COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

REPORT ON THE THIRTEENTH SESSION

(11-21 April 1977)

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTY-THIRD SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 4

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1977
NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Use of a hyphen (-) between dates representing years, e.g., 1971-1975, signifies the full period involved, including the beginning and end years.

Reference to "dollars" ($) indicates United States dollars.

Annual rates of growth refer to annual compound rates.

E/5939
INTRODUCTION

1. The Committee for Development Planning held its thirteenth session at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 11 to 21 April 1977. The Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs made a statement at the opening meeting on 11 April 1977.


3. The Officers of the Committee, elected at the eleventh session for a term ending on 31 December 1977, are:

   Chairman: Germánico Salgado
   Vice-Chairman: Janos Kornai
   Rapporteur: John P. Lewis

4. The Committee expressed regret that Mr. Chedly Ayari, Mr. Saeb Jaroudi, Mr. J. H. Mensah, Mr. Alister McIntyre, Mr. Saburo Okita, Mr. H. M. A. Onitiri and Mr. Leopoldo Solís were not able to attend the thirteenth session. It took note that Mr. Y. Z. Kyesimira had relinquished his membership of the Committee on joining the staff of the United Nations Environment Programme. The Committee expressed appreciation for the contribution made by Mr. Kyesimira to its work during the period he served as a member.

5. Substantive services at the session were provided by the Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. The Committee was also assisted by representatives of the secretariats of the Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic Commission for Western Asia, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Organization of American States.

6. The Committee adopted the following agenda:

   1. Adoption of the agenda
   2. Preparation of comments and recommendations relating to the third over-all review and appraisal of progress in the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade.
3. Examination of long-term trends and forecasts in the economic development of the various regions of the world and their mutual relationship including methodological guidelines for the further examination of such trends in the regions

4. Matters referred by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to the Committee

5. Arrangements for future work

6. Adoption of the report of the Committee to the Economic and Social Council

7. The Committee's deliberations were helped by the findings and conclusions of its three Working Groups that met in advance of the session at the headquarters of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Economic Commission for Africa. The names of the members of the Working Groups are listed below:

   Working Group on Progress and Prospects in South and East Asia (Bangkok, 1-5 November 1976)
   Ester Boserup, Nurul Islam (Chairman) and Germánico Salgado

   Working Group on Progress and Prospects in Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, 22-26 November 1976)
   H. C. Bos (Chairman), Ester Boserup, H. M. A. Onitiri and Germánico Salgado

   J. A. Lacarte (Chairman) and John P. Lewis

8. The documents that were before the Committee at its thirteenth session are listed in the annex to the present report.
I. LESSONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: THE 1970s

9. Looked at through the lenses of the world's concern for the developing countries, the 1970s thus far have been a remarkably eventful decade. Much that has happened - or not happened in the measure projected by the world community - is ominous. And yet the situation is not without hope.

10. The following review is designed to analyse critical facts or events concerning economic and social development in the years since 1970. It is offered both as a contribution to the current review and appraisal of progress in the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade and as an assessment of the position with respect to implementation of the Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. The review, for one thing, highlights the urgency of certain kinds of action needed during the balance of the Second Development Decade. It also raises certain questions for the longer run beyond this Decade.

11. In these first two thirds of the 1970s important developments have occurred at two interacting levels. One of these is that of ideas: there have been changes in perceptions of development problems, needs, and priorities, and in policy declarations on these subjects. The other level has been that of events - many of them unforeseen, some of them unforeseeable - and of policy responses to them.

12. As for the ideas, the Committee for Development Planning certainly joins others in heralding the salience of the changes. Indeed the Committee itself from the early years of the Decade, while emphasizing the importance of economic growth, has been an active contributor to two quite striking and cumulative shifts in the world's thinking about development.

- One, towards a new international economic order that will achieve a more equitable sharing of resources and welfare among nation States and, in particular, lift up the condition of the poorest countries,

- The other, towards the importance of distributional and employment issues and, especially, the needs of the poorest and weakest groups within the developing countries.

13. Yet, having had a hand in their launching, the Committee now has a certain unease that some of the new ideas - for example, "basic needs", "collective self-reliance" - may already be getting too sloganized. (Slogans are useful for getting attention and rallying support but they never escape the problem of incompleteness.) Thus in this review, rather than pressing some of the new conceptual shorthand for which it has sympathy and perhaps even fragmentary responsibility, the Committee proposes to concentrate its assessment at the level of recent events and policy responses.

A. The over-all record

1. Trends and shocks experienced by the world economy

14. The five-year period 1971-1975, which constituted the first half of the Second
United Nations Development Decade, was marked by great economic instability and strain. The world economy experienced an extraordinary combination of shocks during that period.

15. After recording a vigorous expansion in the initial years of the Decade, the countries with developed market economies encountered a serious recession in 1974 and 1975. Contrary to historical experience, the recessionary forces in those countries were accompanied by unprecedented double-digit increases in prices.

16. Adverse weather gravely affected agricultural production in various parts of the world during the years 1971-1974, and contributed to the general economic instability and inflationary upsurge. Poor harvests had serious consequences for the economies of developing countries, particularly the countries in the Sahel region of Africa and in South and South-East Asia.

17. The international monetary system created at Bretton Woods broke down in 1971 when the United States of America terminated the convertibility of its dollar into gold. That system was replaced by a régime of floating exchange rates. International monetary developments continued to add to the international inflationary process.

18. The price of petroleum quadrupled in the short span of a few months in late 1973 and early 1974. The sharp increase in price affected both the countries with developed market economies and the petroleum-importing developing countries. It led to large surpluses in the balance of payments of the petroleum-exporting countries and, concurrently, to large deficits in the balance of payments of the petroleum-importing developing countries and the industrialized countries.

19. Notwithstanding the severity of those shocks, the world economy has shown some resilience in responding to them. A number of factors have contributed to this.

