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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE ARAB REGION: TRENDS AND POLICIES*

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Introduction

From the 1960s until the 1990s, the Arab region could be considered to be divided into host and source countries of international migrants, with the distinction lying in the presence or absence of oil. On the one hand, the large oil-exporting states had an abundance of capital and a shortage of workforce, and consequently became labour importers—with the aggregated Gulf States and Libya forming the world's third largest receiver of immigration flows after North America and the European Union. On the other hand, the non-oil-exporting states suffered an imbalance between a deficit of capital and a surplus workforce and as a result became labour-exporters to Arab oil-producing countries and to other regions in the world. The only exceptions to this pattern were Algeria, and to some extent Iraq, which both received considerable income from their hydro-carbon exports but which have been largely unable to transform this oil income into full employment.

After three decades this relatively clear-cut and almost stable pattern of international migration in the Arab region has recently shown signs of change and the once straightforward distinction between sender and receiver states in the Arab region has started to blur. Oil-states still attract foreign manpower—particularly since oil prices soared again in the early 2000s—but for the first time they are also witnessing alarming levels of unemployment among their own national labour force, which they have responded to with increasingly restrictive policies on the admission and settlement of foreigners. Non-oil-states remain countries of departure for many of their nationals, but are themselves becoming new countries of destination or transit on the global routes of international migration. They too, respond to the new situation with restrictive immigration policies. At the same time they have discovered the importance of their own expatriates as a source of wealth that can be mobilised for national goals, and have developed policies designed to strengthen the ties between expatriates and their country of origin.

The scope of this paper is broad in that it places topics usually dealt with separately—emigration and immigration; the Maghreb and the Mashreq; levels of migration and policies to deal with the phenomenon—within a single framework. Section I examines levels and trends, starting with a discussion of data definitions and sources. This reveals that discrepancies between figures are as much due to divergent interpretations of what counts as a migrant, as to lacking or poor quality data. The same persons can be defined and/or counted as emigrants by their country of origin, but not as immigrants by their country of residence. This is followed by a detailed description of levels and trends of emigration from, and immigration into, Arab countries using national data sources in both Arab countries and major destination countries around the world. Section II deals with policies relating to emigration and immigration. It draws on a variety of sources, including a series of country case-studies conducted within the framework of the CARIM on migration-related legislation and policies in Mediterranean Arab countries, and shows that most countries have a positive perception of emigration and of the links with their own expatriates, but a negative one of immigration and the integration of foreigners into the host society.

1 Levels and trends

1.1 Definition & sources[1]

Numbers of migrants vary according to who is counted as well as to who does the counting. Not only is there no universal definition as to who, or what, constitutes a migrant, but the self-same definition will generate quite different figures depending upon whether migrants are recorded at origin or at destination.

1.1.1 Foreigners and born-abroad residents

Two criteria are used to define migrants, either separately or in combination. The criterion most widely employed is the 'country of citizenship': immigrants are then equated to foreign residents. In several Arab countries, a further distinction is made between 'Arab non-nationals' (citizens from another Arab country) and 'foreigners' (citizens from a non-Arab country). Another criterion is the 'country of birth', according to which immigrants are defined as born-abroad residents.

The difference between numbers of migrants resulting from these two criteria is the balance between the two following categories:

a) Those born abroad, but who are not foreign residents. This category consists of two groups:

- Naturalised migrants: foreigners born abroad who have acquired the nationality of their host country. For example, the statistical office of the Netherlands reports the following statistics for migrants of Moroccan origin on 1 January 2005: a) 168,400 first-generation migrants (i.e. born abroad) of Moroccan origin; and b) 91,558 Moroccan nationals. The difference (55,842) is essentially made up of Moroccan migrants who have acquired Dutch citizenship.
- Nationals born abroad who have migrated to their country of nationality, often, but mistakenly, treated as return migrants. For example, the 2004 population census of Tunisia records 78,388 born-abroad residents, but 35,192 foreign residents. The difference (43,196) includes a number of Tunisians born abroad who have migrated ('returned') to their parents' country, with naturalised migrants.

b) Foreigners, but not born abroad: those born in a given country as a child of foreign parents (usually immigrants). There number will vary according to law in the country of residence and be greater in countries where *jus sanguinis* prevails (like in all Arab countries) than in countries where it is accompanied by *jus soli* (most of Europe and North America)

In some cases, another category is also included in migration statistics: those who are neither foreigners nor born abroad, but citizens—either by birth or by later acquisition of citizenship—born in the country as a child of one or two immigrant parents. They are usually denominated 'second-generation migrants'. For example, in the Netherlands, 315,821 residents of Moroccan origin (1/1/2005) are broken down into: 168,400 first-generation migrants, and 147,421 second-generation migrants, the latter including

131,497 persons with both parents born in Morocco and 15,924 with one parent born in Morocco.

1.1.2 UNRWA Refugees and migrants

The vast majority of refugees registered with UNHCR offices in the world are foreigners born abroad and can be considered as migrants in their country of asylum with regard to the two criteria of 'country of citizenship' and 'country of birth'. This, however, does not apply to Palestinian refugees registered at UNRWA: "under UNRWA's operational definition, Palestine refugees are persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict […] UNRWA's definition of a refugee also covers the descendants of persons who became refugees in 1948. The number of registered Palestine refugees has subsequently grown from 914,000 in 1950 to more than four million in 2002, and continues to rise due to natural population growth."[2]

As a consequence of this definition, UNRWA refugees born after 1948 are not migrants in their country of registration with regard to the 'country of birth' criterion. But are they nevertheless migrants with regard to the other criterion, 'country of citizenship'?

In two of the four countries under the UNRWA mandate, Lebanon and Syria, most Palestinian refugees have never been granted the nationality of their country of asylum, but only permits of residence and travel documents (Diab 2005, Saleh 2005). From a nationality point of view, they are stateless until a solution is agreed on the Palestinian refugee issue. In the countries where they live, they are second-generation or third-generation migrants. Whether they can be counted as international migrants according to the 'country of citizenship' criterion is a matter of interpretation. But in the two other countries where the UNRWA is implemented, the Palestinian Territory and Jordan, Palestinian refugees have the nationality of their country of residence, and thus cannot be counted as international migrants regarding the 'country of citizenship' criterion.[3]

The distinction between refugees and migrants that must be made in the particular case of the Palestinian refugees registered with the UNRWA accounts for the huge discrepancy between numbers of immigrants provided by the UN database on one hand, and national statistical sources in the Palestinian Territory and Jordan, on the other.

According to the UN database, Jordan would be a major receiver of migrants, with 2,224,890 immigrants representing 39% of its 5,703 million inhabitants (mid-2005). According to the national population census (1994) Jordan is a much smaller receiver, with 314,965 foreigners representing 7.6% of its 4,139,458 inhabitants at the time of the census, and 5.3% if only the 220,739 foreigners born outside Jordan, i.e. first-generation migrants, are counted. The difference is the result of refugees being all taken as immigrants by the UN. According to the UN database Jordan would count 1,801,115 refugees (mid-2005). Most of them are Palestinians (1,780,701 Palestinian refugees were registered in Jordan with the UNRWA on 31 March 2005). However, the UNRWA definition implies that all Jordanians of Palestinian origin born in Jordan were born as refugees in Jordan, and consequently they are not immigrants according to the definition accepted by the UN ("the number of international migrants generally represents the number of persons born in a country other than that in which they live").

A paradoxical consequence is that the number of refugees increases with time (through natural increase), while the number of migrants among them decreases (as a result of mortality), as illustrated by the figures below:

Palestinian refugees recorded with UNRWA in Jordan

- July 2000: 1,570,192, of which an estimated 128,508 were born before 1948 (migrants)
- March 2005: 1,780,701, of which an estimated 110,103 were born before 1948
- Change 2000–2005: +210,509 Palestinian refugees, but –18,405 migrants.

The same applies to the Palestinian Territory where immigrants defined as persons born abroad are a minority among the 1,680,142 immigrants, all of them refugees, given by the UN database. According to the Palestinian population census of 1997, 231,766 residents were born-abroad, of which 83,639 born in the pre-1948 territory that would become Israel, and 148,127 in other countries. Since 1997, the former number has certainly decreased (by mortality) while the latter is unlikely to have increased, since return migration has remained under the *de facto* control of Israel.

Apart from the question of whether UNRWA refugees can be counted as migrants, there is also the issue of whether they are actual residents of their country of registration. Because registration is a voluntary act and there is an interest in declaring a birth, but not a death nor a departure, there are serious doubts as to the adequacy of UNRWA records to population counting (Lubbad 2006, Endersen and Ovensen 1994). In Lebanon for example, the number of Palestinians actually residing in the country was reported to be 198,528 in 1997 (ACS 1999), a figure much lower than the 376,472 Palestinian refugees recorded with the UNRWA in Lebanon in 2000.[4]

1.1.3 Where migrants are counted matters

While the country of birth is usually an univocal category (except when political borders are contested, or have changed), the country of citizenship, as a legal category, can be interpreted in various ways. The fact that multiple citizens can be counted as nationals by several different countries affects migration statistics.

For example, given the same population statistics and asked the same question, 'How many Moroccans reside in the Netherlands?', the Dutch and Moroccan authorities would obtain different numbers. For the Dutch authorities, there would be 91,558 Moroccan nationals residing in the Netherlands. For the Moroccan authorities it would be three times this figure with between 299,897 (all first-generation migrants + all second-generation migrants with both parents born in Morocco), and 315,821 (the previous persons + second-generation migrants with only one parent born in Morocco); the exact number accepted by the Moroccan authorities depends on how many of the 15,924 second-generation migrants with one parent born in Morocco have a Moroccan-born father, since according to Moroccan Law, citizenship is transmitted by the father.

