

STATEMENT

BY

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*HEAD OF DELEGATION
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*2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS*

7th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of **Nuclear Weapons**

Statement by Ambassador Gabor Brodi, Head of Delegation of the Republic of Hungary

Mr. President,

I congratulate you and other members of the Bureau for your unanimous election to the post of officers of the seventh Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I can assure you of my delegation's full co-operation and support for the challenging and highly responsible task that lies ahead. The delegation of Hungary is confident and therefore it expects that under your able guidance the Conference will come to a successful end.

Mr. President,

I would like to record at the outset that Hungary supports fully the statement made by His Excellency Mr. Nicolas Schmit, Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg on behalf of the European Union. I will limit myself to addressing a few issues Hungary attaches particular importance to:

Hungary considers the NPT as the most important multilateral instrument in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament, which sets the primary objective to prevent nuclear proliferation while ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology. This legally binding treaty is one of the fundamentals of the maintenance of international peace, security and stability. Restoration of the confidence in the Treaty, preservation of its integrity and promotion of the universalisation of the NPT are all essential elements in order to maintain global and regional peace and security.

Hungary believes that the success of this Conference will be measured to a great extent by its ability to adopt measures aimed at preserving and strengthening the integrity of the Treaty. Over the period under review the multilateral regime of nuclear non-proliferation has been put to unprecedented pressure. We strongly hope that States Parties will acknowledge the gravity of those challenges and the need to confront them through a series of mutually agreed steps. They should work out common understandings, and the conference should address the three pillars of the NPT in a carefully balanced manner. Hungary, as a member of the European Union and individually, is ready to contribute to the formulation of the consensus among the States Parties based on the principles of the NPT and the decisions and resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension and the 2000 Review Conferences. Hungary believes that it would be a serious mistake if the urgent tasks - for example, strengthening of the verification mechanism and the universal compliance with the Treaty - become hostages of the long term objective, that is of the nuclear disarmament.

Mr. President,

Hungary fully recognizes the central role that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has played in providing assurances about the peaceful nature of the nuclear programs of States Party. The alarming developments, especially during the years since the 2000 RevCon, have, however, clearly pointed to the urgency of strengthening the tools at the disposal of the international community and of the IAEA, in particular.

As a first significant step, the Conference should again call for the universal adherence and application of IAEA safeguards. We express our deep regret that there is still a significant number of States Parties which failed to fulfil their obligation under the Treaty to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

Hungary Emily holds the view that the IAEA's current safeguards system should include both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. The experience of the IAEA derived from the recent verification challenges, have demonstrated the utility of the Additional Protocol in practice. We urge the Conference to follow the recommendations by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and by the Secretary-General in his report "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all", and to affirm that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol, now represents the verification standard pursuant to Article III.1 of the Treaty.

Mr. President,

Hungary follows with great interest the on-going discussion concerning new multilateral approaches to sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. The dual-use nature of certain technologies, such as those related to uranium enrichment and reprocessing is a source of concern. We commend the Director General of the IAEA for recognizing the need to address this issue and for his initiative to establish a Group of independent experts. The Conference provides an important opportunity to continue the consideration of various initiatives to control access to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the important and valuable proposals by this Group.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a major and irreplaceable instrument of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Hungary attaches great importance to its early entry into force and expresses its concern about the delay of the ratification process. The Conference should reiterate the call on all States, particularly whose adherence is required for the CTBT to enter into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay and without conditions. We welcome the moratoria on all nuclear test explosions and urge the States concerned to maintain them pending the entry into force of the CTBT.

Hungary is pleased to see the progress made in the establishment of the verification regime and its core, the future CTBTO. We continue to lend our support to the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat in their endeavours to build-up the verification components of the Treaty in a timely and effective manner and thus contribute to its entry into force.

Mr. President,

Hungary remains fully committed to the NPT, wholeheartedly supporting the strengthened review process of the Treaty. We are confident of finding the common elements in the various national positions for attaining our common goal of preserving this invaluable Treaty as the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

I thank you, Mr. President.