Development on the Move
Measuring and Optimising Migration’s Economic and Social Impacts

Laura Chappell, Ramona Angelescu-Naqvi, George Mavrotas and Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah
About ippr

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About GDN

GDN – the Global Development Network – is a small, independent international organisation that allies researchers and institutes in development globally. GDN aims to support researchers in developing and transition countries to generate and share applied social science research to advance social and economic development. It was founded in 1999 on the premise that good policy research, properly applied, can accelerate development and improve people’s lives. GDN’s core business is research capacity building. The aspiration is to achieve a critical mass of researchers who are globally interconnected and produce good research to inform public policy.

www.gdnet.org

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This report captures the main results from *Development on the Move: Measuring and Optimising Migration’s Economic and Social Impacts*, a joint project of the Global Development Network (GDN) and the Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr). We believe that this project is a unique and important contribution to the study of one of the most important phenomena of our time: international migration. It is a ground-breaking global research project that has gathered new, comparative qualitative and quantitative data about migration’s development impacts. It has done so through an ambitious methodology involving primary research in seven countries, across six continents. The researchers have spoken to close to a hundred thousand people and gathered comparable in-depth data from almost 10,000 households.

The project has also been ambitiously broad, looking at a wide range of migration’s development impacts, thinking about how migration as a whole affects development as a whole. And the project is uniquely policy focused, with policymaker inputs at various stages of the research and with fresh, workable policy ideas as one of the key project goals.

The range of outputs the project has produced is diverse, including workshops, a working paper series, a short film, a household dataset and a set of in-depth country studies, and this final report. In keeping with the spirit of GDN’s and ippr’s objectives, all materials from this project (including our survey instruments and the data) will be made available in the public domain, via our websites. This report, to be read in conjunction with the other outputs, summarises the work of the last three-and-a-half years, setting out what was done, what has been found, what it means for policymakers, and what we have learnt from the process.

The project owes its success to the hard work of countless people. While many of these people are thanked in the acknowledgements section of the report, we would like to note our particular gratitude to two groups of people. First, to the international group of donors, without whose support GDN and ippr could not have embarked on such a project. And secondly to the many colleagues past and present at GDN and ippr who have contributed to this project over the last few years.

At GDN, we are particularly grateful to Lyn Squire (the former President), who played a critical role in getting the project off the ground; Ramona Angelescu Naqvi, who has been the intellectual, strategic and administrative backbone of the project from even before it was started; and George Mavrotas for his intellectual leadership, academic advice and econometric expertise during the life of the project and for being instrumental at the crucial dissemination stage. At ippr we are incredibly grateful to Laura Chappell who has worked tirelessly to coordinate every aspect of this very large project, and never losing her infectious enthusiasm for the value of what we have been working towards.

Finally, we wanted to underline the collaborative nature of this endeavour. GDN and ippr have tried from the outset to ensure that *Development on the Move* has been an open and collaborative endeavour between partners from all over the world hoping to learn from one another while adding to the global stock of knowledge. We hope that what we have produced will be of use to researchers and policymakers for years to come. While this report marks the end of this project, we would be delighted to hear from people who have comments and suggestions on how to take this endeavour forward. It is a promising beginning but hopefully much more can be learned, taking advantage of this path-breaking global research project.

Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah  
(Project Director)

Gerardo della Paolera  
(President, GDN)

Carey Oppenheim and Lisa Harker  
(Co-Directors, ippr)

May 2010
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About the authors

This project report was written for GDN and ippr by Laura Chappell with Ramona Angelescu-Naqvi, George Mavrotas and Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah.

Laura Chappell is a Senior Research Fellow at ippr and is Project Coordinator of Development on the Move. During her time at ippr Laura has authored and edited a number of ippr publications on migration and development and the economic impacts of migration on the UK, and written papers for other organisations including the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the OECD and UNDP. Laura has also regularly commented on migration issues in the media, including on the BBC News Channel, More 4 News, Bloomberg TV and BBC World Service, and in the Guardian, the Economist and BBC Online. Previously Laura worked as an ODI fellow at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in Fiji, and with the Liberal Democrat Policy and Research Unit on Treasury issues. Laura holds an MSc with Distinction in Development Economics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from the University of Oxford. She was awarded the SOAS Taught Masters Prize 2003–2004.

Ramona Angelescu-Naqvi is Senior Political Scientist and Program Manager at GDN, with general oversight of the research programme. She is currently leading several global and inter-regional research projects at GDN: on migration, governance and public service delivery, public expenditure accountability, commodity dependence and global governance. Ramona also manages the relationship with GDN’s Regional Network Partners, oversees the periodic monitoring and evaluation exercises and supports the President in fundraising initiatives with bilateral and multilateral donors. Ramona received her MA in Political Science from Northwestern University, United States where she specialised in Comparative Political Economy and Research Methods, and her BA in Political Science/International Relations and Business Administration from Hope College, USA. Her research focuses mainly on foreign direct investment, migration, transition economies, governance and corruption. Her recent publications include ‘Local Research, Global Governance: A Challenge for Institutional Design’ (Global Governance Journal, 2006) and ‘Capacity Building and Policy Impact: The Experience of GDN’ (World Bank, 2005). Prior to joining GDN, she worked in strategy consulting in the United States as well as at the US Chamber of Commerce and The World Bank.

George Mavrotas is the Chief Economist at GDN. He is also a Visiting Professor at CERDI, University of Auvergne, Clermont Ferrand, France, and a non-resident Fellow at the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS). He was formerly a Senior Fellow and Project Director at the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER) and prior to that on the Economics Faculties of the Universities of Oxford and Manchester. George has more than 20 years of experience in working with donor agencies and governments in developing countries on a wide range of development issues. He has also served as a member of various international committees and as an adviser to many international organisations. He has published more than 120 papers and nine books on development issues. He holds a DPhil in Economics and an MSc in Development Economics (with distinction) from Oxford, an MA in Economics and Econometrics from the University of London and a BSc (Econ.) from the Athens University of Economics.

Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah has been Director of the Royal Commonwealth Society since January 2009. From 2004 to 2009, he held various posts at ippr, including head of migration research and Deputy Director. His research interests include international migration, economic development, the political economy of conflict, and ethnic diversity. Danny is author of numerous reports and academic articles, writes regularly in the press (including in the Financial Times and the Guardian), has given more than 500 broadcast interviews, and has been a consultant to several international organisations. He holds a degree from the University of Sydney, and an MPhil and DPhil from the University of Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.
Acknowledgements

The backbone of this project has been the country-based research, carried out by seven teams of researchers. These were led by Mauricio Cardenas (Colombia), Mili Kaitani (Fiji), Robert Thaidze and Karine Torosayan (Georgia), Francis Dodoo and Ian Yeboah (Ghana), Elizabeth Thomas-Hope (Jamaica), Zoran Nikolovski (Macedonia) and Dang Anh and Quynh Nguyen (Vietnam). We are very grateful for their hard work and excellent outputs. We are also grateful for the contributions made by the interviewees in each of the countries, who generously gave us their time, sharing their views and lives with us. It is humbling to think that we have drawn on the experiences of close to 100,000 people in completing this report.

We would like to thank too the more than 200 research teams who expressed interest in the project and applied to the initial Call for Proposals in 2007, validating our initial assumption of the relevance and timeliness of the topic as well as the uniqueness of the proposed approach.

As well as drawing on the work undertaken for the country reports and this report authors’ own independent analysis, this report also builds on work undertaken by others. In particular we should mention Glenn Gottfried, David Lenis and David McKenzie, and Robert (Bob) E.B. Lucas. Glenn, David and David wrote a paper for our working paper series which examines a number of impacts across countries, and Bob co-authored a paper with Laura Chappell on Jamaica, both of which we have drawn on substantially here. We are very grateful to them for these important contributions.

As mentioned in the foreword, this project would never have been possible without the generous support provided by an international group of donors, comprising the Australian Agency for International Development, the Austrian Ministry of Finance, Canada’s IDRC, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UK Department for International Development and the World Bank. It should be noted however that the conclusions presented in this paper do not necessarily represent those of the project funders.

Current and past members of the project management team have also been crucial to its success. Working alongside Danny, Laura, Ramona and George, researchers Alex Glennie, Loic Sanchez and Jai Shah should be highlighted, each of whom provided vital research and logistical support. And Lyn Squire, former President of GDN, must be mentioned. Lyn was a critical member of the project management team as the work began. He gave the project passion, expertise and ambition, and it simply would not have been possible without him.

Outside of the project management team others too from IPPR and GDN made important contributions. Naomi Pollard, Naomi Jones and Glenn Gottfried in particular have been critical. Naomi and Naomi led the design of the methodologies for the launch workshops and stakeholder interviews, as well as the survey implementation. They combined considerable expertise with cool heads and practical solutions. Glenn has made vital contributions to data management and data analysis.

Others from IPPR who deserve mention include Howard Reed, who helped start the project, and Tim Finch and Kate Stanley who were invaluable supporters of the work and ensured it remained manageable and on track. In addition Maria Latorre reviewed many of the tools and outputs, Tony Dolphin reviewed drafts of this report and provided important suggestions, and Georgina Kyriacou transformed our outputs into more accessible and attractive versions of themselves. Thanks are also due to Alex Biancardi of IPPR@Warwick, who assisted with proofreading at very short notice.

At GDN, all three Presidents during the course of this project — Lyn Squire, Gobind Nankani and Gerardo della Paolera — provided the encouragement, support and

1. Analysis from Fiji is not included in this main report as the Fiji dataset and report were not complete at the time this report was being prepared. We anticipate its publication later in 2010.

2. This includes both those screened in the first round of the household survey as well as those given the final full interview.
significant assistance in fundraising for this ambitious project. Manveen Kohli, Catherine Wong, Zufa Kulsum and Mansoor Ali among others provided useful inputs and support to the project, tirelessly coordinating events and communication across all project members. The Finance and Logistics teams assisted us in the management of this complex project and provided invaluable support to our many rounds of reports, contracting, workshops and meetings. Ron Bose also provided important assistance, helping us to think through econometric methodologies.

The project has benefited from considerable support from the wider research community, without which it would have been much the poorer. This group includes the project steering committee, who were the source of much wise advice and guidance, as well as those who contributed through project workshops, as external advisers, as reviewers of outputs and through consultancies. We are grateful to each of them. Specific mention must be made of Michael Landesmann and Vladimir Gligorov of wiiw (Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies), who hosted our meeting in Vienna and were always stalwart supporters of the project, exploring how to maximise its potential; and to David McKenzie of the World Bank and the aforementioned Bob Lucas of Boston University. As well as steering important parts of the project (David the sampling and Bob the questionnaire design), and co-authoring working papers, David and Bob were wonderful contributors to the project as a whole. They were always available to discuss an approach or an idea, always positive, and always practical. We thank them very sincerely.

Laura would also like to thank Sam Benstead, who, as well as filming interviews with migrants for the project’s short film, listened to her, supported her and took an interest in all things Development on the Move.

Finally, Laura, Ramona and George would like to express their thanks and appreciation to the project director Dhananjayan Sriskanadarajah. Danny provided an invaluable combination of support, ideas, leadership and good cheer (if not good humour).

A full list of all project contributors is provided as Annex 1 (available online at www.ippr.org and www.gdnet.org).
Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Cross-sectional</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Difference-in-difference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>All people living outside the borders of a country who were born in that country or share that national identity (including not just migrants themselves but also subsequent generations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DotM</td>
<td>Development on the Move</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>Leaving one country to go to live in another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMO</td>
<td>Global Migration Origin database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Moving into a country – other than the country of one’s birth – to live there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Instrumental Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSM</td>
<td>Propensity Score Matching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>Money sent across international borders</td>
</tr>
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For details of the specific definitions used in the DotM household survey please see Box 2.1 in the methodology section.
Executive Summary

Project background and aims
This report presents the main findings from the major global research project, *Development on the Move*, carried out between 2006 and 2010. The project has examined a wide range of migration’s impacts on development, including through gathering new, comparable data in Colombia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, Macedonia and Vietnam. While the already-published country studies provide details of findings in each country, this report seeks to draw out the main comparative lessons.

The project aimed to make five key contributions to the study of migration’s development impacts:

1. To develop better methodologies for assessing migration’s impacts. The project designed a new, holistic approach to the study of migration and development. Our aim was to examine the range of various effects that international migration – both immigration and emigration – has on economic and social development.

2. To improve the evidence base. The project commissioned a set of new country studies, each of which was conducted in the same way, combining analysis of the existing literature with new data taken from extensive, in-depth household surveys and stakeholder interviews.

3. To carry out comparative work. There is a clear need for more analysis that examines similar research questions, using similar definitions of migration and development, and gathering similar kinds of data in similar ways. This kind of analysis should give us a much greater insight into general lessons and the factors that appear to be at the root of differences in impacts.

4. To analyse policy impacts and options. An explicit focus of the project was current and potential policy frameworks for managing migration and its impacts. We wanted to explore how policymakers could enhance positive impacts and reduce negative ones.

5. To build research capacity on migration. In order to help build migration research capacity and strengthen research networks, especially in developing countries, teams based in the countries studied conducted the majority of research for the project, with support and coordination from GDN and ippr staff and advisers.

6. To promote multi-disciplinary analysis. By adopting a multi-disciplinary framework and by assembling researchers and advisers from different methodological backgrounds, the project aimed to go beyond the narrow focus of much current migration research, and to promote holistic analysis.

Methodology
The project has analysed a wide range of migration’s effects. These include:

• Economic impacts, educational impacts, health impacts, gender impacts and ‘wider’ social impacts

• Impacts for individual migrants themselves, plus their families, communities and nations

• Impacts that occur both directly as a result of movement (through immigration, emigration and return) and indirectly (for example, through remittances, other ‘transfers’ (like the transfer of investment funds or of ideas), and the potential that migration has to change people’s behaviour).

In each of the ‘case study’ countries we worked with local researchers who gathered together the existing evidence on this diverse range of impacts and complemented it with two additional kinds of new data – information gathered from stakeholder
interviews, and a new, nationally-representative household survey. The survey was the most important and innovative aspect of our approach. We designed it specifically for this project to give us reliable data on how common migration is and to investigate a range of its development impacts.

In each country the survey was carried out in such a way that it provided nationally representative results (with the exception of Colombia which, for logistical and financial reasons, was representative of urban areas only), meaning that this project is able to draw a picture of the scale and impacts of migration across the countries as a whole. This means that policymakers can draw on the findings with confidence, knowing that they depict trends for their entire country, not just certain specific groups or areas.

The final dataset includes information from almost 10,000 households, each of which was asked around 178 questions. The topics covered included household members’ characteristics (such as age, occupation, gender) and their experiences of migration, as well as information on the household as a whole (such as their consumption patterns and receipt of remittances). Households both with and without migrants were included, the latter as a basis for comparison, to try to understand migration’s effects.

Attributing causality – that is, understanding when migration is genuinely the cause of a particular trend – is a key issue in interpreting data on migration. For example, if the data show that households with migrants have higher incomes than households without, how can we be sure that migration has caused the increase in incomes? An alternative explanation is that members of richer households are simply more likely to be able to afford to migrate. To overcome this problem, we have used a range of techniques which include:

(a) Advanced econometric tools (such as propensity score matching and instrumental variable analysis)
(b) The use of retrospective questions to plot how things have changed within households over time
(c) Asking migrants themselves about what they believe was cause and what was effect
(d) Drawing on our other methodologies (such as existing literature and interviews with experts) to try to contextualise and explain findings.

Findings 1: How common is migration?
Table 1 (overleaf) provides a summary of existing estimates of migration, as well as our own calculations.

Two points in particular emerge. First, it is interesting to note that the kind of emigration often assumed to have the greatest development impacts – that is, recent emigration in which the migrant leaves other household members behind – does not constitute as large a proportion of all emigration from the countries studied as might have been expected: no more than 60 per cent for the countries we have data for, and in some places far less than this, just above 10 per cent for Georgia, for instance.

Second, the project presents the first nationally representative and comparable statistics on return migration that have ever been collected, as far as we are aware. When ‘rates of return’ are calculated we find that although they vary somewhat between countries, in no cases are they very high. In Georgia we estimate about 12 out of every 100 emigrants have returned, in Vietnam about 16 out of every 100, and in Jamaica about 20. Ghana and Macedonia see somewhat higher levels of return with 34 migrants returning to Macedonia for every 100 who have departed, and 37 out of 100 in Ghana.

Even where rates of return appear broadly similar, that does not mean that return migration is composed of similar people across countries, or that it is driven by similar forces or has the same development effects. Migration’s nature and its impacts need to be explored explicitly and separately from its scale.
Findings 2: Why do people migrate?

Our survey gives an insight into the motivations driving emigration and return across a range of countries in the developing world. Drivers of emigration appear remarkably consistent across countries, with the pursuit of economic opportunity clearly emerging as the major reason to depart. Employment opportunities and higher wages on offer abroad are by far the strongest motivators of movement, with having the opportunity to remit the third most important. The prominence given to remittances demonstrates explicitly that migrants do not leave just to further their own economic prospects, but also to improve their families’ economic welfare.

After these economic factors come two other broad categories of motivation – learning (migration for formal study, to learn a language or to acquire other skills) and family (migrating alongside family members, or to join those already living abroad). It is striking that reasons relating to social and political problems in the country of origin were rarely identified, even in countries such as Colombia which have experienced turmoil and instability in recent years. But this does not mean that such problems are not drivers of emigration – political and social problems often create the economic conditions that drive economic emigration.

While reasons for departure were broadly consistent across countries, reasons for return were much less so both between and within countries, though family and personal reasons were the most commonly reported. The desire to be with family was the biggest driver motivating migrants to return. After family considerations come two sets of reasons: ‘completion’ motivators (the migrant finishes their job or contract, their study, or makes the amount of money they went abroad to earn) and visa and related issues (people returning because of having a bond placed on...

Table 1: Estimates of frequency of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population size</th>
<th>Total emigrant stock¹</th>
<th>Stock of emigrants who departed within last decade leaving some household members behind²</th>
<th>Total stock of returned migrants³</th>
<th>Total immigrant stock⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>44,530,000</td>
<td>460,000 – 3,300,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>110,000 – 115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consensus is above 1,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>4,680,000</td>
<td>196,000 – 1,500,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>167,000 – 526,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consensus around 900,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>23,350,000</td>
<td>960,000 – 4,000,000</td>
<td>541,000</td>
<td>877,000</td>
<td>614,000 – 1,852,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2,690,000</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>13,000 – 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2,040,000</td>
<td>3300 – 700,000</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>33,000 – 130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consensus between 250,000 and 500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>86,210,000</td>
<td>2,000,000 – 3,000,000+</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>479,000</td>
<td>22,000 – 69,000</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[1] Sources: University of Sussex’s Global Migrant Origin (GMO) database and statistics used in-country; [2] Source: DotM; [3] Source: DotM; [4] Sources: DotM, GMO and UN population division; In most cases the DotM immigration estimate falls between the UN and GMO estimates; [5] No DotM statistics are provided for Colombia because the survey there was only representative for urban areas and not the country as a whole.
them, people returning voluntarily because their has visa expired, or people who are deported. It would seem that immigration regimes in countries of destination do drive some return migration, despite assertions by some that they have no effect. Another relatively common set of reasons revolve around the migrant either being disappointed with their life overseas, or missing the culture and lifestyle at ‘home’.

New economic opportunities in the country of origin, such as a new job, or wanting to start a new business, and government or other schemes to motivate return, are mentioned rarely. This is likely to be disappointing for policymakers in both origin and destination countries who hope to tempt returnees back by highlighting new economic opportunities or providing specially tailored programmes, such as voluntary return packages.

Findings 3: Remittance patterns

Table 2 highlights the proportion of absent migrants who remit to the household they left behind when they migrated – somewhere between one third and three quarters, depending on the country in question. Given the information we have on the proportion of households in each country that have a migrant, we are able to calculate the proportion of the population in each country that receives remittances from their own absent migrant. This ranges between 2 and 11 per cent.

Our research also shows that it is very common for households to receive funds from migrants who were not previously members of their households – typically more distant relatives, or in some cases (especially in Jamaica), friends. In three countries (Colombia, Jamaica and Vietnam), more households are estimated to benefit from this kind of remittance than those sent money by their ‘own’ absent migrant. Those ‘non-household member’ remitters send less money, and send it less frequently, than a household’s own absent migrant, but the differences tend not to be very great. This makes clear that the development impacts of migration extend beyond the migrant’s own household into the wider community: an important finding, challenging the commonly held perception that migration’s benefits may only go as far as their immediate household.

The report also explores how the characteristics of migrants influence their remitting behaviour. Neither gender nor the migrant’s level of education prior to departure has a clear or consistent influence over the likelihood that they will remit or the amounts they send. Rather, patterns vary by country, with for example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proportion of absent migrants that remit to their household of origin</th>
<th>Est. proportion of all households in country who receive funds from their own absent migrant</th>
<th>Est. proportion of all households in country who receive remittances from a ‘non-member remitter’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia1</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DotM household surveys 2007 / 2008

[1] In Colombia these are estimates for the proportion of households in urban areas receiving remittances from each source.
Vietnamese women remitting more than men while Macedonian women remit less than their male counterparts. Other characteristics appear to have more consistent effects – for example, if the migrant leaves close family behind (such as a partner or children), they remit more. This is unsurprising, but may raise awkward trade-off questions in policymakers’ minds, especially in countries of origin, for while extended periods of separation are no doubt bad for family welfare, there may be a temptation to pursue that kind of migration to maximise remittance flows.

**Findings 4: The economic impacts of migration**

Our research finds that individual migrants’ own disposable income is improved – quite often dramatically – by migration. Typically between 70 and 90 per cent of migrants are reported to have experienced an increase in their real disposable incomes while abroad, the majority seeing large increases. Of the remainder, the majority experience no change and only a few see their incomes decline.

Our research suggests that not only does migration raise individual migrants’ incomes: it also raises the incomes of households they come from and/or remit to. (While there is some overlap between households that receive remittances and those with an absent migrant, they are not the same – see Table 2). For example, in Colombia households that receive remittances are 12 per cent less likely to be below the national poverty line than those who do not. In Georgia having an absent migrant makes a household more likely to have built up its assets, for example being 10 percentage points more likely to have acquired a DVD player over the preceding five years.

We also found that receiving remittances seems to have a positive impact on business ownership. In Colombia, for example, receiving remittances raises the likelihood that a household has a bank account used for running a business by 5 percentage points. On the other hand, having an absent migrant in the household does not appear to increase business ownership. The general trend for households with returned migrants suggests that on the whole this, too, increases the likelihood of the household owning a business. Here, results vary significantly by country, however: while the presence of a returned migrant in Georgia appears to have no effect on business ownership, in Macedonia it dramatically increases the likelihood. Doing business in Georgia is generally regarded as relatively easy, and in Macedonia less so, and it may be that this means that there is relatively less need in Georgia for the advantages that migration brings.

Receiving remittances appears, on the whole, to have little impact on household members’ labour force participation or unemployment. Nor does return migration affect household members’ employment status, though the returning migrants themselves tend to have a greater chance of being unemployed for the first 12 months after return than would be expected of people with similar characteristics (after that they appear to adjust and this risk dissipates). The evidence on the impact of having an absent migrant is more divided but the most notable results suggest that migration increases employment. In Georgia having an absent migrant reduces the likelihood that anyone in the household is unemployed by 37 per cent, and a result of a similar magnitude is found in Jamaica.

Both households receiving remittances and those with absent migrants see an increase in their savings. In Colombia, for example, households in receipt of remittances save US$4 more per capita per month than otherwise, and households with absent migrants US$3 per capita per month (the World Bank estimates the average monthly per capita income in Colombia is US$228). Return migrants appear to have no effect on savings one way or the other.

**Findings 5: The educational impacts of migration**

The evidence suggests that being in receipt of remittances and having an absent migrant have a positive impact on household spending on education. Households in Ghana with absent migrants, for example, spend US$107 more per year on education...
than those without (the World Bank estimates average annual per capita household income in Ghana is US$670). Return migrants appear to have no particular impact one way or the other.

In terms of school attendance, however, on the whole migration seems not to have any effects – whether household experience is through the receipt of remittances, having a migrant away or having a returned migrant in their household. Putting these two results together suggests that households with migrants are probably making improvements to the quality of children’s education, investing in materials like books, or sending them to better schools, rather than making larger changes such as enrolling them for an extra year’s schooling.

There is, however, an exception to this general statement, as parental migration does appear to have a substantial impact. Some evidence suggests that when a parent migrates, this has a considerable effect on whether or not their children, left behind in the country of origin, are in education (though results vary significantly by country). In Jamaica, parental absence is associated with younger children in particular being much less likely to be in school, whereas in Vietnam and Macedonia the result is reversed, with parental migration being associated with children having a substantially greater chance of being in school. However, the models that examine these impacts do not control for causality, and so it is difficult to know how much of this association is driven by migration, and how much by reverse causality.

Turning to the effect that migration has on national skills stocks, it seems likely that in some of the DotM countries (particularly Jamaica, but possibly also Ghana and Macedonia) migration’s overall effect on a country’s stock of skills may be negative. In other words, the positive effects that migration can have on skills stocks (through immigration, return, remittances and incentive effects) are not able to compensate for the direct impact of skilled people emigrating. In Vietnam, Georgia and Colombia, on the other hand, it seems possible that while skills are being lost through emigration, they are being compensated for through migration’s other channels. Indeed, it may be that these countries now have more skilled people than they otherwise would have had, had no one been able to migrate.

**Findings 6: The health impacts of migration**

Where households receive remittances, there is some strong evidence from across the studies that spending on health increases. In Vietnam, for example, regional fixed effects analysis suggests that not only does receiving remittances raise healthcare spending, but remittances also appear to raise health spending more dramatically than other forms of income. And having an absent migrant on the whole appears to increase spending on healthcare, although here the evidence is thinner and less consistent.

Having a returned migrant seems to affect healthcare spending. In Jamaica, for example, each additional returned migrant in a household increases healthcare spending by more than 50 per cent. The patterns of spending change too, so that less emphasis is placed on traditional Jamaican medicines and more on the kinds of treatments that migrants will have been exposed to in the countries they have been living in (predominantly the USA, UK and Canada). We suggest that while this analysis is based on OLS modelling and thus does not explicitly address questions of causality, these combined findings do point towards migration being the cause of the changed behaviour.

Returning migrants, while they appear to boost healthcare spending, do not affect household members’ reported health status, and neither on the whole (except for in Colombia, where effects are negative), do absent migrants or remittances. As in education, there is a distinction between spending patterns and outcomes – migration appears to have positive impacts on spending on health and education but not, on the whole, to the extent that outcomes such as household members’ health, or school attendance, improve.

“Households with migrants are probably making improvements to the quality of children’s education, investing in materials like books, or sending them to better schools”
The report also looks into the effect that migration has on a country’s healthcare provision – an issue that often gains attention because of fears that ‘brain drain’ draws healthcare professionals out of a developing country. Our evidence suggests that the damage caused by brain drain can often be overstated because opportunities to emigrate may actually drive additional people into healthcare professions through ‘incentive effects’. The resulting net effect on healthcare provision seems to vary across countries. In Jamaica and Ghana 20 per cent and 25 per cent of medically trained personnel respectively are located abroad, which may be levels that these countries have found difficult to cope with. On the other hand, Vietnam and possibly Georgia might actually have more healthcare staff than they do at present if they had higher levels of medical migration, as the more powerful incentive effects might well outweigh the numbers of people who actually leave.

Findings 7: The gender and other social impacts of migration
Exposure to different norms and experiences while abroad can, it is suggested, change people’s attitudes towards gender roles. Among returned migrants this was indeed the case: typically more than 70 per cent of migrants from each country said that as a result of their experiences, they were more committed to efforts to achieve gender equality in their country of origin. However, changes in attitudes do not seem to translate into changes in behaviour within returned migrants’ own households (or in households in receipt of remittances or with absent migrants). None of the evidence gathered on this issue suggests that migration is changing who – men or women – undertakes household tasks (such as childcare, home repairs or cooking).

When it comes to migration’s effects on family structure, our research suggests that while some migration does split nuclear families, this does not occur as often as one might expect. For example estimates suggest that emigration from Colombia makes it 6 per cent less likely that parents and children are living together. These numbers are so low partly because much of the emigration that takes place is of whole households.

It does appear that the temporary separation of families may lead to permanent breakdowns in relationships, however, even when migrants return to their country of origin. For example, in Vietnam rates of separation and divorce are higher among returned migrants than the non-migrant population, as are numbers of single parent families, who make up 4.5 per cent of non-migrant families but 6.7 per cent of returned migrant families. That said, there is no investigation of causality here (and it may be that people migrate to escape from a bad relationship, or feel freer to go because their family life is poor), and the rates are still quite low.

Policy implications
The findings from Development on the Move provide some useful insights for policymakers. We hope that as well as providing some insight into which specific policy levers could be used to maximise migration’s contributions to development, this report also helps policymakers to look beyond the immediate imperatives that often seem to drive migration policy.

At the individual and household level, this project contributes further evidence that in almost all cases migration can be an important way of improving livelihoods and expanding capabilities. This is an important reminder to policymakers and practitioners that migration should not be seen primarily as a ‘problem’ for development. While it may create challenges migration does allow people – many of whom may have few alternatives – to improve their own standard of living and that of their families and others to whom they remit. The evidence suggests, moreover, that through spillover effects such as business creation it may also improve development outcomes, even for people without a direct relationship with a migrant.

That said, poor economic opportunities in developing countries drive migration and may also make return less attractive. Plus, while migration is improving many outcomes for people in developing countries, these changes tend to be incremental. Nothing in the findings of this project suggests that migration is
transformational at the societal level, or that alone it can be relied on to act as a national strategy for development. Rather, the fact that people are migrating in order to achieve certain goals (and are not being attracted back by opportunities at ‘home’) should be taken as a reflection of people struggling to achieve their aims and improve their lives in their country of origin, and that more needs to be done to promote sustainable national development. This is not news – policymakers do not need migration to remind them of the need for development – but it is important to note because there is a danger that migration and its benefits are used as a reason for development to be pursued with less urgency, when it should be seen as another indicator that successful long-term development strategies must be devised and pursued.

An equally important implication of this project’s broad framework has been to underline the complexity of impacts that migration can generate. For example, while large-scale emigration from one particular sector (such as health) can in some instances have a negative impact, there are many other ways in which the departure of those migrants may be having positive impacts on the society they have left behind. Development on the Move has cast light on some of the better known of those impacts (such as the economic benefits of remittances) and those that have not been studied as much (such as attitudes to gender equality). The research suggests that any attempt to intervene based on a narrow or short-term view of migration’s impacts could be counterproductive.

More generally, the findings emphasise how powerful a force migration is – it is very common; it is successful in improving key aspects of migrants’ and others’ lives; and the policies put in place around it can shape but not control or determine it. This implies that policies that acknowledge and even facilitate people’s migration ambitions are likely to be more effective than those that inhibit and frustrate them.

As such, policies that open legal routes for migration that make it easier for migrants to invest and buy property in their country of origin while away; or that reduce remittance costs are likely to boost migration’s development impacts, as are all policies that recognise and work with the grain of people’s migratory intentions and migrants’ interactions with their country of origin. In contrast, policies that try to stop emigration, to induce return without changing the wider policy environment, or even those that are simply poorly connected to the lives migrants live (such as policies that try to induce migrants to invest in community development projects over which they have little control or to which they have few links) are much more likely to fail. Good policy interventions should be based on a sound understanding of migrants’ motivations and real life experiences, and should ‘go with the flow’ of migration as an unstoppable fact of life in the 21st century.

Finally, by taking a wide definition of international migration (examining all movements of three months or more both into and out of a country), and looking at all sorts of interactions (going beyond remittances to consider ideas and attitudes transmitted from abroad, for example), this project has also uncovered new evidence of the scale, nature and even the impacts of migration. In some countries there has been much more short-term migration of a duration that falls below the generally accepted threshold of what is defined ‘migration’. It also may not be officially recorded as migration by immigration agencies. For example, when a Jamaican goes to the United States and works cash-in-hand for a few months before returning home, this is generally not classed as international migration. Yet such behaviour does seem to be common in some contexts and potentially has development impacts as important as those from longer-term migration. The project also finds that new communication technologies appear to be transforming the ways that migrants can interact with their home countries.

Policymakers interested in managing migration, let alone harnessing its development benefits, should recognise, then, that today’s migration patterns do not mirror those of yesterday. While migration may be an age-old human strategy for seeking betterment, the conditions under which migration takes place and the nature of its impacts seem to be evolving constantly.
1. Introduction

This report is the record of a unique experiment.

Between 2006 and 2010 GDN and ippr, together with partners across the world, engaged in a bold attempt to add significantly to the global pool of knowledge about migration and its impacts on development.

It may seem odd to add yet another initiative – yet another report – to the increasingly crowded field of migration studies. Countless academic papers and policy reports have been produced to describe or measure this or that aspect of migration. And, over the past decade, even the previously neglected field of migration and development has grown considerably. Major international development organisations have devoted considerable time and resources to studying the nexus between migration and development (for example see World Bank 2005, OECD 2007 and United Nations Development Programme 2009).

This research attention in part reflects the increased focus that policymakers are placing on migration and development. More developed countries are starting to recognise that their policies need to account for the effects that migration has on development (for example, the UK has published a policy paper in this area [Department for International Development 2007]), and many developing countries are beginning to reflect the topic in their national development strategies, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (for example see Albania, Ghana and Tajikistan [Martin 2009]). The migration-development nexus has emerged as a topic of interest at the multilateral level too – the Global Forum on Migration and Development first met in Brussels in 2007 and has convened annually since then.

