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Statement by
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Minister of State (Foreign Affairs and Consular)

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

National Statement

New York, 28 April 2015

Déclaration de
L'honorable Lynne Yelich
Ministre d'État (Affaires étrangères et consulaires)

Conférence des Parties chargée d'examiner le Traité sur la non-
prolifération des armes nucléaires en 2015

Déclaration nationale

New York, le 28 avril 2015

Madame President,

On behalf of all Canadians, I extend our deepest sympathies and heartfelt condolences to the people affected by the impact and aftershocks of the earthquake in Nepal and Northern India. Our thoughts and prayers are with those who have lost loved ones, and we wish a speedy recovery to the injured.

For 45 years, the NPT has formed the bedrock of the international regime to advance nuclear disarmament, ensure non-proliferation, and facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since its inception, the Treaty has proven time and again to be resilient in the face of proliferation crises, implementation challenges and predictions of its collapse or obsolescence. No other legal instrument can match its breadth of membership or its relevance to creating a world free of the most destructive weapons ever devised.

Twenty years ago, the 1995 Review Conference achieved the indefinite extension of the Treaty. As a part of this landmark success, the principle of “permanence with accountability” was embraced to ensure that extending the lifespan of the Treaty did not inadvertently lead to complacency in pursuing its commitments and obligations. This Review Conference provides us with another opportunity to reinforce this principle by examining what we have individually and collectively done to fulfil our commitments and to work toward an outcome that will serve to further strengthen the Treaty.

This Review Conference does not take place in a vacuum. Since 2010, the Budapest Memorandum has been breached, development of missile technologies to deliver nuclear payloads continues, and Iran continues to pose grave risk every day it does not disclose the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program. As we conduct our work, we must be conscious of the grave challenges we face and the need to reinforce steps to strengthen peace and security for all.

For Canada, non-compliance with the NPT’s non-proliferation obligations remains the most significant threat to the Treaty’s integrity and authority. Canada holds itself to a high standard of compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. It is a standard which we consistently meet. Regrettably, the same cannot be said of some other States Parties.

Iran remains subject to 10 UN Security Council and 12 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolutions and associated sanctions for its on-going non-compliance with its NPT obligations. While we welcome the framework agreement

reached on April 2, much work remains to be done to resolve the serious international concerns with Iran's nuclear activities in a demonstrably verifiable manner. We are particularly concerned about the absence of progress under the Framework for Cooperation with the IAEA in addressing the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program due to Iran's proven refusal to cooperate with IAEA inspectors on the ground, even while at the negotiating table. Iran must allow the IAEA access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel that the Agency has requested so that the IAEA can verify that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The confidence of the international community requires nothing less. It is a truly simple proposition; that if Iran wishes to demonstrate its peaceful pursuits - then Iran could embrace transparency overnight and return to the international community. The mystery of Iran's brinkmanship through negotiations is cause for deep skepticism of its nuclear intentions. This quite simply is not the behaviour of a state or a regime committed to rejoining the world. Verifiable progress is the only path for Iran to make the rhetoric of its leaders sincere. In the absence of verification, the words ring hollow. To this end, on April 2 Canada announced a C\$3 million contribution to the IAEA to support its efforts to monitor Iran's compliance with its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action.

Madame President,

North Korea's nuclear tests, uranium enrichment and ballistic missile activities are at the height of arrogant and cynical behaviour. North Korea also lends us an example of a state that pretended to negotiate in good faith, while pursuing nuclear technology under the table. North Korea's role as a habitual proliferator abroad continues to pose a dire threat to regional and international peace and security. These ongoing acts of brinkmanship and provocation are a violation of UN Security Council resolutions, NPT obligations and the collective will of the international community. They continue to pierce holes into the delicate fabric of the post-Cold War non-proliferation regime, testing the limits of international efforts to avert catastrophe. Canada condemns, in the clearest of terms, that a country unable to feed its own people expends so much of its limited resources on its military ambitions. A de-nuclearized Korean peninsula requires a return by North Korea to adherence to the NPT and to its IAEA safeguards agreement. As it did in 2010, this Review Conference must continue to hold North Korea to account for its actions and call for concrete steps to achieve a comprehensive and lasting peace. The security and

stability of Northeast Asia, as well as the integrity and authority of the NPT, continue to be threatened by North Korea's irresponsible and belligerent nuclear and proliferation activities.

The issue of Syria's non-compliance with its non-proliferation obligations have been largely overshadowed by the protracted civil war in that country, the campaign to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons and the fight against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Nevertheless, Syria must cooperate with the IAEA, in particular to allow the Agency to investigate as soon as possible the Dair Alzour site and other related sites identified by the Agency.