20. The recycling of the external surpluses of the major petroleum-exporting countries has been a crucial element in the adjustment process. International financial markets have played an important, although unplanned, intermediating role in the international adjustment. Development expenditures larger than expected as well as financial loans and grants, on a bilateral and a multilateral basis, by the petroleum-exporting countries have also contributed to the recycling.

21. Although developing countries were able to profit from the economic upsurge in the industrialized countries in the early 1970s through expanding export markets and improved terms of trade, they have been adversely affected in more recent years by the economic recession and inflation in developed countries with market economies. Reduced export growth and rising costs of imports have worsened the balance of payments of the petroleum-importing developing countries. This situation has constrained their economic growth and has led many of them to increased external indebtedness and thus to greater dependence on developed countries.

22. The current economic situation in developed countries with market economies is still precarious, and the economic recovery that began in 1976 has been slow. Several countries are still struggling with the problem of stagflation - that is, the combination of structural unemployment and a relatively high rate of inflation. The desire to avoid inflation has prompted many Governments to hold back from expansionary policies. However, for the developed countries with a strong balance-of-payments position, there seems to be no justification for such a cautious attitude. This attitude needs to be changed.
23. Countries with centrally planned economies experienced comparatively high rates of economic growth during the period 1971-1975. However, a number of unfavourable factors affected the process of their economic growth; they included several poor harvests, increased costs of mining and transportation of fuel and energy, and relative shortages of labour in some countries. At the same time, the further development of external trade relations in the period was a positive factor for economic growth.

24. The value of external trade of countries with centrally planned economies doubled during the period 1971-1975, thus rising considerably faster than national income. Those countries generally managed to protect their economies from the adverse repercussions of monetary crisis, reduced output and growing inflation in the world economy at large. One explanation for this outcome lies in the mechanism of planned regulation of productive and trade interrelationships organized through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Another factor is the comparatively high share of the mutual or intra-group trade in the total foreign trade of those countries. Although they have traded among themselves at prices lower than those ruling in the world market, several of them with more open economies and with greater dependence on imported supplies of raw materials and energy have been more affected by international inflation.

25. Table 1 illustrates for the period 1971-1975 the over-all growth performance in real terms of the various groups of countries in the world. As is evident from the table, the growth experience of those groups differed greatly. Furthermore, the growth was uneven within the five-year period. Per capita output rose faster in developing countries than in developed market economies, which were affected by the recession. However, in absolute terms, the gap in per capita output between those two groups of countries continued to widen.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum-exporting developing countries . . . . . .</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other developing countries . .</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed market economies . .</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and USSR . .</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of the United Nations Secretariat, based on data from national and international sources.

26. Divergent experience in the developing world

26. Averages for the developing countries as a group do not provide an adequate
basis for assessing their progress. While the threefold classification shown in
table 2 is a helpful device for such an assessment, it needs to be stressed that the
economic and social circumstances of those countries vary widely. Indeed, the
differences in circumstances must be taken into account in diagnosing the emerging
problems and in devising realistic development policies.

Table 2. Developing countries: population and
per capita gross domestic product

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>Percentage distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-income non-petroleum-exporting countries a/ ..... .</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-petroleum-exporting countries . .</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum-exporting countries . . . . . .</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, developing countries . . . . . . .</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See table 1.

a/ Non-petroleum exporting countries with per capita gross domestic product in 1970 of less than $200.

27. The recent experience of these three groups of developing countries in respect of economic growth is strikingly different, as is demonstrated in table 3. The economies of low-income countries expanded at an average annual rate of only 3.5 per cent. Those countries, which account for about three fifths of the population of the developing world, are by and large situated in middle Africa and southern Asia. As was emphasized in the report of the Committee on its twelfth session, the problems of poverty and under-development are acute in countries belonging to those two depressed regions. 1/ The other non-petroleum-exporting countries fared much better with an average annual rate of 6 per cent. However, this group consists of countries whose performance varied greatly: countries in Eastern Asia, the larger countries in Latin America and the mineral-exporting countries in Africa generally experienced high rates of economic growth; but other countries in Latin America, particularly those in Central America and the Caribbean, recorded a rate of economic growth that was below the average for the group. The

Table 3. Developing countries: average annual rate of growth of total and per capita gross domestic product, 1971-1975 (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country group</th>
<th>Total gross domestic product</th>
<th>Per capita gross domestic product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low-income non-petroleum-exporting countries a/ . . .</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-petroleum-exporting countries. . . .</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum-exporting countries . . . . . . .</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, developing countries . . . . . . . .</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See table 1.

a/ See foot-note a/ to table 2.

group of petroleum-exporting countries, whose per capita output is no more than moderate because it includes such low-income countries as Indonesia and Nigeria, recorded a still higher annual rate of growth, almost 7 per cent. (The incomes of the petroleum-exporting countries, in fact, rose much faster than their output, because of the sharp improvement in their terms of trade.) The average annual rate of economic growth of the developing countries as a whole, 5.6 per cent, is not far short of the target of 6 per cent specified in the International Development Strategy. But clearly that average of 5.6 per cent has little meaning for a large majority of people in the developing world. The record is even more alarming in per capita terms. The per capita gross domestic product rose at an annual rate of less than 1 per cent in the low-income countries where much of the population of the developing world lives. A poignant reminder of the immensity of problems facing those countries is provided by the fact that their per capita output rose by a scant one dollar a year during the first half of the Decade - from $103 in 1970 to $108 in 1975 (see table 2 above).

28. The experience of low-income countries is disquieting - even alarming - in respect of both agriculture and industry, as is evident from table 4. Agricultural production in the low-income countries increased yearly during the period 1971-1975 by only 1.6 per cent. In fact, the per capita agricultural production of these countries suffered a decline. In the developing world, indeed, agricultural progress has generally been poor. Manufacturing production in the low-income countries expanded annually at a rate of less than 4 per cent compared with 7 per cent for the developing countries as a whole.

