also build community resilience to future price and weather shocks. By fostering inter-ethnic cooperation in the management of a resource that will increase food security, the programme addresses conflict factors.

This is an important programme to highlight because it uses rehabilitation and multi-ethnic management (and maintenance) of agricultural infrastructure as an entry point for conflict resolution and dialogue. It brings different groups together to address a common need and create positive outcomes for all groups involved. By being linked in a profitable venture and having more opportunities for interaction and cooperation among groups, this is an innovative peacebuilding practice.

207 Ibid.
209 Notes provided by WFP, 18 July 2011.
Box 7: Conflict Drivers and the Environment: Fuel Efficient Stoves in Darfur, Sudan

Theory of change: Peace dividends, with cross-cutting issue, environmental protection

Darfur has been in a civil war since 2003. An influx of nearly one million IDPs, through displacement and coercive migration, has increased competition for already scarce resources, such as firewood. Women suffer the consequences of this scarcity; they are often forced to travel long distances in search of firewood and grass in order to cook food for their families. They regularly confront the risk of attack and rape as they are forced to search for fuel farther and farther away. In 2008 UNEP and FAO distributed 300,000 fuel efficient stoves to camps and settlements in rural areas of Darfur. Fuel-efficient stoves are a direct contributor to human and food security; in a humanitarian or post-conflict setting they can serve as peace dividends. With these issues in mind, practical measures to alleviate environmental degradation and resource scarcity in Darfur are vital tools for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Fuel efficient stoves reduce the need for users to buy wood for cooking and to sell their food for fuel, thus ensuring rations are more likely to be eaten by the beneficiaries. They also increase women’s security, since they need to leave the camps less often to gather wood for fuel. WFP has implemented similar programmes in Haiti, Sri Lanka, Uganda and North Darfur, and will begin programmes in DRC, Chad, Ethiopia and Kenya in late 2011.

---

4 Assessing the Effectiveness of Fuel-Efficient Stove Programming; Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Darfur Cookstove Project: Zam Zam, Abu Schouk, and Assalam North Darfur IDP Camp.

5 WFP, WFP and Safe Access to Firewood: Protecting and Empowering Communities (October 2010).
ANNEX H: CROSS-CUTTING AREAS

Cross-cutting Area: Human Rights

In the context of peacebuilding, a human rights-based approach offers a normative framework for stabilisation and development – one that is operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights. It offers a tool to analyse the inequalities which lie at the heart of conflicts and redress discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power that impede progress towards sustainable peace. Under a human rights-based approach, the plans, policies and processes for recovery and development are anchored in a system of rights and corresponding obligations established by international law. This helps to promote the sustainability of peacebuilding work, empowering people, especially the most marginalized, to participate in policy formulation and hold the State accountable.

Economic, social and cultural rights, those relating to the workplace, social security, family life, participation in cultural life, and access to housing, food, water, health care and education, have clear ties with both effective public administration and the delivery of services. Gross violations of these rights have been among the root causes of conflicts, and failure to address systematic discrimination and inequities can undermine recovery from conflict. Examples of economic, social and cultural rights abuses that have fed conflict include: employment discrimination, using education as a propaganda tool, forcibly evicting communities from their homes, withholding food aid from political opponents, preventing access to arable land and water, and poisoning water sources.

Economic, social and cultural rights have become increasingly well defined in national, regional and global legal systems, laws and regulations, national constitutions, and international treaties. The rights to education, health and food associated with the sector studies in this review are all articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).

The right to education: Education, a basic human right, is often interrupted, delayed or even denied during the reconstruction process and early response to emergencies. Even though education can contribute to stability and peacebuilding, the commitment to realizing this human right has been continually subordinated to the logic of security and political stability (see Section 5.1). Beyond the human rights imperative, education provides physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection that can be both life-saving and life-sustaining. The right to education includes the notion that primary education should be free and compulsory, and that secondary education should be accessible to all. Technical and professional education should be made generally available and higher education should be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. Further, as stated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, education “shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace” – clearly providing legal justification for curriculum reform so often needed in post-conflict settings.