Table 3 gives the difference found between the two counts for emigrants originating from the four Arab countries which publish consular records on their expatriates, by country of residence. In all four cases, migrants counted by country of origin are in excess compared with those counted by host countries, or put differently, the latter are in deficit

compared with the former. The relative difference was found to vary between +31% for Algerians and +145% for Egyptians. In the EU, the aggregated difference amounts to +2.367 million migrants. This figure reflects a variety of situations, including dual citizens, former migrants who have now left the country, and irregular migrants. Table 4 shows in the example of Moroccans residing abroad that, whatever the country of residence, Moroccan consulates record more expatriates than national sources, with a relative difference varying from less than 50% (Germany, Italy, Spain) and more than 250% (Belgium, Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Jordan, South Africa).

1.1.4 Insufficient statistics

Two preliminary remarks will help us to interpret the results provided in Section II.

Firstly, in theory the same person should be counted as an emigrant in the country of origin and as an immigrant in the country of destination. However, immigrants are present while emigrants are not. Because we can only count those who are 'in', and not those who 'out' (at least by direct enumeration), most migration data are on immigrants, not on emigrants. As a consequence, emigration from a given country has to be reconstructed as the aggregated immigration originating from this country in all other countries of the world.

Secondly, migration is a movement and accordingly primary statistics should deal with flows. However, for a variety of reasons, only a few countries provide accurate data on flows of migrants, and most available data are on stocks. While flows are made of entries on one side, and exits on the other, stocks only reflect part of the picture: the net result of entries and exits over a period of time, i.e. cumulated numbers of net lifetime migrants.

As a result of the above remarks, immigration to Arab countries will be measured using data collected in these countries, while emigration originating from Arab countries will be estimated as stocks of immigrants in destination countries, i.e. in the rest of the world.

Data on immigrants can be collected by institutions of the host country (statistical offices, Ministries of the Interior, and a few other agencies), and by institutions of the origin country (consulates).

Data collected by institutions of the host country should ideally meet four conditions in order to provide a reliable picture of emigration from Arab countries.

Firstly, all countries in the world are potential places of destination for migrants from every single Arab country, so that statistics from all over the world are needed. In practice, only a few countries publish statistics on their foreign residents of Arab origin by 'detailed country of origin'. In particular, to date almost nothing has been published by statistical offices of the major Arab countries of immigration (Gulf States and Libya).

Secondly, statistics from different countries of destination should refer to standardised categories thus making it possible to aggregate data across countries, and across time. In practice however, categories in use in national statistics are not always constructed with a view to international comparison and aggregation.

Thirdly, because migration is a rapidly changing phenomenon, statistical sources need to be regularly updated. This condition is met only by 'population registers', a system of continuous recording of vital events and changes of residence for all individuals in the

resident population. This system is only in use in a few European countries: Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, and to a certain extent Germany. In all other countries, the main source of data on migrant stocks is the population census, an exhaustive survey usually conducted once every ten years. It misses some of the migration which occurs between two successive censuses, and all of the migration which takes place after the most recent census.

Fourthly, all immigrants should be recorded. Despite the fact that population registers or censuses have a statistical objective and do not serve police controls, most are unlikely to pick up on the greater part of irregular migrants, who are thought to form a rapidly growing category.

Alternative data on migration are provided by consular records. Their main limitation is their voluntary nature, whereby individual migrants are free to register and to cancel their registration on their departure. On the one hand, not all migrants register themselves, and on the other hand, not all the persons recorded actually reside in the country where they are recorded. In addition, consular records comprise not only migrants, but also a number of dual citizens born in the country. It has to be noted however that consular reports are one of the very few sources susceptible to contain some irregular migrants, because they might wish to be in order with their home country's authorities.

1.2 Emigration from the Arab countries

In answer to the question 'How many emigrants are there from Arab countries?' we can only put forward a very tentative estimate since data are not available for all Arab countries of origin or all countries of destination, and are subject to great variations according to sources.[5]

Data from major destination countries, with the exception of the Gulf and Libya, provide an aggregated number of 4,319,598 first-generation emigrants originating from eight Arab countries—from West to East: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon (henceforth Med-Arab)—in the early 2000s (see Table 1). Data from origin countries, which include the Gulf as a destination, provide three times this figure, i.e. an aggregated number of 13,055,340 million for only six out the eight countries[6] (see Table 2) including Palestine, from which most emigrants are in reality second-generation or third-generation refugees. If the Palestinian refugees are not taken into account, the number of Arab emigrants counted by their country of origin (five countries) drops to 8,347,869 million, i.e. twice the number counted by destination countries. If the same subset of countries of origin (five Arab Mediterranean countries) and of destination (the EU) is considered, numbers to be compared are 3,001,349 first-generation emigrants counted at destination and 5,192,537 expatriates counted at the origin (see Table 3), i.e. a figure 1.73 times higher. The reasons explaining this gap have been developed in the previous section.

(Table 1: Emigrants from Mediterranean Arab countries in the EU Member States and in some other countries, according to statistics of destination countries, most recent data)

(Table 2: Migrants from 6 Arab countries by group of countries of residence, according to statistics of origin countries)

(Table 3: Comparison between numbers of migrants counted by their origin country in the Arab region and their destination countries in the European Union)

The number of Arab migrants in the Gulf and Libya remains a major unknown. These countries do not publish data on their foreign residents by detailed nationality and the only source remains consular records or survey data from origin countries. For the five Arab countries which release such data, we obtain an aggregated number of 2,502,791 emigrants in Arab countries (mainly the Gulf and Libya) (see Table 2). If the missing countries of origin were counted, in particular Yemen, Jordan, Sudan and Syria, a much higher number, perhaps twice this figure, would be found.

To the above numbers, computed from national statistics of major destination countries and consular records of countries of origin, one should add the 1.899 million refugees registered with UNHCR, most of them originating from Sudan, Somalia, Palestine and Iraq (see Table 5).

(Table 5: Refugee population by country of asylum / origin)

From what precedes, it emerges that Arab states might be origin countries to some 10–15 million first-generation emigrants today, representing some 3.3–4.9% of their aggregated population,[7] or just over a world average estimated at 3.2%.

The following features emerge from Tables 1 and 2, and a few other sources.

1.2.1 Most Arab emigrants are bound either for Europe or the Arab region

According to data provided by five origin countries, Europe is the single largest destination of first-generation Arab emigrants, and hosts 59% of all such emigrants worldwide (4,897,462 out of 8,347,869,; see Table 2). The Arab oil countries, i.e. the Gulf States and Libya, constitute the second largest destination, with the rest of the world, mainly North America, ranking far behind. This is a partial result, established on the basis of data from five countries which do not represent the others. Considering that most emigrants from the missing countries are bound for destinations outside Europe, mainly the Gulf States (Yemen, Syria, Jordan) and Libya (Sudan), the actual share bound for Europe is much lower.

Destination varies with origin. Migrants from the Maghreb are predominantly destined for Europe. According to data from destination countries (see Table 1), France is the largest single destination country for Arab first-generation emigrants (1,733,441 end-1999), followed by Spain (566,967 end-2005), Italy (347,156 in 2003), and Germany (222,807 in 2002). Morocco is the first country of origin of Arab immigrants into the EU (1,812,510 according to destination countries data (see Table 1), and 2,616,871 in 2004 according to Moroccan consular registers (see Table 2). Algeria ranks second (789,459; 991,796), Tunisia third (358,926; 695,765), and Egypt fourth (127,060; 436,000).

Migrants from the Mashreq are instead predominantly destined for the Arab oil countries and overseas. According to origin countries data (see Table 2), 1,912,279 out of 2,736,729 Egyptian emigrants resided in Arab countries in 2000 (among them 923,600 in Saudi Arabia, 332,600 in Libya and 226,850 in Jordan) (CAPMAS 2001, cited in Nassar 2005). The same probably holds for Jordanian and Yemeni migrants, but no statistics of their distribution by country of destination are available. Lebanese emigrants are more evenly distributed around the world, with a total number of 606,812 post-1975 emigrants

distributed as follows: North America: 179,281; Western Europe: 148,272; Arab countries 123,966; rest of the world: 75,720 (Kasparian 2003). Recent data indicate that Europe is increasingly a destination for migrants from Egypt and Lebanon.

It should be noted that in Egyptian and Jordanian statistics, migration to the Gulf States and Libya is termed 'temporary' while migration to the rest of the world is termed 'permanent' (Nassar 2004). This distinction, however, does not correspond to any actual differences documented by solid comparative data on the duration of residence. It may instead reflect differences between the policies pursued by destination countries, which are integration-oriented in Europe and North-America, but generally not in Arab countries (see Section 2.2).

1.2.2 Three Arab countries with over 2.5 million nationals currently abroad

The Palestinian Territory, Morocco and Egypt have more than 2.5 million of their nationals currently residing abroad. Algeria (possibly Yemen, Sudan?) counts more than one million nationals abroad, and Tunisia and Lebanon (possibly Iraq?) more than half a million. If emigrants are expressed as a percentage of the total population in the country, the Palestinian Territory ranks higher than all other countries, with more nationals abroad than at home. Lebanon ranks next, with nationals abroad representing 16% of its population. All the other countries report less than 10% of nationals abroad.

Populations of nationals abroad shown in Tables 1 and 2 are all the result of recent migration movements: with the passing of time, descendents of migrants no longer keep the nationality of their migrant ancestor, even though part of them could still reclaim it. If ancient migration were taken into account, Lebanon and Syria could claim much larger 'expatriate communities', but these consist of individuals with a Lebanese, Syrian or Ottoman ancestry rather than actual citizenship.

Algeria is another case of a country with high emigration rates in the 1960s, followed by their drastic reduction during the successive two decades. Despite the resumption of Algerian emigration during the 1990s—a period of civil unrest in the country—the sons and daughters of migrants predominate over first-generation migrants. Most second-generation Algerians abroad, particularly in France, have acquired the nationality of their country of residence and disappear from migration statistics.

1.2.3 Arab emigration gaining momentum

By contrast, Morocco, Egypt and Lebanon are countries from where flows of emigration were never discontinued and have even increased over the last decade. First-generation migrants are predominant among their nationals abroad.