29. The disparities in economic growth appear to be strongly associated with disparities in national saving and investment. The ratio of gross national saving to gross domestic product in low-income countries did not increase during the first half of the Decade. The ratio for the developing countries as a whole increased
Table 4. Developing countries: average annual rate of increase in agricultural and manufacturing production in constant prices, 1971-1975 (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country group</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low-income non-petroleum-exporting countries a/</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-petroleum-exporting countries</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum-exporting countries</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, developing countries b/</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See table 1.

a/ See foot-note a/ to table 2.

b/ Including countries which, in the absence of separate estimates, are not covered in the three groups shown above.

Annually by substantially more than the target of 0.5 percentage point specified in the Strategy; but this was largely because of the extraordinarily favourable experience of the petroleum-exporting countries. In spite of efforts to recycle petro-incomes and to tap other sources of loan capital from abroad, the ratio of investment to gross domestic product did not rise in low-income countries.

30. The quantum of goods and services exported by low-income (non-petroleum-exporting) countries expanded annually by just about 4 per cent and the quantum of goods and services imported by them rose by 6.5 per cent. The corresponding figures for other non-petroleum-exporting developing countries are 7 and 8 per cent, respectively. The quantum of exports of the petroleum-exporting countries increased yearly by 5 per cent but, by virtue of the sharp improvement in their terms of trade, their quantum of imports expanded annually by nearly 24 per cent. For the developing countries as a whole, exports and imports rose annually by 5.7 per cent and 11.5 per cent, respectively.

31. The external indebtedness of developing countries as a group increased rapidly. The increase for low-income countries, however, was not so rapid. The stagnating low-income countries had limited possibilities to borrow from international financial markets, and the lack of financial resources from abroad in appropriate volume was an important cause of stagnation. The other non-petroleum-exporting countries fared better in this respect. This group of countries needed more foreign credit to sustain a relatively higher rate of growth, and it was able to get more, to a large extent from international financial markets, but on very hard terms.

32. Economic disparities prevail not only between the three groups of developing countries, but also within these three groups. The group of low-income countries shows more uniform, but also more unfortunate, traits: with few exceptions, a low
of area under crops in which high-yielding varieties had been successfully evolved (such as wheat and maize) resulted in diversion of land from other crops that were not as remunerative (for example, cotton, pulses and oilseeds). The dependence of the new varieties on assured and timely supplies of water also made it difficult to extend them at the same rate as before without a much enlarged programme for extension of irrigation and water management. It also became obvious that the introduction of high-yielding varieties of rice posed much more complex and formidable problems than had been experienced in the case of wheat and maize in the 1960s. The extension of comparable varietal research and development activities to such dry land crops as pulses and sorghums (especially critical to the nutrition of the rural poor in many places) has only commenced in the current decade. The lower rate of growth of agricultural output in the 1970s in good part reflects these various constraints.

36. The rate of growth of agricultural output is so crucial to the strategy of development in the low-income countries that the need to concentrate attention on these constraints and overcome them can hardly be over-emphasized. At the same time it is necessary to warn against the temptation to assume that somehow this rate can be accelerated following more or less the same policies as have been relied upon so far. Many of the sources of agricultural growth that were relatively easy to exploit have been to a large extent exhausted. Significant acceleration, therefore, will need much more intensive effort and more radical institutional changes than have been attempted so far.

37. Thus far land reforms have tended to be of a redistributive type. While this aspect of land reforms is important, and would require even greater emphasis in some countries in the future, it is important to pay attention also to the contribution that rational land management can and should make to realizing the full potential of the available agricultural technologies. The small size of holdings of the bulk of the population dependent on agriculture, and the fragmentation of these holdings over a period of time, are major obstacles to the development of the basic infrastructure required for rapid agricultural growth, such as reclamation of land, contour-bunding and levelling, irrigation and drainage. In order to overcome these handicaps without detriment to the larger social objectives of redistributive land reform, it is essential that much more attention be paid to the consolidation of holdings, and to ways and means by which small watersheds and other relatively large tracts of land can be developed as single units (through co-operatives or other institutional arrangements), utilizing for this purpose the idle labour available in the rural sector. It is also important to ensure that consolidation of holdings does not have the effect of causing eviction of tenants with small holdings as has often happened in the past.

38. Unless rapid progress is made in this direction in the next few years it may prove difficult to achieve during the Second Development Decade even the rate of growth of agricultural output realized in the First Development Decade. A much higher rate of growth, of the order set out in the International Development Strategy, is essential not only to meet the food and other minimum needs of the growing population but for absorbing the rapidly expanding labour force in these countries and for creating domestic markets large enough to stimulate and sustain industrialization at the required rates. If the present trends continue, we must emphasize, the outlook for the future is indeed dismal: proletarianization of the rural population in most of the developing countries is certain to continue at alarming rates, the food intake and nutritional levels of a high percentage of their
rate of economic growth and a rate that did not accelerate in the 1970s. In contrast, as already noted in paragraph 27 above, the group of other non-petroleum-exporting countries includes a number of fast-growing and many slow-growing countries; moreover, countries in this group experienced significant acceleration and deceleration in their rates of economic growth. Clearly, given the many differences among developing countries, great caution should be exercised when drawing generalizations with regard to both retrospective analysis and formulation of targets and policies for the coming years.

B. Agriculture, industry and population: the linkages

1. Agriculture

33. The Committee, in the report on its eleventh session, pointed out that agricultural production in the first four years of the Second Development Decade grew at only about half the rate of 4 per cent per annum which the International Development Strategy called for during the Decade as a whole; 2/ but it attributed this depressing performance largely to the adverse climatic conditions during the period. The years since have witnessed bumper harvests (following improved climatic conditions), particularly in 1975 when agricultural production recorded an increase of 4 per cent. Preliminary estimates for 1976 indicate a further increase of 3 per cent. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, for the six-year period 1971-1976 as a whole, the rate of growth of agricultural output was still no more than 2.5 per cent per annum. This is not only much lower than the target set for the Decade but lower even than the annual rate of 2.9 per cent achieved in the First Development Decade.