The right to food: The right to food is an important vehicle for ensuring food security in conflict and post-conflict settings. The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security to be “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” Food security (through availability, access and utilization) can only be achieved if a person’s right to food is fulfilled, protected and/or respected by the State. The right to food provides entitlements to individuals’ access to adequate food and to the resources that are necessary for the sustainable enjoyment of food security. States are obligated to respect, protect, and fulfil this right, and at a minimum, are obligated to prevent hunger – an obligation that is most relevant during and in the immediate aftermath of conflict. There is also a right to adequate food, essential to obtaining an adequate standard of living, which is broader and can be met pro-

213 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 11.
gressively as a development goal. This can be achieved through development policies that establish the economic, political and social conditions for people to produce and buy food to sustain their families. As such, the right to food also addresses States’ obligations beyond their borders, including trade-related ones.

The right to health: The right to health includes a wide range of factors, such as access to healthcare, safe drinking water and adequate sanitation, safe food, adequate nutrition and housing, health-related education and information and gender equality. States are obligated to make every possible effort to realize the right to health and to immediate take steps in that direction. Notwithstanding resource constraints in post-conflict situations, some steps can be taken right away, such as guaranteeing the right to health in a non-discriminatory manner, developing specific legislation and plans of action, or other similar actions towards the full realization of this right. States also have to ensure a minimum level of access to the essential material components of the right to health, such as the provision of essential drugs and maternal and child health services. These actions contribute to reducing horizontal inequalities and increase public trust in government, which is an important peacebuilding outcome. The right to health is dependent on, and contributes to, the realization of many other human rights essential for sustainable peacebuilding.

Individually and together, these rights contribute to peacebuilding. Recognizing this, along with the principle of non-discrimination, puts the focus on the most excluded, discriminated and marginalized groups in society. Also, they are interdependent, indivisible and interrelated. This means that violating the right to food, for example, may impair the enjoyment of other human rights crucial for the peacebuilding process, such as the right to health, education, or life.

Cross-cutting Area: Social Protection

Social protection is defined as “set of public and private policies and programmes aimed at reducing and eliminating the economic and social vulnerabilities of children, women and their families, in order to ensure their right to a decent standard of living.” Increasingly, countries have recognised the importance of developing and/or expanding social protection systems to increase households’ resilience and capacity to respond to crises, while at the same time ensuring access to basic social services. Short-term safety nets can protect the most vulnerable from the impact of shocks common in transitional environments that may severely compromise coping mechanisms, access to services and employment opportunities. Over the longer-term, they can address horizontal inequalities – a structural source of conflict in many countries.

Social protection measures can be protective, by supporting recovery from shocks (including financial, natural disaster and conflict related ones); preventative, by mitigating risk from shocks; promotive, by promoting opportunities; and transformative, by focusing on underlying structural inequalities that cause vulnerability.

Social Protection policies and programmes can play a key role in promoting peacebuilding outcomes, promoting social cohesion, creating opportunities to strengthen the citizen-state compact and addressing underlying drivers of conflict.

Promoting social cohesion

- Social Protection is increasingly recognised as an inherent redistributive and equity-enhancing strategy and as a crucial tool for ensuring more even growth and contributing to long-term poverty reduction.
- Social protection measures can remove financial and social barriers to access basic services (especially education and health) in fragile contexts.
- By reaching out to those who are economically and socially disadvantaged, social protection compliments sector interventions in health and nutrition, education, and child protection with proven outcomes that increase equity and achieve results for the poorest (e.g. social transfers to increase demand and use of services).

Statebuilding

- Social protection programmes and systems can strengthen national capacity for conflict prevention and management, by i) providing mechanisms and benefits to increase and enhance the resilience of households to shocks and contribute to recovery; (ii) strengthening state capacity to address citizens’ needs, thus building legitimacy.

- Social protection programmes, led by governments, can strengthen the relationship between state and citizens, building trust in government structures and capacity.

