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Permanent Mission
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations
in New York

STATEMENT

by Mikhail I. Uliyanov

**Acting Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation
to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(Main Committee II)**

New York, May 4, 2015

Mr. Chairman,

We consider the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons a primary objective for the States Parties to the NPT; only through achieving it, a more secure and stable world, in particular, a world free of nuclear weapons, as well as step-by-step and effective social and economic development of States and peoples, can be ensured.

It is encouraging that, shortly before our Conference, tangible progress towards a solution on Iran's nuclear program was made at the talks in Lausanne. We note with satisfaction that the responsible and creative approach taken by the six international mediators as well as by Iran made it possible to reach mutual understanding on a number of highly important issues, which give us hope for a successful outcome of the negotiation process by June 30.

However, it would be premature to state that all challenges to the non-proliferation regime have been resolved. In particular, the nuclear problem in the Korean Peninsula is still pending. Its solution can only be achieved by political and diplomatic means within the Six-Party Talks.

The practice of the so-called nuclear sharing missions within NATO remains a matter of special concern in the NPT context. During these missions representatives of non-nuclear Member States of the Alliance acquire skills of applying nuclear weapons and participate in the nuclear planning process. We consider it a clear violation of the NPT. As it is known, the Article I of the Treaty forbids nuclear weapon States to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly, or indirectly. Article II of the NPT, in turn, enjoins non-nuclear weapon States not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly or indirectly. References to the fact that such practice have existed for over forty years are not valid. We call on NATO nuclear and non-

nuclear Member States concerned to abandon this practice, which causes serious concern in the international community, as soon as possible, and bring their policy in line with the letter and the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

One of the main objectives of the Review Conference is to take stock of the interim results yielded by the efforts to convene the Conference on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ), and to agree on steps that could give a significant impetus in that area.

As part of this work we need to carefully consider the documents distributed at the Conference on this subject, in particular, Iranian, Israeli, and, of course, first and foremost, a document of the Arab Group. Essentially, the Arab document proposes a new approach to the convening of the Conference on WMDFZ. It seems that the reason for such innovations is the deep dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, which, incidentally, we fully share.

We are studying the proposals submitted by Arab countries with great interest and care, but have yet fully elaborated our approach to it. First, we would like to become more familiar with their arguments, and to hear opinions of other countries. In principle, we do not exclude the possibility of making certain adjustments in the Conference mandate agreed in 2010, naturally, provided there is a consensus. At the same time, any novelties should seek to establish the WMDFZ in practice. To achieve this goal it is vital that the conference is attended by all the countries of the region and, more importantly by all Middle East states, which have not yet acceded to the milestone international agreements on non-proliferation – the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons. Otherwise, efforts to establish the WMDFZ would be stalled.

In the remaining three weeks, we need to thoroughly analyze all options and to reach the most effective solutions, building on gained experience and possibly on new ideas and initiatives.

Mr. Chairman,

NPT States Parties' confidence in the IAEA safeguards is the key factor in ensuring stability of the whole nuclear non-proliferation system. This confidence has always relied on the impartial nature of the mechanism applied by the Agency to verify the implementation of non-proliferation obligations, its technical feasibility and political impartiality. The exclusive purpose of the safeguards is to verify the States' compliance with their obligations under the NPT.

In order to strengthen the Treaty, the IAEA safeguards system must further meet the above-mentioned requirements. It is important to keep it unaffected by politics and bias. The Agency's policy-making bodies, i.e. the General Conference and the Board of Governors, should play a leading role in making decisions on any changes in the IAEA safeguards system, monitoring the Agency Secretariat's activities, and in case of detection by the Secretariat of facts of State's non-compliance with its obligations under the NPT.

It is essential to focus verification efforts on materials and facilities that can constitute a risk from the non-proliferation point of view. At the same time, the handling of information on possible violations of non-proliferation obligations received from third sources is the issue of special concern. Vigilance in using this kind of information will help to avoid groundless accusations against the NPT States Parties.

We note with satisfaction that in-depth discussions brought significant changes to the content of the safeguards reform, they are considerably based on the opinions of the Agency's Member States. In order to resolve the remaining issues and concerns we urge the IAEA Secretariat to ensure as much as possible the transparency in introducing changes to the procedure of the safeguards

implementation, to inform the policy-making bodies of the IAEA on the planned steps in this field on regular basis, and to make changes to the safeguards system solely with their approval. We expect the IAEA Director General to submit a new comprehensive report on the state-level safeguards concept that is being developed by the Secretariat.

The IAEA safeguard system will further be strengthened through the universalization of the Additional Protocol that together with the Safeguards Agreement should become the universally recognized standard in verifying the States' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. Acknowledging that the adoption of the Additional Protocol remains purely voluntary, we call on States that have not yet done so to conclude the Additional Protocol with the Agency as soon as possible.

The introduction of the so-called integrated safeguards in the States that concluded the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and in those States that received the Agency's confirmation on the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in their territory, also promote the effectiveness of the IAEA monitoring activities.