Canada continues to deplore the violations of Ukraine's sovereignty by Russia, including its illegal annexation of Crimea and its destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine, in breach of security assurances provided in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. As we all know, the Budapest Memorandum was key to securing Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, at the time the third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world, and to remove Soviet-era nuclear weapons from its territory. The repercussions of Russia's irresponsible behaviour continue to create a chill throughout the international system, including in the efforts of the US and Russia to take further steps to draw down their nuclear stockpiles. It also calls into question the reliability of security assurances provided by Russia that reinforce the non-proliferation and disarmament provisions of the NPT. We reiterate our call for Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Advancing nuclear disarmament is another key challenge we must face here at the RevCon. Canada welcomes the significant reductions in nuclear weapon stockpiles that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. However, the number of weapons in existence remains too high, and technology to deliver nuclear payloads being developed by Russia, Pakistan and North Korea is deeply disturbing. As the states with the largest arsenals, the onus has been on the US and Russia to show leadership in the disarmament process. Efforts to implement the New START agreement by 2018 are important. We welcome the American initiative to undertake further reductions, an initiative which the Russian Federation can choose to engage or choose to defer. A choice for the latter, Madame President, will reveal to the world that between its missile technology, its prospective collaboration with Iran, and its disregard for the Budapest Memorandum,

the Russian Federation is embarking on a dangerous path to destabilize the peace of the world. Rather, real leadership has been taken by France and the United Kingdom since 2010 to unilaterally reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles and their means of delivery.

As part of Canada's support for a progressive, step-by-step process to reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles leading to their eventual elimination, progress must continue to be made by all Nuclear Weapon States to draw down their arsenals. We welcome the frequent consultations among these states throughout the current review cycle as a means of strengthening confidence among them. We hope that this engagement will continue with a view to intensifying their work, especially to advance their disarmament commitments under Article VI.

It is important to keep in mind that, while Nuclear Weapon States have the greatest responsibility to advance disarmament, all NPT States Parties also have a role to play. A priority for Canada in this regard remains the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Canada was pleased to chair the UN Group of Government Experts over the past year, where experts from 25 countries engaged in the most in-depth and extensive discussions to have ever taken place on the topic. This has shown that a substantive dialogue between states with differing views is possible. The Group also facilitated the task for future negotiators through the adoption of a consensus report reflecting its robust discussions on possible aspects of the treaty. Most importantly perhaps, experts agreed that negotiations on a treaty should be pursued without delay. The challenge remains to chart a course to do so.

The last challenge I want to highlight cuts across all three of the NPT's pillars as well as the broader nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime: the need to transparently implement the legal obligations and political commitments that we undertake. This is a field in which we cannot afford for our commitment to be mere ink on paper. They must be accompanied by the concrete and sustained action.

Madame President,

Canada has played, and will continue to play, a lead role in demonstrating its commitment to "permanence with accountability" through annual implementation reports to NPT meetings. Furthermore, during this review cycle, we have worked in concert with our partners in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to propose

a reporting form for Nuclear Weapon States. Expanding on this effort, non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties are invited to make use of the reporting template included in the NPDI's working paper on transparency that was submitted to the RevCon.

Turning to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Canada strongly supports the IAEA's central role in facilitating international cooperation in nuclear energy and assisting the efforts of States Parties to fulfill their nuclear security responsibilities. We urge all NPT non-nuclear weapon States that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol. Canada considers this to be the international verification standard to which all NPT States should adhere.

Canada continues to be a leader in efforts to strengthen nuclear security, both in terms of financial support and the provision of expertise. To date, Canada has committed \$467 million towards projects to strengthen nuclear and radiological safety and security, including initiatives launched through the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. These efforts, along with our substantive technical contributions to related initiatives, will continue in the lead up to the 2016 Summit in the US. Looking beyond the 2016 Summit, Canada is actively involved in the process to transition NSS commitments to the relevant international institutions engaged in strengthening nuclear security.

In conclusion, Madame President, I want to reiterate Canada's strong commitment to all three pillars of the Treaty. The NPT remains the prism through which Canada's non-proliferation and disarmament policy is reflected as a world leader in the production of peaceful nuclear materials and technology, a member of NATO and the G7 and a permanent member of the IAEA Board of Governors. We continue to strive to strengthen the Treaty and call on all states that have yet to do so to accede to it as non-nuclear weapon States.

I want to reiterate my delegation's full cooperation and active participation in this Review Conference to arrive at an outcome that strengthens all aspects of the Treaty and promotes a more peaceful and secure world for all.

Thank you.