Addressing conflict drivers

- Social protection interventions can address the structural and underlying causes of economic and social vulnerability associated with conflict/disaster, including poverty, exclusion, loss of assets, unemployment, limited access to essential food supplies, food insecurity, and education and health services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL PROTECTION COMPONENT</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE/IMPACT</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Transfers</td>
<td>Protect and prevent individuals/households from economic shocks and support the accumulation of human and financial assets</td>
<td>cash transfers, food transfers, public work programmes, nutritional supplementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmes ensuring access to services</td>
<td>Overcome social barriers to access at the community, household and individual level</td>
<td>cash transfers, birth registration, user fee abolition, health insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social support and care services</td>
<td>Identify and respond to social vulnerability and deprivation at the child and household level (Human resource-intensive)</td>
<td>child care services, home base care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation and policy reform</td>
<td>Remove inequalities in access to services or livelihoods/economic opportunities to address issues of discrimination and exclusion</td>
<td>maternity leave, inheritance rights, employment guarantee schemes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Link of social protection to sectoral case studies

Food assistance and case for work programmes highlighted in many of the food security case studies (see section 7, Nepal, Liberia, Philippines, and Kyrgyzstan) are examples of social protection. Social protection was also a component in the Sierra Leone education case (see section 5).

Reintegration is an essential component to peacebuilding, and social service provision is a way to facilitate this. A lack of basic services discourages returnees from staying in their native regions. To obtain the “durable solution” of reintegration, UNHCR advocates a bottom-up approach, with the full participation of national and local authorities in every level of planning. One way of increasing social protection is to involve women and other vulnerable groups in planning and implementation. This also facilitates peaceful reintegration with host communities, since both groups are benefitting from these services.

215 UNHCR, South Sudan study, pg 13 (pdf)
Cross-cutting Area: Gender Equality

When post-conflict governments address the distinct needs and capacities of women, men, boys and girls in the process of designing and delivering basic social services, they increase the chances that their efforts will be successful. Integrating a gender perspective into these services will help to bring about increased peace dividends.

Two complementary strategies – gender mainstreaming and targeted action – can help ensure gender perspectives are integrated into service provision. Incorporating more women into the service provision process, both in upper-level planning and at the “front line” service delivery stages, is one way governments can improve the level of service provided. Employing female service providers, such as police officers, health workers and agricultural extension officers, increases the accessibility and usage of these services, especially in environments where deeply entrenched gender stereotypes or cultural norms limit interactions between female beneficiaries and male service providers.

Women in these roles are more apt to recognise and advocate for the specific needs of women and girls, although this is not always the case. Further, the visible presence of women in public sector positions also spurs greater interest and participation by other women in the public sphere, helping to break down obstructive stereotypes and advance gender equality goals.

Improving the status of women and girls in a country recovering from conflict can also have a catalytic effect, whereby women and girls, including adolescent girls, become more economically, politically and socially empowered and are able to play more effective roles in the reconstruction of their communities, improving the situation not only for themselves and their families, but for the nation as a whole (see Annex G, Water Management, Kyrgyzstan). Further, studies have also shown that women spend a greater proportion of their incomes than men on family-related expenditures such as food, education and medicine, meaning that employing more women in public sector jobs is also a wise investment in the overall development of a community, likely contributing to social cohesion.

Given that women and girls represent 50 per cent of the potential human capital in any society, empowering them to realize their full potential lays the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Empowering one half of the population to have a greater role in decision-making, political and government run processes also represents an important strategy to (re)build inclusive, accountable and legitimate institutions at the heart of the social contract. Still, leaders and practitioners must not lose sight of the fact that achieving gender equality is not only an efficient means to a peacebuilding end, but ultimately an important and imperative end in itself.

In recent years there has been a growing consensus that the needs of men and boys should be addressed separately to advance gender equality. They can do this by “sharing family responsibilities, including caring for dependants; preventing violence against women, including through trafficking and HIV/AIDS transmission; and providing role models for younger men.” Sensitising men and boys to the importance of gender equality is the first step; once they have been educated, they can spread the message of gender equality to other males. Obviously, formal education plays a pivotal role, especially in reaching boys at a young age. To be effective, this work should be carried out within a broader gender equality framework that analyses the distinct needs and capacities of females and males of