34. The grave implications of the poor performance in this crucial sector stand out even more sharply when the data for the developing countries are disaggregated. Since estimates of agricultural production in 1976 are not available in the necessary detail, this exercise has to be confined to the period 1971-1975. For the developing countries as a whole the annual rate of growth of agricultural output during this period appears to have been somewhat over 2 per cent. It was 2.7 per cent per annum for the petroleum-exporting countries. But it was only 1.6 per cent per annum for the low-income countries (non-petroleum-exporting countries with per capita, gross domestic product of less than $200 per annum), which for three fifths of the total population of the developing world, and 2.2 per cent in other developing countries in which one fourth of the people of the developing world live (see tables 2 and 3 above).

35. There are a number of reasons for the lag in agricultural production in the low-income countries, especially those in Asia. The First Development Decade had gained significantly from the introduction in several crops of new high-yielding varieties and related agronomic practices. It was in fact the resulting "Green Revolution" that aroused hopes of further acceleration in the rate of growth of agricultural output. While extension of high-yielding varieties has continued in the 1970s, a variety of problems have surfaced during this period. Extension

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emphasis on various sources of growth. For small countries with a limited domestic market, export-led growth necessarily assumes critical importance. Moreover, in the Decade to date a variety of countries have pursued such a pattern of growth with considerable success.

44. A few countries have followed a policy of export-led growth of manufacturing industries based upon heavy reliance on transnational corporations. The experience of such countries, however, may not be easily generalizable elsewhere in the developing world. The patterns of industrialization that are based upon developing-country manufacture of selected components to be fed into the world-wide production and marketing networks of transnational companies with headquarters in developed countries do not always generate adequate linkage effects for the rest of the host country's economy. They may encourage patterns of consumption and production that are not always conducive to the domestic requirements of the host countries for less sophisticated commodities. The export sector, under these circumstances, is often out of line with the consumption and technological requirements of the host country. The production pattern under these circumstances is likely to be unstable, linked as it is to the particular markets or the particular requirements of the parent establishments, as well as to the supply of inputs from those establishments. The domestic industrial structure loses flexibility of adjustment in response to changes in the fortunes - and/or changes in the internal policies - of particular transnational companies.

45. Experience so far indicates that export-led industrialization is not without constraints and not equally applicable to all countries. It makes its practitioners highly dependent on business conditions in the industrialized countries. After buoyant expansion in 1971-1973, the expansion of exports of developing countries slowed markedly in the succeeding three years. Moreover, the success of export-led industrialization in the long run is critically dependent on enlarged access to the markets of the developed countries. If high rates of expansion of exports as recently experienced by a number of developing countries are to be generalized to a majority of developing countries, it will be essential that the developed countries open up their markets by systematic and vigorous trade-liberalization measures, accompanied by a readjustment of their own industrial structures. At the same time, increased economic co-operation among the developing countries should be so designed as to expand the markets for manufactured exports in each other's economies.

46. Apart from the sluggishness of internal demand and the scarcity of investment resources, a major obstacle to indigenous industrialization is the weakness of indigenous research and development for the evolution of appropriate technology in the developing countries. Typically, technological capability in the widest sense of the term, including scientific manpower, technicians, intermediate skills, management and organizational ability, is scarce. Agreements for the transfer of technology from the developed countries should include as an integral component the establishment of research and development facilities that will nurture the growth of indigenous technological capability.

47. Market opportunities afforded by the expansion of the demand in petroleum-exporting countries could be better exploited if triangular co-operation between industrialized, developing and the petroleum-exporting countries were more actively strengthened. It would be possible for the petroleum-exporting countries to get more of their technology than they are yet doing from elsewhere in the third world and for the latter's capacities to be strengthened in the process. Some of this already is happening, but it deserves further encouragement.
population will decline further instead of rising, the supply of essential raw materials will become increasingly inadequate, and the industrialization process will be severely retarded before it has had a chance to gather any sustaining momentum of its own.

39. In many countries, a lack of transport facilities and other economic infrastructure is a serious deterrent to agricultural development. Sometimes this prevents a shift from subsistence production to market-oriented production, and in other cases it makes it uneconomical to apply fertilizer and other purchased inputs in agriculture. A lack of infrastructure in rural areas is the most important obstacle to agricultural development in the low-income countries in Africa, but it is also a grave problem in many developing countries in other parts of the world. Governments and financial institutions need to pay more attention to this problem in order to speed up production of food and raw materials of agricultural origin in low-income countries.

40. The agricultural difficulties mentioned in previous paragraphs are likely to be less serious in some regions. But they are likely to assume grave proportions in the depressed low-income regions of Africa and Asia (identified by the Committee in the report on its twelfth session). The population of the low-income countries accounts for such a large part of the total population of the developing world that they call for immediate attention not only by the countries directly concerned but by the international community as a whole, which is bound to feel the repercussions in a short while.

2. **Industry**

41. Industrial performance has varied widely among the developing countries during the 1970s so far.Industrial production in countries with per capita incomes below $200 has grown less than 4 per cent annually as against the target of 8 per cent specified in the International Development Strategy for the developing countries as a whole. Poor industrial performance seems, in general, to be associated with poor performance in agriculture in many countries. Sluggish agriculture causes sluggish internal demand; it impedes the supply of raw materials for local industry and constrains the availability of foreign exchange resources for the industrial sector. The slow expansion of industry, in turn, hinders agricultural progress in a number of countries.

42. At the same time it is only fair to note that manufacturing in some developing countries has been doing rather well. (In countries accounting for one sixth of the third-world population, the annual increase in industrial production during the first half of the Decade equalled or exceeded the 8 per cent target of the Strategy.) Further, a number of countries have recorded a fairly strong industrial expansion despite sluggish agricultural growth. At earlier stages of industrialization, in many cases import substitution has provided a strong push to the rate of growth of local industry.