Yet, despite this increased interest, we still struggle to answer some fundamental questions around migration and its links to development:

• How many migrants are there in today’s world?
• To what extent does the migration of skilled people (sometimes called ‘brain drain’) harm the communities they leave behind?
• On balance, does migration help or hinder economic development in poor countries?

Addressing gaps
GDN and ippr embarked on Development on the Move because we wanted to try to address some of these significant gaps in our collective knowledge about migration’s relationship with development. We also aimed to conduct our research somewhat differently from much of what had gone before.

We designed Development on the Move to address the following six ‘gaps’:

1. There is very little holistic work on migration and development. Much of the recent research on migration tends to be focused either on specific issues (for example remittances) or involves broad reviews of the literature. Very little achieves true synthesis, looking at migration and development in the round, examining both emigration and immigration, and economic and social development (though the recent UN Human Development Report Overcoming Barriers [United Nations Development Programme 2009] is an important exception).

We believe a holistic view is important, especially from a policy perspective, because we need to understand better the various and diverse developmental impacts of migration. Focusing in detail on one or a few impacts is undeniably important but policymakers are usually more interested in the bigger picture. Despite a burgeoning literature on migration, there are very few holistic frameworks that simultaneously examine the multiple impacts of migration on development.
2. There is a serious lack of data. Many developing countries are unable to say much about even basic migration patterns, such as how many of their citizens have emigrated or how many immigrants are in the country (Chappell and Sriskandarajah 2009). Similarly, little tends to be known about the patterns of remittances beyond broad national trends, and even less about their use. In our view, there is a pressing need to add to the existing stock of data on migration.

3. Very little migration research is truly comparative. Partly because of a lack of data, researchers have proceeded in a highly incremental way in their building of an evidence base, meaning that many have been wary of drawing out general lessons about migration’s development impacts. Even where they have wanted to undertake comparative analysis they have had to proceed by reading between the lines, trying to compare the results of often very different studies (which may vary in their locations, definitions, methodologies, impacts being examined and so on). This means that where results vary, it is difficult to know which of the differences is at the root of that variance.

In our view there is a clear need for more comparative work – analysis that examines similar research questions, using similar definitions of migration, and development, and gathering similar kinds of data in similar ways. This kind of analysis should give us a much greater insight into any general lessons which can be drawn about migration and development, as well as allowing us to see what factors appear to be at the root of differences in impacts.

4. Fresh, workable policy ideas are rare. Apart from relatively easy-win recommendations (for example reducing the transfer costs of remittances) and theoretically attractive but politically implausible proposals (for example direct compensation for brain drain), there have been few policy initiatives that are both effective and workable. We wanted to take a much more rigorous look than has previously been possible at the kinds of policy that appear effective, as well as to explore the scope for new policy approaches.

5. Very little migration research emanates from the developing world. As a result migration studies can feel like a field dominated by a select group of researchers, the vast majority of whom are based in the United States and Europe. Even where research on developing countries is produced, it is often conducted or led by researchers based in developed countries. We felt that generating home-grown knowledge – GDN’s over-riding objective – was a particular priority in the field of migration and development.

6. Multidisciplinary migration research is rare. While the extent of our knowledge about migration is limited, it often feels even more limited than it is because of the lack of knowledge sharing between researchers, especially across different disciplines. Insights from economics often are not appreciated by sociologists, for example, and political scientists share very little with anthropologists. We think there is a need to try to break down these disciplinary barriers and to build a pool of knowledge that brings together insights from these different fields.

Project aims
Accordingly, the project’s aims were:

1. Develop a more comprehensive methodology for assessing the economic and social impacts of migration
2. Improve the evidence base on migration
3. Undertake more comparative analysis
4. Explore fresh and workable policy ideas
5. Promote migration research capacity-building in developing countries
6. Promote multidisciplinary analysis.
Together these six aims defined our experiment. They made it ambitious in a number of ways – in the range of issues it wanted to provide insights into; in its aims to not just analyse, but also to collect data; and in its set-up, requiring collaborative work between researchers from across the world and from different disciplinary backgrounds, and moreover, on an agreed set of research questions, using similar research methods.

This report assesses our success in achieving these aims. It examines how far we did the things we intended to; discusses what we found out about migration and its development impacts, as well as why we think we found the things that we did; and presents suggestions as to what policymakers might do about them. We also review what we have learnt throughout the process of undertaking this research, about migration and development and about doing ambitious research projects such as this one.

**Sources and structure**

This report draws on a number of sources. The most important is the research conducted by the in-country research teams involved in the project. In addition to this we draw on the findings of project working papers, as well as some data analysis carried out specifically for this report. We also draw on the wider migration and development literature, which enables us to both present findings on issues where we have not been able to get much insight from our own primary research, and to place our own findings in context.

This report is structured in the following way: Chapter 2, following this introduction, presents a discussion of our methodology – defining what our experiment involved and how it proceeded. In Chapter 3 we discuss our findings in relation to migration itself, as well as about remittances and the other phenomena created by migration which have the potential to affect development outcomes. Chapter 4 sets out what we have learnt about migration’s development impacts. Chapter 5 provides the report’s policy contribution, where we set out our analysis of how policy can contribute to improving migration’s development impacts, and makes recommendations to policymakers about taking this agenda forward. Finally, in Chapter 6 we present our thoughts on the work, and where research in this area may productively focus next.
2. Methodology

This chapter outlines the ways in which the project was designed to meet its six aims. Given that what we wanted to do was innovative in many ways, getting the methodological design right was important. Recognising this, the project management team and steering committee spent 18 months before the main phase of the project began in 2008 planning an appropriate methodology. This included discussions at two-day expert workshops held in London in September 2006 and Beijing in January 2007. What follows is a brief description of how the project was designed in order to address each aim.

(i) Develop a more comprehensive methodology for assessing the economic and social impacts of migration

The first priority was to establish the holistic analytical framework. As stressed above, this project is based on the belief that while many studies have made important advances in understanding particular impacts that migration can have on development, there have been few attempts, even analytically, to draw together these various impacts in order to try to understand the ‘total’ impact of migration. Such an approach is especially valuable because it closely approximates a policymaker’s responsibilities. Policymakers need to know what a change in migratory trends means for development as a whole, not just how it affects children’s schooling or foreign exchange balances, for example.

As discussed in more detail in the first project working paper (Chappell and Sriskandarajah 2007), the work to develop an analytical framework began by defining what ‘development’ entails, mapping the ‘areas’ of development where migration might have an impact, and analysing the routes or causal pathways through which migration can have these effects.

Having looked at various definitions of development, the project decided to draw on the capabilities (for example see Sen 2001) and sustainable livelihoods approaches for guidance. The resulting definition of development, used throughout the main project outputs, involves the following aspects:

• The process of development is viewed as the process of expanding people’s capabilities to live their lives in the way they wish – their ability to choose their own paths in life. This means that the sort of migratory impacts we focus on are those which could affect people’s capabilities, either positively or negatively.

• This means development is not simply seen as being about increases in income – though increasing people’s income is often an important way to expand their capabilities.

• It should also be stressed that ‘development’ is not something that happens to places, but to people. This means that while the focus is on developing countries rather than developed countries as the location for the research, the project is not just concerned with the development of people currently living in those countries. The focus is also on migrants who are from those places but who are currently away.

• The impacts the project is interested in include migration’s direct impacts on people and their assets (defined broadly), as well as impacts on the structures and processes (such as a country’s fiscal balance, for example) which can affect people’s livelihoods.

• Where impacts are contentious – such as remittances which add to household budgets but which are spent on consumables (thereby having only a time-limited impact on development) rather than ploughed into investment (which might lead to long-running reductions in poverty and expansions in capabilities) – our framework provides criteria by which to evaluate the effects: that is, whether the impact expands
or restricts substantive freedoms. Where contentious impacts may have positive short-run effects that do not contribute to sustainable outcomes in the long run, as in the above example, the framework recognises the tension, while emphasising the importance of sustainability.

With a definition of development in place the next stage was to be clear about how the project defined ‘migration’, and to define it widely, as the project management team felt it was important not to miss some kinds of international migration and their potential impacts on development. Box 2.1 provides the definitions used in the DotM research.

**Box 2.1: Definitions**

Where we refer to our own dataset, we use the following definitions:

- **Immigrant**: A person who was born in another country but has come to live in the country of our study.
- **Returned migrant**: A person who was born in the country of our study and who lives there now but who at some point has lived in another country for three months or more.
- **Absent migrant**: A person who was born in the country of our study but who, within the last 10 years, left to go and live in another. Absent migrants are still living abroad.

A three-month definition of migration differs from the usual definition used in official data sources which only include people who moved for a year or more. We feel our definition is more useful as it enables us to capture short-term, irregular and seasonal movement, as well as more permanent emigration (and as Chapter 3 below sets out, many countries experience a lot of these short-term movements). However, while we think it is important for this project to define migrants in this way, it must be borne in mind that our data refers to a slightly different group to the ‘migrants’ found in other datasets. We make clear throughout the report, therefore, which kind of data we are drawing from, to allow the reader to understand which group is being discussed.

There are a few additional points that should be stressed about our definition of absent migrant. Firstly, we only examine people who went to live abroad in the last 10 years. This is in order to try to minimise ‘recall errors’. Studies of people’s ability to remember and accurately describe past events when responding to surveys demonstrates that anything that took place several years ago can easily be mis-remembered. We therefore considered that asking about people who departed more than 10 years ago would risk damaging data quality.

Secondly, it must be noted that the way we conducted our survey means some kinds of absent migrants are not captured in this category. Because we rely on household members in the country being studied to identify people who have migrated, where the whole household has left the country there will be no one remaining there to tell us about them. This means our survey only picks up on absent migrants who have left some family members behind.

In the report we clarify where we use our data, and therefore where the ‘absent migrant’ group includes only a sub-group of all emigrants – relatively recent departures who leave family members behind – and where we use other data sources, which are likely to define emigrants differently.

The next task was to draw up a list of the aspects of development that migration might have an impact on (this was based on a wide survey of the migration and development literature, as well as discussions with our steering committee and other experts). This resulted in a ‘map’ (provided in Annex 2 on the iprr website), detailing 38 separate aspects of development on which migration might have an impact, grouped under eight headings:

- **Economic impacts** (for example on poverty, risk, economic growth, inequality, labour force participation and trade)
- **Educational impacts** (for example on educational spending, attendance, provision and quality)
• Health impacts (for example on health, health spending, healthcare provision and quality)
• Gender impacts (for example on female migrants’ own opportunities, gender roles, attitudes towards gender)
• ‘Wider’ social impacts (for example on attachment to traditional culture, family structures, and confidence in the ‘home’ society)
• Governance impacts (for example on personal security, state capacity and standards of governance)
• Environmental impacts (for example on attitudes towards the environment and environmental technologies)
• Relief impacts (for example disaster relief).

In the analysis, including in this paper, environmental and relief impacts were not examined, mainly because we felt they would be harder to tackle using a methodology that draws heavily on a household survey. We have also combined ‘governance and wider social impacts’ to make the structure of the reports simpler.

These impacts range from individual level impacts (including impacts on the migrants themselves), as well as effects on households, on communities and on the nation or society as a whole. This means they range from impacts on a migrant’s own income, for example, through to effects on the views held within a community on gender roles.

Routes via which migration makes these impacts

Migration does not create all these impacts in the same way, however. Six ways, or ‘routes’, have been identified via which migration can have these impacts (Chappell and Glennie 2009), three of them direct (ways in which migration immediately leads to a development impact; a–c below) and three indirect (migration creates a phenomenon, such as remittances, which then has an effect on development; d–f below).

a) Emigration. When people leave their country of birth to move elsewhere this can have important effects on development. If the people are skilled this is often termed ‘brain drain’, and if it leads to an overall decrease in the numbers of skilled people in a country or sector it may cause that country or sector harm. For example, if emigration leads to fewer doctors in the country concerned this may damage healthcare (Awases et al 2004).

b) Immigration. The second way in which migration can affect development is through immigration. Although it is sometimes assumed that most migratory movements involve people moving away from the world’s poorest countries and towards the richest, in fact patterns of movement are more complex than this, with the majority of migrants moving to countries in the same ‘development category’ as their country of origin (for example moving from a country with a low level of human development to another country with a low level of human development – though usually one which is doing somewhat better [United Nations Development Programme 2009]). This is often to neighbouring countries, but also to places further afield. In some cases immigration may substantially compensate for emigration, and some developing countries are ‘net immigration’ countries – that is, they have received more migrants than they have ‘lost’. These countries include Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Gabon (SASI Group and Newman 2006).

c) Return. Recent research (for example Finch et al 2009) has emphasised that migration is increasingly ‘circular’ and does not always involve a permanent, one-way move, as has sometimes been depicted. Rather, many migrants move more than once, some on to other destinations and some returning to their place of origin. Return can therefore potentially have an important impact on the numbers of people a country is calculated to have lost through migration. However, returning migrants do not just affect the numbers of people in a country; return can also alter the resources and
assets available to a country, as in many cases returning migrants bring assets back with them. This can include new skills, ideas and ways of doing things, as well as hard financial assets. For example, if a doctor leaves a poor country she may temporarily reduce the stock of healthcare professionals in that country, but if she returns several years later having studied and worked in a different environment she may bring back more skills and new ideas. As a result the overall impact of her movement may be positive rather than negative – perhaps counter to expectations.

d) Incentives. Because migration is an attractive prospect to many, it has the potential to change behaviour. Specifically, it has been suggested that would-be migrants look at the conditions under which people migrate and change their behaviour in order to be more like the typical migrant and have a greater likelihood of successfully migrating. This effect is vital to debates on brain drain in particular because if skilled people are more likely to be able to migrate than the less skilled (which tends to be the case), or if skilled migrants gain more as a result of migrating than the unskilled do (in terms of income, opportunities and so on), this may give people an extra incentive to invest in education and skills. And given that it is very unlikely that all the people who invest in skills subsequently migrate it is possible that the country in question ends up with a more skilled workforce than it otherwise would have done. In other words it is possible that a ‘brain drain’ can, by inducing others within the labour market to continue in education, turn into a ‘brain gain’ (Docquier 2006).

e) Remittances. Migrants are in many cases a highly valuable source of indirect finance while they are absent. Remittances have risen dramatically over the past decade, exceeding both aid and foreign direct investment as a sources of external finance for developing countries. Moreover, they have proved much more stable than either of those alternative sources during the global crisis and economic downturn (Ratha and Mohapatra 2009). This flow of money can play a major role in development in a number of ways. For example, World Bank research in Tonga shows that the incomes of poorest households increase by a massive 600 per cent when remittances are included in the family budget (World Bank 2006).

f) Other transfers and diaspora contributions. Migrants are not just a source of financial support to their countries of origin. While abroad, migrants are often in close contact with their families and others in their country of origin and therefore have the potential to shape their attitudes, values and actions. This may be at the household level – shaping attitudes to education, for example, or at the national level – for example diaspora activism appears to have played a significant role in the politics of Iraq and Sri Lanka in recent years (Vertovec 2006).

In sum, the project sought to establish a systematic framework for analysing migration’s development impacts that would enable the examination of the diverse ways in which migration can impact on development. As well as underpinning this piece of research it is hoped that this thinking contributes to the wider search for better methodologies in this area.

(ii) Improve the evidence base

The second aspect of the project involved commissioning new research to gather fresh evidence of what was going on in developing countries of interest. Through an open and competitive process, research teams in seven countries – Colombia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, Macedonia and Vietnam – were identified to work on the project; Box 2.2 provides further details of how the country research teams were selected and information on the countries concerned. The idea was that the research conducted by these teams would improve the evidence base both by bringing what is already known about migration’s development impacts in each country into one study, and by adding to the existing stock of knowledge by undertaking new stakeholder interviews and conducting nationally representative household surveys.

“It is possible that a ‘brain drain’ can, by inducing others within the labour market to continue in education, turn into a ‘brain gain’”
Between 20 and 30 stakeholders were interviewed in each country, involving people with different perspectives on migration and development, including academics, and representatives of government, international organisations and civil society. These interviews followed the same broad structure in all cases, drawing on the same interview template, but researchers adapted each interview to ensure it was appropriate to the country and stakeholder concerned to make the most of each interviewee’s knowledge.

The stakeholder interviews produced different kinds of data. This included factual information that was not yet available in the public domain (for example, details of policies that were in development, as in Colombia); expert opinion, which can be important in tackling questions where the existing information alone is insufficient (for example, which estimates of the number of emigrants abroad is likely to be most accurate, as in Macedonia); and also provided a narrative for some of the findings and the context in which they have occurred (as, for example, the Vietnamese team exploited extensively). The stakeholder interviews also generated a sense of priorities, ideas and in some cases misconceptions that need to be addressed by researchers.

Household survey
The household survey was the more important and innovative aspect of the project’s data-gathering phase. A major new survey was designed specifically for use in this project to provide reliable, comparable data on the prevalence of migration in each of the countries studied, as well as on its development impacts.
Developing the survey took more than 18 months, and involved many different stages. A core team of three drew up a first draft design, with inputs from tens of others (this draft was based on many previous surveys but the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys in particular – see Grosh and Glewwe 2000). This draft was then intensively discussed with the Jamaica team, who undertook the pilot stage of the work, and was then put into the field in Jamaica towards the end of 2007. This involved a smaller sample size than planned in the main stage of research (486 households answered the full survey), and the project management team were more involved in the implementation, but it otherwise closely followed the planned model for the main phase of research.

After the results and feedback from that pilot were received (which went very well overall) the draft was adapted, and then a process of several additional rounds of changes were undertaken, based on feedback from close to 50 reviewers. This included the discussions that took place in a two-day workshop in Washington DC in June 2008, with all the survey leaders in the case study countries. There the details of the survey were finalised, definitions firmed up, and training in its implementation provided. This final template (Annex 3; see ippr.org or gdnet.org) was then adapted by each of the country teams to suit their own context (this involved changing some of the response options to make them more appropriate to country circumstances, as well as removing or adding a limited number of questions).

The survey itself was, in every country except Colombia, sampled to be nationally representative, meaning that the results produced are representative for the scale and impacts of migration across the countries as a whole. The expectation is that this will be valued highly by policymakers, because it means they are looking at information that reflects the situation across the country as a whole – their domain of responsibility – and not only the way migration is affecting those in the area which was sampled. (Many other surveys are limited to capital cities, or areas where migration is particularly prevalent.) Sampling strategies were drawn up by each team in collaboration with ippr staff and an external consultant, and outlines of each can be found attached as annexes to each individual country report. An outline of the template used by each team to draw up their sampling strategy is provided in Annex 4 (ippr.org or gdnet.org).

Actual interactions with the households involved two rounds of questions. The first round was a listing and screening round, where information was gathered about every household in the primary sampling units (small localities where the interviews were being conducted – typically villages or small parts of cities or the countryside) regarding whether they had a migrant member, checking for immigrants, returned migrants and people currently away (see Box 2.1 above for further information on the definitions used in the survey). This approach ensured the researchers could calculate what proportion of households in the areas in question have migrants, and because the sampling strategy was nationally representative, allowed for the calculation of national migration rates. While very useful this approach was also highly ambitious, and involved speaking to large numbers of people – thousands or tens of thousands in most cases.

The second set of contacts involved following up with a certain number of the households in each place. At this stage the households were given the full, 178-question interview and the strategy was to disproportionately focus on the households which contained a migrant, so that the final dataset contained information from more households with migrants than those without (usually around two-thirds of the final sample was made up of households with migrants). Information on both kinds of households was needed so that comparisons could be drawn between households with migrants and those without as one tool for assessing what the impacts of migration are.

The number of households given the full interview ranged from 486 in Jamaica through to between 1150 (Ghana) and 1508 (Vietnam) in the main phase of the project. The questionnaire gathered a wide range of information about individuals within the household (including demographic and socio-economic information, as well as data on their migration histories), and about the household as a whole (such as their consumption patterns, receipt and sending of remittances, and use of financial services).

5. In Colombia nationally representative sampling was too challenging for logistical and financial reasons. As a result that sample is representative of urban areas only.

6. Available at www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports and www.gdnet.org
as well as information on the head-of-household’s opinions about migration. This process resulted in the gathering of an extraordinarily large amount of data. If all the questionnaires used were piled on top of one another, the resulting tower of paper would be taller than the Statue of Liberty!

Steps were taken in each country to ensure the quality of the data was sufficiently high. The survey leaders were trained by the project management team directly, and provided outline training documents (see Annex 5) for them to use in training their own fieldworkers, who were either contracted directly, or through highly reputable firms or the national statistical office. Each survey leader organised in-country training sessions which lasted up to a week, and interviewers were fully supervised, with checks put in place (for example re-contacting households who were said to have been interviewed) to check the accuracy of the interviewers’ work. Many of the teams also checked the parameters of the data collected (such as gender and age distribution of the sample and source countries of remittances) against existing data. When differences in definitions were taken into account, the Development on the Move data were found to be consistent.

The research teams in each country have written country reports that bring together existing evidence plus the results of the DotM stakeholder interviews and household surveys. These reports describe the current shape of migration to and from each country, examine what impacts migration appears to have on development, and analyse policy, making suggestions of where improvements might be possible in order to enhance positive effects and minimise negative ones. This report draws heavily on those papers, as well as on additional analysis conducted using the data by other researchers.

The household dataset will also be made available to researchers worldwide on an open access basis later in 2010.

(iii) Undertake more comparative research

As set out above, the project tools were developed with the aim of producing comparable results so that it would be easier and more valid to draw out overarching lessons. Specifically:

• Each output is grounded in the same analytical framework, as set out in Section (i) above.

• Each research method used by country-based researchers was based on a central template. This has included a template stakeholder questionnaire guide (Annex 6), a template household questionnaire (Annex 3), a set of guidelines for sampling strategies (which drew, from among other sources, on Bilsborow et al 1984, and is provided as Annex 4) and a set of guidelines for undertaking econometric impact analysis (which draws, among other sources on a note written for the project, [McKenzie 2009], and is provided as Annex 7).

• Each piece of country-based research began in a similar way, with a launch workshop where key local stakeholders could share their views on what research would be useful and the kinds of impacts that require attention. Again, this was based on a template launch workshop format which was piloted in Jamaica, and on the circulation of advice from one team to another about what worked and what did not (launch workshop guide provided as Annex 8).

• Each country report was based on the same skeleton outline.

However, an important part of the project approach was to attempt to strike a balance between achieving comparable results and reflecting local context. For example, the launch workshops, while planned in a similar way to achieve similar outcomes, were a key forum in which to discuss what impacts require most attention in that particular country. This meant that while researchers examined some impacts across the board (for example effects on labour market participation), some impacts were selected because they were considered to be of special importance in that developmental context.
Furthermore, while each country team’s work was based on the same research templates, teams were able to alter those templates quite substantially in discussion with the project management team, for example adding questions to the household survey (as Vietnam and Ghana did most extensively), and changing the response options (for example Macedonia changed questions about income from exact amounts to income bands, as they felt the template wording was not appropriate in the Macedonian context). Similarly, while recommended analytical tools were identified for use when examining the household data, different teams were familiar with different impact analysis techniques, and used those which they had the greatest expertise in.

One of the drawbacks of needing to balance cross-country comparability with local relevance is that it limits this report’s ability to examine all trends and outcomes for all countries. For example, when this analysis draws from the findings of the country reports it is limited by the issues the researchers chose for analysis. And while analysis conducted for the working papers, or independently by the report authors for this publication is not affected by this constraint, some variables in the project dataset are not easily available for all countries (for example because responses were coded differently to capture country specificities). In these cases we have restricted our analysis to countries with appropriate comparable information.

(iv) Explore fresh and workable policy ideas
In order to maximise the chance of generating fresh policy insight, significant focus was placed in the country studies on understanding and improving policy. Each country research team was encouraged to examine policy challenges relating to migration in their country in detail, to take these into account when conducting their research and then pay explicit attention to policy implications and recommendations in their final report. As a result, each country report includes a substantial section setting out what the current relevant policies are in each country – including migration policies but going beyond them to examine all policies that affect migration’s development impacts. They also contain a section on enhancing policy, which explicitly asks what improvements can be made.

More generally, there was a strong attempt to focus on policy throughout the project. This included constructing a holistic analytical framework which allows for researchers to take a policymaker’s perspective, sampling for national representativeness, and using stakeholder interviews to ensure that the research was up to date with policy priorities and development. We also wrote a working paper exploring the kinds of policies that might be relevant (Chappell and Glennie 2009), which was provided to the research teams in each country as a background to their own thinking, and which also feeds into the policy section of this report.

(v) Promote migration research capacity-building in developing countries
Measures undertaken in order to meet this goal include:

• Commissioning teams based primarily in the developing world to conduct the country-based research (at least half of the team members, including the project leader, needed to be based in a developing or transition country).

• Commissioning some research teams and researchers with less experience of conducting migration research in order to bring new researchers into this relatively under-studied field.

• Supporting those researchers with external advisers – established experts working in the field of migration and development, with whom they could discuss methodological approaches, and who would review their outputs and provide feedback. In some cases the engagement of the external advisors was quite in-depth. For example one adviser spent a week with the research team’s home institution assisting in the process of putting the dataset together, creating the weights and planning the analysis.
• Organising regular meetings (most team leaders attended five project workshops over the life of the project) that brought together the country researchers, the project management team, expert advisers and others working in the field to discuss research methods and lessons learnt. These meetings included a dedicated survey planning workshop and one on impact analysis and report writing.

• Developing templates, which, while promoting comparability, also introduced some of the researchers to new tools and methods of analysis in a supportive fashion.

(vi) Promote multidisciplinary analysis
Several mechanisms were used to promote the crossing of disciplinary boundaries.

First, the project management team ensured that the people involved in the project reflected a range of methodological perspectives. Key to this was that each research team commissioned included members from more than one methodological background. Also important was that external experts involved in the project (including external advisers, the project steering committee and experts invited to attend various workshops) came from a range of methodological approaches.

Second, a ‘Q-squared approach’ was taken, using a range of methodological tools to investigate migration’s development impacts, both quantitative and qualitative (as has been discussed previously). The sequencing of these research methods was discussed quite extensively with the research teams to ensure that the work took place in the most sensible way possible, to get the most out of the interaction of methods (this drew on a paper commissioned by GDN on getting the most out of multidisciplinary research projects [Hulme 2007]).

Third, guidelines for the country teams urged that they produce reports that integrate the analysis from the different research methods. The outline produced for the country reports stressed, for example, that the findings arising from each approach should not be presented in separate chapters or sections, but be integrated into a single narrative. Qualitative interview analysis should be presented alongside quantitative survey findings so that when a question is addressed in the report (for example, what is the impact of migration on household incomes?) all the evidence is brought to bear to answer it. In the view of the DotM team such presentation not only enhances the multidisciplinary nature of the work, but also makes the report much more readable, as most of our audience are likely to be more interested in what was found about migration’s impacts than the intricacies of how the results were produced.
3. Patterns of migration, remittances and other interactions

The *Development on the Move* research methodology allows three different kinds of insights into the field of migration and development. First, because the surveys gathered nationally representative data, they allow a good insight into the scale and nature of migration into and out of the countries of study. Second, the research provides an insight into the most prominent indirect route via which migration affects development – remittances. Third, DotM also tries to examine other forms of interaction between migrants and the people they leave behind (though this is more challenging to observe). This chapter addresses each of these issues in turn.

### Patterns of migration

#### Scale of migration

The first question to address is how many people migrate. This is of crucial significance, as most countries lack reliable statistics on emigration, immigration and return, and knowing how many people migrate is the first step to understanding and therefore shaping the various inflows and outflows. Table 3.1 sets out some estimates of the scale of migration in the countries studied, providing both existing estimates and fresh calculations using the DotM data. For a note on the differences between existing estimates and the DotM numbers please see Box 3.1.

Four sets of estimates are provided. First, in column three there is an estimate of the total stock of emigrants from each country – that is, estimates of the total number of people born in that country who now live elsewhere. The range of numbers provided in this first column are taken from the University of Sussex’s Global Migrant Origin (GMO) database, a generally reliable data source, and from in-country sources.

The fourth column presents estimates for the DotM survey regarding emigration. However, it is vital to note that this does not provide an estimate of total migration, as in the first column, but rather a sub-set of total emigration. This is emigration that has taken place relatively recently (within the last 10 years), and that has left household members behind. As it is a sub-category of total emigration, and does not include either people who departed more than 10 years ago or people whose whole families now live abroad, it is

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7. The GMO uses the approach that the number of people who have emigrated from a country can be estimated by identifying how many of its people are currently living in every other country worldwide (taking this data from censuses where possible, and making estimations where it is not), and then adding these totals together. Though it has its shortcomings (the estimated data points are problematic) it provides the most comprehensive data available yet which can give an insight into how many emigrants a country has spread across the world.

8. The in-country sources vary depending on the country, and vary greatly in their reliability. We provide them here alongside the GMO data mostly to give a sense of the range of emigration estimates that exist, which in turn gives a sense of how imperfect existing knowledge is.

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Box 3.1. Data on the scale of migration – definitions and comparability

We need to bear in mind two differences between the DotM data and other data sources. First, as discussed in the methodology section, the DotM data defines migration as going to live in another country for three months or longer, whereas most other datasets use a one year definition. Second, the data were collected at different points in time, with the DotM data collected in the second half of 2008 (except for in Jamaica, where the survey was conducted at the end of 2007), whereas the University of Sussex’s Global Migrant Origin (GMO) data refer to 2000, and the other data vary in the time period they refer to (though it is usually some point between 2000 and 2010).

In our assessment the differences in the timing of data collection do not cause major problems for comparing across data sources. The issue of the differences in definitions may be more problematic, particularly for countries with a lot of short-term migration (see discussion on this below), but we believe these comparisons remain instructive as long as the differences in definitions are borne in mind.
only appropriate that the figures in the second column are substantially smaller than the figures in the ‘total emigration’ column. It is important to look at this sub-set of emigration separately though, because both recent departure (see for example Dustmann and Mestres 2009) and leaving family members behind (see for example Pollard et al 2008) have been identified as important indicators of a migrant’s likelihood of interacting with their country of origin and thereby potentially promoting development.

The fifth column provides estimates of return migration – which are believed to be the first set of nationally representative and comparable estimates of return migration ever collected. The information presented here again refers to a total stock, meaning that it is an estimate of the total number of people born in the country in question who have previously migrated, but now live back in that country.

The final column presents data on immigration. Here again a range of figures are presented, as relevant data are available (for most countries) from the GMO, DotM and a third source, the UN Population Division’s International Migration Statistics. This makes it the only case where we directly compare DotM estimates with those derived through other methods, and doing so gives some comfort that our surveys are fairly reliable. In all cases but one – Georgia – the DotM estimate falls between the two existing estimates. Moreover, in Georgia the researchers felt that this higher number was most likely to be more accurate (they were surprised that it was not higher still).

### Table 3.1. Estimates of frequency of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population size</th>
<th>Total emigrant stock¹</th>
<th>Stock of emigrants who departed within last decade leaving some household members behind²</th>
<th>Total stock of returned migrants¹</th>
<th>Total immigrant stock¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia⁵</td>
<td>44,530,000</td>
<td>460,000 – 3,300,000. Consensus above 1,500,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>110,000 – 115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>4,680,000</td>
<td>196,000 – 1,500,000. Consensus around 900,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>167,000 – 526,000⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>23,350,000</td>
<td>960,000 – 4,000,000</td>
<td>541,000</td>
<td>877,000</td>
<td>614,000 – 1,852,000⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2,690,000</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>13,000 – 30,000⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2,040,000</td>
<td>3300 – 700,000. Consensus between 250,000 and 500,000</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>33,000 – 130,000⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>86,210,000</td>
<td>2,000,000 – 3,000,000+</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>479,000</td>
<td>22,000 – 69,000⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:
1. Sources: GMO and statistics used in-country.
2. Source: DotM.
3. Source: DotM.
4. Sources: DotM, GMO and UN population division.
5. No DotM statistics are provided for Colombia because the survey was only representative for urban areas and not the country as a whole.
6. The lower estimate comes from the UN figures and the higher estimate from DotM. The GMO estimates Georgia’s immigrant stock at 219,000.
7. The lower estimate comes from the GMO and the higher estimate from the UN. DotM figures estimate Ghana’s immigrant stock at 664,000.
8. The lower estimate comes from the GMO and the higher estimate from the UN. DotM figures estimate Jamaica’s immigrant stock at 17,000.
9. The lower estimate comes from the GMO and the higher estimate from the UN. DotM figures estimate Macedonia’s immigrant stock at 59,000.
10. The lower estimate comes from the GMO and the higher estimate from the UN. No DotM immigration data was gathered for Vietnam.
Three notable findings emerge from this data. First, despite increasing discussion of the importance of south–south migration (for example see Ratha and Shaw 2007), which is often interpreted as implying that southern [developing] countries are receiving large numbers of migrants, each of the countries studied appears to be more a country of emigration than of immigration, though to different degrees. Ghana stands out as having the highest levels of immigration under any measure, whether in terms of absolute numbers of immigrants, immigrants as a proportion of its total population, or in terms of net migration (that is, when numbers of people who have emigrated are compared with numbers who have migrated in). In net migration terms, Ghana may even be close to parity under some estimates, though it seems likely that it has at least marginally lower levels of immigration than emigration. In each of the other DotM countries immigration is a rather negligible phenomenon. So while south–south migration may be an important phenomenon in some parts of the world, our data suggests that it is not significant – at least in terms of scale – everywhere.

