

ESCAP-DESA Regional Workshop: "Beyond Inflation Targets" Dhaka, December 19-22, 2011

**Influencing Capital Flows in Macro-economic Policies: The Malaysian Experience** 

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## Coverage

Views and rationale on use of exchange controls: A broad perspective

Monetary Policy--Managing short-term flows in Malaysia

• Evaluation of short and long-term impact of capital flow management measures

Critical success factors for controls on capital flows

Conclusion

3.

4.



### Views on controls to manage capital flows

1. **Generally adverse views in the past**: historically controls used mainly for BOP reasons and in economies with less developed financial sector

#### 2. More recent studies showed mixed views

- View controls on inflows to be more effective than outflows
- Controls to restore monetary and financial stability beginning to be viewed more favourably

### 3. IMF more receptive recently, but still cautious

Main issue is difficulty to segregate impact of controls from other measures

#### 4. World Bank

- Effective as insurance against further "disturbances"
- Minimal damage to integrity of market place
- Modest benefits & costs

Evaluating effect of controls require full understanding of economic & financial structure, state of economy, objective, type, nature & magnitude of controls, causes of instability

### Views on controls

### Generally 3 situations:

- ☐ Address balance of payments issues, mainly through curbing outflows
- Manage volatile capital flows, mainly through controls on short-term inflows
- ☐ Influence composition of capital inflows limit volume of short-term flows, convert short-term into longer-term flows.



## The Malaysian experience

Since floating Ringgit Malaysia (RM) in 1973, exchange controls used as <u>prudential</u> and <u>development oriented policy instrument</u> to support growth and influence economic stability

<u>Principles</u>		<u>Objectives</u>		
1.	Export receipts repatriation	•	Develop foreign exchange market	
2.	Approval for foreign borrowing by residents (including NRCC)	•	Ensure barrowers meet external obligations and reduce strain on nation's reserves	
3.	Approval for large foreign remittance by residents	•	Encourage use of nation's financial resources for productive purposes within country	
4.	Selective exchange controls are temporary, specific, mainly to complement other policies	•	Mitigate adverse impact of volatile short- term flows without affecting trade flows and FDIs	



## Use of controls to manage capital flows in Malaysia

Only as a **short-term line of defense** to restore stability **under extreme situations** 

**NEVER** substituted for **sound macroeconomic policy** 

- □Used mainly to manage s-t flows when other measures prove inadequate
  □Controls imposed only during periods of strong BOP position, **not solution to bop problems**□As safeguard measures to reduce vulnerability to destabilising external shocks during periods of structural reforms
- □Applied on selective and temporary basis
- □When needed to allow monetary policy to be more effective to influence domestic conditions
- □Safeguard against imperfect markets: "hostile capital"

# Controls to address volatile capital flows used on two occasions

### 1993-1994

- Large speculative inflows into RM
   denominated assets
- Highly destabilizing on asset prices and ER
- Limited monetary instruments
- Complement use of interest rates to contain effects of inflows on exchange rates
- Restore monetary conditions to support growth & contain asset inflation

### **Asian Crisis 1997-1998**

- Speculative attack on currency → herd mentality and contagion affects
- Destabilizing ER depreciation not reflective of economic fundamentals
- Interest rates increase not effective in containing speculation
- Financial & economic instability heightened risks of prolonged contraction

# 1993-1994: Controls specifically targeted at s-t capital inflows


### **Objective:**

High interest attracting more inflows, but need to manage inflation

#### Measures:

- Eligible liabilities for computing SRR revised to include all inflows from abroad
- Limit on non-trade related outstanding net external liabilities of banking institutions
- Restrictions on sale of s-t monetary instruments to NR
- Require banks to place with CB the RM funds of foreign banking institutions held in non-interest bearing vostro accounts
- Commercial banks were not allowed to undertake non-trade related swaps and outright forward transactions on the bid side with foreign customers, excluding forwards for hedging purposes.
- SRR revised upwards 3 times to as high as 11-5% (from 8-5%)

# 1998 Controls introduced as part of a comprehensive macro-economic policy package



economic structural reforms

# Controls in 1998 aimed to achieve objective of monetary policy easing & facilitate restructuring

## **Principles**

- □ Target was specific
  - Reduce destabilizing impact of offshore trade in ringgit
- Measures were limited
  - covered mainly portfolio flows
  - did NOT cover trade flows
  - did NOT cover FDI
- Measures were temporary
  - Removed once market stabilized

### Measures

- ☐ Curb internationalization of ringgit by reducing access to offshore RM for funding speculation
- Regulate short-term capital flows to reduce volatility in exchange rate.