43. The sources of growth in the industrial sector from the side of demand are import substitution, expansion of the domestic market through agricultural growth and export expansion. The relative importance of the different sources of growth has varied as between different developing countries, depending on a number of factors, such as the stage of industrialization and the size of country. There need be no inconsistency between the various strategies that put differential
48. In spite of the crucial role of small-scale industry in integrating agricultural and industrial sectors in the developing countries as well as in expanding employment and income opportunities in the rural areas, in the majority of countries this subsector continues to suffer from a lack of finance, managerial and technical assistance, an adequate supply of inputs, and effective marketing arrangements. The few developing countries successful in the field of small-scale industry could usefully share their experience and techniques with the rest of the developing world.

3. Population

49. The rather sombre outlook in regard to the short- and medium-term prospects of agricultural and industrial growth in the countries belonging to the lowest-income group underlines the importance and urgency of measures that can reduce the rates of population growth in these countries. There are, of course, a large number of developing countries in which the need for population policies is less closely linked to prospects for agriculture and industrial development. There are countries that perceive a need to reduce population expansion even though their development prospects are good. There are others that see low population density as a constraint on development and favour rapid population expansion for the time being. Elsewhere, however, particularly in South and South-East Asia, the acceleration in population growth following decline in mortality rates has created severe strains and has led to measures designed to reduce rates of expansion of population.

50. At the same time, unless there is clear appreciation of the values, motivations and aspirations that mould the attitude of ordinary people to the number of children they wish to have, as well as of the objective conditions that give rise to such attitudes, the measures adopted for population control may not only violate basic human rights but prove highly counter-productive. The greater the pressures created by population growth, the greater is the temptation to adopt such policies.

51. Individual and social values regarding family size are, of course, very complex, and no simple generalizations are possible. This is an area in which more intensive study and research is required. Nevertheless, enough clues are already available on which to build some of the essential elements of an enlightened and viable population policy; and particular attention is drawn to these elements.

52. It is particularly important to bear in mind that in societies in which economic activity is organized to a large extent with family labour available in households - whether it be for agriculture, small-scale industry or trade - children can be useful in a variety of ways that outside observers can easily overlook. Apart from the contribution they make by way of tending cattle, bringing water from distant sources, collecting firewood and other fuel, etc., it is only the children who survive who provide any kind of insurance to parents in periods of illness and in their old age. If, in these circumstances, there is a high rate of infant and child mortality, it would be not only natural but perfectly rational for there to be no strong tendency to restrict births or limit the size of families.

53. Not surprisingly, both earlier historical experience in European countries and more recent experience in certain developing countries suggest a tendency of birth rates to start falling significantly only after there has been a sharp fall in infant and child mortality rates. Infant mortality rates are typically in the range of 140 to 240 per 1,000 live births in the less developed countries; but when
the extension of health facilities, improved nutrition, education of women, etc. result in a perceptible fall in these rates, the essential conditions for restricting births on rational grounds are fulfilled. Even if these are not sufficient conditions, restriction of family size on the basis of some mechanical formula when these conditions have not been satisfied would generate justifiable resistance — and be unlikely to succeed.

54. This has important policy implications for development, particularly in the spheres of health and education. Clearly it is not enough to have health facilities that help bring down the over-all death rate; it is necessary to consider more explicitly how best to make available health facilities that can help bring down infant and child mortality rates. Women's education has also to have a high priority in development programmes. All this, along with the more conventional programmes for improving, popularizing and encouraging adoption of techniques of family planning, must form essential ingredients of population policy in the developing countries if it is not to become a caricature of the values that development truly stands for.

C. The urgency of action during the balance of the Second Development Decade

55. Up to now, performance during the Second Development Decade has generally fallen well short of aims, both by sectors and by countries. The situation certainly warrants no complacency. Social pressures for improved living conditions have continued to mount up everywhere in the developing world. There exists a need for urgent action during the balance of the Decade. Even under favourable conditions, many targets that countries hopefully embarked upon at the beginning of the Decade, will not be reached. But, rather than lose hope at this stage, a renewed and intensified effort must be made to improve growth rates and get the world economy to 1980 in a state of reasonable repair, as a prologue to subsequent international action in the cause of development.

56. The Strategy contains a series of commitments addressed both to developed and developing countries, and recognizes that the main thrust for progress must come from the developing countries themselves. The provisions of the Strategy have been reinforced and extended by a number of subsequent decisions of the General Assembly, notably those taken at the sixth and seventh special sessions of the Assembly. In so far as developing countries are desirous of reaching their development goals, they must provide even greater proof of their determination to take those internal self-management measures which are essential to progress. Mobilization of investment and resources in general, appropriate tax and budget structures, forward-looking land reform and agricultural production, effective employment policies, fair distribution of income and a constant search for industrial advance and diversification are only some of the dimensions in which developing countries must strive towards better performance. Development is essentially in their interest, and it is their obligation to provide the essential drive in this direction.

57. Likewise, the kinds of collective self-help by developing countries including economic-integration efforts mentioned in the next section of the present chapter should be started sooner rather than later. While joint schemes among developing countries should play an increasingly important role beyond the 1970s, this certainly does not mean that a beginning should not be made now in strengthening
existing arrangements for co-operative action and creating new ones - giving
attention always to the maintenance of a careful balance between such measures, on
the one hand, and relations with developed countries, on the other.

58. During the Decade thus far the developed countries have varied rather widely
in their contributions to the cause of development. Some of the financially
powerful countries in the world, for example, have let their aid shares remain far
below the world community's norms. As a consequence, and in spite of the efforts
of other developed countries, support by developed countries - both market and
centrally planned - has failed to reach a satisfactory level.

59. The ratio of official development assistance to gross national product, which
was targeted at 0.7 per cent in the Strategy, has averaged only 0.33 per cent. In
trade matters, it can be reasonably considered that there has been no advance, for
while occasional liberalization measures have been taken by industrialized countries,
either singly or jointly, they have been more than offset by other protective and
restrictive actions. In this respect, too, there has been a considerable disparity
in performance; where developed countries have taken trade liberalization measures,
their beneficial effects for developing countries have been substantial.

60. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the framework of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade have failed to progress since their official inauguration at
Tokyo in 1973. While this stagnation undoubtedly reflects the intervening strains
on the world economy, the latter are no adequate justification for the failure to
open markets in favour of developing countries. The on-off pattern keeps recurring.
Concessions granted under the General Preferential System, which is itself an
imperfect tool of trade promotion, are countered by such initiatives as the proposed
renewal of the Textile Agreement, proposed limitations on imports of leather
manufactures in major countries, and other similar restrictions.

61. Under conditions of economic slowdown and unemployment in industrialized
nations, protectionist forces tend to grow. Yet, any inroads they make are counter-
productive, since a series of trade flows is aborted by each import control measure;
and while protectionist measures can relieve industries suffering from foreign
competition, offsetting damage is caused to the developed countries' own export-
oriented industries. In the end, both developed and developing countries lose gains
from trade, but the latter suffer more painfully.

62. The temptation to yield to protectionist pressures must be defeated. The world
already has learned a series of bitter lessons on this score. It is essential that
they not be repeated. In particular, protectionism should not be allowed to harm
developing countries, whose import financing capacity commonly is especially
sensitive to their export earnings. Thus their failures to sell in world markets
are quick to generate descending spirals that can only be harmful for both developed
and developing countries.

63. A number of developing countries are highly dependent on exports of primary
commodities. Under the aegis of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, important negotiations have been under way for some time to set up
commodity agreements for some 18 main primary products. Technical issues have now
been studied at length, and the moment is ripe for the political decisions that will
get the system under way. The price stabilizing effect of this programme should be
of considerable benefit to many developing countries and industrialized nations
should resolve the issues still pending among them on this subject as a contribution, not only to the cause of development, but also to world economic stability and to orderly access to nature's resources. Emphasis should also be placed on the companion policy of stabilizing the export earnings of primary producing countries directly by means of compensatory financing. In this connexion, the Lomé Convention, effecting an agreement between the European Economic Community and a number of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, provides an interesting illustration of such financing, although with limited funding and with a limited membership. Equally noteworthy - and more generally available - has been the greatly expanded compensatory financing facility provided by the International Monetary Fund in recent years, a service that should be sustained and, indeed, be expanded further.

64. In financial matters, owing to world conditions explained elsewhere in this report, developing countries have shown a weakening in the ratio of their international reserves to imports and of their external debt to gross domestic product. In 43 countries, the debt ratio has increased, as against 26 where it has decreased. Because the international financing institutions were unable to respond to more than a fraction of the developing countries' burgeoning needs for foreign exchange after 1973, a number of developing countries were forced to go heavily into the private international credit market, whose institutions accommodated them extensively, but on short-tether, high-cost arrangements. At the same time, as noted, concessional transfers from industrialized countries failed to keep pace either with targets or with increased needs. The annual net flow of transfers from developed market economies during the period 1971–1975 averaged $23.7 billion in current prices and $16.5 billion in prices of 1970. The estimated net flow from centrally planned economies in current prices was around $1.3 billion a year during this period.

65. While, as stated earlier, some developed market economy countries have reached good figures in terms of the percentage of gross national product, the over-all flow of official development assistance has been very disappointing. The structure of resource transfers is also inadequate, with official development assistance dropping relative to total transfers and with the distribution of aid being highly skewed. The poorest countries have been receiving considerably lower aid per capita than others.

66. Clearly enough, a majority of countries with developed market economies, have failed to reach stated aims in this field. Many low-income developing countries are now at a stage in which it is illusory to believe in the settlement of their foreign obligations within the periods they originally accepted. In fact, these loans should have been grants in the first place, and the time has come for the international community to recognize this fact and act accordingly. Present preliminary negotiations in this respect should be concluded promptly and followed by actual and ample debt relief for these countries, liberating them from official loans they can repay only at the expense of urgent internal needs. While it is recognized that some reasonable degree of country-by-country analysis must take place, the Committee feels that there do exist certain broad categories of countries that clearly qualify for this form of relief. Further, it emphasizes that such relief from official debt burdens, far from impairing their credit worthiness as to external commercial debt, should (on any rational basis) only increase their ability to service the latter category of debt.

67. Industrialized countries are well aware that their exports to the remainder of the developing countries are also dependent, essentially, on the latter's import
financing capacity. A substantial number of these countries have very serious roll-over and exposure problems in regard to their foreign debt, aggravated in a number of cases by stiff terms. The importance of some of these debtors means that their failure to buy abroad could substantially affect world trade. For this purely selfish reason, but also because it is by no means indifferent to the progress of these still developing, middle-income countries, it behooves the world community quickly to develop appropriate debt refinancing mechanisms for these countries that, at reasonable interest rates, not only allow them to roll over their present obligations but roll them over into obligations of substantially longer average terms. Proposals under discussion in this regard - for example, arrangements that will allow countries to refinance accumulated debt via expanded access to the International Monetary Fund - deserve early adoption.

D. Some conclusions for the longer run

68. Within the next year, if, as we presume it will, the international community decides to formulate a strategy for a third development decade, it must start considering what the content of that strategy will be. In this regard certain lessons can begin to be drawn from the experience of the 1970s.

69. First, the world-wide surge of political energy in behalf of greater equity - both within countries and among countries - that has characterized the 1970s is unlikely to abate. Indeed, the same drives for a more just international division of incomes and resources and to meet the minimal needs of the poorest groups and classes are apt to become even stronger in the 1980s.

70. Second, as a best guess, not as an expression of preference, the Committee suspects that the industrialized market economies are not likely as a group soon to regain the high growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s. Their inflationary problems have become more inhibiting. Plainly it is to be hoped that a better reconciliation of high employment with low inflation will be achieved. But demand policies will be characteristically cautious. Governments will be striving to adjust to more sparing and restructured patterns of energy use, and, possibly, of some scarce raw materials. They will continue to be burdened with monetary imbalances. Moreover, national policies among the advanced industrialized countries may reflect an altered social attitude as to the importance of high growth rates - a new perspective on the quality of life that is more mindful of environmental protection and more insistent on appropriate conditions of work. In the report it has repeatedly been urged that these braking factors not be turned into an excuse for inward-turning policies as to trade - and none of the Committee's policy recommendations is more important than this. Yet buoyancy and exuberance probably are not the words for the international market environment that countries with developed market economies will be providing to the rest of the world.