220 Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the Advancement of Women, Women 200 and Beyond: The Role of Men and Boys in Achieving Gender Equality (December 2008), p.2.
all ages, and that mobilizes not just women and girls, but also men and boys around a common goal of a more just and equitable post-conflict society. Therefore, curricula reform to address gender norms is necessary.221

Investment in inclusive youth groups, where both girls and boys have opportunities to assume leadership roles and have their voices heard contributes positively to the reconstruction and development of their communities.222 Conflict transformation efforts targeting youth can also yield results. In Lebanon, Lebanese and Palestinian children and youth participated in peer to peer training in conflict transformation, tolerance and alternatives to violence, the aim of which was to promote dialogue and develop and sustain conflict resolution mechanisms to facilitate the resolution of inter and intra-communal tensions.223 Stakeholders should ensure that significant investments are made in gender- and age-appropriate life-skills education, leadership and conflict resolution training for youth; the latter should specifically target adolescent girls so that they can participate equally in the rebuilding of their societies and as future leaders. The opportunities that conflict and crisis can present should not go unnoticed. In particular, they offer space to engage girls to better know and demand their rights as citizens and to have their voices heard.

Cross-cutting Area: Environment

The poor governance and management of scarce renewable natural and high-value extractive resources can be drivers of conflict. Consequently, their availability, access and proper management are vital priorities both to ensure the safety and security of populations as well as to provide needed resources to serve economic recovery and development, upon which peacebuilding depends.

In developing countries, people’s livelihoods are dependent upon environmental resources for energy, sustenance and income. Violent conflict often severely undermines access to and availability of these resources. In post-conflict settings, limited natural resource availability can trigger fresh conflict. Basic social service provision in such settings needs to be integrated in a manner to help preserve and ensure sustainability of these limited renewable resources. The effective utilization of limited natural resources will minimize potential negative impacts on conflict dynamics and support continuous provision of the basic social services that are so critically needed in post-conflict settings. Similarly, transparent management of extractive resources will be critical for ensuring economic recovery in a post-conflict setting and preventing grievances.

Education around appropriate uses of natural resources is an effective way to address a conflict driver and contribute to durable peace and development efforts. It is imperative to educate former combatants in particular that such resources are not material for conflict, but rather valuable assets to serve the common good – i.e. societal development. Targeting new students – i.e. children and women gaining access to education for the first time – is likely to ensure even stronger impact.

The careful management of water extract (an accessible freshwater resource), transport (water supply) and consumption (demand control) should be taken into account for peacebuilding. In addition, wastewater treatment and sanitation protects the environment and prevents the transmission of contagious diseases.

Provision of food is deeply reliant upon the availability of usable land and land fertility. The efficient management of land – such as creating of irrigation system for agricultural development – helps local populations plant more crops, secure food supply and thereby prevent migration to other occupied land for food, which can be a source of conflict (See section 7, Water Management, Kyrgyzstan).

221 Ibid, p. 3.
ANNEX I: COMMUNITY CONSULTATIONS FINDINGS

Consultations with Communities, Youth and Local Government Central African Republic (CAR), Kyrgyzstan and Uganda

Methodology

UNICEF and WFP organized a series of consultations with communities, local government and civil society on the contributions of essential administrative and social services to peacebuilding. Focus group discussions took place between end of June and beginning of July 2011 in Southern Kyrgyzstan (Osh and surroundings), Northern Uganda (Gulu district), and Central African Republic (Bouar and Kaga Bandoro). Depending on the context, consultations were held in urban and/or rural settings, and in some cases, women and men were consulted separately (Kyrgyzstan).

Focus group discussions took place with the following groups and individuals: community members (women, men, youth); students (secondary school); community leaders; representatives of women’s organizations; religious representatives; NGOs; local government representatives (dealing with education, health, water, social affairs, youth); representatives of village municipalities; directors of schools and medical units; teachers; social workers; vice-mayors; deputy heads of districts.

