

**Review Process 2010
PrepCom I General
Debate Statement by
Norway**

Mr. Chair,

Since it is the first time my delegation takes the floor, I would like to echo others in congratulating you on assuming the position as Chair of this meeting. My delegation is convinced that under your able guidance the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the NPT 2010 Review Conference will fulfil its task.

The NPT has for nearly 40 years served our collective security. Despite its impressive record, the Treaty is now under growing strain. The 2010 Review Cycle starts up at a critical stage.

There is a lack of common vision on how to further strengthen this vital instrument. We missed two important opportunities two years ago, the 2005 Review Conference and the World Summit.

In the meantime, we are facing serious proliferation challenges and there is a growing fear that the world is moving towards a second nuclear weapons era. It is therefore essential that this Review Cycle is able to move the NPT process forward on a constructive and positive track. We must restore the sense of compromise which prevailed in 1995 and 2000. This should be possible.

In the lead-up to the World Summit, Norway, together with Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Romania, South Africa and United Kingdom presented concrete proposals which generated wide-spread support. My delegation remains convinced that the Seven Country Initiative tabled proposals which could form basis for our efforts to rebuild a broad international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

We should reconfirm our common understanding that the NPT remains the cornerstone in international security and remains an indispensable basis for addressing the danger of nuclear proliferation.

The NPT aims furthermore to reach a world free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is clearly an integral part of the NPT package.

By complying with the NPT and its non-proliferation obligations, States Parties have an inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology.

Norway advocates a comprehensive approach where disarmament and non-proliferation must mutually reinforce each other. But, we must refrain from artificial links. Lack of progress in one area must not be used as an excuse for not moving forward on the other.

Mr. Chair,

We must address the proliferation challenges posed by Iran and the DPRK. Norway fully supports the decisions taken by the Security Council. We reiterate our aim to solve these two matters through negotiations. We urge Iran to comply with the demands set by the international community. The DPRK must honour its obligations from the Beijing agreement in February.

It is imperative to close any loophole in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA plays a key role in securing that peaceful nuclear material is not diverted to military purposes. We join others in congratulating the Agency on the occasions of its 50th anniversary. We must provide the IAEA with the necessary political and financial support.

The IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards combined with the Additional Protocol constitute the verification standard. In our view, ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol must be seen as a precondition for taking part in peaceful nuclear co-operation.

Nuclear terrorism remains a fundamental threat to international security. Security Council resolutions 1540 and 1673 call upon all States Parties to put in place legal and administrative measures at national level to ensure that nuclear materials do not fall into wrong hands. Norway has provided funding to the UN and other institutions to promote implementation of Security Council resolution 1540.

Let me also underline that the Proliferation Security Initiative as well as export control regimes play an important role in sustaining the NPT norm.

Last year Norway organised an international symposium on the minimisation of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector. It was recognised that the existence of HEU in civilian nuclear installations may represent a security threat. It was also recognised that in all but a few cases it was technically feasible to convert from HEU to low enriched uranium. Norway urges the IAEA and other relevant institutions to continue their good work in supporting voluntary HEU minimisation projects.

Mr. Chair,

Norway is convinced that a credible non-proliferation regime will greatly facilitate peaceful nuclear co-operation. Countries having in place and enforcing adequate national legislation, such as export controls, are much better positioned to receive nuclear materials and technology.

Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle will also help more countries to benefit from nuclear energy. It is a prime example of how non-proliferation and peaceful use could go hand in hand. Norway hopes that the NPT community during the Review Process will encourage further progress in this area.

IAEA estimates that the use of nuclear energy and other nuclear applications will grow in the years to come. While recognising this fact, we must ensure that peaceful uses do not undermine non-proliferation efforts, human safety and security and the environment. Indeed, more efforts are needed in the field of nuclear safety. The IAEA must play a key role in this respect.

Mr.
Chair,

It has been rightly affirmed that the NPT is also a disarmament agreement. The ultimate goal is a world free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is a priority area for the Norwegian Government.

The Review and Extension conference in 1995 and the Review Conference in 2000 identified principles and concrete steps in order to move forward the disarmament agenda. We must base our deliberations on the outcome of these two conferences as well as taking into account new developments.

Some weeks ago, there were high expectations that the Conference on Disarmament could reach agreement on a programme of work. That would have allowed the international community finally to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Unfortunately, the CD did not yet manage to move out of its long-lasting impasse.

FMCT would serve disarmament by capping future production of materials for weapons purposes which are crucial for the production of nuclear weapons. A legally binding instrument is essential to prevent any possible nuclear arms race.

In parallel, the nuclear weapons states should respond positively to the repeated calls of putting excess fissile material under IAEA control and if possible be made available for civilian nuclear fuel. This would be a prime example of disarmament supporting peaceful uses.

Norway has for several years called for the full implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the US, the Russian Federation and the IAEA. We regret that this has not yet happened.

Norway recognises that nuclear disarmament is not cost free. Through the Norwegian Action Plan on Nuclear Safety in North West Russia, Norway has spent more than 200 million USD. Since 2003 this support has been part of the G8 Global Partnership. In recent years, priority has been given to dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear powered submarines and in safe handling and storage of spent fuel and radioactive sources.

The announced nuclear test by the DPRK last fall clearly illustrates the need for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In the meantime, we call upon all nuclear weapons states to adhere to their test moratoria. We must also support the CTBTO in completing the International Monitoring System.

While recognising the positive contribution by the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (Moscow Treaty), we call for additional cuts. This becomes even more imperative when

START expires in 2009. We are pleased that the US and the Russian Federation have initiated consultations. Likewise, we urge the two countries to move forward towards the full implementation of the 1991/1992 Presidential Initiatives on sub-strategic nuclear weapons. The sooner nuclear warheads may be counted in the hundreds rather than in the thousands, the less the risk that such weapons fall into the wrong hands. New reductions should be carried out on the basis of irreversibility, transparency and adequate verification. Transparency and reporting is not a matter of choice, but clearly an obligation.

Likewise it is important that nuclear weapons states proceed on reducing the operational status of their weapons as agreed in 2000.

Nuclear weapons free zones can be considered as both disarmament and non-proliferation measures. Norway supports such zones as a contribution to regional stability as well as sustaining the global NPT norms. We must make further progress in promoting the zones on the basis of the UNDC guidelines. Such zones provide an important avenue for legally binding negative security assurances. Likewise we must move forward the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

The review must also address important institutional matters, such as Article X and how to better sustain NPT. We should also value of the contributions provided by civil society. My delegation does not believe that an enhanced dialogue with NGOs and research institutions will undermine the intergovernmental character of the NPT. Rather we think it should inspire us to redouble our efforts in this room. We follow their recommendations with great interest.

Mr. Chair to conclude,

The NPT has served us well for nearly 40 years. Like a precious plant, we must nurture this Treaty and further strengthen it. We must all demonstrate the necessary will and flexibility to do so.