Second, it is interesting to note that the kind of emigration often assumed to have the greatest development impacts – that is, recent emigration in which the migrant leaves other household members behind – forms only a relatively small proportion of all emigration from the developing countries studied: no more than 60 per cent for the countries we have data for, and in some places far less than this, just above 10 per cent for Georgia, for instance.

Third, the DotM dataset allows for the examination of the scale of return migration, an exciting prospect as nationally representative return data has been lacking to date, and yet return has been highlighted in recent years as potentially being able to make important contributions to development (for example see UK Border Agency and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2010).

The DotM data show surprisingly similar rates of return across the countries in question (see Box 3.2 for details on how these were calculated). They show that although they vary somewhat between countries, in no cases are they very high. In Georgia about 12 out of every 100 emigrants have returned, in Vietnam about 16 out of every 100, and in Jamaica about 20. Ghana and Macedonia see somewhat higher levels of return with 34 migrants returning to Macedonia for every 100 who have departed, and 37 out of 100 in Ghana. However, because the countries have quite different rates of emigration in the first place, this equates to quite different levels of return migrants in the population as a whole. Between 0.6 per cent (in Vietnam) and 8.9 per cent (in Jamaica) of the population in each country are returned migrants.

Box 3.2. Calculating the rate of return

The number of people who return out of the group who initially migrate is calculated using return migration figures and the total stock emigration figures provided in Table 3.1. (A single emigration figure was selected for each country by the report authors, based on our assessments of the reliability the various figures within the ranges presented. The GMO figures were relied upon most heavily.)

Because in some cases these ranges are quite wide, margins of error have been calculated. These margins are fairly substantial for Ghana and Macedonia, such that in Ghana, where this issue is most extreme, while the return rate presented is 37 per cent, it may actually be located anywhere between 18 and 48 per cent. As a result it is advised that these two estimates in particular should be treated with some caution.

The two figures are a good match in that they both refer to total stocks. However, as noted in Box 2.1, the DotM data define a migrant as someone who has moved for three months or more, and the GMO uses a one year or more definition. This means that the statistics may overstate the rate of return migration somewhat, depending on what proportion of returning migrants are away for between 3 and 12 months.

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9. This discussion uses total immigration and emigration figures (not the DotM statistics on recent migration that leaves family behind).
Destination countries

The DotM research generated rich data on which countries migrants move to. This is important because there is extensive debate about the kinds of places migrants from the developing world move to, with three suggested types of destinations:

(i) Regional destinations. Some stress the importance of south–south movements and particularly ‘cross-border’ movements to neighbouring countries, which it is assumed migrants can access most easily (because costs of travel are low, as are the costs of meeting or evading border regulations). Quantitative information on this kind of movement is particularly poor because these migrants are often undocumented (Shitundu 2006).

(ii) Major recipient countries. Others emphasise the extent to which a few developed countries attract the vast majority of migrants – especially the skilled. While fairly good data are available on migrant stocks in OECD countries (Chappell and Mulley 2010), this data nonetheless misses short-term and irregular migrants. Also, without good information on other kinds of movement it is difficult to see how significant it is in relation to other forms of migration.

(iii) Policy-mediated destinations. There is also an interesting, albeit under-informed, discussion about the importance of policy in determining where migrants move. Some analysts suggest that policy has very little role in determining migratory movements (Dorling 2009) and that people will migrate to ‘desirable’ places regardless of policy. Others stress that changing policies can have a major impact on movements. Such arguments are bolstered by examples of instances where policy appears to have had a major effect. One such instance is when Poland’s entry to the EU prompted very large movements to the UK and Ireland, as Polish citizens gained the right of free movement (Pollard et al 2008). This example makes clear that the kind of policies that are relevant are not necessarily ‘migration’ policies, and that other policy decisions, sometimes taken for other reasons entirely, may have significant impacts on migration patterns.

The challenge is, however, to go from categorising types of destinations (which few would disagree with), to examining the relative importance of different kinds of destinations. The DotM data enables a cross-country analysis of the kinds of destinations migrants from developing countries move to, for the first time as far as the report authors are aware. The data show 23 major migratory corridors (defined as such if 5 per cent or more of a country’s absent and/or returned migrants have moved through them). These corridors involve Colombians moving to the United States, Spain and Venezuela; Georgians moving to Russia, Greece, Turkey, ‘Other former Soviet Union,’ and ‘Western Europe’; Ghanaians moving to Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, ‘Other Africa’, the USA, UK, Germany and Italy; Jamaicans moving to the USA, UK and Canada; Macedonians moving to Italy, the USA, Switzerland, Germany, Slovenia and Australia; and Vietnamese moving to the USA, Malaysia, Taiwan, Russia, Korea, Japan and Germany.

Breaking this down into the three categories of destination, the data show first that migration within regions does appear common – nine of the major migration corridors DotM gathered data on are between countries in the same region. In some cases these movements are cross-border (for example Ghanaians moving to Côte d’Ivoire, Georgians moving to Russia). A substantial number of migrants also go to countries with which they do not share a border but that are in the same region (for example Vietnamese migrants moving to Malaysia, Macedonians moving to Slovenia). More striking perhaps is the finding that regional migration is less common than migration to outside the region. Fourteen of the migratory corridors, a clear majority, are between countries in two different regions.

Large, wealthy countries that are considered desirable to migrants the world over are prominent destinations for migrants from all of the DotM case study countries – 10 of the major migratory corridors used by DotM migrants lead to the 10 countries rated most attractive to migrants. (These are the USA, UK, Australia, Norway, France, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland and Hong Kong, according to Economist
Intelligence Unit 2008b.) Seventeen lead to the top 20 countries (the next 10 comprise Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland, Spain, Israel, Finland, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy [ibid]). Moreover, every country studied by DotM has at least one corridor that leads its migrants to a ‘top 10’ country. These findings suggest that movements to very popular, successful developed countries are at least as substantial numerically as migration within the region.

A third point to make is that policy and history do seem to matter. A full 18 of the major migratory corridors are between countries with major historical or policy links (which we define as policies on migration, trade, regional cooperation and integration, and other forms of political integration, including colonial links, all of which have been diagnosed as helping to shape migration patterns [Sassen 1998]). While this may seem coincidental – after all, the policy linkages between countries are extensive – it appears that policy plays an active causal role in shaping migration. For example, most of the migration corridors used by Vietnamese migrants take them to countries outside their region and which are not considered attractive countries to migrants generally. What links Vietnam to these countries is policy. The Vietnamese government has been very active in facilitating access for its workers to a range of labour markets across the globe (Dang et al 2010) and their success in doing so shows up in the DotM data.

Moreover, some of the most significant migratory corridors of all – those with the largest numbers of people moving – are those where there is a significant history of policy engagement. These include movements from Colombia to Spain (with Colombia a former colony of Spain and Colombians until recently not needing a visa to go there [Berube 2005]); from Vietnam to the USA (a large part of which is related to the fall-out from the Vietnam–USA war, which led to the departure of those associated with the South Vietnamese government and the United States [Dang et al 2010], and from Georgia to Russia (with Georgia a former part of the Soviet Union which means that the two countries have extensive economic, familial and ethnic connections [Tchaidze and Torosayan 2010]). In these cases, while migration policy may have played some role, it seems that other kinds of policy, especially high level political engagement, are perhaps even more critical.

**Origin of immigrants**

Turning back now to the question of immigration into the DotM countries, the major countries of origin are countries within the same region. This fits well with the findings sketched out above, as the DotM case study countries are not rated as countries that are particularly attractive to migrants (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008b). Nor do they have extensive policy linkages beyond the region that might be expected to promote migration.

Data on immigration into Ghana, for example, as shown in Figure 3.1, demonstrate that a substantial majority of immigrants are from the directly neighbouring countries of Côte d’Ivoire, Togo and Burkina Faso. However, other West African countries including Niger and Mali also feature in the top countries of origin.

There are also very small numbers of immigrants to Ghana from some developed countries – the USA, UK, Italy and Germany. These four nations are in fact the same non-African countries Ghanaian emigrants tend to move to, as described above. By way of potential explanation for this, it seems likely that some of these immigrants are people who were born in Ghana but who have been away for a substantial period of time and gained the citizenship of their country of destination before returning, perhaps for retirement (Banful 2004). Some may even be second generation Ghanaians coming to live in the country of their family’s origin (as described for example in King and Christou 2008). It is also possible that migration patterns are emblematic of a larger relationship between two countries – political, historical, trade-based and so on – which will also include and produce two-way migration flows.
Patterns of movement

It is important here to address the question of whether or not it actually makes sense to talk about ‘migration corridors’ or a migrant’s ‘country of destination’. Both phrases imply that migrants move from one place to another, and then either remain in that place permanently, or eventually depart to return to their country of origin. Recent research has emphasised that some migrants actually move in more complex patterns and to multiple countries of destination (for example see International Migration Institute 2006). Two distinct patterns of movements of this kind have been distinguished – super-mobility and step-migration.

Theories of super-mobility suggest that migrants are highly mobile, moving not just once after leaving their country of origin, but repeatedly, from destination to destination depending on the relative attractions of different places at different times. This theory is usually said to apply to those with the greatest ability to move as they wish, particularly the highly skilled (Finch et al 2009).

‘Step-wise’ or ‘onward’ migration is another theory that emphasises that migrants may live in a number of countries (Anarfi et al 2003). In this case, however, the focus is on those who lack the ability to move directly from their place of origin to their desired destination. The theory is that they may instead use a series of steps, a number of episodes of migration, to enable them to build up the resources and characteristics (such as qualifications or wages) so that they can meet the migration policy requirements of their desired destination.

The DotM evidence is not supportive of these theories of multiple movements, however, at least in the countries studied. The project data suggest that the vast majority of migrants had lived in just one country while they were away; more than 90 per cent of Jamaican emigrants stayed in one place, as did a similar proportion of emigrants from Ghana. Evidence on immigration to Ghana paints a similar picture. Of this group, more than 95 per cent moved directly from their country of origin to Ghana, without living in any other migratory destinations in between. This may be their first move in a step-wise migration to other destinations, but the data fail to bear this out. 92 per cent of Ghana’s immigrants reported that they had no intention of leaving Ghana. Of the 8 per cent who did, it must be presumed that some proportion intended to move back to their country of origin, leaving only a small percentage of Ghana’s total immigrants who might be engaging in step-wise movements or super-mobility.

Figure 3.1: Country of citizenship of immigrants to Ghana

Source: Development on the Move Ghana household survey.
Notes: Ghana features in this graph because it lists immigrants’ country of citizenship, and approximately 11 per cent of Ghana’s immigrants have become Ghanaian citizens. The figures for USA, UK, Germany, Italy and Other are existent but too small to see on the graph.
Reasons for moving
The DotM data strongly confirm the findings of previous migration research that emphasises that economic opportunity is the major reason for people to migrate (for example see Schoorl et al 2000, Pollard et al 2008). As Figure 3.2 makes clear, economic reasons – employment and wages – are by far the strongest motivators of emigration from the DotM countries. Having the opportunity to remit – another economic driver – is the third most important reason for departing. The importance that migrants ascribe to the opportunity to remit demonstrates that they do not leave just to further their own economic prospects, but also to improve their families’ economic welfare – a point that previous literature has also emphasised (Solimano 2004).

![Figure 3.2: Reasons given for emigration](image)

**Figure 3.2: Reasons given for emigration**

Source: DotM household surveys 2007/2008
Note: In Jamaica the reasons were put to the migrant to agree or disagree with, whereas in the other countries the question was open and all motivators mentioned were recorded by the interviewers. This seems not to have affected the relative emphasis placed on each reason for departure by Jamaican migrants but it seems to have elevated the frequency with which each was highlighted. As such, any comparison between the proportion of Jamaican and other migrants citing a particular reason for moving should not be given too much weight.

After these economic factors come two other broad categories of motivations – learning, and family. Taking learning first, migration for formal study, migration to learn a language, and migration to acquire other skills are each more minor, but still significant reasons for departure. Migration to reunite with family members who have already migrated is also fairly common, usually acting as a motivating factor for between 5 and 15 per cent of emigration. Migration alongside other family members is significant, if slightly less so. Marriage is a less common reason to move on the whole, though results are much more divided across countries here, with Vietnamese migrants in particular leaving for marriage. (These marriages are often arranged in order for the woman – it is usually a woman – to move to a wealthier place, making this too in many cases an economically driven movement [Dang et al 2010].) Marriage is also a not negligible reason for emigrating from Ghana and Macedonia, but rare in the other three countries.

The least common set of reasons given for departure are related to social and political problems in the country of origin, which is striking, given that some countries, such as Colombia, have experienced economic difficulties, internal insurgencies and political upheaval in recent years. Excluding Jamaica, no more than 3 per cent of migrants in any country left because they did not feel safe in their country of origin, because they wanted to have more personal freedoms, or because they experienced discrimination. That is not to say, of course, that social and political problems do not motivate some departures – in each country some migrants gave these reasons for moving. However, more importantly, social and political issues can create the economic problems which
people cite as their reason for leaving (Van-Hear et al. 2009).

It is interesting to examine if migrants who left for economic reasons tended to have work arranged before migrating. The data suggest that this is not the case – 67 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants, according to the DotM survey, did not have work arranged before departure, and even more Georgian absent migrants – 85 per cent were in that position. The same patterns can be observed for those who have now returned.

This suggests much migration for work does not take place through work-related migration channels. Work permits for instance usually require a job to be secured in advance of departure. Though their purpose is to work, these migrants must find other routes – whether via family reunification, migration as students, travel as tourists or arriving clandestinely. In a number of cases this involves violating immigration and labour laws.

Reasons for return

The analysis turns next to the reasons that migrants return, as charted in Figure 3.3. It is immediately obvious that these are much less consistent across the DotM countries than the reasons for leaving. It is also difficult to discern trends within countries, with responses spread more evenly across the response options, and there are far more responses categorised as ‘other’. All this points towards return being driven by more personal and idiosyncratic reasons than departure, as has been found in previous research (Finch et al. 2009). However, it is still possible to draw out some common themes.

First, family reasons are the biggest driver behind return. Simply returning to be with family is the major reason for migrants across all the countries studied here to return to their country of origin. Not far behind is return for less positive reasons – because someone in the family needs them to be there. This emphasis on family is again in line with previous studies (for example Pollard et al. 2008).

Following family reasons are three sets of reasons which have broadly the same level of influence. These issues could be termed ‘completion’, ‘migration policy’, and ‘unhappiness’.

First, completion motivators involve the migrant completing a job or contract, their course of study, or making the amount of money they went there to earn. Of these, completing a particular job or contract is the most important. This links

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10. Under a bond a migrant goes abroad (often for study), supported by the government of their country of origin, agreeing to return. If they do not return they have to pay a certain amount of money to their government.

11. The Jamaica statistics here are not accurate. In Jamaica voluntary return because of visa expiry and deportation were one response category, as deportation is a very sensitive issue in Jamaica and the survey team were reluctant to ask about it in case it led to the termination of interviews. We have designated all those who indicated they returned to Jamaica because of visa issues under the ‘returned voluntarily’ heading (this was more common than deportation in each of the other countries, and so it is a reasonable assumption that more of this group returned voluntarily than were deported).
to the second set of motivators, which are issues related to migration policy. People returning because of having a bond placed upon them\(^{10}\) is the most important reason among this group – as well as those who return voluntarily because their visa expired (often likely to be linked to the end of a job or contract), or who are deported.\(^{11}\) This shows that regulations around movement do have an effect on flows, though not to the same extent as other factors such as family-related issues. Third is a set of reasons around the migrant not enjoying their life in the destination country, and missing the lifestyle they left behind.

These second-tier motivations for returning are given different priority by migrants from different countries. In particular, migrants from Georgia stand out as citing completion motivations as important reasons for coming back, and Ghanaians are much more likely to have returned because of disappointment in their life abroad – a not insignificant 21 per cent gave this reason. It seems likely that some of the disappointment Ghanaians feel about their migration experiences reflects the fact that many of the countries they move to are poor, making it more difficult for the migrants to achieve their key goal of improved economic opportunities.

Turning to the remaining set of reasons for return, the ‘least significant’ category contains new economic opportunities in the country of origin – such as a new job, or wanting to start a new business. This makes opportunity in the country of origin a less important reason for return than deportation or bad experiences abroad. The numbers here are low and probably disappointing for most policymakers.

Governmental or non-governmental schemes (such as those run by the International Organization for Migration) designed explicitly to motivate return come bottom of reasons for return, with no migrants at all in either Colombia or Jamaica citing these as important in their decision to leave. Even among Ghanaians, who cited these schemes more often than others, only 1.5 per cent of returnees mentioned them. This suggests that compared to other policy tools specific schemes aiming to motivate return are unlikely to motivate anyone beyond very niche groups of potential returnees – a finding mirrored by previous studies (for example Black et al 2004). This must be borne in mind by the whole range of countries, both of origin (for example Korea [Lee and Saxenian 2009] and Jamaica [Thomas-Hope et al 2009]) and destination (for example the UK [Thiel and Gillan 2010]), which are at various stages in designing schemes to motivate return.

**Duration of stay**

The DotM evidence suggests that the length of an ‘episode’ of migration varies radically depending on the migrant’s country of origin. Table 3.2 presents results from Jamaica (Lucas and Chappell 2009) and Macedonia (Nikolovski et al 2010) – countries that illustrate the extremes of migration duration.

In Jamaica a large proportion of migrants move for very short periods – for example just over 50 per cent of Jamaican returned migrants are away for less than a year. In contrast, in Macedonia less than 3 per cent were away for under 12 months, and almost half had been away for more than 10 years before they returned.\(^{12}\)

The country to which migrants move also seems to affect the length of time they are away. For example, while most migrants from Macedonia who do return are away for relatively long periods, those who migrated to the USA stay away for much less time on average. This trend for shorter migration periods to the USA is replicated in the Jamaican data too, and in other countries (not shown in the table). In Vietnam, for example, 49 per cent of returned migrants who went to the United States returned within a year of departing, whereas only 19 per cent of returned migrants who went to Taiwan came back that quickly (and migrants going to other destinations were even less likely to return within a year). This apparent trend for migrants returning more quickly from the USA than from many other countries, if they return at all, is probably related to the USA’s status as the most popular destination for international students (O’Shaughnessy 2009) as well as its relatively strict immigration rules. It should be noted too that many migrants who move to the USA will never return, settling there permanently.

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12. Note that this analysis is only for migrants that ‘complete’ an episode of migration by returning. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, most migrants do not return: only around one in five Jamaicans and one in three Macedonians do so.
Migrants’ characteristics

The DotM research enables us to profile migrants in a way that has rarely been possible before. In particular it enables exploration of whether or not migrants tend to have similar profiles across countries, and whether or not some of the stereotypical ideas about migrants are correct. The characteristics we examine encompass the demographic – gender, age, marital status and parental status, and the relationship between the familial migrant and their household, and the socio-economic – educational achievement and income.

A stereotypical picture of a migrant would suggest that they are equally likely to be male as female (UNDESA 2009), and that typically they have a young profile (perhaps being in their early twenties) (McKenzie 2007). However, relatively little is known about migrants’ marital or parental status, so what can be added here is particularly important. Information about the relationship between the migrant and the head of the household they left behind is also scarce, though it often seems to be assumed that the two are married or partners. Regarding socio-economic characteristics, migrants are usually thought to be highly educated (Kaya 2008), and relatively wealthy (Development Research Centre on Migration Globalisation and Poverty 2006). It is generally accepted that the poorest of the poor rarely migrate (at least not internationally – internal migration seems to be an option more open to the poorest households [United Nations Development Programme 2009]).

This research confirms some of this received wisdom and questions other parts.

Gender

Taking gender first (see Figure 3.4), in five out of six of the countries we studied the majority of absent migrants are men; only in Vietnam do women make up the majority of absent migrants (57 per cent). Jamaica and Colombia have close to gender parity, but with marginally more male migrants, and Georgia (at 61 per cent), Ghana (68 per cent) and Macedonia (a very striking 78 per cent) have substantially more male than female migrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Country of destination</th>
<th>&lt; ½ year</th>
<th>½ ≥ 1 year</th>
<th>1 ≥ 2 years</th>
<th>2 ≥ 5 years</th>
<th>5 ≥ 10 years</th>
<th>10 years plus</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DotM household surveys 2007 / 2008
Note: [1] From three to just under six months. Any time abroad that lasts less than three months is not counted as migration.
What explains these differences? It could be an extension of the historical trend – in Macedonia for example migration was traditionally an almost solely male pursuit (Nikolovski et al. 2009), which may have formed cultural attitudes that continue to shape migratory trends today. However, it also seems likely that destination country demand may also play a role in shaping the gendered patterns of movement. For example, as illustrated in Figure 3.5, which depicts Georgian absent migrants, more women than men move to Greece and Turkey, and these are destinations characterised by high demand for services such as baby-sitting, housekeeping and waitressing. On the other hand migrants moving to Russia and other former Soviet Union countries are often involved in industries requiring physical strength such as construction, and this demand appears to generate higher levels of male migration (Tchaidze and Torosayan 2010).

Age
The DotM evidence generally does not support the view that migrants (at least in the countries studied) are particularly young.13 In Georgia, for example, migrants are younger than non-migrants on average, but only marginally: 36 years old compared with 38 for non-migrants. In Colombia and Ghana migrants tend on the whole to be older than non-migrants. In Colombia the difference is only marginal (34 years versus 32), but in Ghana it is substantial (34 years versus 25).

13. Though it should be noted that we report the migrants’ ages at the time of the survey – their ages at the actual moment of migration were younger.
Marital and parental status

The evidence on migrants’ marital and parental status is more consistent (see Table 3.3). The majority of migrants in each country are married or have a long-term partner, and the majority also have children. In each case the most common arrangement is for migrants who have partners to be living with that partner abroad (who may be a fellow migrant or may be someone born in that country). Indeed, it is quite striking that in both Colombia and Vietnam more than four in five migrants who have partners are living with those partners abroad.

However, it is less likely for migrants’ children to have moved abroad with them – in each of the cases shown the proportion of offspring living abroad with their migrant parent is less than the proportion of partners doing so. In Ghana, less than half of the absent migrants who have children have all those children with them abroad.

Table 3.3. Migrants’ marital and parental status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Location of partner</th>
<th>Parental status</th>
<th>Location of children¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married/in partnership</td>
<td>No partner</td>
<td>With migrant</td>
<td>Not with migrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>61% 39%</td>
<td>86% 14%</td>
<td>65% 35%</td>
<td>68% 46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>72% 28%</td>
<td>67% 33%</td>
<td>59% 41%</td>
<td>48% 57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>67% 33%</td>
<td>69% 31%</td>
<td>57% 43%</td>
<td>51% 49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>60% 40%</td>
<td>82% 18%</td>
<td>72% 28%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DotM household surveys 2007/2008
Note: [1] The rows here can sum to more than 100% because one absent migrant can have two or more children located in different places.

Given this information it is unsurprising to find that the relationship between the current head of the household in the sending country and the absent migrant is relatively rarely a spousal relationship (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4. Absent migrants’ relationship to the head of the household they left behind

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absent migrant is the x of the current head of household</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister/brother</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandchild</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niece/nephew</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister/brother in law</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daughter/son in law</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother/father in law</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DotM household surveys 2007/2008
Note: The columns may not sum to 100 as very small categories of responses and ‘other relatives’ have been left out.

¹ We use ‘children’ to mean offspring of the parent and thus they could be over the age of 18.
The absent migrant is only the head of household’s partner in between 5 per cent (Colombia) and 19 per cent (Macedonia) of cases. It is far more common that the absent migrant is the offspring of the head of the household. Between 40 per cent (Colombia) and 69 per cent (Vietnam) of absent migrants have this relationship with the head of household. Next most common is that the absent migrant is the household head’s sister or brother; this is so in between 9 per cent (Vietnam) and 21 per cent (Colombia) of households. No other relationship is mentioned anywhere near as frequently as these three.

It is worth noting that it is rare for the migrant parent to have left their offspring behind as the head of household. This occurs most frequently in Macedonia and Vietnam, where 6 per cent of absent migrants are the parents of the current head of household. It should also be noted that a significant proportion of children of absent migrants are adults themselves. This data therefore makes clear that the much feared situation where parents migrate leaving children to fend for themselves (as discussed in UNICEF 2008) is relatively uncommon.

Education and income
The last issue to be examined is migrants’ level of education and income. The evidence here suggests, in line with previous findings, that migrants are more highly educated than the average non-migrant in their country (see Table 3.5) – a finding which is consistent across the countries. The countries are experiencing a brain drain, although whether this has a net positive or negative effect on development cannot be assumed and must be assessed (Chappell and Mulley 2010, Clemens 2009).

Patterns of remittances
Remittances are often seen as the major benefit of migration, and with good reason. Pioneering work by the World Bank in particular (for example, see World Bank 2005) has brought together different kinds of macroeconomic remittance data to show clearly for the first time the amount of remittances flowing into each country. This has alerted
researchers and policymakers to the significant size of these flows, which previously had been only a marginal part of the development agenda. This change in approach to remittances has been so significant that some commentators (for example Mitchell 2006) have called it a ‘remittance euphoria’. Furthermore, while the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) did not originally focus on remittances, newer MDG documents have referred to the need to harness their potential (Usher 2005).

However, while absolutely vital in raising the prominence of the issue, and permitting fascinating analysis of some of the macroeconomic impacts of remittances (for example Bugamelli and Paterno 2005), this data has not provided all the insights necessary in order to maximise their development impact. In particular, because the data are macroeconomic, they remain at an aggregate national level, and do not indicate who receives remittances, how much they receive, or many other aspects relating to the way this money affects people’s daily lives. These issues are just as important – if not more so – than the total amounts received nationally.

Other more micro forms of data do also exist. Some more specific studies provide important insight into particular groups of recipients, for example European Stability Initiative 2006, which examines remittances received in two villages in Kosovo. Others look at ‘remittance corridors’, for example Hernández-Coss and Bun 2007, on the UK-Nigeria corridor. However, few have gathered information that is both in-depth and nationally representative, characteristics that are very important for anyone making policy decisions.

The DotM research has been able to address some of these gaps. It has collected nationally representative data on the receipt of remittances, enabling an analysis of patterns of remittances to each country. It has also gathered detailed information on who remits and who they remit to, and includes data on informal remittances as well as the funds sent through the banking system. This is vital, as rough estimates have suggested that perhaps half of all remittances are sent informally, and are thus missed by the macroeconomic data (INAFI Asia Secretariat 2007, Siddiqui 2004).

Proportion of households receiving remittances
The data from the DotM household survey provide some important insights into the proportion of households receiving remittances in each of the case study countries, as set out in Table 3.6. The results contradict some of the usual assumptions about remittances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proportion of absent migrants that remit to their household of origin</th>
<th>Est. proportion of all households in country who receive funds from their own absent migrant</th>
<th>Est. proportion of all households in country who receive remittances from a ‘non-member remitter’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DotM household surveys 2007/2008

Note: [1] The Colombian figures are estimates for the proportion of households in urban areas receiving remittances from each source.
Table 3.6 makes clear that not all migrants remit. While few people would assert that remitting is universal, sometimes discussions of the importance of remittances for development can give the idea that the vast majority of people departing are sending money home. In fact, in the countries studied the extent of remitting varies widely. Between 36 per cent (Macedonia) and 77 per cent (Vietnam) of absent migrants remitted money or goods back to the households they lived in before departing.15

One possibility offered by the DotM household survey is that it allows for the testing of the commonly made assumption that the key remitting relationship is between a migrant and their pre-migration household. Some recent research has questioned this idea (World Bank 2006) and it does not necessarily fit with widespread understandings of the social structures and obligations at work in many of the countries migrants come from. DotM investigated this assumption by asking households both about remittances they received from their own absent migrants and remittances received from others (those not living in their household before departure).

The results, set out in column 3 of Table 3.6, are quite striking. They suggest that between 4 per cent (Colombia) and 28 per cent (Jamaica) of households in each country received funds from a ‘non-member remitter’ (people who were not members of the household they are currently remitting to before they migrated). For Jamaica the high figure suggests that major contributions could be being made by non-member remitters to households’ welfare across the country. The Colombia figure, on the other hand, may seem negligible. However, it is worth comparing it with the number of households who have their ‘own’ absent migrant and receive remittances from them (column 2, Table 3.6). In several of the countries studied (including Colombia) more households receive remittances from non-member remitters than from their own absent migrants, and up to as much as four times as many in Jamaica. Moreover, in none of the countries are the numbers of households receiving remittances from their ‘own’ absent migrants dramatically larger than the number receiving from non-member remitters.

So who are these people remitting to households they were not previously members of? There is no consistent picture across countries. In Vietnam non-member remitters are very predominantly close family members, including siblings, parents and children16 (more than 90 per cent of the non-member remitters fall into this category in Vietnam). In contrast, in Georgia and Macedonia they tended also to be relatives, but not close relatives – around 40 per cent of non-member remitters fell into the ‘other relative’ category in both these countries, which includes aunts and uncles, cousins and so on. And in Jamaica the trend is different again – almost half of the non-member remitters in Jamaica were not related to the households they were sending money to, with the relationship presumably based on friendship instead. While it is difficult to be definitive, it seems likely that these different patterns exist because of pre-existing differences in patterns of social relations and obligations in the different countries. It seems likely that remittance patterns probably reflect the ways in which households and individuals in those countries already relate to one another (World Bank 2006).

These findings demonstrate how important it is in any investigation of migration and remittances not to expect that migration from a household and remittances to a household will always coincide. Many people migrate and do not remit (or at least not to their household of origin), and many people remit to households they were not members of before leaving. In fact, the evidence suggests that this kind of remitting should be thought of as just as significant as that between a migrant and the household he or she has left behind.

We turn now to investigate the nature of both kinds of remittances in greater detail.

Total remittance amounts sent over the previous year

Cash (as opposed to goods) remittances sent by absent migrants to the households they left makes a significant contribution to those households’ income17, although the amount remitted varies quite substantially from country to country. For example, in Georgia absent migrants on average sent the equivalent of approximately US$1325 in the 12 months prior to being surveyed. Average annual household incomes in

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15. There may be some under-reporting of remitting. In the survey planning stage the Macedonian team in particular were concerned that respondents would not want to share financial information. However, while this may mean that true levels of remitting are somewhat higher than indicated here, we are confident that the interviewers were well trained and will have obtained at least broadly accurate results.

16. Please note that by our definition household members live together, sharing food. For example, a brother and sister in many cases will have lived in separate homes prior to the migration of one, meaning that although they are closely related they are not defined as members of the same household.

17. Note that the rate of non response tended to be higher for these questions than for most others in the survey. This may affect the accuracy of the results.
Georgia were US$2244 in 2005, making remittances a very important source of income for many recipients. On the other hand, though, in Jamaica the average amount remitted by absent migrants to their households in the previous 12 months was approximately US$640. For comparison average household incomes in Jamaica in 2008 were about US$7400, making remittances relatively less important to the average household there. However patterns of remittances being sent tended to be similar across countries. Most absent migrants send relatively small amounts (typically in the hundreds of US dollars per year) but with a ‘long tail’ of people sending larger amounts.

Remittances from non-member remitters tended not to vary too dramatically from these patterns, though on the whole the amounts sent were towards the lower end of the spectrum for each country. It is striking, however, that amounts were not dramatically different. In Georgia, for example, the average amount remitted by a non-member remitter was US$1120 (compared with US$1325 for absent migrants).

How is money sent?
It is important to understand the dynamics of how the money is sent – how often the migrants make transfers, how they make them, and who precisely the money is sent to – in order for policies that attempt to influence the transfer of money to be well grounded in migrants’ actual behaviour.

Figure 3.6 shows how frequently absent migrants from Georgia, Ghana and Macedonia sent remittances to their households. The patterns across the countries are fairly similar, with most absent migrants sending money home bi-monthly or monthly. (It seems likely that these frequencies are chosen by most remitters as they give the remitter and recipient the optimal trade-off between sending money regularly while avoiding flat rate charges for each transfer made.) The only real difference between the countries is the numbers of absent migrants who send funds only occasionally, including for special occasions (such as for a wedding) or in emergencies. In Ghana, it seems this occasional form of remitting is more common than in the other two countries. The same is true for Jamaica (not shown in the figure), where about half of the absent migrants sending money back to their households do so only occasionally.

Turning to non-member remitters, they are, in terms of the frequency with which they remit, quite different to absent migrants remitting to their households of origin. There is a clear trend towards sending money less often among non-member remitters, and
particularly in sending it only on special occasions and in emergencies. The latter was the case for around two thirds of the time for Jamaican and 40 per cent of the time for Macedonian non-member remitters.

While the frequency of sending money was broadly similar across countries, the method generally used by absent migrants to send their money varies considerably by country, as shown in Figure 3.7.

Macedonia and Ghana both make much greater use of travelling friends and relatives to send their money back – perhaps because many of the migrants from those countries go to destinations that are relatively nearby. It is also notable that money transfer agencies such as Western Union are used much less frequently in Georgia than in the other countries. Georgia has over the past few years undergone an extensive financial deregulation process (Tchaidze and Torosayan 2010), and this may be why its banking system is getting much more business, business which in other countries appears to go to money transfer agencies.