Depending on the target audience, the following issues were discussed:

- Most important characteristics, results benefits of peace
- Impact of conflict on access to services (education, health, water and sanitation)
- Impact of conflict on ability to provide services (government)
- Impact of conflict on food security
- Role of education for peace
- Social services and the social contract (issues of trust in government, accountability, legitimacy)
- Contribution of social services to a sense of normalcy and reconciliation
- Role of the national government in service provision
- Role of the local government in service provision
- Priorities after conflict and expectations from government

Various challenges and limitations emerged through the consultations. Depending on the target audience and understanding of certain terminology or subject matter, certain questions had to be slightly adapted, rephrased, and in some cases, left out. Translation was often required, of local languages to French and English, and in some cases, translation capacity was weak. At times discussions were politicized by certain community members, and there were different levels of access to information and knowledge of the issues among the target audience.

Synthesis of Findings

Social services and peace

In all three countries there was a consensus that equal access to social services is a condition for inter-communal peace. The effect of social services on communities was described in different ways, from “stabilizing,” “tension diffusing,” and “calming aggressions and the belligerent mood” (Kyrgyzstan), to “confidence building,” “fostering unity,” and strengthening the “spirit of collaboration and cooperation” (Uganda). As stated in CAR, the resumption of social services signaled the return to normal life: “when water pumps were created, people came back from the
bush (...), when teachers returned to schools, students regained confidence in the educational process (...) when health services resumed, women could give birth in the safety of hospitals again” (Community consultations, Bouar).

According to communities in Kyrgyzstan, Uganda and CAR, limited and unequal access to social services fuels conflict; left unaddressed, this can be a critical obstacle to true reconciliation and peace. Discussions in Kyrgyzstan highlighted the importance of **equitable access to services**, of **inclusiveness**, and **non-discrimination** and accountability in service delivery. While the Uzbek ethnic minority clearly felt discriminated against, having limited access to services compared to their Kyrgyz neighbours, the perception of “unbalanced” delivery of post-conflict aid in favour of the Uzbek community had further exacerbated resentment and tensions between the two groups. Ensuring that social services and other state support are provided without any ethnic or other forms of discrimination was identified as a key condition for the establishment of trust in government and for peace and stability.

Consultations in all three countries highlighted the **interrelated nature of social services**, and the need for a comprehensive approach to service delivery. “It is not possible to provide a good education if healthcare is not catered for. On the other hand, a good health care service goes hand in hand with provision of safe water, good road networks and other support services. There is a need to adopt an integrated approach to service delivery (...)” (Community services department, Uganda). Communities identified basic social services, including health, education, water, sanitation and food production/food security, as priorities and the primary responsibility of the government.

**Social services and reconciliation**

Equal access to social services was linked to reconciliation in numerous ways. Firstly, tensions are diffused and social cohesion enhanced when communities feel they have access to services, regardless of ethnic or other affiliations. Secondly, social services have the potential to bring people together, can serve as a platform for inter-group/inter-ethnic interaction, and are important entry points for rebuilding tolerance and trust. Examples from Kyrgyzstan include: Uzbek patients being treated by Kyrgyz doctors; Uzbek and Kyrgyz children interacting in mixed schools and youth groups (UNICEF project), children being taught by teachers from different backgrounds, and ethnically mixed women self-help groups coming together to rehabilitate irrigation channels for mutual benefit (WFP project). In Uganda, there was a consensus that shared health, water, education and other services and resources offered an entry point for communal unity. And in Bangui (CAR), restoring water and electricity in particular neighbourhoods points to a decrease in social unrest and an increase in government legitimacy.

**Social services and building the social contract**

There was a clear consensus across all three countries that the state needs to (re)invest in social services to gain the confidence of the population. In Uganda and Kyrgyzstan, community members resented the **lack of government transparency, accountability** and opportunities for **participation in decision-making**. The feeling was one of powerlessness and distrust, due to the inability to effectively demand from and influence government decisions on the one hand, and the limited government role in social service delivery, on the other. In Kyrgyzstan, the perception among many was that the government did not play any significant role in service provision; while all of the communities consulted expected better service delivery at all levels, there was little awareness of where to go and whom to address with their demands. Functioning social services provided in a non-discriminatory manner would help re-establish trust in government, according to many. In Uganda, a particular example of consultation and collaboration between government officials and representative/leaders from different communities was mentioned; the resulting joint planning of and delivery of services promoted a spirit of togetherness and re-established confidence in government.