71. The developed countries with centrally planned economies still have strong motivation and capacity to sustain fairly high growth rates, although probably somewhat lower than those achieved in the past. During the 1970s they expanded trade and economic co-operation rapidly both along east-west and north-south lines, but with the former more accentuated. Several centrally planned economies took advantage of the favourable credit markets brought about by the combined effects of the recession in developed market economies and rising petroleum incomes to finance accelerated industrial modernization. If now, dampened growth in the industrialized market economies, let alone a slide into protectionism by those
countries, were to inhibit east-west economic intercourse, this might also disturb relations between the developed centrally planned economies and the developing countries.

72. Third, under these prospective circumstances, the rationale for economic co-operation among developing countries is greatly strengthened. Here the lessons of the 1970s, while pointing out the benefits of such co-operation, also point out its difficulties and complexities, particularly under conditions of political instability and/or uncertainty among the co-operating parties. Some of the positive lessons may be, first, the on-balance advantages of mutual openness to trade among neighbouring countries - especially small countries; second, the priority that should be accorded the building of the basic infrastructure (roads, other transport facilities, communications) needed for linking contiguous countries, for example, in many parts of Africa; and third, the stronger lead that multilateral development agencies may be able to take in promoting and assisting negotiation of major transnational projects that would bring mutual benefits to the co-operating parties.

73. Fourth, these tentative outlines of trends beyond the 1970s suggest that the concept of "collective self-reliance" should in no sense deflect attention from the substantial and urgent need that will persist for international trading arrangements and for concessional financial transfers from rich to poor countries. Indeed, the more that events slow and inhibit a full rationalization of international trade, the greater the need will be for concessional transfers, from both the industrialized market and the developed centrally planned economies. In the cases of both groups of donor countries, it will be reasonable to expect Governments to separate and differentiate their transfer policies from factors inhibiting other actions.

74. Fifth, going back to the first point above, developing country Governments in the 1980s can and should be expected to have a strong focus on meeting the needs of the poor masses (food, health, education, shelter) and on their inclusion in the development process. Similarly, those supplying concessional transfers can and should be expected to show interest in providing resources aimed at such basic needs. But on both sides it will be important to remember the essential need for reinforcing productive growth in agriculture and industry in the developing countries and therefore for not adopting an excessively narrow interpretation of the "basic-needs" strategy. Appropriate policies to raise the productivity, incomes and living standards of the poor should also increase the rate of growth of output.

75. In this context, it should be pointed out that any programme for meeting "basic needs" or for promoting "collective self-reliance" - on which considerable focus is now being placed in various forums - cannot make any great progress without the kind of institutional and structural changes at the national level (in the developed and developing countries) and on the international plane that this Committee has been advocating as an essential and integral part of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. It is the opinion of the Committee as it looks ahead to the 1980s that the 1970s could well appear in retrospect as a decade in which the world temporized with a variety of needed institutional and structural changes but not much was done in the directions suggested. In fact, it is the failure to take effective steps for carrying forward these needed changes that has been responsible to a large extent for the wide divergence between what was hoped for at the beginning of the Second Development Decade and what has actually been achieved, particularly in the low-income countries that account for three fifths of the population of the developing world.
76. In earlier parts of the present report, attention has been drawn to the
degree to which the experience of different developing countries has diverged and to
the gravity of recent trends. The further moral to be drawn from the experience
of the current Decade is that focusing attention on such particular dimensions of
the accepted development strategy as "basic needs" and "collective self-reliance"
can help only if it promotes greater determination to implement the required
institutional changes at the national and international level - and does not merely
replace old slogans with new ones as a matter of political expediency. Only if the
1980s witness a much more fundamental grappling all around with such difficult
and painful but pivotal issues of structural change, can one look to the medium-
term future with considerable hope.
II. LONG-TERM STUDIES AND PROJECTIONS

77. In accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1079 (XXXIX), entitled "Economic planning and projections", which established the Committee for Development Planning, the Committee has not lost sight of its duties which include, inter alia, that of considering and evaluating the programmes and activities of the organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies relating to economic planning and projections. Therefore, both at the present session and at the sessions of its working groups in November-December 1976 - which were held at the headquarters of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Economic Commission for Africa - the Committee has been pleased to receive up-to-date information on the work on long-term studies and projections at the regional and sectoral levels that is under way or is in the process of being initiated. In the case of the secretariats of some regional commissions, the work is well advanced; others have hardly initiated such work and have inadequate resources either for its initiation or continuance. Moreover, in their preliminary assessment of long-term trends, the secretariats of regional commissions have achieved disparate results, both in terms of progress achieved and in terms of the methodologies employed.

78. The Committee has also been informed of the work embarked upon or intended on long-term studies and projections at the global level, particularly the undertakings of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research in this field. It is cognizant of the importance of such global, long-term studies as devices for organizing and co-ordinating research, as well as their potential use in promoting dialogue among different disciplines and institutions.

79. Long-term studies and projections can illuminate future policy choices. At the same time, the need to make such studies and projections should not become an excuse for delay in matters requiring urgent action in areas where the needed course is clear. Projections are often based on existing institutional and structural parameters. In such cases, it will frequently be necessary to broaden analyses to consider the implications of alternative institutional and structural assumptions.

80. The United Nations Secretariat should serve as a clearing-house for long-term studies and projections, with the objective of appraising, evaluating and disseminating ongoing work within and outside the United Nations system, as well as launching new research. Cross-referenced information about the various assumptions of such studies would be helpful to researchers in the field but even more to policy-makers who may use their products. It is particularly important that, within the United Nations system itself, the various regional, sectoral and global studies - of a qualitative and quantitative nature - be harmonized in respect of their assumptions and objectives. In presentation, results should always be accompanied by an evaluation of the assumptions and methods of the studies being discussed.