There are over thirty nuclear facilities in our country included in the list for possible application of the Agency's safeguards, in accordance with the Agreement between the USSR and the IAEA of February 21, 1985. Since July 2010, the facility of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk has been under the Agency's safeguards. In 2007, Russia ratified the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

By implementing the national programme of scientific and technical support of the safeguards, our country provides technical and financial support to the Agency. For more than thirty years of its existence, large amount of work aimed at strengthening the technical database of the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA Secretariat has been done.

Under this programme, Russia provides the Agency with the assistance to

analyze in Russian laboratories environmental samples collected in the course of inspection activities, as well as to develop new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. We devote particular attention to the training of the IAEA inspectors, which goes beyond traditional methods of non-destructive control of nuclear material, but also includes inspections of uranium enrichment plants. We continue the training of specialists from the IAEA Secretariat and the IAEA Member States on accounting for and control of nuclear material at the premises of the Russian specialized institutions.

Mr. Chairman,

In the context of implementing Article III of the NPT, Russia attaches importance to the activities of the international export control regimes – the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). These regimes demonstrated the possibility to effectively and on a discriminatory basis prevent the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation without prejudice to the international cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Russian Federation is building its national export control system on the basis of the NSG and Zangger Committee guidelines and control lists. Russia implemented in its national legislation rigorous but objective criteria, governing transfers to non-nuclear weapon States of the most sensitive nuclear equipment, material and technology, such as uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The most important criterion is that the importing State must be a Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, one of the obligatory conditions that Russia takes into account when deciding on export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment is the effective Additional Protocol to an IAEA Safeguards Agreement in an importing State.

Mr. Chairman,

In early April this year, the Group of Governmental Experts concluded its work on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). An unprecedented in-depth analysis of this issue was held, which was certainly useful. One of the

conclusions that can be drawn from the results of this work is that signing such an agreement is long overdue. FMCT could have been a significant agreement in the late 60s – early 70s. Over time, its ‘added value’ began to decline due to the fact that four nuclear powers imposed voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material and non-nuclear countries acceded to the NPT, which actually bans the production of fissile materials. However, although such a treaty can hardly be considered a priority, we believe that negotiations on this issue could achieve some practical results. These negotiations should be conducted in the framework of a balanced program of work at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and should be strictly based on "Shannon Mandate" (document CD/1299).

We consider repatriation of fresh or spent highly enriched uranium fuel from research reactors of Russian and American origin in third countries to be an important area of cooperation for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. During the implementation of the program, the total of 800 kg and 1346 kg of fresh and irradiated fuel respectively was exported from 14 countries.

Mr. Chairman,

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to ensuring and maintaining nuclear security not only on its territory but also around the world. We fully comply with our international obligations in this area.

Russia is a party to all major international legal instruments in the field of nuclear security, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, its 2005 Amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We believe that adherence to these legal instruments by States that have significant stockpiles of nuclear and radioactive materials, is a priority in strengthening nuclear security worldwide. States' participation in these international legal mechanisms is a key indicator of their conformity with universally accepted international standards in the field of

nuclear security. In this regard, we call upon all States that have not yet acceded to these conventions to do so.

We firmly believe in the fundamental and inviolable principle of a State's responsibility for ensuring the efficiency and reliability of its national nuclear security system, which determines its optimal parameters at its own discretion. We stress the need to avoid imposing on States requirements that go beyond international legal norms recognized by the international community. Any international cooperation or assistance to States in establishing national mechanisms on nuclear security can be carried out strictly at the State's request and in accordance with its national legislation. In this regard, we appreciate the outcomes of the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety that took place in July 2013.

We consistently support the central role of the Agency in coordinating international cooperation in this area. We note the importance of providing the Agency with adequate resources required for its activities. Russia has been making voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since 2010, and intends to continue this practice in the future.

Mr. Chairman,

Russia attaches great importance to enhancing security of information on the protection system for nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. We are convinced that too much transparency in this area may have grave consequences.

All nuclear materials, storage facilities and installations in Russia, as well as transport of nuclear and radioactive materials are protected with appropriate security measures, in accordance with the national legislation and with the account of the IAEA's recommendations. We constantly improve national regulations in the field of accounting for and control of nuclear materials.

We pay special attention to enhancing nuclear security culture. In November 2012, as well as in December 2013 and 2014, together with the

IAEA we organized international seminars in Obninsk, primarily for experts from those countries which have just started using nuclear power. Courses and seminars on physical protection are being held at the Global Nuclear Security and Safety Institute at the National Research Nuclear University, and Tomsk Polytechnic University. Over 500 foreign experts have completed training in the field of control, account and physical protection of nuclear materials.

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear terrorism continues to pose a threat to international security. In this context, we support consistent implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1540 by all countries, aimed at countering WMD "black markets" and preventing non-state actors, primarily terrorist organizations, from acquiring such weapons and related materials, technologies and means of delivery. Russia is taking an active part in the deliberations of the UNSC Committee established to efficiently implement the UNSC Resolution 1540.

Russia and the United States launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2006. The Initiative has become a major forum to exchange best practices in countering nuclear terrorism and strengthening nuclear security in the world. We are pleased to note that the number of participants in the Initiative is growing. Today, 85 States participate in the Initiative, with four international organizations acting as observers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.