Morocco emerges as a key country of emigration and provides times series of consular records,[8] Which reflect, albeit not parallel, the growth of the Moroccan expatriate population. The number of Moroccans registered in their consulates worldwide has doubled during the twelve last years, from 1.549 million in 1993 to 3.089 million in 2004. A twofold increase in twelve years represents an annual growth rate of 6.3% (compared with a 1.3% rate of population growth in Morocco). It includes second-generation nationals abroad as well as new first-generation migrants.

(Table 6: Moroccan population residing abroad according to consular records 1993–2004)

Table 6 illustrates their destination. The bulk of this 1.540 million increase is found in the EU (+1.337 million, i.e. 87%), with France ranking first (+434,000), followed by Spain (+358,086), and Italy (+207,250), i.e. the three European countries closest to Morocco. Not only is Moroccan migrant population growing at a high rate, but the pace is accelerating. Annual numbers of additional Moroccans registered in their consulates worldwide have grown as follows: +92,195 per year in 1993–97, +132,804 per year in 1997–2002, and +253,496 per year in 2002–2004.

On the destination side, the comparison between an 'old' destination country (the Netherlands), and a 'new' one (Spain) provides additional information. In the Netherlands over the period January 1996 to January 2005, the total population originating from MENA countries has increased by 199,337, from 529,566 in 1996 to 728,933 in 2005, i.e. an annual growth rate of 3.6%. Two thirds of the increase are due to second-generation dual citizens (i.e. non-migrants born in the Netherlands), but one third to additional first-generation migrants.[9] In Spain the number of Arab nationals has been multiplied by a record 4.6 during the last seven years, representing an annual rate of growth of 21.9%, with Morocco ranking average (see Table 7).

(Table 7: Nationals from selected Arab countries residing in Spain 31/12/1998–31/12/2005)

A combination of internal factors (demographic pressure at working ages, unemployment and low return to skills) and external factors (call for migrant workers in other parts of the world, particularly Europe), makes a continuation of migratory pressures a likely scenario in the coming years. However, it is not certain that pressure will transform into actual migration, since the destination countries of Arab migrants, whether within, or outside the Arab region, are now all tightening barriers to migration.

1.2.4 A majority of low-skilled migrant workers

Economic migrants from Mediterranean Arab countries in the West (Europe and North America aggregated) are predominantly semi-skilled or unskilled workers, as illustrated below by their distribution according to occupation (see Table 8):

- Legislators. senior officials and managers: 11.4%
- Professionals: 4.4%
- Technicians and associate professionals: 8.1%
- Clerks: 10.7%
- Service workers and shop and market sales workers: 18.0%
- Skilled agricultural and fishery workers: 6.3%
- Craft and related trades workers: 20.6%
- Plant and machine operators and assemblers: 5.2%
- Elementary occupations workers : 15.5%

(Table 8: Active population originating from Arab countries, according to country of origin, country of destination and occupation)

Two factors explain the diversity of the socioeconomic composition of the migrant populations in destination countries. First, the period of migration, insofar as the earlier the migrating cohort, the less skilled it tends to be. And secondly, the migration and labour-market policies in the destination country. This second factor appears to have a stronger impact on the socioeconomic profile of incoming migrants. This explains why the most skilled occupations account for 40–60% of Arab migrants in the UK, Canada and the USA, against less than 20% in the two countries of Southern Europe for which we have data (France and Spain).

The same diversity of socioecomic profile characterises the country of origin. In the small number of destination counties for which data are available (which excluded many OECD countries and all the Arab oil countries) emigration originating from the Maghreb tends to be less qualified. Egypt, Jordan and Syria occupy an intermediate position, while immigrants from Lebanon and Palestine are the most qualified. This situation is largely explained by different periods of emigration and different destinations, but it does not necessarily reflect the overall occupational profile of those available for migration in origin countries.

Differences in categories of occupation generally reflect differences in levels of education, as illustrated below by the proportion of migrants with a university level by country of origin (seeTable 9)

- Algeria: 19,7%
- Egypt: 41,3%
- Palestinian Territory: 49,8%
- Jordan : 52,6%
- Lebanon: 51,8%
- Morocco: 15,3%
- Syria: 50,9%
- Tunisia: 24,6%

(Table 9: Migrant population aged 15 and over originating from Mediterranean Arab countries, according to country of residence, country of origin and level of education)

The earliest flows (Algerians in France, Moroccans in the Netherlands) account for the highest proportion of migrants with lowest levels of educational attainment, because when they left their country of origin education was not as developed as its has become since.

As in the case of occupational differences, the period of migration cannot completely explain the differences in levels of education, but the policy of receiving countries does

play a critical role. For example, two contemporary flows of departure from the same country, i.e. Morocco, will have very different educational profiles according to whether they are bound for Spain or the USA. In the former case they will tend to have only an intermediate, or lower secondary level of education, while the majority of those heading for the USA will have a university degree.

Generally, the USA and Canada, which are 'new destinations' for migrants from the Maghreb, attract the majority of highly-skilled people. University graduates represent close to 60% of first-generation migrants originating from Mediterranean Arab countries in Canada and the USA, against 10% in the four European countries for which data are available (Austria, France, Germany, and Spain). Out of a total of 550,232 first-generation migrants with a university degree, 281790, i.e. 51%, are residing in Canada and the USA alone, while 80% (1,284,132 out of 1,614,238) of those who have a lower than primary, a primary or a secondary level of education are living in Europe.

Migrants' occupational and educational profiles depend more on the destination than the origin country, a fact which reflects the critical role played by immigration policies of the major receiving countries around the world.

1.3 Immigration into Arab countries

Immigration into, and emigration from, Arab countries are roughly of the same order.

The UN Population Division database delivers for the first time an overall picture of immigration. Aggregating all Arab countries gives a number of 20.913 million immigrants (thus including intra-regional migrants from one to another Arab country). This figure is not strictly comparable to numbers of first-generation emigrants dealt with in Section 1.2, as it contains second-generation and third-generation Palestinian refugees (see Section 1.1), and possibly other second-generation migrants in countries where data are provided by current nationality rather than by country of birth, since naturalisation of non-nationals is rare in Arab countries and children born from foreign parents remain foreigners.

An alternative source could be national data of the countries of destination. The resulting figure is lower than that of the UN. In the fourteen Arab countries that have published immigration data, the aggregated number of immigrants is 13.025 million (at varying dates, on average early 2000s). For the same fourteen countries but later (2005), the UN estimate is 18.888 million immigrants, i.e. 1.45 times higher (see Table 10). If we exclude from the comparison the Palestinian Territory and Jordan where the discrepancy is explained by UNRWA refugees being systematically counted as immigrants by the UN (see Section 1.1), twelve countries give an aggregated number of immigrants of 12,288 million to be compared with 14,983 provided by the UN (22% higher than national figures). The gap between the two sources (2.695 million) is partly, but not entirely, explained by the fact that UNHCR refugees are counted in migration statistics by the UN, but not by national sources.

(Table 10: Numbers of immigrants in Arab countries according to national sources and UN estimates)

1.3.1 A majority of immigrants bound for the Gulf

According to the UN database (2005 figures) 12.8 million non-nationals, including an unknown but probably smaller number of first-generation migrants,[10] now live in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, representing 36% of their 36 million inhabitants. Half of these immigrants are in Saudi Arabia, and the highest proportion of immigrants in the population is recorded in the United Arab Emirates where they account for 71% of all inhabitants. However, very few updated population statistics are released by GCC countries so that very little can be said about the most massive immigration into the Arab region, which makes GCC the third largest region of immigration in the world after North America and Europe. Given the shortage of accurate statistics, scholars have to rely on estimates that are recurrently produced, even though the exact nature of data collection, processing, adjustment and publication of these estimates is rarely clarified and thus cannot be validated.

Looking at the most recently published data, one can assume that trends in migration have not changed notably since the aftermath of the 1990–1991Gulf War, which had provoked considerable disruption among migrant communities in the Gulf region. The overall dependency in immigrant labour is still unchanged, as is the predominance of men, of low-skilled workers, and of non-Arabs, mostly Asians, among migrants.

In Saudi Arabia, the very same proportion of non-nationals was found at the two population censuses of 1992 and 2004, 27.4% and 27.1% respectively,[11] as well as the same proportion of women among immigrants (29.6% and 30.5% respectively) indicating that there has not been any significant feminisation of migration, contrary to previous expectations. Domestic work remains the single most important profession among women migrants in the GCC region (as in other countries of the Mashreq, such as Lebanon and Jordan (Jaber 2005, Jureidini 2002)).

The Saudi Labour Force Survey of 2002 found that the bulk of immigrant workers still have low levels of skills (54.1% with no education or only primary education, compared with 32.9% among Saudi workers), and particularly women immigrant workers (66.7% with no education or only primary education and only 9.6% with university education, compared with respectively 6.4% and 51.1% among Saudi working women).[12]

In all GCC countries Arabs are currently a minority of migrants: 38% in Saudi Arabia and 46% in Kuwait around 25% in Qatar and 10% in the UAE, and less than 10% in Oman, where non-Arabs account for 95.6% of the immigrant labour force in the private and public sectors combined, with Indians alone accounting for 60% (Girgis 2002, Shah 2004, Kapiszewski 2004, State of Oman 2004).

Outside the Gulf region, a few other countries host immigrant communities ranging in the hundreds of thousands. Libya has probably the largest of these communities but it provides no up-to-date population statistics. Jordan hosts a sizeable population of migrant workers, in particular from Egypt (124,566 at the last Jordanian population census in 1994, 226,850 according to Egyptian records in 2001), and Lebanon, together with Jordan and Egypt, receive increasing numbers of workers from Sri-Lanka, the Philippines and a few other Asian countries. More than 55,000 work permits are attributed each year in Lebanon to East-Asians, mostly women. Syria has a sizeable Palestinian refugee population (2.16% of its total population, i.e. an estimated 402,000 in

2005), but few other foreign residents, whose total number was estimated at 55,000 in 2005 (Sadeldine 2005).[13]

1.3.2 The particular situation of the Palestinian Territory

Starting from the onset of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, and particularly since the Oslo Declaration of Principles and the Peace Process initiated in 1993, the Palestinian Territory has become a country of immigration for a significant number of Israeli citizens. The UN database gives a number of immigrants in Palestine equal to that of refugees (1,680,142 in 2005), which implicitly means that there are no immigrants other than Palestinian refugees (whose quality of 'immigrants' is a matter of debate, see Section 1.1).