## **Summary of Measures**

### **Objective**

1. Reduce RM volatility by curbing internationalization of ringgit

#### Measure

- Restriction on external account transactions
- Tighten rules on overseas investments
- Settlement of all trades in foreign currencies
- Restrict export and import of ringgit
- Limits on foreign currency notes held by Malaysian travelers
- Demonetize large currency notes
- Fixed exchange rate

- 2. Monitor gross flow of shortterm RM assets
- Transactions in securities effected through authorized depositories

3. Reduce volatility in capital flows

 Investment in RM financial assets for a minimum of 1 year

## **Impact Assessment of Measures**

- No impact on residents, except ⇒ when travel abroad
- Free to effect forex transactions, only fill statistical forms
- 2. No impact on long term ⇒ investors
- Free to repatriate int., div. and profits and cap. Assets upon divestment
- Free to make payments/receipts in forex, only fill statistical forms
- 3. Impact only on Non residents, ⇒ except when travel abroad
- Free to effect forex transactions, only fill statistical form
- 4. Malaysian traders cannot settle 

  trade in RM
- Necessary because trade in RM provides RM overseas for speculation

## **Evaluation of Measures**

1. On monetary sector	Effective	No financial repression, allowed indep. Monetary Policy
2. On stock market	Effective	Contribute to recovery, no adverse effect; initial adverse sentiments reversed later
3. On FDI	Neutral	Not important factor because segregate measures on short-term & long-term flows
4. On access to financing	Mixed	Did not impact access – bond over-subscribed Impact on pricing also due to other factors

# On balance, positives outweigh initial adverse reactions

## Positive

- Establish exchange rate
- Allowed the lowering of Facilitated timely reform of
  - financial sector Restored domestic &
    - foreign investor confidence Avoid social dislocation

Initial adverse reactions

- Removed from MSCI Foreign shareholdings in
- equity market declined Relatively less portfolio
  - inflows

# Details on evaluation of measures: 1. Controls allowed greater monetary autonomy

# Domestic interest rates lowered aggressively after implementation of controls

- ☐ Controls contained speculative activities and allowed rapid interest rate cuts
- ☐ Confidence among residents, supported role of controls in granting monetary independence
- ☐ Resumption of private sector activity, orderly growth in consumption
- ☐ Elsewhere interest rate fluctuating, influenced by US rates
- ☐ Rapid cut in interest rates in Malaysia reduced the magnitude of monetary easing, relative to other regional economies

# MP of other countries shadowed the US

## Change in 3-month interbank rates during Apr 2000 – Mar 2004 (bps)

Malaysia	-34		
US	-539		
Thailand	-219		
Philippines	-135		
Korea	-325		

### **Details on evaluation of measures:**


# 2. Controls did not lead to or arise from financial repression

Key features of financial repression		In Malaysia, market forces determine pricing		
1.	Controlled retail rates	<ul> <li>Lower pricing of BLR in selective sectors</li> <li>Rate of decline in ALR&gt; decline in policy rate</li> </ul>		
2.	Negative real deposit rates	<ul> <li>Positive real rates a regular feature</li> <li>No disincentive to save, GNS among the highest in the world</li> </ul>		
3.	Lending to Government at below market rates	<ul> <li>Open tender basis, bids at market rates, published results</li> </ul>		
4.	Requirements imposed on banks' lending & investment	<ul> <li>Liquidity requirement abolished in 2001</li> <li>SRR strictly a monetary tool</li> <li>Demand for Govt. papers exceeded supply</li> </ul>		
5.	Central bank funding budget deficit	<ul> <li>Law prohibits funding of fiscal budget</li> </ul>		