It is also worth noting that in each of these countries very few households reported receiving funds through unofficial money transfer agencies. In other countries, notably Vietnam, the numbers receiving money this way were higher: 10.2 per cent of rural households received funds from their absent migrants in this way in Vietnam, as did 16.9 per cent of urban households. But nowhere were the numbers of people using these channels very substantial. It may be that sending via unofficial transfers agencies is under-reported because people struggled to distinguish between the official and unofficial (though interviewers were trained to know the difference), or because some people did not want to admit to using unofficial channels. However, assuming that these results are at least in the right sort of range, they suggest that for those seeking to formalise remittance sending, money being sent through unofficial remittance companies is much less of an issue than people using their friends and relatives.

Methods used by non-member remitters tend to shadow the methods used by the absent migrants remitting to their households in each of the countries. This suggests that characteristics specific to the country of origin (such as the financial systems in place) are the critical determinants of how remitters behave, rather than any aspects of the relationship between remitter and receiver.
Lastly, it is interesting to examine who is the intended recipient of the remittances – the households in their entirety, or one specific individual. Across the countries the clear majority of funds sent by absent migrants to the households they left were sent to support households as a whole rather than specific members – 70 per cent of funds were sent for the household as a whole in Jamaica, and 90 per cent in Macedonia, for example. In contrast, remittances from non-member remitters were much more likely to be sent to individuals. This is not surprising given that the migrant was not previously a household member and is therefore likely to feel less responsibility for that household’s overall income. For example 52 per cent of non-member remitters in Jamaica sent funds to specific individuals, as did 28 per cent in Macedonia.

Complicating factors?
There are four aspects of remittances that potentially have the ability to change the usual understanding of the size – and even the nature – of remittance flows, and yet they have tended to remain unaddressed because of a lack of evidence. These are:

(i) In-kind remittances: the sending of goods rather than money (as highlighted by Brown and Leeves 2007 among others)

(ii) The repayment of remittances: some remittances may be more like loans than donations (highlighted by Grosh and Glewwe 2000)

(iii) ‘Reverse’ remittances: money being sent to migrants from their households at origin, rather than vice versa (see Mazzucato 2009)

(iv) ‘Other’ non-household remittances: money sent either from a migrant to themselves (see Siddiqui 2004), or between an organisation and a migrant (see Economist Intelligence Unit 2008a). For example: a migrant may transfer money from an account in a country where they live to an account in the country of their birth; money may be sent by migrants to organisations like community groups, schools or religious institutions; or money such as a pension payment may be sent from an organisation to a returned migrant.

Each of these issues has been raised as potentially changing our understanding of what remittances mean for development, and with good reason. For example, if there are very large in-kind flows then a large part of the contributions that migrants are making to households in their countries of origin has been missed by much past research which has focused on financial flows alone. If remittances are in effect loans that have to be repaid then our understanding of them as simple additions to household budgets may be wrong, and the nature of the relationship between remitter and recipient may not be as altruistic as has previously been assumed. If ‘reverse remittances’ are large, then the focus usually placed on gross remittance flows is wrong – we need to move towards looking at net remittances, and understanding the reciprocal financial relationships between the migrants and their households. And if many migrants remit to organisations as well as people, then we may have misunderstood the size of the contribution that migrants are making to development, and the focus on household level impacts may be skewed, to the detriment of community level effects.

The evidence from the DotM work in fact suggests that the first three of these phenomena are not as significant as to change our understanding of how large remittances are, or their nature. But the last is rather different. Each is explored in more depth below.

In-kind remittances
The extent to which migrants send in-kind remittances of goods varies between countries, but in no case does it appear to happen nearly as extensively as the sending of money. In Jamaica, for example, where some of the highest levels of in-kind remitting are observed, about one third of absent migrants send goods back to their households of origin. Relatively high levels of in-kind remittances were expected in Jamaica, with previous research having noted the phenomenon of ‘barrel children’, children who are left behind by migrating parents and who are sent packages of goods as ‘compensation’ for their parents’ absence (Thomas-Hope et al 2009). It is less common in most other
countries, however, with, for example, less than 20 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants sending in-kind remittances back to their households.

As well as being sent less frequently, in-kind remittances are also of considerably lower worth than remitted cash. In Jamaica, for example, the average value of the in-kind remittances received from absent migrants is about US$265 annually, less than half the value of cash remittances. In Macedonia many of the in-kind remittances are worth around US$100, which does not begin to compare with the size of the average cash transfer. The amounts involved and the frequency with which they are sent are not negligible, but neither are they game-changing in our understanding of remittances and their development potential.

Repayment
The DotM data suggest that it is very rare for households to have to repay the remittances they are sent – for example only 3 per cent of absent migrants’ remittances to their households in Jamaica were expected to be repaid, and 1 per cent in Ghana. In Georgia, none of the households receiving remittances from non-member remitters expected to repay that assistance. This survey therefore does not contradict migration scholars’ previous work which understood remittances as transfers rather than loans.

Reverse remittances
The data suggest that reverse remittances are also relatively rare – just 9 per cent of Ghanaian absent migrants received remittances from their households in the year prior to the survey, for example, as did 5 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants and 3 per cent of the Jamaicans.

‘Other’ non-household remittances
Some kinds of non-household remittances are also very rare. 7 per cent of Jamaican returned migrants indicated that they had sent remittances to an organisation while they had been away, almost all to religious organisations. A similar proportion of Macedonian returned migrants had sent organisational remittances either of their own accord and/or through membership of a group of Macedonian citizens abroad. For them too, the focus was primarily religious, with more than three quarters of these funds being sent for religious purposes. According to this evidence the vision that some may have had of migrants making significant contributions to development by supporting community development in their places of origin is not being realised, at least in the countries studied here.

On the other hand ‘remitting to oneself’ may be significant in some circumstances. In Jamaica, Macedonia and Vietnam more than 60 per cent of returning migrants brought funds back with them on their return (such transfers are counted as remittances in balance of payments statistics). Depending on the size of the amounts brought back, and whether or not many migrants also sent themselves funds regularly while they were away, they could amount to a not-insignificant proportion of the remittance flows observed.

Moreover, remittances from organisations look in some cases very significant indeed. For example, information from research with stakeholders in Jamaica suggested that Jamaican retirees who spent some of their working lives in the UK but who have now returned to Jamaica are collectively drawing down large amounts of money in pensions. The amount received annually in pensions from the UK is around US$100 million – quite significantly more than amounts being transferred annually by currently absent migrants back to their households of origin (Thomas-Hope et al 2009). And this figure only takes into account pensions from one destination country.

It may be thought that the Jamaican case is not likely to be replicated in many other countries to the same extent, as Jamaican returnees are often considered to be disproportionately returning for retirement. However, data presented on reasons for return and duration of absence, as discussed above, show that the majority of Jamaican returnees are not retirees – far from it. Furthermore, some other nations do see a large proportion of their returnees having spent a large proportion of their working lives abroad and thus they may be receiving pensions; Macedonia is a good case in point. So organisational remittances may be very important in a number of contexts, placing extra emphasis on the need to ensure that any benefits that migrants accrue while working

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18. This question was only asked to returned migrants, who were thought to be the group who would have the best information on the sending of this type of remittance. To the extent that returned migrants differ from those who stay away, organisational remittances from currently absent migrants may look somewhat different.
abroad are ‘portable’, or transferable back to their country of origin.

These findings all add to the sense that we need to rethink the traditional approach of viewing remittances as money sent home by migrants to the households they have left behind, and view them more broadly as all the accumulated funds that flow from a migrant’s country of destination to their country of origin as a result of their migration. This includes, but is not limited to, transfers to household members, transfers to other family members and friends, money being sent to bank accounts in the country of origin to build up a ‘nest egg’, resources and assets being transferred back to a migrant’s country of origin with them if they decide to return, and monies they continue to receive (such as pensions) from sources abroad, even when they have relocated back to their place of origin.

**Factors affecting remittances**

This section examines factors that affect the amount of remittances each migrant sends.\(^1\) This is a vital question, as if it is possible to identify general lessons about what causes more generous remitting, policymakers could try to encourage those kinds of people to migrate, or to help migrants to acquire ‘positive’ characteristics. The factors explored are migrants’ personal characteristics, the nature of their experience of migration, the nature of their relationship with their household of origin, and the households’ own characteristics.

**Personal characteristics**

The first two characteristics examined are attributes of the migrants themselves – the migrants’ gender and educational achievement at the time of departure. Generally, women have been described as more likely to remit than men, and sometimes also likely to send more money than men (for example see Martin 2007, UNFPA and IOM 2006). Educated migrants might be expected to remit more because they can gain better jobs in the country of destination (for example see Bollard et al 2009). Other analysts (for example Faini 2003) have suggested that they may have less reason to do so, for instance because they come from richer families in the first place. At present it seems that the consensus is that educated migrants may be somewhat lower remitters, although patterns vary by country (Chappell and Mulley 2010).

The DotM data reveal a mixed picture on both characteristics. Gender appears to have little effect on remitting to Georgia, while men remit more to Jamaica and Macedonia, and women remit more to Vietnam. Education is positively related with remitting in Georgia, Macedonia and Vietnam, but appears to have a negative effect in Jamaica. Both sets of results suggest that making decisions to ‘export’ particular kinds of people in the hope that they will have a particular effect on development through remitting is probably too simplistic a strategy. Many countries have tried this approach however, including Bangladesh, the Philippines and Pakistan (International Organisation for Migration 2005, Orozco and Ferro 2008a, Orozco and Ferro 2008b).

**Migration experience**

It has been suggested that the amount of time a migrant is away is particularly important in determining remittance behaviour (Agunias 2006). Theory suggests that the likelihood of a migrant remitting and amounts sent are relatively low at first, as migrants need time to establish themselves, but once they have they are more likely to remit, and to remit more. It has been suggested that remittances drop again as ties with the country of origin weaken over time.

The DotM evidence broadly supports this picture. It suggests that remitters do need time to establish themselves, with remitters less likely to remit and sending lower amounts for around the first one to three years. After that point trends seem to vary by country, though major drops are not observed anywhere. In Jamaica and Georgia remittances decline slightly after the one to three year peak point, but in Macedonia and Vietnam remittances do not tail off at all; rather they continue to rise. This trend will not continue ad infinitum – most of this evidence refers to migrants who are remitting back to households they left within the last 10 years, meaning that a decline may occur at some point beyond 10 years. However, the evidence gathered shows remittances are likely to continue to be sent, and in fairly substantial amounts, over at least the medium term.

"Results suggest that making decisions to ‘export’ particular kinds of people in the hope that they will have a particular effect on development through remitting is probably too simplistic a strategy"
The data also permit analysis of an aspect of migration that has been little considered previously – the relationship between a job being arranged in advance of migration taking place, and remittances. The new evidence presented by DotM researchers – though taken from only two of our case studies, Georgia and Macedonia – suggests that having a job arranged in advance has a positive effect on remitting. This suggests that when migration is more effectively planned it is likely to lead to better outcomes for the migrants’ households (as well as, presumably, for the migrant themselves). This may have important policy implications.

The last aspect of the migration experience explored here is the relationship between the country that migrants move to and their remittance behaviour. Figure 3.8 sets out how remittances vary with a migrant’s country of destination for migrants from Vietnam, Jamaica and Georgia. This appears to show that remittances vary dramatically depending on the country a migrant moves to, and this is confirmed by econometric analysis conducted in the individual country reports.

It is not easy, however, to say why migrants remit more from a particular country. There is no uniform pattern. For example, it does not seem to be based on the kind of destination moved to, such as whether or not it is within the same region, or a highly developed country. Moreover, no one country stands out as a place where migrants remit more from; migrants from Georgia and Jamaica who move to the USA remit relatively more, but this is not the case for migrants from Vietnam. So while destination seems important, there are no easy lessons to be drawn about which kinds of destinations policymakers might want to direct their migrants towards.

Relationship between remitter and recipient
This is the set of factors that appears to have the most consistent impacts on remitting. First, and in line with the findings of previous work (for example Dustmann and Mestres 2009), when a migrant leaves their family behind, they remit more. This finding is universal across the four country studies which looked into this issue. This may raise some difficult issues from the perspective of the migrants’ country of origin. If remittances have positive effects that go beyond the household receiving them (for example multiplier effects for the local economy, or positive impacts on the balance of payments, as evidence in Chapter 4 suggests is the case), origin country governments may have mixed feelings about migrants migrating with their families, or family members joining them at a later date. This is because while it is presumably good for the families
concerned that they can be together, it may reduce remittances and some of the positive externalities that remittances can produce for those who do not migrate.

Also unsurprisingly, where a migrant has frequent contact with the household they have left behind they remit more – or at least this is the implication from the evidence presented in the two studies that examine this, Georgia and Macedonia.

Lastly, the closeness of the relationship between the migrant and the household tends to affect remittances in the way one might expect. Where the relationship is a close one (for example between parents and children, or between siblings) migrants send larger remittances, whereas more distant relations and friends tend on the whole to receive less. An interesting exception to this finding is Jamaica where although close relations receive the most, friends tend to be sent more money than distant relatives.

Household characteristics
Three household characteristics in particular are the focus of our analysis here – the urban or rural location of the household, the household’s position on the income spectrum, and household members’ education.

The findings imply that on the whole households in rural areas receive more remittances; this is the case at least in Georgia and Vietnam although in Jamaica the location of the households has no discernable effect. To the extent that being located in a rural area does raise the amounts that a household receives from its migrants, this may be down to the fact that the migrants know that the household has more limited opportunities for making money, and so are more reliant on remittances.

Evidence on the other two characteristics is thinner, but still interesting to report. Household consumption per capita appears to have no effect on amounts remitted in Jamaica, and to result in a negative relationship in Macedonia – that is, poorer households receive more remittances. This mixed picture fits well with earlier research, which is highly divided about the effect of household income on remittances (for example Fajnzylber and López 2007 conclude that remittances are generally sent to richer households but that patterns vary between countries).

Finally, household members’ education appears to have a positive relationship with remitting: the more educated a household’s members are, the more remittances they receive. This is the case at least in Colombia and Georgia. This finding may not fit very comfortably alongside the previous finding on household income/consumption. As these two sets of findings are based on the results from two different sets of countries, it would be interesting to know to what extent each finding is relevant to the other group.

Interactions beyond remittances
While remittances are the major measurable transfer that migrants make to households and communities in their countries of origin, it is clear that interactions between migrants and the people and places they leave behind go deeper than this and are multifaceted. Indeed, remittances can be seen as just one marker or indicator of the engagement of migrants with their places of origin – albeit one with significant developmental potential.

Many of the diverse additional roles that migrants play could affect development outcomes, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively. These interactions include for example playing a part in politics, either informally (such as by supporting a conflict or terrorism, or the development of human rights and democracy [Brinkerhoff 2006]), or formally (with some countries’ diasporas – such as Macedonia’s – having the right to vote in some elections [Nikolovski et al 2009]). Diasporas can also promote the formation of business links across borders – for example with families or communities capitalising on their understanding of two markets to create trading companies (Lucas 2001).

Alternatively, other theories suggest that they can transfer attitudes and knowledge across borders from one person to another, which can gradually change the ways in which communities and societies structure and order themselves. A good example of this is the transmission of ‘norms’ about family size, which migrants appear to transmit back to their families and communities, changing fertility patterns over time (Beine et al 2008).
One of the reasons why less is known about these kinds of interactions and transfers is because they are difficult to measure. It is often assumed that they are at play when migration appears to be linked to a particular trend but remittances are not thought to be the cause, meaning they tend to be picked up as a ‘residual’, rather than examined in themselves. Indeed, this is the method this report predominantly uses to understand their effects in Chapter 4 (see Box 4.1 for details). But some data was gathered in the household survey which at least gives a sense of the strength and frequency of some of these non-remittances interactions – data on how often households are in contact with their household members who have moved abroad.

The research shows firstly that many more households seem to be in touch with their migrants than receive remittances from them. For example, whereas only 36 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants remit back to their households of origin, more than 99 per cent of them are in regular contact with them. In Jamaica the corresponding figures are 67 per cent and 100 per cent, and in Vietnam 77 per cent and 96 per cent. This is intuitive as it seems likely that some migrants will stay in touch with their families and yet not be in a position – or want – to send money back to them. However, it also shows the potential importance of these interactions in affecting development outcomes: because personal ties are much more widespread than financial ones, their influence is potentially broader.

Second, the intensity of these ties also seems quite significant, though they do vary by country. In each of the three countries set out above, the majority of absent migrants are in touch with their households of origin more than once a month, and in Jamaica and Macedonia substantially more frequently: significantly more than 50 per cent of Jamaican absent migrants are in touch at least weekly, as are nearly 70 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants. If these personal interactions do have the potential to act as conduits for changing attitudes, then in countries like Macedonia they may very well be playing an important developmental role. We now go on to examine this issue in some depth in the next chapter.
4. Migration’s development impacts

In this chapter the analysis moves from measuring migration and the phenomena it creates to estimating the developmental impacts it has. Following the framework set out in the methodology chapter, we examine:

• A broad range of migration’s development impacts, both economic and social. In turn these have been broken down into five categories — economic, educational, health, gender, and ‘other’ social impacts.

• The effects that occur at different ‘levels’: effects on the migrants’ own development, effects on their households, and effects on the wider community and society.

• The different channels through which the effects appear to take place, with analysis broken down to separate the effects of receiving remittances, of having a migrant absent from one’s household, and the effects of having a returned migrant.

Original DotM findings are presented alongside findings from the existing literature. This should help to place the new contributions of this project in context, and provide readers with an overview of what is currently known, where gaps have been filled, and what still clearly requires further research.

Two key issues should be noted about our methodological approach (which is set out in detail in Box 4.1).

Firstly, our assessment of migration’s impacts has been made using a range of econometric techniques. Some of those techniques, such as OLS, are quite simple but the use of others, such as Instrumental Variables and Propensity Score Matching techniques, actively tries to ensure that we go beyond diagnosing correlation and ascertain when migration is the cause of a set of circumstances and when it is effect.

Secondly, while the research attempts to separate out the ‘channels’ through which migration’s effects work, we are limited by what we can observe. The best technique available to us involves splitting the sample into households that have an absent migrant, households that have a returned migrant, and households that receive remittances, and then using these sub-categories as the basis for analysis. One implication is that it has not been possible to analyse the development impacts of immigration. This probably does not hinder our understanding of migration’s development impacts in the countries in question too greatly, however, given the finding that immigration is fairly negligible in most of our countries of study (except for Ghana).

Economic impacts of migration

Migration can have many types of economic impact, including effects on wages (Mishra 2007), total demand within an economy (Glytsos 1993), growth (Glytsos 2001), trade (Bacarreza and Erlich 2006), technological progress (Burns and Mohapatra 2008) and exchange rates (Lopez et al 2007), to name a few. As such we have had to select a subset of economic impacts at the individual, household and societal levels to focus on. These are drawn from our impact map (Annex 2).

Box 4.1: Impact identification methodology – further details

In trying to diagnose causality, it is important to try to control for two phenomena – the possibility of reverse causality (such as migration not causing increased income, but increased income increasing the possibility of migrating) and self-selection (comparisons between migrants and non-migrants not being valid, because migrants might be different to non-migrants).

The current best practice for addressing these issues where panel data is absent (as here) is using instrumental variables (IV) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM). IV is useful for
addressing reverse causality, and PSM can potentially address both concerns (though only where migrants ‘select’ themselves based on observable characteristics). If there are differences between the two groups that cannot be seen – for example if migrants are particularly ambitious – then PSM models still do not give an accurate picture of migration’s impacts. While not perfect, both are useful tools for trying to determine causality.

We use other models, too, which cannot address these methodological problems (including fixed effects models, Ordinary Least Squares [OLS], probit and logit). While less reliable in terms of diagnosing impacts they have the advantage of being more widely understood.

Second, while ideally we would seek to separate out the channels migration’s effect (in order to be better placed to shape migration’s developmental effects), we are limited by what we can observe. In some cases we control for effects through one channel while analysing others. In most cases, however, the best approach available is to break our sample into households that have an absent migrant, households that have a returned migrant and households which receive remittances, and then, on the assumption that a different mix of impact channels is probably at work in each sub-group of households, infer which channels the observed effects are operating through.

Looking first at households with absent migrants, we can be sure that all the households in this group show the direct impacts that a migrant’s absence creates (for example no longer being able to carry out household tasks or work in the domestic labour market). In addition to this there will be significant effects through remittances (as between around one third and three quarters will be receiving remittances, depending on the country concerned, as shown in Chapter 3). Any incentive and non-remittance interaction effects are likely to be felt in this group, as the evidence we have collected on non-remittance interactions suggest that the vast majority of households are in close touch with ‘their’ migrants. It may also be that households with absent migrants have a raised probability of having a returned migrant, as migration tends to take place within social networks (Amit 2007), which, once established, make it easier for subsequent family members to migrate. To the extent that these households do have returned migrants, their presence may also affect outcomes.

Turning to households with returned migrants, this group will show the direct effects of the returned migrants’ own presence and the resources, attitudes and so on they have brought back with them. Observing the returned migrant may also create incentive effects in other household members (for example if the migrant has improved their circumstances it may spur others to become more like them and attempt to migrate). It also seems likely that because of the link between migration and social networks, households with one migrant are more likely to have a second migrant, meaning that households with returned migrants may have a raised likelihood of having a currently absent migrant, with all the impacts that entails, as set out above. Social networks are also likely to promote the receipt of remittances by households with returned migrants, even if they do not have a migrant currently away: while they were absent many of the returned migrants will have built connections with people in the destination country who may now be sending them money, or they may be in receipt of pensions they earned while working abroad.

Lastly, looking at households receiving remittances, it seems very likely that the major effect here is through the remittances themselves. However, to the extent that this group includes households with absent migrants (who appear to make up roughly half of all households receiving remittances in the average country), then they will also experience the effects of having an absent migrant, as set out above.

**Economic impacts on the migrant**

The most obvious economic impact that migration can have on migrants themselves is on their standard of living. While this is determined by income, simply assessing income prior to departure and then comparing it with income abroad is not necessarily the most effective way of assessing migration’s effect – in fact, it could be highly misleading for two reasons.
Firstly, asking specifically about income does not take into account the costs that migrants face in the country of destination. Given that most move to richer countries, prices are also likely to be higher. One can attempt to compensate for those cost differences, however, by comparing income in the country of origin and destination in purchasing power parity (ppp) terms.\(^\text{20}\) When this is done it demonstrates that even when cost differences are accounted for, migrants still gain dramatically in terms of income. According to our Colombian research, for example, a Colombian migrant more than quadruples their income by moving to the USA, where they earn on average in ppp terms US$25,000 annually, against approximately US$6200 in Colombia (Cardenas et al 2010).

This is insightful; however, the migrant’s own standard of living is affected not only by costs but also by transfers. As the previous chapter showed, between a third and three quarters of migrants from every country remit, often sending thousands of US dollars annually to their own household, as well as amounts to others too. When these remittances are also deducted from their income, it may be that the economic impacts on the individual’s own development are not as positive as might have been hoped. It is possible that while their incomes have been raised by moving abroad, they transfer back the real difference in income between their country of origin and country of destination (or perhaps even more than the difference). In this scenario migration could potentially reduce instead of raise their standard of living.

To ensure such issues did not prevent analysis of the effect of migration on migrants’ real standards of living, the DotM questionnaire asked returned migrants and the families of absent migrants to assess the overall material standard of living that migrants had abroad, versus their living conditions before migrating. This allowed us to take into account the differences between living in the country of origin and as a migrant abroad (such as increased costs and remittance transfers), permitting a fairer assessment of the impact of migration on the migrants themselves.

The research reveals that the great majority of absent migrants were reported to have improved their standard of living by moving abroad. Only around 1 per cent of migrants from Macedonia and Jamaica for example were reported to have a worse standard of living, and while some were rated to have about the same, this was typically only 5–10 per cent of the migrants from each country. The rest were regarded as having improved their standard of living, and generally by a large amount. For example, 51 per cent of all Macedonian migrants were reported as having improved their living standards dramatically through migration, with 41 per cent improving them ‘somewhat’. In Jamaica the corresponding figures were 77 per cent and 15 per cent.

This is really striking, given that concerns are often raised over, for example, migrants being misinformed about opportunities abroad, being discriminated against once they arrive, the poor quality of life irregular migrants can have and so on (for example see International Labour Organisation et al 2001). Some migrants of course do experience difficulties and some are seriously exploited, but it does not seem that, according to their households at least, these experiences prevent the vast majority from improving their living standards, very often to a great extent.

We should make a caveat about this finding, however: migrants’ families are not always fully informed about their relatives’ lives abroad, as a struggling migrant might withhold certain information in order not to cause their families concern. For this reason the questionnaire also asked returned migrants themselves about their experiences abroad, and whether they were better off materially as migrants than before they migrated. Again, this group may not be completely representative of migrants as a whole, but they are a useful complement to the data gained from the absent migrants’ households.

Generally, returned migrants are a little less positive than absent migrants’ households. Looking across the countries one can observe some increase in the numbers of people reporting broadly similar living standards before and during migration (in relation to the results reported for absent migrants), and also some larger numbers who say their lives got worse. Also, the balance between migrants reporting much better standards of living and slightly better standards of living was different, with more people locating

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20. Two incomes have ‘purchasing power parity’ if they are able to buy the same set of goods. Thus incomes calculated in ppp terms take into account the differing costs that items have in different countries.
themselves in the slightly better off category. The overall picture remains remarkably positive, however. In Macedonia still more than 70 per cent of returned migrants report migration actively improved their living standards, as did similar proportions of Georgian and Ghanaian migrants.

These positive results would be good news in any circumstances, but they are even more important in light of the fact that across the countries examined in this project, improving one's economic standard of living was the major driving force of movement. People aim through migration to increase their disposable incomes, and by and large they achieve it.

As well as looking at the impact that migration has on migrants’ disposable incomes while they are away, it is also possible to look for evidence about what the experience of migration does to their incomes if they return. Taking Georgia as the example here, the researchers found that the migration experience had a significant, positive effect on individuals’ incomes (see Table 1, Annex 9 for the full results). Income is measured in brackets, and the researchers found that experience abroad was linked with an increase of almost one full bracket for returned migrants – a very sizeable increase.21

This same analysis also suggests that the circumstances of return are important. Georgia’s migrants’ main country of destination is Russia, and in the year 2000 migrants were returning from Russia both as a result of the financial crisis there at the end of the 1990s, and as a result of political difficulties in the two countries (Tchaidze and Torosayan 2010). It is likely that many of these returnees came back not in a planned way as the result of a positive choice, but because their options in Russia were suddenly narrowed. The research finds that Georgians who returned in 2000 have significantly lower earnings than other returned migrants, holding all other factors constant. This points to the importance of planning for and choosing return.

Economic impacts on migrants’ households
The focus of analysis turns now to the economic impacts that migration appears to have on households directly affected by migration – either because they have a migrant away, have a returned migrant in their midst, because they receive remittances, or any combination of the above. On the whole the literature has emphasised that the economic impacts of migration tend to be good, on average, for the households affected by it (for example see Gibney and Hansen 2005), though again differences across economic indicators and across contexts tend to be highlighted. The DotM data have allowed for the in-depth, cross-country analysis of a number of key issues – household income and poverty, business ownership, and labour force participation.

The effect of migration on household income is vital because income is critical to households’ day-to-day wellbeing. Plus, as highlighted in the previous chapter, many migrants report that they migrated in order to earn money to send back to their households to improve their living standards, so it is important to see if they have been able to achieve this.

Business ownership is important for several reasons. First, if migration is linked to increased business ownership this is a concrete way in which it may have a lasting impact on households’ welfare. Some people have worried that while migration may alleviate poverty and increase incomes in the short run, once the migrant returns or stops remitting there may be few lasting impacts. If businesses can be started that generate their own ongoing income, then effects may be long-lasting. This is certainly the hope of many policymakers, and one of the most discussed policy interventions is trying to encourage remittance recipients to invest their funds in business development, and link returned migrants to business start-up opportunities. It is not clear, however, if this optimism about migration and business investment is based on a real aptitude or on interest in business ownership among remittance-receiving households and households with migrants. Moreover, if migration does lead to business creation on the part of affected households this is important because its effects are likely to spill beyond the households concerned and benefit the wider economy. Assuming that some of the businesses are large enough to employ non-family members, increased business creation

“People aim through migration to increase their disposable incomes, and by and large they achieve it”

21. The brackets are of different sizes so this is not a uniform amount, but moving up a bracket means increasing one’s income by between 20 and 100 per cent – in any case a very substantial amount.
by migration-affected households can have positive effects for the local community too (IOM 2004).

Finally, labour force participation, like business start-ups, is often the topic of feverish debate on the basis of a rather thin evidence base. The commonly discussed scenario (for example see Gallina 2008) is that remittance recipients withdraw from the labour market because they have no need to work, and are able to rely on outside inflows of money instead. Policymakers worry that this will lead to de-skilling, ‘laziness’ and ultimately dependency, with households unable to provide for themselves (leaving them vulnerable if remittances stop). It is interesting, then, to see whether or not the receipt of remittances in particular, and exposure to migration more generally, does lead to people opting not to work.

**Household income**

The first relationship to be examined is the relationship between migration and household income and poverty. Each research team used its own methods for assessing this, some focusing on household wealth (measured by ownership of assets such as land and consumer durables like cars and TVs), some looking at income, and some looking at expenditure. All give an insight into the impact that migration has on the household’s welfare and living standards.

Table 4.1 (overleaf) sets out the details of what was found in each of the countries. Summarising across countries, in none does migration tend to have a negative effect on households’ incomes – impacts are either neutral, or more often, positive. This is very important given the emphasis migrants place on remitting to improve the lives of their families as a reason to migrate in the first place.

Only the Macedonian analysis finds that migration has no positive impacts on household welfare – that analysis suggests no impacts on living standards from either having a returned or absent migrant in the household (but does not examine remittances explicitly). This work is reliable methodologically, but it may be that the measure of living standards used (ownership of large assets, such as land), is a little too inflexible to pick up small and more nuanced effects. Set alongside the other cases, which all report improvements, it seems sensible to cautiously suggest that if smaller asset items were included in the analysis, positive impacts might also be found in Macedonia.

In Jamaica there is weaker evidence (based on OLS) that having a returned migrant in the household may increase household welfare, by around 6 per cent, although migrants currently being away appears to have no effect. In Ghana, this trend is reversed, with absent migrants appearing to boost their household’s welfare (on an expenditure basis at least, if not in terms of income), but with returned migrants having little impact. The Ghanaian analysis is based on propensity score matching, and thus should be some of the most accurate evidence presented.

The three remaining countries show broadly positive impacts across all categories of households – those with absent migrants, those with returned migrants and those receiving remittances. Vietnam’s analysis provides weaker evidence (using a fixed effects model controlling for unobserved province-level factors) that per capita income increases with migration, with the biggest effects resulting from an absent migrant being away, rather than from return. Households with absent migrants have 82 per cent higher per capita incomes, according to the model, compared with 8 per cent higher incomes for households with returned migrants. However, the absent migrant effect is so large, and so out of kilter with the impacts on expenditure for Vietnam (see below), that it must be suspected that some of this result is attributable to reverse causality.

The Vietnam researchers also analysed expenditure on the households’ economic wellbeing (i.e. expenditure minus items which don’t directly benefit the household, like debt repayment and gifts to others). This analysis (again using fixed effects models) also suggests that migration has positive impacts on households’ economic welfare (though, as noted above, the effects are more modest than those derived from income analysis) – increases in per capita expenditure of around 8 per cent across households with both absent and returned migrants. Remittance-receiving households experience very similar trends to households with absent migrants, with 82 per cent higher incomes per capita and 9 per cent...
### Table 4.1. The impact of migration on household incomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Households with absent migrants</th>
<th>Households with returned migrants</th>
<th>Households in receipt of remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Positive effect on per capita income (US$ 97 per month) when remittances are included. Positive effect (of US$72) when remittances not included.</td>
<td>No significant impact on per capita income.</td>
<td>Positive impact on per capita income of around US$62 per month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive impact on expenditure of around 41US$ per month.</td>
<td>Positive impact on expenditure of around 44 US$ per month.</td>
<td>Positive impact on expenditure of around US$37 per month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No significant impact on US$1 per day poverty. If a household has a member away but receives no remittances then 3% more likely to be below US$2 per day. If remittances are received then effect is neutral. If there is migration but no remittances then 7% more likely to be below national extreme poverty line. If remittances are received then effect is neutral. Migration without remittances has no effect on national poverty. If remittances are received the household is 14% less likely to be below national poverty line.</td>
<td>No significant impact on US$1 per day poverty. If a household has a member away but receives no remittances then 3% more likely to be below US$2 per day. If remittances are received then effect is neutral. If there is migration but no remittances then 7% more likely to be below national extreme poverty line. If remittances are received then effect is neutral. Migration without remittances has no effect on national poverty. If remittances are received the household is 9% less likely to be below national poverty line.</td>
<td>No significant impact on US$1 or $2 a day poverty, or national extreme poverty. However, households receiving remittances 12% less likely to be below national poverty line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Basically no effect on expenditure.</td>
<td>Increases expenditure on household expenses (approx 3US$ per month).</td>
<td>Spend more on most items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive asset effect – increased likelihood of gaining various assets over previous 5 years, including DVD player (10% more likely) and washing machine (9%).</td>
<td>Positive effect on assets – increased likelihood of gaining washing machine over past 5 years (11%), a car (8%) and a mobile phone (21%).</td>
<td>Very positive asset effect – increased likelihood of gaining many items over the past 5 years, including a 26% increase in the likelihood of gaining a fridge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>No significant effect on income per capita.</td>
<td>No significant effect on income per capita.</td>
<td>No significant effect on income per capita.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher expenditure on some items – education (US$107) and savings (US$267).</td>
<td>No significant effect on expenditure.</td>
<td>No significant effect on expenditure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>No significant effect on assets.</td>
<td>Experience 6% higher living standards (asset measure).</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>No significant effect on assets.</td>
<td>No significant effect on assets.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Dramatically higher per capita income – 82% on average. Higher per capita income – 8% on average.</td>
<td>Dramatically higher per capita income – 82%. Higher expenditure per capita (8%).</td>
<td>Higher expenditure per capita (9%).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

higher expenditure per capita. This suggests that many of the positive effects that absent migrant households appear to gain from having a member away result from the remittances they receive from those absent members.

