Inflation Matters: Targets & Types What can monetary policy do?

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## Outline



- Inflation-growth-poverty: inconclusive evidence
- Inflation targeting: costly trade-offs limits of Taylor rule
- Sources of inflation: food price, imported – limits of monetary policy
- Beyond inflation targeting: multiple targets & pragmatism

Inflation matters, but targets can contract "On balance, ... support the use of single digit inflation targets....However, pushing inflation too low—say, below 5 percent—may entail a loss of output and seigniorage revenue, suggesting a need for caution in setting very low inflation targets in low-income countries. .. Inflation targets should be set so as to help avoid risks of an unintended contractionary policy stance." (IMF, 2006: 17)

## Actual targets: 5% or less


Inflation targets in PGRF 2003-Feb 2007


Source: Goldsbrough, Adovor & Elberger (2007) Of 32 program countries, inflation target 5% or less in 22 (69%)!

Inflation target <5% in 29 SSA IMF program countries in 2000s (IEO, 2007)


Clearly, actual policy <u>not</u> based on research findings Does inflation harm growt • "Historically, all possible combinations have occurred: inflation with and without [economic] development, no inflation with and without [economic] development." (Friedman, 1973: 41) • "The ratio of fervent beliefs to tangible evidence seems unusually high on this topic." (Bruno & Easterly, 1998: 3)

## Inflation not bad for growth (40 developing countries) 1960s 1970s






## Mild +ve relation up to 2000 2000s 1960-2010




## Low inflation can hurt



Inflation >5%
does not harm
growth.

•Trying to keep inflation at low single digit level may harm growth


## Inflation bad for poor 1980s



## Mild -ve relation up to 20%

#### 2000s

#### 1980-2010



Impact of inflation on poor depends on:

Real wage & employment effects
Wealth & net debt effects
Food & other essential prices

## What next? – Back to basics

• No suggestion that deliberately targeting higher inflation can yield faster growth or poverty reduction. It depends considerably on the inflation history and institutional arrangements of each country • IMF Article IV: ... each member shall: 1 (i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to its circumstances

# Inflation targeting -

## What are the trade offs?


#### Very low target reduces fiscal space

- Inflation > typical in IMF programs → additional fiscal space, via monetary financing of fiscal deficit
   Additional monetary expansion → higher
  - inflation → redistribute resources toward the government (via the inflation "tax" on those holding currency)
- Inflation tax is distortionary; but other taxes are distortionary too
- Given the low tax base and collection, inflation tax (seigniorage) is impt source of revenue

Higher interest rates Higher government borrowing costs & deficit even if no new spending • Lower private investment • Attract short-term capital flows: -pushes up exchange rate  $\rightarrow$  loss of competitiveness -increases financial sector fragility

#### Interest rate response asymmetric

# Lending rates rise with policy rate, but do not fall



Lower inflation, but high borrowing costs in 2000s

Oligopolistic banks

Premium of reduced inflation captured by big banks; NOT passed on to borrowers Exchange effects: Differential lags Shorter lag of pass through; imported inflation Longer lag of aggregate demand effects • Frequent adjustments of exchange rate to achieve inflation target, can produce growth, employment instability

## Taylor rule – simple, but difficult

• No precise basis for choice of coefficients

- Actual variables required for implementation equilibrium real interest rate, potential output – not observable – must be inferred from other information. Nominal & real output not known with any accuracy until much later
- Output gap may narrow due to decline in potential output; not due to rise in actual output
- Given these uncertainties, central banks tend to be cautious in interpreting economic data, and to smoothen interest rate paths

#### Taylor rule – rigid & costly

- Rigid commitment to one instrument rule


   violates Tinbergen rule biased towards inflation
   (Blanchard: 'divine coincidence')
- no room for judgment or discretion
  Reliance on interest rate limits policy options can be costly
- May encourage unhelpful market speculation or prevent a central bank dealing promptly with a crisis (Greenspan & Bernanke)
- No explicit account of exchange rate and food price or imported inflation
- IMF (WP/05/148, 2005): possibility of abuse

## Sources of inflation matter

Dealing with imported inflation

# Supply shocks – imported food & energy

#### Co-movement of Inflation and Food Price Index



Should monetary policy be tightened? • "Let's kill GDP – Inflation will fall" Surjit Bhalla, ex-WB economist on recent RBI efforts Greater output fluctuations when focused on price stability • Pro-cyclical bias of IT monetary policy in responding to supply shocks

Dealing with food price inflation Rationing & public distribution Provision of social wage • Non-inflationary wage adjustments • Needs expanded fiscal space



## IMF research rethinking

"Before the crisis, mainstream economists and policymakers had converged on a beautiful construction for monetary policy. ... we had convinced ourselves that there was one target, inflation. There was one instrument, the policy rate. And that was basically enough to get things done. If there is one lesson to be drawn from this crisis, it is that this construction wasn't right, that beauty is unfortunately not always synonymous with truth. The fact is that there are many targets and there are many instruments." (Blanchard 2011)

## Monetary policy

• Avoid stabilisation trap: Recognise both price, growth stabilisation roles • Participatory policy making -- trade-off inflation, unemployment parameters • Monitor asset price inflation – curb unproductive lending • Greater use of other instruments, e.g. reserve requirement, directed credit • Encourage productive investment, SMEs, agriculture • Coordinate with fiscal authority to stabilise food prices

## References cited

• Anwar, S. & Islam, I. (2011). Should Developing Countries Target Low, Single Digit Inflation to Promote Growth and Employment?, ILO WP #87 • Blanchard, O. (2011). 'Monetary Policy in the Wake of the Crisis', IMF Macro Conference, March • Bruno, M, & W Easterly (1998). Inflation Crises and Long-run Growth. J. of Monetary Economics, 41: 3-26 • Friedman, M. (1973). Money and Economic Development, Toronto: Lexington Books • Goldsbrough, D. Adovor, E. & Elberger, B. (2007). Inflation Targets in IMF-Supported Programs. Center for Global Development, Washington, DC. • IMF (2006). Designing Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Low-Income Countries. Occasional Paper 250.

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