However, there are other immigrants in the Palestinian Territory. Regarding the two criteria of 'country of citizenship' and 'country of birth', one should indeed count as immigrants the 422,000 Israelis settlers currently living in the West Bank—182,000 in East Jerusalem and 237,000 in the rest of the West Bank (Fargues 2005a, Table 2, p. 375), not including the 8,000 Israeli citizens who returned from the Gaza strip to Israel in 2005—because they are residing beyond the 'Green Line' which is the only internationally recognised border between Palestine and Israel.

1.3.3 Rising illegal immigration

Figures provided in Table 10 do not entirely reflect the entire picture of immigration into Arab countries. Other flows, most of them unrecorded by official statistics, are nevertheless notorious. Sudanese refugees in Egypt (Roman 2006), Iraqi refugees in Jordan (Chatelard 2004) and Syrian temporary workers in Lebanon[14] have never been counted, but figures ranging in the hundreds of thousands have been put forward by several sources of the media or NGOs for each of these flows.

The GCC states, as all other major countries of immigration around the world, host unrecorded but probably large numbers of irregular migrants (Shah, 2005). They have usually entered legally but over-stayed illegally, either while on a pilgrimage (Saudi Arabia), or through a 'sub-contracting' process whereby sponsors recruit more worker migrants than there are actual jobs available and then place them with another broker in order receive twice the fee, from two successive brokers, which puts the immigrant in an illegal situation until the second broker finds that worker a job (Battistella, 2005). In the United Arab Emirates, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs reports that the number of illegal immigrants in the country may be as high as 300,000,[15] and in Saudi Arabia, some 700,000 deportations of irregular migrants would take place every year.

Illegal immigration is not only occurring in traditional countries of immigration, but also in most traditional countries of emigration, which are currently turning into new countries of immigration. They are still major senders while at the same time they have become significant receivers of migrants. The immigration they receive is largely made of 'transit migrants' (Lahlou, 2005), i.e. persons who were initially trying to reach a more distant destination—in particular, Europe—but found themselves stuck at the gate of their intended destination because of restrictive policies regarding the admission of aliens and reinforced border controls. This immigration is commonly considered unwanted, because it challenges local economies that are already plagued by

unemployment and labour surpluses, and puts pressure on administrative systems that are better adapted to deal with the emigration of nationals than with the immigration of aliens.

All of the Maghreb has now become a transit region. It began with Morocco, the closest to Europe, and then spread to countries more distant from Europe, as the shortest routes were becoming subject to the tightened controls. Successively Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and now Mauritania became ports of embarkation for illegal migrants arrived from Africa South of the Sahara. But it takes times to embark and those who eventually do it are a minority. An increasing number of would-be migrants remain in the transit country where they become *de facto* settlers and enter the local labour market, and in some cases occupy entire niches in the economy of the transit country (Bensaad 2005).

(Table 11: Numbers of apprehended irregular migrants in Morocco, 2000-2005)

Numbers of such migrants rank in the tens of thousands if one judges from statistics of apprehended cases (Table 11). This phenomenon is not limited to the Maghreb, but extends to Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Yemen itself, one of the poorest countries of the world but located at the gate of countries that are among the wealthiest, has become a place of transit for migrants originating from the Horn of Africa and initially bound for GCC states.

Given, the strengthening of migratory pressures in its southern and eastern neighbourhood on the one hand, and the tightening of border control and conditions required for in its northern neighbourhood and in the Gulf, on the other, it seems likely that transit migration will continue to gain momentum in the Arab region.

2 Policies

As a result of changes in migration to, from and through the Arab region, the old dichotomy opposing sending to receiving countries is no longer fully operational for policymaking. There is no longer a clear-cut division between the two situations since all traditional senders have themselves become receivers, and apart from GCC states and Libya, every country now has two policies at the same time, one a regarding its expatriates and the other regarding immigrants.

In what follows we argue that there is less contrast between Arab countries with regard to either immigration or emigration policies, than between policies dealing with emigration on one hand, and those dealing with immigration, on the other. Schematically, all Arab countries that have significant expatriate communities are willing to mobilise these communities for national purposes and have a positive vision of emigration. At the same time, all Arab countries, whether predominantly senders or receivers, are developing increasingly restrictive policies of immigration. At the risk of being too schematic, one can say that, whatever the country. emigration is predominantly viewed as part of the solution, and immigration as part of the problem

2.1 Emigration policies

For decades development and employment have been top issues on the policy agendas of Arab countries. It is in this framework that emigration may be viewed by some governments as part of the solution, and not solely as part of the problem. The policy of Arab countries regarding current emigration, its level and composition, varies from disincentive to encouragement according to period and context (Fargues, 2004). Their policy varies much less regarding emigrants themselves, who most Arab governments regard as a resource that can be mobilised for national purposes.

2.1.1 Emigration between *laissez-faire* and incitement

Apart from the GCC states (now themselves faced with significant levels of unemployment among their young nationals) Arab governments generally recognise that sending surplus manpower abroad may alleviate pressures on their domestic labour markets. As far back as the 1960s (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria), and 1970s (Egypt and Jordan), several of the Arab states actively facilitated the international mobility of their nationals. For some of them, emigration became part and parcel of national growth strategies enshrined in their development plans (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen). For others the emigration of citizens could not be openly viewed as a policy solution to unemployment.

In some Arab countries policies have been remarkably constant over time. Morocco is one of them. Its 1968 five-year plan already set as a target the largest possible number of emigrants in order to retain as few unemployed workers as possible on the national labour market, to draw a maximum of financial resources in the national economy through workers' remittances, and to raise the skills of the national labour force in anticipation of its return. Morocco stuck to the same policy line when European governments started to close the door to labour immigration in the mid-1970s. At the same time, the King of Morocco was recurrently affirming his unwillingness for the integration of Moroccan expatriates in host societies and the recognition the double nationality. Moroccan policy was perfectly coherent: emigration is an export activity, and if it is promoted, it is for the country's benefit.

Tunisia, after a short period when its government could incite its expatriates to return in the wake of the migration crisis with Europe started in 1974, has always shown a similar concern for channelling to the country emigrants savings and investments.

Yemen is another country where emigration has constantly been promoted in recent decades. Despite the forced return of more than half a million of its expatriates workers from Saudi Arabia during the 1990–1991 Gulf War, its government has continued to make emigration a goal. Its five-year plan 2000–2005 provides for the "cooperation with neighbouring countries to increase the share of Yemeni migrant workers in those countries, as well as explore new employment fields that correspond to improved skills of the Yemeni labour", and encourages "the private sector to establish and operate training centres, including those that train Yemenis wishing to emigrate on the occupations and skills required in foreign markets".[16]

Other countries, such as Algeria, have on the contrary reserves about emigration. After a short period when emigration was bilaterally managed, in 1973 the government of

Algeria unilaterally decided to discontinue its labour migration agreement with France, encouraged its expatriates to return back home (which very few did), and denounced emigration as a form of post-colonial dependence. Indeed, Algeria receives considerable income from its oil and gas exports and the government does not view remittances as an important resource for development. However, it is faced with alarming levels of unemployment (on average 20–30% of the workforce from independence in 1962 until the time of writing) and thus tacitly views its expatriates staying abroad from a positive angle, as a means to contain the pressure on the domestic labour market, and consequently on the state.

Egypt, by contrast, has followed a totally different path with a strict limitation of emigration under President Nasser and until the war of 1973, followed by President Sadat's 'open door' policy which unlocked the borders of Egypt to the entry of foreign investors as well as to the emigration of millions of Egyptian workers. In 1996 its Ministry of Manpower and Emigration was assigned a goal of 'linking emigration policy with the national interests of the state in achieving economic and social development'.[17]

The positions taken by Arab governments vary according to the levels of skills involved in the emigration process. They are generally more willing to encourage the emigration of their low-skilled workers than of highly-skilled professionals, even though this preference does not reflect systematically current patterns of unemployment. As a matter of facts, unemployment now affects the entire hierarchy of skills, and in several Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon) the highest rates of unemployment are registered among the young and university-educated.

Whatever the actual level of employment of highly-skilled workers, Arab governments predominantly view their emigration as the loss of a scarce resource, rather than as an opportunity to enhance skills available to the country through additional experience gained abroad in case of return migration. It is widely acknowledged that the causes of the brain drain do not lie exclusively in wages differentials between origin and destination countries, but also stem from national institutional systems that hamper individual prospects for social mobility and professional advancement, and offer low rewards for skills. In some cases, political factors and particularly civil conflicts have a certain bearing on the decision of elites to leave their country of origin (e.g. Lebanon in the late 1970s and 1980s, Algeria in the 1990s, Syria, etc.). However important the emigration of highly-skilled workers has become (Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan) no specific public policies have been designed to tackle the issue.

Governments also have to accommodate public opinion and those parties that do not systematically approve of emigration. In Lebanon for example, part of the opposition has recurrently argued that high rates of emigration entail the risk of depopulation, and criticizes the government for emphasising the positive image of the country generated by its large and often influential diaspora (Kiwan, 2005).

In the framework of the Barcelona Process, eight Arab countries have signed association agreements with the European Union, which may have a bearing with migration. These agreements include provisions relating to the living and working conditions of legally settled migrant communities, to the prevention of illegal migration, and to the reduction of migratory pressures, but nothing on the management of further economic migration.