81. However, apart from some of the deliberations of its three Working Groups mentioned in paragraph 77 above, the Committee itself has not so far examined in
depth the scope and methodology of the studies referred to above and, therefore, cannot as yet make concrete recommendations in this respect. In the context of the preparation of initial proposals for a new international development strategy, it will be necessary for the Committee to use long-term studies and projections, including formalized quantitative models. The Committee therefore needs to inform itself more closely about the characteristics of the variety of such official and non-official studies under way. Reference to such activity is made in chapter IV of the present report, in the context of arrangements for future work of the Committee.
III. OTHER MATTERS REFERRED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

A. List of the least developed among the developing countries

82. In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 31/17, 31/42, 31/187 and
31/188, the Committee examined information relating to Angola, Cape Verde, the
Comoros and Sao Tome and Principe in order to ascertain whether they could be
included in the list of the least developed among the developing countries. To
ensure international comparability, the information was examined on the same basis
as that used by the Committee for its general review in 1975 of the list of the
least developed among the developing countries.

83. The available data on per capita domestic product, the share of manufacturing
in total output and the literacy ratio suggest that Cape Verde and the Comoros may
be included, as borderline cases, in the list of the least developed countries.
The per capita gross domestic product of Angola and Sao Tome and Principe appears
to be much higher than the limiting value used by the Committee in its general
review of 1975. However, the Committee is aware that Angola and Sao Tome and
Principe have been faced with serious difficulties since the years for which data
were available to the Committee. It has therefore decided to examine more recent
and more detailed information on these two countries at its next session. For this
purpose, it has asked the Secretariat to assemble the relevant data.

B. Integrated development planning

84. The report of the Secretary-General on the application by Governments of a
unified approach to development analysis and planning (E/CN.5/540) was made
available to the Committee in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3409 (XXX).
The Committee has taken note of the report with interest.

85. In this connexion, the Committee wishes to draw the attention of the General
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to the Secretariat's study entitled
"Planning for development: goals and policies of developing countries for the
second half of the 1970s" (E/AC.54/L.91 and Add.1-5). This study, which was before
the Committee at its thirteenth session, sheds light on, among other things, the
integrated approaches to development planning that have been adopted in developing
countries.
C. Integration of women in the development process

86. The Committee took note of General Assembly resolution 3490 (XXX) in the report on its twelfth session. 3/ It has been informed about the views put forward by the Commission on the Status of Women in the report on its twenty-sixth and resumed twenty-sixth sessions 4/ on the subject of major trends and policies with regard to the status of women, particularly the integration of women in the development process. In discharging its responsibilities, following its customary practice, the Committee will continue to draw on the work carried out by the Commission on the Status of Women and all other bodies of the United Nations that are concerned with development problems and policies.

3/ Ibid., Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 6, para. 94.
4/ Ibid., Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 3.
IV. ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUTURE WORK

87. The Committee has decided to put the following three items on the agenda for its fourteenth session:

   (1) Development issues for the 1980s;

   (2) Evaluation of long-term studies and projections and their policy implications for development;

   (3) Economic co-operation among developing countries.

88. The Committee has already identified in the present report some issues that appear to be important for the 1980s. There may be other issues that are considered important in this context by organizations of the United Nations system. The Committee will consider such issues at its fourteenth session under the first of the three agenda items mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

89. The Committee has decided to convene in the latter part of 1977, within the resources available to it for the current year, a working group consisting of seven members that will meet for a week to evaluate the work carried out and under way in organizations of the United Nations system on long-term studies and projections and their policy implications for development. The deliberations of the working group will help to pave the way for a more systematic discussion on this topic at the Committee's fourteenth session. The Committee has requested the Secretariat to provide it and the working group with relevant documentation concerning the work carried out on long-term projections at the global level. The Committee hopes that the secretariats of the regional commissions, in carrying out their long-term studies and projections, will pay special attention to the policy needs of countries whose problems of poverty and under-development are acute. It also hopes that organizations of the United Nations system engaged in preparing long-term studies and projections at global and sectoral levels will regularly include relevant details concerning various geographical regions.

90. The Committee has also decided to convene, within its normal resources, a working group comprising seven members that will meet for a week to conduct a preliminary examination of issues relating to economic co-operation among developing countries. The Committee is aware that a great deal of work is being done on this subject in the United Nations system. It has requested the Secretariat to provide it and the working group with relevant analyses, including an independent paper by a consultant, on the key issues arising out of experience on economic co-operation among developing countries. The timing of the session of the working group will be determined by the Secretariat in the light of the likely completion date of the required analytical work.
# Annex

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Long-term trends in the economic development of the regions of the world: report of the Secretary-General a/

E/CN.5/540

The feasibility of welfare-oriented measures to complement the national accounts and balances: report of the Secretary-General

E/CN.6/598 and Add.1 and 2

Application by Governments of a unified approach to development analysis and planning: report of the Secretary-General

Measure undertaken under the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade and in implementation of the World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives of the International Women's Year: report of the Secretary-General

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a/ Comprising the over-all report prepared by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and the regional reports prepared by the secretariats of the Economic Commission for Europe, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and the Economic Commission for Africa. For the corresponding report prepared by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America see document E/CEPAL/1027.

The economic and social development and external relations of Latin America: report prepared by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America

Report of the third meeting of the Committee of High-level Government Experts

Long-term trends and projections of Latin American economic development: report prepared by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America

Survey of economic and social conditions in Africa, 1976: report prepared by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Africa

Measures to combat inflation, raise output and increase employment in industrialized market economies: views of workers' and employers' organizations - report prepared by the secretariat of the International Labour Organisation (to be issued as an ILO document)

Third biennial review and appraisal of progress in the Second United Nations Development Decade: paper prepared by the secretariat of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO document DD2/77-1)

Second Development Decade - report of the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the progress achieved at mid-Decade and proposed revision of objectives (UNESCO document 19 C/72)