The Colombia team examined the effect of migration on several poverty and income indicators and found that, according to every measure used (per capita income, expenditure and likelihood of being in poverty) having a migrant currently away, on average, improves household welfare in that country. The same is true for receiving remittances (from absent migrants and non-member remitters), though the size of the impacts tends to be smaller. The impacts of having a returned migrant in the household are also positive (in relation to per capita expenditure and the likelihood of being in poverty, though there does not appear to be an effect on income). It should be noted, moreover, that these results are derived from propensity score matching techniques, and are therefore among the more reliable results. So the evidence clearly suggests that in Colombia migration improves households' economic wellbeing, and, through reductions in poverty, improves national economic outcomes too.

In addition to this broad picture, the Colombia results are able to give precise insights into which aspects of migration are having these impacts, at least in the case of absent migrants. For details of this analysis see Annex 10.

Finally, the results from the Georgia analysis (also derived from propensity score matching so again of good quality) also suggest that migration broadly increases affected households’ welfare. The results they obtain are strongest for households with returned migrants, where both expenditure and assets increase. In contrast no increases in expenditure are seen for absent migrant households, and while asset increases are observed, they are slightly smaller than for returned migrant households. Being in receipt of remittances clearly plays a positive role in building up both expenditure and assets for households who receive them.

**Business creation**

While the analysis above showed the 'static' effect that migration appears to have on household income, it is vital also to see whether or not migration is able to play a role in helping households to generate new sources of income. If they are able to do so this is likely to benefit not just their own household in the long run, but also have multiplier effects in the local economy by employing others and creating wholesale demand (Glytsos 1993).

There is a range of evidence about whether households with exposure to migration are more likely to run businesses, about the kinds of businesses that appear to be started, and what aspects of their experiences seem important in making them more or less likely to do so.

Evidence is presented in Table 4.2 from Colombia, Georgia, Macedonia and Vietnam23 on whether households with exposure to migration are more likely to own businesses. The results are not very consistent across countries, although once again it should be noted that migration does not appear to do any harm: in none of the four countries does it appear to reduce business ownership (or proxies of it). Results are either neutral or positive.

Firstly, setting out the case where there appears to be least impact, in Georgia migration appears to have little relationship with business ownership. The evidence (drawn from propensity score matching) suggests that having a migrant currently away from or returned to one’s household has no effect on the likelihood of running a business within the 12 months preceding the survey. The research finds a small impact of remittances on the likelihood of running a business, but this only holds for urban areas outside the capital Tbilisi, not the country as a whole.

Next, turning to Colombia, the researchers ran two propensity score matching models, one comparing results across different households (cross-sectionally) and one comparing each household’s results over time (difference in difference), of which the latter produces the most reliable results. The first model suggested that both having a returned migrant in one’s household and receiving remittances increases the likelihood that the household has an account with a financial institution that they use for business purposes (this is probably a useful proxy for having a fairly well established and formal business,
though the ownership of smaller and more informal businesses is probably not incorporated in this analysis). However, the difference in difference analysis suggests that only the receipt of remittances actually has an impact, raising the likelihood of having a business account by about 5 per cent.

In Macedonia the results are quite different. There it appears that having a returned migrant in one’s household makes you more likely to have run a business – and the effect is strong and highly statistically significant, being found consistently across different Instrumental Variable models and using propensity score matching. In Macedonia it also appears that currently having an absent migrant makes a household more likely to have run a business, though the effects are much less strong, and are only significant in the IV models.

In Vietnam, where only the effect of returned migration was analysed (using probit analysis and so not controlling for reverse causality) the evidence suggests that having a returned migrant in the household may raise the likelihood of households currently running a business with two or more employees. The Vietnamese researchers focused only on businesses with two or more employees as this kind of business is quite distinct in Vietnam from self-employment, which many undertake because they have no other options.

It is possible, however, to go beyond simply examining if households with exposure to migration are more likely to have run businesses. Information was also collected on the characteristics of those businesses, and whether or not they were successful. Descriptive statistics suggest that households with migrants tend to be more likely to operate larger, more formal businesses. So for example, in each of the countries that examined the split between family member and non-family member employees (Macedonia, Jamaica and Vietnam), the businesses operated by households with migrants (either absent or returned) were more likely to employ non-family members. Vietnam also found that households with migrants had more businesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Households with absent migrants</th>
<th>Households with returned migrants</th>
<th>Households in receipt of remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>No significant effect (PSM model, CS)</td>
<td>Increases likelihood of having an account with a financial institution used for business purposes by 4% (PSM model, CS)</td>
<td>Increases likelihood of having an account with a financial institution used for business purposes by 4% (PSM model, CS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>No significant effect (PSM Model, DD)</td>
<td>No significant effect (PSM model, DD)</td>
<td>Increases likelihood of having an account with a financial institution used for business purposes by 5% (PSM model, DD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Increases likelihood of ever having owned a business</td>
<td>Increases likelihood of ever having owned a business (IV model)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Increases the likelihood of currently running a business of two or more workers (Probit model)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: PSM = propensity score matching; CS = cross-sectional; DD = difference in difference; IV = Instrumental Variable
(though the difference is only marginal, and the other countries did not examine this). These findings are important because they suggest that where migration does promote the establishment of businesses, those businesses appear likely to have a larger impact on the wider economy than the average business owned by a non-migrant.

It should also be noted, however, that households with migrants are, across all three countries, more likely to have failed businesses – but the rates of business failure are not dramatically high, either in absolute or relative terms: for example 5 per cent of Macedonian households with migrants have had a failed business compared with 4 per cent of non-migrant households, and the rate in Vietnam is 11 per cent for households with absent migrants and 7 per cent for non-migrant households. This suggests that while migration may have provided households with extra resources like finance and skills, those resources are not always sufficient to ensure success. It may be that they induce some households not actually suited to entrepreneurialism to start businesses. However, it should also be noted that the time it took for these businesses to close tended to be longer for households with migrants, in some cases much longer. The difference between households with migrants and those without ranged from a year in Macedonia (where it took almost four years for non-migrants’ businesses to close and almost five for migrants’) to almost eight years’ difference in Jamaica (with migrant businesses lasting on average about 11.5 years, compared to around three for non-migrant failed businesses). Without subjecting these statistics to more in-depth analysis it is difficult to know quite why these differences might exist, but it could be that because the migrant businesses appear to be larger, it would take longer for them to fail. It may also be that the households are more reluctant to admit failure if the resources they have put into them are greater.

Lastly, the analysis permits us to look at which aspects of migration appear most important in determining whether or not a household with a returned migrant runs a business. The Vietnamese researchers analysed this issue in some depth – see Table 4.3.

The findings from Vietnam suggest that the migrant’s education prior to departure is the most important variable in determining whether or not they go on to run a business, with those with higher levels of education most likely to do so. Some of this result may be due to the fact that there are no variables included in the model for individuals’ or households’ income, and so what appears to be the result of higher levels of education is actually driven by the fact that richer households are both more likely to run businesses and also have higher levels of education. However, the model also finds that particular skills – professional and technical skills, rather than college level education – have the highest impacts on the likelihood of running a business, which emphasises the importance of having both a certain level and a certain type of skills, especially practical abilities. Also important in terms of demographic and social characteristics of the migrants are gender (with men more likely to start businesses) and the area the returned migrant lives in (with urban areas associated with higher rates of start-ups).

The model does not just examine socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the returnees, however: it also examines their migration experience. Surprisingly, some aspects of migration that might be expected to have an effect do not. The length of time spent abroad does not appear to affect the likelihood of starting a business, and neither does the reason for which a migrant returns to Vietnam. The timing of return also has no effect, which may be disappointing to Vietnamese policymakers. In the early 2000s significant economic reforms took place promoting the growth of small and medium sized enterprises, which might have been expected to facilitate the return of migrants wishing to run their own businesses. However, migrants returning after these reforms (post-2002) are no more likely to be in a household with a business than those who returned earlier. This does not mean the reforms themselves had no impact on business ownership – this result is consistent for example with all households – migrant and non-migrant – after 2002 becoming more likely to open businesses. It just does not
support the idea that the reforms induced the return of people who were more likely than previous returned migrants to establish businesses. This finding fits with the results set out in the first part of Chapter 3, which suggested that few migrants return specifically because of economic opportunities.

Other aspects of migration do appear to be related to business ownership, however. In particular, across both specifications gaining educational qualifications while away makes a returned migrant’s household less likely to be running a business. This could be explained by a number of things including bonding (migrants’ study only taking place on the condition that they return to their previous place of work); education opening up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1: Including all returned migrants</th>
<th>2: Only returnees who stayed abroad &gt;=1 year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Std-er</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Running a business having workers &gt;=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of obs</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.086*</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education prior departure</td>
<td>0.111*</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· secondary and high school</td>
<td>0.283***</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· professional and technical</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· college and above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working before going abroad</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban location</td>
<td>0.146***</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience while abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time spent abroad (in months)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working while abroad</td>
<td>-0.126**</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieved some educational qualification while abroad</td>
<td>-0.124*</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point of return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at return</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at return squared</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returning after 2002</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending home remittances while abroad</td>
<td>0.102**</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing money back when returning</td>
<td>0.080*</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Earned a certain amount of money, then came back home</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Finished study, then came back home</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of returnees</td>
<td>0.093**</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dang et al 2010 Note: ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
alternative opportunities which migrants would prefer to pursue; or simply the fact that those who study abroad have different aims to those who do not (that is, those who study abroad aim to apply for jobs that need those skills and formal qualifications, whereas those who aim to open their own business see less value in formal study).

In contrast to this finding on skills are findings on finance. The researchers found that migrants who remitted to their household while they were away or brought money back with them are more likely to be running a business. This suggests that the resources that really matter for returned migrants who intend to open their own businesses, in Vietnam at least, are finances, rather than skills.

Household labour force participation
We now focus on the much discussed issue of migration and labour force participation. Theory suggests that migration might affect it in two opposing ways. On the one hand (Vogiazides 2009) migration could make household members more likely to be in work or self employment because it creates additional opportunities for them (for example through the formation of new household businesses via the processes set out above). However, on the other, if households are able to access alternative sources of income, especially remittances, as a result of migration, they may have less need to work and will therefore exit the labour market (Acosta 2007).

Exiting work or the labour market is not necessarily problematic from the household’s point of view – it is something they have freely chosen to do – and not necessarily either from a national perspective (if for example it allows parents to devote more time to caring for their children, which should be good for society as a whole). There have been concerns, however, that it could also have some negative effects in the long run at the national level too, potentially leaving the households concerned without any other sources of income (as skills and so on may degrade over time, see Arulampalam et al 2001). This leaves them dependent, and vulnerable if remittances stop. It is this scenario that tends to preoccupy researchers’ and policymakers’ minds.

DotM research suggests, however, that outcomes on employment and labour force participation do not reflect policymakers’ fears (Table 4.4). Migration more often leads to higher labour force participation than it does to lower.

Examining first households with absent migrants, only in one case does migration lead to reduced labour force participation – Vietnam – and the effect is very small. (This evidence is also drawn from a probit model which does not control for causality and so is less reliable than other findings.) In contrast, in Georgia (from PSM) and Jamaica (using logit) the results indicate that labour force participation increases, and the results are of much larger magnitudes than for Vietnam. Having an absent migrant away seems to reduce the likelihood of anyone in the household being unemployed in Georgia by around 37 per cent, and the likelihood of household members being in work in Jamaica increases by an even larger amount for every migrant who has departed Jamaica. In Colombia, Ghana and Macedonia the best evidence suggests that having an absent migrant has no impact on labour force participation.

Looking to returned migrants, the evidence suggests that having a returned migrant in the household does not affect, in either direction, the likelihood of other household members being in the labour force or unemployed. However, returned migrants themselves are less likely to be working, as evidence from Jamaica, Macedonia and Vietnam shows. But where the likelihood of being in work is investigated over time, the studies find that after migrants have been back for 12 months or more they are no more likely than a comparable individual to be unemployed – it appears it simply takes time for them to adjust.

Receiving remittances has no impact on labour force participation or employment status in Georgia, Ghana or Macedonia. In the other three countries there does appear to be a reduced probability that household members are in work, though the effects are small (for example receiving remittances reduces labour market participation by 4 per cent in Colombia according to results derived using PSM) and in some cases not very statistically significant.
### Table 4.4. Impact of migration on labour force participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Households with absent migrants</th>
<th>Households with returned migrants</th>
<th>Households in receipt of remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>No significant effect on labour force participation (CS).</td>
<td>No significant effect on labour force participation (DD).</td>
<td>Negative effect on labour market participation. Receiving remittances makes household members 7% less likely to be in the labour force (CS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No significant effect on labour force participation (DD estimates).</td>
<td>No significant effect on labour force participation (DD).</td>
<td>Negative effect on labour market participation. Receiving remittances makes household members 4% less likely to be in the labour force (DD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No significant effect on unemployment (CS estimates).</td>
<td>No significant effect on unemployment (CS).</td>
<td>No significant effect on unemployment (CS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No significant effect on unemployment (DD estimates).</td>
<td>No significant effect on unemployment (DD).</td>
<td>No significant effect on unemployment (DD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Decreases the likelihood of anyone in the household being unemployed by 37%.</td>
<td>No effect overall but in rural areas return migration decreases the likelihood of anyone in the household being unemployed by 31%.</td>
<td>No significant effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>No significant effect.</td>
<td>No significant effect.</td>
<td>No significant effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Increases labour market participation. For every additional household member who migrates, the likelihood that remaining household members are in work (employment or self-employment) increases by 42%.</td>
<td>In the short run returned migrants themselves are less likely to be in work. This effect disappears after the returnee has been back for 12 months.</td>
<td>Reduced labour market participation – a 1% increase in remittance receipts reduces the likelihood of household members being employed by about 3% but result is not very statistically significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>No significant effect.</td>
<td>In the short run returned migrants themselves are less likely to be in work (almost 40% less likely than the comparable non-migrant). This effect disappears after the returnee has been back for 12 months.</td>
<td>No significant effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Small negative impact. Those living in households with absent household members are 2% less likely to have worked over the last 12 months than comparable households.</td>
<td>Returned migrants themselves are about 8–9% less likely to have worked in the last 12 months than comparable household members.</td>
<td>Small negative impact. Those living in households receiving remittances are 3% less likely to have worked over the last 12 months than comparable households.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: CS = cross-section; DD = difference in difference

### Housing

Much of the literature discusses the important relationship between housing and migration, with returning migrants and remittance recipients often said to build new homes with the money they have made (de-Haas 2006). Investment in housing is important not just because of its potential to improve the lives of those who live in it, but also because it can create multiplier effects in the local economy – boosting demand for local construction firms and so on (Cotula et al 2004), providing an asset base to allow for increased borrowing and investment – because home owners can use their homes as collateral, and because for poorer families improving one’s housing can also
improve health by decreasing exposure to the elements and improving sanitation and availability of electricity. As well as being important in itself, this can also increase people’s productivity (Fisk 1999).

So is home ownership higher in households with migrants, and do they have an improved quality of housing? The evidence suggests that remittances are the key issue here; in all the cases examined being in receipt of remittances has a positive impact on housing. In Colombia it raises the likelihood that a household owns its own home by 5 per cent (using the more accurate difference in difference estimates) and in Ghana the effect is of an 8 per cent magnitude. In Georgia the research examined the number of rooms a household had, and found that while across the country as a whole there was no relationship between migration and the number of rooms, in rural areas it seems that receiving remittances means a household does have more rooms than the average. This result may be peculiar to rural areas because it is easier in those circumstances to add rooms or floors (if a household has the finances to do so) than it is in urban areas (Tchaidze and Torosayan 2010).

Table 4.5. Impact of migration on housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Households with absent migrants</th>
<th>Households with returned migrants</th>
<th>Households in receipt of remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Positive impact – raises likelihood of owning one’s home by 11% (CS estimates)</td>
<td>Positive impact – raises likelihood of owning one’s own home by 9% (CS)</td>
<td>Positive impact – raises likelihood of owning one’s own home by 14% (CS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No significant effect (DD estimates)</td>
<td>No significant effect (DD)</td>
<td>Positive impact – raises likelihood of owning one’s own home by 5% (DD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>No significant effect</td>
<td>No significant effect</td>
<td>No effect overall, although there is a strong and significant effect in rural areas, with households more than twice as likely to have added new rooms to their homes if they receive remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Positive impact – remittance recipients mean 8% more likely to own their own home</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DotM household survey 2007/2008. Details can be found in Tables 9, 15–7 and 19 in Annex 9. Note: CS = cross-section; DD = difference in difference

Savings

It is also important to examine the relationship between migration and savings. Previous literature has emphasised that migration may enable households to save, or to reach levels of savings that would not have been possible otherwise (Lucas 2005), providing them with a wider range of livelihood options (Waddington 2003). Savings are also important to development from a macroeconomic perspective, as a crucial driver of investment, and therefore growth and development (Drinkwater et al 2003).

The results suggest that migration has positive impacts on savings by most measures. In all cases for which there is evidence, migration appears to boost the savings of households with absent migrants. The size of this impact seems to vary quite radically across countries however, with OLS results from Vietnam suggesting a tiny increase, of less than US$1 per capita per year, whereas PSM results from Ghana suggest an annual increase in savings of US$267 for households as a result of having an absent migrant. (Colombia falls in the middle, again using PSM, with increases of US$3 per capita per month/$36 per year.)
While in Colombia it appears that this result may be being driven by the effect of receiving remittances (as there is a similar finding for households in receipt of remittances), in Ghana remittances do not have a significant impact on savings. This suggests that increases in saving may be the result of other ‘impact channels’ such as transmitted ideas from migrants abroad, or changed incentives. Being in receipt of remittances does, however, have a positive impact in Georgia (all of these findings are derived using PSM).

Lastly, the balance of DotM evidence on return migration suggests it has little impact on savings. This evidence comes from Ghana and Colombia. Return migration in Ghana appears to have no effect, and in Colombia the more useful of the two versions of the model run (which examines savings per capita rather than household savings as a whole) also finds no impact.

Community-level and nationwide economic impacts

The focus of the report now moves onto the wider effects that migration has on the economy. On the one hand it is important not to put too much emphasis on these impacts. Too much of a focus here and there is a temptation to discount the effects that migration has on the households directly affected and simply to look to the ‘other’ group as the proper focus of any government intervention. However, not only are both kinds of households made up of citizens, to whom government has an equal obligation, but impacts on households with migrants are particularly important because they are the ones who have taken the risk involved in migrating.

Moreover, to some extent the distinction between effects on households that are directly affected and those that are not are somewhat artificial because, as already noted, impacts on households with migrants or those that receive remittances also affect non-migrant/non-remittance-receiving households. In some cases this is because of spillover effects. For example, if rural Georgian households build more rooms in their houses after receiving remittances, it seems likely that this will have a positive impact on the local economy through the employment of local builders, purchase of materials and so on. In some cases the impact is more direct – for example when households in Jamaica step up their labour market participation as migrants depart, this will directly affect the local and national unemployment rate; and when
households in Colombia are less likely to be in poverty because of migration, this reduces national poverty rates.

However, it is vital to look directly at some of the wider outcomes because policymakers are charged with delivering positive outcomes for their country as a whole. Many have worried that under certain circumstances – such as ‘brain drain’, the departure of the highly skilled – migrants may choose outcomes that are good for themselves and their families, but that do not take into account the possibility of adverse externality impacts on others in society. These concerns need to be measured, and if found to be problematic, responded to by policymakers.

**Inequality**

The major wider economic impact examined is migration’s impact on inequality.\(^24\) The results presented in this section measure first the effect that remittances have on inequality, and then look at the net effect – including impacts through other channels besides remittances. (We present just the results here, not the analysis, as the latter is quite technical. See Annex 11 for full details.) For analysis of the impact of remittances evidence is drawn from three countries; when we look at net impacts we consider evidence from Colombia only.

Assessing the effect of remittances on inequality is not a simple task, as there are two distinct ways of thinking about it – vertical measures of inequality, and horizontal measures. Taking vertical inequality first, the effect of remittances can be calculated by considering the incomes households would have if they didn’t have remittances (which can be calculated simply by removing the amount of remittances each household receives from their household budgets). Once we have all households’ non-remittance incomes we can look at the distribution of remittances on top of this. If remittances contribute to an evening out of incomes across the income spectrum (i.e. are distributed more to poorer groups than non-remittance forms of income), adding them to household budgets will make incomes more even than they would otherwise have been. Such an effect reduces vertical inequality.

The other way of thinking about remittances and inequality – horizontal inequality – is to look at total inequality after the addition of remittances. So while remittances may (as in the example set out above) be sent more evenly to households than other forms of income, this will move the recipient households up the income spectrum, leaving some poorer households who don’t receive any remittances behind. Under these circumstances the differences between all households in the income spectrum could widen, thus causing horizontal inequality to rise. (Further information on each and how they are calculated is provided in Box A1, Annex 11. See also the work of Frances Stewart as a background to horizontal inequality [Stewart 2002].)

The findings are fairly clear. In two cases – Macedonia and Vietnam – remittances result in a decrease in inequality on both vertical and horizontal measures. In the case of Colombia it causes a fall in vertical inequality, but an increase in horizontal inequality. Negative results are also derived when the net effect of migration on inequality is calculated in Colombia, with analysis suggesting that inequality has risen as a result of migration.

These findings are particularly important because while the literature in this area is still nascent, and the results rather mixed, it appears that the prevailing wisdom is that migration increases inequality (Castles 2007). This analysis serves to strengthen the case that there is no simple story to be told, and that the possibility of positive impacts must be very much considered.

**Summary**

This concludes the analysis of migration’s economic impacts. The findings from this unique and in-depth investigation are generally positive. The work suggests that, on the whole, migration is positive for the people who migrate, often very positive, raising their disposable incomes and improving their earning prospects on return. At a household level, the average household affected by migration seems, as a result, to have higher incomes, be more likely to own a business as well as their own home, and also to save
more (although results do vary across countries). Moreover, the much discussed negative impact on labour force participation which has been said to result from receiving remittances does appear to exist in some circumstances, but it is very small and often seems to be outweighed by other aspects of migration that encourage members of households with absent migrants into work.

Some of the positive household impacts – such as increased business ownership and savings – are likely to have positive spillover effects affecting the wider society, meaning migration is not just good for the households concerned but the country at large. This will especially be the case for countries with high levels of movement, such as Macedonia and Jamaica, where migratory movements are large enough to impact on outcomes for whole communities, regions or even the nation itself.

In addition to extrapolating about what the household level findings mean for communities and the nation as a whole, this report explicitly examines one impact at those levels – the effect that migration has on nationwide income inequality. Here the analysis provides mixed results, though decreases in inequality as a result of migration appear to be more common than increases across the countries studied.

Broadly speaking, while the findings are not identical across indicators and countries, there is a clear overarching lesson that, on economic grounds at least, migration is good for individuals, households and the wider society across the diverse range of countries studied by DotM. This raises two challenges. First – an academic challenge – to understand further what determines when impacts are positive, neutral or negative, and how sizeable those impacts are. Second – a policy challenge – is to understand how migration can be shaped, both in its extent and in its nature, to increase the positive impacts and minimise the small number of negative ones.

We now move on to focus on migration’s impacts on educational development, again looking at individuals, households and wider communities and societies.

**Educational impacts**

The majority of evidence which has been produced so far on educational impacts is for household level outcomes. This research suggests that migration usually promotes investment in education. This might be for one of three reasons: first, because of incentive effects (educated people who migrate successfully incentivise others to gain education [Batista et al 2007, Chand and Clemens 2008]); second, as a result of the extra resources remittances bring to households, some of which are put into education (Cox and Ureta 2003); or third, because of transmitted values and attitudes which place greater emphasis on education (Lindley 2006).

These findings are not universal, however. In some circumstances, migration appears to decrease investment in education, especially, it seems, where the migration options available do not require high levels of qualifications or skills (McKenzie and Rapoport 2006). This seems to result in a negative incentive effect whereby household members conclude that to migrate and earn a decent income, education is not required. There have also been studies about nationwide effects of migration on education, which usually tend to suggest that the departure of qualified teachers, university staff and so on can have knock-on negative effects on educational provision (UNESCO 2010). It is also vital to examine one of the most discussed and contentious impacts that migration can have – the effect of ‘brain drain’, or skilled people migrating, on a country’s stock of skills. The fear is that if skilled people leave, this has a negative effect on the number of skilled people a country has, with knock-on damaging economic and social effects (Docquier 2006, Kapur 2001).

This section now goes on to examine these hypotheses, as well as setting out some evidence on the impacts that migration has on the migrant’s own level of education. As with the previous part of this chapter, the aim is to provide comparable data on a broad range of migration’s impacts, as well as some nuance as to how migration appears to cause these educational outcomes.
Educational impacts on the migrant

The first evidence presented here is on educational qualifications gained by migrants while abroad. Skills acquisition by migrants is beneficial for the migrants themselves, and also has the potential to boost skill stocks in their country of origin if they return (though the ‘transferability’ of what they have learnt is also important). The evidence presented here is only indicative (as it has not been possible to construct a counterfactual to understand the extent to which those who migrated might have gained qualifications had they stayed in their country of origin). However, observing the extent to which migrants study while they are away remains insightful.

The extent to which migrants study while living abroad varies significantly by country. At one end of the spectrum almost 50 per cent of absent migrants from Macedonia have gained an additional qualification during their time out of the country (and even more are likely to have studied without gaining any formal qualifications) whereas at the other, only around 6 per cent of Jamaican returned migrants gained qualifications abroad. These different trends are likely to be explained partially by the time these groups spend abroad; as shown in Chapter 3, Macedonian migrants rarely return for a few years, whereas the majority of Jamaican returned migrants stay away for under 12 months.

Examining specifically the kind of qualifications gained abroad, the evidence shows that it is most common for migrants to acquire work-related qualifications. For example 65 per cent of Macedonian absent migrants who gained a qualification, gained one of this kind. Vietnam stands out as the clear exception here, with tertiary level qualifications (bachelors, masters and doctorates) making up about half of the qualifications gained by migrants who return to Vietnam. This result probably reflects the fact that Vietnamese migrants are less likely, compared with migrants from other countries, to gain any kind of qualification while abroad (about 17 per cent of these returned migrants do, one of the lowest proportions in the countries studied). Therefore, while the proportion of tertiary qualifications gained is high compared with other types of qualifications, this result may simply be because Vietnamese migrants gain few ‘other’ qualifications. Indeed, many of the migration-for-work channels used by Vietnamese migrants do not place them into jobs where gaining additional qualifications seems a very likely outcome. Vietnamese migration to Malaysia and Japan, for example, is often irregular (Hugo 2005) and this may limit opportunities to gain in-work qualifications.

Alongside gaining formal qualifications, it has also been theorised that migrants can benefit through informal skills development as well. DotM found that many do in fact do so. The majority (54 per cent) of Vietnamese returned migrants, for example, said that they had gained new skills or ideas while abroad which have been helpful to them now that they have returned, and in Macedonia just less than half (42 per cent) said this. The most common kind of skill developed in both cases was learning a new language. 31 per cent of the group of Vietnamese returning migrants who claimed they had gained new skills (or 15 per cent of all returned migrants) cited language learning. The corresponding figure for Macedonia was 42 per cent (or 18 per cent of all returning Macedonians) Also prominent is profession-based skills development, as reported by 31 per cent of Macedonian returned migrants with new skills (or 13 per cent of the group as a whole), and 23 per cent (or 11 per cent) of Vietnamese.

In Vietnam the researchers investigated working style and habits. 31 per cent of those who said they had gained new skills (or 15 per cent of all returned migrants) suggested they had gained in this way. The researchers in Vietnam also asked if returning migrants gained a new perspective on culture and society by living abroad, and a similar proportion (30 per cent, or 14 per cent of all returning migrants) assented. Together these statistics suggest that a significant minority of returned migrants may have returned with changed attitudes about the culture, they and live within.

Lastly, smaller though not insignificant numbers in both countries reported learning new life skills such as how to drive, or to use a computer while away: 12 per cent of the Vietnamese group reporting new skills cited new life skills (6 per cent of the total returnees), as did 14 per cent of the Macedonian group with new skills (6 per cent of

“The majority of Vietnamese returned migrants said that they had gained new skills or ideas while abroad which have been helpful to them now that they have returned”
the group overall). Some also said that they had learnt more about a particular social issue (such as environmental issues) – 10 per cent of Macedonian returnees claiming new skills said this (4 per cent of the overall group), as did 15 per cent of the Vietnamese group with new skills (7 per cent of returnees overall).

These are quite striking findings. They suggest that migration creates an important opportunity for skills development and possibly the broadening of horizons for individual migrants. Indeed, it is close to being the norm that migrants will develop informal skills, according to this evidence. This makes migration a good way for individual migrants to expand their capabilities, and seems likely to concomitantly increase the skills base and the range of ideas in the respective ‘home’ societies – a point that will be picked up again at later points in the report.

Educational impacts on the migrant’s household

This section presents evidence on the impact that migration has on educational outcomes at a household level. The findings are once again mixed but broadly positive (see Table 4.7). The picture seems clearest in terms of the effect that remittances have on education. Broadly, educational expenditure rises on the receipt of remittances (these are the findings from PSM analysis in Colombia and Georgia); only in Ghana is there a different result (again using PSM) – no increase.

Conversely, where the relationship between remittances and school attendance is analysed, the result tends to suggest no impact (in Colombia, using PSM, and in Macedonia and Vietnam, using binomial logic and probit respectively). It is logical to see an improvement in expenditure but not attendance, as expenditure on education is an easier variable in which to see incremental differences (every extra dollar spent is reflected in the data), whereas school attendance requires a larger shift in behaviour (deciding whether or not to put a child in school) in order to be observed. Moreover in some of the countries examined school attendance – at least at primary level – is already close to universal, in which context investments in quality rather than quantity of education seem much more likely.

The exception to this finding on school attendance is Jamaica. There older children – those aged 17 and above, with 17 chosen as the age at which many in Jamaica discontinue their education – in households receiving remittances are more likely to be in education than their peers in non-receiving households. The model finds that a doubling of household income through remittances increases their likelihood of being in higher education by 80 per cent. This analysis is conducted using a logit model, however, and so it is not entirely clear in what direction causality runs – does having children in higher education make a household more likely to receive remittances, or do remittances raise the likelihood of children undertaking higher education?

It is worth noting that this focus on higher education, rather than education as a whole, is reflected in the other findings on remittances – in Colombia for example most of the extra expenditure on education from remittances appears to be focused in higher – rather than basic – education.

There is less evidence on the effects of return migration, but what there is suggests that generally return migration has little influence over the household’s educational outcomes. However it does appear to have a positive influence on educational expenditures in Colombia (results taken from PSM). It is interesting to note that return migration appears to impact on a different area of education than remittances. Whereas remittances seem primarily to raise expenditure on higher education, the majority of the impact of return migration appears to be on basic education, in some ways making it particularly important in developmental terms.

The area where the findings are the most interesting, nuanced and indeed divided is on the impact of absent migrants on the household. The simplest results come from Colombia and Ghana, which examine expenditure on education using PSM, both finding that having an absent migrant increases expenditure. It is interesting, though, that this effect is smaller in Colombia than the positive effect of remittances, suggesting that while remittances may increase expenditure, other aspects of having an absent migrant may not be as positive. In contrast, Ghana found remittances do not have a positive
impact on educational spending but having an absent migrant does, suggesting that other aspects of migration – such as transmitted ideas and attitudes – may account for this impact, rather than simply flows of money from the absent migrant.