However, several Arab governments fear that the scheduled establishment of a free trade area in the Mediterranean in compliance with the association agreements, may have a disruptive effect on their domestic production, leading to substantial job losses and increasing migratory pressures. They also point out that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the security-oriented and tightened migration policies of the European Union and its Member States may jeopardise their development potential. They suggest that *ad hoc* solutions be found to secure labour mobility and labour circulation, as they view both factors as a corollary to the transition process in which their countries are currently involved. Tunisia and Morocco asked the European Union to initiate a dialogue on visa facilitation in order to guarantee a modicum of circulation for specific categories of migrant workers. Both countries view visa facilitation and labour circulation as essential accompanying measures to development and economic liberalisation.[18]

2.1.2 Diasporas as a mobilisable resource for countries of origin

Governments of Arab migrants' origin countries have all set up institutions—either ministries or specialised ministerial sections, as well as specialised agencies—to help institutionalise the links between emigrants, wherever they reside, and their country of origin. These institutions have developed policies along two lines: economic and cultural.

a) Economic line

Emigration, whether permanent or temporary, generates substantial financial remittances that help offset persisting trade balance deficits and inadequate welfare systems. It can also foster the acquisition of high levels of skill and influential positions. Arab governments are willing to channel the progressive economic empowerment of their expatriates and global elites.

Because remittances and in-kind transfers are sent to migrants' families, they often reach the same regions that migrants come from, i.e. those most in need of development resources. All ministries or state agencies dedicated to developing links with emigrant communities work to maximise the financial flows received from migrant communities, as a way to help them contribute to the economic and human development of their region or community of origin, by facilitating financial transfers made by emigrants and inciting them to invest at home.

A range of banking and investment reforms have been adopted by most countries with a view to stimulating the growth of remittances, to sustaining the expansion of the private sector, and to favouring the inflows of direct investments made by nationals residing abroad. In several countries, exchange controls were relaxed and current accounts in convertible local currencies were allowed; banks of origin countries set up branches in major receiving countries.

To date, neither the impact of these institutions on the volume of remittances, nor the role played by remittances on the development of local recipient economies, or the improvement of education and health in communities left behind, have been assessed. In addition, very little is known about the variation of remittances over the life cycle of migrants, and in particular whether migrants' propensity to remit follows a reverse-U curve and diminishes after a given duration of stay in host countries. Consequently it is impossible to judge whether a remittances-driven development is sustainable, or

presupposes continuous flows of emigration in order to maintain continuous flows of remittances.

b) Cultural line

Countries of origin do not view expatriate communities solely as a source of external financing. Institutions set up to manage relations between expatriates and their country of origin take into account the range of assets that these communities represent, not only financially, but also in terms of human, cultural and social resources.

Irrespective of whether or not they left their country with the intention of returning home, many Arab emigrants, particularly to the West, end up settling, marrying and having children in their host country. The transition from first-generation to second-generation immigrants is accompanied by a cultural transition within the family, as the first generation is educated in their country of origin and the second in the host country. In order to tackle this situation, in Arab countries state-institutions dealing with their expatriate communities have initiated programmes offering migrant populations the means to maintain—or revive—links with their culture of origin. They organise religious and linguistic activitiesin the host countries (courses of religion and Arabic language for second-generation migrants), or at home (holidays in countries of origin). Several of them view the training of imams in state-controlled institutions in their countries of origin as a guarantee against the self-appointment, within the immigrant populations, of elements that could undermine the maintenance of civic order and offer easy prey to extremist movements (Fargues, 2005b).

Apart from their economic and cultural role, institutions in the countries of origin may also intervene in other domains, notably:

- the legal domain, with a view to protecting migrants' rights in their country of residence;
- the political domain, with a view to managing political participation of migrants in their country of origin.

To date, only Algeria and Morocco have extended the right to elect (both countries) and be elected in their country of origin to second-generation migrants.[19] In other cases, some emigrants have been able to elect their presidential leaders through the diplomatic representations of their countries of origin (e.g. Tunisia). In Lebanon, it is feared that granting émigrés a right to vote in parliamentary elections may have a disruptive effect on the communal balance of power, since their communal distribution is suspected to be different from that of the Lebanese population residing in Lebanon.

2.2 Policies on immigration

All Arab countries have become receivers of migrants. Whether large and traditional or small and recent receivers of imigrants (see Section 1), Arab countries share two common stances on immigration: protectionism, and the absence of any project for integrating immigrants into society.

2.2.1 A predominantly protectionist approach

Arab countries (like many others) share a concern for keeping work as far as possible for their nationals. This is a relatively new situation for the large oil-exporting countries which had adopted a predominantly labour importing policy until the Gulf War of 1990–91, and an entirely new situation for the non-oil Arab countries, which had long been exclusively exporters of labour and have suddenly been faced during the last decade with the unprecedented challenges of transit migrants on their labour markets.

a) Indigenisation of the workforce in the Gulf

Labour migration policies in the Gulf are protectionist in two different ways. By making the entry of foreign workers more difficult (tightened visa issuance) as well as their stay (limited right to family reunification, non-eligibility to free heath insurance schemes or free education, etc.) they intend to curb the supply of foreign labour. By giving priority to the employment of nationals (indigenisation policies) they intend to curb the demand for foreign labour (Shah, 2005).

Saudi Arabia illustrates a situation common to all GCC states. Foreigners account for one third of its population and two thirds of its workforce, a figure which rises to 95% for employment in the private sector. These foreigners send their savings to their countries of origin. As a result, it is an average $16 billion/year that leaves annually Saudi Arabia where the economy, prior to the soaring oil prices as of 2002, had suffered a decade where the rates of growth of GDP were lower than that of the population. Unemployment reaches 8% among Saudi nationals (30% of the younger cohorts) while economic activities continue to rely heavily on immigrant labour. Private-sector employers have an interest in hiring foreigners, whom they pay less than nationals, while nationals search for employment in the public sector which offers higher wages, more security, better welfare packages and more prestige. It was in order to curb these trends that the Saudi government formulated a policy of 'saudisation' in the mid-1990s (Looney, 2004; Pakkiasamy, 2004).

Saudisation consists in banning the employment of foreigners in certain professions, in requiring private firms to increase the share of Saudi nationals among their employees (by 5% a year for firms with over 20 employees), and in taxing the recruitment of foreigners. It is relayed by other policies, such as employment-oriented education and training schemes for young Saudis. In 2003 the goal was to reduce the proportion of foreigners to 20% of the overall population and to limit the proportion of any single foreign nationality to a maximum of 10% of the total foreign population in ten years. [20]

Only the detailed results of the 2004 population census (not yet released at the time of writing) will allow us to assess the real impact of Saudisation on the actual distribution of the population by nationality and economic activity. However, its preliminary results give a number of foreigners significantly lower than previously expected. The census counted 6,144,236 foreigners, i.e. 27.1% of the total population, a proportion slightly lower than the one found at the previous census (27.4% in 1992), but much lower than what was thought just before the census when the number of foreigners was estimated by the Minister of Labour at 8.8 million,[21] that is, 36.7% of the total population.

Comparable policies of indigenisation have been developed by all GCC countries, with limited success. It is reported for example that in Oman during the four years 2001-2004 close to 50,000 nationals have left their jobs in private companies, because of low wages.[22]

It is not only in GCC states that immigrants are viewed as competitors of the local labour force on the labour market. Several other countries of the Mashreq have limited the access of foreigners to specific occupations in order to avoid competition with local manpower. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria have adopted this kind of limitation, while in 2005 Lebanon lifted an earlier decision banning Palestinian refugees from a whole list of professions.

b) Prevention of illegal immigration in Northern Africa

Most Arab countries have adopted restrictive policies and legal provisions regarding economic migration with a view to protecting the employment opportunities of their nationals in domestic labour markets. Few countries, however, possess the required instruments to deal with illegal transit migration. Two of them, Morocco in 2003 (Elmadmad, 2005) and Tunisia in 2004 (Chékir and Ben Cheikh 2005), have adopted new laws on the entry, residence, and exit of foreigners, in response to illegal migration from and through their territory. These laws prescribe severe punishments for smugglers and illegal migrants, but contain no provision for the protection of foreign migrants against mistreatment by employers or the administration. These laws have sparked off a heated public debate and attracted harsh criticism from human rights organisations. It was argued that they do not provide a sustainable solution to the problem of illegal migrants from Sub-Saharan countries) and that they marginalise and repress illegal migrants, at the risk of aggravating their humanitarian plight. It was also argued that these laws were only adopted in response to pressure from Europe.

However, good relations with Europe are not the only reason why the governments of the Maghreb participate into the Euro-Med efforts to prevent illegal migration (Cassarino, 2005). This participation also addresses their concerns regarding domestic employment and security. The agreement between the European Union and its Mediterranean partners is only partial insofar as only the latter consider that illegal and legal migration need to be linked. For governments of the Maghreb, development is the best preventive policy to combat illegal migration. They insist that illegal migration is a result of underdevelopment combined with closed borders, and that legal labour migration works for development, through the financial and non-tangible transfers made by migrants. These governments consider that their best approach would be global, whereby preventing illegal migration and reopening channels of legal economic migration are two inseparable and complementary facets of any coherent migration policy.

2.2.2 Absence of integration projects

Migration often starts as a temporary move, but ends up in a permanent settlement. When guest workers become settlers, the question of their integration in host societies arises. Integration can be broadly defined as the process by which migrants are able to participate in the building of a cohesive society respectful of comparable rights and obligations. For example, the European Commission has recommended that immigrants in European countries gradually acquire core rights and assume obligations, so that they

be treated in the same way as nationals of their host state, even if they are not naturalised. In this vision, integration includes the right to family reunification, access to work and equal treatment in the workplace, the promotion of 'civic citizenship' guaranteeing a number of rights and obligations, the protection of immigrants by anti-discrimination legislation and policy tools and, in many cases, the opportunity to acquire citizenship of the host country.

No modern Arab country has any project of this sort. Integrating foreigners into society, be they Arabs or non-Arabs, is not on any agenda. The unwillingness to integrate migrants has become particularly clear in the Gulf after the crisis of 1990–91.