### **Details on evaluation of measures:**


# 3. Foreign perception about investing in Malaysia improved over time

- Negative short-term effect on portfolio investment
- Confidence returned soon after
  - Reinstatement of MSE in MSCI Index in June 2000
  - S&P rating agency established equity research unit in Malaysia
  - Portfolio inflows returned soon after controls
  - MSE outperformed most other regional bourses in 2004



# Details on evaluation of measures: 4. FDI recovered, changing patterns emerged






- ☐ Careful design of controls to exclude FDI flows mitigated short-term impact on FDIs
- ☐ Gross flows sustained, increasingly into high value-added services and knowledge-based activities
- ☐ Flow after 1998 in the line with structural changes in economy
- ☐ No FDI re-location post-controls

# Details on evaluation of measures: 5. Continued access to external financing

- ☐ Temporary setback when controls were imposed, no access problems, but spreads rose significantly
- ☐ Spreads narrowed to below pre-crisis levels quite quickly, upgrades by rating agencies




Sovereign ratings by rating agencies							
	Foreign Currency Long-term Debt, 2004						
	MOODY's	S&P	Fitch	R&I			
Malaysia	Baa1 positive	A- stable	BBB+ positive	A- stable			
Korea	A3 negative	A- stable	A stable	A- stable			
Thailand	Baa1 stable	BBB positiv e	BBB positive	BBB+ stable			
Philippines	Ba2 negative	BB stable	BB stable	BBB- stable			

### **Details on evaluation of measures:**

### 6. Provide window of opportunity to accelerate structural reforms

☐ Malaysia ahead on financial restructuring & voluntary corporate workouts



% of assets resolved by AMC

Recovery rate of assets resolved by AMC

## Lessons: 1. Why 1998 controls worked for Malaysia


- Structural adjustment in place prior to controls
  - finance company mergers
  - AMC (Danaharta) to handle NPLs
  - SPV (Danamodal) to address recap. With rationalisation of FI's
  - corp. debt restructuring
- 2. Without controls, external disruptions to progress of structural changes
- 3. Greater monetary independence---flexibility to stimulate domestic economic activity to protect employment



### **Lessons: 2. Critical success factors**

- Controls focused on objectives
- A temporary measure
- Not a substitute for sound macroeconomic policy
- Strong fundamentals must already exist
  - No BOP problems
  - Reserves at satisfactory level
  - Low reliance on external funding
- Pragmatic & well designed implementation policies
  - Controls are specific and well targeted
  - Able to distinguish between long and short-term flows
  - Good governance and efficient administrative machinery do not raise cost of business

### **Lesson 3: Implementation Process Matters**



• All groups meet everyday at 4-5 pm to review events of the

day, discuss issues & decide on specific actions.

### **After 1998**

- Controls removed before target date when objectives were achieved
- ☐ Resumed progressive liberalization of financial sector
- ☐ Implemented more market-based monetary & financial policy framework → liberalization aligned to financial sector master plan targets (banking sector + capital markets)
- ☐ Further liberalization of controls to:
- Reduce regulatory cost to banking system
- Improve efficiency
- Flexibility to banking system to manage risks
- Deepen capital market
- Reduce transaction costs
- Liberalization an on-going exercise to benefit economy and with safeguards to ensure financial stability
- ☐ Improved monitoring system on flows more use of cash bop data, securities settlement data, regional consultations.

### Conclusion

- ☐ An option for small developing economies to protect against excessive destabilising capital flows in a less perfect global market
- ☐ An option to manage excessive speculative activities
- An option under extreme conditions where delayed actions could incur greater adjustment cost & social dislocation
- ☐ Effective when controls restore stability in financial markets
- ☐ Benefits sustainable over time when periods of stability used to accelerate financial & economic restructuring
- ☐ Controls are temporary & removed when targets are met.
- ☐ Going forward, a good data base on capital flows essential, leverage on technology platforms for real—time data

# Thank you

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