Table 4.7. Impact of migration on household members’ education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Households with absent migrants</th>
<th>Households with returned migrants</th>
<th>Households in receipt of remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>No significant impact on school attendance. Positive impact on expenditure – increases by about US$8 per capita per month. Evidence suggests that much of the effect comes through increased expenditure on higher education.</td>
<td>No significant impact on school attendance. Positive impact on expenditure – increases by about US$5 per capita per month. Evidence suggests that much of this effect comes through increased expenditure on basic education.</td>
<td>No significant impact on school attendance. Positive impact on expenditure – increases by about US$11 per capita per month. Evidence suggests that much of the effect comes through increased expenditure on higher education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Increased expenditure by US$39 per year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Positive impact on educational expenditure, of about US$107 per year.</td>
<td>No significant impact.</td>
<td>No significant impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>No significant effect on school attendance.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Increased likelihood of household members aged 17–21 being in education, in line with any other addition to household income. A doubling of living standards through remittances (or any other income) would lead to an 80% increase in likelihood of children over 16 being in education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Negative impact on school attendance. The effect is primarily through children aged 19–22. Positive impact on expenditure if it is the child’s parent who is absent, raising the likelihood that the child will be in school very substantially. Again the effect operates mostly through the 19–22 age group.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>No significant impact on school attendance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>No significant impact on school attendance. There is, however, a quite a large positive impact on school attendance if the child’s parent is absent.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: DotM household survey. For details see Tables 9, 15–17 and 27–30, Annex 9
Researchers for DotM in Colombia, Vietnam, Jamaica and Macedonia examined the relationship between school attendance and having an absent migrant. In the former three countries there appears to be no impact. However, in Macedonia there is apparently quite a strong negative effect. For each additional absent migrant in the household, older children are substantially less likely to be in education. The effect is for older children only, and may result from those children seeing migration (which, as described in Chapter 3, is usually quite low-skilled for Macedonians) as a viable alternative to education. These results are derived from a logit model and so questions around causality remain.

When the absent migrant is the parent of the children involved a very interesting dynamic can be observed, which is examined in Jamaica, Macedonia, and Vietnam (though through probit and logit models, so again questions of causality remain unresolved). In each of the cases the effect is dramatically different to having an absent migrant of any relationship within the household. In Jamaica the effect appears to be strongly negative, particularly for children aged 5–16. This fits with what is known about the effect that parental migration has on children in Jamaica: in the much discussed phenomenon of ‘barrel children’, children whose parents are away are sent ‘barrels’ of goods in an attempt to compensate for their absence. Several studies have found that these children suffer psychologically because of their parents’ absence, which may be reflected in their school attendance (Thomas-Hope et al 2009).

In Macedonia the result is the exact opposite, and the numbers are even more dramatic. While having absent migrants in the household appeared to deter those aged 19–22 from attending higher education, if those members are the parents of the children concerned, then the result reverses. Again, to the extent that this is the result of migration, it seems likely that it is explained by Macedonian circumstances. Many stakeholders in Macedonia discuss how migrants go abroad explicitly to try to find the funds to educate their children and in particular to put them through university (Nikolovski et al 2009). While remittances appear to have no impact on higher education attendance, it may be less the resources that parents commit to education that spur attendance and more the motivational effects that migration and remittances create: children, appreciating their parents’ ‘sacrifice’ of migrating (which is how migration is often perceived in Macedonia [ibid]), increase their commitment to attending.

Lastly, while generally having a migrant absent from your household in Vietnam does not appear to affect school attendance, having a parent away appears to substantially increase the likelihood that a child attends school (though not to the same extent as in Macedonia). It may be that psychological and motivational factors push Vietnamese children (or perhaps more accurately their guardians in this case, as the result applies to younger children here) to ensure their school attendance. The lack of ability to discern causality for all these purported impacts of parental migration, should, however, be borne in mind when reviewing these results.

Impacts on community-level and nationwide educational outcomes
A number of aspects of migration’s wider impacts on education at a community and nationwide level can be noted and considered alongside the impacts that seem to be taking place at an individual and household level.

Firstly, the evidence on remittances to educational institutions, which has been discussed in some quarters as potentially an important way in which migration might lead to good educational outcomes, suggests a negligible impact. In Jamaica, for example, 7 per cent of returned migrants sent money to organisations while they were away, of whom 5 per cent sent money to schools – in other words less than 0.5 per cent of the migrants sent money to schools from abroad. The proportions in Macedonia are similar. It seems important, then, to separate out the fact that some individual migrants and diaspora organisations provide important support to schools and other institutions on the one hand and the scale of that support on the other. The DotM research indicates that in scale at least the support is only marginal.
Secondly, and potentially much more importantly, migration can clearly affect a country’s stock of skills – indeed ‘brain drain’ is one of the best known phrases associated with migration and development. Skilled people clearly do – at least in some circumstances – play a vital economic and social role in developing countries (Docquier 2006, Kapur 2001, Chappell and Mulley 2010). This makes the impact that migration has on a country’s stock of skills an important consideration for policymakers.

It is difficult, however, to make an assessment of the impact of migration on a country’s stock of skills because there are at least five different effects. These include the original patterns of emigration (a negative effect), and any immigration and return that also occur (which can potentially have positive effects). Then there are the indirect effects that take place through remittances (which often increase spending on education, as shown above, boosting skill stocks), and through incentives (if skilled people migrate then there may be more of an incentive to gain skills in the first place). This section attempts to piece together evidence on how migration affects national skill stocks in the DotM countries through these different routes.

First, evidence on emigration (see Chapter 3) suggests that migration does have a skill bias. In every country examined migrants were more highly skilled than the average non-migrant. In most cases though the actual proportion of all emigrants departing the countries with a high level of skills (a degree or postgraduate degree) is fairly small – around the 15 per cent mark (though Georgia is a notable exception at 41 per cent). This means that while the DotM countries are losing skilled people via emigration, in no cases are the majority of departing migrants highly skilled (and the reality is usually a long way from this).

So what then of immigration and return? Are they likely to make major contributions to a country’s stock of skills? Immigration, as shown in Chapter 3, is fairly negligible in most of the DotM countries. Nor did the dataset collect (except in the Ghana case) any information on immigrants’ skill sets, making the evidence on the contribution of migration to skill stocks rather thin. However, the evidence from Ghana (Yeboah et al 2010) shows that immigrants have a very similar profile to the average Ghanaian, suggesting that they are unlikely to compensate much for the higher-than-average-skilled Ghanaians who tend to leave the country. This evidence fits too with the discussions of other literature (Chappell and Mulley 2010) which suggest that in most cases immigration to developing countries is likely to be too limited and/or too unskilled to make much of a dent in the skills gaps caused by emigration.

Return, on the other hand, tends to be more common than immigration for most of the DotM countries, potentially making it a more significant contributor to skills stocks. Moreover, the evidence presented above suggests that a substantial number of migrants (approximately half) increase their skill levels, either formally or informally, while living abroad, meaning that – to the extent that these skills are transferable – return migration constitutes a non-negligible addition to a country’s skills base. Moreover, in many cases, these skills and ideas are likely to be different and complementary to those of people who have remained in the country (Nathan 2008). However, while this is all positive, the scale of return still remains quite low compared with the scale of emigration.

One interesting illustration of the extent to which return can compensate for original departure is to examine how different industrial sectors have been affected by emigration and return, which is illustrated for Ghana in Table 4.8 overleaf. The first column of the table provides information on which sectors Ghana’s absent migrants departed from, the second column shows which sectors returnees are now working in, and the third shows the extent to which return to each sector compensates for the original departure. Some assumptions have been made in order to make these calculations (detailed below the table), which mean that they should be read with some caution, but they are insightful nonetheless.

The table suggests that sectors have been compensated to different extents by return migration, but that in all but one case the proportions of returnees who have come back
to the sector do not compensate for the numbers of people who originally left it through emigration. Interestingly, the one sector that is an exception is health and social care – the sector about which there tends to be the greatest concern over brain drain. While this result deserves further investigation because it is based on a series of assumptions, this is still a thought-provoking finding (and is backed up by previous research that has uncovered evidence that suggests that nurses may be more likely to return than other skilled professionals [Haour-Knipe and Davies 2008]). Beyond this, though, it seems clear that return is not extensive enough to compensate for the losses created by emigration in Ghana, and given that Ghana has the highest return rates of any of the countries studied, this conclusion can be safely extrapolated across the DotM countries as a group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Proportion of absent migrants leaving from that sector</th>
<th>Proportion of returning migrants working in that sector at the time of the survey</th>
<th>Percentage of original emigration that return compensates for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale/Retail</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric/Fishing/Forestry</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport/Storage</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts/Entertainment</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Scientific/Technical Services</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health/Social Work</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>111%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Services</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining/Quarrying</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric/Gas/Water</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors calculations based on Development on the Move Ghana household survey

Assumptions:
1. We use the rate of return (37%) calculated in Chapter 3 to transform the figures in column 2 into the statistics in column 3. However, the Ghanaian rate of return statistic has quite a wide margin of error, which means that the figures in column 3 do too. For example, while 34% ‘compensation’ is our best estimate for the wholesale and retail sector, it could be anywhere between 17% and 44%.
2. We assume that the same proportion of return migrants are working as absent migrants prior to departure. On the evidence provided in the first part of this chapter, this is a reasonable assumption.
3. The data used for diagnosing the sectors that absent migrants depart from is DotM absent migrant data – meaning that it only tells us the sectors of migrants who departed in the last 10 years and left household members behind (see Box 2.1 on definitions). The most important implication of this may be that some industries will show relatively lower rates of emigration than they actually have (in all likelihood sectors with more highly skilled people who are more able to migrate with their families – for example professional, technical and scientific services), thereby overstating the extent to which return compensates for departures in these sectors.
Turning to the impacts of remittances on household educational outcomes, the analysis presented above indicated that remittances may have improved the quality of education that household members are getting, but they probably are not increasing attendance. As such, while remittances may probably make a small contribution to skill stocks, it seems unlikely that even when this positive effect is combined with additions to skills via return and immigration, the effect would be strong enough to counteract the original effects of departure.

The last route whereby migration can affect skill stocks is incentives. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the fact that migration is attractive, and that having a high level of skills makes it easier to migrate, means that people in developing countries may invest more in these sorts of skills than they would have done had they not been considering migrating. Moreover, as not all these people will subsequently leave the country, the nation will retain some skilled people who, without the existence of migration, would be less qualified. The key question, however, is over the strength of the effect. Is the incentive effect fairly marginal, only leading to a few people gaining skills and not enough to counteract the departure of all those who migrate? Or is it strong enough that at least some countries end up with more skilled people than they would have in a scenario where there was no emigration?

The best evidence on incentive effects suggests two key findings. First, up to a certain level brain drain has positive impacts on skill stocks in the country of origin (implying, somewhat counter-intuitively, that some countries can have too little brain drain). Second, above a certain level brain drain is damaging, and increasingly so (that is, the damage is not linear but exponential). The key is understanding where this dividing line between benefit and harm is drawn, and whether it falls in different places for different countries.

Taking the latter question first, the latest evidence (Beine et al 2007) suggests that brain drain may benefit the very poorest countries most – low income countries and perhaps some of the lower middle income countries. But the evidence for incentive effects occurring in richer countries appears weaker. Regarding where the lines between benefit and harm are drawn, the evidence cumulatively suggests that for the poorest countries at least, where brain drain is below 5 per cent of the country’s population the nation may benefit from having more skilled people abroad (for example Beine et al 2006, Docquier 2006). These papers suggest that the ‘best’ proportion of people to have away may be somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent, and when the proportion away is above 30 per cent or so, then harm may be taking place, and increasingly so as brain drain rises above that limit.

Of the DotM countries Jamaica and Ghana have such large proportions of their skilled people living abroad (85 per cent and 47 per cent respectively [Docquier 2006]) that it is unlikely that those countries are benefiting from incentive effects that are strong enough to compensate for the direct effects of skilled emigration. Macedonia also seems unlikely to benefit, as at 29 per cent (Docquier 2006), the level of its skilled people outside its borders is getting close to the level that appears to be damaging; moreover, it is not a low income country, which suggests the incentive effects may not be powerful enough to counteract the effect of departures.25

Vietnam has a similar level of brain drain as Macedonia (27 per cent [Docquier 2006]), but it seems possible that it is not being harmed, because as a low income country incentive effects there should be relatively stronger. Colombia and Georgia’s brain drain rates are much lower, suggesting that they may be being compensated by incentive effects for their original loss of skills through emigration. And certainly in those places it seems likely that together incentive effects, immigration, return and remittances are combining to counteract the original effect of emigration.

In sum then, migration’s effects on skill stocks in the DotM countries are highly diverse. It seems likely that in some countries – particularly Jamaica, but possibly also Ghana and Macedonia – migration’s overall effect on skill stocks may be negative: that immigration, return, remittances and incentive effects are probably not able to compensate for the original scale of skilled departure. In these cases there is a need for policymakers to

25. Note, however, that there is other recent country-specific research which is potentially more rigorous and that questions the idea that middle income countries experience much weaker incentive effects: see studies of Fiji (Chand and Clemens 2008) and Cape Verde (Batista et al 2007)). In Fiji, an upper middle income country with brain drain of approximately 62 per cent, the study shows that expected negative impacts on skill stocks did not play out. Migration should not provide a strong enough incentive to invest in skills to balance out brain drain in Fiji according to the findings of the existing literature, but it was. This suggests that even in some middle income and high emigration countries emigration may induce substantial increased investment in skills.
Consider what actions might be appropriate to try to strengthen skills stocks. However, it should be noted that even in these three countries, the extent to which migration flows are made up of skilled people is less than expected, as the country reports make very clear. It seems that in some cases concern about brain drain has made policymakers and observers think that migration equals brain drain when in fact skilled people make up only a small proportion of all those moving.

In the other countries – Vietnam, Colombia and Georgia – it seems possible that while skills are being lost through emigration, they are being compensated for through migration’s other channels. Indeed, in some of those countries it may be the case that they now have more skilled people than they would have had otherwise, had no one been able to migrate.

Summary

The findings on the educational impacts of migration are a little more mixed than those on the economic impacts. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that improving economic outcomes appears to be the major motivator of movement. To find that those outcomes have improved simply bears testament to the fact that migrants, having observed the desired economic benefits migration has brought to others, rationally choose to engage in it themselves. That said, however, improving educational outcomes is the second most important motivator for movement (alongside family motives), so one would presume that migration should also improve life in this respect too – at least for the migrants themselves (as the migrants’ own education was the particular focus of educationally-linked migration), but potentially for their families as well. On the whole the DotM evidence bears this out.

The DotM findings suggest that a significant proportion of the migrants from each of the countries examined gained additional qualifications abroad, somewhere within the broad range of around 10 and 50 per cent. On the whole these tended to be vocational rather than academic qualifications, but in Vietnam in particular academic qualifications – especially degrees and masters – comprised up to half of the qualifications gained. The extent of qualifications gained and their type appear to depend on factors such as the duration and nature of migration (for example whether regular or irregular). While it is hard to say what situation the migrants would be in had they never migrated, one can presume by the fact that many explicitly cited achieving educational goals as a reason for migrating, and that evidence suggests that on average migrants succeed in meeting their objectives, that the quality and/or quantity of qualifications gained was improved through migration.

Perhaps even more significant, however, is the evidence on informal skills development and the broadening of mindset that many migrants report. This is reported by about half the returned migrants, giving them new language abilities, professional skills, life skills (such as driving or computer skills), knowledge about new issues, and new ways of viewing the world.

At a household level, the evidence suggests that being in receipt of remittances and having a returnee in the household tends either to have a neutral or positive effect on households’ educational achievement. Generally, while the effects do not seem to be as significant (on the whole) as affecting whether or not children are in education, they do appear to boost investment in it, thereby improving the quality of education children get.

The picture with absent migrants is more complex. While on the whole having migrants away seems good for educational achievement, two important points need to be stressed. First, it is very important to make a distinction between any migrant departing and a school-age child’s parent migrating. In each of the countries where this distinction was made, researchers found that the results for the two analyses were very different. Second, the effect of a parent departing seems very different across countries, probably because of the different social contexts within which that departure takes place. In two of the DotM case study countries the apparent effect was strong and positive, and in a third it was strong and negative (though in all cases causality remains an issue, and more evidence would be desirable to assess this question further). This seems to be an area where altering the context within which migration takes place might pay some significant dividends in terms of improving the effect migration has on development.

26 The potential for the quality of education to be improved should not be downplayed. The major developed economies have an incredible stock of educational resources (from teachers to libraries to information technology to research facilities) which can enhance the quality of education offered. This means the migrant may be better off in educational terms through studying abroad even if, had they remained in their place of origin, they had studied for a qualification of a similar grade.
Finally, examinations of the wider impacts that migration has on education suggest that several long-standing ideas about this issue should be questioned. First, while there has been a fair amount of optimism about the contributions the diaspora can make to education systems in their countries of origin, in financial terms at least these contributions are small. Very few migrants report having sent money to schools and other educational establishments while away.

Second, migration does not equal brain drain – in fact the majority of people migrating are not highly skilled. That said, some countries have seen very large proportions of their skilled people depart – in some cases (especially Jamaica, but also Ghana and Macedonia) possibly too many. However, in other cases it may be that migration overall has a neutral or even positive effect on skills.

**Health impacts**

We now move on to examining a third area of impacts: impacts on health. This is a relatively understudied area – except for examinations of brain drain of medics – but there are a range of theories that suggest migration could affect health outcomes in a multitude of ways.

**Health impacts at the level of the individual**

The effect of migration on migrants’ own health is a little studied phenomenon, though what evidence exists suggests that effects can be very mixed. On the one hand migration could potentially harm health through exposing the migrant to poor nutrition, poor living conditions, lack of access to social services or exposure to new diseases. On the other, migration may provide migrants with better living conditions and higher incomes than those in their home country, improving their health (Waddington and Black 2005). The fresh research from DotM can add only a little descriptive work to this area, but it is interesting nonetheless.

Taking Vietnam as an example, one can observe that reported health for those who have never migrated and those who are returned migrants is remarkably similar – 20 per cent of both groups class themselves as having excellent health, 3 per cent of both also report poor health, and 5 per cent of non-migrants report very poor health, compared with 6 per cent of returned migrants. Essentially, there is little in this study at least to suggest that living abroad either notably enhances or harms migrants’ health.

This is interesting because it contests the idea that the majority of migrants either suffer in health terms because of doing dirty or dangerous work and in some cases lacking access to health facilities; or that they benefit from healthcare options that are dramatically superior to those they can get at home. There may be differences of course, and some migrants may fall into the former group and some into the latter, but at the aggregate, the effect, in Vietnam at least, is not sufficiently significant in one direction or the other to register in the statistics. Further investigation into this issue would be interesting.

**Health impacts at the household level**

Turning to the health of households exposed to migration, migration appears generally to boost expenditure on healthcare. This is a quite strikingly consistent finding across almost all the DotM countries and regardless of how the household is affected – through the receipt of remittances, through having an absent migrant or through having a returned migrant (the only exception is Colombian households with absent migrants, where there appears to be no impact).

What is particularly interesting here is that in most cases there is clear evidence that other aspects of migration beyond remittances appear to be affecting households’ behaviour. The evidence from Colombia and Jamaica regarding the influence of returned migrants is particularly notable. In Colombia having a returned migrant seems to have a more sizeable effect than receiving remittances does (PSM methods used), and in Jamaica the model used allows us to see that while remittances simply act as any other income in boosting expenditure on health, having a returned migrant independently increases health expenditure by almost two thirds.
While this result is drawn from OLS analysis and so there are issues of causality (and the size of the ‘effects’ shown both for returned and absent migrants suggest that there probably is some reverse causality taking place), the suggestion that some of the Jamaican result is caused by migration is supported by the finding that the nature, and not just the extent, of health spending changes when there are returned migrants in the household. Households move away from traditional Jamaican remedies and towards the kinds of medicines that migrants would have been exposed to in their major destinations – the USA, UK and Canada. As such, the result does point to the likelihood of attitudes and knowledge being brought back by returned migrants and affecting their households’ behaviour.

However, while expenditure patterns may be changed for the better by migration, health outcomes show less positive trends. The evidence mainly suggests that migration has no

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Households with absent migrants</th>
<th>Households with returned migrants</th>
<th>Households in receipt of remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>No significant impact on healthcare expenditure.</td>
<td>Positive impact. Increases per capita health expenditure by US$7 per capita per month.</td>
<td>Positive impact. Increases per capita health expenditure by US$6 per capita per month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative impact on health. Where there is a migrant absent household members are 4% less likely to report being in good health. This effect is driven by women reporting worse health.</td>
<td>No significant impact on whether household members report being in good health.</td>
<td>Negative impact. The receipt of remittances appears to reduce the likelihood that household members report good health by about 5%. The effect comes mostly through women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>No significant effect on household members reporting poor health.</td>
<td>No significant effect on household members reporting poor health.</td>
<td>No significant effect nationally on household members reporting poor health, though different effects in different parts of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Positive impact. Expenditure on medical care goes up by US$132 per year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Children who have absent parents are equally likely to miss days of school as comparable households.</td>
<td>No significant impact on days lost from ill health.</td>
<td>Negative impact – but remittances act as any other source of income. It seems likely that those with higher incomes are more able to take days off sick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive impact on healthcare spending. Each additional absent migrant boosts spending by a hefty 93% (controlling for remittance receipts).</td>
<td>Positive impact – each additional returned migrant boosts spending on healthcare by 68%. Moreover, households with returned migrants show a greater preference for non-traditional medicines.</td>
<td>Positive impact – receipt of remittances raises healthcare spending, acting as any other form of income.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Positive impact. Every additional migrant in the household increases health expenditure by about 14%.</td>
<td>Positive impact. Every additional migrant in the household increases health expenditure by about 14%.</td>
<td>Positive impact. For every 1% increase in remittances per capita received, household health expenditure rises by about 0.13%. Here remittances do not just act as other income, but make a more positive contribution to healthcare spending than other forms of income.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

impacts on household members’ health, but there are some negative results. The Jamaica result, in the view of the current report’s authors, is misleading, the result of a poorly designed question in the pilot stage of the project, and can be discounted. However, even setting this aside, negative impacts on household members’ health from having an absent migrant away and receiving remittances are still found in Colombia, where the effect falls on women’s health specifically. Some local stakeholders noted that women who are left behind when their male partners migrate may feel isolated and concerned for the migrant’s welfare abroad, which may impact on their own health (Cardenas et al 2010).

In Georgia there are sub-national, if not national, effects on health as a result of migration. Remittances appear to reduce by about a third the likelihood that rural households will have a member in poor health. By contrast, in Tbilisi, the capital, they increase the likelihood by similar odds. This emphasises the importance of understanding the local context, which will determine what effect introducing an outside influence like remittances has on outcomes.

Community and national level impacts
Health sector brain drain is one of the most discussed aspects of migration, with many fearing it seriously damages development in places. The analysis here mirrors the analysis above on skill stocks, to provide some insight into the specific effects of medical brain drain in DotM countries. We take Jamaica as an illustrative example.

A review of literature about the Jamaican health sector found, as might be expected, that when staff migrate, shortages in the workplace are exacerbated. Increasing staff shortages ratchet up the workload and responsibilities of remaining staff, which in turn leads to high levels of staff absenteeism, lowered staff morale and a deteriorating quality of healthcare (Mortley 2009). There are substantial shortages in Jamaica: 2000 nurses were registered in the public healthcare system in 2008, while the Jamaican Nurses Association thought there should have been 4500 (Thomas-Hope et al 2009).

However, although shortages lead to a deterioration of care and migration appears to exacerbate them, it has also been found that migration did not create the shortages (Mortley 2009). In 2008 the budget for training health professionals in Jamaica was cut to J$301 million from J$322 million the previous year – a 15 per cent reduction in real terms (Thomas-Hope et al 2009), and significant enough to place pressure on the provision of staff for the public healthcare system without any contribution from migration.

In order to get a full sense of the effect that migration has on health sector performance, it is important to look more broadly than this, to examine departures and the context within which they take place alongside immigration and return, remittances, other diaspora contributions, and incentives.

The first aspect to be considered is the role immigration and return play in counteracting the shortages. Foreign nurses, chiefly from Cuba and Nigeria, have helped to fill some of the vacancies in Jamaica. There have been concerns about language barriers potentially leading to mis-communication and mis-diagnosis, but it is difficult to know to what extent these concerns reflect real problems with healthcare quality (Thomas-Hope et al 2009). Return migration to Jamaica is not that common: about one in five of all migrants return. Given these general return rates it is probably safe to assume that return of nursing staff will make some contribution to the staffing of the healthcare sector, but in all likelihood not a significant enough contribution to address the original levels of departure.

Examining next contributions of diaspora to healthcare facilities, the evidence suggests that, in financial terms at least, these are minimal. In Jamaica, no returned migrants at all said that while they had been away they had provided funds to hospitals or other healthcare facilities (the numbers are very low for the other countries examined too). It may be that by providing non-financial contributions (including volunteering missions and so on) some additional contributions are made, but it seems safe to say that the diasporas’ contributions to healthcare are marginal.

27. The Jamaican study (the pilot) used ‘days lost through ill health’ as a measure of health outcomes (whereas the other countries used ‘self-identified health status’ – i.e. how people viewed their own health). It was presumed that the number of days lost to ill health would increase as people’s health worsened and work as a proxy measure for health status in that way. We found, however, that as household income increased, people were more likely to take days off sick, presumably because they could afford to, whereas poorer households could not. Thus it seems very likely that the ‘negative’ relationship we find here whereby the more remittances received, the more likely it is household members take time off sick (derived from OLS analysis) is not due to remittance receipts causing people to be ill, but rather because they make them wealthier, making it easier for them to take time off if they get ill.
Incentive effects must also be considered, given the critical role they appear to play in boosting various types of skills in some contexts. Assuming that incentive effects operate in broadly the same way for specific skill sets (for example nursing) as they do for skills in general (which we expect is a fairly safe assumption*), we can look at existing data on medical migration and see how extensive it is and therefore whether incentive effects look likely to be playing an important compensatory role.

Interestingly, while Jamaica certainly falls into the ‘harm’ category for general skilled migration, as discussed earlier, its healthcare professionals are actually much more likely than the average skilled Jamaican to have remained in Jamaica. Previous research suggests that about 20 per cent of Jamaica’s healthcare professionals live abroad (Docquier 2006). However, setting this against the two scales that determine the strength of incentive effects – the income scale and the extent of medical migration scale – it may be that departures are still not compensated for by the incentive effect (as Jamaica is a middle income country and so incentive effects may be relatively weak there and unable to counteract levels of departure of that kind). However, it seems likely that an important contribution to healthcare provision probably is being made through incentive effects.

This framework for assessing potential harm caused to healthcare provision can be used for examining the other DotM countries too. Such an exercise suggests that none is likely to be impacted as negatively as Jamaica. Of the group, Ghana causes the greatest concern with a level of medical brain drain of about 25 per cent – close to the 30 per cent ‘cut off’ identified in some literature as indicating when brain drain may begin to cause serious harm to skill stocks. On the other hand, Ghana is a low income country, and incentive effects have been shown to act particularly strongly in these countries. Moreover, the evidence presented earlier on return to the medical and social care sector in Ghana suggests that return may be playing an important role there too.

In the other countries, medical brain drain is below 15 per cent, and thus well below levels at which it would be expected to become a problem for healthcare staffing and systems. In Vietnam (a low income country) and possibly also Georgia (a lower middle income country), it might even be the case that if more healthcare professionals migrated the incentive to gain healthcare qualifications might be stronger, and the countries might end up with more healthcare professionals than they have currently.

Summary
The focus of the new evidence presented above has been on household-level health impacts. This evidence suggests that exposure to migration can quite significantly change the emphasis placed on health by households. While remittances appear to increase health expenditure, there is some strong evidence to suggest that households with absent or return migrants increase their expenditure on health (and even change what kinds of healthcare they spend their money on) as a result of effects that are not related to remittances.

However, while migration may increase the emphasis that households place on health and boost spending, it does not necessarily improve their actual health status. The findings suggest that migration has no impact on household members’ health, and where there are impacts, they are negative (though small). These impacts tend to occur where people are currently separated from loved ones, rather than when people have returned, and thus it might be speculated that being apart in this way can negatively affect health. Evidence on the impact that migration has on individual migrants’ health is less robust, but does suggest that migration does not tend to have dramatic impacts on the health of the average migrant.

Examination of the effect of migration on national level health provision suggests that contrary to expectations, when looked at in the round (and not just focusing on departures) in most of the DotM case study countries, migration probably does not harm national healthcare provision, mostly because of the incentives created by the possibilities of migration that induce people to train as healthcare professionals in the first place. It seems likely that impacts are probably negative in Jamaica however (although this should not obscure the impact of other issues such as cuts in funding for

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28. This assumption requires medical migration to cause people to train in medical skills as ‘effectively’ as general skilled migration encourages people to gain general skills. However, given how prominent the knowledge is in many developing countries that gaining medical skills permits migration, we would expect that medical migration will have as strong incentive effects as ‘general’ high skilled migration – if not even stronger.

29. In all these discussions, however, it should be noted that having more skilled healthcare professionals is not necessarily good for a country in the way that having more skilled people is overall. Education is a good in many ways, improving people’s own lives, empowering them socially and politically, and playing a role in driving economic growth. In this sense then higher skills levels can be read as almost always being good for development. However, specific skill sets, such as medical skills, have a much narrower relevance. While in simple terms it might be thought that more doctors and nurses equal better healthcare equals better development outcomes, in some cases spending financial and human resources on healthcare may not be the best use of those resources. Investing more in training doctors may divert scarce resources away from building up the country’s stock of teachers, or lawyers, or entrepreneurs; and in some contexts, the marginal contribution that one more doctor can make to development may be less than the marginal contribution of one more lawyer.
healthcare training). In other countries, notably Vietnam but possibly also Georgia, healthcare provision could potentially be improved if there were more migration of healthcare personnel.

**Gender impacts**
The fourth area of focus is gender-based impacts of migration: the effects that migration might have on restrictive gender-based roles and expectations.

**Migrants’ own gender-based experiences**
This section examines first whether or not migration can offer opportunities for escaping restrictive gender roles or if it might reinforce them.

The first interesting finding in this regard comes from the Jamaica analysis, where the researchers examined whether or not migration was driven by different motivations for men and women. While some of the motivations were cited by similar numbers from each gender, some responses were more divided along gender lines. The most significant differences are depicted in Figure 4.1.

It is interesting that more women than men cite the economic motivations of employment and wages as reasons for migrating. Women also more frequently mention social reasons for migration – to leave behind experience of discrimination and wanting to have more personal freedoms, which fits with what has been found in other research (UNFPA 2006, Black et al 2004). This suggests that migration may be being seen by women as a way to expand their economic and social freedoms. The only area men were more likely than women to cite as a reason for moving is skills development.

![Figure 4.1. Motivations for migration by gender, Jamaica](source: DotM household survey 2007/2008)

While this may give the impression of migration being something of an emancipatory experience for women, other evidence suggests that they do not escape all their traditional roles through migration – especially not their caring role. The DotM survey asked if remittances from absent migrants were consciously allocated towards any particular items. Some households identified child support as an area where remittances were particularly used, and of the group of remitters whose funds are used for this purpose, 63 per cent were women (a disproportionate amount, as approximately half the migrants from Jamaica are women). This supports the view that women are, through their migration, still taking responsibility for the provision and care of children, as is traditional.

Moreover, breaking down responses to questions about the degree to which migrants’ lifestyles improved while living abroad (compared to when they departed) shows no significant difference between the sexes (in Jamaica at least). In other words, while women may pursue migration more avidly as a way to enhance aspects of their economic and social wellbeing, it only appears to improve their lives to about the same degree as men.
It is also interesting to examine how migration has changed individuals’ own attitudes to gender equality in their country of origin. In every case examined on this measure (Georgia, Jamaica and Vietnam) migration had a major impact, with large numbers of male and female returned migrants reporting that their experience of living abroad had made them think that more effort was needed ‘back home’ to ensure gender equality. In Jamaica about 80 per cent of both male and female returnees reported feeling this, and in Vietnam the figure was around 90 per cent for both sexes. In Georgia, in contrast, women reported a similarly increased level of support for gender equality efforts (86 per cent), but men felt less strongly, with 60 per cent saying that they felt this way. However, 60 per cent of men is still a large section of the returning migrant population, and the figures across the countries as a whole suggest that these returned migrants collectively could make a strong, potentially game-changing, force for greater gender equality in their countries of origin.30

‘Gendered’ outcomes in households
The first place where it is possible to assess whether or not greater support for gender equality gained through migration translates into better outcomes is within migrants’ own households. One unique way in which DotM aims to do this is by asking households about the distribution among household members of tasks that do not earn an income. It might be expected that in households with returned migrants, and potentially other kinds of exposure to migration, these tasks might be distributed in a less gender stereotypical way than in other households.

The data make very clear, however, that no substantial changes in habits have taken place. Simply examining the distribution of household tasks between households with migrants and those without shows very little difference between the households in any of the countries. The only country where there is a significant difference in the likelihoods of men doing traditionally male tasks and women doing traditionally female tasks is Macedonia, where households with migrants (absent and returned) see women more likely to spend time doing the traditionally female task of cooking. Evidence over time from Macedonia similarly shows that women in households with migrants have also become more likely than those in households without migrants to spend a large proportion of their time cooking and cleaning compared to five years previously. This is not a good result in terms of demonstrating the influence of the supposedly radically changed attitudes of returned migrants.

Under a more advanced analysis, controlling for the influence of other factors does not paint a much more positive picture. Probit analysis which looks at all the countries except Jamaica together (i.e. Colombia, Georgia, Ghana, Macedonia and Vietnam) suggests that men are more likely to undertake traditionally female tasks in households without migrants than they are in households with absent migrants or returnees (see Table 35 in annex 9 for the results).

Complementary, detailed and more rigorous analysis was conducted by two teams of researchers, those in Georgia and Colombia. Taking Georgia first the researchers there also used a probit model to predict the proportion of household members expected to undertake particular household tasks that are not those traditionally assigned to their gender, based on individual and households level characteristics, should migration not have an influence on the distribution of tasks. They are then able compare the predictions with the actual percentage of each gender undertaking these tasks in households with migrants. Any deviation from the predictions they presume to be linked to migration.31 Tables 36–38 in Annex 9 provide the details of these models and their outcomes.