The 1990-91 Gulf-War was the first large-scale military conflict to take place at a major crossroads of international labour migration. It threw millions of legal migrants on the road of return. It was an opportunity for major labour importing countries to affirm policies of indigenisation for their labour force. After the political crisis these countries were faced with an economic crisis. The price of oil, which had only increased slightly during the war, then fell progressively until 2000. The bill of post-war reconstruction had to be paid with oil income on the decline. For the first time, GCC nationals were faced with a drop in purchasing power and the emergence of unemployment among graduates. Young generations of the oil bust were entering the labour markets armed with diplomas but with no guarantee of being hired, while their fathers, the first oil boom generation had mostly ignored labour markets. This is the context in which policies for transferring jobs from non-nationals to nationals were formulated.

The entire concept of labour was affected. During the first oil boom, labour was seen as a means for transforming oil income into welfare and capital. Work was assured by non-nationals, but the capital it produced was kept by nationals, through the sponsorship system: in other words, labour imports were responding to a strategy of capital accumulation. Revealing the vulnerability of economies built on imported labour, the crisis of 1990–91 has led to a political reappraisal of national labour. Labour should now transform oil income into wages, to the benefit of nationals, and thus serve the social contract and the political link. According to this new conception, immigrants and nationals are competitors for employment and priority should be given to the latter.

In an integrationist context amnesties are intended to regularise illegal migrants, thus enabling them to remain legally in their host country. By contrast, all amnesties in GCC states consist in waiving fines and prison sentences imposed on illegal migrants replacing this with deportation rather than integration.

Conclusion

Three facts emerge from the above analysis of trends and policies of international migration in the Arab region.

First, all Arab countries are now exposed to migration at a significant level, with around 15 million first-generation immigrants and roughly the same number of first-generation emigrants. Not only migration has gained momentum in recent years, but one can reckon that it will continue to rise in years to come. On one side, emigration will be driven by persisting international differentials – in labour opportunities, wages, return to skills,

governance, security, etc. – that work to the disadvantage of Arab countries and make Europe and North America desirable places for many would-be migrants. On the other side, immigration will be driven, in the Gulf by the resumption of soaring oil prices, and in the rest of the Arab region by tightened immigration policies and reinforced border controls pursued by major countries of immigration – in particular European Union member States and the Gulf States – that make their neighbours unwitting receivers of transit migrants. As a consequence, there is an unprecedented need for specific policies dealing with international migration.

The second fact is that migration creates a durable link between origin and destination countries. It has been shown elsewhere that the movement of persons, including migration, has become a key form of exchange between countries that are otherwise poorly linked by low levels of international trade, such as the Gulf States and the other Arab countries, or the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. If one judges from financial statistics, in many cases workers remittances come far before any single export of goods or services. Not only migration brings substantial financial transfers, but it fosters a range of human relations which persist for generations, since many migrants tend to settle in their destination country. That migrants are bridges between societies finds expression in the gap between statistics of origin and destination countries: it has been found that numbers of migrants counted by the former are systematically in excess compared with those counted by the latter. Among the various reasons which explain this gap, the presence of multiple citizens and of second-generation migrants counted as nationals by both countries is a clear sign that the same individuals are recognised theirs by different societies. As a consequence, there is a need for international migration policies to be the product of international dialogue.

The third fact is that the distinction between countries of emigration and countries of immigration is increasingly blurred in the Arab region. Indeed, all Arab countries have become receivers of migrants whether wanted or unwanted and irrespective to their remaining major senders of migrants. In spite of the same countries being at the same time exposed to immigration and emigration, there is now a clear-cut opposition between policies dealing with emigration and those dealing with immigration. Schematically, emigration is regarded positive and thus protected and promoted while immigration is regarded negative and accordingly contained and restricted. Arab governments now court their diasporas and develop tools for mobilising them for national purposes as well as for defending their rights in host countries, but at the same time they adopt protectionist policies on immigration and do not show any willingness to integrate immigrants, whether non-Arab or Arab, into their own societies. As a consequence, there is a need for policies of emigration on one hand and of immigration on the other hand to be reconciled in the Arab region.

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[1] This section is largely taken from 'Overview' in Fargues 2005*a* , except paragraphs 'refugees and migrants' and 'the case of the Palestinian Territory'.

[2] www.unrwa.org

[3] In application of the Jordanian Law of Nationality of 1954, "Any person who, not being Jewish, possessed Palestinian Nationality before 15 May 1948 and was a regular resident in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan between 20 December 1949 and 16 February 1954" is a Jordanian national (Olwan, 2006).

[4] http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pdf/figures.pdf

[5] Emigration has been reconstructed (in the framework of the CARIM project www.carim.org) in eight Arab countries for which statistics were obtained from destination countries (Table 1) and / or origin countries (Table 2), from West to East: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon (henceforth Mediterranean Arab Countries). Owing to a lack of accurate data, tables do not include the rest of the Arab region which also comprises important countries of emigration, such as Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia and Mauritania.

[6] Jordan and Syria do not produce statistics on their expatriates.

[7] The total population of the Arab League's members states was 290 million in 2000 and 323 million in 2005.

[8] Moroccan time series of consular records by detailed country of residence over the twelve years from 1993–2004 are the only such data available to date in the Arab countries.

[9] Data computed from the Population Records, Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg/Heerlen 8/28/2005.

[10] Naturalisation of foreigners is rare in GCC countries, so that children born from foreigner residents are themselves foreigners.

[11] The population census of 2004 gives 16,529,302 Saudis and 6,144,236 non-Saudis, against 12,310,053 and 4,638,335 respectively in 1992.

[12] http://www.planning.gov.sa/statistic/sindexe.htm

[13] The UN database figure of 984,587 immigrants—which would make of Syria a leading country of immigration in the Middle East—does not seem to correspond to any statistics actually published by Syrian national sources.

[14] Before many of them left in 2005, more than 300,000 Syrian migrant workers would have been employed in Lebanon, mostly in the construction and agriculture sectors, according to media sources (Razzouk 2005).

[15] *Khaleej Times*, 23 February 2005.

[16] Yemen, Ministry of Planning and Development, Summary of the Second Five –Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 2001–2005, pp. 62, 63. See, http://www.mpic-yemen.org/new1/mpic.asp.

[17] http://www.emigration.gov.eg/

[18] In this respect, President Zin El-'Abidine Ben 'Ali made clear in November 2003 that the security concerns of the EU should not conceal the fact that migration flows are 'the direct consequence of the economic changes with which South Mediterranean countries are being faced in their development process and in the context of their openness to the North.' See, Réalités, '15ème Symposium international du RCD: vers une solidarité euro méditerranéenne', No. 932, November 2003. Additionally, the January 2005 lifting of the Multi-Fibre Agreements and its forecast disruptive effects on domestic labour markets are expected to put increased pressure on Tunisia and Morocco's capacity to absorb surplus manpower on their labour market, impacting on their capacity to manage effectively migration flows, irrespective of whether these are legal or illegal.

[19] Speech by King Mohamed VI of Morocco of 5 November 2005; see http://www.carim.org/database/SOC/MOR00245.pdf.

[20] The three expatriate communities from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are thought to exceed largely 1 million persons, while three others –from Egypt, Sudan, and the Philippines– might be just below this figure (Pakkiasamy 2004), that is above the 10% threshold. The detailed results of the census of 2004 will provide the real figures.
[21] www.saudinf.net.
[22] *Khaleej Times*, 29 March 2005.

TABLES

TABLE 1: EMIGRANTS FROM MEDITERRANEAN ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES AND IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES, ACCORDING TO STATISTICS OF DESTINATION COUNTRIES - MOST RECENT DATA*

Country of Destination		*Country of Origin*								
	*Definition***	*Algeria*	*Egypt*	*Jordan*	*Lebanon*	*Morocco*	*Palestine*	*Syria*	*Tunisia*	*Total*
Austria	B	330	4721	291	382	515	118	583	1194	8134
Belgium	B	7221	793		1045	83631		815	3263	96768
Cyprus	A	19	2609	222	1386	33	182	1638	19	6108
Czech Rep.	B	366	130	134	191	105	72	315	196	1509
Denmark	B	456	637	652	5361	3226	0	1037	508	11877
Estonia	B	1	1		1	1				4
Finland	B	225	210	132	95	613	10	134	183	1602
France	C	685558	15974	933	33278	725782	468	10826	260622	1733441
Germany	B	17308	14477	10435	47827	79838		28679	24243	222807
Greece	B	267	7448	672	1277	526		5552	231	15973
Hungary	B	216	178	131	90	23		487	23	1148
Italy	B	15750	40879	2011	3333	223661	389	2505	58628	347156
Ireland										
Latvia	A	8	8	9	88	6		16		135
Lithuania	B	2	3	14	119					138
Luxembourg	B	103	27	2	36	252	1	1	138	560
Malta										
Netherlands	A	4013	10982	833	2861	168400		6663	4117	197869
Poland										
Portugal	B	135	115	88	187	778	11	81	54	1449
Slovakia										
Slovenia	B									
Spain	B	46278	2501	1297	1442	511294		2579	1566	566957
Sweden	B	531	662	594	2238	1475		4801	871	11172
UK	A	10672	24705	3105	10454	12351	2490	4167	3070	71014
EU		789459	127060	21555	111691	1812510	3741	70879	358926	3295821
Algeria	B		5943	1496	391	18661	3791	723	8389	39394
Jordan	B	205	124566		2818	370	92131	31805	208	252103
Morocco	B	14392	780	401	560		392	1054	1860	19439
Tunisia	B	9612	672			6363	652	416		17715
Med-Arab		24209	131961	1897	3769	25394	96966	33998	10457	328651
Armenia	A				90			246		336
Australia	A		33370	2390	71310		2660	6730		116460
Canada	A	19095	35975	4880	67230	24640	5455	15680	4780	177735
Iceland	B	9	9	9	4	63		10	10	114
Iran	B									0
Japan	B	98	754	89	42	195		98	128	1404
New Zealand	A			546						546
Norway	B	424	210	96	290	1329		354	274	2977
Romania	A				1027			7412		8439

Country of Destination	*Definition***	*Country of Origin*								
		Algeria	*Egypt*	*Jordan*	*Lebanon*	*Morocco*	*Palestine*	*Syria*	*Tunisia*	*Total*
South Africa	C	19	42	14	12	55		2	4	148
Switzerland	B	3127	1369	288	1982	1982	122	671	4876	14417
USA	A	10880	113395	46795	105910	34680		54560	6330	372550
Other Countries*		33652	185124	55107	247897	62944	8237	85763	16402	695126
Total		847320	444145	78559	363357	1900848	108944	190640	385785	4319598

* This table contains only those countries which provide census data on foreign residents by detailed country of nationality / birth. Some of the world major countries of immigration, such Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries of the Gulf, could not be included by lack of accurate data.

** Immigrants are defined as foreign born [A], non-nationals [B], or a combination of both criteria [C]

Sources of data: Algeria: Recensement de la Population 1998 ; Armenia: 2001 population census) ; Australia: 2001 Population Census ; Austria : Population census, 2001 ; Belgium: Office des étrangers, 2005 ; Canada : 2001, Statistics Canada ; Cyprus: Census of Population, 2002 ; Czech Republic: Ministry of the Interior, 2002 ; Denmark: Statistics Denmark, 2003 ; Estonia: Population census, 2000 ; Finland: Statistics Finland, 2003 ; France: Recensement de la population, INSEE, 1999 ; Germany: Central Register on Foreigners, 2002 ; Greece: Population Census, 2001 ; Hungary: Population Census, 2001 ; Iceland: Statistics Iceland, 2003 ; Iran: Statistical Centre of Iran, 2003 ; Ireland: nd ; Italy: Residence permits 31.08.2004 ; Japan: Japan Statistics Bureau, 2000 ; Jordan: Population and Housing Census 1994 ; Latvia: Population and Housing Census, 2000 ; Lithuania: Population and Housing Census 2001 ; Luxembourg: RP2001 ; Malta: nd ; Morocco: Direction Gén. Sûreté Générale, 2002 ; Netherlands: Netherlands statistics, 2004 ; New Zealand: Population census, 2001 ; Norway: Statistics Norway, 2005 ; Palestinian Territory: Israel, Central Bureau of Stat, end 2004 ;

Poland: nd ; Portugal: 2003 ; Romania: Census of Population, 2002 ; Slovakia: nd ; Slovenia: Population Census, 2000 ; South Africa: Statistics South Africa,2003 ; Spain: Source Fuente de información: Dirección General de la Policía, 31.12.2005 ; Sweden: Statistics Sweden, 2003 ; Switzerland: Office fédéral de l'immigration, 2003 ; Tunisia : Recensement de la Population 2004 ; Turkey: Population Census of 2000 ; United Kingdom: 2001 Census ; United States: 2000, U.S. Census Bureau, Census.

Source of the table: Fargues, Ph. (Ed) Mediterranean Migration Report 2005, CARIM, European University Institute, Florence 2005, pp. 374-5

TABLE 2 : MIGRANTS FROM 6 ARAB COUNTRIES BY GROUP OF COUNTRIES OF RESIDENCE, ACCORDING TO STATISTICS OF ORIGIN COUNTRIES

Country	*Type of data*	*Country of residence*			*Total*
		*European Countries**	*Arab Countries*	*Other Countries*	
Algeria 1995	A	991796	66398	14052	1072246
Egypt 2000	B	436000	1912729	388000	2736729
Lebanon 2001	B	157030	123966	325604	606600
Morocco 2004	A	2616871	282772	189447	3089090
Tunisia 2003	A	695765	116926	30513	843204
Sub-total		4897462	2502791	947616	8347869
Palestine 2002	C	295075	4180673	231723	4707471
Total		5192537	6683464	1179339	13055340

Type of data: A = consular records; B = survey on expatriates, C = PCBS estimates of Palestinian refugees worldwide.

* Europe to read in the case of Palestinian refugees as all countries except the Arab countries and the US

Source: Fargues (Ed) *Mediterranean Migration Report 2005*, CARIM, European University Institute, Florence 2005

TABLE 3: COMPARISON BETWEEN NUMBERS OF MIGRANTS COUNTED BY THEIR ORIGIN COUNTRY IN THE ARAB REGION AND THEIR DESTINATION COUNTRIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION*

Origin country	*Migrants counted by*			
	Destination countries (EU)	*Origin countries*	*Difference {Origin - Destination}*	
			Absolute	*Relative*
Algeria 1995	766966	991796	224830	29%
Egypt 2000	126126	436000	309874	246%
Lebanon 2001	111261	157030	45769	41%
Morocco 2004	1634986	2616871	981885	60%
Palestiniam Territory 2002**	3741	295075	291334	7788%
Tunisia 2003	358269	695765	337496	94%
Total	3001349	5192537	2191188	73%

* Only 6 Arab countries publish statistics of their expatriates by countries of residence. No comparative table can be constructed for migrants in Gulf, for lack of statistics on immigrants by country of nationality in these countries.

Source: Tables 1 & 2

TABLE 4: NUMBERS OF MOROCCAN MIGRANTS ACCORDING TO WHICH COUNTRY COUNTS

Country of Destination	Country where migrants are counted			
	Destination Country	Origin Country	Difference {Origin -Destination}	
			Absolute	Relative
Austria	515	1164	649	126%
Belgium	83631	293097	209466	250%
Czech Rep.	105	214	109	104%
Denmark	3226	6300	3074	95%
Finland	613	1103	490	80%
France	725782	1113176	387394	53%
Germany	79838	102000	22162	28%
Greece	526	630	104	20%
Hungary	23	40	17	74%
Italy	223661	298949	75288	34%
Luxembourg	252	666	414	164%
Netherlands	168400	300332	131932	78%
Portugal	778	2866	2088	268%
Spain	333770	423933	90163	27%
Sweden	1475	10000	8525	578%
United Kingdom	12351	35000	22649	183%
Algeria	18661	79790	61129	328%
Canada	24640	77713	53073	215%
Japan	195	419	224	115%
Jordan	370	1958	1588	429%
South Africa	55	832	777	1413%
Switzerland	1982	11500	9518	480%
Tunisia	6363	25637	19274	303%
United States	34680	100000	65320	188%
Sub-total	1721892	2887319	1165427	68%
Other countries	n.a.	201771		
Total		3089090		

Sources: Destination countries figures: National censuses or population registers; origin country figures: Source:Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, 2005; Table: Fargues (Ed) 2005, *Mediterranean Migration Report 2005*, EUI, Florence.

TABLE 5: REFUGEE POPULATION BY COUNTRY OF ASYLUM / ORIGIN

Country \ Year	*by country of asylum*		*by country of origin*	
	1994	*2003*	*1994*	*2003*
Algeria	219.1	0.0	20.7	11.7
Bahrain	0.0	0.3		
Djibouti	33.4	234.0	18.1	0.5
Egypt (1)	7.2	0.0	0.5	5.7
Iraq (2)	119.6	134.2	749.8	368.6
Jordan	0.6	1.2		
Kuwait (3)	30.0	1.5		
Lebanon	1.4	2.5	15.7	24.9
Libya	2.0	11.9		
Mauritania	82.2	0.5	68.0	30.5
Morocco	0.3	2.1		
Palestinian Territory			82.6	427.9
Qatar	0.0	0.0		
Saudi Arabia (4)	18.0	240.8		
Somalia	0.4	0.4	631.4	402.3
Sudan	727.2	138.2	405.1	606.2
Syria	40.3	3.7	7.1	20.3
Tunisia	0.0	0.1		
United Arab Emirates	0.4	0.2		
Yemen	48.3	61.9		
Arab Countries	1,330.3	833.5	1,999.1	1,898.7
World Total	15,733.7	9,680.3	15,733.7	9,680.3

Source: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics

1. The 2002-2003 figures include an estimated 70,000 Palestinian refugees residing in the country.

2. Figure for 2003 refers to end-2002.

3. Since 1995, 27,000 Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, previously assisted by UNHCR, are no longer reported by the UNHCR Office.

4. The 2001-2003 figures include some 240,000 Palestinians who were not reported previously.

TABLE 6:MOROCCAN POPULATION RESIDING ABROAD ACCORDING TO CONSULAR RECORDS 1993-2004

Country of registration	*1993*	*2004*	*Annual rate of growth %*
Europe			
France	678917	1113176	4.50%
Spain	65847	423933	16.93%
Netherlands	164546	300332	5.47%
Italy	91699	298949	10.74%
Belgium	145363	293097	6.38%
Germany	85156	102000	1.64%
United Kingdom	25000	35000	3.06%
Switzerland	5517	11500	6.68%
Sweden	5500	10000	5.43%
Russia	-	8687	-
Denmark	4622	6300	2.82%
Norway	3400	6300	5.61%
Other	-	7597	-
Total Europe	1279558	2616871	6.50%
Arab Countries			
Libya	102413	120000	1.44%
Algeria	54576	79790	3.45%
Saudi Arabia	9000	27830	10.26%
Tunisia	20000	25637	2.26%
United Arab Emirates	2992	13040	13.38%
Other	7036	16475	7.73%
Total Arab Countries	196017	282772	3.33%
Other countries			
United States	25000	100000	12.60%
Canada	45000	77713	4.97%
Other	3722	11734	10.44%
Total other countries	73722	189447	8.58%
TOTAL	1549297	3089090	6.27%

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, 2005

TABLE 7: NATIONALS FROM SELECTED ARAB COUNTRIES RESIDING IN SPAIN 31/12/1998 - 31/12/2005

Country of nationality	*1998*	*2005*	*Change 1998-2005*	*Annual rate of growth %*
Algeria	5,924	46,278	40,354	29.4
Egypt	799	2,501	1,702	16.3
Morocco	111,043	511,294	400,251	21.8
Tunisia	528	1,566	1,038	15.5
Jordan	696	1,297	601	8.9
Lebanon	1,072	1,442	370	4.2
Syria	1,187	2,579	1,392	11.1
Total 7 countries	123,247	568,962	445,708	21.9