Looking first at how men’s roles change with migration, the results point to the reverse of what might be expected based on returned migrants’ reported increased commitment to gender equality. Returned male migrants actually only perform ‘female’ tasks (including cooking, cleaning, childcare and laundry) about half as often as comparable men in comparable non-migrant households (8 per cent were predicted to do undertake these tasks, but only 4 per cent actually did). Exposure to migration has precisely the opposite effect on ‘other’ men – that is, not the returned migrants themselves. Other men in returned migrant households are actually a little more likely than predicted to carry out traditionally female tasks (7 per cent do, versus an
expected 6 per cent), which may be because the returned male migrants in those households have reduced their contribution in this regard so significantly. Men in households with absent migrants have a significantly increased likelihood of undertaking ‘female’ tasks – 7 per cent were predicted to do these tasks, and 11 per cent actually did.

Turning to the women, female returned migrants are much more likely than expected to undertake traditionally male tasks (these include gathering firewood and water, repairing the home, attending social occasions and enjoying rest and recreation). 16 per cent of them were predicted to do so, and 25 per cent actually did. Again, perhaps because these women increased their likelihood of undertaking male tasks so much, other women in their returned migrant households reduced their likelihood of undertaking male tasks somewhat (from 13 to 10 per cent). And there is a reduction in the proportion of women doing typically male tasks in households with migrants currently away, with 13 per cent expected to undertake these tasks, and 11 per cent actually doing so.

In Georgia, then, there is no simple relationship between migration and gender roles within the household. Both male and female returned migrants appear quite significantly more likely to undertake more traditionally male tasks than would be expected, based on comparable non-migrants in non-migrant households. Other men and women in their households adjust to this accordingly, doing less typically male tasks. In absent migrant households men are more likely to undertake typically female tasks, but so too are women.

One explanation for these results is that typically female tasks are the more day-to-day tasks around the home, whereas male tasks are more occasional, and some are not tasks at all, but leisure activities. Looking at the result through this lens suggests that in the case of absent migrants, the findings may reflect changing workloads rather than changing roles – with migrants departing there are fewer adults to do the day-to-day tasks around the home, leading everyone to take on more. In the case of returned migrants it may be that the findings reflect changed habits but not roles. This has led, however, to their fellow household members to have to compensate for the returnees.32

In the other case, Colombia, the results (derived from propensity score matching) back up the suggestion that there is no simple relationship between gender roles and migration (see Table 39, Annex 9). Some of the impacts found in Colombia are positive, that is they indicate a move away from traditional gender roles. Specifically, women living in households with migrants are less likely to spend time cleaning. the likelihood of women doing cleaning falls by 8 per cent in households with returned migrants and 6 per cent in those with absent migrants. Similarly, men living in households with migrants are more likely to spend time cooking, though the impact here is only marginal (2 per cent) and the result does not stand when households with absent and returned migrants are examined separately. It is possible however that in both cases the changes may reflect changed habits developed abroad being brought back to Colombia.

On the other hand both men and women living in households with returned migrants are more likely to spend time on childcare (though additional analysis suggests this may be related to the demographic structure of those households rather than migration per se). The Colombian researchers also show that the gendered distribution of a whole range of other activities is apparently not affected by migration. These include the undertaking of home repairs, farming, and the taking of rest and recreation.

**Other social impacts**

Before concluding Chapter 4 the analysis turns to two other social impacts on which DotM has shed new light.

First is the impact migration appears to have on family structures, and in particular whether or not it affects couples’ ability to be able to live and remain together, and also

32. Another potential explanation is that returned migrants are more likely to work than non-migrants in their households, and therefore less likely to do the day-to-day tasks around the home. However evidence above on employment and labour force participation suggests that in the first year back returned migrants are less likely to be in employment than comparable non-migrants, and afterwards only equally as likely, so it seems that this theory is probably not accurate.
the extent to which children are affected by parental absence (deepening the analysis of family dynamics provided in Chapter 3).

Second, we explore the extent to which those affected by migration cite themselves as being supporters of ‘traditional culture’.

**Family structures**

There is concern in many countries that migration separates families. In many cases this is temporary, but it can also cause relationships to break down permanently. There is even greater concern around children who are left behind: it is feared that migration leads to many children being raised without one or even both parents which, depending on the alternative arrangements made for their care, could damage them emotionally or educationally (Hinds *et al.*2006). On the other hand, the section on education earlier in this chapter suggested that in most countries having a parent abroad may in fact have a positive impact on children’s education. For all these reasons it is important to investigate in greater depth.

Evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggested that migration may split up families in a significant number of cases, at least temporarily. DotM research suggests that on average about 50 per cent of absent migrants who have children have left behind a child33 in their country of origin, and the majority (on average about 65 per cent) have children (see Table 3.3); therefore approximately 30–35 per cent of absent migrants appear to leave a child behind.

However, this analysis refers only to situations where household members are left behind – households who migrate in their entirety are missed by the DotM survey. Using a very rough assumption that on average as many households migrate in their entirety as do in part,34 we may be looking at a situation where around 15 per cent of migration involves a parent leaving a child behind. However, the number of cases where (i) both parents leave, (ii) the child is still below the age of 18, and (iii) there are no other adult guardians, are likely to be very substantially smaller still.

But to what extent is migration actually the cause of families’ separations? It could be that they would be separated anyway, for example if the parents split up, or if one parent moved elsewhere in the country for work. Even where rates of separation are higher for migrant households, it could be that migration is not the cause but the symptom – a parent may migrate precisely because their relationship is foundering or they are having difficulties with their children.

Probit analysis enables us to go beyond descriptive statistics and examine more rigorously the links between family structures and migration. Research looking across the countries (Colombia, Georgia, Ghana, Macedonia and Vietnam) suggests that migrants themselves (whether absent or returned) are more likely to be divorced or separated than non-migrants.35 The effect is stronger, interestingly, for female migrants than male migrants (see Table 40 in Annex 9). Turning to households that are affected by migration, rather than looking at the migrants themselves, and the results are similar, with people living in households with either absent or returned migrants more likely to be divorced or separated. Here the effect is particularly strong for men (see Table 41 in Annex 9).

Probit analysis does not allow any insight into causality, however, so it is useful to complement this work with evidence from Colombia, which examines family structures using propensity score matching. These findings suggests that households directly affected by migration (whether through having migrants – either absent or returned – or because they receive remittances) are less likely to have their ‘core family’ living together than other households.36 In the most accurate estimation made, having a migrant in the household (either absent or returned) is associated with a reduced likelihood that the core family not living together (the difference is about 6 per cent), as is receiving remittances (about 10 per cent). However, the results for absent and returned migrant households separately are not significant, suggesting that these results are not as strong as might be desired (Table 42, Annex 9).

The second, perhaps less accurate iteration of the model in Colombia shows similar results, but does have significant results for households with absent migrant and

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33. Here ‘a child’ means any offspring of the parent, rather than someone below the age of 18.

34. The DotM emigration data misses two groups – all households who migrated more than 10 years previously, and households who have migrated in their entirety at any time. As shown in Chapter 3, the DotM emigration group is between 10 and 60 per cent of a country’s total emigrant stock. Some of the remainder (40–90 per cent) will be those who left previously and some will be those who left in the last 10 years with their family. The calculation above assumes that around 30–35 per cent of this group migrated in the last 10 years.

35. Only people aged 20 – 64 are included in this analysis.

36. The ‘core family’ is defined as a household containing both parents (if both are still alive) and at least one child. In other words, core families are not together if the spouses are not living in the same household, or if a parent isn’t living with their child.
households with returned migrants considered separately. Interestingly, this model suggests that the return of migrants to Colombia does not reduce the extent to which core families are living apart. Indeed in this model returned migrant households are marginally more likely to be separated than absent migrant households – they are 10 per cent less likely to have kept the core family together compared to non-migrant households, versus households with absent migrants which are 7 per cent less likely. This suggests that many of the separations induced by migration may not resolve themselves, but may turn into permanent splits. However the extent of families being split by migration – both temporarily and permanently – is not as great as perhaps many expected.

Traditional values
The last impact examined is the extent to which migration affects the importance people assign to ‘tradition’. Of course it is not possible to generalise about what tradition means to each respondent, or in each country, but it is interesting to see the extent to which the very notion of tradition and its importance is supported by those with exposure to migration. This is because in most countries it is possible to draw a line between those who support ‘small c’ conservative values and are hesitant about cultural and social change, and those who class themselves as progressives and broadly welcome the notion of change. Moreover, migration has been suggested to affect attachment to tradition. For example it has been shown how migration (both internal and international) supports ‘tradition’ in Fiji, where it it boosts attachment to the traditional village structure of society (Sofer 1992). It has also been suggested, however, that the effect might work in the other direction, with those exposed to a larger alternative set of ways of living becoming more critical of tradition in their own place of origin.

The evidence from the DotM studies suggests that there is no simple relationship between migration and the perceived importance of tradition. In Georgia, Jamaica and Vietnam only indicative evidence is available, which suggests that migration is likely to be associated with an increased attachment to tradition. A very large 93 per cent of Vietnamese returned migrants say that their experiences abroad made them more protective of traditional ways of life in Vietnam and more than three quarters of Jamaican returned migrants felt the same way about their country. In Georgia results broken down by gender are very interesting, as while both genders tend to cite an increased attachment to tradition, there are significant differences between them. 91 per cent of female and 76 per cent of male returned migrants suggested that as a result of their migration they increasingly felt it is important to protect traditional ways of life in Georgia, of whom 75 per cent of the women and 49 per cent of the men felt this ‘strongly’. The Georgian researchers speculate that women’s stronger support for traditional values may be because women are stronger supporters of keeping the family together – a traditional Georgian value (Tchaidze and Torosayan 2010).37

It is important, however, to go beyond the statements of returned migrants to look at the impact these attitudes have more widely, as, similarly to the gender example, it may be difficult to observe spill-over from individuals’ changed attitudes which then affect others. Evidence from Macedonia and Ghana is most interesting in this regard. Briefly, the most accurate model used by Macedonian researchers (probit with IV) suggests that the heads of households with migrants – either absent or returned – are no more or less likely to support ‘tradition’ than those without exposure to migration (see Table 43 in Annex 9) – with the general trend being towards supporting tradition (78 per cent of all household heads said more needed to be done to protect traditional ways of living).

However, in Ghana exposure to migration is associated with decreased support for tradition. Using PSM, the research finds that households receiving remittances are 12 per cent less likely to think it is important to protect traditional ways of living, which may reflect the positive feeling that those households have about departure from Ghana and life elsewhere because of the flow of money they are receiving as a result. In addition, households with both absent and returned migrants are also less likely to think it important to protect traditional ways of living (29 per cent less likely), though this result feels less reliable as neither households with just absent migrants nor those with just returned migrants have different opinions to the comparator non-migrant household. It

37. Also interesting in Georgia is the extent to which non-migrant men and women say they support traditional ways of living – 83 per cent of men were in agreement that they needed protection, as were 82 per cent of women (47 per cent felt strongly in agreement in each case). If we read the returned migrants’ statements simply as the strength of attachment to traditional values they reveal, it is interesting to see that men who have migrated have lower attachment to traditional values than their non-migrant counterparts while the reverse is so for women.
may simply be, however, that households with both kinds of migrants have on average a higher degree of exposure to migration and to attitudes and lifestyles from elsewhere, which means that they take different views to those whose level of experience of migration is less (see Tables 44 and 45 in Annex 9 for results).

Summary of migration’s impacts on development

The findings presented in this chapter are diverse, nuanced, and can be looked at in a number of different ways. This summary briefly considers some different ways in which the findings can be interpreted, looking at them through three different lenses: comparing the different areas of impact – economic and social; looking at the role of different channels for transmitting effects (remittances, return and so on); and examining impacts at different levels (individual, household, community and national).

Economic vs social development

The first way in which the findings can be thought about is to look across the different developmental areas. What is most striking is that the economic impacts appear to be the most strongly positive. Almost every impact that migration has on economic indicators, whether these are incomes, savings, or business ownership, tend to be positive, and if not positive, neutral. Next most positive are impacts on education and health outcomes, which are still broadly positive, though some negative effects are present too. Effects on gender and wider social indicators follow, with outcomes tending to be more mixed and ambiguous.

The reason that this is particularly important is that the way in which development is conceptualised in this project – using a capabilities-based framework – places particular emphasis on the goals that people have in their own lives – the things that they deem important. The analysis presented earlier into why people migrate showed very clearly that economic motivations are the primary reasons for people choosing to migrate – a result found consistently across countries. As such, it is clear that by improving economic outcomes for individual migrants and their families, migration is delivering development – it is meeting the goals that people set for it. This makes it a powerful and important development tool.

Impact channels

The second way in which the findings can be viewed is to compare the impacts that migration has on the three groups used for analysis – households with a migrant away, those with a returnee, and those in receipt of remittances. Looking at this enables some insight to be made into which ‘channels’ migration’s impacts are working through, as well as to give some idea about the patterns of migration that would be most beneficial for development, and thus where policymakers’ focus may best be directed (for example this might be boosting numbers of households with absent members, trying to encourage return, or increasing remittance flows).

The impacts that are the most consistent and the easiest to understand are those that result from return migration. Where households have return migrants this tends to deliver some modestly positive impacts (for example on business ownership). In some areas where other households affected by migration may observe impacts, those with return migrants do not (for example on savings). Negative impacts too are uncommon, with only one impact which could be interpreted as such – the likelihood that families stay together, with return migration associated with around a 6 per cent drop in the likelihood of two parents and their children living together in Colombia, for example. It is worth noting that a similar effect of a similar magnitude is found for households with absent migrants, suggesting that it is not return per se which creates this phenomenon, but that the return of the migrants does not reduce the family separation that results from absence. Return migration, then, appears broadly positive for the households concerned, though not transformational of any areas of their lives that have been examined in this project.

Moreover, understanding whether this change should be considered positive or negative is difficult, however, without greater understanding of the context in which it is taking place. (For example relationship breakdown may be good in some contexts if migration

38. Please see Box 4.1 for a detailed discussion of which channels of impact we expect are working in each of the three groups of households.
empowers people to leave harmful relationships that prevailing attitudes in the country of origin encourage them to stay in.) These kinds of changes deserve further investigation using qualitative methods in-country.

Looking beyond the household, return migration appears to have a positive impact – and perhaps a more consistent and stronger positive impact than any of the impacts it has at the household level, positively affecting skill stocks and healthcare provision. This suggests that perhaps the major impacts of return migration are felt not at the household level, but within the community.

Turning next to households in receipt of remittances, the effects here also seem fairly clear. The evidence is generally consistent in suggesting that being in receipt of remittances tends to lead to improved outcomes across a range of household indicators (household incomes, spending on health and education, investment in housing and so on). The effects that derive from remittances also tend to be some of the strongest (compared with the effects on households with returned or absent migrants).

There are a few areas where impacts seem to be lacking, or tending towards negative – such as impacts on labour force participation and the health of household members. It is possible however, that these effects are a direct result of the improvements in people’s lives in other areas – so for example because households are richer they have less need to participate in the labour market; or that increases in wealth that result from remittances lead to changing lifestyles, and increased incidence of non-communicable diseases.

It should also be noted that exposure to migration through being a household in receipt of remittances does – like having a returned or absent migrant – appear to shape social behaviour and attitudes. It appears to make families less likely to stay together, and makes people less supportive of traditional ways of living. However, as noted above, interpreting whether these changes should be viewed as adding to or diminishing people’s capabilities is difficult. The direct impacts of remittances on wider community outcomes seem much more negligible, at least in terms of the contribution to health and education systems, despite optimism from some that diasporas can make a serious contribution in this regard. Indirect effects, however, may be significant, to the extent that impacts, for example on savings, have spillover effects.

The impact of having an absent migrant is perhaps most interesting. On the whole the effects for this group are similar as for those in receipt of remittances, but not as strong. This suggests that the combined effects of having a person away – their actual absence, plus the effects of their interactions with the household they have left behind, and the incentive effects they inspire in their household – are not as strong as the pure impacts of remittances (and indeed in some cases may be negative). (While this is true, as a general rule it is not a consistent result across indicators, so for example households with absent migrants appear at least in some cases to spend more on education than those in receipt of remittances.) This finding implies that it is remittances that are the strongest and most reliable conveyor of positive impacts of migration on households. Such a claim, however, cannot be proven simply by this piece of research, which has to rely somewhat on inference to draw this conclusion, and there is much scope for further investigation of the relative importance of different channels in affecting households.

Looking finally to the effects of absent migrants on communities and wider society, it is more difficult to establish what impact migration is having directly. However, the best existing evidence on if and where the incentive effects created by people living abroad boost people’s levels of skills and draw them towards particular professions (such as healthcare) suggests that the effects can be very strong in places, while also varying substantially across countries. In the countries studied for this project, Jamaica may justifiably have the greatest concerns about the impact of emigration on the nation as a whole, whereas other countries, particularly Georgia and Vietnam, may be benefiting in terms of stocks of skills and healthcare provision, and might do even better with higher levels of emigration. Through indirect effects too, it seems that currently absent migrants are probably impacting positively on a range of household behaviours, which then spill over and affect others in the community.
As such, the effects on a community of having absent migrants appears, at least according to the evidence presented here, mixed depending on the circumstances of the country in question, but in many cases much more positive than is often depicted.

Individuals versus households versus communities
A key concern of policymakers is to know whether or not migration has classic ‘externality’ effects – or if, in other words, it seems like a good choice for the individuals who engage with it, but has wider impacts for others that are not taken into account by the people who make the decision to migrate. This, for example, drives concern about brain drain that the skilled people who are leaving benefit on average from that decision, but that the impacts for those left behind are problematic, particularly if the migrants were previously performing vital roles such as in healthcare.

The analysis presented here focuses most directly on household level impacts, which means it cannot give a comprehensive assessment of the scope of impacts at different ‘levels’ but it does nonetheless provide some interesting insights, which we summarise briefly below.

Effects at all levels – on the migrant themselves, the households they have relationships with, and their wider communities and society – appear broadly positive (though there is some variation across countries and indicators). As such, it is not clear that externality effects are of as great a concern as has been expected. While the existence of some of the expected negative externalities has been supported by this research, in other cases they are not as problematic as had been thought, and in some cases DotM has shone a light on positive externalities that had previously been either overlooked or neglected altogether. These include the extent to which migration affects many more households than expected in broadly positive ways via the sending of remittances: these spread much more widely through society than has previously been recognised, far beyond the households that migrants were previously members of. When added to the spillovers that result from household level impacts (for example on savings or business ownership), this research does not provide much support for the hypothesis that migrants benefit from migration to the detriment of others. Rather, the developmental impacts that migration has are broadly, though not uniformly, positive across different levels of society.
5. What can policymakers do?

This chapter is divided into two sections. First, we draw out the big-picture policy messages that emerge from the DotM project, presenting three principles we believe all policymakers should base policy around. Second, we take a more detailed look at specific policy tools, because while the report’s findings have some big-picture implications, they also show a remarkable degree of nuance in how migration affects development. This in turn suggests a role for a broad range of policies to shape and enhance the process of migration and development, to increase its development benefits and reduce its costs.

Three principles for policy
This research has three fundamental messages that all policymakers need to take on board if migration is to reach its development potential. Were all these three planks to be accepted by all key players in the process, this would provide a solid foundation upon which specific, well-designed policy interventions could be built.

(i) Migration is generally good for development
The major, overarching conclusion of this research is that migration is good for development. On average it improves migrants’ lives, it improves their families’ lives, and in most cases it improves the lives of the other people living in their communities and countries of origin through positive spillover effects. More specifically, the research suggests that most developing countries would benefit from high levels of migration, with large numbers of migrants remitting, strong contacts between migrants and the people and places they leave behind, and significant numbers of people returning.

Just as important as the fact that migration improves people’s lives is the finding that it improves them most dramatically in the ways that matter to them. The framework developed for this project (based on the capabilities approach) makes clear that people’s own development goals – the ambitions they themselves have identified and hold dear – should be at the centre of development. Answers to questions about why people migrate reveal that economic goals – improving job prospects, pay, and being able to remit – are the major hopes held by migrants across most countries. And the findings of this research suggest that it is in the economic arena that the most dramatic improvements in outcomes occur.

The finding that migration is good for development is not new – many research projects have approached this question from various different angles and often come up with the same conclusion. However, policymakers in some developed and developing countries alike have resisted it – for political reasons and/or because they are concerned about specific effects (such as those that might result from brain drain). Our research does not suggest that there are no reasons to be concerned. Migration can have negative impacts in some areas in some countries (for example on skills stocks or on health). However, when these negative impacts are set in a wider context, as we have tried to do in this project, it is clear that migration is generally a force for good in development with some negative impacts to be addressed by policy, rather than a force for harm that policymakers should be aiming to limit where possible.

(ii) Migration is not a development strategy
While migration may be a force for good in development, nothing in the findings of this project suggests that migration is transformational at the societal level, or that it can be relied on to act alone as a national strategy for development. While migration is improving many outcomes for people in developing countries, these changes tend to be incremental. Indeed, poor economic opportunities continue to be drivers of migration even in places that have had many decades or even centuries of previous emigration.
The fact that people are migrating in order to achieve their goals (and are not being attracted back by opportunities at ‘home’) should instead be taken as a reflection of the fact that people are struggling to achieve their aims and improve their lives in their country of origin, and that more needs to be done to promote sustainable national development. This is not news – policymakers do not need high levels of migration to remind them of the need for development – but it is important, because there is a danger that under some circumstances migration and its benefits could be used as a reason for development to be pursued with less urgency. In many countries, the evidence suggests that migration should be seen as another indicator that successful long-term development strategies must be found.

(iii) Migration is not a ‘policy variable’

One of the most striking findings, which has come up again and again in this research, is that migration is not a policy variable. It is not something that policymakers can switch on or off or that they can design: rather, migration patterns are the result of two incredibly powerful forces.

First, migration is part of globalisation. The increasing interlinkages and interdependence that are being built between countries through globalisation both encompass and create migration. Policymakers are aware that they can facilitate or mould other aspects of globalisation, but they are also aware that it is a process that is proceeding independently of them too. This same awareness must be brought to discussions of migration, which at present is all too commonly portrayed as something governments should ‘get a grip on’, or ‘manage better’.

Second, perhaps more so than any other element of globalisation, migration is also a social phenomenon. This means that shaping migration is different to shaping trade or financial flows. Migration’s impacts do not just arise because an economic factor of production has been moved from one place to another; the movement of people also has very profound and immediate social implications. It can potentially change people’s identities, their social relationships and the nature of their obligations, all of which in turn have development implications.

This makes it more difficult to ‘design’ particular development outcomes through policy for two reasons. Firstly, it makes it more complex – the variety of factors involved in determining migration’s outcomes makes policy planning in this area particularly challenging. And secondly, because migrating involves changing people’s social lives as well as their economic circumstances, it is a particularly profound decision for people to make. As such, when people decide migration is worthwhile, it is very hard to deter them from moving, even if policymakers would prefer that they did not.

Our research illustrates this point several times, but no more powerfully than through the finding that when short-term migration (trips of less than a year) is included, emigration from Jamaica doubles, and this despite the fact that official channels for Jamaican migrants to move on a short-term basis for work are fairly circumscribed (the majority of this movement is for work).

The powerful motivating factors behind migration and its complexity mean that the starting point for policy interventions must not be ‘limiting migration’ or any other simple goal that goes against what we know about why people move and what they get out of it. Policies that acknowledge and even facilitate people’s migration ambitions are likely to be more effective than those that work against them.

We do not claim these are new insights. Much previous research in this area has come to similar conclusions. We stress them here nonetheless for two reasons. First, these findings come from a project that has looked at a range of impacts and a range of countries. It matters that the same results emerge from a rigorous comparative analysis. Second, these messages are not yet reflected in policy in many countries, meaning that there is still a need to emphasise their importance to policymakers.

“In many countries, the evidence suggests that migration should be seen as another indicator that successful long-term development strategies must be found”
What affects migration’s development impacts?

With this vision of migration and development, and policymakers’ potential role within it in place, it is possible to move on to examine specific policy measures that governments could put in place to promote better development outcomes. This section draws upon everything that has been learnt about the nature of migration and its impacts through the research thus far to consider and evaluate potential policies. The approach taken to achieve this (following Chappell and Glennie 2009) is based around altering the whole process of migration and development. In this view, migration’s development impacts are seen as resulting from a process that occurs over time (see Figure 5.1 for a simplified depiction of this process).

Figure 5.1: The migration and development process

Figure 5.1 will be familiar to researchers and policymakers working in the field of migration and development. It shows the cyclical nature of migration and development, demonstrating how migration is determined – at least in part – by development circumstances in the originating country. It also shows that the development outcomes of migration can then directly and indirectly affect future migration flows.

However, the main purpose of including this diagram is to show the migration and development process as it takes place over time and space, and to help to clarify how a range of micro and macro factors influence that process, and therefore migration’s impacts. The hope is that thinking in this way enables the policymaker to see, in a more systematic way, all the points at which policy might be able to exert influence. This should result in a wider and more rigorously considered set of potential policy tools.

Figure 5.1 breaks down the migration and development process into three parts:

- The actual process of movement (prompted by the determinants of migration, including the development circumstances experienced by the person in question)
- The conditions experienced by the migrant in the country of destination
· The outcomes of migration (including impacts on the migrant themselves, and on the development of the migrant’s originating country. These help to form the determinants of migration, thereby returning to the first point in the cyclical process).

What this means in practice is that, starting from the process of movement and the question of whether or not a given person migrates, it is clear that this is affected by the development circumstances of the person in question, which are partially formed by the effects of previous acts of migration by that person themselves or by others in their household, community or country. Depending on their capabilities, such as financial resources, skills and also the situation in which they find themselves (for example, conflict or environmental degradation or disaster) the individual, in consultation with others, makes a decision regarding whether or not to move. They also decide the process of that movement – where to move to, how to fund the movement, how to make the journey and so on. This may be an initial movement out of their country of origin, a movement between countries of destination or the decision to return back to their country of birth.

So given that a migrant moves, and moves to a particular location, the next stage in the process is the conditions he or she experiences there. These include the terms of entry experienced, with distinctions between migrants (based for example on country of citizenship and skill sets) determining whether or not someone is allowed to enter a country legally, for how long they are permitted to stay, as well as what they are permitted to do once in the country. An important way in which these shape the conditions experienced by the migrant is by determining the legality of their actions. In particular, if some aspect of their movement is not legal, then the migrant’s possibilities are restricted – they may have to remain more ‘in the shadows’, take less skilled work, have less recourse to the law should a crime be committed against them and so on (for example see United Nations Development Programme 2009).

As well as entry conditions, however, the conditions of integration experienced by the migrant are also vital. Here we interpret ‘integration’ widely, along the lines of the British Council-sponsored ‘integration index’ (Niessen et al 2007) which includes access to nationality, anti-discrimination, family reunion, labour market access, long-term residence and political participation as relevant. These ‘integration conditions’ experienced by the migrant work in a similar way to the entry conditions in determining what kind of life the migrant is able to lead in their country of destination. Are they able to use and develop their skills or not? Are they able to earn a good wage or not? Are they able to share their ideas and ways of living and learn new ones from their host community? This is vital because it determines the outcomes of migration.

The third part of the migration and development process is the outcome of movement. The sum of the migrant’s experiences thus far will determine how migration affects her or him – which matters in itself in any definition of migration based on capabilities, as emphasised previously – and this in turn affects the ways in which they interact with their country of origin. Together these outcomes of migration influence development circumstances in the originating country. As Figure 5.1 shows, this in turn helps to determine the existence, extent and nature of the next round of migration.

So the key question is what makes impacts better or worse? What changes to movement itself, the conditions experienced and the outcomes of migration are important in altering migration’s impacts? If we can identify these then we can identify what sorts of policies might be able to alter these aspects of the process most effectively to promote development. This section adds the substantial new information generated by this research to what is already known to analyse this, identifying four groups of factors that are important in affecting the migration and development process. These are:

1. The migrant’s own characteristics and activities
2. The nature of the migration taking place
3. The characteristics and policies of the origin country
4. The characteristics and policies of the recipient country.
Each of these is discussed below, and then the main findings are summarised in a table at the end of this section.

The migrant’s own characteristics and activities
DotM research points to three aspects of the migrant’s own characteristics and activities that are potentially important in shaping migration’s development impacts, through altering movements themselves, the conditions migrants experience, and the outcomes of their movement.

(a) **Personal characteristics.** Migrants’ personal characteristics – their gender, age, education and so on – are much discussed as potentially important in influencing their migration and its development potential. And it seems clear from this research that these factors are influential in a number of ways.

First, it seems clear that migrants’ characteristics, particularly their income and educational achievement, shape where they can afford to move to and where they are allowed to go. Broadly, the wealthier and more highly educated a migrant is, the more in demand they are from countries and employers across the globe. They are also more likely to have the resources required to fund emigration. Gender may sometimes be important too, with constraints related to traditional ideas of gender roles sometimes stopping women from moving – whether those ideas are in the country of origin (so families discourage their female members from moving), or in the country of destination (with one gender or the other in demand for particular kinds of work – such as care work or construction).

The evidence suggests that such constraints stop some people from moving at all, while others may move but find themselves in contravention of regulations in the country they have moved to. For example, the UK’s migration for work system is closed to low-skilled migrants from outside the European Union (Chappell and Mulley 2010). Should a migrant from somewhere like Ghana migrate to the UK they would thus find themselves living and/or working without permission. This means that as well as affecting whether or not people move in the first place, the interaction between a migrant’s characteristics and migration regulations can determine someone’s experiences as a migrant, with irregularity in particular associated with many difficulties and restrictions (United Nations Development Programme 2009).

However, while personal characteristics clearly matter in this way, it is quite striking the degree to which one cannot predict any particular set of outcomes based on migrants’ personal characteristics. The research found that there are no consistent outcomes regarding whether men or women or highly or less educated people remit more, for example. Nor are there clear patterns as to whether men or women gain more personally from the experience of migration, with both tending to report similar levels of improvements in their standards of living. In fact, throughout the report it has proved very difficult to generalise in any way about migration’s impacts based on migrants’ own personal characteristics.

In some ways this is not surprising. Experiences of migration are diverse and complex enough that simple demographic or social characteristics should not be expected to have too much purchase on migration’s outcomes. But the findings should still be emphasised because many countries have discussed trying to encourage particular segments of their populations to migrate in order to gain from the supposedly better impacts that will result from their movement. (For example, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Pakistan have targeted more skilled people as migrants [International Organisation for Migration 2005, Orozco and Ferro 2008a, 2008b].) These results suggest that governments may be better off targeting their efforts at other points in the migration and development process.

(b) **Migrants’ social networks and ties.** This research seems to indicate that the second aspect of migrants’ own characteristics that influences the migration and development process is their social networks, and social and cultural ties. DotM research suggests that the location of a migrant’s family in particular, and also the
migrant’s levels of engagement with their place of origin are important in shaping
the migration and development process.

First, the evidence suggests that migrants’ social networks are very powerful in
shaping movement itself. The findings here show that family (alongside study) is the
second most important reason why people migrate (after economic motivations). This
fits with a wider literature about the motivations behind and the process that
facilitates migration, which stresses the crucial role social networks play in migrants’
decision-making (Chappell et al 2009, Vertovec 2002, Sassen 1998). Moreover, ties of
family relations and of identity are even more important in determining whether
people return to their country of origin or not. Family is the main reason why people
do so, with a feeling of belonging among the second tier of motivations.

Social network and social and cultural ties are also very important in determining
migration’s outcomes. The evidence suggests that people remit more if they have left
close family members behind, and the more frequent their contact with their families,
the more they remit. This fits with the findings in previous research. For example many
Caribbean migrants have a ‘return ideology’, meaning that because of their attachment
to their place and culture of origin they tell themselves they will return one day. In
some cases they do, and in some they don’t, but regardless of the future patterns of
movement this ideology has been shown to result in strong ties with many people and
institutions left behind, and therefore strong interactions (Conway and Potter 2007). In
some cases this may involve migrants trying to ‘earn’ the future ‘right’ to return by
assisting in the present. In some contexts if migrants have not been seen to have
contributed to their family and community while abroad then their communities may
be hostile towards them if they try to return (Heath 2009).

This raises two important considerations for policy. First, a policy dilemma. If family
separation is good for remittances, and remittances are good (as was shown in
Chapter 4) for development in the country of origin, it may be that origin–country
governments have mixed feelings about families migrating together and about
family reunion. There may appear to be a trade-off between the families’ own well-
being and the development and the well-being of the country they come from.

In the view of this report it is vital that the well-being of migrants and their families
is not sacrificed for the wider well-being of people remaining in the country of
origin. Migrants and their families are the ones who take the risks in migrating. As
such their needs and priorities need to be put front and centre in any migration
policies. Moreover, migrants are not just a resource to be deployed in the most
effective way possible for the countries they were born in, but people with rights to
seek out livelihoods and to a family life. The key to resolving the trade-off may then
be to try to create very strong links between a country of origin and a migrant even
when their family has migrated with them. It may be that policymakers want to build
more on ties of identity and belonging and less on ties of family. This is not to say,
however, that this is an easy approach, and any policies put in place to achieve it
would need careful thinking through and rigorous impact assessment to ensure that
they are really contributing to strengthening development impacts.

Second, it makes clear that people are happiest sending money to places and people
they have a real link to, which they have some information about, and where they
can hold its recipients accountable for its usage. This may seem obvious, but it is
important to point out, as many countries are considering or already establishing
schemes to try to pool remittances, or to get migrants to contribute to national
development projects. In light of the evidence presented here these schemes need
to be very carefully considered, because at present many are not structured to
involve stringent oversight by migrants, or designed to be tightly based on their ties
and interests. We would venture that under these circumstances these schemes have
little chance of success.

(c) Planning. The last specific element of migrants’ own characteristics and actions that
seems to be important in shaping the migration and development process is the
extent to which migration is actively planned. The more migration is able to be
planned, the better this appears to be in terms of outcomes. Examples of this include the findings that if migrants arrange their job in advance of migrating they remit more; if return is planned then migrants earn more once they are back in their country of origin; and that if migrants are able to arrange alternative childcare arrangements for any children they leave behind, the effects of migration on those children appear to be more positive.

While this finding may at first seem to have little to do with policy there are at least two ways in which it is relevant for policymakers.

First, a number of countries provide pre-departure training to migrants. This is clearly very beneficial, enabling migrants both to plan for what they will encounter abroad and to think about the situation they will leave behind. DotM research suggests that such training should be provided to as many groups as possible.

However, while formal training of this kind is clearly useful, the research has made clear that much migration does not come onto the radar of policymakers but is rather arranged business to business or by individuals. It may therefore be useful to design alternative initiatives to target at this wider group of migrants. For example, the British government is currently running a substantial ‘know before you go’ campaign, which encourages travellers and migrants of all kinds leaving the UK to do research about where they are going in advance, and also to prepare (for example, to arrange insurance) in case they encounter problems. The government is placing advertisements and information where travellers and migrants might encounter it, from travel agents and airlines to public places like train stations.

Similarly, in Georgia a group of organisations led by the IOM has established a website, www.informedmigration.ge, which aims to serve as a ‘one-stop shop’ for would-be migrants, providing comprehensive up-to-date information on safe migration opportunities as well as information about the dangers of human trafficking. As well as providing this information and links to further details, the site informs migrants about free courses that can be attended on safe migration and provides a ‘virtual consultation’ email address for people with queries.

This seems to be an area where much innovation is currently taking place, and where countries of origin and departure may have some shared interests, presenting a good opportunity for collaboration and joint working. However, there appears to have been relatively little study of how effective such information campaigns are, and how to improve their effectiveness. Therefore as well as being an area in which it may be worth investing more effort, it may also be one where more policy impact assessment is required.

Second, sometimes the reasons that migrants do not plan is not because the migrant chooses not to, but because policymakers do not allow them to. For example, evidence presented to DotM suggested that when, at the turn of the millennium, Georgian migrants were unexpectedly forced to come back from Russia because of its economic crisis and the political difficulties between the two countries, the migrants who returned earned less than comparable returning migrants who came back at other times of their own volition. The importance of this kind of voluntariness in maximising migration’s development impacts has also been stressed in previous work (Heath 2009). However, policy can sometimes force migrants to act quickly and sometimes against their will. Policymakers should be cautious about these sorts of sudden policy changes – the evidence is that they are bad for development.

The nature of migration

While migrants’ own characteristics may be less significant in determining migration’s outcomes than might perhaps have been expected, this research suggests that the nature of the migration – particularly the reasons for which people move and how long they move for – is central.\(^{42}\)

(a) Purpose of migration. First, and unsurprisingly, it appears that the reason behind the decision to move matters. The implications here are quite intuitive. If someone

\(^{42}\) Where they go to also matters: the nature of the destination country is discussed in detail below.
migrates for study, for example, we see that they tend to be away for a shorter period, and are less likely to start a business on return (indicating that study moved them towards professional, rather than entrepreneurial, goals).

The implication of this finding is interesting. If people’s reason for leaving matters, the value of an approach that advocates migration for migration’s sake as a policy goal has to be questioned. While there may be a temptation for some to suggest that getting people across borders is what matters, these findings suggest that strategies should be more nuanced, as what people go to achieve affects the impacts of their movement.

(b) Duration of migration. The research makes some quite surprising findings about the length of time a migrant spends away. Where the duration of migration has been discussed in previous research, it has often been suggested that shorter durations are better for development. This seems to be for one of two reasons. Firstly, longer stays are often associated with the migrants moving their family to the country of destination (as migrants are more likely to gain citizenship and other rights over time, enabling them to bring their families), which reduces migrant's interactions with their country of origin. The other explanation is that longer stays reduce the likelihood that the migrant ever returns (as they become more attached to the society they have joined), denying the range of positive development impacts that return appears to bring.

However, this research enables a greater degree of nuanced analysis than may previously have been possible. It suggests that while previous assumptions about family location and return do not appear to be incorrect, these are not the only issues that should be examined when looking at the duration of migration. The evidence presented here suggests that where migrants stay away for longer periods but do not move all their close family members away and do eventually return, longer stays may have stronger development impacts than shorter ones. For example, remittances do not reach their peak until the migrant has been away for at least several years, and in some countries they continue to rise over time for at least the first 10 years. Similarly, where migrants are away longer they are more likely to gain skills and qualifications, adding to a country’s skill stock if they return.

This suggests that policy needs to distinguish carefully between the duration of stay and other aspects of the nature of migration. Where migrants retain strong ties, including family ties in the country of origin and do return, longer stays may actually be more beneficial for the country of origin. The task is to see if it is possible to encourage longer stays that do not involve weakened ties and lower likelihoods of coming back.

Characteristics and policies of the country of origin
A large range of characteristics of the country of origin appear to affect the migration and development process, and can be viewed by policymakers as potential levers to maximise migration’s developmental benefits. These include the following:

(a) Economic climate. The evidence suggests that economic conditions are vital in a number of respects. Firstly, they are the most important factors in shaping whether or not migrants decide to move in the first place – much more so than any other motivators such as family, study or safety. Second, economic conditions influence migration’s outcomes by shaping remittances, as well as the options available to migrants who return.

DotM findings suggest that the economic climate (and financial regulations in particular) appears to shape how migrants send remittances. Where formal financial institutions are more open, more migrants remit through those routes. To the extent that formal remittances are good for development (for example expanding the banking sector and promoting lending and investment [Gupta et al 2007]), this improves development outcomes.

The economic climate influences too the likelihood of returned migrants starting businesses, as well as returnees’ reintegration into the labour market. Evidence
presented here suggests that labour market reintegration can take some time, and the economic context which returnees enter – especially labour market conditions – seems likely to be important in determining just how long. To get the most out of returned migrants policymakers need to create an enabling business environment and labour markets that recognise the skills and experiences migrants have gained abroad.

However, it should be noted that there is little evidence that migrants return to actively pursue economic opportunities, or that improvements to the economic climate would encourage people to come back – at least for the range of countries studied here. Few people reported returning for economic opportunity in any of the countries, and there appears to be no relationship between a country’s economic performance and return. Ghana and Macedonia have the highest rates of return, and yet they have very little to mark them out from the other countries in the sample – they are neither the richest, nor the fastest growing, nor the easiest in which to do business (Ghana ranks at 92 out of 183 countries on the World Bank’s Doing Business index, second worst of the DotM case study countries, and Macedonia 32, second best [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2009]).

Of course, many factors determine return rates, and so not seeing any direct correlation between the two is not that surprising. Yet it is still important to highlight, as some policy discussion appears to imply that improvements in the economic environment will pay dividends in terms of attracting large numbers of people back, and the evidence presented here suggests that it is not so simple.

(b) Culture of migration. It is not only the economic climate that shapes movement. This research provides some support to the theories, much discussed elsewhere, that cultures of migration develop that perpetuate themselves (Elrick 2005), becoming built into livelihood strategies and cultures. In this research for example it was shown that Macedonia has the most heavily gendered migration flows, with men making up more than three quarters of Macedonia’s absent migrants. It seems likely that, as well as being the result of current factors (such as the nature of the labour demand that Macedonian migrants are responding to), this may also be influenced by the history of solo male migration (known as ‘Pechalbarstvo’) which is very much ingrained into Macedonian culture (Nikolovski et al 2009).

(c) Structures of social support and obligation. Patterns of social support and obligation are important in shaping the migration and development process because they affect how migrants interact with their country of origin, and how the people at the place of origin respond to migration. The importance of this is shown most clearly by the patterns of remittances observed in the DotM data, which are sent far beyond the household of origin to the wider family and even to friends. This appears to reflect the existing patterns of obligation and identity in the countries concerned, with for example extended families or village membership playing an important role in people’s lives. It is also important, however, in determining how communities respond to a migrant’s absence, for example how they care for children left behind. Where societies have structures, such as extended family networks, that allow them to manage disruptions to family life the effects on the child will be much improved (Bryant 2005).

This means policymakers must not just pick policy options off the shelf, or expect very particular outcomes to result in their own context simply because they have come to pass elsewhere. The general positive impacts that migration has on development do seem clear when looking at the diverse range of countries studied here. However, understanding quite how scenarios will play out in a particular place, and designing effective policy responses clearly requires careful consideration of the national context, and in particular the structures of social support and obligation.

Each of these aspects of the country of origin are to some degree under the control of policymakers, especially the economic climate, but each will also take some time to change as they are not policy variables in themselves, but complex structures that are the result of many influences. There are also, however, some more discreet policy issues
and variables that can be altered much more simply by policymakers and that appear to have important effects on the migration and development process.

(d) Policies around migration (emigration and return). The first policy area that seems important for country of origin governments to get ‘right’ is emigration. This may seem a rather marginal area as few governments have policies on emigration per se (and emigration is viewed as a human right, even if immigration is not [Pecoud and de–Guchteneire 2006]), but a number of country of origin policies are important in shaping emigration. This includes policies such as bilateral labour migration agreements and policies and approaches around tackling human trafficking. These policies either facilitate or limit migration, as well as affecting whether migrants are afforded certain standards of protection and have their human rights respected or not.

This research shows that bilateral labour migration agreements and similar policies are important, helping migration to deliver development benefits when they are effective. For example, in Vietnam the government has targeted recruitment for labour migration in certain places, focusing on rural areas in particular, and this appears to have been successful in opening up migration opportunities to poorer households. Conversely, in the absence of good emigration policy migration’s contributions to development can be much diminished, or it can even cause negative outcomes. For example, the Vietnamese research also suggests that poor enforcement of the activities of labour recruitment agencies has led to people paying very large sums of money to be able to migrate, which has increased debts and reduced migrants’ ability to improve their families’ lives (Dang et al 2010).

The key goal overall appears to be to try to maximise as far as possible both people’s opportunities to move and the rights they are accorded. These two goals have often been thought to be contradictory, as it has been suggested that countries are more likely to accept large numbers of migrants if they are not required to accord them a full set of rights. However, new research suggests that the expected ‘trade off’ between numbers and rights may not exist in reality (Cummins and Rodriguez 2009). That research finds that there appears to be no link, on the whole, between the number of migrants a country hosts and its approach towards migrants’ rights. Indeed, it suggests that if there is a relationship, it may be that countries with more migrants afford those migrants higher levels of protection, rather than the other way around. The implication for countries of origin is that they should pursue – as far as possible – emigration strategies that push for access for their migrants abroad and respect for those people’s rights, and not be deterred by the notion that one must necessarily be traded off against the other.

In addition to policies that explicitly shape and facilitate emigration, there are policies that seem to do so implicitly. These policies have been discussed at various points in the report, and include most prominently trade policies, policies on regional integration and other ‘political’ policies, including past histories of colonialism. As this research has made clear, where two countries have important economic and political links, they become more integrated, and one natural corollary of integration is migration. Thus where policymakers seek expanded migration (or indeed diminished migration) they must be aware of the long-term potential of regional integration, trade and other forms of policies that build links between countries to promote this. Entering regional integration agreements or building trade relationships with a country look like good long-term strategies for gaining enhanced migration opportunities.

Turning to return, it is notable in this research that ‘return’ policies play very little role in actually promoting return in the countries studied. Almost no migrants in any of the countries said they came back because of policies targeted at potential returnees. This fits with the wider literature on return (Black et al 2004, Thiel and Gillan 2010) which stresses that return policies are marginal to most migrants’ return decisions. As a result, this report strongly recommends that policymakers in countries of origin very carefully assess the extent to which it is worthwhile putting resources into policies reaching out to the diaspora in a bid to promote return. In circumstances where
development resources are often scarce, it is important to direct them towards activities that are known to have development-promoting effects.

(e) Protection policies. The second category of specific policies that seem important in influencing migration’s development impacts are policies around protection. While migrants are abroad these are the most powerful tools that countries of origin have to control the conditions that they are subject to. A number of countries, notably Mexico and the Philippines, have placed significant emphasis on protection and there is much that can be learnt from their experiences (Agunias 2008). If migrants can be protected this obviously improves their own capabilities vastly, and it also should improve their earning power, increasing the likelihood that they can gain qualifications and so on, all of which, as shown here, improve the outcomes of their migration for others.

(f) Policies promoting transfers and interaction. As well as assisting migrants to move abroad and attempting to protect them while they are there, countries of origin can also enhance the effects of the migration and development process by putting in place appropriate policies around transfers.

It is vital that countries of origin make it as easy as possible for migrants to transfer back the things they have gained abroad – whether that is income they are sending back as remittances, or ideas or knowledge, or any other kind of asset. As well as delivering the benefits that those transfers are associated with (such as increased spending on education or health, as set out in Chapter 4), enhanced interactions between the migrants and communities in their country of origin strengthen the migrants’ ties to the place they have come from, tying them into a pattern of future engagement.

The sorts of specific responses that governments could make to facilitate transfers are very broad, and include positive actions to promote transfers and interactions as well as actions that simply eliminate barriers. Measures to simplify financial regulations to make sending remittances quicker and cheaper, tax incentives for investing, and bonds specifically targeted at non-resident nationals would fall into the former group (the latter two are initiatives recently taken up in India). Governments might also organise investment forums targeted at their country’s diaspora (as for example the Tanzanian government did in the UK in 2008). Barriers that countries can eliminate include the permitting of dual nationalities so that migrants who take up the nationality of their destination country are not forced to cut ties with their place of origin (making it more difficult for them to return), or rules that bar citizens living abroad from doing certain things, like owning land or voting. For example in 2003 the Indian government removed restrictions on Indians living abroad from purchasing property in India.

While the range of potential measures in this regard is very broad, they must all be voluntary. Compulsory remittances, for example, as some countries have attempted to implement, go against a capabilities-based notion of development, which values freedom of the individual to make their own choices.

(g) Government responsiveness. Finally, it is also important to emphasise that if countries of origin wish to shape migration’s development impacts, a key variable under their control is their general level of responsiveness to the problems and issues facing their country. It is our contention that if a government is already aware of and responsive to the development challenges their country is facing, then the extra challenges that are sometimes introduced by migration can often be addressed simply by adjusting existing policies.

In this view, where migration has negative impacts (for example, it sometimes appears to have negative effects on health sector staffing, or on children’s care) the appropriate response is not to try to stop migration (which, as well as being impossible would be self-defeating, given migration’s overall positive contributions to development). A better approach would be to focus on the issue of concern – whether that is healthcare or childcare – and adjust existing strategies in light of the new concern (migration). After all, migration is only one of a range of factors that
adds to any larger problem or challenge. There is no need, in most cases, to focus on altering migration itself, or even to design a brand new ‘migration and health’ strategy (for example). Instead government would examine all the factors that prevent the health sector from providing adequate healthcare, which would cover everything from finances to access to staffing. Migration would then be seen as one of the issues (alongside internal migration and movement into the private sector and out of health altogether) which make staffing difficult. This involves full mainstreaming of migration into existing national development strategies.

For this to be successful, however, governments must be aware of the problems facing their people, and be responsive to them. Thus one of the most effective actions that governments could potentially undertake to get the best results out of migration would be to build up their capacity to identify – through improved data on development trends and on migration – the development challenges their country faces, as well as their capacity to respond.

Characteristics and policies of the country of destination
The last set of factors that affect the migration and development process are the characteristics and policies of the country of destination. As with countries of origin, there is much that countries of destination can do to enhance migration’s development contributions, as described below.

(a) Economic climate. It is clear that, like in countries of origin, the economic climate in countries of destination is key in shaping the migration and development process.

Firstly, the economic climate at destination affects how many migrants want to move there. Generally the richer a country is, the more attractive it is to migrants. This was demonstrated by the emphasis placed on economic criteria in the explanations given for why migrants move, as well as the extent to which DotM migrants moved to a small group of very rich destination countries, such as the USA, Canada and the nations of Western Europe.

However, migration is not determined only by raw income levels, though undoubtedly these matter. Specifics that determine how easy it is for migrants to access that wealth are very important. In this sense countries are particularly attractive if they have relatively deregulated labour markets (which makes finding formal work easier), a good system for recognising the validity of qualifications gained elsewhere (allowing migrants to work in jobs that reflect their skill levels) and a thriving market for irregular work (which makes irregularity less difficult). The nature of labour demand in the countries of destination also matters. This is demonstrated, for example, by the gendered nature of emigration patterns observed in Vietnam and Georgia. These appear to be determined at least in part by the nature of the labour demand in the countries migrants move to.

Clearly, then, the economic climate in countries of origin is critical in determining emigration. However, the economic climate in the country of destination also appears to affect return patterns. Of the countries studied here, Ghanaian migrants generally move to the poorest destination countries (other countries in West Africa). Also, Ghana has the highest return rates of any of the countries studied, as well as the highest proportion of returnees saying they came back because they were not happy with their life abroad. Economic success appears to attract and keep people, and a lack of it is more likely to make people dissatisfied and see them return.

Turning to the effect of the economic circumstances on migration’s outcomes, their influence here is on the whole less clear. The one exception is outcomes for the migrants themselves, which are clearly enhanced by a more successful and open economic environment (which for example is suggested by the statistic provided above about Ghanaian migrants’ greater levels of unhappiness in relation to migrants from other countries, who tended to move to richer places).

Turning to how it influences migration’s outcomes for households, the existing literature is divided. Some suggests that the ‘better’ the environment migrants enter, the better this is for development outcomes in the country of origin, because
migrants do better themselves and therefore interact more positively with people remaining in their country of origin (Chappell and Glennie 2009). Other evidence suggests, however, that should the environment migrants enter present many opportunities, enabling them to integrate successfully, their communication with the country of origin might be less, damaging the potential for development-promoting interactions (Faini 2003).

Though not able to provide any conclusive evidence on this question, the DotM research does give one interesting insight. The data show that almost all absent migrants – regardless of their economic success or otherwise in the country of destination – continue to interact regularly with the households they came from in the country of origin. This suggests that economic integration does not necessarily come at the expense of connections and contributions in the country of origin.  

(b) Migration policies. Turning to specific policy areas that appear important, clearly policies around migration are a vital part of the influence that countries of destination can have, affecting the process of movement itself.

The most obvious of these is policies on how many people are able to migrate. We recommend that in order to enhance migration’s development impacts, countries of destination should open up more formal migration opportunities for people from developing countries. It is important to note that almost all countries in the world are countries of destination to some extent, and so this has relevance to most countries, although it is particularly important for the major developed economies that are so attractive to migrants and that have the sorts of environments where migrants can be most successful. This opening up of opportunities would enable a larger group of people to directly experience the positive developmental effects that migration can bring, as well as improving the lives of others through indirect spillover effects.

The concern of course is that some migrants’ departures may be more problematic than that of the ‘average’ migrant, and that increased opportunities for these sorts of people to migrate would actually damage development. The clearest example of this is the fear about development damage to the country of origin from health worker migration.

In our view such effects should not, however, lead policymakers in countries of destination to have doubts about allowing increased migration, including of health workers (or other kinds of migrant whose movement may be associated with certain negative development impacts). This is because, as argued previously, limiting migration based on single impacts such as the stock of health workers in a country ignores the host of other effects – often positive – that migration can have. It is hard to envisage a scenario in which a particular area of development (such as the stock of healthcare skills in a country) could be evaluated as being more important than the numerous other, mostly positive impacts that migration has on individuals, households and nations. Such limits also deny would-be migrants the freedom to pursue their own development goals, which is a key tenet of a capabilities-based view of development.

However, simply increasing opportunities for immigration is not the only migration policy that countries of destination should consider in order to boost migration’s development impacts. It is also important that countries tackle forms of movement that are not development friendly, such as people trafficking, which restricts and often exploits the migrants concerned, often dramatically reducing their capabilities. Addressing this should be seen as an integral part of the migration and development agenda (Chappell and Glennie 2009).

In addition, countries of destination should put policies in place that facilitate return and circular migration, as the evidence presented here suggests that return has a range of positive developmental impacts, and in particular impacts at the national level. It does not necessarily involve complex new policy arrangements; in fact some of the most effective actions might involve simplifying current rules. For example, simply allowing dual citizenship should strengthen the ties between a migrant and their place

43. Although the frequency or quality of those contacts may be shaped by the economic climate in which the migrant lives. It seems likely that poorer migrants, or those located in remote rural areas, will be less able to afford and access technologies that enable them to be in touch regularly for example.
of origin, and the likelihood they will return; or changing the rules about the process for gaining citizenship, particularly reducing requirements around the amount of time the candidate has to remain in the country they have moved to, may increase the strength of migrants’ ties and their circulation (Chappell and Mulley 2010).

Lastly, policies around labour migration should be considered in light of the contribution that low skilled migration in particular can make to development. In some countries such as the UK there has been a tendency to focus labour migration opportunities on the highly skilled. As well as not necessarily meeting the real labour market needs of the countries concerned (for example see Chappell et al 2009), limiting legal migration opportunities to the highly skilled will severely circumscribe the ability of poorer households to migrate legally, as the poor tend to be low skilled. This limits the reach of migration’s direct developmental benefits down the income spectrum. Conversely, in situations where a larger number of poor, lower skilled people have been able to migrate (see for example emigration patterns from Vietnam) poorer people appear to gain more of the direct benefits of migration.

(c) Rights and anti-discrimination policy. In addition to allowing migrants into a country and offering a general economic climate that enables success, it is also important that migrants are not prevented through discrimination or exploitation from improving their lives.

Much discussion has taken place over what kinds of rights and protection countries of destination can or should implement. DotM analysis provides relatively little fresh insight into the specifics of this, as it has not looked in detail at the rights accorded to migrants in a systematic manner, or linked this to wider developmental outcomes. However, a recent United Nations report on migration and development (United Nations Development Programme 2009) concluded that while it may not always be possible for international conventions on migrants’ rights to be ratified (as this looks politically very difficult for many countries of destination), other ways of ensuring basic rights must be found. These basic rights include equal pay for equal work, decent working conditions and rights to collective organisation. According to the UNDP analysis, ensuring these rights should deliver better development outcomes for migrants, and potentially too for their families and others.

(d) Community cohesion policy. Protecting migrants’ rights is important for improving migrants’ lives, but there are other complementary policies governments can implement that play a similar role. Building community cohesion is particularly important in this regard. Living within cohesive communities should improve migrants’ own lives, meaning that they are less likely to be subject to discrimination or hostility, and making it easier for them to find work and engage socially and politically in the community around them. This improvement in outcomes should also feed through and enhance development impacts elsewhere, as set out earlier.

The kinds of policies that building community cohesion includes are diverse. One example is space and city planning policies, which are more likely to promote integration and cohesion if they mix newcomers, established members of migrant communities and locally born people, as evidence from Montreal shows. The Canadian city has medium density mixed rental and owner occupier neighbourhoods, which allow for these kinds of population configurations, and mean that migrants can be located near more established members of their own ethnic or national community who provide them with support and information, while also interacting regularly with people beyond that group (Chappell and Glennie 2009).

Alternative approaches include community-level interventions, such as those being undertaken by Boston Borough Council, a UK local authority, that has a strategy of putting on local public events to draw people together and promote cohesion. It has also identified ‘myth hubs’, places in the community, such as pubs and hairdressers, where rumours may start about immigrants and thus discourage cohesion. The council is now considering if it can target those myth hubs to prevent them from damaging cohesion (Chappell and Glennie 2009).
(e) **Family reunion policy.** As discussed above, policymakers may feel that family reunion is not a positive, development-promoting policy, and that there are grounds to limit it to ‘maximise’ development outcomes. In this light policies such as Canada’s which allow children to reunite with their parents up to the age of 22, could be said to promote poor development outcomes.

However, as has previously been stressed, any view of development that sees it as expanding capabilities must fundamentally recognise that migrants are not just a resource to be deployed in the most effective way possible for the countries they were born in, but people with rights to seek out livelihoods and to a family life. As such migrants’ rights to family reunion improve migrants’ own development and must not be sacrificed to try to deliver gains to others. Strong family reunion policies, especially when set alongside complementary policies to facilitate migrants’ continued engagement with the country they came from, are supportive of development.

(f) **Policy on transfers.** While countries of origin have an important role to play in making it easy for migrants to transfer back assets such as remittances (such as by financial deregulation), countries of destination also have a role to play. In some cases this may involve particular schemes specifically targeted at migrants. Examples include a 2005 EU Aeneas project which attempted to explore how remittances between Spain and Ecuador could be maximised, and an initiative by the international NGO Voluntary Service Overseas (supported by the UK’s Department for International Development) which helps members of diaspora to volunteer in their country of origin, transferring their skills.

Perhaps most important though, in promoting transfers back to countries of origin, would be changes to policies around the ‘portability’ of social security, that is the extent to which migrants are entitled to make claims on social security systems in their country of destination to which they have contributed. Migrants often contribute to social security programmes while working abroad – with pensions especially important – but their ability to claim in relation to these contributions can be very limited, particularly when they return to their country of origin.

This lack of ability to claim upon return can potentially motivate migrants not to return, even if they might otherwise want to, depriving their country of origin of the benefits of their return. Moreover, even if they do return, the differences that pension transfers can make to capital inflows is not negligible, as the statistics presented for Jamaica have shown. Jamaica is receiving US$100 million in pensions annually from the UK alone, making up a substantial proportion of all Jamaican remittances. Receiving or not receiving such sums can potentially have major effects both at a household level and at a macroeconomic level, and makes ensuring the portability of social security benefits a very important step that governments in countries of destination can take to maximise migration’s developmental benefits.

Other policy decisions that can affect transfers are not migration specific, however. They include money laundering regulations. These rules have been tightened since 9/11, and the much more stringent regulations that have been put in place have made it harder for migrants to send remittances (Hernández-Coss and Bun 2007), thereby damaging development. It is important that countries of destination are aware of the possibility that policies not about migration or development explicitly, such as money laundering rules, can nonetheless affect migration’s development impacts.

(g) **Prioritising migration and development.** The point made above about the relevance of many areas of policy to migration’s development impacts leads onto a wider issue. To deliver good development outcomes as a result of migration, countries of destination need to understand migration and development and how policy is affecting it, and be willing to take these impacts into account in policymaking.

Specifically, this involves firstly having good data on immigration. This ideally includes data on immigration flows and stocks, as well as migrants’ demographic and socioeconomic information, and data on where they are living within the country at present. It also means development strategies being planned with
migration in mind – as, for example, the EU is currently doing, with migration systematically being included in country strategy papers for development cooperation. It is vital here that migration’s implications for existing development priorities are the focus of this, rather than development tools being used to pursue the country of destination’s migration priorities.

Countries of destination can also prioritise these issues by actively engaging in international fora that look to share lessons and create common ground, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development and regional consultative processes. Opening bilateral discussions may also prove useful.

**Policy summary**

*Development on the Move’s* contribution to migration and development policy has been twofold. First, it has underscored the importance of a positive policy approach to migration and development, but one that is appropriately wary about the contribution that policy can make to improving migration’s development impacts. It has stressed in particular the need for policy to ‘go with the flow’, and not try to stand in the way of what migrants and potential migrants intend to do. The analysis has also carefully dissected the points at which policy can intervene in the migration and development process, and explored what the effects of that intervention might be, with a view to understanding how impacts can be improved.

While further, impact-assessment forms of research would be required to assess rigorously what kinds of policies are most effective in enhancing migration’s development impacts (particularly in different national contexts), we believe it is possible to highlight specific policies that are likely to be particularly important. The six that appear to be most important according to the evidence presented in this report are set out in Table 5.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Who needs to act</th>
<th>What they need to do</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for migration</td>
<td>Countries of origin and</td>
<td>Work together to find politically acceptable ways to provide more opportunities for migration, under terms that protect migrants’ rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>destination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Countries of origin and</td>
<td>Help migrants and would-be migrants to plan, preparing for what lies ahead and what they leave behind. Don’t make sudden policy changes that force migrants to act without planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>destination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic opportunity</td>
<td>Countries of destination</td>
<td>Promote migrants’ own development by providing an economic environment in which they can succeed. In particular this requires countries of destination to dismantle any barriers to migrants’ success, such as discrimination, or lack of recognition of skills gained in their place of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties between the migrant and their place of origin</td>
<td>Countries of origin</td>
<td>Explore whether there are ways of effectively enhancing migrants’ emotional and social ties to their country of origin that will enhance the frequency and depth of their interactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers and interactions between the migrant and their place of origin</td>
<td>Countries of origin and</td>
<td>Explore ways to facilitate transfers between the migrant and the place they have come from. Relevant policies include financial system regulations, rules about dual nationality and approaches to the portability or otherwise of social security benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>destination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government responsiveness and prioritisation</td>
<td>Countries of origin and</td>
<td>Governments need to have good data on migration trends, be concerned with improving development outcomes, and be willing to engage in debate on ways to improve outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>destination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. What have we learnt?

The experiment that has been Development on the Move is now drawing to a close. It has been a unique project that has brought together an unusual coalition of partners from across the world and developed a new and ambitious research methodology, all with the aim of adding to the global understanding of migration’s development impacts.

Almost four years since its inception, we feel that the project has delivered substantial results for all involved. The project’s findings do, we believe, substantially add to the global body of knowledge in this area. They have confirmed much of the previous research about migration’s development impacts (even if, crucially, to remind policymakers that migration is in fact good – on the whole – for development), while perhaps confounding some existing expectations (on brain drain for example), and providing a range of brand new insights (such as on rates of return).

The project has not been without its challenges. Balancing comparability and country specificity has been difficult, as there is an innate tension between trying to draw out general lessons, and understanding and providing policy insights into what was happening in seven very different countries. We tried to find an appropriate balance by using common research templates and examining similar issues in each place, while allowing each research team to tailor the research tools and questions to some extent to suit their own context. It may be that we erred too far in favour of country specificity, especially in view of this final report, which tries to draw out general lessons. If there had been fewer differences between the analytical methods used and in the focus of the analyses, we may have ended up with an even stronger set of conclusions.

It was also a challenge to try to integrate the different methods and sources of information available to the project into one analysis. An enormous amount of different kinds of information – quantitative and qualitative – were generated by the project, which also drew on a wide range of existing data sources and studies. The new quantitative findings were perhaps the project’s major new contribution and its most innovative aspect; emphasising the findings from the data was a very natural focus of the research. However, perhaps it is true that the research focused too substantially on the quantitative work, and the project might have gained even more if it had added to and explained these results using qualitative data or other complementary literature.

While it is important to recognise the work’s limitations, we believe that these notwithstanding, Development on the Move has not only provided useful substantive findings about migration and development and how policy can engage with it, but also a new perspective on doing research on this topic. We hope in particular that we have developed a comparative, capabilities-based methodology that helps to place the study of migration and development in a different context, as well as a set of concrete research tools that are now freely available to all to use, as they are or adapted for their own purposes.

What happens next?
The Development on the Move project management team sees several priorities for future work.

Firstly, this project looked at all international migration in the same way, with little distinction made in the analysis between different kinds of movement (for example migrants moving for different reasons, or to different destinations). This was a deliberate decision. So much of the debate and policy thinking around migration and development treats international migration as one category, and to contribute to those debates we wanted to think in the same way. However, it seems very likely that impacts vary depending on what kind of migration is taking place – which our findings hint at – and the next stage of analysis should break down the ‘migration’ category into different kinds of movement, and rigorously compare them to one another.
Secondly, the project identified a number of aspects of the migration and development process that can potentially act as policy levers. It seems clear that changing things like the skill level of the people migrating, or the nature of the communities they are migrating into, can change migration’s development impacts. However, while Chapter 5 brought the new DotM evidence to bear on policy issues that have often in the past been discussed with very little associated evidence, our findings remain only preliminary. A vital next step would be to put these potential policy levers at the heart of analysis and explore how outcomes differ when these policy levers change.

Thirdly, we would like to see the methodology applied to additional countries, potentially including developed countries. After all, countries like the UK, US and France have large diasporas, are interested in harnessing them for improving outcomes at ‘home’, and are concerned about their migrants’ well-being while they are abroad. It is just as possible to apply our methodology to assess the impacts of migration on developed countries as it is to developing ones. Moreover, doing so would make clear one of the central messages of this work – that migration is a natural part of everyday life, something that will necessarily happen in a globalised world, albeit something that can, especially for the poorest, dramatically improve lives.

In the meantime, however, we hope that the data generated by the project (all of which will be made available in the public domain before the end of the year) and the analysis conducted so far will be useful for researchers and policymakers alike in their quest to understand and shape migration and its impacts. In a century where we know so much about so many things, migration – an age-old and ubiquitous phenomenon – remains poorly understand but heavily politicized. We hope that this research has made a small step towards changing this.
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