Source: Fuente de información: Dirección General de la Policía - INE 2006

TABLE 8: ACTIVE POPULATION ORIGINATING FROM ARAB COUNTRIES, ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, COUNTRY OF DESTINATION AND OCCUPATION*

Country of Origin	*Country of Destination*	*Legislators, senior officials and managers*	*Professionals*	*Technicians and associate professionals*	*Clerks*	*Service workers and shop and market sales workers*	*Skilled agricultural and fishery workers*	*Craft and related trades workers*	*Plant and machine operators and assemblers*	*Elementary occupations workers*	*Armed forces*	*Total*
Algeria	Canada	1095	3135	1190	1245	1965	900	30	575	140		10275
	France	8452	11313	39546	49371	59698	472	91262	2182	65359		327655
	Spain	851	87	446	744	1582	2803	3700	1546	17	32	11808
	Tunisia	454	521	359	226	253	50	301	226	373		2763
	UK	2024	483	1594	0	919	412	0	606	575		6613
	USA	2840			1085	1335	-	325	800			6385
	Total	15716	15539	43135	52671	65752	4637	95618	5935	66464	32	365499
Egypt	Canada	4140	6655	2900	1600	3385	910	45	585	85		20305
	Jordan	40	302	31		276	42675	14764		47938		106026
	Spain	117	17	76	84	92	36	175	52	1	1	651
	Tunisia	105	98	59	19	26	7	143	16	44		517
	UK	3952	5284	2667	714	996		2423	-	439		16475
	USA	32320			7590	15065	95	2110	6580			63760
	Total	40674	12356	5733	10007	19840	43723	19660	7233	48507	1	207734
Palestinian Territory	Tunisia	50	52	12	20	4	--	1	2	2		143
	Canada	610	545	260	160	515	245	0	115	15		2465
	Spain	16	1	17	4	3	12	7	4	0	0	64
	Total	676	598	289	184	522	257	8	121	17	0	2672
Jordan	Canada	455	450	280	160	600	260	35	130	30		2400
	Spain	62	22	69	45	54	5	68	14	1	2	342
	USA	8870			2875	9035	40	1705	3275			25800
	Total	9387	472	349	3080	9689	305	1808	3419	31	2	28542
Lebanon	Canada	8260	5975	2945	4940	11410	140	5730	1950	520		41870
	Spain	108	25	80	63	97	9	59	19	1	0	461
	UK	989	-	1060	-	674		565	-	-		3288
	USA	26355			6025	16525	15	3920	6250			59090
	Total	35712	6000	4085	11028	28706	164	10274	8219	521	0	104709
Morocco	Canada	2440	3565	1910	1260	3220	1015	30	570	150		14160
	France	8769	10454	33634	34270	53626	2132	78395	19320	67016		307616
	Spain	9507	498	2757	8389	20799	29805	31704	15096	196	607	119358
	Tunisia	260	121	144	102	196	42	619	324	1421	0	3229
	UK	1467	470	542	-	932	-	-	454	735		4600

Country of Origin	*Country of Destination*	*Legislators, senior officials and managers*	*Professionals*	*Technicians and associate professionals*	*Clerks*	*Service workers and shop and market sales workers*	*Skilled agricultural and fishery workers*	*Craft and related trades workers*	*Plant and machine operators and assemblers*	*Elementary occupations workers*	*Armed forces*	*Total*
	USA	7300			4590	5610	4	1265	2480			21249
	Total	29743	15108	38987	48611	84383	32998	112013	38244	69518	607	470212
Syria	Canada	1490	1105	835	580	1650	1185	20	605	85		7555
	Jordan	6	143	6		235	96			1262		1748
	Spain	118	35	101	76	115	28	114	35	0	2	624
	Tunisia	84	78	28	22	18	3	24	9	8		274
	USA	10665			2600	7785	30	2045	3940			27065
	Total	12363	1361	970	3278	9803	1342	2203	4589	1355	2	37266
Tunisia	Canada	470	1070	270	305	655	275	25	105	10		3185
	France	5304	5862	14357	13737	21443	318	34446	1934	20573		117974
	Spain	57	9	46	53	92	26	112	48	1	2	446
	UK	1327	514	-	-					1384		3225
	USA	1640			545	690	15	185	360			3435
	Total	8798	7455	14673	14640	22880	634	34768	2447	21968	2	128265
Total 8 countries		153069	58889	108221	143499	241575	84060	276352	70207	208381	646	1344899

*Only countries of destination providing the distribution by occupation of Arab migrants by country of origin are included in Table 8.

Sources : Statistical Institues of Germany (2001), Canada (2001), Spain (2001), USA (2000), France (1999), UK (2002), Jordan (2003) and Tunisia (2004).

TABLE 9: MIGRANT POPULATION AGED 15 AND OVER ORIGINATING FROM MEDITERRANEAN ARAB COUNTRIES, ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION

Country of origin	*Country of residence*	*Level of Education*			*Total*
		Below primary or primary	*Lower secondary or secondary*	*Tertiary*	
Algeria	Austria	155	97	45	297
	Canada	2300	4310	10790	17405
	France	222751	157066	87757	467574
	Spain	7469	28759	426	36654
	Tunisia	4544	3175	1133	8912
	United-States**	1330	2075	6240	9645
	Total	238549	195482	106391	540487
Egypt	Austria	2084	901	821	3806
	Canada	3660	7215	23305	34185
	France	1569	2068	8953	12590
	Jordan	81959	23247	820	106026
	Spain	226	649	74	949
	Tunisia	159	186	222	980
	United-States**	7875	17470	71320	96665
	Total	97532	51736	105515	255201
Jordan	Austria	123	74	59	256
	Canada	905	1280	2070	4260
	France	78	85	506	669
	Spain	38	262	26	326
	United-States**	7490	10830	20825	39145
	Total	8634	12531	23486	44656
Lebanon	Austria	212	87	34	333
	Canada	20395	18695	25970	65045
	France	2778	4393	18298	25469
	Spain	46	337	21	404
	United-States**	20790	20920	50975	92685
	Total	44221	44432	95298	183936
Morocco	Austria	254	139	75	468
	Canada	4205	7505	12720	24425
	France	221985	143156	102326	467467
	Germany	8000	17000		25000
	Spain	100028	228171	2279	330478
	Tunisia	2694	2083	837	6396
	United-States**	4465	8465	16740	29670
	Total	341631	406519	134977	883904
Palestinian Territory	Austria	40	48	20	108
	Canada	1175	1795	2515	5490
	France	98	46	404	548
	Tunisia	54	192	358	479
	Total	1367	2081	3297	6625
Syria	Austria	298	117	90	505
	Canada	4350	3585	6780	14710
	France	1050	1246	6148	8444
	Spain	53	412	105	570

Country of origin	*Country of residence*	*Level of Education*			*Total*
		Below primary or primary	*Lower secondary or secondary*	*Tertiary*	
	Tunisia	58	118	174	676
	United-States**	13985	9265	24420	47670
	Jordan	1623	29	96	1748
	Total	21417	14772	37813	74323
Tunisia	Austria	602	378	70	1050
	Canada	655	1050	3510	5215
	France	69515	58559	36233	164307
	Spain	94	536	32	662
	United-States**	915	1030	3610	5555
	Total	71781	61553	43455	176789
Total 8 countries		825132	789106	550232	2165921

*Only countries of residence providing the distribution by occupation of Med-MENA migrants are included in the table

** Population aged 24 and over

Sources : Statistical Institutes of Austria (2001), Germany (2001), Canada (2001), Spain (2001), USA (2000), France (1999), UK (2002), Jordan (2003) and Tunisia (2004).

TABLE 10: NUMBERS OF IMMIGRANTS IN ARAB COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO NATIONAL SOURCES AND UN ESTIMATES

Country	*National data (most recent census / survey)*		*United Nations 2005*	*Difference UN / National*	
	Number	*Year*		*Absolute*	*Relative*
Algeria	72	1998	242	170	237%
Bahrain	245	2001	295	50	21%
Comoros			67		
Djibouti			20		
Egypt	116	1996	166	50	43%
Iraq			28		
Jordan	315	1994	2225	1910	606%
Kuwait	1388	2001	1669	281	20%
Lebanon	302	1997	657	355	117%
Libya			618		
Mauritania			66		
Morocco	61	2002	132	71	116%
Oman	559	2003	628	69	12%
Palestinian Territory (1)	422	2004	1680	1258	298%
Qatar	420	2001	637	217	52%
Saudi Arabia	6144		6361	217	4%
Somalia			282		
Sudan			639		
Syria	458		985	527	115%
Tunisia	35	2004	38	3	8%
United Arab Emirates	2488		3212	724	29%
Western Sahara			3		
Yemen			265		

Source : UN estimates http://esa.un.org/migration/

Saudi Arabia: Population Census, 2004

Kuwait: Public Authority for Civil Information (data of 2001) cited in Shah 2004.

Oman: Population Census 2003

Bahrain: Population census 2001

UAE and Qatar: GCC Secretariat source cited in Kapiszewski 2004

Algeria: Recensement de la Population 1998

Egypt: Population census, 1996

Jordan: Population census 1994

Lebanon: . ACS Conditions de vie des ménages 1997 / Choghig Kasparian, "L'entrée des jeunes libanais dans la vie active et l'émigration depuis 1975", Presses de l'Université St Joseph, Beyrouth, 2003

Morocco: Direction Gén. Sûreté Générale, 2002 / Source : Ministère des Affaires étrangères et de la Coopération, Maroc, 2005

TABLE 11: NUMBERS OF APPREHENDED IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN MOROCCO, 2000-2005

Year	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*
Nationals	9850	13002	16100	12400	9353	8000
Foreigners	14395	15000	15300	23851	17252	22000
Total	24245	28002	31400	36251	26605	30000

Source: Moroccan Ministry of the Interior